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HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE EXTRAORDINARILY FAVOURABLE SITUATION; HOW TO OVERCOME BACKWARDNESS

(Results of the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I.)

THE XI. Plenum met over a year after the meeting of the Enlarged Presidium of the E.C.C.I. During the past year, events had developed rapidly in the direction foretold by the VI. Congress of the Communist International in its characterisation of the contradictions of the third post-war period, by the X. Plenum of the E.C.C.I., and finally by the Enlarged Presidium.

Since the Enlarged Presidium met, the crisis of over-production on the basis of the general crisis of capitalism developed into the greatest economic crisis the world has ever known, embracing all capitalist countries and all the most important branches of industry, depriving of work, throwing out on the streets, and dooming to hunger 35,000,000 workers, not counting those who work part-time and the workers in the colonies, who have not been included in the statistics. This crisis is aggravated by the fact that it is combined with a grave agrarian crisis which has already dragged on for ten years.

Simultaneously, in another zone, in the U.S.S.R., we witness the tempestuous growth of Socialist construction. The turn of the peasantry to Socialism has been strengthened. The collective farm movement has again begun to grow with an ever-increasing tempo and to-day already 45 per cent. of the peasant households have been collectivised. Socialist competition is growing, shock brigades are growing, and we have already entered the decisive year of the Five-Year Plan, which, it is clear to all, will be realised in four years.

“The contradictions between the capitalist and Socialist systems have never manifested themselves so forcefully, the superiority of the Socialist system over the capitalist system has never revealed itself so visibly, as to-day . . . Capitalist stabilization is drawing to its end. In the U.S.S.R. the building of the foundations of Socialist economy is being completed.” (Theses of the XI. Plenum, from Comrade Manuilsky's Report.)

We are witnessing in capitalist countries, on the one hand, the furious growth of Fascism, the sharp increase of political reaction of the ruling classes trying to find a capitalist way out of the crisis at the expense of a lowering of the level of the living conditions of wide working masses through their further economic and political enslavement, trying to get out of the crisis by means of military intervention against the U.S.S.R.

“Danger of military intervention against the U.S.S.R. has become the immediate danger for the whole world proletariat.” (Theses from Comrade Cachin's Report.)

In capitalist, colonial and semi-colonial countries we are witnessing, on the other hand, the growing dissatisfaction of the widest masses, the growth of their sympathy for the country of the proletariat dictatorship, the growth of Communism, the growth, even *though unequally*, of the revolutionary upsurge, in some European countries the growing basis for a revolutionary crisis, and in some colonial countries the existence already of a rapidly maturing revolutionary crisis. During the last year, in Great Britain, we saw again a rising wave of strike movement in Scotland, South Wales and Lancashire. In the U.S.A. we saw our Party able to bring one and a half million unemployed out on the streets on March 1st, 1930. In Czecho-Slovakia we saw a powerful movement of the unemployed led by our Party. In Germany the movement has already been raised to a much higher stage. Four and a half million votes for our Party at the elections, a 50 per cent. increase in the membership of our Party, the Berlin metalworkers' strike, the Ruhr strike under our independent leadership, the continual demonstrations accompanied by bloody encounters with the police, the beginning of the disintegration of Social-Democracy—all this bears witness to the fact that in Germany the prerequisites for a revolutionary crisis are growing. The same can be said of Poland, where, together with the upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, we see the upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the peasantry, particularly in Western Ukraine, where the peasants burned the landowners' estates, where Pilsudski's forces pacified them by punitive expeditions. And in Roumania (in the Dobrudja) and in Bulgaria we see a powerful upsurge of the peasant movement. In China, where the Red Army grew to 100,000, where the Soviets have already been organised in districts with a total population of tens of millions, where the Red Army successfully repelled the offensive of Chang-Kai-Shek, we can already speak of a revolutionary crisis. The maturing revolutionary crisis in India is taking other forms. The revolutionary crisis in Spain is growing.

We see that there is full justification for the Theses of the XI. Plenum, declaring :

"The development of the class struggle under the conditions of the further development of the world economic crisis confronts the broad masses of the toilers with the decisive alternatives : either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat."

The objective conditions are very favourable for us, but the subjective factor (the preparedness of the Communist Parties for the great future battles at the head of the working class) lags tremendously behind the tempo of developing events, in spite of the undoubted achievements of some of our parties, particularly of the German Communist Party.

* * *

It was in this situation that the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. took place. They were confronted by a complicated task—to mark out the path for the overcoming of our backwardness. To solve this task, unsparing self-criticism was demanded and was made at the Plenum. It was in the process of this self-criticism, in the debates, that it became manifest, as Comrade Kuusinen, closing the Plenum, correctly noted, that our International was more united and monolithic than it had ever been, while at the same time we observe now in the camp of our enemies and, above all, in the camp of the II. International the growth of elements of disintegration which represents a clear reflection of the deep crisis of capitalism and the strengthening of the positions in favour of Communism.

On the agenda of the Plenum there were only two points closely related to one another : (1) Report of Comrade Manuilsky—"On the Tasks of the Sections of the Comintern in connection with the deepening of the economic crisis and the growth, in a number of countries, of the prerequisites of a revolutionary crisis" with the joint reports of Comrades Thälmann, Lensky and Chemodanov on the Situation and Tasks of the Communist Party of Germany, the Communist Party of Poland and the Young Communist International respectively. (2) Report of Comrade Cachin—"On the Growing Danger of Military Intervention Against the U.S.S.R. and the Tasks of the Communists." We shall not dwell here on Comrade Cachin's report, which is of immediate significance, nor on the discussions on this report; this question will be dealt with in a number of special articles.

We shall only take up the first report, around which the discussions in the Plenum and in the Commissions developed, mainly because in treating the questions touched upon by this report some comrades and even some parties showed mistakes and vagueness at the eve of the Plenum,

which in the future might lead to serious mistakes. In connection with this the Plenum was confronted with the following tasks :

- (1) To make clear the question of the essence of the revolutionary crisis and of the conditions of its growth, in order to avoid "left" and right mistakes;
- (2) To make absolutely clear the questions connected with the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and its different forms, as well as those connected with Fascism and Social-Fascism, as two manifestations of the social support of this dictatorship;
- (3) To note wherein consists at the present moment the chief immediate task of the Party in relation to the proletariat;
- (4) To make clear wherein lies, at the present moment, our chief weaknesses; and finally
- (5) To find the true path to the reserves of the proletarian revolution and a differentiated approach to the masses in the different countries, in order to explain more easily to them the necessity of a revolutionary way out of the crisis.

The XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. gave a clear answer to all these questions, thus sharpening our ideological weapons for the approaching large-scale battles which in some countries will prove of decisive importance.

* * *

In an evaluation of the contemporary objective situation and the revolutionary perspectives, our parties or individual comrades have frequently resorted to the term "political crisis," and have spoken very often of "the growing of the economic crisis into a political crisis." In the basic report on the first point of the agenda, and especially in the concluding speech of Comrade Manuilsky, it was shown with exhaustive thoroughness why, under the present conditions of gravest economic crisis and the growing of the prerequisites of a real revolutionary crisis, the use of the term "political crisis" can divert the Party from the true path. "Political crisis" is an indefinite term, applicable to most varied situations. Very different upheavals and correlations of classes and parties are understood by the term "political crisis" : parliamentary crises and the crises of the upper classes in the camp of the ruling classes, as well as revolutionary crises. The term "political crisis" in the present setting, fraught with revolutionary events, can be falsely interpreted in the sense of a crisis of secondary importance, not a profound one, not touching the basis of the existing order and, therefore, can *withdraw attention from the revolutionary activity of the masses*, and concentrate attention on different regroupings in the camp of the ruling classes.

This indefinite term can give rise to "left" and particularly to "right" mistakes. When, for example, the rapid growth of Fascism and the rapid passing of the petty-bourgeois masses out

of the old traditional bourgeois parties into the Fascist camp, is called a political crisis of bourgeois power, it is obviously a "left" mistake in the evaluation of the objective situation. In this case it is correctly considered that the stormy transition of the petty bourgeois masses from openly-bourgeois parties to Fascist parties denotes the growth of their dissatisfaction with the policy of monopolist capital. But the other side of this is not taken into consideration, namely, that the Fascist parties in this case, through their national and social demagoguery, succeeded in switching the dissatisfaction of these masses to a struggle with the revolutionary movement, and that this is one of the means of the bourgeoisie for forestalling the revolution and for violently crushing the revolutionary movement. Such a "left" evaluation of the situation can lead one to the false conclusion that the overcoming of Fascism is very easy, that it disintegrates of itself. Such a formulation can lull our vigilance and beget passivity in our struggle with Fascism. Still more dangerous is the other opposite formulation that the political crisis is a "crisis of the upper strata" with the comparative lagging behind of the revolutionary upsurge of the lower strata, representing a whole unavoidable stage separated by a Chinese wall from the revolutionary crisis. Such a right formulation would have brought us towards the direct path of Brandlerism.

In view of all this the XI. Plenum proposed to our Parties that, in the evaluation of the present political situation and the revolutionary perspectives, they use only clear terms—the revolutionary crisis and the revolutionary situation, showing the presence of those three objective changes which Lenin pointed to, namely, when firstly, the upper strata can no longer rule as of old, when, secondly, the lower strata no longer wish to live in the old way, and when, thirdly, the revolutionary activity of the masses is growing. In connection with this, there is, in the Theses of the XI. Plenum, the differentiated characterisation of the political situation in different countries depending on the degree and the rate of the development of the economic crisis and the growth of internal and external contradictions in connection with it.

In connection with the evaluation of the present stage of the crisis of capitalism, the Political Report of Comrade Manuilsky criticised the mechanical and fatalist theory which made it appear as if Fascism was a "new type" of state, as the Fascists themselves declare, and as if this was not simply one of the methods used by the bourgeoisie to suppress the working class, as if the Fascist type of bourgeois dictatorship is the last "political superstructure" of capitalism, and as if "its destruction is possible only with the

destruction of capitalism." The latter may be true of Italy, but it has already proven false for Spain, where the Fascist-Monarchist régime of Primo-de-Riviera fell and has, so far, been replaced not by the dictatorship of the proletariat but by a bourgeois landowners' dictatorship under the Republican Flag. A fatalistic point of view of the development of Fascism can lead to, and has already led to, serious opportunist errors, to a refusal to resist the offensive of Fascism, while, as they say, the proletariat, led by the Communist Party, is not strong enough to carry through the proletarian revolution. It is enough to point, for example, to the intolerable passivity of our Finnish comrades during the Lapuan uprising (acknowledged and criticised by the C.C. and the Conference of the C.P. of Finland).

* * *

The following question, to which the XI. Plenum paid much attention, is—who is our chief enemy. It has been said that our chief enemy is Fascism. Such a view contains within itself great danger because it bolsters up Social-Democracy which tries to justify all its vileness and all the vileness of the bourgeois-democratic government by the fact that it is, they say, "the lesser evil" in comparison with the threat of the establishment of an open Fascist dictatorship. Comrade Thälmann, in his co-report on the example of Germany, showed plainly that Social-Democracy can most successfully play the rôle of Fascists, not mentioning the fact that it clears the way for Fascism by its whole policy. Even before the September elections to the Reichstag there began, with the increased encouragement of financial capital, the tempestuous upsurge of the National-Socialist Fascist movement in Germany. The Communist Party answered with counter tactics. Having presented the programme of the "social and the national liberation of Germany," it opened fire on the Fascists, attracting the Social-Democratic workers to a united front in the struggle with Fascism. Consequently, it was able to put a stop to the growth of Hitler-Fascism and even to introduce elements of decomposition in it, but this has still not put an end to the general process of the fascisation of the State. At present the Brüning Government, with the active co-operation of Social-Democracy, which uses its police apparatus for the violent suppression of the Communist movement, is engaged in introducing a Fascist dictatorship.

In order to make this question clear, the XI. Plenum, through the person of its reporter Comrade Manuilsky, recalled to mind that the "chief enemy of the working class has always been, is, and will be the bourgeoisie," that "Fascism and Social-Fascism are only two

varieties of the social support of the bourgeois dictatorship." In the theses, on the first point of the agenda, in connection with this question, it is said:

"Fascism, as the naked form of the bourgeois dictatorship, organically growing out of so-called bourgeois democracy, which is the masked form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, sharpens all the methods of oppressing and enslaving the toilers, *inherent in the capitalist order and inseparable from the whole system of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*—(Italics ours—Ed.). The bourgeoisie advances and moulds the Fascist régime, interweaving with it the remnants of bourgeois democracy on the path to the destruction of the class organisations of the proletariat, prohibition of Communist Parties, creation of special terrorist organisations *independent of the abolition or the preservation of parliamentary forms.*" "By drawing a contrast between the 'democratic' form of the dictatorship of the bourgeois and Fascism, Social-Democracy lulls the vigilance of the masses in the fight with the growing political reaction and Fascism, conceals the counter-revolutionary character of the bourgeois democracy, as a form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and thus itself serves as an active factor and channel for the fasciation of the capitalist state The successful struggle against Fascism demands . . . a rapid and resolute correction of mistakes, *which, in the main, consist of drawing, after the Liberal fashion, a contrast between Fascism and bourgeois democracy*—(Italics ours—Ed.)—and between the parliamentary forms of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, and its openly Fascist form, which were the reflection of the Social-Democratic influence in the Communist ranks."

* * *

The XI. Plenum further took up the question of what was our chief task. Lenin had already answered this question at the III. Congress of the Comintern. When it had become clear that due to the post-war revolutionary crisis the revolution was victorious only in Russia while in other countries the revolution had suffered defeat due to the treachery of Social Democracy, Lenin particularly emphasised in this connection that our chief strategic task was winning the majority of the working class:

"The main-stay of capitalism in industrial capitalist countries is precisely that part of the working class organised in the 2nd and 2½ Internationals. If it had not rested on this part of the workers, on these counter-revolutionary elements within the working class, the international bourgeoisie would have been absolutely in no position to maintain itself. . . . The more organised the proletariat in a developed capitalist country is, the more does history demand of us thoroughness in the work of preparing the revolution and with the more thoroughness must we set about winning over the majority of the working class."

This chief strategic task which the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. again brought into the fore-

ground, not only retains its significance now, but becomes particularly urgent because the economic crisis and the rapid development of Social-Democracy to Fascism, as well as the revolutionary upsurge of the proletariat, brings us closer, particularly in those countries where the revolutionary processes have moved considerably ahead, as in Germany and Poland, toward the realisation of this task. Consequently the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I., in the Theses of Comrade Manuilsky's report, says:

"The principal task now of all the Communist Parties consists of *winning the majority of the working class* as the essential condition for the victory over the bourgeoisie and for preparation of the working class for the decisive battles for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The successful execution of this chief task is most closely bound with the consolidation of the independent revolutionary trade union movement, the transforming of the mass movement of the proletariat through the revolutionary trade union opposition and the independent revolutionary trade unions, into really mass organisations actually able to prepare and lead the economic struggles of the proletariat and to become the basic transmission belts between the Communist Parties and the broad masses of the workers."

