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**CELEBRATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY
OF OUR PARTY AND LEAD
THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION
FROM VICTORY TO VICTORY**

By Armando Liwanag
Chairman, Central Committee
December 26, 1993

**GENERAL DECLARATION
ON MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT**

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CONTENTS

Celebrate the 25th Anniversary of our Party and Lead the Philippine Revolution from Victory to Victory 1

I. The Glorious Record of Revolutionary Struggle in the Last 25 Years	2
Reestablishment and Formative Years of the Party	5
Cumulative Growth Along the Correct Line and the Interference of Opportunism	20
II. The Current Party Situation and Our Tasks	42
A. Ideological Situation and Tasks	44
B. Political Situation and Tasks	51
C. Organizational Situation and Tasks	62

General Declaration on Mao Zedong Thought 71

Major Contributions to Marxism-Leninism	71
Mao's Greatest Achievement	75
Conclusion	79

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CELEBRATE THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF OUR PARTY AND LEAD THE PHILIPPINE REVOLUTION FROM VICTORY TO VICTORY

BY ARMANDO LWANAG
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COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
DECEMBER 26, 1993

Let us celebrate the 25th anniversary of the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines on December 26, 1968 on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. Since then, the Party has achieved great ideological, political and organizational victories. These constitute the glorious record of the Party in the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and the entire people for national liberation and democracy against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

These great victories are the result of the correct revolutionary line and the hard work, struggles and sacrifices of Party cadres and members and the broad masses of the people. Our Party cadres and members have faithfully upheld Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought as their guide to revolutionary action and have gone deep among the workers, peasants and other people in order to arouse, organize and mobilize them and thereby lead them correctly and effectively. Let us always remember and pay homage to all the revolutionary martyrs who have made the supreme sacrifice to make our victories possible.

When we reestablished the Party in 1968, we were determined to bring to a victorious conclusion the first great rectification movement and to carry out constantly the fighting and constructive tasks of the people's democratic revolution. We are now in the midst of the second great rectification movement, partially started in 1988 and

proceeding comprehensively and thoroughly since 1992. We have reaffirmed our basic revolutionary principles and we are rectifying and overcoming deviations, errors and shortcomings. We are reinvigorated to wage revolutionary struggle. Thus, we now celebrate the restrengthening of our Party on a nationwide scale.

We are successfully raising to a new and higher level the revolutionary unity and fighting will and capabilities of the Party and the people against the enemy, the U.S.-Ramos clique that currently represents the ruling system of the comprador big bourgeoisie and the landlord class, both servile to foreign monopoly capitalism.

The 25th anniversary of the Party coincides with the 100th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong. We offer our victories as our bouquet of tribute to the memory of this great communist thinker, leader and fighter. His correct leadership of the new-democratic and socialist stages of the Chinese revolution continues to inspire us. His Marxist-Leninist critique of imperialism, modern revisionism and neocolonialism and his theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian

dictatorship are vindicated by the events from 1989 to the present and give us scientific light and foresight in the long struggle to achieve socialism and, farther on, communism.

I. THE GLORIOUS RECORD OF REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE IN THE LAST 25 YEARS

The reestablishment of the Party was preceded by the development of the legal anti-imperialist and antifeudal mass movement from 1961 onward; the emergence of advance revolutionary mass activists among the workers, peasants and youth; the clandestine theoretical and political education of proletarian revolutionary cadres in Marxism-Leninism; and the first great rectification movement which partially started in 1965 and was vigorously launched in 1967.

Earlier in 1962, the representative of the new proletarian revolutionary cadres had joined the leadership of the old merger party

of the communist and socialist parties and in subsequent years had taken the initiative of pushing the legal progressive mass movement in a comprehensive way, providing refresher courses to veteran cadres and combating subjectivism and opportunism in the history and circumstances of the old merger party as well as modern revisionism then centered in the Soviet Union. He had taken the line that the revolutionary party of the proletariat must ceaselessly promote the legal democratic movement but the point is to resume at the soonest possible time and accomplish the unfinished armed revolution of the people against foreign and feudal domination. As Comrade Mao Zedong taught, the chronic crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system demands and allows a protracted people's war.

Proletarian revolutionary cadres joined the trade union movement by doing social investigation and educational work. They came into contact and close working relations with the veteran cadres and the masses of workers and peasants from 1962 onward. Among the toiling masses, the proletarian revolutionary cadres increased their number. They also continued to arouse, recruit and militate the student and other youth to serve the people. From a Marxist-Leninist vantage, the *Progressive Review* shed light on domestic and international issues from 1963 onward. From 1964 onward, theoretical and political education was promoted through Kabataang Makabayan, a comprehensive youth organization of young workers and peasants, students and young professionals.

In 1965 the proletarian revolutionary cadres put forward a review of the history of the old merger party of the communist and socialist parties and criticized the major errors which had caused almost the total destruction of the revolutionary movement in the 1950s. From 1966 onward, *Struggle for National Democracy* became the principal study material of the mass movement. Inspired by the previous revolutionary struggles of the Filipino people and impelled by the worsening conditions of oppression and exploitation, the youth joined up with the workers and peasants by conducting social investigation, mass work and concerted activities. They were also inspired by the

Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the Vietnamese war of national liberation against U.S. imperialist aggression, the ceaseless revolutionary struggles of the Korean and Cuban peoples and other revolutionary struggles in the capitalist and underdeveloped countries.

In 1967, a sharp division and struggle developed between the proletarian revolutionary cadres and the Lava revisionist renegades who refused to rectify their long-running errors and who clung to the patronage of the Soviet revisionist renegades. Consequently, preparations were made for the reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines, entailing comprehensive and thoroughgoing criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism and the Lava revisionist renegades in Manila as well as the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique which had usurped authority over remnants of the old people's army in Central Luzon.

For more than a year before the reestablishment of the Party, the first great rectification movement was carried out along the Marxist-Leninist line. The document, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, was enthusiastically studied by the proletarian revolutionary cadres and the advance revolutionary mass activists. They studied and analyzed the history and circumstances of the working class and the entire people. The *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution* and the *Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines* were also prepared and studied. The Marxist-Leninist classics of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao were propagated. While seriously studying the revolutionary theory of the proletariat and the ideological and political line relevant to the concrete conditions of the Philippines, the proletarian revolutionary cadres led the legal democratic movement and were determined to reestablish the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The major errors and shortcomings of the old communist party (since 1930) and the subsequent merger party (since 1938) were identified, criticized and repudiated. The most damaging errors were those of the Lava brothers who one after the other assumed the position of general secretary of the old merger party from 1942 to

1964. They were afflicted with bourgeois subjectivism and swung from Right to "Left" opportunism and vice versa.

The proletarian revolutionary cadres consistently pursued the *Marxist-Leninist ideological, political and organizational line*. Since the beginning of the 1960s, they had been the ones responsible for clarifying the character of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the character of the present revolution as national democratic of the new type (led by the proletariat), the motive forces, the targets, the strategy and tactics and the socialist perspective of the Philippine revolution.

Reestablishment and Formative Years of the Party

The reestablishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines involved the integration of the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought with the concrete conditions and concrete practice of the Philippine revolution. Using the Marxist-Leninist stand, viewpoint and method, the proletarian revolutionary cadres thoroughly studied and analyzed the history and current circumstances of the Filipino people.

At the congress of reestablishment on December 26, 1968, there were twelve delegates (one in absentia), representing a few scores of proletarian revolutionary cadres who had studied the full course on Marxism-Leninism and the Philippine revolution and several hundreds of advance revolutionary mass activists. The latter were prospective Party members and were assisting the Party cadres in the mass organizations of workers, peasants and youth. These organizations under the effective leadership of the proletarian revolutionary cadres had a total membership of no more than fifteen thousand people.

Soon after its reestablishment, the Party linked up with the good cadres, commanders and fighters of the remnant units of the old people's army, engaged them in ideological and political studies, mass work and politico-military training. Together, they repudiated the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique. The Party formulated and promulgated the *Rules of the New People's Army* and established the New People's Army on March 29, 1969. The Party inherited the good

cadres, commanders and fighters and the rural mass base from the previous revolutionary movement and was true to the revolutionary line of pursuing the new-democratic revolution through people's war and the development of the *worker-peasant alliance*.

The Plenum of the Party Central Committee in 1969 integrated into the Central Committee the representatives of the peasant movement and the people's army. It decided that the mass base in Central Luzon would be the main resource base for the nationwide expansion of the revolutionary forces. It also decided to seek military assistance from abroad upon the proposal of cadres in the NPA.

The people's army became the main organization of the Party under its absolute leadership. It started with only 60 fighters and nine automatic rifles and 26 inferior firearms in the second district of Tarlac province. It had a mass base of 80,000 peasants with revolutionary experience since the 1930s, especially in the armed struggle against the Japanese occupation during World War II. In preparation for starting guerrilla warfare at several strategic points in the archipelago and for building the people's army nationwide, politico-military training of the Red fighters in Tarlac as well as of cadres to be deployed to Northern Luzon and the Visayas had been conducted by the Party in the months before the establishment of the New People's Army.

