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Editorial: ON RESUMING PUBLICATION

**CARRY OUT RECTIFICATION,
FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE PARTY AND
INTENSIFY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
STRUGGLE**

**REMINDERS ON THE STRUGGLE
OF IDEAS WITHIN THE PARTY**

CLARIFICATIONS ON OUR TASKS

**Volume I Number 1
January-March 1990**

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Editorial

ON RESUMING PUBLICATION

With this issue, we are resuming the publication of *Rebolusyon*, the theoretical and political organ of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

In this connection, we wish to recall that based on a decision of the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee in late 1975, *Rebolusyon* was thenceforth to be the Party's internal theoretical organ. On the other hand, *Ang Bayan* which the Party Central Committee had been publishing since the Party's reestablishment in December 1968, was to be its news-oriented publication for mass distribution.

In the ensuing period, these two Party publications operated according to their respective orientations, with *Rebolusyon* coming out with its very first issue in June 1976. It contained the Third Plenum's summing-up document, "Our Urgent Tasks," which provided the theoretical underpinnings for our steady advance in the following several years.

In 1977, due to circumstances beyond our control, *Rebolusyon* suspended publica-

tion after coming out with its third issue. Consequently, *Ang Bayan* also carried articles of a theoretical-political nature, in addition to its usual news contents.

Rebolusyon is resuming publication at a time when the Party is calling for ideological as well as political and organizational consolidation in preparation for bigger advances in our national democratic revolutionary struggles amid favorable objective conditions for such advances. It also comes at a time when the Party is reinvigorating democracy within its ranks in the form of free discussions and principled struggles on all important issues regarding our revolutionary theory and practice. As originally intended by the Third Plenum of the Party Central Committee, and with the cooperation of all Party organs and units as well as members, we are sure *Rebolusyon* will be of help in these important undertakings.

As before, *Rebolusyon* is under the aegis of the Party Central Committee and its

nature is both theoretical and political in line with Marxism-Leninism and with our national democratic revolution, and is for the benefit mainly of Party cadres and members.

More to the point, we hope to be able to come out with articles with the following scope:

1. Theory on the basis of the classics and basic principles, with relevance to the national democratic revolution and to socialist revolution (from theoretical to practical);

2. Theory and current revolutionary practice of whatever entity of our Party and whatever scope in time (on any matter of general or critical interest);

3. Philippine history, politics, economics, culture and art, and international issues in light of Marxism-Leninism;

4. Theory and current revolutionary practice of foreign parties and movements.

In accordance with a recent decision of the Political Bureau, The Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the Party acts as the Editorial Board and produces *Rebolusyon* through an editorial staff.

The Editorial Board calls upon Party organs and units as well as individual Party members to submit contributions. We

also welcome contributions, including reprints, from the authorities and members of foreign Parties.

To stimulate discussions and promote democracy, the Editorial Board likewise invites the readers — be they Party collectives or individual members — to respond to published articles or comment on policies of the Party with a view to clarifying issues or promoting inner Party discussions. Generally, such responses and comments should not exceed two or three pages so as to afford everybody a chance to have his views aired.

In its selection of articles to publish, the Editorial Board will give due consideration to contributed articles and suggestions from readers. The Editorial Board will also give consideration to urgent and significant issues which will be taken up by assigned writers, if necessary. Decisions by the Editorial Board, including the selection of articles to print in a given issue, will of course be subject to constraints of time and space.

The Editorial Board will endeavor initially to publish *Rebolusyon* on a quarterly basis (once every three months). In time, we hope to be able to come out even more frequently than that.

CARRY OUT RECTIFICATION, FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE PARTY AND INTENSIFY THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

The Communist Party of the Philippines has completed another year of arduous revolutionary struggle. It is fully determined to win further victories, rectify errors and shortcomings, further strengthen itself and intensify the national democratic revolution against US imperialism and the local exploitative classes of the comprador big bourgeois and landlords.

The Party has the capacity to further build its strength as the proletarian vanguard and perform its revolutionary duties. It fights for the patriotic and progressive rights and interests of the broad masses of the Filipino people, relies on them and mobilizes them against their oppressors and exploiters, and takes advantage of the ever-worsening crisis of the moribund ruling system. The Party has a deep reservoir of strength built through more than twenty years of life-and-death struggle. It is ever determined to increase the ranks of Party cadres and members and raise their quality through struggle, and is ever ready to identify errors and weaknesses in order to rectify them.

I. Rectifying Errors, Overcoming Weaknesses and Further Strengthening the Party

By dint of hard work, militant struggle and self-sacrifice, the Party and the masses that it leads have proven themselves to be the most formidable and most developed revolutionary force in the Philippines. The enemy confirms this fact by describing the Party and the revolutionary mass movement as the biggest threat to the ruling system and by ruthlessly launching campaigns of anticommunist suppression. Despite the enemy's unprecedentedly massive and vicious enemy campaigns of terror and deception, the Party has been able to lead the armed revolution and the legal democratic movement from victory to victory.

The preservation of the Party and the other revolutionary forces against tremendous odds posed by the US-Aquino regime's policy of total war is by itself a great victory. More than just preserving itself, however, the revolutionary movement has painstakingly strengthened itself and advanced the anticolonialist, antifeudal and antifascist struggle. In

the countryside, in towns and in cities in the various regions and in so many provinces, the Party, the people's army and the revolutionary mass organizations have kept aloft the red banner of revolution and thereby invigorated the broad masses to persevere in struggle and demand their democratic rights.

The advances made by the revolutionary movement are stepping stones towards greater victories, serve to further widen the cracks in the ruling system and render as a mere pipedream the enemy's boast of destroying the movement by 1992. While the counterrevolutionary total war suffers one defeat after another, the Aquino regime must pay the political, military and financial costs of its policy of intensifying militarization in the countryside and in urban areas that surpasses the worst perpetrated by the Marcos fascist dictatorship, and must accept a bigger U.S. role, direct and indirect, in "counterinsurgency."

On the other hand, certain errors and shortcomings in major lines of revolutionary work have been pinpointed whose rectification was more than ever before vigorously pursued in 1989. These errors and shortcomings have been obstacles to our continuous and all-round advance and would probably cause more harm unless they are promptly and decisively overcome. While adjustments are now being undertaken in plans, priorities and allocations of cadre and other resources of the Party, we must pursue the solutions more resolutely and must deepen our unified comprehension of the lessons from our past experience and of the prac-

tical and theoretical matters involved. While actively leading, expanding and intensifying tactical struggles, we must firmly attend to the task of *solution and rectification for internal consolidation* and as a means of ensuring all-sided progress over a long period to come.

In the armed revolution, the New People's Army led by the Party has seized a big number of firearms from the enemy and has inflicted on him a big number of casualties. This results from our conscious intensification of the armed struggle nationwide, our upgrading of our capability and technique in battle through our own efforts, and our effective use of the sufficiently extensive guerrilla fronts to repeatedly strike blows on vulnerable enemy units and contingents. Although the US-Aquino regime's total war and gradual constriction have brought about problems and difficulties to the Party, to the people's army and most of all to the masses, these have not deprived NPA units of sufficient areas for maneuver. Losses are so great and so frustrating to the enemy that the reactionary factions out of power are denouncing the ruling Aquino and Ramos factions for failure in their campaigns of anticommunist suppression.