The realisation of this chief task is closely bound up with the "liquidation of the mass base of Social-Democracy." The XI. Plenum paid particular attention to the struggle with Social-Democracy. The theses of the XI. Plenum declare:

"The world economic crisis plainly revealed the rôle of international *Social-Democracy, as the main social support* of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. . . . The whole development of Social-Democracy since the war and the rise of Soviet power in the U.S.S.R., is an uninterrupted process evolving to Fascism . . . The whole counter-revolutionary, anti-workers' policy of the international Social-Democracy is crowned by the preparation of *blockade and military intervention* against the first proletarian State in the world." . . . The Second International "*has transformed itself into a shock brigade of world imperialism, preparing war against the U.S.S.R.*"

In the debates at the XI. Plenum, comrades dwelt on the methods of struggle with Social-Democracy and its "left" pacifist manoeuvres. It was pointed out in the debates that opportunism and capitulation was a step taken by Social-Democracy long ago; that now the upper strata of Social-Democracy have organically fused with the capitalist State apparatus and with capitalist organisations, that *it has joined itself with them for life and death.* The Social-Democratic leaders are the conscious enemies of the working class, the *conscious* agents of a foreign class, of a hostile class in the workers' midst. Therefore, they cannot but

dupe their own rank and file members of the parties in a most dastardly way. They cannot speak with the Social-Democratic workers in a comradely fashion, initiating them into their real intentions, because objectively there is a gulf between them although this has not yet penetrated into the consciousness of the Social-Democratic worker (though it is already beginning to do so). Consequently, in order to win the Social-Democratic working masses, we must, above all, in the process of the development and the independent leadership of class struggles, expose to the Social-Democratic working masses how the leaders betray them, and explain to them that they and their leaders now belong to two different hostile classes. This, of course, is not enough for the Social-Democratic rank and file workers to become Communists. For this it is necessary that they, in addition, understand that the present-day Social-Fascism is inevitably and organically a growth from the old Social-Democratic opportunism. They must, in addition, understand that the Fascist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is an organic outgrowth of the bourgeois-democratic dictatorship. They must understand that the proletariat has only one path leading to emancipation—not through the “rectification” of Social-Democracy, not through a return to the “pure” bourgeois-democratic order, but through the October path to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This they will understand if the intolerable situation in which the Social-Democratic party has brought them is contrasted with the victorious construction of Socialism to which the Bolsheviks, with their whole bolshevik revolutionary policy, has brought the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. But first of all, and above all, it is necessary to attract the Social-Democratic working masses into the class struggle, show them through experience that they and their leaders now belong to two hostile classes.

* * *

The XI. Plenum, having noted a number of the successes of the sections of the Comintern, pointed out as well that there are still great weaknesses there which manifest themselves, chiefly, in lagging behind the rate of the development of events, and that the chief danger now lies in this backwardness. In the Theses of Comrade. Manuïlsky's report we read :

“Simultaneously with these successes, the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. has to record a number of serious weaknesses and deficiencies in the work of the majority of the sections of the Comintern which find their expression, fundamentally, in lagging behind the radicalisation of the masses, in the inadequate exposure of Social-Democracy and represent a particularly serious danger in the present, higher stage of the class struggle.”

We will not dwell here on those forms of “tailism” and lagging behind the radicalisation of the masses and on those methods of struggle with this backwardness, or on those paths of the approach of the Communist Parties to the revolutionising of the masses which the E.C.C.I. has already repeatedly pointed out (work in the big factories, organisation and activation of productive nuclei, independent leadership of all economic struggles, skilful presentation of partial demands at the given moment and in the given place, of the masses, and their skilful union with our general revolutionary slogans). We will only mention one clearly formulated point of the Theses of the XI. Plenum, causing our separation from the masses and our lagging behind their radicalisation, viz., “the mechanical adaptation of general directives without concretising them for a particular country and a particular concrete condition of the class struggle.”

The speaker reported in detail on the methods of overcoming this abstract approach in our propaganda and agitation in his concluding speech, illustrating it with many examples.

Taking the example of the Austro-German Tariff Agreement, the reporter explained that the German and Austrian comrades must react to this in one way, the Czechs, Polish and British comrades in another way, because the Communist Party of every country must fight, above all, against the imperialism of its own bourgeoisie. Consequently the German and Austrian comrades must expose this agreement ruthlessly as the attempt of German imperialism to regain its former strength. On the other hand, the French and British comrades must expose with equal ruthlessness the struggle of French and British imperialism against the tariff agreement as an attempt to perpetuate the Versailles yoke.

The question of the evaluation of the slogan, “the national revolution,” advanced by the German Communist Party, was raised in connection with the question of the concretisation of the slogans for each country at the XI. Plenum. Comrade Garlandi rose to speak against this slogan, pointing out that a like slogan of the Italian Communist Party was, in its time, rejected by the E.C.C.I. as a slogan lending itself to opportunist interpretations. The XI. Plenum confirmed the correctness of this slogan as it is now presented in Germany, and the incorrectness of this slogan as it was then presented in Italy. Comrade Hans Neumann, in his report on the work of the Political Commission, which thoroughly edited the Theses based on Comrade Manuïlsky's report and analysed this question, explained that this slogan, advanced at one time by some Italian comrades, had, according to the

conclusions arrived at by the Commission, an opportunist character, since this slogan in Italy had been advanced together with the proposal to convene a Constitutional Assembly in case of the fall of the Fascist dictatorship. In Germany this same slogan was advanced as the synonym for the dictatorship of the proletariat in connection with the slogan of Soviet Germany, and was presented with it in order to emphasise the fact that the German proletariat—the leader of the revolution—aimed not only at emancipating all the working masses from capitalist slavery but from emancipating Germany nationally from the fetters of the Versailles system. Therefore, this slogan advanced by the German Communist Party had the complete approval of the Commission.

The reporter, in his concluding words, also showed with illustrations how essential it was to *differentiate* the approach to the masses in different countries in propaganda for the *revolutionary way out of the crisis*. The question of the revolutionary way out of the crisis must be expressed in one way for Britain, where at present it has only a propagandist significance, and in a different manner, for example, in Germany or Poland, where prerequisites for a revolutionary crisis are growing. In all countries the necessity of a revolutionary way out of the crisis must be based on the living example of the victorious construction of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. and the presence of the gravest crisis in the capitalist world. But at the same time supplementary arguments arising from the concrete situation of the given country must be presented.

In Austria, for example, Communists must explain to the masses that within the limits of capitalism and the Versailles system Austria is fated to decay, that salvation for the working masses of Austria lies only in a Soviet system and in Socialism, necessitating the abolition of narrow tariff boundaries.

The necessity for a revolutionary way out of the crisis for Britain must be based on the fact that its colonies, emancipated by the proletarian revolution in Britain, or the revolution in the colonies with the active participation of the British proletariat, will be transformed from countries hostile to capitalist Britain into loyal allies of Soviet Britain, and that this brotherly union of emancipated nations would save Soviet Britain from destruction in the future war with American imperialism which so frightens present-day imperialist Britain.

In France the necessity of a revolutionary way out of the crisis must be based on the fact that

predatory French imperialism, robbing Germany, stifling the colonies, and holding a number of new States formed on the continent of Europe in vassalage, intensifies the slavery of the working class of France with the assistance of the bought upper strata—the aristocracy of the workers. The speaker noted that in practically no one of our parties, with the exception of the German Communist Party, is there any differentiated approach to the question of a revolutionary way out of the crisis.

The speaker, in conclusion, pointed out the necessity of combining our agitation for a revolutionary way out of the crisis with the mobilisation of the masses around concrete tasks, uniting them with the direct interests of the working class and the working masses, and, above all, with unemployment. Correspondingly, the attack, for instance, in Czecho-Slovakia, should be directed mainly against the low "Austrian" wage level and against the rôle of Czecho-Slovakia as the chief reservoir for military equipment in the war against the U.S.S.R. In this connection, the mobilisation of the masses of the U.S.A. against American capitalism, for example, should be brought about by a struggle for the introduction of social insurance at the expense of the capitalists and the bourgeois State, etc.

* * *

The XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. removed much of the scholastic, mechanical, abstract and the trite in the evaluation of our situation to-day, of our revolutionary perspectives in the presentation of our next tasks. The XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. explained that it was necessary to concretely adapt the lesson of Leninist revolutionary dialectics to the present complicated network of class antagonisms and the class struggle in different countries and different national settings. The XI. Plenum put in all its concreteness the question as to our chief enemy, as to the chief social mainstay of this enemy, as to our chief tasks, as to our chief weakness, as to our chief weakness, and as to the chief methods for overcoming these weaknesses. The XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I. forged an excellent weapon for the sections of the Communist International in the coming large-scale struggles which will prove decisive in some countries. The tasks of the sections of the Communist International consist in, once having rolled up their sleeves, realising in practice, with real Bolshevik energy, persistence and consistency, the decisions of the XI. Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

THE SECOND INTERNATIONAL AND THE QUESTION OF INTERVENTION DURING THE FIRST RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

By G. VALETSKY.

THE roots of the counter-revolutionary interventionist policy of the leaders of the Social-Fascist II. International lie in the far distant past. There is a legend current about the supposed active support given by the western-European Social Democrats in the first Russian revolution of 1905. Actually this support was nil, and this was shown particularly plainly when the question of their intervention was raised, should an attempt be made by their Governments to send an army into Russia to defend Tsarism.

The revolution of 1905 disturbed and alarmed a number of capitalist countries who sensed in it a menace to their sovereignty. The mass political strikes, growing into an armed uprising, grew to a scope and power unknown to history and unsettled the legalist theories of revolutionary methods of struggle being "out of date," as accepted by "domesticated" Social Democracy, and enriched the proletariat of the capitalist countries with a new weapon. But besides the possibility of the revolution spreading to the West, the subsequent development of the revolution in Russia itself made the European capitalists uneasy about the tremendous capital they had invested in Tsarist Russia. It is from this time on that plans for intervention, as far back as 1905, were born.

On October 19, 1905 — immediately after the news had been received that the "constitutional" manifesto had been wrenched from Nicholas by the powerful general strike of October, Lenin wrote:—

"The forced nature of the concession agitates most the moderate bourgeois. The organ of the French ruling money bag, *Le Temps*, was terribly indignant at the 'anarchy' and spouted abuse and slander against the organisers of and participators in the All-Russian political strike . . . Europe is already agitated. Its bourgeoisie is perplexed and is prepared to give millions and billions to stop the conflagration in Russia. The rulers of the military European powers are thinking of rendering military aid to the Tsar. Wilhelm has already sent several cruisers and two divisions of torpedo-boats to establish direct connections between the German martinets and Peterhof. The European counter-revolution is extending its hand to Russian counter-revolution." ("The First Victory of the Revolution," *Collected Works*, II. Edition, Vol. VIII., p. 355-357.)

Some weeks later the C.C. of the R.S.D.L.P. wrote the following in the appeal to the International Socialist Bureau:

"Wilhelm is mustering an army on the western borders of Russia and there is serious reason for thinking that this army will be sent into Russia to suppress the Polish people. The Russian Revolution, which is that of all humanity, is in danger . . . We ask you, dear comrades, to indicate what measures you intend to adopt to avert this danger and help the Russian people."

In the middle of April, 1906, the Tsarist Government, whose treasury had been exhausted not only by the loss of the Russo-Japanese War, but by the revolution, received a loan of 2¼ milliard francs from Paris—through the assistance of the French Government, at the head of which Clemenceau and Briand then stood—in order to organise a military counter-revolutionary fund.

However, the leaders of the then existent II. International, in spite of the enthusiasm with which broad masses of the European proletariat regarded the Russian revolution, brushed aside any thought of the adoption of efficacious measures to fight against the threat of armed intervention or of generally introducing the "Russian" methods of proletarian struggle into their own countries. We do not know the kind of answer sent to this letter by the International Socialist Bureau, at the head of which Vandervelde then stood, and whether there was, generally, any answer at all. But the very fact that it was necessary to send such an "enquiry" and its content is very significant.

The debates at the Congress of the German Social Democracy, the leading party of the II. International, which took place on September, 1906, at Mannheim, revealed most plainly the opportunism and the perplexity of the leaders of the II. International on the question of the intervention. Representatives of other sections of the International—French, English, Belgian, Dutch, Austrian, Swiss, Italian, Swedish, and the secretary of the International Socialist Bureau, Huysmann, were also present at this Congress. The question of the mass political strike, the very presentation of which was a direct reflection of the influence of the Russian Revolution, was the pivotal point at the Congress. Among the proposals of individual local organisations, that of the Mülhausen organisation, demanding the use of armed mass strikes should the attempt be made by "Prussia-Germany to interfere by means of arms in the glorious struggle of the Russian nation for emancipation," was outstanding.

The speaker on this point of the agenda, the aged Bebel, who then, along with the whole of the C.C. of the German Social Democracy, was in the clutches of the openly-reactionary leaders of the trade unions, devoted the entire concluding part of his report to a justification of why the Mülhausen resolution should be *set aside*.

"This resolution—declared Bebel—is a result of the danger present, of the fact that in the course of the great struggle of Russia for emancipation, the Prussian Government might wish to muster an army against Russia in order to suppress the revolution with the blood of Germans . . . *Comrades from the most varied circles have addressed themselves to me with the question—is it true that Germany is preparing intervention, and in such event, how would German Social Democracy act?* I answered: there is no reason to think that Germany will intervene . . . Bebel gives a number of considerations and arguments to prove that intervention would not take place—but should intervention take place, in spite of everything, it would mean a European war and in that event *Social Democracy would be completely powerless to do anything.*"

Rosa Luxemburg was the first to speak against these declarations made by Bebel. She had just been freed from the Warsaw fortress where she had been imprisoned for taking a leading part in the struggles of the Polish proletariat against Tsarism. She began by taking a different stand from that of her co-speaker Bebel, and the trade union leader Legien, the experienced opportunist and great enemy of all that smacked of revolution.

"He, who to-day—said Rosa—in the presence of the great Russian revolution, which for many decades will be the teacher of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, is now studying the problem of mass strikes mainly on the basis of events in Italy and France, proves what Lenin proved in his reference to tradition—that he is unable to learn anything or forget anything. As far as I can understand, the idea was such — that if we found ourselves faced with war, we could do nothing. Our friends in France would be in a very difficult situation if Bebel's speech could be interpreted to mean this because there our brave friends declared with the words of Vaillant: If war with Russia threatened, they would obstruct the venture. Our friends advanced the slogan: '*plutôt l'insurrection que la guerre!*'—*sooner rebellion than war!* This was the steadfast voice of the French proletariat and I hope that the German proletariat will find courage enough to say: 'Nothing can take place against my will.'"

(We know that in the beginning of the World War, Vaillant, together with the entire leadership of the French Social Democracy, went over to the camp of the chauvinists and, forgetting his old "formula," wholly supported the war.)