Even as the Party initiated and developed the people's war from scratch, it never ceased to lead and develop the legal democratic mass movement based in the urban areas. It coordinated the revolutionary struggle in both urban and rural areas. Legal and illegal forms of struggle helped to strengthen each other. In terms of developing the capability to seize political power, the revolutionary armed struggle based in the countryside is the principal form of revolutionary struggle. The legal forms of struggle in the urban areas are secondary, indispensably important but vulnerable to enemy suppression and therefore defensive in character. Both forms of struggle are integral aspects of the people's war.

Since the beginning of the people's war in 1969, we have been conducting united front work mainly for armed struggle and secondarily for legal struggle. The revolutionary class line in the entire

national democratic revolution is the same class line for developing the united front. This requires the leadership of the working class through the Party; the basic worker-peasant alliance through the people's army and the peasant movement; the basic revolutionary forces, including the petty-bourgeoisie; the positive forces, including the middle bourgeoisie; and taking advantage of the contradictions among the reactionaries in order to isolate and destroy the power of the most reactionary big comprador-landlord clique most subservient to foreign monopoly capitalism at every given time.

Even before 1969, the good remnants of the people's army had been creating the barrio organizing committees as organs of political power. But the Party would subsequently raise these to a higher level of development in accordance with the revolutionary antifeudal line of the working class through its Party, relying mainly on the poor and middle peasants and the farm workers, winning over the middle peasants, neutralizing the rich peasants and taking advantage of the contradictions between enlightened and evil gentry in order to isolate and destroy the despotic power of the latter. Since 1969, the main form of the united front has been the local organs of political power, notwithstanding the existence of the National Democratic Front and the urban-based legal alliances.

In 1969, the Party was able to hold a large demonstration of 15,000 peasants in Metro Manila and subsequently another of 50,000 in Tarlac province. These proved that the reestablished party had already gained a sizeable peasant mass following. At the same time, the NPA waged guerrilla warfare and raised the number of its automatic rifles from nine to 200 from early 1969 to the middle of 1970 through ambushes and raids. In 1969, the U.S.-Marcos regime sought but failed to nip the people's army in the bud. Marcos resorted to massacres, bloody crimes of intrigue, widespread illegal searches and detention, torture and other barbaric acts in order to suppress the revolutionary movement in Tarlac from 1969 onward. He used the Lava revisionist renegades in bloody crimes of intrigue but the Party and NPA frustrated the enemy scheme by punishing the individual culprits with pinpoint accuracy after thorough investigation.

Some of the major errors in 1969 included the persistence of the roving rebel band mentality, the purely military viewpoint, the neglect of solid mass organizing, the failure of some units to raise the revolutionary antifeudal class character of the barrio organizing committees and the adventurist dispatch of armed cadres to Negros province without an initial mass base, the putschist attacks on "barrio self-defense units" without distinguishing between the bad from the good elements in them, the repeated dispatch of NPA squads from Tarlac to Zambales across the mountain without any prior mass work in the enemy-controlled villages on the Zambales side, and the like. These errors were promptly criticized and corrected.

The overwhelming concentration of one full enemy division, Task Force Lawin, in the second district of Tarlac against only 200 Red fighters resulted in severe losses of the revolutionary movement in the area. In the latter part of 1970, Marcos announced the demise of the New People's Army after enemy armed units under Task Force Lawin seized in one raid the sixty M-16 rifles of the NPA main force in the sparsely-forested and sparsely-populated Tarlac-Zambales mountain range. However, a few cadres and weapons had earlier been shifted from Tarlac to Isabela. Valuable lessons in Tarlac were learnt and immediately transmitted to the revolutionary cadres and forces in Isabela province. At the end of 1970, the NPA successfully raided the armory of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City and seized several scores of Browning automatic rifles — a fitting riposte to the earlier enemy capture of the weapons of the NPA main force in Central Luzon.

Unknown to the enemy, the Party had already created a large mass base of 150,000 people in Isabela and Nueva Vizcaya by 1970. This area would become the training ground of more cadres for nationwide expansion. It also became the venue for the 1970 Politburo meeting which produced the *Organizational Guide and the Outline of Reports* and which pushed for the revolutionary seeding of the whole country with cadres arising from the armed revolutionary movement and the legal democratic mass movement. These cadres were instructed to form provisional regional Party committees. The

1970 PB meeting decided to accelerate the recruitment and education of Party members from the ranks of advance mass activists in the First Quarter Storm of 1970. Thus, before the end of the year more than 200 Party members had taken the basic Party course with the basic Party documents, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution* and the Party Constitution and *Philippine Society and Revolution* as the basic texts.

In continuing to lead the legal democratic mass movement based in the urban areas, the Party directed and carried out the First Quarter Storm of 1970. This consisted of weekly demonstrations and marches, participated in by 50,000 to 100,000 youth and workers in Metro Manila and considerable numbers of youth and other people in provincial cities. These mass actions broadcast the general line of national democratic revolution and generated a powerful mass movement all over the country. These yielded advance revolutionary mass activists who would subsequently join the Communist Party and the New People's Army. Kabataang Makabayan and its schools for national democracy and cultural groups were in the forefront conducting political education and propaganda. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines emerged as a formal legal united front organization.

Previous high points of the legal mass movement in the 1960s had been the anti-CAFA demonstration of 5000 mainly students in March 1961, the demonstration of 15,000 workers, peasants and students in January 1966 and the demonstration of 15,000 peasants in April 1969 in Manila and 50,000 of them in Tarlac also in 1969. The proletarian revolutionaries who reestablished the Party and the people's army consistently led the urban-based legal democratic movement and took away the initiative from the blatant enemy forces as well as from the Lava revisionist renegades, the clerico-fascists and other groups that were opposed to the national-democratic line and acted as special agents of the reactionary state.

In 1970, *Philippine Society and Revolution* was printed and publicly distributed to provide a full presentation of the entire history, the current basic problems of the Filipino people and the new democratic

revolution. There were also timely definitive articles from the Party about domestic and international issues. The most prominent among these concerned major domestic and international issues, including the First Quarter Storm (FQS) of 1970, the domestic and international struggle against modern revisionism and Soviet social-imperialism, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, the war of national liberation in Vietnam and the entire Indochina, and the major revolutionary struggles in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the capitalist countries. *Ang Bayan* (The People), the main newspaper of the Party Central Committee, carried the articles.

The Party central leadership directed the entire Party organization to conduct general mass education on the national democratic revolution and special mass courses focused on the specific interests of the various types of mass formations. At the same time, the Party central leadership drew up the three-level Party program of Marxist-Leninist study. In accordance with the Party Constitution, the Revolutionary School of Mao Zedong Thought was put in overall charge of Party education and specifically in charge of the intermediate and advance study courses and the Education Department under the General Secretariat was put in charge of the basic Party course. The course outlines and the reading lists were drawn up.

The Revolutionary School of Mao Zedong Thought took charge of the selection, translation and reproduction of study materials. The Education Department of the General Secretariat took charge of producing the study guide of the basic Party course and the translation of related materials. The mass organizations took charge of basic mass education. Simplified Party and mass courses were made for the NPA Red fighters of peasant stock and for the peasants in local mass organizations and Party branches.

In 1971, the CC Plenum summed up and drew the lessons from the revolutionary experience gained in Central Luzon, Northern Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon and Negros Island. It paid ample attention to the major errors committed in Tarlac province and to the objectives of recovering lost areas there and expanding into the

whole of Central Luzon by taking advantage of the 1971 collapse of the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique which had previously blocked the expansion of the revolutionary movement there in 1969 and 1970. It criticized and rectified the rapid and arbitrary punishment of suspected informers in Isabela. The principles and methods of adhering to due process were clarified. So was the question of forming the people's court. The *Organizational Guide and Outlines of Reports* was improved, finalized and ratified.

The Plenum also thoroughly discussed and planned the nationwide expansion of the Party and other revolutionary forces. It was decided that the country would be covered by seven regional Party organizations: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas and Mindanao. Cadres were chosen either to strengthen the existing regional committees or form new ones where these did not exist. The establishment of a provisional regional Party committee in Mindanao, the second largest island of the archipelago, was one of the major objectives.

On the basis of discussions during the Plenum, the Party central leadership consequently formulated the *Rules for Establishing the People's Government* and the *Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform*. The local organs of political power at the barrio level were the base of higher levels of the people's government to be built from one territorial level to another upward. It was made clear that the Party would be the ruling party in the evolving people's government and that it would exercise political power, especially at levels where the people's government still had to be formed. It was also made clear that the minimum program of land reform would be the general antifeudal line. This entailed land rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, improving the prices of the peasants' produce, raising production in agricultural and sideline occupations through the initiative of individual households and rudimentary forms of cooperation.

The translation and reproduction of the works of Mao Zedong were pushed. The Party made a selection of these works to make seven volumes under the titles: *On Philosophy, On Class Analysis and*

Social Investigation, On Party Building, On the Armed Struggle (two volumes), *On the United Front and On Economic Work and Land Reform*. These were intended for the intermediate Party course and for advance reading and study by Party organs, units and individual Party members.