Based on the present level of guerrilla warfare in the country, it is appropriate and necessary to maintain main units of company or undersized company strength or a combination of platoons for offensive operations under the command of the typical region or advanced guerrilla front. These serve as the strike forces as well as the rallying points of smaller

but more numerous and more widely deployed local guerrilla forces (squads and platoons), armed propaganda units and groups, and units of the people's militia. In keeping this balance, the people's army is able to maintain a high level of initiative and flexibility for offensive and defensive requirements and more effectively combine annihilative and attritive actions, and military work and mass work. Whenever necessary, the main forces combine with local guerrilla forces to launch operations requiring strength exceeding that of a company, or disperse into platoons and squads to carry out military operations or mass work on a wider scale.

The creation of guerrilla units giving principal stress to military work and, not long afterwards, of company formations in relatively advanced regions, gave rise to the intensification of guerrilla warfare nationwide in the first half of the 1980s. The subsequent "regularization" (standardization) programs, strengthening of coordination among regions and guerrilla fronts, and the further development of annihilative capacity also enhanced the overall capability, technique and methods of the people's army. But there also arose some serious negative tendencies to one-sidedly give stress to battle requirements, to the strengthening of the main forces and, more recently, the hasty creation of even bigger formations in the people's army.

In some extreme cases, the one-sided strengthening of the main forces and the prematureness in the creation of even bigger formations resulted in the almost total depletion

of cadres and personnel who should be doing mass work in the localities. There have also been some cases of excessive centralization of guerrilla units in relatively high levels of command. But the most common manifestation of the problem in some areas has been the excessive weakening, excessive delay or the total lack of development for long periods of time of local guerrilla forces, armed propaganda units, people's militia and military work in the localities.

The size, number and mode of deployment of big strike units should conform to our situation in logistics, reserves and, most important of all, mass support. In a situation where we lack cadres in the localities and the local armed units are very weak, the mass base in many parts of the countryside has not continuously expanded and deepened, and has even been weakened in quite a number of places because of enemy onslaughts. While we have not decisively resolved the problem regarding cadres, guerrilla forces and mass work in the localities, the bigger fighting units cannot be optimized and will become a bigger burden and probably susceptible to a host of problems. If totally or seriously deprived of mass support, these units may be pushed into a passive position, and become highly visible and vulnerable to superior military forces of the enemy.

The New People's Army is waging people's war and is imbued with conscious discipline instilled in it by the Communist Party of the Philippines. As a fighting force, the people's army can be put on campaigns with short rest periods between battles.

The people's army strives to improve its capability and technique in battle, its command and coordination at appropriate levels, and its support services like intelligence, medical and logistics. But more than before, at its various levels it must provide more time and attention to political and production work.

Any armed organization that depends mainly or solely on its firepower and neglects mass work is liable to be isolated from the people, becomes arrogant and commandist and is prone to commit serious mistakes not only in political terms but even in military terms. Cadres and men of the people's army must participate more actively in mass work since there is a dearth of cadres and activists doing mass work and other work in the localities. But more than this, the continuous and deepgoing participation of units of the people's army in mass work is needed to ensure their internal political health and vigor, as well as their close and correct relations with the people.

The Party has achieved victory in clarifying the long-term all-round requirements for attaining total victory in the protracted people's war as well as the current all-round requirements of developing guerrilla warfare in the strategic defensive. Party cadres and members and NPA commanders and fighters now have a better understanding of the comprehensive requirements of waging armed revolution. Imbalances in regard to revolutionary work and in the allocation of cadres and resources have been noted and are being redressed. The Party must strive to advance extensive and intensive

guerrilla warfare that enlists a bigger and bigger organized support of the people. This is the principal road for further advances in the strategic defensive and for the eventual leap into the strategic stalemate and strategic offensive.

The main units of the New People's Army must be augmented by secondary units and reserves. The NPA must make certain that it has wide and deepgoing support from the organs of political power and the mass organizations of various types. Party cadres and resources must be reallocated so that the formation of larger units does not fly away from the necessity of building a wide and deepgoing mass base. Any shrinkage of the mass base in the countryside resulting either from enemy attacks or the Party's own subjective errors, or both, must be confronted and remedied by resolute efforts to expand and consolidate the mass base and more than compensate for any unavoidable loss of territory due to enemy attacks.

The 60 guerrilla fronts cover only 20 percent of the national population and territory. And within each guerrilla front, the development of the revolutionary forces is uneven. There is, therefore, a wide field for expansion and consolidation within and beyond the guerrilla fronts. The Party must have a well-balanced view regarding the formation of larger NPA units and the creation of an even wider and deepgoing mass base.

The bulk of the present mass base in the countryside was formed from the late 1970s to the middle of the 1980s, through rapid expansion and militant antifeudal and antifas-

cist mass campaigns which complemented the expansion and intensification of guerrilla warfare throughout the land. As early as that time, in many regions and guerrilla fronts the work of solidifying the organizations and giving political education to the masses was being left far behind. The effect is evident even today in the big disproportion between the number of people within the mass organizations and the much bigger number of people encompassed by the guerrilla fronts and governance of the organs of political power. In the 1980s, there was a relative lowering in the quality of cadres and units directly supervising mass work in the localities due to the lack of theoretical and political education and training plus the continuous reassignment of cadres to higher levels, to military work and to other lines of work. This accounts for the renewed aggravation in the problem of inactive and narrowing mass organizations, dispirited mass base, and procedures whereby army units were linking up with, and getting dependent upon, Party branches, organs of political power or other relatively small groups in the barrios without consultation with, and mobilization of, more people.

The Party is now more determined to improve organization work in the mass organizations of workers, peasants, fishermen, youth, women, professionals and cultural activists; invigorate the agrarian revolution and other mass campaigns; and expand the organs of political power and committees of the National Democratic Front. In strengthening and raising the qual-

ity of the mass base, the Party is also alert to the dangers of becoming unduly engrossed with or setting false targets in the development of the agrarian revolution and of organs of political power in guerrilla bases and relatively advanced areas. Sufficient attention and personnel must be given to the expansion and consolidation of the mass base in places that are not yet well organized, and that are more unstable and more complicated but are more heavily populated and more politically significant lower areas, lowlands and coastal areas. We must make certain that the mass base has sufficient breadth and depth and is well entrenched in the mountainous areas, in the lowlands and beside principal transportation routes.

Based on the strength of our revolutionary forces, what we are capable of implementing in the agrarian revolution until today is the minimum program of land reform in only over 20 percent of the countryside. This includes rent reduction, control of interest rates, improving farm workers' wages, arranging fair prices for farm products, enhancing production through household units, and elementary forms of cooperation in agriculture. We limit and are more deliberate about the implementation of the maximum program of confiscation which cannot as yet be defended except in a few exemplary cases, particularly against landgrabbers and despotic landlords.