After Herman Duncker, representative of the organisation (now leader of the Party Schools of

the German Communist Party) spoke, insisting that the Russian comrades expected thorough clarity from the Congress on the question of intervention, the equivocal declaration made by Bebel was attacked very forcefully by the young and fiery Karl Liebknecht. He said:

"Bebel noted the other day in his report: 'In the life of nations as of parties, situations arise when they must fight resolutely, risking even defeat.' What is our position in relation to the Russian revolution where just now counter-revolution celebrates with an orgy of cruelty and vileness the like of which world history has not known? The blood which our brothers are shedding there is being shed for us, for the proletariat of the whole world and all that we can do from here for our struggling Russian brothers is but a small bit to pay off for the bloody sacrifices laid down also for us in the East. In spite of all that we have done so far, we have only cleared off a minimal part of our debt to our Russian brothers and sisters. And it is to us, the German Social-Democrats, that the following slogan refers: 'Better to be executed by the Tsarist hangmen and their accomplices than to become accomplices of the Tsarist hangmen'. . . And Bebel, in whose speech one felt his aged rather than his ever young heart, will have to shout most sharply and definitely in order to be heard where it is necessary. Not only the German and the Russian Governments watch the conduct of the German proletariat in this question, but the whole Russian liberation movement as well. Bebel spoke yesterday of the possibility of intervention. His words, referring precisely to that, although extremely unlikely, possibility, demand to be refuted. There it is essential that we declare unanimously that no sacrifice is too great for us when the matter concerns assistance for our Russian brothers. If an attempt were made to make the German people the butcher of Russian freedom, that would be the dishonouring and the cultural self-annihilation of the German nation. In that case we would have had nothing to take into account. We would have been faced by that situation of which Bebel spoke yesterday in the saying referred to above. World history must not say: the Russian movement for emancipation was crushed by the German people who, for that purpose, used the numerous and strongest organisations of the proletariat. . . We would be dishonourable churls (*erbärmliche Kerls*) and of no earthly use whatever if we did not adopt all possible measures in order that the possible attempt of Germany to deal a blow to the Russian revolution should lead to the decisive defeat of German-Prussian reaction."

In his concluding words Bebel went "half-way" to meet the challenge flung by Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht, remaining, however, basically on the position taken in his report.

"Certainly"—declared Bebel—"our rulers would have readily sent the Russian Revolution to the devil; certainly, they tried to influence the German bankers in order to win their support for Russian despotism with loans; certainly, they concentrated

some large armies on the frontier in order to organise a cordon against fugitives; but in my opinion there is no ground for thinking of armed intervention. If it were undertaken, then the German Social Democracy, in virtue of its international obligations and its international solidarity, as well as in order to give the Russian nation the possibility of fighting for its liberation from under the yoke of despotism, would have done all to counteract such plans of the German Government. The same is true in relation to the question of any other European war. In that event we, certainly, will not throw ourselves into the war with a hurrah!—but will carry out our cultural mission to the advantage of the world.” . . .

The value of this latter declaration was made completely clear on August 4, 1914.

The impression made by Bebel's speech did not change the verbal resolution adopted at the Congress “on the Russian Revolution” in which it was said that the

“party was ready henceforth, according to the degree of its strength, to struggle energetically against all attempts, direct and indirect, at financial support of Tsarism abroad and to counteract in a most resolute way every military interference within Russian internal affairs.”

The true face of the Mannheim Congress is best of all characterised by the names of its delegates of the openly right and centrist groups who constituted the overwhelming majority of the Congress. Besides the deceased Ebert, Legien, Haus, David, we should name the living and present heads of German Social-Democracy: Severing, Otto Bauer, Wells, Kautsky. A small group of the revolutionary delegates were represented at the Congress besides Rosa and Karl, (later savagely murdered by the Social-Democratic government of Ebert), Clara Zetkin and Dunker.

The tragedy of the revolutionary wing of the then existent German Social Democracy led by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht was the preservation of the organisational unity of the party, the opportunist essence of which was hidden by the centrist leadership of Bebel and Kautsky who cleverly circulated revolutionary words in order to mask their right acts. Only the subsequent development of the Russian revolution gave a decisive impulse to the final formation of the revolutionary wing, its resolute struggle with the centrists which resulted, on the basis of the experience of the imperialist war, in an organised split and in the creation of the Communist Party of Germany.

In the position of the leaders of the German Social Democracy of the epoch of the first Russian revolution in regard to the plans of that time for intervention, is to be found the embryo of the position of the post-war II. International in regard

to the October revolution and to military intervention against the U.S.S.R. The position of the revolutionary wing of that day anticipated the position of the revolutionary proletarian vanguard of the post-war epoch, the position of the active defence of the victorious Russian revolution from the attempts of capitalist intervention, the position of turning an imperialist war into a civil one.

In Bebel's and Kautsky's position in relation to the threat of intervention in the epoch of the first Russian revolution, there predominates estrangement from all that is revolutionary, base pacifism, cowardice of thought and fear to act. In the epoch of imperialism and of the proletarian revolution, when the reformism of the pre-war II. International grew into the Social-Fascism of the post-war II. International, the old position of capitulation in regard to intervention grew into the position of an active support for it.

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THE RÔLE OF RUMANIA IN INTERVENTION AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

By T. MARIN.

THE Trials of the "Industrial Party" and of the "All Union Bureau" of the Mensheviks have proved to the world proletariat that imperialism has put intervention against the U.S.S.R. on the order of the day as the *most urgent and immediate task*. The French Government and the French general staff, as well as certain English imperialist circles, take the leading role in the preparation of intervention. Among the direct agents of the anti-Soviet plans of French imperialism Poland and Rumania undoubtedly take first place. It is difficult to say which of these States have recently shown the greatest hostility to the U.S.S.R. It is characteristic of Rumania that there the bourgeoisie have, for the last three years, made their central task the technical and political preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union, on the fulfilment of which all the energy of the bourgeoisie and the National Peasant Party is concentrated.

The Economic and Agrarian Crisis.

One of the basic factors which instigate the Rumanian bourgeoisie to an anti-Soviet venture, is the general agricultural crisis.

In the light of the following summary, the extraordinary sharpness of the agrarian crisis will be apparent. Due to the catastrophic fall in prices, beginning with 1929, and particularly throughout 1930, the cost of agricultural products fell approximately by one milliard gold marks (or 40 milliard Rumanian lei which exceeds the total Government budget of Rumania for 1930).

Naturally, the agrarian crisis hit the broad masses of peasantry first. The debts of the petty and middle peasantry rose tremendously in 1930: while the debts for all Rumania averaged 4½ thousand lei per hectare, for petty peasant households of 1 to 5 hectares in Bukovin and in Bessarabia, the debts amounted to 25 to 31 thousand lei per hectare, with the market price of a hectare at 5-6 thousand lei. This means the complete ruin of the petty peasant households. Forced sales have become general phenomena: in 1929 more than 2,000 peasant plots established as a result of the agrarian reform, were sold by auction, and in 1930 almost twice as many (these figures do not take into account the plots sold by the peasants which were *not* set up as a result of the reform). The pressure of taxes exceeds all

limits. The leading paper of the Rumanian bourgeoisie "Adeverul" (of November 6, 1930), describes the condition of the Rumanian village as follows:

"Peasants sell absolutely all their property—rugs, horses, cows—merely in order to pay off their taxes; other peasants sell the still unreaped harvest for a song . . . Tax collectors, however, continue to fulfil their duty with admirable zeal: they continue to collect taxes. Hundreds of drafts are daily protested at the banks, and every day inspectors go into the districts to sell the property of the peasant by auction for a trifle, to be bought up by some usurers."

The direct result of the ruin and expropriation of the broad masses of the Rumanian peasantry is the fall in their purchasing capacity and the tremendously aggravated industrial and economic crisis. It is enough to note here some basic figures: the turnover of transportation on the railroads was reduced by 25 per cent. in 1930 in comparison with 1929, railroad receipts by 22 per cent., rediscounted notes of the National Bank according to the December report of the Administrative Council fell by 2½ milliard lei, the gold reserve was reduced from 16 milliard lei in January, 1930, to 11 milliard in December. With the retrogression in the economic situation to which the 5 milliard deficit in the budget for 1930 bears witness, the debt of Rumania to foreign capital is growing: interest on external debts grew in 1931 by almost half a milliard lei. The following distribution of the State Budget plainly shows the catastrophic situation in which Rumania finds itself: of 30 milliard lei, 10 milliard is interest on foreign debts, 10 milliard—expenses for maintaining the State apparatus, police, gendarmes, etc., 10 milliard—for military expenses (actually the military budget is much larger).

Under these conditions, the negotiations for a new debt recently concluded by Rumania and particularly those conditions which accompanied it, are extraordinarily characteristic. The Rumanian Government managed to get a small loan of 40-50 million dollars, nominally received 40 million, and with the deductions for commissions to cover various old debt obligations—actually received altogether only 20 million. The type of argument of one of the French newspapers—"Journal des Debats," which is friendly to Rumania, runs as follows:

"The actual result of the loan transacted will be a sum of almost 750 million francs because of the nominal sum of 1,400 million francs, *one milliard* will go to cover the budget deficit up to the end of March; 200 million francs—for the organisation of agricultural credits; 100 million—for war orders, and finally, another 100 million—for the liquidation of controversial questions, etc."

And the newspaper formulates the question rationally: is it in general worth while giving Rumania a loan under such conditions?

These comments in themselves prove that foreign capitalists, regardless of all the pressing invitations of Rumanian business, are very reluctant to put their capital into Rumanian enterprises.

The bourgeoisie shift the whole burden of the economic and agrarian crisis on to the shoulders of the working masses, advancing the slogan of "common" sacrifices. Thus, for example, the leader of the Peasant Party, the Democratic-Republican Loup, advises all

"the productive strata of the nation to sacrifice themselves for awhile and give the Government all that they can give above what is absolutely essential for a bare level of existence."

But the opposition of the masses to this "level" increases each day. To illustrate this, it is enough to point to the fact that the number of strikers in 1928 was 54,200; in 1929, 105,755; in 1930 over 120,000. Simultaneously, all over Rumania the peasant masses under the whip of the agrarian crisis and chronic hunger are beginning, despite Fascist terror, to arouse themselves to direct mass action against the oppression of the landowners and the banks. If there is no direct revolutionary situation present now in Rumania, the numerous demonstrations of the workers and peasants increasingly prove that a revolutionary situation can quickly come about.

We can cite a very authoritative person who least of all might be suspected of sympathies for the communists. He is the Rumanian patriarch who, until the return of Carol to Rumania, had been one of the three regents. He informed the king in his New Year's Greetings:

"If we continue to act as we have since the war, then we are *certainly on the way to a social catastrophe* which must be opportunely averted." (Paper *Adeverul* for January 6, 1931.)

In order to "avert the catastrophe opportunely" the Rumanian bourgeoisie is preparing an anti-Soviet war.

Rumanian Armaments.

The Liberal Party, representing the interests of powerful national capital, sent at the beginning of 1930, extraordinarily curious instructions to their provincial and local sections, summing up

the military-technical preparation of Rumania, and noting the outlook for the further development of the war industries and the forced preparation for war. The leaders of the Liberal Party in these instructions note with satisfaction the adaptability of the metallurgical factory in Transylvania for the purposes of war, the construction of a large number of new war factories, but think these achievements absolutely inadequate and call on their members and the Government to increase the rate of arming the country.

And we must say that the desire of the opposition Liberal Party entirely coincides with the activity of the Government National-Peasant Party. During 1930 there were more new war factories built in Rumania than for all the previous five years. With the help of the French firm Schneider-Creusot and the Czecho-Slovakian factory Skoda, orders for Rumania were fulfilled to the amount of 3 milliard lei. The Rumanian Government has undertaken to construct and equip a large factory for explosive materials and supplies near Bucharest, has laid the foundation for a large factory for the production of gas-masks, has simultaneously placed an order for 30,000 gas-masks abroad, has enlarged and re-equipped the old military factories in Transylvania and in Banat, and already by the beginning of 1931 had finished the construction of chemical factories in Dice-San-Martin. The aviation factory in Brashov has increased the production of aeroplanes in 1930 so that it is now able to produce 300 aeroplanes a year.

Highways and railroad lines which are of great strategic significance, are being feverishly constructed all over Rumania. One must note here the road between Brashevo-Bucharest, which connects old Rumania with Transylvania and gives the possibility, in case of war, of rapidly transporting military supplies and food from distant parts of the country to the port and the scene of military action. The Rumanian Government, with the help of English and Dutch engineers, according to the plan of the English Admiral, Henderson, is feverishly re-equipping Constanza to adapt it and turn it into a naval base on the Black Sea. A similar base is also being sought for at the mouth of the Danube. The port of Burgas on the Dnestrovsk estuary, which is about 60 kilometres from Odessa and connected by rail with the port of Halats, has already been fitted out. Only a month ago the construction of an important strategic railway, *Kainar-Kishenev* which reduced the distance between both localities by more than 70 kilometres was completed. A parallel railway, *Chernovtzi-Marashesht*, has been constructed which unites Northern Transylvania through Bukovina

with Moldavia and Bessarabia and should assure a more rapid and direct conveyance of Czechoslovakian military supplies and the Polish army into Rumania.

The infantry in Rumania increases from year to year: in 1905, 125,000; 1926, 160,000; in 1929, more than 200,000.

But Rumania tries not only to increase its war industries and its army, but also to become a naval power. Anglo-French imperialism assists Rumania to this end in every way, and this was reflected in the special decision of the naval conference held in London last year. For the time being Rumania has at its disposal a comparatively small, but thoroughly modern fleet. Besides the old torpedo-boats "Marest" and "Marashesht" completely re-equipped several years ago, there were two others produced in Italy in 1930: "Rezhele Ferdinand" and "Regina Maria." The Rumanian Government has also two submarines and one destroyer. A submarine base is to be completed this year. The Government decided to give the whole *river fleet* over to a concession of foreign capitalists for its radical reorganisation, because of the tremendous rôle which the Danube fleet must play during war. The dreams of Rumania go far in the direction of the creation of tens of torpedo-boats and submarines, which is probably beyond its power, but we must say that the personnel of the vessels is enough for sea operations in an anti-Soviet war.

The military expenditures of Rumania which are visible to the naked eye, were in 1925 about 15 per cent. of the budget, in 1929, about 30 per cent., and in 1931, more than 36 per cent.

We must note the particular energy of the Rumanian Government in the military-technical preparation in *Bessarabia* for an anti-Soviet war. Here, first the salaries of officers were increased, the telephone and telegraphic network adapted to military needs has already been reorganised, and a number of highways and other roads are being laid between individual cities and the more important centres, as, for instance, Floresht-Soroki, Ismail-Bulgard, etc.

The special *manœuvres* which took place in Bessarabia in March and again at the end of 1930 are also characteristic. The latter preceded the so-called general royal manœuvres in Forarashsk and Sibiisk districts. (This is the second of the royal manœuvres since the war, and is a great demonstration of Rumanian militarism with an army of 60,000 participating, special sections and more than a hundred aeroplanes. The scope of the manœuvres is characterised incidentally by the fact that expenditure during manœuvres, for the railroads alone, was 150 millions.) While the divisional manœuvres were going on in Bess-

arabia (in the Chernovistk district — the 8th infantry division and in the vicinity of Dnestr in the Belst-Floresht region — the 14th division) there were also manœuvres in the region of the Sulinsk canal in which the sea and river fleet participated.