In 1971 on the third anniversary of its reestablishment, a summing-up was made of the first three years of revolutionary experience. Both dogmatism and empiricism were criticized. Revolutionary phrasemongering and blind practice were repudiated. The call for closer links with the masses and for more thorough social investigation was made in order to strengthen the integration of theory and practice. The main thrust of the criticism was to correlate properly the fighting tasks of the NPA with the task of social investigation, propaganda and solid mass organizing. The cadres and fighters were reminded that it was not enough to build barrio organizing committees and that they had to build the various types of mass organizations, the Party branches in the localities and the militia. The concrete dialectical relationship of consolidation and expansion was explained.

Wishing to impose a fascist dictatorship on the Filipino people and reacting to the upsurge of the revolutionary armed struggle and the legal democratic mass movement, the U.S.-Marcos ruling clique accelerated its campaigns of suppression and its preparations for martial rule from 1970 to 1972. Marcos first suspended the writ of habeas corpus immediately after the Plaza Miranda bombing on August 21, 1971 which the regime automatically blamed on his arch rival Benigno Aquino and on the Party. The Party made a prompt denial and put the responsibility squarely on Marcos himself. And then, on September 22, 1972, Marcos imposed martial law based on a proclamation predated September 21, 1972.

While Marcos was still preparing to install his dictatorship, the Party intensified the revolutionary armed struggle and the legal democratic mass movement and, in anticipation of the martial rule, strengthened the revolutionary urban underground. Thus, when martial law was imposed on the people, the Party could secure most of its Party cadres and members and revolutionary mass activists in the urban

areas. Most of those immediately arrested by the fascist dictatorship did not belong to the Party. Nevertheless, a number of Party members were arrested and detained indefinitely.

Among all political parties in the country, including those of the reactionary opposition, it was the Communist Party of the Philippines that gave the clearest and most comprehensive analysis and explanation of the long-term premeditation and preparations (including the so-called constitutional reforms and the massacres) that Marcos had made for the imposition of the fascist dictatorship on the people and thereby prolong his rule. The Party correctly described that the open rule of terror was an act of desperation by both the ruling clique and the entire ruling system, a manifestation of the gravity of the crisis and inability of the ruling classes to rule in the old way. The Party also correctly predicted that martial rule would fail to suppress the revolutionary movement but would further serve to incite the people to armed revolution.

In accordance with the decision of the 1971 Central Committee Plenum, the division of Northern Luzon into two subregional committees, Cagayan Valley (Northeastern Luzon) and Ilocos, Mountain Provinces and Pangasinan (IMP or Northwestern Luzon) was accomplished in 1972. It was necessary and advantageous for the Party to form the subregional Party organization of northwestern Luzon and develop the guerrilla forces in the Cordillera because the division-size Task Force Saranay of the enemy had been determinedly launching search-and-destroy operations against the NPA main units in Isabela from the latter half of 1971. The whole Central Luzon remained under one regional Party committee. So did Southern Luzon (with Southern Tagalog and Bicol as subregions), Metro Manila, Western Visayas, Eastern Visayas and Mindanao.

The Party called for the realization of a formal underground national united front organization and put forward the 10-point program of the National Democratic Front on April 24, 1973. In accordance with this program, the NDF-Preparatory Committee (NDF-Prepcom) sought to coordinate the formerly legal organizations which had been forced underground, to win over allies from the urban

petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie, and to establish cooperative relations with the reactionary groups and leaders opposed to the fascist dictatorship of the U.S.-Marcos ruling clique. The anti-Marcos reactionaries kept on hoping that the United States would withdraw support from Marcos and were lukewarm to offers of cooperation from the NDF Prepcom.

There was the urgent need to redeploy the high concentration of more than two thousand Party members from Manila-Rizal who had gone underground because of the declaration of martial law. But the capacity of the regional Party organizations outside Manila-Rizal to absorb these cadres was still limited. The main base in Isabela was blockaded by the enemy and the Party had just begun to expand in *Central Luzon under difficult conditions*. The underground organization of the Manila-Rizal Party organization and the central staff organs of the Party absorbed many of the cadres. A significant number of them were gradually redeployed to other regions. It was only in 1974 that they could be rapidly absorbed by the other regions.

The open rule of terror became a favorable condition for the growth in strength and advance of the revolutionary movement. However, it experienced severe difficulties and setbacks. There were the unbridled military campaigns of suppression directed against the known guerrilla zones. Since July 1972, the main units of the people's army in the forest region of Isabela had borne the main brunt of enemy "search and destroy" operations, which included depopulating the area. Eventually, these main units (two well-armed companies) became isolated and passive in the same forest region from 1972 onward. One ill-armed company disintegrated in Nueva Vizcaya.

The initial armed propaganda teams in Mindanao were decimated in 1972-73 because the regional leadership made the mistake of dispatching them to the armed hill tribes without first doing mass work among the peasants in the plains. NPA companies rose and fell in Aurora and Sorsogon provinces in the 1973-74 period. Some national cadres of the Party were arrested in 1973 and 1974. In 1973, the leadership of the national trade union bureau became wantonly careless with its security. In early 1974, some central Party cadres

failed to sidestep completely after their security had been compromised as a result of the failed attempt to import weapons.

But on the whole, from year to year, the nationwide expansion of the Party, the NPA and the other revolutionary forces and the start of guerrilla warfare and mass work at strategic points of the country more than compensated for the arrest or death of central and regional Party cadres, the isolation and passivity of the two companies in the Isabela forest region and other setbacks in different places at different times. There was not an instance when the central Party leadership or an entire regional Party leadership or organization was wiped out by the enemy in the period of 1969-85, even if from time to time, a central or regional organ suffered hard blows from the enemy. Even the arrest of central Party cadres in 1974, 1976 and 1977 did not cause overall setback of the Party and the revolutionary movement in any year.

The nationwide expansion of the revolutionary forces was achieved under the direction of the Party Central Committee. The central and regional cadres who were directly responsible for two NPA companies in the Isabela forest region did not redeploy and shift them to Cagayan province until 1977 despite the depopulation of the area through the enemy's forced mass evacuation and the sustained enemy campaign of encirclement and suppression and despite the repeated instructions of the Party central leadership for them to shift and redeploy troops earlier and despite the clear demonstration by the platoon in Tumauni, Isabela that succeeded in developing a new mass base outside the enemy's sphere of encirclement.

In accordance with the decision of the 1969 Plenum and upon prodding by cadres in command of the people's army, the Party central leadership was able to draw up a plan and make the concrete arrangements, which were very complicated, for the shipment of weapons from abroad in 1972. But notwithstanding the Central Committee decision to deliberately avoid the heating up of Isabela to make way for the importation of firearms, the head of the national operational command who had been eager to get the imported firearms decided to intensify tactical offensives in the province from

June 1971. In these offensives in the latter half of 1971, the scores of *Browning automatic rifles (BAR)* seized in the raid of the arsenal of the Philippine Military Academy in December 1970 were used and thus the general location of the NPA main forces became exposed to the enemy.

As a result, the enemy escalated the armed strength and operations of Task Force Saranay to a full division in Isabela. This compounded even more all the complexities, difficulties and vulnerabilities of the arms importation plan and the resulting errors in implementation. The failure of the entire importation plan and the errors involved were criticized promptly and thoroughly. But again upon the prodding of the same military cadres, the central leadership adopted and implemented another plan under more complex, more difficult, more limited and more vulnerable objective conditions, only to end up again in failure in 1974. The failure and errors were once more promptly and thoroughly criticized. These did not involve any change of revolutionary line and had no fundamentally adverse effect on the nationwide expansion and development of the revolutionary forces.

In 1974, the success of the Party in nationwide expansion and development of the revolutionary forces were indubitably clear. On the basis of the wealth of experience, both positive and negative but mainly positive, it was timely to write and issue the *Specific Characteristics of the People's War in the Philippines*. This is guided by the teachings of Mao Zedong on people's war and yet takes into account the concrete geographic, socioeconomic and political conditions of the Philippines and the revolutionary experience so far gained by the Party. This definitive work demonstrates the advances already made and those that could still be made and points to the principles and methods by which objective and subjective advantages can be enhanced and how disadvantages can be turned into advantages and how difficulties and setbacks can be overcome. It takes into account the most favorable as well as the most unfavorable conditions under which the revolutionary forces can preserve

themselves and carry forward the revolutionary armed struggle in accordance with the principle of self-reliance.

The point is to take advantage of the chronic crisis of the semifeudal and semicolonial conditions and the countryside as a wide area of maneuver enhanced by the mountainous and archipelagic character of the country, to develop the people's war in stages along the probable course of the strategic defensive, strategic stalemate and strategic offensive (with the people's army growing from small to big and from weak to strong), to wage guerrilla warfare and to be guided by the line of centralized leadership (ideological and political) and decentralized operations.

Party membership had grown from 2000 in 1972 to 4000 in 1974 but it was still highly concentrated in the central staff organs and regional Party organization in Manila-Rizal. In 1974, the central leadership decided to streamline the central staff organs and deployed the biggest number ever of Party members from Manila-Rizal to other regional Party organizations. Guerrilla fronts and guerrilla zones were growing in number and strength all over the country. It was favorable and necessary to strengthen the Party core and leadership within the people's army. However, the urban-based personnel of the General Secretariat and the National Liaison Committee thinned out, floated and became vulnerable to enemy surveillance and arrest. This was the negative side of the correct policy of dispatching a relatively large number of cadres to the countryside.