The organs of political power and the mass organizations must work together in undertaking campaigns of education on the national

democratic revolution and on class and sectoral issues; further organizing the people into associations; collecting reasonable contributions and taxes; running health programs; organizing and training the militia and self-defense forces; arbitrating problems among the people; raising the cultural level and providing entertainment through cultural works, presentations and sports.

The organs of political power must have working committees to direct the mass organizations and give full play to their initiative. The Party and the NDF must see to it that the organs of political power and the mass organizations in the localities are functioning and developing, and are providing all necessary support to the New People's Army.

There is a sufficient number and quality of cadres to further invigorate, expand and strengthen mass work and the mass movement in the localities, provided there is efficiency and balance in the assignment of present cadres, army units participate in mass work, leading Party committees and cadres exercise closer supervision and guidance, and theoretical and political training is well attended to. Cadres and activists deployed from the urban areas to the localities also provide very valuable support. We must now avoid the situation where cadres and units in the localities lacking experience and knowledge are left to fend for themselves without sufficient guidance and check-up by higher Party committees, are incapable of, and are not given any training in, maneuvering and carrying on their work when the enemy is active, or

are easily entrapped in the enemy's military operations or lose heart and flee.

The U.S.-Aquino regime's total war and so-called *strategy of gradual constriction* are base-denial and clear-and-hold operations enlarged and expanded nationwide for the purpose of rapidly crushing the armed revolutionary movement. Gradual constriction which is being carried out in 12 guerrilla fronts is characterized by the concentration of large military and paramilitary forces and the launching of large scale and continuous sweeps, harassment and destruction to crush the revolution's mass base, create a purely military situation, and eventually corner and defeat the main forces of the people's army.

To frustrate the enemy's total war and gradual constriction, the Party and the people's army must have the resolve to combat the enemy and must have a high level of flexibility and mobility, and there must be indirect and direct coordination among the regions and guerrilla fronts to intensify guerrilla warfare in the widest expanse possible and throughout the country. The enemy must be made to pay dearly for spreading terror in the countryside and for his excessive concentration and protracted stationing in some places. He must be made to suffer and to shed blood through widespread operations of annihilation and attrition, and through widespread mass exposures and protests. At the same time, we must maintain the broadest mass base in the countryside for the flexibility and maneuverability of units of

the people's army. While striving to fight the enemy and mobilize the masses within the areas of enemy operations, we must continuously expand to areas that are relatively free of the enemy.

The enemy's gradual constriction strategy cannot defeat the revolutionary forces if the NPA itself does not go into self-constriction by the formation of larger units that lack widespread mass support and reserves, and does not commit the error of becoming inflexible and static. The U.S.-Aquino regime is confronted by worsening political, military and financial problems rooted in the ever-deepening economic and political crisis. It is becoming increasingly difficult for the enemy to sustain the previous magnitude and intensity of its assaults, the people's armed and unarmed resistance is expanding, and factional strife in the ranks of reaction is intensifying. Although revolutionary work in some areas get disorganized or even destroyed for a time by the enemy's concentrated force, he leaves other wide areas open for revolutionary work. Space temporarily conceded to the enemy is in due time recovered by the revolutionary forces.

There is no other way to defeat the enemy but to take up the just cause of the people and arouse, organize and mobilize them on a nationwide scale. The Party skillfully wields the weapons of armed struggle and united front in order to defend the people and deliver lethal blows against the enemy.

The legal mass movement of workers, peasants, fishermen, youth, women, teachers and other profes-

sionals has grown in strength and become more militant as the U.S.-Aquino regime is held responsible for the betrayal of the people's national and democratic interests, and for the ever-worsening socio-economic conditions. 1989 has been a year of big advances in the legal democratic movement throughout the country, of upsurges in mass protests and struggles, and of closer interlinking of economic and political mass struggles.

The workers' movement is ahead of the other mass movements. Workers have widely launched strikes that further expanded and gained strength and culminated a number of times in general strikes. The initiative in the workers' movement remains in the hands of genuine and anti-imperialist trade unions which are ever expanding. Workers have also been spearheading mass actions with an increasingly anti-imperialist and anti-U.S. bases content.

The growing strength of the peasant movement is felt not only in the countryside but also in urban areas. The open peasant movement has been playing a more prominent role in exposing and fighting the U.S.-Aquino regime's opposition to genuine and thoroughgoing land reform. The correctness of the land reform program of the revolutionary movement is thus underscored, and the narrow interests fostered by the ruling state of the landlord class and the comprador big bourgeoisie is all the more exposed. The peasant movement has been making increasing use of legal forms and methods of organization, education, propaganda and struggle. Although distinctively

antifeudal in character, the open peasant movement plays a big role in the antifascist and antimilitarization struggles and an increasingly prominent role in antibases and antiimperialist campaigns and propaganda.

The youth and student movement is resurgent and is fast gaining strength. The nationwide boycott movement against tuition fee increases and the continuing anti-imperialist protests among the youth and students are indications of an advance towards a new level of militance. The youth movement is exceedingly important because it is the training ground for educated cadres necessary for various types of revolutionary work.

The women's movement is also resurgent. The combination of working class, peasant and urban petty bourgeois women is already at work and is a potentially formidable force. The women's movement has been gaining prominence not only in championing women's interests and in tackling women's issues but in the overall democratic movement and in the antiimperialist, antifascist and antifeudal struggles.

Among the professionals are the teachers who are fighting for decent working and living conditions. They have repeatedly been launching general strikes and other protest actions for their economic demands and their democratic rights. They have consistently demonstrated that the US-Aquino regime has never taken up the interests of the middle social strata. With the passing of time, the teachers have come to clearly interlink their economic struggles to the antiimperialist

struggle. The public school teachers have inspired other government employees to rise up and make their own demands. Government employees have gained experience at self-organization and militant action, are advancing fast and are actively joining up with the workers' movement.

The community-based organizations of the urban poor, youth and other sectors have been subjected to campaigns of terror and intimidation by the military, police and paramilitary forces. But they are struggling hard to flourish and to grow in strength in the face of intensifying repression in the urban areas.

The various patriotic and progressive sectors of society are building their distinct organizations; and at the same time are building alliances within every sector and also multisectoral alliances. They are taking up sectoral and multisectoral issues that are guided by the national democratic line.

The National Democratic Front, the most consolidated underground united front organization of the basic forces, and the legal united front organizations of basic forces have been increasing their strength within their respective frames. They have also been combatting sectarian tendencies without giving up revolutionary class principles. They are always ready and willing to broaden the united front on a consultative and consensual basis. Thus, broader united front formations and broader united actions have arisen and continue to arise.

The united front is an important weapon for realizing the people's power, for bringing together the widest range of forces against the enemy, and for frustrating the attempts of the enemy to isolate and discredit the most progressive forces.

The Party has accomplished much in political work, in building the revolutionary mass movement. But it should not be self-satisfied and complacent. Even when work is being done well, the question can be raised whether it can be done better. The Party has to be alert that the correct line and methods of work are followed, that errors and shortcomings are identified and rectified, that those who lag behind or even commit errors can catch up with those who work well and produce good results. Criticism and self-criticism based on fact must be promoted and invigorated.

Accomplishments and shortcomings can be analyzed, understood and acted upon at the level of political work. The revolutionary movement can be pushed forward by political education on the program of the national democratic revolution and by conscious avoidance of opportunist errors of the Right or ultra-Left kind.