Against whom is this feverish arming of Rumanku directed? There can be no doubt whatever on this score: against the U.S.S.R. Not only does Carol himself bear witness to this with complete frankness (see his declaration made last June on his return to Rumania) but also the repeated statements of the leading generals like that of the Bessarabian General-Governor Draga, whose open statement of the inevitability of war against the Soviet Union, aroused at that time a panic among the Bessarabian bourgeoisie.

Rumania is joined in war alliance with France and Poland. The leading rôle of France in the preparation of intervention is generally known. The Polish-Rumanian military treaty concluded in 1926 and continued in March of that year specifies, in case of an anti-Soviet war, the number in the Polish-Rumanian army, in the Rumanian sections. There are to be eleven divisions out of which three are to be Polish and eight Rumanian, under the superior command of the French General Staff for which General Gurod has already been appointed. When Pilsudsky was in Rumania, the important Rumanian paper "Universul," the organ of the Rumanian secret police and military circles, wrote openly that the Rumanian and Polish armies would direct the central activity in the war against the Soviet, while other imperialist armies would attack the U.S.S.R. from the flank.

That is how Loucheur's declaration in Parliament, which said that Rumania "is the outpost of the defence of our western civilisation against a civilisation which can not attract us," i.e., against "Bolshevik barbarity," is to be understood.

THE EXTERNAL-POLITICAL PREPARATION FOR INTERVENTION.

The external-political preparation of Rumania for intervention takes two basic paths: on the one hand, the Rumanian bourgeoisie seeks to safeguard the rear among its neighbours (Bulgaria, Hungary), trying in every way to convince public opinion of the capitalist countries of the supposedly increasing menace of "red imperialism," and on the other—to weave together a system of international imperialism which would guarantee to it the maximum support of the chief imperialist robbers and a considerable share of the war booty.

See for example, what one of the principal organs of the Rumanian bourgeois press writes about the particular red menace, supposedly hanging over bourgeois Rumania :

"The geographical situation of Rumania, created as a result of the peace treaties, points to the lasting and cardinal point with which international policy must reckon—the presence of the colossal Russian State in its vicinity" . . . "now, as formerly, the rulers of Russia try to force through to the straits; to-day the danger is, perhaps, much greater because the Soviets believe besides what the Tsar believed, that they can carry their revolutionary-Communism through the body of Poland and Rumania." (*Adeverul* for January 18, 1931.)

On this basis the Rumanian bourgeoisie think themselves justified in promoting the downfall of Soviet power through the preparation for an attack on the U.S.S.R. The former Premier of Rumania and the president of the Government party, Maniu, announced in the "Neue Freie Presse" :

"It would be a mistake to think that Bolshevism will fall of itself . . . It would be equally mistaken to suppose that the tide of Bolshevism can be stopped '*passively*' at the borders of Russia."

And his colleague, the ex-Minister Radukan, called directly for the establishment of an economic blockade against the Soviet Union. Rumania is taking this same tone in the so-called *agrarian* conferences. The basic goal of these conferences consists in the creation of a government monopoly of the grain trade all over Europe, which, as the Social-Democrat, Baade, expressed it, will give the possibility of *more easily throttling* Soviet agricultural exports. This anti-Soviet platform of an agrarian bloc was expressed with particular clearness by one of the important leaders of the government party in Rumania.

"Prohibitive measures, taken by every government individually against cheap Russian grain, can rouse the people who will not allow themselves to be starved while we prohibit Russian wheat because it is too cheap. Therefore we need a general agreement against Soviet dumping." *Adeverul*, December 17, 1930.)

The question arises, has Rumania made any success whatever in her external-political preparation for intervention? There is no doubt whatever of the fact that generally the whole anti-Soviet attitude of the Rumanian bourgeoisie finds decisive support among world imperialism, particularly in recent times. It is enough to point here to the above-mentioned decision of the London Naval Conference and particularly to the decree of the Hague conference of last year which, chiefly on the initiative of France, reduced the war indebtedness of Rumania by almost 40 per cent. and gave it the possibility of using the

means thus freed for forced development of armaments.

On the other hand, Rumania has succeeded in creating a definite *system of treaties* with its neighbours in order to guarantee a peaceful rear. This concerns chiefly the *Little Entente*, directed against the revisionist appetites of Hungary. However, Rumania does not yet feel itself secure enough against the encroachments of Hungary on her borders particularly since Fascist Hungary does not conceal its intentions to use the designated intervention for winning back its former boundaries. Certainly, the Rumanian-Hungarian antagonisms are not at all indefinite: a united front of the countries through which the Danube flows in the so-called agrarian bloc (Hungary participating) is possible and exists only on the basis of a struggle against the Soviet Union. However, Fascist Hungary does not want to participate in intervention and particularly not to guarantee the rear of Rumania at too cheap a price. Judging by the position which the Hungarian Government took during 1930, the price of Hungary's participation in an anti-Soviet war would be the transformation of Transylvania into an *autonomous* region. Hungarian Fascism regards such autonomy as the first step to the restitution of Transylvania.

The decisive conditions for the smoothing out of Rumanian-Hungarian antagonisms is the possibility of an agreement between France and Italy into which Hungary would be drawn. A Franco-Italian agreement would also deprive Rumania of the possibility of some external-political manœuvres, into which it is sometimes plunged, in spite of the desires of the Parisian masters, and would, thereby, also accelerate the anti-Soviet negotiations between Rumania and Hungary.

The affair is in much better shape between Rumania and Bulgaria. The Bulgarian-Rumanian friendly alliance concluded last year guarantees peace on the western border of Roumania.

THE ECONOMIC PREPARATION FOR WAR.

During the past year, the Rumanian Government has also exhibited extraordinary energy in the field of the internal economic and political preparation for an attack on the Soviet Union. Those facts which concern the adaptation of the whole productive apparatus of the country to the needs of war, are very significant in this respect.

Above all one must note here the law of the compulsory formation of syndicates and cartels in industry as well as the creation of a state centralised apparatus for the distribution of agricultural and industrial products. This law signifies

essentially the mobilisation of industry and its organisation for the intervention of to-morrow. In regard to the monopoly of agricultural products, the Rumanian Government in this case follows the method which it used in 1916 on the eve of its entry into the World War when a net of warehouses were constructed at the most important railway junctions in order to organise the reserves of agricultural products and to guarantee the provisioning of the Rumanian army.

Since 1928, the Rumanian Government has not granted permission for the construction of any new metallurgical factories unless they contained machines for the manufacture of military supplies. The largest industrial undertakings have already been militarised long ago. The railways, have, for more than two years, been used systematically for the railroad regiments which, in case of strikes, or during war, can serve all the needs of railway transport. In March, 1930, regular special military protection was introduced on all the railways.

At the same time the general staff of the Rumanian army began to pay increased attention to agriculture in the sense of adapting it to the needs of war time. Proof of this can be found in the report of General Gorsky, of the general inspection of Rumanian aviation, on rationalisation "in the work of national defence." At this conference (January 19, 1931) the fact was particularly emphasised that industry and agriculture during the war must be adapted to produce all the material necessary for the front. The general also noted the necessity of such an organisation of specialists as would give the possibility of avoiding mistakes such as were made during the World War. According to the General's opinion, agriculture in Rumania suffered severely during the war because it was not organised rationally. How Rumanian land owners visualise concretely the organisation of agriculture which would be adapted to the needs of war time is shown by the following declaration of Komaa-shesky, the present Minister of Agriculture in Professor Yorga's Fascist cabinet:

"In case of war, huge masses of able-bodied people leave their homes, draught cattle of large and petty proprietors go for other uses, large estates do not dispose of their agricultural stock, and hundreds of thousands of small allotments remain uncultivated. Then the waste lands will be heavily exploited, new organs of labour will be created, and mechanical power will have to be used . . . But in order to distribute this power we will first have to have it in the country, we will have to teach producers how to use it. This above all is the duty of the State." (*Viatzia Agricole*, No. 9, 1926, p. 285.)

Only a month ago the general plan for *lumbering* adapted to the needs of a military campaign was discussed at the special Government Commission in which the representatives of the General Staff participated.

By similar measures in the economic field, the Rumanian Government is trying to create a powerful economic base for carrying on intervention.

THE UNITED ANTI-SOVIET FRONT OF THE BOURGEOIS AND SOCIAL-FASCIST PARTIES.

The ruling bourgeoisie tries to make a compromise with the individual fractions within its camp as well as with the bourgeois national minorities. Proof of this is afforded by such facts as the reconciliation of the Liberal parties, who stand for the interests of powerful finance capital with Carol and the Government of the National-Tsaranists. Further proof is the compromise with the bourgeois national minorities, particularly of the Hungarian bourgeoisie in Transylvania, the Ukrainian in Bessarabia and in Bukovina, the Bulgarian in Dobrudja, and the general fascisation of the bourgeois parties.

The positions taken up by the different parties from the Liberals to the Social-Democrats inclusively, are extraordinarily characteristic in this regard. Thus, for example, the leading organ of the Rumanian "Democracy" writes, welcoming the increase in the military budget:

"All parties capable of Government will find essential the most serious armament measures, on our part as well." (*Adeverul*, November 6, 1930.) "The problem of arming our army is more urgent than before; these demands are imperative. Its non-fulfilment is impossible without the most real danger for law and order in the State." (*Adeverul* for November 16, 1930.)

The central organ of the Liberal Party "Victorul" not only in every way welcomes the increase in armaments, but has already raised the questions very concretely of an alliance with those or other groups of States against the U.S.S.R., the question of the neutralisation of the Danube in time of war, of the defence of the Black Sea shore, etc. The National-Tsaranist party which was in power for almost two and a half years under the flag of "peasant" democracy, has the thorough preparation of intervention against the U.S.S.R. as the central point in its programme.

But it is the Rumanian Social-Fascists, who burnt their fingers in the anti-Soviet campaigns, who excel in the political working up of the working masses. Already, in 1924, during the Rumanian-Soviet Conference in Vienna, after which the Rumanian Communist Party was driven underground, the Social-Democracy took a definitely

anti-Soviet position. Its thesis reads literally as follows: The Soviet Union has no right whatever to demand a plebiscite in Bessarabia, seized by Rumanian imperialism owing to the fact that more than six years have passed since its seizure! . . . The character of this declaration is still more striking, if it is contrasted with the assertion of the White Guard, General Averesku, formerly Chief Commander of the occupation armies during the period of seizure of Bessarabia, who declared at the Jubilee celebrations in 1928 that Bessarabia is Rumanian *only* because *the Rumanian army was sent there at his initiative in 1918*. Thus the Rumanian Social-Fascists show themselves to be more zealous agents of Rumanian imperialism than do the rampant militarists themselves.

In complete conformity with this loyal and imperialist position of Social Fascism are the tactics of Social Democracy both in relation to the National-Tsaranist Government, the historical mission of which consists in the thorough preparation of Rumania for an anti-Soviet war, and particularly in the attitude to Carol Hohenzollern whose accession Social-Democracy regards as a guarantee of democratic and other rights. Are we then to be surprised at the following announcement of the Social-Democratic party on the latest military manœuvres:

"The Bureau of the Social-Democratic Party considers that these manœuvres are not in contradiction to the general tendency toward *disarmament and peace* which has paved its way all over Europe and with which *Rumania has repeatedly associated itself through its representatives.*" (*Diminyatza* for September 28th, 1930.)

Thus Rumania organises grandiose manœuvres precisely on those sections which, according to the declaration of authoritative Rumanian generals, must serve as the field of battle against the U.S.S.R. because . . . Rumania wholly shares, according to the opinion of the Social-Democrats, "the general tendency to disarmament and peace." We will not stop here to discuss the generally familiar speeches of the Social-Democrat deputies who had become such only by the kindness of the National-Tsaranist bourgeoisie; the aim of these speeches is to prove the innocence of Rumanian imperialism—to present it in the rôle of the innocent lamb menaced by the Bolshevik wolf. One must note, however, that in the recent months, particularly in the second half of 1930, in conformity with the general growth of the hostility of the bourgeoisie and the growing activity of its anti-Soviet policy, the Social-Fascists in Rumania, as everywhere generally, have sharply increased their intrigues against the Soviet Union. The extent to which

the Social-Fascists can go in this respect is shown by the declaration of the left Social-Democrats in Bukovina through their Party organ—the Chernovitz "Vorwärts." On the occasion of the arrival of the British Fleet in Constanza, this paper wrote:

"We cannot doubt but that these war-ships will serve as a warning for those who are perpetually carrying on a policy of brandishing their sabres (i.e., for the U.S.S.R.) and from this point of view *these war-ships are a definite symbol of peace.*" (*Vorwärts* for August 22, 1930.)

THE FASCISATION OF THE COUNTRY.

All the above-mentioned facts reveal quite clearly the united anti-Soviet front of the bourgeois parties beginning from the "opposition" Liberals and ending with the "revolutionary" and "left" Social-Democrats. This united anti-Soviet policy permits Rumanian Fascism and the Rumanian bourgeoisie to carry through, without the slightest hindrance, a policy of the *fascisation* of the State apparatus and the militarisation of all State and civil life which finds its reflection, for example, in the law recently passed on the militarisation of the administrative apparatus. According to this law, all officers who have attained a certain age limit, which, incidentally, has been considerably lowered, have the first right to *civil employment*. If one is to take the fact into consideration that the number of such officers in Rumania runs into thousands, it becomes quite clear that this law of the militarisation of the civil administration has been adopted *now* as one of the *measures of the preparation for intervention*. This law was adapted in the Rumanian Parliament with such unanimity between the bourgeois and Social-Democratic parties that the War Minister had occasion to declare:

"Only an extremist régime could try to transform the army into an instrument of a dictatorship. Our country has never known such a régime, which should be avoided as far as possible by such mutual trust." (*Dpretata* for February 23, 1931.)

The voice of the Social-Democrats also joined in this chorus of "mutual trust."

With the direct militarisation of the administrative apparatus, the bourgeoisie propagate energetically *semi-military* Fascist organisations chiefly attracting the kulak youth into them. In this respect the first place, in point of numbers, is taken by the militant organisation of the governing National-Tsaranist Party known under the name of "Voinicha." This organisation contained about 20,000 members in 1929; in 1930, about 100,000, and in 1931, over 150,000. But besides the Voinicha there is a number of other aggressive Fascist organisations such as, for

example, "the Anti-Semite League," of Professor Kuza, "The Iron Guards," "Protectors of the King," "Aktziunar Romany" in New Dobrudja, etc. The bourgeoisie acknowledge without the slightest shame that their chief rôle consists in suppressing the revolutionary movement of the workers and toilers generally, and of the national minorities in particular, *especially after the war against the Soviets is declared*. (See the declaration of the leader of the National-Tzaranists, Maniu, at the beginning of 1930 at the sessions of the Councils of the Party in Klyausenburg as well as the speeches of the ex-Minister, Voika Nitzesku, in Braschov.)

WORKING THE MASSES UP FOR INTERVENTION.