From late 1974 to early 1975, the Party was able to initiate and lead workers' strikes in 300 workplaces all over the country. On the basis of these strikes, we could foresee that before the end of the decade a gigantic mass protest movement, far greater than the First Quarter Storm of 1970 and mobilizing workers in the main, would arise if the correct line would be pursued. Legal mass organizations, including trade unions, peasant associations and student organizations reemerged under the clandestine leadership of the Party.

The whole of 1975 was a year of rapid development of the revolutionary forces on a nationwide scale. In December of that year, the Central Committee held a plenum whose significance and degree of accomplishment were those of a national Party congress. It replenished the ranks of the Central Committee by nominating the most outstanding cadres from the regional Party organizations and central staff organs and electing by secret ballot from the long list of nominees new members of the Central Committee. It reviewed the revolutionary experience from all over the country since 1968 and drew positive and negative lessons from it. It assessed and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of the revolutionary forces in various regions and made many important decisions to strengthen all of them. It concluded that the martial rule of the U.S.-Marcos regime had failed to destroy the revolutionary movement and had instead created favorable conditions for the armed revolution. The Party had attained a membership of 5000 and the NPA had accumulated a force of 1000 Red fighters armed with automatic rifles, excluding a thousand more with inferior firearms (single-shot rifles and handguns).

Northeastern Luzon had a few hundreds of Red fighters with automatic rifles (in two companies in the Isabelia forest region, one oversized platoon in Tumauni and two platoons in Aurora); Northwestern Luzon, a few scores of Red fighters in squads; Central Luzon, close to a hundred, plus around 30 which had come from the former company in Aurora that had shifted to Nueva Ecija; Southern Tagalog, a few scores in Quezon; Bicol, a few tens, remnants of the company in Sorsogon; Eastern Visayas, several scores; Western Visayas, several scores; and Mindanao, around 150 at the core of several times more of inferior firearms. Mindanao, Samar and Panay had the most homemade shotguns, garands and M-1 carbines which ran into hundreds, augmenting the automatic rifles.

On the basis of the discussions and decisions of the Plenum, the central leadership formulated and issued *Our Urgent Tasks* in 1976. This document clarifies the antifascist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal line and elaborates on the principles and methods of building in stages the mass organizations, the organs of political power and the

Party within the army and in the localities. It is the product of a great amount of revolutionary experience and the criticism of previous errors. It is the necessary and logical development of the *Organizational Guide and Outlines of Reports*. It shows the way to raise the level of the revolutionary forces on the basis of the best and most practicable lessons from the revolutionary experience of the Party and the people. It would become the most important and most fruitful document in guiding mass work and mass campaigns in the rural and urban areas and in building the organs of political power. It demonstrates the practical steps to take, from the stage of social investigation and initial contacts in a new area. It is a document of far-reaching significance, correctly guiding revolutionary mass work from 1976 onward and up to the present.

In the period 1976-77, the growth in the number and strength of the guerrilla fronts and the urban-based legal democratic forces proceeded rapidly and cumulatively. The main line of development was for the regional Party organizations to strengthen themselves notwithstanding the arrest of the principal central leaders of the Party in 1976 and 1977. By studying and applying *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines* and *Our Urgent Tasks*, the regional Party committees gained confidence in waging revolutionary armed struggle and in building the Party, the people's army and the mass base.

The revolutionary forces of Northwestern Luzon struck deep roots among the people in the Cordillera and a portion of Pangasinan. Those in Central Luzon relied on the revolutionary traditions of the people in the region and expanded far beyond the confines of the original mass base in Tarlac in 1969-72, despite the ultra-Left error of land confiscation which backfired in Tarlac in 1972 and the enemy-inspired communal conflict in the same area in 1974. Those in Manila-Rizal took advantage of the continuous development of the legal democratic forces, the increasing activation of the anti-Marcos reactionaries and the hypocritical "normalization" measures of the enemy. Cadres in Southern Tagalog and Bicol persevered in revolutionary struggle despite the grave errors of some previous

leaders in the Southern Luzon Party Committee and one supervisor assigned by the NPA National Operational Command up to 1974 and the serious adverse consequences of such errors.

From 1976 onward, the regional Party committee and organization as well as the people's army in Eastern Visayas were showing the entire country how to develop the revolutionary forces in an allround way. This is documented by the report of the regional Party committee to the Central Committee, published by *Rebolusyon* in 1977. Those of Negros and Panay in Western Visayas were also doing well. So were those of Mindanao. The two NPA companies that had become isolated and passive in the Isabela forest region were able to redeploy and shift themselves to Cagayan province in 1977. The central as well as the new regional leadership comprehensively, thoroughly and vigorously criticized the previous error of prolonged isolation of these units from the masses in the Isabela forest region.

In 1976 and 1977, the central leadership foresaw and planned the multiplication of guerrilla fronts, with platoons as the center of gravity, on the basis of a wide network of squads, and with each squad capable of operating in a guerrilla zone (roughly equivalent to a municipality) and dividing into armed propaganda teams with militia support to do mass work under favorable conditions (when no superior enemy forces are concentrating on the area). Upon the constant expansion and consolidation of the mass base, the guerrilla forces can expand and intensify the revolutionary armed struggle and have a wide room for maneuver against any militarily superior enemy force capable of seizing a piece but never the entire territory of the armed revolutionary movement.

Cumulative Growth Along the Correct Line and the Interference of Opportunism

A new central leadership of the Party assumed responsibility in November 1977. It was legitimately continuous with the previous central leadership and was recognized and supported by all the regional Party organizations. It succeeded in overcoming the loss of some principal leaders of the Party. It firmed itself up by drawing

strength from the central staff organs and the regional Party committees and organizations through a series of consultations, promotion of cadres to the Central Committee and plenary meetings of the Central Committee.

By and large, the Party's ideological, political and organizational line drawn by the central leadership was followed by the regional Party organizations and the NPA regional commands. But certain elements in the Central Committee and central staff organs began to question in 1978 the analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal. They argued that Philippine society had become more urbanized and industrialized than China before 1949 and the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war needed to be modified, adjusted or refined in order to heighten the role of urban uprisings and thereby cause a leap from the early substage of the strategic defensive to the advance substage.

By their claims, they falsely credited the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship with "industrializing" the Philippines. They blinded themselves to the fact that the big comprador bureaucrat-capitalist policy and operations of the Marcos ruling clique were deepening the semifeudal status of the Philippine economy. They also overlooked the fact that the NPA had at the most only 1500 Red fighters with automatic rifles for making the big leap to the advance substage. With their wishful thinking, they laid the subjectivist ground for interfering with the proper development of the people's war, particularly the multiplication of guerrilla fronts with platoons in relative concentration as centers of gravity and the eventual emergence of the company also in relative concentration as centers of gravity at the regional level.

From 1977 to 1979, the regional Party organizations which followed the correct line rapidly expanded and consolidated their forces in an all-round and balanced way. The most outstanding example in mass work and tactical offensives was provided by the Eastern Visayas regional Party organization. Other revolutionary forces in the Visayas and Mindanao steadily developed. Those in Northeastern Luzon, Southern Tagalog and Bicol recovered and expanded. Those in Central Luzon remained steady. The

comprehensive development of the revolutionary forces in both urban and rural areas was guided by *Specific Characteristics of People's War and Our Urgent Tasks*.

The most effective way of developing the people's war involved the deployment of squads, with each capable of controlling an entire municipality or the equivalent of it as a guerrilla zone or consolidated guerrilla zone and subdividing into armed propaganda teams to do mass work, and the deployment of a platoon as the center of gravity or strike force of an entire guerrilla front. In 1978, however, certain impetuous elements in the central leadership were already devising the rationale and plan for making the leap from the early to the advance substage of the strategic defensive by exaggerating the urbanization of the Philippines and the role of urban uprisings as well as urban legal struggle. Also in 1978, certain elements in the Manila-Rizal Party committee were driven by struggle mania and insisted that the Party openly participate in the farcical 1978 "parliamentary elections" staged by the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship and that the Party was limited to a choice between participation and boycott. Thus, it became impossible for the central leadership and the Manila-Rizal leadership to work out a decision similar to that previously taken by the Party in the 1969 and 1971 elections. The Party had called these past elections farcical and adopted tactics to propagate the revolutionary program, denounce the enemy and favor progressive forces and elements. The 1978 debate became limited to the participation-boycott dichotomy and to a contest of citing precedents and quotations from Bolshevik history. Worst of all, certain elements in the Manila-Rizal Regional Committee pushed their erroneous line so that by 1979 the Party organization had gone into shambles.

From 1980 to 1983, there was an unprecedented acceleration of growth of the Party and the revolutionary movement due to the rapid worsening of the crisis of the ruling system starting in 1979, the accumulated strength of the revolutionary forces and the continuing correct line of revolutionary struggle pursued by the overwhelming majority of Party cadres and Red fighters. The Party membership on the average grew almost 4000 annually. Basic Party units arose in the

factories, transportation lines, schools, people's army units and rural and urban-poor communities. The number of barrios under revolutionary organs of political power increased by the thousands yearly.