But to have a more comprehensive and profound understanding of the revolutionary process and to be able to recognize the subjectivist roots of errors, be these dogmatist or empiricist, it is necessary to promote theoretical education in Marxism-Leninism on the basis of the works of the great communists and in connection with the concrete practice of the Philippine revolution. Periodic

and timely criticism and self-criticism must be undertaken in accordance with the scientific spirit and with the personal ease of mind among Party members.

Steps are under way to run schools and theoretical study, publish a theoretical journal, encourage researches and social investigation, and produce study materials that may be read in advance by Party cadres and members or discussed in advance by Party units. Theoretical education has been neglected in the last few years, and the adverse effects of this neglect is now being felt by the revolutionary movement.

More important than the abstract study of foreign works is the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Philippine history and circumstances and the already long and rich experience of revolutionary struggle in the Philippines. Many of the major errors and shortcomings emerging in political work are due to the neglect of theoretical education and to the failure to apply the correct outlook and methodology on the practice and problems of the Philippine revolution.

Theoretical education produces the cadres at the core of the Philippine revolution, who keep the Party on the road of revolution and who can lead the work, no matter how history goes into twists and turns. They can range over the past and present and have foresight, an attribute that is needed in leading the revolution to victory.

By virtue of the escalating attacks of the enemy as well as by virtue of its own errors and weaknesses, the Party membership has not registered an overall significant

increase. Certain regions have registered increases while others, losses. If there is no increase of Party cadres and members, the revolutionary mass movement would suffer from lack of a proletarian hard-core.

When the enemy succeeds in forcing the evacuation of the people or in imposing military and paramilitary control on any area, the Party should try to operate among the evacuees or among the controlled people. But the principal means by which the Party can compensate for losses in one area is to build its strength in other areas. Only through flexible tactics and the energetic broadening and deepening of the mass base can we ensure the continuous expansion and strengthening of the Party in the face of the enemy's ferocious assaults.

Among the errors that have limited the growth of Party membership are the rapid absorption of cadres and resources into the military effort; the lack of theoretical and political training; the bureaucratism and commandism which dampens initiative and development of Party members and mass activists; the liberalism and ultrademocracy which weaken unity and discipline; the sectarianism in dealing with actual and potential allies; and, worst of all, the recurrent hysteria in antiinfiltration campaigns. All these errors are being rigorously corrected.

Regarding the problem of hysteria in antiinfiltration campaigns, the Party has upheld the principle that the structures and normal processes of the revolutionary organizations are to be trusted because they and their members have emerged

from the test of revolutionary struggle. There are now clear guidelines that distinguish contradictions among the people and contradictions between the people and the enemy; and guidelines to prevent the emergence of deadly panic that arise from mere suspicions and speculation.

The Party has formulated and implemented the principles and methods pertaining to prearrest investigation, determination of prima facie evidence, investigation of the arrested suspect, trial, evaluation of evidence, calibration of penalties and the appeal process. Work among personnel in the legal and judicial processes are well delineated to prevent violation of the right to due process as well as other rights of suspects and those under arrest. The legal and judicial system of the revolutionary movement is being developed, and legal and paralegal training is being undertaken.

The problem of Party cadres and members and Party documents being seized by the enemy has been confronted and is being decisively dealt with. The laxity of Party cadres and members which started in 1984 and peaked in 1986 and 1987, especially during the ceasefire, has been identified as a major cause of successful enemy actions against Party cadres and members, especially in the urban areas. There are city-based Party organizations which are neglectful of rules of clandestine conduct and which have become used to mixing up legal and illegal personnel, units, facilities and lines of communication, a situation dangerous not only for them but for others

with whom they are in contact.

Contacts in urban areas of Party personnel on the wanted list of the enemy with former political prisoners, progressive leaders, relatives and other viably legal but marked people are extremely vulnerable to enemy surveillance. The countryside under the control of the NPA can be used as the venue for any necessary meeting between "wanted" and "marked" personnel.

The urban basing and style of work of Party personnel in the enemy's wanted list are under serious study and action is being undertaken to ensure security. Leading Party cadres in urban work and in the enemy's wanted list should refrain from any direct contact with those in the legal democratic struggle. The former should give timely guidance and directives to the latter. But the former should encourage the latter to learn to rely upon their own initiative, and be creative and resourceful while being guided by basic principles, policies and standing decisions.

In view of Party documents previously seized by the enemy, the entire Party is alert to intensified surveillance and intrigues by the enemy and knows how to deal with these. Methods for keeping information, prohibiting overrecording and dependence on computer equipment, have been clarified and are being implemented, even as we strive to strengthen the reporting system and the documentation and dissemination of important analyses and decisions of leading committees of the Party.

Guided by the principle of democratic centralism, the Party is seeking to strengthen itself organizationally by taking major steps necessary to bring into organs of leadership tested and competent cadres and putting into full play the initiative of the Party membership. Higher organs are determined to issue timely analyses and guidelines on issues and on work to be done, to promptly solve key problems that cannot be solved by lower organs and organizations, to avoid protracted administrative meetings so as to allow more time for study and work, as well as combat bureaucratism in order to give full play to the initiative, creativity and resourcefulness of lower organs.

The Party is consciously promoting inner Party democracy as well as democratic consultations and consensus with allies and other non-Party people. In promoting inner Party democracy, the Party is mindful of providing appropriate venues for discussion and debate in consonance with the Party's clandestine character. By making timely decisions on the basis of inner Party democracy, the problem of liberalism or looseness — including the problem of sensitive matters falling or spilling into enemy ears — is averted. If inner Party democracy does not exist, Party cadres and members are like robots functioning under bureaucrats, or else they are tempted to violate discipline and voice their complaints outside the confines of the Party.

At the same time, because it is engaged in a life-and-death struggle with the enemy, the Party requires

discipline and unity of will among its members and adopts strict but not excessive security measures. We must strengthen the Party spirit and consciously combat individualism, small-group mentality and ultrademocracy which are symptoms of petty bourgeois weaknesses within the Party. We must also forestall irresponsible bickerings in certain parts of the Party which often aggravate differences and misunderstandings, and abet the disregard of Party policies and decisions, and looseness in discipline.

The Party is determined to expand its membership on a nationwide scale in both urban and rural areas on the basis of an expanding mass movement. More Party cadres should arise from the ranks of the workers and peasants. But there is also an acute need for educated cadres who can be assigned to work among the toiling masses, the people's army and in spheres requiring professional and technical competence.

Aside from developing the revolutionary forces within the country, the Party promotes the patriotic and progressive organizations among overseas Filipinos. The Party is doing international work in order to make the people of the world aware of the significance of the Philippine revolution and to gather moral and material support from them. The Party has expanded its relations with working class and other parties and revolutionary movements abroad. Solidarity organizations in support of the Filipino people's revolutionary struggles continue to expand in the various regions of the world.

II. The Crisis of the Ruling System

The objective conditions for the growth in strength and advance of the revolutionary movement are exceedingly favorable. The nonsolution and aggravation of such fundamental problems of the Filipino people as US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism are plunging the semicolonial and semifeudal system into a new and deeper level of economic and political crisis.