Without the slightest doubt, the bourgeoisie takes into account how difficult it is to arouse the masses to a struggle against the Soviet Union. While during the imperialist war the Rumanian bourgeoisie was able to skilfully conceal its class aims under the so-called ideal of national emancipation, this is now impossible (though some efforts are made in this direction, for example, in Bessarabia where propaganda for the "emancipation of the brothers" from the Moldavian Soviet Republic is widespread). The masses saw that national emancipation meant their enslavement to the Rumanian landowners and capitalists. The masses will not a second time swallow the bait of the "national-emancipatory" ideal. Consequently the Rumanian bourgeoisie, like any other bourgeoisie, looks everywhere for a means which would permit it to mobilise the hate of the toilers of Rumania against the Soviet Union. With this aim in view, the Rumanian bourgeois press consistently reflected and "defined" the whole anti-Soviet campaign of the bourgeoisie, beginning with a description of the "horrors of forced collectivisation," the preaching of a peasant campaign and ending with "dumping" and "forced labour." Further, the Democratic bourgeois and Social-Fascist press most energetically fulfil the rôle allotted to it of the pacifist drugging of the toiling masses. Thus, for example, one of the most influential papers of the Rumanian bourgeoisie, "Adeverul," which is under the leadership of a well-known leader of the Social-Democratic Party, E. Sokor, has, for several months belched out pacifist propaganda, accusing the Soviet Union of preparing poisonous gases and bombs laden with bacteria. "Argus," the organ of the powerful financial and industrial bourgeoisie, resounds with anti-Soviet ravings:

"Direct war becomes less and less possible because of the extraordinary annihilating power of poisonous gases. Economic war, based on Russian dumping, can be much more destructive than any

other war because it upsets the very basis of the existence of taxes." (*Argus*, February 20, 1931.)

Sir Henry Deterding could "convince" the Rumanian imperialists and militarists that the U.S.S.R. is preparing war against them.

"Whoever read the declaration made by Deterding several days ago in our press"—wrote the well-known Rumanian General Anastasia—"as well as those who have not read it, but judge by what they hear and can understand, must take into account that actually the greatest danger to peace, not only for Europe but for the whole world, is *undoubtedly, exclusively* the abnormal situation of affairs in Russia and the savage policy of the Soviet power." (*Adeverul* for April 5, 1931.)

Social-Fascism, Rumanian and French militarism, Sir Henry Deterding—these are the motive forces of intervention!

None the less, even such "disinterested" people as Sir Henry Deterding cannot convince the Rumanian peasant and worker that he must fight against the Soviet power. Of the endless series of anti-Soviet campaigns the version of "Soviet dumping" alone can find some response among the mass of the Rumanian peasantry, gasping in the clutches of the agrarian crisis. It would be a great political mistake to close one's eyes to this.

OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF INTERVENTION.

However, the Rumanian bourgeoisie does not think itself sufficiently prepared for beginning immediate intervention. Intervention is being delayed, first of all, by the *external* political antagonisms, both between the powerful imperialist robbers and the supposed direct agents of intervention: between Rumania and Hungary in particular, between Hungary and the Little Entente generally. Rumania has, to date, not counted itself secure enough from Hungary, which demands as payment for its participation in intervention the restoration of the territories of which it was deprived. Certainly, the powerful empires, particularly France, are taking very energetic steps to smooth out the antagonisms between the petty imperialist robbers. The possibility is by no means excluded that, with the help of Anglo-French pressure, a common platform of an anti-Soviet adventure can be found with comparative ease, but, none the less, such antagonisms are still a hindrance, as we saw even during the Polish-Rumanian misunderstandings on the occasion of the prolongation of the military treaty in the question of a united command during war, sharing the future booty, the defining of the future zones and spheres of influence, etc. Some very energetic pressure on the part of French imperialism was called for to compel Rumania to submit.

On the other hand, the Rumanian bourgeoisie has not yet been able to overcome the *internal antagonisms* in its own camp. Negotiations have been carried on now for more than a year among the Rumanian bourgeois parties for the organisation of a Government of national unity (Titulesku's combination) which would have to throw off the fig leaf "of national unity" and become quite openly a Fascist dictatorship (new cabinet of Professor Yorga). The fact that the fusion between the leaders of the bourgeoisie, of the national minorities and the bourgeoisie of the ruling nations *has not yet been consummated* is a weakening factor for the Rumanian bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the Hungarian and German bourgeoisie in Transylvania, the Bulgarians in Dobrudja, the Ukrainians in Bukovina think the given moment most suitable for winning maximum *concessions*. Therefore, in the beginning of the current year, you could observe the attempt of the bourgeoisie of the national minorities to create a *united bloc* in order to wring a fixed statute from the Rumanian Government for the national minorities independent of the changes in the Government's policy. This fact, naturally, does not promote the consolidation of the rear for the Rumanian bourgeoisie. The ruling bourgeoisie understand that on this section it will be much more difficult to liquidate the antagonisms, not so much because the national minorities could not reduce their demands (their interests now to a significant degree are covered by the interests of the ruling Rumanian bourgeoisie) but chiefly because it is most difficult for the latter to adopt the manœuvres and tactics of conciliation with the Rumanian bourgeoisie in the eyes of the toilers of the national minorities: as open conciliation between the bourgeoisie of the national minorities with the ruling bourgeoisie would destroy their reputation with the working population. But the Rumanian bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the national minorities, however, fear the national-liberation movement which can thus prove, in the final count, to be the basis of a most rapid conciliation between both fractions of the bourgeoisie, with the aim of suppressing the movement for national-liberation, as well as, generally, the revolutionary worker and peasant movement, because the basic obstacles on the path to intervention is the ever increasing class struggle of the proletariat and the toiling peasants which the bourgeoisie have not yet succeeded in "liquidating."

In spite of the great effort made by Fascist terror, in spite of the complete support which Social-Fascism hastens to give the capitalists in all the economic conflicts of the workers, betraying the class interests of the proletariat in every

way, the latter rises to struggle again and again, after every defeat. Thus, we can note the recurrent strikes of the Bugush textile workers and the Reshitz metal workers in 1930, the demonstrations of the railway workers in January, 1931, and the strike of the Bucharest metal workers at the Lemetre factory. The toiling peasantry in its turn, with growing frequency, comes out en masse against the landowners, the gendarmes and the government authorities. Peasant demonstrations took place in 1930 all over Rumania, particularly, in Maramuresh, in Northern Moldavia, in Southern Bukovina, in New Dobrudja and in Southern Bessarabia. Frequently *dozens* of villages and *thousands* of peasants participated in these demonstrations.

It is true that the bourgeoisie try to set up against the upsurge, particularly of the peasant movement, not only terror, but also special methods of political corruption; they try, as for example they did in Southern Bukovina, to turn the peasant movement into the channels of anti-Semitism in which, however, they are not altogether successful. The unrest of the peasant masses is growing with every day and with a skilful policy carried out by the revolutionary party of the proletariat, can become class conscious and revolutionary.

With all the organisational weakness of the young Rumanian Communist Party, the bourgeoisie know well enough that it is threatened by the greatest danger from this side. Therefore it tries in every way to destroy the revolutionary workers' movement, and, first of all, the revolutionary organisations of the proletariat, which are under the influence and leadership of the Communist Party: the Unitarian (revolutionary) trade unions, the worker-peasant bloc and others. The National-Tsaranist Government of Maniu and Mironescu is not behind that of the former Government of Bratiana in this: the execution of the Kishenev, Temeshvar workers, of the Loupen miners and the Bucharest railway workers — these are the basic landmarks of the "worker" policy of the National-Tsaranist Party. The reverse of this policy against the revolutionary movement is the complete support of the Social-Fascists up to the very subsidising of them.

However, in spite of the most savage terror, the Communist Party lives and becomes stronger. The only obstacle in the path to the growth of its influence over the proletariat and the toiling masses lies in the *slow* surmounting of *right opportunist* conceptions in some sections of its work, particularly, in the *field of the peasant movement*. Thus, for example, in the last issue

of the central organ of the Rumanian Communist Party, this statement was made :

... "to attract *it* (the peasantry) to the side of the revolution against imperialist war, in defence of the revolution of the Soviet Union, can be effected only on the basis of systematic work among the peasants, only by our penetration into the village. At the present moment the *peasantry* is the victim of the terrible economic and political crisis. . . The question of usury, taxation, the acceleration of the processes of differentiation and the proletarianization of the village—must all be discounted by our Party in its work for winning over the peasant masses." (*Loupta de Classa*, p. 8, No. 1, 1931.)

In spite of the general (too general, and, therefore, fallacious) formulation of the differentiation and the proletarianization of the village, a right opportunist conception of the peasantry as a *class as a whole* was reflected here. The all-inclusiveness of the formulation can objectively conceal here a right deviationist conception on the peasant question. It is hardly necessary to prove the fallacy of the statement — that the Communist Party can base itself in the struggle against intervention, on the kulak class. We see in Rumania, as well as everywhere else, that the kulak class, to a significant degree, make up the *basic cadres* of the militant Fascist organisations. It is equally untrue that all the strata of the peasantry to an *equal degree* suffer from an economic and political crisis. The weight of the crisis falls with all its force on the *middle and poor* strata of the village to which the *Communist Party must address itself with a challenge and slogans*. It must expose before their eyes, first of all, the true causes of the campaign against what is called "Soviet dumping," explain to them

that their unbearable conditions are the result of the very nature of feudal-capitalist Rumania.

The central organ of the Communist Party is making yet another mistake when it writes: "War of imperialists against Soviet Union is *inevitable*" . . . (page 7, *ibid*). This slogan cannot in *any way* promote the *mobilisation* of the toiling masses in the defence of the Soviet Union and for the struggle for the revolution. It is true the degree of probability of intervention depends *first of all on the degree of the revolutionary struggle of the masses themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party*. The bourgeoisie understands this excellently, trying to crush at the root the slightest revolutionary opposition of the toilers, trying to destroy entirely the Communist Party itself, which has every chance of becoming the assembling and organising centre in the revolutionary struggle of the masses.

The increasing upsurge of the class struggle creates a basis on which the Communist Party could win the trust of the toiling masses, establish its hegemony in the revolutionary and national-emancipatory movement. Such facts as the polling of the same number of votes as did the bourgeois parties in the district elections in Vender district, in Bessarabia where Fascist terror has reached most extreme limits; such as the success of the worker-peasant bloc in the Bichor district (at the district elections) in Temeshvar, at the partial Parliamentary Elections in 1930, etc., prove that with a correct policy the Communist Party can become a factor for the acceleration of the approach of a revolutionary situation.

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PRELIMINARY RESULTS OF FEBRUARY 25TH

WORK AMONG THE UNEMPLOYED AND ITS ORGANISATIONAL FORMS.

(Abridged Stenographic Notes of the Discussion in the R.I.L.U.)

INTRODUCTORY WORDS OF COMRADE LOZOVSKY.

LOZOVSKY: The figures of the international day of the struggle against unemployment, February 25, on the basis of which I want, to-day, to make preliminary deductions, relate, chiefly, to twenty countries of Europe and to America. We must agree beforehand that the evaluation and the deductions will be doubly preliminary since we must still use the desultory telegraphic figures. The point of departure of the evaluation of February 25 must be the comparison of this year's international day with that of last year.

In comparison with last year, we see that the setting in which international unemployed day took place this year represents in itself a tremendous advantage. Last year, the number of unemployed on the international unemployed day was 17 to 18 million. To-day,—February 25—it numbered 35 million. The second peculiarity consists in the fact that not a single country on the face of the earth is free from mass unemployment. The setting in which international day this year found itself was at least twice as advantageous as last year, firstly, because unemployment to-day is twice as great as then, and secondly, because this day took place after mass struggles had taken place in a number of countries.

Speaking of February 25, we must note, first of all, some lack of co-ordination. Like last year, Latin America had its own unemployed day—March 20. Disparity can also be seen in a number of other countries as, for example, in Switzerland, where the party and the trade union opposition fixed their own unemployed day, because February 25 coincides with the Swiss national holiday. If we are to approach it from the point of view of the time necessary for the preparation for international unemployed day, we must note that this year there was approximately two to two-and-a-half months. If, allowing for the favourable objective conditions and sufficient time being allowed for preparation, we place the question categorically, was the number of demonstrators, workers and unemployed at least twice as great as last year, we must answer, No. For many countries the size of the movement was smaller than that of March 6, 1930. The scope of the movement in the U.S.A. is particularly characteristic in this sense. Last year, according to the figures of the Communist Party, approximately 1,250,000 workers took part in the demonstrations in the U.S.A. This year about 300,000 workers took part.

The general feature, characterising all countries this year, lies in the fact that in those cities and

industrial centres where last year there were considerable mass demonstrations, there were much fewer this year. On the other hand, a number of centres which last year did not take part in the demonstrations of the unemployed, this year had significant demonstrations.

The peculiarities of international unemployed day this year consist in the fact that international reformism in the shape of the Second and Amsterdam Internationals, their national sections and the anarchist syndicalists, among whom they still have some influence, took a much more decisive stand against unemployed day this year than last. On the other hand, the measures which the Governments of these countries, including those countries of so-called democracy as well, took, were of a much more serious character, than in the previous year. The mobilisation of the police and the army for the dispersal of the demonstrations bore the character of a military mobilisation of all land forces.

If we try to distribute the countries according to the line followed below, in the order determined according to where the international day was most successful—we can, according to preliminary data to hand, say that this day had the greatest mass character in Czecho-Slovakia. There, according to telegraphic communications, almost 200,000 workers took part in the demonstrations, a number which, for Czecho-Slovakia, represents a very great magnitude. Germany must be given second place (VASILIEV: "More than a million persons took part in the demonstrations there.") And taking the figures of the demonstrators, we must also keep in mind the number of proletariat as well as those in the ranks of the Communist Parties and trade unions in the given country.

To the extent that one can judge from the preliminary information, the movement of February 25 took on rather sharp forms in Spain, to be explained now by the special revolutionary situation in that country. The scope of the demonstration of unemployed was quite significant in France where a really perceptible unemployment has touched the masses only this year. But since unemployment in France the previous year was not great, a comparison with March 6 of last year will not give us an idea of the actual scope of the movement of February 25.

In several Scandinavian countries where the movement last year was quite weak, the demonstrations were rather significant this year. Of the Scandinavian countries, the greatest—in relation to the strength of the Party and trade union opposition—number of participants in the demonstration of February 25 was in Denmark though, according to

the membership in the Party, it is much weaker than Sweden and Norway.

The U.S.A. this year, in comparison with the former year, was backward. There the number of demonstrators and the intensity of the struggle decreased, although, on the other hand, we have the curious figures of mass demonstrations in a number of cities in the south where there had been no demonstrations the year before. If we ask ourselves, whether international unemployed day was successful from the point of view of the demonstration of the masses, we can say frankly that it was successful, more or less, only in individual countries. February 25 did not take on the scope, and did not attract the millions of masses whom it could and should have attracted under the present conditions of tremendous growth of crisis and unemployment. The success of this day was considerably below the objective setting and those possibilities which were at the disposal of our Parties and our revolutionary trade unions.

Demonstrations took place in almost every country, but when we evaluate these demonstrations it is evident from the start that not in all countries did they bear a sufficiently aggressive mass revolutionary character.