Guerrilla fronts covered almost entire provinces and big portions of regions, extending to well-populated areas, environs of town centers, along highways, seashores and on the plains. Those in Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol covered two-thirds to three-fourths of the barrios. The majority of the regions had two or three big and relatively stable guerrilla fronts. The NPA armed strength increased by an annual average of 800 to 900 rifles through confiscation from the enemy. The tactical offensives were carried out mainly by the NPA squads and platoons. As early as 1982, there were thirty-four platoons and more than 200 squads nationwide. These carried out tactical offensives frequently throughout the breadth and length of the country.

However, overlapping with the factors of advance was the increasing drive by impetuous elements in the central leadership and in certain regional Party committees to bring about at first the leap from the early to the advance substage of the strategic defensive and then the so-called strategic counteroffensive (SCO) as the highest substage of the strategic defensive and "regularization" in the Party and the people's army (creating more layers of bureaucracy and command without the corresponding development of the mass base and the Marxist-Leninist education of the cadres) and the premature formation of NPA companies at the cost of reducing the number of squads and platoons capable of widespread mass work and more flexible guerrilla warfare.

In the enlarged Plenum of 1980 attended by delegates from the central staff organs and the regional Party organizations, the Central Committee replenished its ranks through the method of appointing those deemed as the most outstanding cadres from the regional Party committees and the central staff organs. It created several new central staff commissions in order to scrap the previous system of central staff commissions, including the general secretariat. It also

created several interregional commissions as staff organs to supervise the regional Party organizations which had been increased to sixteen (16).

The Plenum spent a lot of time discussing the character of Philippine society, questioning the analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal and asserting that Philippine conditions were unlike those of Russia and China before their revolutionary victories. The Plenum preoccupied itself with looking for a rationale to modify the strategic line of protracted people's war and to give a greater role to armed insurrections. Emphasis was given to the Vietnam 1945 uprising and Tet offensive Vietnam as the model for emulation but taken out of their historical context.

By 1981, the meeting of the Political Bureau was no longer focused simply on making the leap from the early to the advance substage of the strategic defensive, despite the fact that the armed strength of the NPA Red fighters with automatic rifles was hardly 3000. Some Politburo members wished to attain the "strategic counteroffensive" and they further elaborated on the need for "regularization" in the Party and the NPA as well as on the need to give insurrection an immediate key role in the realization of the "strategic counteroffensive". By the time the Politburo met again in 1983, the main focus was already on drawing up and carrying out a plan to achieve the "strategic counteroffensive" and possibly to win the entire people's war in the immediate future.

The concept of "strategic counteroffensive" was a semantic anomaly, converting the probable third and final stage of the entire people's war into a mere substage of the strategic defensive. It was a "Left" opportunist wish far beyond the capability and given strength of the NPA nationwide. Notes of individuals who attended the 1981 PB meeting were circulated for study and application by regional Party organizations. Subsequently, there was the drive to create layers of the Party bureaucracy and army command, to form NPA companies by drastically reducing the number of smaller units and taking cadres away from work at the grass roots. Every regional Party organization:

was encouraged to make its own scenario for "regularization" and intensifying the war towards the "strategic counteroffensive".

The basic Party course was undertaken from 1979 onward but would peter out sometime in 1983 even while there was an urgent need for it and for higher levels of Marxist-Leninist education. In every PB meeting during the 1980's there was always a recognition of the need to carry out theoretical and political education and a decision to do so. But from 1983 onward, the central leadership did not find it necessary to maintain any central staff organ in charge of implementing any program of theoretical and political education. This was supposed to have been delegated to the regional Party organizations but was in fact neglected because the latter were not given clear direction and guidance by the central leadership and were preoccupied with practical work.

Copies of study materials in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and even basic Party documents dwindled and disappeared. As if to conceal the dearth or absence of these study materials, it became commonplace to say that the Party learned from all possible revolutionary examples abroad. The successful anti-authoritarian insurrection in Nicaragua which was led by quasi-Marxist petty-bourgeois radical anti-imperialists became more highly rated by certain elements than the Chinese revolution and other social revolutions led by Marxist-Leninist parties in the process of a two-stage revolution (*new democratic and socialist*). Up to 1979, some of the leaders of the Manila-Rizal Party committee concentrated on reading some works of Lenin but characteristically quoted him out of context to exaggerate the importance of their urban work, lay aside the basic documents of the Party and the works of Mao Zedong. Eclecticism and subjectivism ran rampant.

The proletarian revolutionary cadres did not lack the facts and arguments against the erroneous trend of questioning the analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal and of undermining the theory and strategic line of people's war. There were the research and writings done previously and currently on the subject. In 1982 and 1983, there were the articles on the mode of production and the

losing course of the armed forces of the Philippines. Even the group commissioned by the central leadership to restudy the character of Philippine society would conclude later on that Philippine society was still semicolonial and semifeudal. Some proletarian revolutionary cadres repeatedly called on the Party and the people's army to pay attention to the horizontal basis (the mass base, the small units dispersed for mass work, etc.) for building the vertical structure of forces (higher NPA formations) and warned against premature verticalization.

In 1982, the Mindanao Commission made its own elaboration on strategy and tactics on the basis of the notes of commission members who attended the 1981 Politburo meeting. On the wrong presumption that under the strategy of people's war rural work had been overemphasized at the expense of urban work, armed struggle at the expense of political struggle and domestic work at the expense of international work, the commission put out a paper metaphysically dichotomizing the supposed coordinates (cities and countryside; political and military; and domestic and international work) and then "re-coordinating" these on paper in order to undermine the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside, overrate urban insurrection as the highest form of politico-military struggle, downgrade the people's army as a purely military and secondary force and exaggerate the importance of international work to undermine the importance of self-reliant revolutionary struggle.

The Party and the NPA were "regularized" through the creation of additional leading and staff organs and the filling up of positions in these organs without sufficient ideological, political and organizational training of the cadres who were thus promoted. Until 1985, the premature formation of absolutely concentrated NPA companies in Mindanao was pushed according to the rationale that larger military units were needed so as to hit the enemy forces before these were fully reinforced by forces being shifted from the Moro areas. So long as the absolutely concentrated companies could be formed, some of the top cadres in the people's army in Mindanao did not mind the people's army being downgraded on paper as a purely military force.

secondary to the putative spontaneous "urban insurrectionary forces". The spontaneous popular forces in an insurrection were considered political and principal while the people's army, purely military. Such an organized revolutionary force as the people's army was considered inferior to the spontaneous or unorganized masses in the revolutionary process. The term "full-time" NPA unit was also reinterpreted to mean separation from mass work and absolute concentration on military work.

From 1983 to 1985, especially in 1984, the building of the absolutely concentrated NPA companies went into full swing in Mindanao. In 1984, however, these companies became isolated and passive because of the drastic dwindling of the mass base and the enemy campaigns of suppression which proved to be effective in the purely military situation. But still in 1984, the Executive Committee of the Mindanao Commission made another paper further elaborating on the line of military adventurism and urban insurrectionism and distributed this to all lower organs of the organizations of the Party and the NPA without the benefit of any democratic discussion beyond the aforesaid Executive Committee and without consideration of the gross setbacks already occurring as a result of the wrong line.

In the Plenum of 1985, the promoters of the line of combining military adventurism and urban insurrectionism had the temerity to demand the full rejection of the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war in favor of their wrong line which by then had already caused gross setbacks and had led to the murderous anti-DPA hysteria called *Kampanyang Ahos*. Dishonestly, they did not present the facts of these disasters to the Plenum and they strutted about as victorious leaders in their sphere of work. The Plenum repulsed the proposal to discard the strategic line of people's war but did not withdraw the erroneous line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" which had encouraged military adventurism and urban insurrectionism. Instead, the Plenum approved a three-year program (1986-88) "to develop/build the NPA into a regular army" and realize the "strategic counteroffensive" by "building the factors of regular mobile warfare" and "maximizing the advantages of guerrilla

warfare" The 1987 Politburo meeting further extended and elaborated on the aforesaid program.

Focal attention is given to the sequence of the wrong line of urban insurrectionism and military adventurism, gross setbacks, and anti-DPA hysteria in the period of 1982 to 1986 in Mindanao because this sequence of events inflicted the worst damage ever to the Party, the NPA and other revolutionary forces in their entire history — up to the point of murdering Party cadres, Red fighters, NDF allies and mass activists by the hundreds in both rural and urban areas on the basis of mere suspicion and false confessions extracted by torture. Kampanyang Ahas was touted as a "revolutionary success" by its principal perpetrators. They claimed that it saved the revolutionary forces in Mindanao from totally collapsing. They did not credit the Party and the masses for their perseverance in revolutionary struggle but castigated them for failing to catch up with the premature NPA companies.