The same crisis that brought about the rise, decline and fall of the Marcos fascist dictatorship and has put the entire ruling system on a course of disintegration continues undiminished and has become even far worse under the bourgeois-democratic veneer of the US-Aquino regime's restoration of the big comprador-landlord governmental institutions and processes obtaining in the prefascist or pre-1972 period. The perseverance of the armed revolution guarantees the doom of the ruling system.

The class character of the US-Aquino regime is fundamentally similar to that of the Marcos regime. Like its immediate predecessor, it is a proimperialist and reactionary regime of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class. It pretended at first to be liberal democratic but it soon became increasingly oppressive and exploitative of the working people and middle social strata. The Aquino regime has proven itself incapable of solving the fundamental problems of the people but capable of aggravating them.

The Aquino regime has been consistently more subservient to US imperialism than the Marcos regime in an all-round way, especially in economic and security policies. It has adamantly refused to undertake basic reforms to assert political and economic independence and carry out genuine and thoroughgoing land reform. The current regime has not only failed to cleanse the country of the stench of corruption and bloody crimes of the previous regime but is surpassing it in corruption and human rights violations.

The Aquino regime is in a worse economic and financial situation than the Marcos regime and has to face more bitter internal strife within the civil and military frames of the entire political system. The regime also has a bigger problem with an expanding revolutionary movement more determined than ever before to overthrow the reactionary state through a protracted people's war.

The Aquino regime promotes socio-economic policies beneficial to US, Japanese and other foreign investors and creditors and to the local exploiting classes, but extremely harmful to the broad masses of the people. The economy remains agrarian and underdeveloped, dependent on raw-material and labor exports, low-value added reexports and imports of consumer and producer goods that do not change the character of the economy.

The economy is being bled dry by increasing foreign debt servicing and transfer pricing, profit remittances on foreign investments, bureaucratic corruption, military expenditures, luxury consumption and

other import-dependent activities.

What is passed off as economic recovery is the increase of spending on luxury consumption and nonproductive activities. The growth of the gross national product is accounted for by a rise in consumption due to increased government expenditures. Despite this, however, essential public services, including electricity and transport, are gravely short of public need.

The already crushing foreign debt burden of US\$30 billion is bound to grow. The annual debt service level now exceeds US\$4 billion, which is more than 60 percent of export income, and creates a demand for new loans. Trade deficits are rapidly growing because the terms of trade for Philippine exports continue to deteriorate. Budgetary deficits are also rapidly growing because debt service and military expenditures are eating up more than 60 percent of the budget.

The lot of the common people is accumulated unemployment of more than 40 percent; deliberate depression of wages; soaring prices of basic consumer goods; shortage of basic consumer and producer goods; and breakdown of production and essential social services. More than 70 percent of the people fall below the poverty line and their number continues to increase. There is widespread malnutrition and disease.

Criminality is on the rise. Military, police and paramilitary personnel engage in criminal activities, victimizing ordinary people. They rob, kill, maltreat and threaten people both in areas where there is armed conflict and where there is none yet.

Under conditions of rapidly worsening exploitation and oppression, there is widespread social unrest and people's resistance. The working people and the middle strata are increasingly launching mass actions to protest their intolerable conditions and to demand better conditions. The aggravated general economic crisis and the intensification of feudal and semifeudal exploitation in the countryside provide *fertile ground for armed revolution.*

The original intent of the restoration of the pre-1972 institutions and processes under populist and democratic pretenses was to spread power-sharing from the narrowness of the fallen Marcos fascist clique to a relatively wider pro-Aquino coalition of reactionary factions; and to marginalize and exclude the genuine representatives of the people.

However, under economic and financial conditions worse than those under the Marcos regime, the Aquino faction, especially the relatives, have tended to monopolize bureaucratic loot. The rivalries among factions within the pro-Aquino ruling coalition, and between the Aquino and anti-Aquino factions within the entire ruling system, has intensified.

The pro-Aquino ruling coalition, *Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino* (LDP), has steadily narrowed and made the partner factions of the Aquino faction within it uneasy. The military faction of Ramos and the civil faction of Salonga, the Liberal Party (LP), are still uneasy major partners. While rejecting the Pimentel faction, the Pilipino Democratic Party (PDP), the Aquino faction has cynically won over to its fold erst-

while elements of the Marcos faction. Now ranged against the Aquino faction is an anti-Aquino coalition of the factions of Laurel (Nacionalista Party-Laurel wing), Enrile (NP-Enrile wing), and Marcos' political heirs, especially Eduardo Cojuangco and General Ver (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan).

In connection with the presidential election of 1992, all major political factions are engaged in maneuvers and countermoves within the ruling system and within the pro-Aquino coalition. What makes their interfactional struggle increasingly volatile is the deteriorating socio-economic conditions, the increasing discredit and isolation of the Aquino faction and the rise of the revolutionary movement.

Political struggle is not confined to civil forms. These factions build their own private armed organizations and their connections with factions within the Armed Forces of the Philippines. At the same time, factions within the AFP seek to build their own connections with Washington, the major civil factions and with financiers among the big compradors and landlords.

In terms of indefinitely maintaining a bourgeois-democratic civil facade of the big comprador-landlord state, the United States has unwittingly made a series of mistakes by promoting the fascist politicization of the AFP under the Marcos regime, introducing a split within the AFP to overthrow Marcos and prohibiting Aquino from removing fascists and anti-Aquino factions of the AFP. There are now four definable factions within the AFP. They

are the Ramos, Aquino, Enrile and Marcos factions. At the same time, due to widespread discontent within and outside the AFP, there is a strong current independent of these military factions but willing to cooperate with other factions in a coup against the Aquino and Ramos factions. This independent current springs from the widespread discontent within and outside the AFP.

All and each of the four factions and those belonging to the independent current are strongly pro-US and anticommunist. The fractiousness of the AFP is bad for the ruling system. But the United States wants to make use of it and does make use of it to promote its own interests, especially the perpetuation of the US military bases beyond 1991.

The coup attempt that ran from November 30 to December 9 took advantage of the popular mood against the Aquino regime in connection with the economic crisis. The coup plotters accused the regime of failure in the anticommunist suppression campaign, of corruption and of economic mismanagement.

The coup leaders demanded the resignation of Aquino, her cabinet and the whole of Congress; and sought to install a governing military council which was supposed to give way at the soonest to a civilian-military junta. They promised to hold a referendum on a new system of government; and elections. The coup attempt was planned and carried out by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM), and Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP) and the Young Officers Union (YOU). It

involved the combination of the Enrile and Marcos factions and the independent current of officers who detest the Aquino regime and the Ramos and Aquino factions within the AFP.

The latest coup attempt was far bigger, more destructive and closer to success than the first serious coup attempt in August 1987 because it was able to muster several high-ranking military officers, including several generals, and at least 3,000 troops from elite units, including the marines and scout rangers.

But this recent coup attempt still carried the aspect of a coup de theatre. There were no special ground units of sufficient size assigned to seize the palace and the persons of President Aquino, General Ramos and AFP Chief of Staff General de Villa. The coup plan was obviously designed to minimize casualties between opposing military factions, induce officers and men to change sides or stay neutral and let the civilians take most of the casualties.