This day was least successful in the countries which have the greatest unemployment, as, for example, in England. Certainly, there were demonstrations in England, there were processions, there were meetings, but they did not have a mass character. There were 500 or 1,000 people in the demonstrations. And if we keep in mind the 3,000,000 unemployed, the recent battles in which 160,000 Welsh miners participated, the 250,000 textileworkers of Lancashire, etc., then these demonstrations are not to be compared with the objective possibilities which existed in England.

We must say that in a number of countries where the most savage white terror reigns, there were demonstrations of unemployed which called forth very severe repression. Such was the condition in Poland, although the demonstrations there did not bear a mass character. According to the data which the press gave, in some places — Warsaw, Cracow, Lvov—there was an aggregate of several hundred to 1,000 people, in other places there were flying meetings and demonstrations. We cannot, however, say that these demonstrations bore a mass character.

In Bulgaria, the demonstrations were rigidly suppressed. The demonstrations in such countries as Roumania, Jugo-Slavia, Greece, were very insignificant. We have no data whatever of any demonstrations there may have been in Italy. At least, up to now, I have not seen in the press, apart from desultory communications, anything relating to what has taken place in Italy. This is to be explained by the rigid censorship and the policy of Fascism not

to permit any information whatever to leak out of the revolutionary workers' movement.

Thus we can say that in those countries where the movement bears a legal or semi-legal character—such as Czecho-Slovakia, Germany, U.S.A., France, etc.,—and in the countries where our Parties and trade unions are illegal or have a semi-legal character as in Poland, Roumania, Jugo-Slavia—the movement did not reach the scope which it should have reached. In those countries where the movement assumed the greatest scale in numbers, as in Germany, or was more significant in relation to the specific gravity of the Party and trade unions, as in Czecho-Slovakia, it was, none the less, lower than we ought to have achieved in the given setting and in the given country. Therefore, we must turn our attention, first of all, to an explanation of the causes which prevented the movement of February 25 from reaching a scope in accordance with the real possibilities. That the Communist Parties had the best intentions is beyond doubt.

In what lies the basic causes of the weakness of the movement? I think that the basic causes are due to the fact that in the sphere of organisation, *in the sphere of work among the unemployed we did not seriously advance in comparison with what was done last year.* In the sphere of the organisation of the unemployed, the methods of work among the unemployed, methods of uniting employed and unemployed, the old traditions were followed in all countries. Furthermore, we came out, in defence of the unemployed with general formulas instead of concrete demands. The content of the work was not differentiated: we advance one and the same demands, but the most destitute category of the unemployed remain outside the sphere of our influence, the burning questions of the day of every unemployed worker such as: eviction from homes, cutting off of gas and electricity, lack of fuel, social feeding for the unemployed, etc., did not receive enough attention in our organisations.

We must help the unemployed by fighting for their immediate, most vital demands and then they will go further with us in the struggle against the whole capitalist system. If we are to separate from the demands of to-day the struggle for our ultimate aims, we will not be able to attract the masses of unemployed. On the other hand, in the sphere of the form of the organisation of unemployed, we continue to stick to the system of committees poorly united with the unemployed masses. The committees act for the unemployed though their task is to attract the unemployed themselves into the movement. And, in conclusion, we have not made any serious achievements in the work among the unemployed because *in the overwhelming majority of countries work among the unemployed is still regarded as of secondary importance.*

Let us take the countries which have the most persistent and oldest unemployment. There we have the stabilisation of committees of unemployment. Let us take the U.S.A. Regardless of the fact that unemployment for the past few years has grown catastrophically, there exists but a microscopic organisation which embraces but a couple of thousand people. Let us take Germany, where the organisation of the unemployed takes on a most divergent character. We have there, mainly, unemployed committees, but the lower network of the organisation of unemployed has still not yet been formed, its features are not yet distinct enough. The unemployed committees themselves have no definite, organisational form, but the activity of these committees is also not sufficiently defined, and does not have a sufficiently concrete character. Lower organisations of the unemployed do not exist, the union of the unemployed are the lower nuclei of the trade union opposition.

We have not at our disposal data concerning the Far East apart from the haphazard telegrams from which it is evident that there were demonstrations and arrests there. But even in respect to those countries of which we have information, we must say that they did not, by half, fulfil what they should have, and could have, done there.

The basic cause of this consists in the fact that we are conservative in the field of the form of the organisation of the unemployed. Obviously now when unemployment has reached tens of millions of workers, the organisations which were created when unemployment involved tens of thousands, do not answer the new tasks and demands. We must think out how to create special independent new organisations of unemployed, subordinated in leadership to the centre of the trade union opposition. and the Red trade unions. In order to develop the movement of the unemployed and retain this movement in their hands, we must create mass non-Party organisations for the unemployed which would be accessible to every worker. Only such an organisation will possess the power of attraction for the unemployed. Every unemployed worker will know that these organisations are working in his immediate interests.

We must keep in mind that in the next two or three months the number of unemployed in some countries will somewhat decrease. This is connected with the building season. This will mean some decrease in the number of unemployed (we have already received a telegram from England with the information that for the last week unemployment decreased by 13,000). Undoubtedly this will be used by the bourgeoisie and the Social-Fascists who will say that the turning point in the crisis is beginning, the number of unemployed is decreasing. As far as one can judge, the insignificant decrease, in the number of unemployed in individual industries which may take place

in March and April is so insignificant that it cannot to any extent touch the basic branches of industry, as, for example, mining, textile, metallurgy. And this means that according to all objective data not only is there no turning point in the sense of the approach of the end of the crisis, as our enemies talk of it, but on the contrary, there is still a basis for thinking (and this is supported by a large amount of objective data for England, U.S.A., Germany) that the crisis in the most important branches of industry increases and sharpens, and that unemployment will grow.

This brings before us the obligation to take into account the lessons of February 25 as well as all the lessons of our work among the unemployed.

What were these lessons? I have already spoken of this, but, in order to facilitate the exchange of opinions, I will repeat it briefly :

(1) We must change to new forms and methods of work among the unemployed from the point of view of the *content* of the work.

(2) We must, in those countries where there are not yet independent organisations of unemployed in existence, set about the building up of such organisations from *below* in order to increase the attraction of these organisations for the unemployed.

(3) Creating a network of independent organisations of unemployed, we must simultaneously, along the line of the Communist Parties and the Red trade unions, unite them practically with the work among the employed in order that there should not be an organisational and political break between the movement of the unemployed and that of the employed.

(4) The growth of the number of unemployed and the weak character of the movement on February 25 in most of the countries places before us the question of seeking in each country the causes of the failure of February 25, beginning with the weaker ones and those countries where the movement has not taken on such a wide scope as it had last year.

I. VASILIEV : It seems to me that we need not agree with some of the considerations advanced by Comrade Lozovsky. First, in regard to the evaluation of the success of February 25. Can we say that February 25 gave us that which we did not expect? I think that here, first of all, we must establish what it is we expected from February 25. I questioned representatives of individual countries. From the answers of the comrades it is evident that in some countries there was a greater success achieved than was expected. (LOZOVSKY : And when did you ask them, before or after February 25?). After. On the other hand, undoubtedly, we have not, a complete picture even in the most important countries. We only have more or less complete information of what took place in some of the main centres. But we have little information concerning the provinces. Whereas, it is characteristic for the workers' move-

ment in capitalist countries for recent times that the revolutionary upsurge embraces the provinces and backward districts more and more profoundly and extensively. Furthermore, I think that the fact that we have no information regarding what took place in Poland and in Australia constitutes a great gap. There was, in Australia, during the past international campaigns, a great revolutionary movement. Unemployment in Australia has grown to gigantic dimensions and the general situation has become worse.

In relation to France, it is very interesting to note that on February 25, according to the information in "L'Humanité," the smallest demonstrations were in the Paris district where unemployment is greatest, while the strongest movement was in the provinces where, in comparison with Paris, unemployment and the movement is smaller. Another very interesting feature; in France the main contingent demonstrating on February 25 was of employed workers and not of the unemployed.

I think that the fact that there was a very great movement in the north, among the miners, among employed workers, is very important for France. This movement should be connected up with the attack which the employers are now making and which the Unitarian Union of Miners is preparing to answer with a general strike of miners on March 16. The great movement among the miners on February 25 is a favourable objective sign of the possibility of organising a serious movement of miners under the leadership of the Unitarian unions.

I think that the fact that the movement was great in the provinces as well is characteristic of Czecho-Slovakia. At the same time we must note that in Czecho-Slovakia the movement of the unemployed, up to most recent times, has centred only around Komotai where the great mass movement of the unemployed is led entirely by our Party. The Social Democrats stopped the organisation of workers' meetings because such meetings, without exception, pass into our hands and pass our resolutions. We have information that armed forces have been concentrated all over the country there. On the territory of Komotai, many soldiers and gendarmes have been concentrated in connection with a widespread movement of the unemployed. I think that it is very important to study the situation in Komotai, to find out why the unemployed movement is widespread and how our Party there was able to eliminate the influence of the Social Democratic Party, and have now such great, almost monopolistic, influence among the masses.

Turning to Germany—I think that in Germany we have a large movement. For an estimation of February 25 in Germany we must keep in mind the tremendous mobilisation of the police force and the exceptional aggressiveness of the police in dispersing

the demonstrators. However, regardless of all this, according to communications of the newspapers, more than a million people in Germany were out on the streets on February 25.

I do not think we can explain the relative failure of February 25 only by the weakness of the organisational work of our Parties and revolutionary trade union movement among the unemployed. I raise the question of the correction of the choice of February 25 as the international unemployed day. It seems to me that February 25 was too late; I think we should have chosen January 10 to 15 at the latest, for International Unemployed Day. The tempestuous spontaneous demonstrations, in spite of the trade union bureaucrats and reformists and regardless of whether or not our Party carried on work among the unemployed, began with the second half of December. And the Party and the trade union opposition should have struck while the iron was still hot. It was necessary to use this crucial moment for organising a general demonstration, at the latest, by the end of January, having given oneself a short period for the development of most energetic agitation.

I think that the lessons of this campaign should be seriously studied in the sense that it is impossible to decide the question of the political demonstration of wide masses depending only on the degree of organised preparation we have made for this demonstration at the given moment. I think that in such a case we must adapt those considerations which we adapted to strikes, and even in relation to our highest forms of struggle of the proletariat—to armed uprising. We, as Communists, must prepare ourselves for all seriously and properly organised mass demonstrations. But we must not go to the other extreme and fall into menshevism from the other end. When a favourable moment arises (and such a time, I think, arose at the end of December and the beginning of January), we should have mobilised all our forces and made the maximum use of the fighting spirit of the masses. And what was actually done? Beginning with the second half of January, the movement in the basic capitalist countries began to fall, the number of demonstrations began to decrease, and precisely at this moment our Party began to get going for the preparation of February 25. Here one must note another very important reason for the many deficiencies and general weakness of February 25—that the Party had not succeeded in getting into its stride and did far too little for the success of this great international campaign.

The development of the campaign in the U.S.A. presents a very curious picture. We must remember that the February 25 campaign preceded the petition campaign. In the very beginning of this campaign there were, all over the country, large mass demonstrations of the unemployed accompanied by breaking into food stores, clashes with the police, etc. Then,

when the day approached for the presentation of petitions, the movement became smaller and weaker and on the day when the petition was to be presented there were almost no demonstrations.

The third important reason for the weakness of February 25 was the poorly chosen slogans. Examining the slogans advanced by the Parties in preparation for February 25, we can say that some Parties really broke the record for abstractness. The American and British Parties should receive the first prize for this. They proposed slogans which had absolutely no relation to the unemployed movement. In France the slogans were not so abstract as they were contradictory, confusing the workers who supported the Party. The question of the selection of slogans is very important.

There is still one question which Comrade Lozovsky did not touch upon and which deserves, I think, most serious attention. This is the question of the Social Democracy, of how our Party used this whole campaign for the struggle with Social Fascism. The picture is approximately as follows: in all countries our Party had the monopoly of the defence of the interests of the unemployed. I do not know of a single country where Social Fascism could advance anything serious against our agitation.

It is very characteristic that in Austria, in spite of the fact that our Party is very weak politically and organisationally, now, after the referendum on unemployment at workers' meetings which for the most part were organised by Social Democrats, the workers voted against their leaders. I personally think the attention of all sections of the R.I.L.U. and Comintern should be centred particularly on this side of the question. If we are to take Austria for example, it is a very important fact that our Party has grown numerically during recent months. I think that the new members of the Party come, chiefly, from among the unemployed and that among them there are quite a few members of the Social Democratic Party who voted against their Social Democratic leaders and broke up a large number of Social Democratic meetings.

In regard to Czecho-Slovakia, I have already pointed to Komotai where the Social Democracy cannot organise workers' meetings as these meetings pass into the hands of the Communists. In the last few months, 600 members have been added to our organisation in Komotai. Obviously, this has taken place, to a considerable degree, from the unemployed. In Germany our Party has recently greatly increased in numbers. Comrades will have read the latest figures published in the "Pravda"—that there are now 206,000 members in the Communist Party. From what strata has this growth been made? I think that basically the increase has been made from the unemployed and that many unemployed Social Democratic workers have joined our ranks. I think

this is enough to emphasise the exceptional importance of the problem.

EMERICH: I am convinced that the present forms of the organisation of the unemployed in the contemporary stage of the development of the class struggle no longer satisfy the demands which we must make of it. If we must still admit the presence of a large gap between our political influence and the organisational strengthening of this influence then this is even stronger in the unemployed movement.

Even in Germany where we have the hegemony in the leadership of the five-and-a-half million unemployed, our group only includes 65,000. The unemployed who in Germany are partly divided according to professions, and attached to different labour exchanges, have been organised by us into groups at the labour exchange. All the groups of the unemployed are united on a local scale with the factory groups of the different branches of production of the Trade Union Opposition. The unemployed of all branches of industry are not united together on a local scale.

On paper this seems to be an ideal situation. It seems that such a practical organisation creates a really united front between employed and unemployed workers. But all my experience has convinced me that this organisational form has not that magnetic power which many comrades think it has. I think that the unemployed should be united into an organisation which includes only the unemployed. This should be carried out along the following lines: all the unemployed, regardless of the branch of industry to which they belong, should be united in local organisations of unemployed. The basic organisations in those countries where the unemployed have to register at the labour exchange, should be the labour exchanges. Where the unemployed do not have to appear at the labour exchange, or where other difficulties exist, local organisations of the unemployed can be created according to residence. It is self-understood that all the groups existing in individual labour exchanges, or groups embracing individual city districts, must be firmly united on a local scale. The unemployed must create district leadership from the representatives of the most important local groups.

It is another question, whether such a form of organisation will create a break with employed workers. I do not think so. In the long run it depends upon the policy we take within the organisation of the unemployed.

What tasks must such an organisation of unemployed fulfil? I think that the unemployed in Germany, who are united in productive groups of the revolutionary trade union on the labour exchanges, are not convinced that such a form of organisation defends, above all, the urgent interests of the unemployed.