"Left" opportunism took various forms and expressions and were encouraged in various regions because the "Left" opportunist line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" persisted and the dismal experience in Mindanao was not correctly summed up and criticized but was even pushed widely as a model for emulation, and because the cadres responsible for the grave errors in Mindanao were promoted to the Central Committee's Politburo, Executive Committee, and Military Commission, and to the "general command" of the NPA and thus were able to propagate their wrong line within these leading organs and nationwide through them as well as through a series of national and regional military conferences from 1984 to 1990.

As early as 1985, the nationwide rate of growth of the revolutionary forces declined mainly as a result of the gross mistakes and self-destructive Kampanyang Ahas. By 1986, Party membership in Mindanao had fallen from 9000 to 3000, the mass base by 50 percent and the NPA strength from 15 companies and 30 platoons to two companies and 17 platoons. But the advances of the revolutionary forces in Northern Luzon, the Visayas and Southern Luzon kept the

overall rate of growth from becoming negative from 1984 to 1987. Even as the "Left" opportunist line was already being imposed on all regions, it could not totally overpower the correct line and stop the advance of the revolutionary forces in a number of regions.

But from 1987 onward, the losses caused by the "Left" opportunist line overtook the advances made along the correct line. The nationwide growth rate became negative. It was in early 1988 that the Politburo meeting noticed the significant decline in Party membership by 2500 and the mass base by 12 percent. From 1986 to 1990, Party membership declined by 15 percent; the number of barrios covered by local organs of political power, by 16 percent; and, worst of all, the membership in the rural mass organizations, by 60 percent.

The "Left" opportunists' easy and shallow explanation for the losses and setbacks was that the enemy was proving to be superior with his strategy of "war of quick decision" and "gradual constriction" and that the premature and unsustainable premature companies and battalions were doing their best along the correct line but that the Party and the masses could not catch up with the NPA. This is a puerile and erroneous line of reasoning. The correct line necessitates stopping military adventurists and urban insurrectionists from preempting for themselves the personnel and resources of the Party and thereby playing into the hands of the enemy with their wrong line. The Party should always lead comprehensive and balanced building of the Party, the mass organizations, the organs of political power and the appropriate NPA formations. The Party and the people should never be made to tail after "Left" opportunists but should stop them on their track.

A review of our experience from 1980 to the present shows clearly that the revolutionary movement developed best in accordance with *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines* and *Our Urgent Tasks*. Painstaking mass work and solid organizing of the various types of mass organizations, organs of political power and the Party have laid the foundation for the development of the guerrilla forces and the guerrilla fronts. The properly balanced force structure requires that guerrilla squads are dispersed on a wide scale to do

mass work and, on this basis, the center of gravity (the rallying point and strike force) can arise. This is the force structure for conducting extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare on an expanding and ever consolidated mass base.

In contrast, the revolutionary forces suffered grave setbacks where the Red fighters were overconcentrated in prematurely formed companies and a far lesser number of Red fighters were in small units to expand and consolidate the mass base. In 1985 in Mindanao, the main regional guerrilla units (companies) absorbed more than 50 percent and the secondary regional guerrilla units (usually platoons) absorbed some 30 percent, thus leaving only some 20 percent of the total number of Red fighters in the island in small units to do mass work. After the big debacle in Mindanao, one of the worst examples was the concentration of 598 Red fighters in one battalion and two companies (80 percent) while only 151 (20 percent) Red fighters were in local guerrilla units in Eastern Visayas in the late 1980s. Inevitably, the result was the dwindling of the mass base by more than 50 percent within a short period of time, preoccupation with logistical problems and, of course, the ineffectiveness, isolation and passivity of the prematurely large military formations.

In the nationwide propagation of military adventurism from 1984 onward, the drive to form 36 companies and two battalions repeated the grave errors in Mindanao from 1982-85. These bigger formations were to absorb nearly 70 percent of the total troop strength of the NPA in 1986 and were to be set up at the expense of local squads which would have been otherwise deployed for mass work and for control of guerrilla zones (usually the size of municipalities). Some of the remaining local squads and platoons were to be reduced to service and logistical support units of the prematurely formed bigger units. When the bigger formations suffered personnel losses due to battle casualties or demoralization, they replenished personnel by devouring the smaller guerrilla units.

The line of military adventurism and urban insurrectionism were shown up to be clearly untenable in most regions by 1987 and 1988, especially after the so-called nationally coordinated offensive in 1987

which consisted mainly of attritive actions. These wasted ammunition in ineffective attacks on enemy hard points and unduly invited enemy retaliatory actions which exacted a significant toll on the revolutionary forces in both urban and rural areas. Consequently, some regional Party committees complained of the companies and battalions as excessively heavy logistical burdens and yet less effective than smaller units in launching tactical offensives and as the cause for the big loss of mass base. But the "Left" opportunists in the central leadership continued to insist that the prematurely bigger formations were the life buoy rather than the millstone around the neck of the revolutionary movement.

As early as 1988, the proletarian revolutionaries in the central leadership recognized the imbalances in revolutionary work and called for corrections and adjustments. The brief review of the history of the Party on the occasion of its 20th anniversary started to make criticisms along the proletarian revolutionary line against military adventurism and urban insurrectionism. In its 1989 Party anniversary statement, the Party central committee called for rectification and strengthening of the Party. From year to year, the devastating results of the wrong line came in. These prompted the proletarian revolutionary cadres in the Central Committee and lower Party organs and organizations to argue strongly against the wrong line. The yearly anniversary statements of the Party and the records of Executive Committee and Politburo meetings since 1989 reflected the intensifying two-line struggle and the eventual victory of the proletarian revolutionary line and the defeat of the "Left" opportunists.

In 1989, major corrections and adjustments started to be made. The proletarian revolutionaries in the central leadership prevailed and stopped the further formation of premature and unsustainable companies. Upon the direction of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee, an increasing number of regional Party committees dissolved and redeployed some of these companies. In 1990 the concept of "strategic counteroffensive" was finally withdrawn, thus undoing the roots of military adventurism and urban insurrectionism. In 1990 and 1991, the gross damage caused by the

wrong line on a nationwide scale became absolutely clear. Thus in 1991, the central leadership decided to undertake a comprehensive and thoroughgoing rectification movement.

"Left" opportunism has a Rightist content and direction. The "Left" opportunist line of combining military adventurism and urban insurrectionism is no exception. The "Left" motivation and facade is to accelerate total victory in the revolution far beyond the given level of strength of the revolutionary forces. But in fact the line plays into the hands of the enemy and delivers the revolutionary forces to both self-destruction and destruction by the enemy. Those who espouse the ultra-Left line either simultaneously carry both ultra-Left and Rightist ideas or swing from a conspicuously ultra-Left position to a blatant Rightist position after the telling frustration of the ultra-Left position.

By arguing that relations with the Soviet and Soviet-bloc revisionist parties would mean access to more powerful weapons and funds for accelerating the victory of the armed revolution, the "Left" opportunists went to the extent of considering these parties as genuine Marxist-Leninist parties; and the societies that they ruled as genuinely socialist. They turned their backs on the foundational antirevisionist line of the Party as early as 1982. Without even seeking the nullification of the antirevisionist line in the Party Program and Constitution, they spread within the Party the line that the Soviet Union was socialist and not social-imperialist and was a great exponent of proletarian internationalism and a great source of aid for proletarian revolutionaries and national liberation movements. From 1985 onward, papers carrying this line were passed off as documents of the central leadership and started to guide international work, despite the fact that the 1985 Plenum of the Central Committee decided to subject these papers to further study.

The "Left" opportunists, especially those in the NPA "General Command", based themselves in Metro Manila under the pretext of waiting for a "sudden turn of events" and "seizing opportunities" along the line of urban insurrectionism and attending to "special operations". The "special operations" consisted of making arrangements for the importation of weapons, which never materialized, and conducting

gangster activities, including robbery holdups and kidnap-for-ransom, which were never authorized by the appropriate central organs and were not accounted to them. The "Left" opportunists were engaged in outright criminal activities. They stubbornly based themselves in Manila-Rizal even as the enemy repeatedly captured many of them and their staffers here from 1988 to 1991.

Following the arrest of CC and GC officials in 1988, an anti-informer hysteria emerged in Metro Manila and this spread to a number of regions. This followed the pattern of the wrong line of combining military adventurism and urban insurrectionism, gross setbacks and anti-DPA hysteria. It was similar to the sequence of events in Mindanao from 1982 to 1986. The anti-DPA hysteria which consecutively involved Olympia, Operation Missing Link (OPML) and Save the Center (STC) had the high potential of destroying no less than the central leadership of the Party and the entire revolutionary movement. It was stopped by the formulation and implementation of the guidelines on the correct principles and methods of investigation, trial and evaluation of evidence by the central leadership in 1988.

The "Left" and Right opportunists had a common starting point in exaggerating the urbanization of the country and the role of urban work in achieving political power but one wished and aimed for urban insurrection and the other for an indefinite parliamentary struggle for reforms. As regards the united front in the urban areas, the "Left" opportunists lumped together and rejected both the bourgeois liberals and the anti-Marcos reactionaries (the big bourgeois and landlords); and the Right opportunists espoused a "broad legal alliance" which meant denying the existence of the Party and other revolutionary forces, putting them aside or downplaying them in order to please and serve the anti-Marcos reactionaries.