There are indications that — as in the past coup threats and in the 1987 coup attempt — US handlers of the coup plotters put a limit to the coup plan and gave the highest US authorities the chance to intervene at a point known to them well in advance. The capture or killing of Aquino was completely out of the plan.

It was a coup attempt bound to fail by a basic flaw in its design. It failed as soon as US F-4 phantom jets made their "persuasive flights." The sound and fury of the coup attempt demonstrated that the United States held the ultimate extraterritorial power in a neocolony.

and that Aquino was at the mercy of the United States and was more than ever beholden to her foreign master. The United States delivered the clear message that she must extend the tenure of the US military bases or else suffer the consequences.

So far, the coup threats and coup attempts have had the function of a shakedown beneficial to the United States. After every coup threat or coup attempt, the United States gets what it wants from the Aquino regime, pushes it to adopt a more antinational and antidemocratic stand and boosts the political stock of General Ramos who has been building "peace and order councils" and the paramilitary forces as his political base.

Given their own hatred for the Aquino and Ramos factions, the anti-Aquino and anti-Ramos factions in their next coup attempt can be expected to assign special units to seize the persons of Aquino and other key officials. Even as they are devotees of US imperialism and anticommunism, the coup plotters have started to resent that they have repeatedly been used by the United States and are getting wise to timely US interventions. Their optimum hope is still that of winning with the approval of the highest US officials. In the next coup attempt, their minimum objective would likely be to present the United States with a fait accompli.

Next to the United States, Mrs. Aquino and General Ramos have been winners after every coup attempt. But between Aquino and Ramos, the latter has always been the bigger winner. On the eve of the latest coup

attempt, Aquino appointed him as her vice commander-in-chief. In the course of the coup attempt, he was the one who directly made the request for the United States to intervene with its fighter planes; and got Aquino's formal approval only after he had made the request.

The proclamation of a national state of emergency promotes the conditions for further militarization and fascization, and the suppression of the people's democratic rights. It prepares the ground for US puppets to extend the US military bases beyond 1991 in the face of the surging revolutionary mass movement. Meanwhile, this provides the Aquino and Ramos factions an extra weapon and room for maneuver against their reactionary military and civilian rivals.

In their pragmatist view, U.S. officials can consider themselves smart and successful in being able to manipulate competing civil and military factions within the Philippine ruling system. But the fractiousness of the AFP and the increasingly violent strife of the reactionary factions clearly manifest the objective tendency of the ruling system to disintegrate.

Anytime the US policymakers decide, General Ramos can initiate a mock coup attempt to enable him to grab martial law authority if Aquino should pose a big problem to the United States in any way. More than ever, Aquino has become dependent on Ramos and she cannot remove him from his office despite the fact that he is a major cause of factionalism and dissension within the AFP. Neither can Aquino wipe out anti-

Aquino and anti-Ramos factions within the AFP, despite her tough talk, because thereby she would merely hasten another coup attempt.

The Party and all progressive forces in the underground and aboveground are correct in condemning both the Aquino regime and the coup plotters — the Aquino regime for aggravating the crisis which gave rise to the coup attempt and for welcoming and approving US intervention, and the coup plotters for their pro-US and anticommunist line. Both the rightists in power and those out of power deserve to be rejected by the people.

The armed revolutionary movement can accelerate its advance under the current conditions in which the economic and political crisis is further worsening; the main component of state power is severely divided against itself; and troops in numbers larger than ever have to be deployed in defense of the center of power in Metro Manila.

While the AFP is in disarray, the NPA under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines can and must intensify its tactical offensives. The armies of the Moro people can and must do likewise. Principally, campaigns of annihilation and secondarily campaigns of attrition can be waged effectively on a wide scale.

At the same time, the Party must see to it that the imbalances between military and mass work are corrected and that the comprehensive and balanced development of all revolutionary forces are assured. The situation is excellent not only for the intensification of military operations

but also for the rapid strengthening of the mass movement, the expansion of contacts and strengthening of cooperation with other progressive forces, the development and training of more cadres and activists, the strengthening of education and propaganda work, and the expansion of the Party.

We must more aggressively expand and strengthen peasant organizations and struggles not only in mountain areas but also in the lowlands, in coastal areas and beside major transportation routes. The organization and mobilization of the peasants in economic and political struggles must result in their closer links with both the guerrilla warfare and the legal democratic movement.

In view of the trend to tighten military control in Metro Manila and other urban areas, the legal democratic movement must be vigilant toward any surprise attack instigated by the United States. The urban underground must be strengthened and prepared. Training for self-defense must be undertaken.

But the legal democratic movement must remain militant and continue to expand. It can intensify propaganda and agitation, organizational work and mass actions against the worsening economic and political crisis, US impositions like the prolongation of the tenure of the U.S. bases under a new agreement, and the trend toward another barefaced fascist dictatorship.

Within the next two years, it is possible for a people's uprising similar to that in 1986 to occur. It can be ignited by grave abuse of the people's national and democratic rights, by

the extension of the US military bases, by a mock or real coup attempt or by any one of several possible issues or incidents. Major battles on fundamental national and social issues continue to heat up. While the crisis deepens, the people's temper rises and the reactionaries all the more greedily compete for power and abuse the people's interests and rights.

The people can stand to benefit from the uprising only in accordance with the strength of the revolutionary forces and their ability to combine with other progressive forces and even some conservative or reactionary factions which accede to some major demands of the people.

The issue of the US military bases is of great importance. It can serve to prove who the patriots and the traitors are. It can define the targets of a people's uprising or the special operations of the people's army. The US and local reactionar-

ies are being given ample warning not to continue exacerbating the already grave suffering of the people by forcing through the extension of the US military bases under any pretext or guise and thereby continuing the violation of Philippine sovereignty and territorial integrity.

While there are prospects for a people's uprising in the offing, the Party and the revolutionary forces should recognize that in view of their current level of strength the best that progressive legal forces can have would be a share of power in a government still under the hegemony of nonprogressives. The people's demand for liberation and democracy would not yet be completely fulfilled. But the ruling system would be far weaker than ever. It would be necessary for the revolutionary forces to retain the breadth and depth of their clandestine strength and be ever ready to pursue the protracted people's war.

**--Central Committee
Communist Party
of the Philippines**

December 26, 1989

REMINDERS ON THE STRUGGLE OF IDEAS WITHIN THE PARTY

The healthy struggle of ideas within the Party is a natural part of Party life and is needed in the development of correct ideas and unity within the Party. We carry this out in accordance with the Party spirit and the principles of democratic centralism.

However, there have been instances when wrong and unhealthy attitudes emerge among some comrades with regard to the struggle of ideas within the Party. There has been a strong streak of liberalism, of a tendency to ascribe evil to the struggle of ideas and suppress the process, and there have been excessive and relentless struggles, sectarianism and excessive reference of personalities.

The PB-CC is issuing the following reminders to encourage the healthy struggle of ideas within the Party and combat wrong attitudes towards it.