They think that these groups of unemployed workers are used chiefly for the work of the trade union opposition and for achieving political aims. We know, certainly, that the interests of the revolutionary trade union opposition do not conflict with the interests of the unemployed. However, from the viewpoint of expediency, the creation of organisations uniting only unemployed has tremendous advantages. The basic content of the work of this organisation is the defence of the pressing interests and the daily demands of the unemployed proletariat, even the smallest demands. The organisations fulfilling these demands will undoubtedly have an extraordinarily stimulating effect on the broad masses of unemployed; with correct and revolutionary leadership, it will succeed in bringing the struggle of the unemployed to a higher level and in uniting them with the struggle of the employed workers to transform these battles into conscious political battles against the capitalist system.

BILL DUNN: In the U.S.A. this year all the forces of philanthropy were organised, all social work was organised in order to create the impression that something or other was being done, that the turning point was approaching. This had a significant effect on the demonstrations this year. Besides, the repressions in the U.S.A. directed against the immigrants played an important rôle in the question of decreasing the number of demonstrations. This becomes clear if we keep in mind the tremendous rôle which the worker-immigrants play in the U.S.A. The repressions resulted in many thousands of immigrants being deported, and many arrested. Besides, it must be pointed out that from March 6 of last year to the end of July, neither the Party nor the trade unions did anything to develop work among the unemployed, to reach the huge masses who went with us on March 6. After March 6 we left them without saying what further had to be done.

However, the fact that as many as 300,000 demonstrators in forty different cities, participated in the demonstrations, speaks of a movement of great scope. While the movement of March 6 was largely spontaneous, this year the masses consciously came into the streets for the Communist Party. We should notice as well the change in the composition of those who participated in the demonstrations this year. In a recent report of his trip through the country, Comrade Foster says that native Americans chiefly participated in the demonstrations. This is a very important fact because until now the movement had developed chiefly among the immigrants.

Let us turn to England. There we can observe something heretofore unknown in the history of the Communist International, i.e., the workers actually struggling without any leadership whatever. Let us

take the struggle of the miners or the struggle of the Lancashire textile workers. The fact is that these workers had their own leadership. This leadership was neither that of the trade union bureaucrats nor that of our Minority Movement. There are a number of interesting things to be noticed this year in the English movement, in spite of all the weaknesses. In Alexandria, Scotland, a small town with a population of a few thousand, all the proletariat of the town participated in the demonstrations.

How is one to explain the situation that in London the Party could not get the masses out on the street while in the small towns and localities it was successful? This is to be explained by the fact that the local Parties in these towns are closely united with the workers. The Party leads the work among the workers and the workers know for whom they stand.

The second fact which should be noted in relation to England is that in several cases our leadership did all that they could to prevent a fighting spirit from developing. The "Daily Worker" of February 26 informs us that at one of the demonstrations in London at which Comrade Elias of the Minority Movement was chairman, the police arrested him and demanded the payment of a fine of £2. When a movement began among those gathered there to free the arrested comrade, Comrade Saklatvala took the floor and proposed that a collection be made for the payment of the fine and the affair ended at that.

These questions must be seriously considered. We must point out that the old trade union tradition of legalism is very strong in the British movement.

Comrade Lozovsky is right when he says that the old forms and methods which were suitable when we had thousands of unemployed are not suitable now when unemployment has reached millions. The Life Insurance Co. in the U.S.A. has investigated the situation of workers in view of the catastrophic fall in payments for insurance policies. It was ascertained that 23.8 per cent. of all those who had made these payments were wholly unemployed. And this means that there are almost twelve million wholly unemployed.

To this we must add the millions who are partly unemployed. Even the "American Miner," the organ of the Social Fascist union of miners, specifies the number of unemployed, together with their dependents, as approximately 40 million people. Thus we have a huge army which even goes beyond the limits of the proletarian class because among the the unemployed now you have the "white collar" workers, i.e., bank clerks, office workers, who once had received quite a considerable monthly wage and did not consider themselves part of the working-class. All this cannot but affect the methods and forms which

must be adopted in order to reach the unemployed. Our methods formerly were based mainly on work in the bread lines. We worked to reach the unemployed in the night lodgings. We carried on work among the unemployed who went to the labour exchanges. Certainly, all this now is insufficient.

SKULSKY: Although we had a number of successful demonstrations in Warsaw, Lublin, Posnan in Poland, we must acknowledge, however, that these demonstrations had an insufficient mass character. As one of the causes of this we must note that, in Poland, Fascist terror rages and increases. Besides, one must still take into account the manoeuvres of Polish Fascism.

Recently the Fascists adopted a number of measures (postponing the cutting of wages for miners for one year, draft of a new law for all kinds of social insurance, distribution of potatoes, and money, etc., in a number of localities). In this, Polish Fascism is ahead of Italian and Spanish Fascism. The aim of such a policy is not only for a struggle against the revolutionary organisations of the proletariat, but the desire to gain influence over the masses.

Returning to the question of the inter-relations of the struggle. When we have such large mass unemployment, when the unemployed constitute, in many countries, half of the whole proletarian army, then the movement gains a new quantitative significance. Under present conditions the former forms of inter-relation are no longer sufficient. They must be re-examined from the point of their better adaptation to the present significance of the unemployed movement. Intensifying and widening the union of the struggle of the unemployed with the struggle of employed workers in every way, we must by no means put the slogans which mobilise the unemployed masses into the background. Our Party and trade union organisations must give the struggle of the unemployed under the present conditions almost as much attention as they give to the struggle of the employed workers.

Yet the attention given by our organisations to the struggle of the unemployed lags behind the objective demands of the movement. If the tendency of our organisations in regard to the line of the unemployed struggle is expressed in approximate and rough percentages, then the following is obtained. According to the line of the Party, about 50-70% of our attention is given to political campaigns and inter-Party work (depending on the country and the season); 25-35% to the economic struggle (also depending on the country and the Party), and about 10% to the struggle of the unemployed. It is even worse when we come to the revolutionary trade unions and the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposi-

tion. They allot about 10-20% of their work to the political struggle, about 20-30% to intra-union questions, about 40-50% to the economic struggle of employed workers and not more than 3-5% to the struggle of the unemployed.

Such a state of affairs is absolutely intolerable. The question of the clearness and preciseness of our slogans and the ability to bring such slogans to the fore which under the conditions of a given country and a given period can mobilise the greatest number of the unemployed masses (i.e., 80%) who receive no employment relief whatever, is very important. The main slogan must be the demand for the distribution of benefits to all workers and the maintenance of benefit for the whole period of unemployment of the worker. This demand mobilised in Poland the entire mass of the unemployed when other demands (as for example, increasing benefits up to the level of wages) mobilise those who receive it and have not yet been removed from the list. It is clear that with this main demand others must also be presented. In Germany the chief one must be the demand for the maintenance of the complete benefits for the whole period of unemployment. On other countries we must also determine and put into the foreground those demands which are the chief mobilising links in the whole chain of demands.

One of the most vital questions now is the question of the increased initiative and independence of this movement. Committees of unemployed are now no longer sufficient. We must create independently active mass organisations of unemployed.

PIATNITZKY: The unemployed movement for the last years has a special character. Its peculiarity lies in the fact that the movement against unemployment included both the employed and the unemployed. Let us take two examples: In the strike of the Berlin metal workers there was not a single strike-breaker from the ranks of the unemployed; the same was true of the Ruhr; incidentally, in the face of such colossal unemployment as the present, the like of which has not before been seen in the world, there is not as much strike-breaking as formerly. The character of present unemployment differs from the former in that the unemployed do not become strike-breakers. If the unemployed, who in some countries receive an insignificant dole and in others receive no help whatever, came to the factory gates and declared that they would work at a lower wage—if only work were given them—the wages of the employed would have been lowered far more than has been the case.

In Germany there is some law which prohibits the breaking of an agreement but in America, for example, such a law does not exist, nor does it exist

in a large number of other countries. If the unemployed do not do this to any great extent, in face of the colossal unemployment, it proves that, thanks to our organisations, thanks to the slogans of linking the work among the unemployed and employed, the unemployed to-day greatly differ from those of former times. It is true, we cannot say that this slogan has been realised 100%, but something has been done in this sense. I do not agree with Vasiliev that the campaign of February 25 did not reach the scope we had expected because the date set was very late, and that the campaign should have been set for January. These arguments would have been justified if unemployment were seasonal, transitory—no work in winter, but with the spring, work would commence and unemployment decrease. But what do we see? In Germany unemployment is still increasing regardless of the fact that spring approaches in France unemployment has only just begun to develop (VASILIEV: "That is why the movement in France is developing."). It is impossible to set a date for a world movement which would be acceptable for all countries (the actual slogan of the campaign of this year was assistance to the unemployed for two months of winter, while February is, in many countries, a summer month). Unemployment did not decrease (VASILIEV: "We must make use of what has ripened in the masses"), and not all States began to pay doles to the unemployed by February 25, therefore, it seems to me, that this date did not play an important role. If we were to fix a different date for the struggle with unemployment for every country, the date would have been very significant. The question would have become much sharper, for example, in Poland because there the unemployed demanded coal, and coal, we know, is needed in the winter. But potatoes are always in demand. And to the extent that we are concerned with fuel, in Southern Germany and France, the date was of no significance whatever because there houses are generally not heated.

Comrades are mistaken who think that the success of the campaign on the day of the struggle against unemployment is chiefly to be measured by the extent of the demonstrations which should have taken place on February 25. The question of whether the demonstrations were good or bad settles whether the campaign was successful or unsuccessful. We fixed this day not only for demonstrations but in order to strengthen our work among the unemployed. And what was fixed as the International Day of Struggle against unemployment definitely stimulated the Communist Parties and revolutionary trade unions to work more with the unemployed than they had formerly.

The fact is, that work among the unemployed increased from the moment the day was fixed. What did we expect? Certainly, it is very simple to say

that we expected nothing or that we expected very much. I remember when the question of America was discussed in the E.C.C.I. Commission, the comrades who spoke on this question at this Commission said: "There will not be such a large movement of unemployed in America this year as there was last year on March 6." I will say later why such a large movement was not expected this year. If there was a movement of considerable size anywhere last year which exceeded our anticipations, it was true of America, where no one would have imagined that 1,250,000 workers would come on to the streets at the call of the Communist Party.

Our weakness in such countries, as for example, Germany, Britain, Austria, where there is social insurance for the unemployed is that we carry on work among the unemployed generally. There are many unemployed in Germany who receive a crisis dole (a smaller dole than given for unemployment), and even some who receive, at best, only support from charity organisations. The latter do not go to the labour exchange to register and are difficult to organise. Moreover, they, together with those unemployed owing to the crisis, constitute a large percentage of the unemployed and comprise their most destitute section. (On January 1, 1931, according to official figures, there were 4,357,000 wholly unemployed. Of these, 2,155,000 received unemployment relief, 667,000 crisis doles, and 1,535,000 had to turn for help to charity organisations and the municipalities.) The Communist Party of Germany and the Trade Union Opposition should have chiefly organised these, should have gone to them for support, and then it would have been possible to penetrate into the midst of the unemployed. Working only at the labour exchanges where those who are more or less in regular receipt of unemployed benefit come for their doles, receiving benefit to the extent of one-third to one-half of their wages, the Trade Union Opposition and the German Party organisations cannot reach wide strata of destitute workers.

The same is true of England. There we have many unemployed who receive no relief whatever. If they could be organised, then together with them we could really carry on a struggle. But since we organise the unemployed generally, I am not certain that there are those elements present in the unemployed organisation on which they should, for the most part, turn to for support. Such a differentiation is very essential for carrying on a real organisation of the unemployed, although I acknowledge that it is much more difficult to organise these unemployed since they are not to be found in one place. This is one of our weaknesses in those countries where there is social insurance.

Now for America and Czecho-Slovakia. They can be contrasted. Last year we were all surprised; the American comrades as well, that at the call of the small Communist Party, of whose existence wide

circles of workers still are not aware, great masses of working men and working women came to the demonstrations in almost all industrial cities. We thought that our American Communist Party could strengthen itself, and turn into a mass party even, though at the expense of the unemployed. But what did the Party do in order to retain those unemployed who showed at the demonstration of March 6, 1930, that they were in search of leadership? The Party did not adopt any measures to organise these unemployed. There are only a few unemployed committees in the U.S.A. and they play no rôle whatever in the sense of uniting and organising the unemployed. What were the slogans which the Trade Union Unity League and the Communist Party in the U.S.A. advanced to attract the unemployed? Complete social insurance against unemployment. But the propagandists immediately added, that such insurance can only be introduced under the dictatorship of the proletariat. Is it possible to reach wide masses of unemployed merely with such an abstract slogan?

If our Party had taken this movement into its hands, it could have created a wide organisation of unemployed. It did not do this. It only came out against charity which is widely practised in America to help the unemployed, instead of taking some measures to organise assistance. Well, you can preach as much as you like to the starving worker that he should not go and take the bread of charity, but your propaganda will turn to dust, if he wants to eat. And we drove the unemployed away with our dry propaganda against charity since we could offer nothing in its place.

On the other hand, in Czecho-Slovakia we began to organise the unemployed. We were able, through the demonstrations in the municipalities at the same time, to get help for the unemployed to the extent of 10 to 15 kroners. In this way we succeeded in organising almost one-third of the unemployed and in Czecho-Slovakia the unemployed really support the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia and the Red Trade Unions. (YUSEFOVITCH: "There were also cases in America where we were able to get relief for the unemployed.") Yes, there was a case when the unemployed in New York succeeded in having one million dollars granted by the municipality (the money was given to charity organisations). In spite of the fact that New York's budget comes to 600 million dollars a year, the million-dollar grant to the unemployed was to come from the wages of the municipal workers and employees. One per cent. of their wages was deducted. Even this fact was not sufficiently used by our Party and the Trade Union Unity League. After this, of course, it was not to be expected that there would be mass demonstrations in America. Of course, if there hadn't been a demonstration of 1,250,000 people on March 6, 1930, a

demonstration of 300,000 this year would have been a tremendous achievement, but once 1,250,000 working men and working women had demonstrated, we can no longer count the demonstration of February 25, 1931, as a mass demonstration. We must yet add to this the fact that last year the number of unemployed was half what it was this year.

Furthermore, Comrade Vasiliev, himself an organiser, speaks very slightly of the organisation of the unemployed. That is quite incomprehensible to me; no matter what the contents of the work might be, no matter how correct it is, it is wasted if there is no organisation to strengthen the work already done. (VASILIEV: "What I wanted to emphasise is that if the slogans are not correct, then the best organisation is wasted as well.") That is true. The form of organisation plays a very important rôle. I think that the organisation of the unemployed did not reach wide masses of unemployed in a single country: that can be said even in relation to Germany.

In Germany the forms of organisation were too limited and insufficient. Organisation is carried on there under the flag of the Trade Union Opposition and such an organisation cannot reach large masses of unemployed, particularly the members of the reformist trade unions and even those sympathising with them. Such an organisation cannot rally around itself large masses of unemployed.