As early as 1981, the "Left" opportunists had adopted the insurrectionist terminology and mind frame of some prominent FSLN and FMLN leaders in Central America, which regarded the people's army as a "military force" and the spontaneous masses in uprising as the "political force". Some of the opportunists also openly adopted from these liberation front leaders the notion that the vanguard Party

of the proletariat must be replaced by the vanguard front. Thus, the idea to liquidate the leading role of the Party in the Philippine revolution came to be espoused both by the "Left" and the Right opportunists within the Party. The so-called New Katipunan was envisioned to replace the Party and the NDF.

The Right opportunists in the Party gradually increased their number and influence in the Party by becoming key persons in certain central staff organs and by having access to certain sources of funds, like local institutions and Western funding agencies. They played an important role in helping revive the legal democratic movement during the Marcos dictatorship, especially in the 1980s, but just before and after the fall of the Marcos regime they were publicly expressing views that were reformist and parliamentarist. Some of them created outside the Party small petty-bourgeois groups soliciting funds for themselves from foreign funding agencies.

The Right opportunists in the Party were mainly responsible for pushing the idea of building the NDF as a federation or confederation in which the Party loses its independence and initiative, becomes a mere member-organization subject to the majority vote of noncommunists. But the chief exponent of "reformism for urban insurrectionism" became the most active in pushing the aforesaid idea of the Right opportunists. This wrong idea was adopted by the Politburo meeting in 1987. The same opportunist usurped authority and tried in 1990 to carry out the wrong line of converting the NDF into a federation or confederation that was at the same time a unitary organization of individuals, bound by a program of bourgeois nationalism, pluralism and mixed economy.

In the years after the fall of the Marcos fascist autocracy, the "Left" opportunists collaborated with the Right opportunists within the Party and with the anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups like the pro-imperialist liberals, bourgeois populists, Christian democrats, petty-bourgeois socialists and Trotskyites to overstate the boycott error of 1986 as the biggest error ever in the entire history of the Party. In their view, it was a strategic error causing the strategic decline and marginalization of the Party. The opportunists, the

anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups and the most notorious publicists and academics of U.S. imperialism chorused that the only way out for the Party was to opt for a deemphasis or liquidation of the revolutionary armed struggle.

The boycott error was indeed a major tactical error which could be criticized from a correct Left viewpoint. But the chief exponent of reformism for urban insurrectionism deliberately and dishonestly overstated the boycott error to rationalize and whip up bourgeois reformism and capitulationism and obscure the far graver error of combining military adventurism and urban insurrectionism which led to the gross setbacks in Mindanao in 1984 and the bloody anti-DPA hysteria in 1985-86. He is one of those principally responsible for these disasters.

In 1986, after the release of political prisoners (except those falsely accused and convicted of common crimes), the proletarian revolutionaries held the view that the new presidency of the exploiting classes could be sufficiently countered in propaganda on the question of peace without necessarily entering into any ceasefire agreement. But the "Left" opportunists who were directly responsible for the debacle in Mindanao from 1984 to 1986, who criticized the 1986 boycott error from a Rightist position and who claimed that ceasefire was the way out of the debacle in Mindanao, masterminded some localized ceasefires in Mindanao and pushed the central leadership to enter into a nationwide ceasefire with the Manila government prior to formal bilateral peace talks.

Various types of insurrectionism have arisen within the Party. Like all kinds of opportunism, they have a petty-bourgeois social base, outlook and methods. The appearance is Leftist but the content is Rightist. The exponents of insurrectionism are carried away by impetuosity. They wish to finish the revolution quickly and easily. They do not have the proletarian class stand, logic, wisdom and tenacity for the protracted people's war, especially its requirement of painstaking mass work and solid mass organizing. They deck out the stale theory of spontaneous masses as something new and superior to the theory of protracted people's war. However, when they are

frustrated, the insurrectionists typically swing to a conspicuously Rightist position.

The proponents of the "strategic counteroffensive" held the view that *uprisings could be made in third and fourth class municipalities* to ignite nationwide insurrection. This kind of insurrectionism is more akin to the failed uprisings of the Sakdalistas in the 1930s. Although it sought to imitate the 1945 uprising in Vietnam, it was not reliant on the revolutionary organization of the masses and was not yet confronted with an army that was either defeated or disintegrating. Although it sought to imitate the Tet offensive of 1968, it ran counter to the line of protracted people's war and it did not have an already powerful people's army.

The kind of insurrectionism contained in the proposed "strategic counteroffensive" served to encourage other kinds of insurrectionism which directly or in effect rejected the development of the people's war in stages and wave upon wave. In the period of 1982-90, a number of interregional commissions and regional Party leading organs were inspired at different times to initiate their own particular kinds of insurrections. These are now being criticized and repudiated by the Party organs and organizations concerned. We take up here only the kinds of insurrection which were most damaging to the revolutionary movement.

So far, the kind of insurrectionism that has been most destructive to the revolutionary forces is that which sought to reduce the people's army into a purely military force and put it in the service of urban armed insurrections as the "highest form of politico-military struggle". The dramatic actions of armed city partisans and people's strikes were conducted supposedly to whip up the insurrectionary consciousness and then the spontaneous masses rather than the organized revolutionary forces were expected to overthrow the ruling system.

One variant of this kind of insurrectionism was linked to military adventurism in Mindanao and had resulted in grave damage to the revolutionary movement there from 1982 to 1986. Another variant of this insurrectionism was that one pushed since the 1970s by the

expelled former secretary of the Manila-Rizal Party Committee. It sought to use small groups of armed men to engage in isolated anarchist actions or to steal the scene from the masses during mass actions and deliberately provoke the police and military to attack the mass demonstrators.

The most absurd type of insurrectionism was actually pushed by the main drafter of the 1984 paper in Mindanao, which elaborated on the line of combining urban insurrectionism with military adventurism. While usurping authority from the central leading organs of the Party and trying to change the character of *Ang Bayan*, the National United Front Commission and the National Democratic Front, he collaborated with certain anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups in a vain attempt to entrap the legal progressive forces in a "peace" framework proposed by the so-called multisectoral peace advocates and calculated to pressure the NDF to capitulate to the reactionary government. He also autocratically worked out the concept of an anti-imperialist democratic front as a medium-term plan of insurrection. He pushed his plan in collaboration with the secretary then of the Manila-Rizal Party committee and certain members of the National United Front Commission.

He sought to combine the legal organizations of the Left, Middle and Right to form the so-called people's caucus and to call on then President Aquino in 1990 to agree to a so-called people's agenda. If Aquino refused, then in the medium term the legal organizations of the Left, Middle and Right were presumed to come into a conjuncture with all "armed opposition groups" like the NDF, MNLF and the factions of the reactionary armed forces (RAM, YOU and SFP) and once more call on Aquino to agree to a still broader people's agenda. Should Aquino refuse again, then the insurrection would be carried out. This was a counterrevolutionary idea of going Right with the ultra-Left objective of armed urban insurrection before the end of the presidential term of Aquino in 1992.

The insurrectionism of the exponents medium-term plan and that of the former leadership of the MR regional Party organization sabotaged the legal democratic mass movement in 1990-1992. The

chief promoters of these two types of insurrectionism held the common view that there could be no favorable objective conditions for mass protest actions, unless these resulted in armed urban uprisings immediately or in the medium term. They campaigned in 1991 and 1992 to deny the worsening crisis of the ruling system as a favorable condition for the party to lead (arouse, organize and mobilize) the masses for offensives (mass protest actions and NPA tactical offensives) but at the same time they were agitating for nothing less than an armed urban insurrection. They were ultra-Leftist in appearance but in fact they were Rightist.

The type of insurrectionism that is clearly Rightist without ultra-Left appearance is that which proposes insurrection as the vague goal of an indefinite protracted legal struggle in order to liquidate the strategic line of protracted people's war in the Philippines. The Lava revisionist renegades and the bourgeois populists are the main proponents of this kind of insurrectionism. Certain elements who have become bureaucrats of foreign-funded "NGOs" also run along the reformist line and at the same time spread the notion of spontaneous peasant insurrections as the replacement of protracted people's war.

It is not surprising that in bitter opposition to the rectification movement, the "Left" opportunists have conspicuously merged with the Right opportunists in order to push an outrightly anticommunist, anti-Stalin line formulated mainly by the long-running counterrevolutionary Right and are now openly collaborating with the U.S. Ramos regime and also with such anticommunist groups as the Lava revisionists, the pro-imperialist liberals, the bourgeois populists who call themselves popular democrats, the Christian democrats who call themselves social democrats, the petty-bourgeois socialists and the Trotskyites. It has come to light from the admission of one notorious opportunist now acting openly as a counterrevolutionary Rightist and as an agent of the enemy that he and a handful of elements inside and outside the Party have sought to form a "reform bloc" within the Party since 1988 to liquidate the Party from within in imitation of Gorbachov.

The anti-Party elements have been held responsible clearly for their grave errors (and for some, their crimes) and have been exposed and isolated. They have been compelled by their own counterrevolutionary character to publicly attack the Party and to move out of it. They have openly proclaimed their opposition to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, the antirevisionist line, the analysis of Philippine society as semifeudal and semicolonial, the general line of new democratic revolution, the vanguard role of the working class through the Party, the strategic line of people's war, the revolutionary class line in the united front, democratic centralism, the socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism.