1. Unity-struggle-unity. This is the essence of the correct attitude towards, and conduct of the struggle of ideas within the Party. Our starting point is the united objective and desire

of unifying and that we carry out struggle with other comrades to attain stronger unity.

2. The struggle of ideas within the Party is not a clash of personalities. In resolving such a struggle and differences of opinion, what is most paramount is the prevailing of what is correct and what is good for the Party. Neither personalities nor a contest to prove who is better should be involved.

3. The comradely spirit and method should prevail in the struggle of ideas within the Party. Personal attacks, the sowing of intrigues, the destruction of the standing of an individual or organ and the small-group mentality run counter to the Party spirit.

4. Be open and above board. Don't sow intrigues. Don't carry out underhanded maneuvers. Unite, don't cause rifts.

5. In the course of the struggle, we give full rein to individual analyses and stand. But the collective opinion and will should prevail once a collective decision has already been reached and there should be discipline in the implementation

of the decision or policy so reached.

6. Questions regarding prevailing policies should be confined to processes of Party committees and its organization. If there is a question regarding a given policy or decision, this should be conveyed to the appropriate Party committee for its reconsideration and decision.

Democratic centralism is violated when a subordinate Party committee or unit arbitrarily blocks the dissemination and implementation of a policy. It is also detrimental to Party unity and leadership to just disseminate contrary opinion without clarifying the prevailing policy and stand of the Party committees concerned.

CLARIFICATIONS ON OUR TASKS

To guide the Party, the last meeting of the PB-CC made the following clarifications on the concept of advancing people's war, on our principal tasks based on the development of the political situation, on the rectification of errors and shortcomings, and on Party consolidation.

A. Changes and clarifications regarding the concept of advancing people's war:

In the stage of the strategic defensive, our general task is to strengthen the revolutionary forces and to further weaken the enemy to change the balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution. The PB-CC made a clarification in 1989 and further deepened this at its last meeting in the early part of 1990 that this strategic task can be carried out through a combination of three important components: the extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare throughout the land, some elements of regular mobile warfare, and widespread revolutionary mass movement and people's uprisings.

Our previous concept regarding the implementation of our strategic task during the strategic defensive revolved around the creation and development of regular mobile forces and of base areas which would serve as a reliable rear of the regular mobile forces. Regular mobile warfare was to smash large contingents of the enemy's armed strength and play a

decisive role in changing the balance of military forces between the revolution and reaction.

In the third substage of the strategic defensive which we called strategic counteroffensive or SCO, regular mobile forces were to emerge, we were to develop regular mobile warfare until it became decisive in the whole war, we were to pursue coordinated political and military campaigns, and, in the latter part, base areas were to emerge in wide areas of the countryside. This was to be the substage to make the leap from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate.

We are changing the said concept of advance of the strategic defensive to give emphasis to the development of widespread and intense guerrilla warfare enjoying a continuously expanding and deepening mass support. The general stress in the pursuit of people's war towards the mature level of the strategic defensive is in extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare and the development of mass bases and revolutionary mass movement while developing, in combination with these, some elements of regular mobile warfare.

Here, the PB-CC gives emphasis to the important role of the mass movement and people's uprisings in weakening and dismantling enemy forces, as well as their decisive role in fulfilling the political, cultural and economic requirements for the advance of people's war to the higher

strategic levels until the strategic offensive and total victory.

Armed struggle continues to be decisive to attain a change in the *general balance of forces*. But it is the mass movement which ensures the breadth and depth of the mass base and mass support upon which depend the strengthening of the armed forces of the revolution. Aside from their direct contribution in weakening the enemy and strengthening the revolution, the political movement and political struggles also help to enhance the effectiveness and the victories of the armed struggle.

The leap of people's war from the strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate will be attained through a combination of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, some elements of regular mobile warfare, and mass struggles and mass uprisings. The cumulative effect of these components at their optimum will bring about a big leap in the strength of the revolutionary forces as well as the widescale decimation, weakening and scattering of the armed forces of reaction; the paralyzation of reactionary political power in vast areas if not in the whole country; and the accelerated disintegration of the ruling system.

Through widespread and intense guerrilla warfare, the revolution can thoroughly use and enlarge the advantages of people's war which is advancing throughout the land and which now encompasses terrains of varying types, from the mountainous and far-flung to the city centers. Wide areas which enemy troops are not capable of occupying

or concentrating upon can be fully used by the people's army to constantly ensure its flexibility, initiative and continuous strengthening.

Extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare complementing a extensive and strong mass movement ensures the closest combination of armed and unarmed struggles and of military work and political work on the widest scale. It is also through these that we bring about and develop the requirements such as widespread and deepgoing mass support, the reserve and support forces and logistical capability needed for the fullscale organization of big strike forces and the continuous advance of regular mobile warfare in the future.

Some elements of regular mobile warfare refer principally to relatively big formations (companies and perhaps battalions) at selected levels and scopes, and the relatively concentrated military operations and coordinated military campaigns that are carried out from time to time. These must be continuously developed in the midst of widespread and intense guerrilla warfare to deal concentrated blows on reactionary troops in the pursuit of particular military and political objectives.

Through extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare and some elements of regular mobile warfare, we can develop the cadres and forces as well as accumulate the war materiel needed in the setting up of more regular mobile forces and the launching of regular mobile warfare in the ensuing strategic level of our people's war.

We must develop guerrilla bases of varying breadth in mountainous terrain surrounded by extensive guerrilla zones in the adjoining lower areas, in the lowlands, in coastal areas and in areas adjoining the principal lines of transportation and communications.

While we are developing the guerrilla bases, we must determinedly wage contests with the enemy to be able to expand and deepen the mass base. The mass movement and mass base must be continuously expanded, consolidated and deepened in the guerrilla zones as in city centers.

The mass movement and the mass struggles ranging up to people's uprisings will give rise to a gigantic mass force which will persist in economic and political struggles under varying conditions, develop the people's self-defense capability and prepare the masses for the uprisings especially during periods when the moribund ruling system is undergoing convulsions. From 1983 to 1986 the people in the principal cities and other population centers experienced big mass struggles that culminated in a people's uprising. That level of people's struggle can be used repeatedly to weaken and maim the reactionary forces that are making life miserable for the people.

B. The emergence of urgent political tasks on the basis of latest developments in the political situation:

The latest convulsion of the reactionary state further hastened the disintegration process of the

ruling system. At the same time, excellent opportunities arose for the further strengthening of the revolutionary forces. In this condition, the following urgent political tasks came to the fore:

1. Exert utmost efforts to uphold and project the national democratic line and program as against the reactionary and pro-imperialist program and stand of the principal contending reactionary factions. We must relentlessly expose the antinational, antipeople and antidemocratic Aquino faction as well as the anti-Aquino reactionaries (KBL, NP, RAM-SFP) which, while intensely maneuvering and scheming against the Aquino faction, have been noisily peddling policies and positions that are antinational, antipeople and antidemocratic, if not openly fascist. We must firmly put forth and repeatedly clarify to the broadest masses of the people their own anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist agenda and program. Through this, we can expand and invigorate the people's participation and support for the revolutionary and progressive organizations and struggles. We can also thus prepare the conditions for bigger mass struggles and people's uprisings, the creation of political alliances, and the launching of military campaigns which are principally annihilative and secondarily attritive.