About slogans: We cannot limit ourselves only to main slogans: Complete insurance to the extent of full earnings at the expense of the employers and the State. Besides these we must put forward those slogans which, in the given moment, would bring the unemployed to our organisation. Together with such slogans there can be put forward on the 25th of February the demand for simultaneous relief to the extent of two months' wages at the expense of the military budget, and the exemption of the unemployed from the payment of rent. Partial slogans can and must be adopted in every individual case. It is not enough to have unemployed committees who only send out a call for demonstrations. It is impossible to limit oneself only to calling the unemployed to demonstrate. They will come out on the streets once, they will come a second time, a third time, and then they will stop appearing at demonstrations because they see no direct results of their struggle. One must find the content of the work for the organisation of the unemployed and it can be found. There is Germany as an example—what do you think—would it be bad if the unemployed council collected money and organised a restaurant at least for the hungry children of the unemployed? It would not be a bad thing if they defended all the unemployed who are being evicted from their rooms and where the gas, water, and electricity supplies were cut off for non-payment of public service, rates, etc.

If there were a strong organisation to defend the interests of the unemployed, would this not be the content of their work? Was it really impossible to organise support for the unemployed who were being evicted from their houses, etc.? Such activity would have drawn the unemployed to us. They would have come, at least, to the organisation with all their needs and complaints. They would have been strongly bound to such an organisation. And if such an organisation would have called the unemployed to come to demonstrations, I am certain that all would have gone out into the streets and the demonstrations would have included many more than they have. But to-day, when we call them out into the streets, only those come who always side with us, who participate in the struggle of our Party. We have not yet penetrated the widest masses of unemployed despite the fact that there is no other single Party, or single organisation which concerns itself with them. We must rebuild our organisations. We must work out a complete plan of how the organisations of the unemployed should work. I am convinced that very many of our comrades think: is it really worth spending time on such petty spade-work among the unemployed? Yet we must do this work, make it concrete, responsive to the interests of the unemployed. For example, feeding the children of the unemployed or fighting against the eviction of the unemployed—this can be done in Germany as well as in America. There is no country where this could not be done. Is all our work ended among the unemployed with the campaign of February 25? Nothing of the kind. Summer cannot put an end to enormous unemployment. Unemployment will be permanent, not only the structural unemployment which resulted from pitiless capitalist rationalisation, but now also in addition unemployment due to the crisis. So far there are no prospects at all that unemployment will radically decrease this year or in the near future. Therefore it is still not too late to take up now the form of the organisation, and chiefly the concrete content of the work. Thus, if we gave directions concerning the form of the organisation of the unemployed—of committees at the labour exchanges and unemployed councils according to the district and city—I do not remember a single document where anything was said of the content of the work, except for the directions to the American Communist Party which were given several months ago. This is an omission of the R.I.L.U. and the Comintern which should be remedied.

STOLYARSKY: I would like to answer the question raised—why the demonstrations in the provinces were much more aggressive than in the industrial centres. We must take two facts into consideration. First, unemployed do not receive benefit in the provinces to the same extent as those in the centre and the percentage of unemployed who

receive benefit is smaller than in the industrial centres; second, police terror in the provinces is, none the less, weaker than in the industrial centres. In Poland, of the 400,000 registered unemployed, 125,000 receive benefit. This is approximately one-third. If we take the industrial centres—Warsaw, Lodz, Silesia—we see that 70 to 80% of those registered receive benefit while 10% of those in the provinces received doles, and the majority of the unemployed are generally not registered; in many places there is not even a labour exchange. That is why the need of the unemployed in the provinces is so much greater, and since the police forces are not so concentrated there, the unemployed can gather more easily and can remain longer on the streets during the demonstrations. But these demonstrations in the provinces are for the most part spontaneous in character, disorganised, and certainly without that political significance which the demonstrations in large centres have, where the apparatus of force is concentrated. One thing more which the comrades here did not mention, that is—the manoeuvres of Fascism. We know and we saw how in Poland and in the Balkans when the International Day or the Day of the Struggle of the Unemployed for one country was proclaimed, the Government hastens to adopt for example such manoeuvres: several days before the day for the demonstrations the Fascists gave simultaneous doles to the unemployed. With this they hope to pacify the unemployed; they give them coal, bread, potatoes. Undoubtedly, the comrades who say that Fascism does this due to pressure from the masses are right. But we do not take these manoeuvring capacities of Fascism sufficiently into account, *and we do not explain to the masses that these benefits coal, flour, postponement of taxes have been won only by organised struggle.*

Now concerning the slogans. We did not sufficiently differentiate the slogans. I will point out a concrete example in Greece. There the Unitarian unions were able to mobilise as many as 20,000 people in December for simultaneous benefits during the holiday and actually won it, managed to obtain dinners and ultimately increased their influence among the unemployed. I want to turn your attention to several Fascist and Social Fascist slogans which impressed some of the unemployed. This is the slogan of working in turns. We must turn our attention to the events in Halatzia and the port. The unemployed demanded that they be given work; that one day the regular stevedores should work and on the next day the unemployed. This resulted in a bloody clash between the stevedores and the unemployed. We did not expose these manoeuvres of the Social Fascists. We also did not expose those cases where the workers gather to drive out the village workers from the city, and demand that the village workers should not be given work in the cities. We

saw this in Roumania. In Roumania and Greece (tobacco workers) the Social Fascists advanced slogans for the removal of married women from work and of the hiring of men. This also we did not expose.

Now on the question of the unions of unemployed. No one here used the word—"union of the unemployed"— But it seems to me that the idea of several demonstrations was just of that nature. I am afraid that we may have such a phenomenon which was to be observed during the period of great unemployment of 1925-1926 in several Polish districts. There unions of the unemployed were created and their chief work was to collect money for the unemployed in organisations and from individuals. Those who collected the money received a specified percentage and, other than scandals and the corruption of many unemployed, no other results were achieved. We came out very strongly against such unions then, and severely criticised the charity methods of work, mobilising the unemployed around the slogans of state relief, municipal aid, etc. We then advanced the slogan of the acceptance of the unemployed in productive unions and not the creation of unions of unemployed. Now, it is most important to subdivide the slogans and advance them, not generally, but concretely, for the needs of the separate categories of unemployed, organising the struggle for their daily needs.

WEINSTONE: In England the struggle of the unemployed did not reach the broad working masses forced out of industries by the crisis. This, without doubt, together with other causes is to be explained by the fact that there is a relatively high rate of benefit paid to the unemployed in England. The activity of the English proletariat for the current year manifested itself as a much greater upsurge of the struggle of employed workers against reductions in wages and rationalisation as well as in the development of the strike movement. This is especially true of the last three months.

Judging by communications in the press, the demonstrations of the unemployed in England on February 25 brought no basic improvement in comparison with March 6. However, the demonstrations in Scotland were imposing and bring us to the conclusion that important battles in which the unemployed will participate, are imminent.

We discussed the situation in the U.S.A. and came to the conclusion that the most important cause for the decline in the demonstration was the fact that the Communist Party and the Trade Union Unity League did not advance precise, concrete, direct demands, but contented themselves with such general slogans as "Work or Wages."; that they did not popularise the slogan of unemployment insurance,

did not present demands for immediate assistance, and did not carry on organisational work among the unemployed. For example, last year on July 4 a conference was called with 1,300 delegates but the conference was completely unprepared, the delegates had not been chosen from below, the preparation had only begun about a week before the conference, while the conference itself lasted only one day. It was more a mass meeting than a conference. An executive committee of the unemployed was elected but nothing was heard of them after the conference. Under such conditions the bourgeoisie, with the help of an intense propaganda campaign and many demagogical manoeuvres was easily able to confuse the masses. However, some improvement in the struggle of the unemployed can be noted since the last Plenum of the T.U.U.L. This is particularly characteristic of the last weeks. Impressive and aggressive demonstrations have taken place all over the country and attained the highest tension on February 10 in the national demonstrations led by the Party and the T.U.U.L. The demonstrators worked their way into the legislative meeting, as for example, in Minnesota, where the representatives of the unemployed spoke for more than two hours and where the demonstrators carried placards demanding relief. Analogous things took place in other localities. The T.U.U.L. and the Party this time secured the leadership of the struggle of the unemployed.

February 25 was marked by notable success; for example, in Czecho-Slovakia. The demonstrations of February 25 were, undoubtedly, successful in comparison with those which had taken place several months earlier. How is this to be explained? First of all, I explain it by the fact that we learned how to advance concrete slogans and carry on a daily struggle in the interests of the unemployed masses. However, the organisational forms are also significant. I think that it is correct to organise the unemployed into separate organisations with small membership contributions. Such organisations adhere to the revolutionary trade union organisations and are under their leadership. The unemployed organisations must also publish a paper of the unemployed where there is sufficient basis for it.

However, we must take care that these organisations do not grow into organisations of professionally unemployed. Such a tendency can be observed in England. A guarantee against this is the firm leadership of the Revolutionary Trade Union Opposition over the movement of the unemployed, and giving it the widest mass basis. The formation of separate organisations should not exclude the formation of councils of unemployed which must arise in the form of committees, elected by the unemployed at the labour exchanges, at soup kitchens, municipal night lodgings, according to neighbourhoods, as well as at the factory gates. In the

unemployed council there should be representatives of revolutionary trade unions, and fraternal organisations.

CONCLUDING SPEECH OF LOZOVSKY.

It seems to me that a number of comrades put the question incorrectly when they said that they did not know what they expected of February 25. I think that this is an incorrect formulation of the question. If we are to come down to reality, there is not a single country in the world where on February 25—the day of the struggle of the unemployed and employed—the Movement, even to the slightest degree, corresponded with the objective possibilities. What did we expect? We did not expect a revolution, we did not expect street battles. But I think basic slogans would reach a much greater scope. Certainly, no one, either in the Comintern or in the R.I.L.U. thinks that the day of February 25 is the end of the campaign. We consider that February 25 is one of the stages, one of the methods for mobilising the masses and gathering forces, in order to take further steps later.

We have to admit that in Germany—the country which has the largest Communist Party—we achieved far less than we could have had. The cause of this is not at all the reason given by Vasiliev, namely, that the date fixed was February 25 and not January 15. (VASILIEV: "I am still convinced of this.") Certainly, the selection of the day in every international campaign plays a very serious rôle, but the complexity of the international campaign is due to the fact that the movement in different countries ebbs and flows at various periods, and it is impossible, certainly, to catch the moment of the general and simultaneous upsurge in all countries. If we had chosen January 15, the force of the struggle in a number of countries would have been even less. But this does not solve the problem. The basic cause of the insufficient scope of the movement is the fact that the growth of unemployment, the problem of unemployment, was not the main consideration of the Communist Parties. When there were only hundreds of thousands of unemployed, when the unemployed were only 10% of the workers, to say that work among the unemployed was something temporary, transient, could be understood because such a percentage of unemployed was not a decisive one. But when the number of unemployed and partially employed rose to 50% and 60%, the problem of work among the unemployed from the point of view of defending their interests, becomes a most important political task. This means that our work has to be reorganised and that our forces should be turned to the solution of this most important task. And if we allot only one-twentieth of our efforts in order to organise these masses around their demands when half of the proletariat are in the ranks of the unemployed, it means that we have insufficiently made clear to

ourselves the fact that the task presented by many millions of unemployed is not of secondary importance, but one of the most important political tasks, one of the most important organisational tasks at this given stage of our struggle.

The comrades here tried, and quite correctly, to define in one way or another to what extent work among the unemployed is being carried on. I say that the Communist Parties do not allot 10% of their activity to this work. I say more: our sections of the R.I.L.U. do even less than the Communist Parties, when the contrary should be the case. Both the trade unions and the Trade Union Opposition should, at any rate, exert themselves more on this front. Instead of this, we neglect this part of the work which continues to remain some kind of "subsidiary task" and not the central political and organisational work for our Parties and trade unions.

This question is even more important because it places before us not only the problem of work among the unemployed, but also brings the question of our tactics before us in a new light. A year ago we raised the question of an economic struggle during a crisis. But we raised that question when unemployment was much smaller. At the same time, undoubtedly, the greater the number of millions of unemployed, the greater are the difficulties in an economic struggle. It is not at all accidental that the number of strikes in Germany is falling. It is not at all accidental that together with the stormy growth of unemployment, tremendous additional difficulties for the strike movement are created. But a crisis creates not only *new difficulties*, it also creates *new possibilities* for economic struggle. The beginning of 1931 is characterised, for several countries, by a tremendous growth of the strike movement (England). Additional difficulties are compensated by the growing dissatisfaction of the masses, the tremendous unrest of the employed and unemployed, and the growing desire toward struggle. Therefore, the decline in the strike wave in various countries is to be explained, not so much by the growing crisis, as by the subjective factors. We must see, must understand, that together with the problem of the struggle against unemployment, new questions arise of that new situation which is being created under present day conditions for various forms of economic struggle. To-day the question regarding organisational work among the unemployed is doubly important. It seems to me that there was no necessity for Comrade Vasiliev's exaggeration, that organisational work is not now one of the most important tasks. Let us take Germany. There are there 2,000 committees of unemployed. But these committees were chosen in one case by twenty workers, in another by five and in a third by fifty. No one knows how many people elected these committees, what happened to these voters. The voters, who should have participated in

the struggle, were themselves unorganised. We now hang on to the old forms of organisation. At the same time there are about 200,000 members in the Trade Union Opposition and the independent unions, while the unemployed constitute six millions. Organisations should be created which would attract new strata of the workers. In this sphere we have not advanced at all. We have remained in those forms which existed five years ago. (VASILIEV: "What, then, shall we organise new unions of unemployed?") A net of lower organisations of unemployed should be created which would have their own elected organs, which would organise according to districts and regions, which would raise questions of interest to the unemployed. It is also necessary to conduct work for the co-ordination of the organisation of employed and unemployed. We must take the initiative for the organisation of the unemployed. If we do not take the initiative, others will do it. We will lose the possibility of leading the unemployed masses who will fall under the influence of the Fascists. If we work, weld strong organisations, we will then lead it.

In conclusion, the last question consists of the following: How are we, simultaneously with the creation of organisations, formally existing outside of the Red Trade Unions, Oppositions, etc., to retain our influence in them, in order that these organisations represent on the one hand, a significant force, and on the other, carry on a political class struggle?

This can be done only if we take the initiative in creating these organisations, and take not only the initiative, but try to see that the Party and the trade unions, and particularly the trade unions and the revolutionary trade union opposition spend half their energy, half their means, give half of their people, for this work. If we do not do this then the organisations created by us will slip from our hands and can turn into weapons against us. This is seen by the experience of those countries where there were organisations of the unemployed. Therefore, the question of the creation of independent organisations of unemployed is closely bound up with the serious reorganisation of all the work of our trade unions and trade union opposition. Unless this is done everything remains on paper and after a year we will obtain the same results as we have to-day.

What concrete deductions can be made on the basis of the discussion carried on here? First of all, on the form of the organisation of the unemployed. Does that mean that we propose for all countries a stereotyped, and the same organisational form? Certainly not. This would be unbolshevik. The forms of the unemployed organisations must be adapted to the condition of every country, to the conditions of the legal, semi-legal, illegal movement, to colonial and semi-colonial countries, to countries with strong, or with weaker movements. The practical and concrete work which we must now introduce into the trade union movement consists of this.