2. Intensify the anti-imperialist, antimilitary bases and anti-intervention struggles. We must exert every effort to expose U.S. imperialism and strengthen the movement against the bases and against U.S. intervention. While increasing the

number of people we are rallying to the anti-imperialist mass actions, we must enlist the widest support from the various social classes and sectors. We must also carry out military actions to punish U.S. imperialism and its rabid instruments and agents for their meddling and rule in the Philippines.

We must likewise prepare for direct U.S. imperialist aggression whose threat is increasing. While there have been an aggravation in the crisis of reactionary politics, a strengthening in the people's patriotic sentiments and an advance of the revolutionary forces in the Philippines, there has been a relative weakening of the anti-U.S. imperialist front in the world. We must prepare the minds and determination of the revolutionary forces and of the people against the threat of U.S. aggression, through the relentless exposure of the schemes and maneuvers of U.S. imperialism, the continuous political education for the people and the incessant accumulation of strength.

3. We must intensify the struggle to totally frustrate the U.S.-Aquino regime's counterrevolutionary total war and advance people's war. The total war scheme of the U.S.-Aquino regime whose ambition is to crush the armed revolution before 1992 has run into difficulties and is on the verge of totally falling apart. On the other hand, we must further intensify the political, military and propaganda struggles against this scheme so that it will be totally frustrated, so that the reactionary and puppet regime and the whole of reaction can be made to pay dearly for their all-out assaults on

the revolutionary movement and their depredations on the guerrilla bases and zones, and translate the frustration of the enemy's total war into solid victories and further advance of the revolution.

4. Relentlessly strengthen and invigorate the revolutionary mass movement of workers, peasants and fishermen, youth and students, public and private employees, and teachers and other professionals. The broad masses have been enthusiastically responding to our efforts to organize and mobilize them on the basis of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist line. The Party must exert its utmost to further expand, strengthen and invigorate the organization and mobilization of the people in the countryside and urban areas in anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist struggles, both economic and political. On the expansion and deepening of the organized mass base depend the advance of other work and struggles.

5. Create a broad anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist united front. The unification of all progressive and patriotic forces in the face of the intensified oppression and exploitation of the people is all the more urgent. We must keep the door open to other political forces and try for various types and levels of unity and cooperation with them on the basis of the anti-imperialist, antifeudal and antifascist line. The front should also be open to tactical cooperation with those segments of the reactionary forces that are not diehard, are willing to give in to significant interests of the people, and are willing to fight the principal

agents of U.S. imperialism or the principal pillars of reaction.

6. Work for closer coordination of activities and struggles within and outside the country. This coordination should strengthen the anti-imperialist front, strengthen support for the Philippine revolution, and further strengthen the internationalist line of our struggle. This is in line with the further expansion of the links of, and support for, the Philippine revolution among revolutionary and progressive forces overseas.

7. Invigorate and expand propaganda work. We must continually disseminate to the broad masses of our people the analyses and stand of the illegal and legal revolutionary forces. This is important to guide the people closer to the revolution especially in the present condition when the economic and political crisis is deepening. Important components of this effort are the following: our own broadcast machinery, legal publications, strong machinery for the channelling of information, and regular illegal publications that give continuous and prompt guidance to Party units and to the revolutionary forces.

C. Rectification of errors and shortcomings:

We are continuing with our rectification of pinpointed errors and shortcomings in balancing mass work and army building and the interconnection of political work and military work. We must promptly rectify and overcome the errors and

shortcomings so that the revolutionary forces can resolutely and continuously advance and effectively make use of the fine opportunities created by the excellent political situation. We are carrying out rectification while fighting. The tasks enunciated by the PB-CC give due regard to rectification work.

The PB-CC is giving particular attention to the strengthening, recovery and expansion of the revolutionary mass movement in the populous lowlands, coastal areas and areas adjoining principal communication and transportation lines while continuously expanding and consolidating the guerrilla bases and zones in mountainous terrain. It is important to cherish and further strengthen the revolutionary forces and mass base in populous areas to effectively wield leadership over the broad masses, effectively advance guerrilla warfare over wide areas, expand the area of maneuver of units of the people's army, and maximize the use of mountainous and forested terrain.

In 1989, the PB-CC laid emphasis on the all-round strengthening of the machinery in the localities to attend to the strengthening of the mass base, the local guerrilla forces, the Party units and mass organizations, the invigoration of the revolutionary movement in the localities, and the effective repulse and frustration of the enemy's military operations and political schemes. Related to this,

we must overcome weaknesses in cadre training; further clarify the orientation and tasks of cadres in the localities, in the army and in administrative work; tighten up the supervisory work of leading Party committees; and exercise closer links with, and guidance over, the masses especially during the enemy's military operations.

On the matter of building the people's army, the PB-CC emphasized in 1989 that priority in the creation of formations should be on guerrilla platoons assigned to the localities, as well as the strengthening of the people's militia. This rectified the program for army building in 1988 which focused on the achievement of rather high targets in the formation of companies.

We are also giving emphasis to the invigoration and systematization of political education and political work within the people's army and to the giving of more time by the people's army to mass work and production work. These tasks of the people's army have been relatively left behind and neglected, a situation which is detrimental to the political quality and vigor of the Red commanders and fighters, to the relation of the people's army with the masses, and to internal morale and unity.

The undertaking of political work within the army and of the army's own political work are also part of the rectification of cases where military action did not give sufficient consideration to political

implications, of such concepts as "expansion by fire" which had a tendency to belittle painstaking mass base building in expansion areas, and the haphazard preparation and planning which gave rise to battles of attrition.

In the mass movement in the urban areas, we noticed shortcomings in consolidation work even as we were succeeding in rallying bigger numbers of people into legal organizations and in legal struggles. We also took note of the value of expansion and consolidation in the communities along with the enhancement of strength in factories, schools, offices and other places of work. We hope that the implementation of these tasks will invigorate the deployment by the movement in the urban areas of more personnel, cadre and material support to the countryside.

D. Strengthening of the Party

The Party is faced with heavy tasks. It must strengthen itself so that it can lead well and take the leading role in the important tasks of the revolution and resolutely advance in the face of hardships and sacrifices in this stage of our revolution.

The Party needs strong ideological unity, thoroughgoing rectification of errors and weaknesses, clear political objectives, and a strong backbone of cadres who are prepared to sacrifice in life-and-death struggles.

The Party will carry out an education campaign, conferences on the major lines of work, and summing-ups on important matters and experiences. It will also attend to the systematic training and allocation of cadres for various work and for various areas, and for the strengthening of the central organs. It will strengthen the leadership of central organs as well as democracy within the Party.

While wholeheartedly facing up to our tasks, we must pay more

attention to security. We must resolutely expand and deepen the underground movement and provide for a safe and effective machinery for national liaison and coordination. Leading committees and cadres must change their style of work and of operations that are not appropriate to methods and rules of the underground movement and which the enemy has been taking advantage of to place them within the compass of its surveillance and espionage network.

PB-CC
March 1990