The principal pushers of the "Left" opportunist line in yesteryears have openly and unabashedly become counterrevolutionary Rightists since 1992, have sought to wreck the Party from within and outside and have openly combined with the anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups to push the NDF to capitulate to the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique. They make propaganda about seeking convergences and accommodation with this clique and collaborate with it in intelligence and psy-war and in anticommunist rallies.

They prate that the people's war is futile, that the people are satisfied with oppression and exploitation and are tired of their own revolutionary resistance, that the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system are invincible and that the global trend is for national liberation movements to strike peace deals with and capitulate to the enemy. Frustrated in their previous "Left" opportunism, these new counterrevolutionary Rightists are even more rabidly capitulationist, reformist and liquidationist than the long time Right opportunists who have not made ultra-Left posturings.

These newly surfaced anticommunist elements are receiving funds and other kinds of assistance from foreign and local reactionary entities in order to attack the Communist Party of the Philippines and the revolutionary mass movement. They are now in the process of forming anticommunist groups and alliances in various sectors and one more anticommunist party as a minor adjunct of the major big comprador landlord parties. They have gone to the extent of

announcing their intention to seek convergences with the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique and are openly collaborating with civil and military agencies of the regime. Some of the anticommunist ringleaders of these new anticommunist formations have exposed their long-running links with the intelligence agencies of the U.S. and the Philippine reactionary governments.

The correct line had sustained the consistent general trend of advance from year to year in 1968-1984 and has prevailed to save the strength and achievements of the Party from that period up to the present. The errors of subjectivism and opportunism and the violations of democratic centralism have been the causes of the reduced rate of growth from 1985 to 1987 and the negative growth from 1988 onward. The Party has been able to launch, carry out and win victory in the current great rectification movement because its theoretical foundation in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought is still strong and it has an ample corps of proletarian revolutionary cadres.

There has always been a two-line struggle between the proletarian revolutionaries and the unremoulded petty-bourgeois within the reestablished Party. To deny this fact is to be an idealist. The Party somehow reflects the social reality outside and the development of the Party membership is always uneven; thus unremoulded petty-bourgeois elements can hold on to and generate varying degrees of antiproletarian ideas and certain Party members can degenerate and retrogress within the working class party.

In the 1968-80 period, the antiproletarian ideas and actions were fragmentary and sporadic. But from 1980 onward, these had become systematized to undermine the proletarian revolutionary line, principally through "Left" opportunism and secondarily through Right opportunism. Since 1988, there has been a conscious and systematic effort by a so-called reform bloc of counterrevolutionary Rightists to liquidate the Party in a comprehensive way. In 1990, the anti-Party elements usurped authority over certain central staff organs, the National United Front Commission and *Ang Bayan*, the Visayas interregional commission and Manila-Rizal Party organization to

openly attack the proletarian revolutionary line of the Party and push their bourgeois counterrevolutionary line. Finally, in the last quarter of 1991, one of the ringleaders of the anti-Party group drafted and issued anti-Party manifestoes in the form of letters to the Party general membership.

Just as the anti-Party elements were conspiring to take over the Party and destroy it from within, the proletarian revolutionaries in the Central Committee started to confront and combat them with the correct revolutionary line. They started in 1988 to criticize the gross imbalances in work and in the deployment of personnel and resources and to demand corrections. They restrained the general trend of decline from 1989 onward and proceeded from year to year to prevail over the wrong line until the decision was taken in 1991 to carry out a rectification movement to defeat the wrong line in a comprehensive and thoroughgoing manner and strengthen the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. Thus, the rectification movement came into full force in 1992, especially after the Plenum of the Central Committee approved the rectification documents.

The rectification movement has become a vigorous ideological and political movement within the Party to criticize and repudiate the "Left" and Right opportunists, especially the worst counterrevolutionary Rightists among them who have criminal liabilities. It has brought about a new and higher level of revolutionary unity among the Party cadres and members along the correct proletarian revolutionary line and along the general line of the new-democratic revolution through protracted people's war among the broad masses of the people. The Party cadres and members are more determined and more militant than ever to rectify and overcome the major deviations, errors and shortcomings; practice correct assessment and evaluation, criticism and self-criticism; go more deeply into the midst of the toiling masses of workers and peasants in order to learn from and lead them; and raise to a new and higher level the fighting will and capabilities of the Party and the people against the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique and the entire ruling system.

II. THE CURRENT PARTY SITUATION AND OUR TASKS

The current situation of the Party is excellent as a result of the rectification movement. Under the leadership of the Party Central Committee, the Party cadres and members have resolutely united to reaffirm the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and rectify errors in order to raise higher the fighting will and capabilities of the Party and the people against the ruling system and the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique.

The entire Party is reinvigorated as the vanguard force of the Filipino proletariat and people. It has further strengthened itself ideologically, politically and organizationally. It is more resolute and more confident in integrating the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and in leading the new democratic revolution against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Party, the tens of thousands of Party cadres and members, the thousands of Red fighters of the New People's Army and the millions of people under the organs of political power and mass organizations in both urban and rural areas are determined more than ever to wage the revolutionary struggle against the enemy.

The rectification movement led and initiated by the central leadership is an overwhelming and resounding success. The national staff organs, the interregional commissions, all regional Party organizations and the general membership have seriously studied the principal rectification documents, *Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors*, the *General Review of Important Events and Decisions* and *Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism*. They uphold, support and are guided by the line, principles and policies taken by these documents and all the related and consequent decisions of the 1992 Plenum of the Central Committee.

The rectification documents guide the summings-up, criticism and self-criticism and the definition of tasks. These documents were drawn up by the central leadership on the basis of the accumulation of facts and ideas from the 1980-1992 period of the history of the

reestablished Party and scores of major documents and hundreds of other related documents of the Central Committee and the lower Party organs and organizations, arising from direct investigation, reports, consultations, conferences and other forms of democratic interaction between the central leadership and the lower organs and organization of the Party.

The lower Party organs and organizations have made new summings-up, criticism and self-criticism, and definition of tasks in the light of the rectification documents issued by the Central Committee. The process of gaining revolutionary knowledge is a never ending dialectical process. It characterizes the rectification movement. The principle involved in the process is "from the masses to the masses" of Party members through the appropriate organs and units.

The overwhelming majority of the central staff organs and regional Party committees have made their new summings-up, criticism and self-criticism, and definition of tasks and submitted their reports to the Central Committee. Only a few other organs are still in the process of doing these and are expected to submit them soon. Those already submitted are being studied by the Central Committee and are being shared with organs other than those submitting them. *Rebolusyon* publishes the appropriate materials to make these available for study by the general Party membership.

In the course of the rectification movement, the proletarian revolutionary line has vigorously asserted itself and resoundingly defeated the counterrevolutionary bourgeois line. The opponents of the proletarian revolutionary line have clearly exposed themselves. First, they became a conspicuously anti-Party faction of "Left" opportunists and Right opportunists; subsequently the "Left" opportunists dropped off their "Left" mask and exposed their counterrevolutionary Rightist character. Finally, these anti-Party factionalists, splittists and liquidationists flagrantly put themselves out of the Party by publicly declaring their "autonomy" and their anticommunist, anti-Stalin line.

These renegades are only a few. They are the excrescences of the revolutionary movement. They include the frustrated military

adventurists and urban insurrectionists who are responsible for Kampanyang Ahas and who are criminal gangsters. They also include long-running Rightists who have sought to liquidate the Party and subordinate the working class to the bourgeoisie and who now have full initiative within the gang of counterrevolutionary Rightists in pushing the line of anticommunism, reformism and capitulationism. Some of these counterrevolutionaries have exposed their longstanding character as intelligence and psy-war agents of the enemy.

Since July 1993, the anti-Party group has come out publicly in an anticommunist alliance which includes the lackeys of the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique, the local lackeys of the now defunct Soviet revisionist party, the bourgeois populists (popdems), pro-U.S. liberals, Christian democrats ("Socdems"), petty-bourgeois socialists and Trotskyites. The self-exposure of the anti-Party elements as counterrevolutionary Rightists facilitates their own isolation and political extinction and is a manifestation of the overwhelming victory of the rectification movement.

In just over a year, the Party has demonstrated the main and essential character of the rectification movement; has upheld, defended and advanced the correct revolutionary line; has respected due process and has exercised restraint in dealing with the anti-Party ringleaders and those few whom they have misled through lies, slander and intrigues.

A. The Ideological Situation and Tasks

The rectification movement is an educational movement in Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. Theoretical education is of crucial importance because there can be no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory. It means the study of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism taught by the great communists Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and the rich accumulation of revolutionary experience and works resulting from the integration of Marxist-Leninist theory and concrete practice in the Philippine revolution.

The first requisite for winning cumulative and lasting victories in the current rectification movement and in the entire revolutionary process is for the entire Party to carry out successfully the movement for Marxist-Leninist theoretical and political education. Unremoulded petty-bourgeois elements were able to generate subjectivism and bring in even the most outrightly counterrevolutionary ideas within the Party because they were able to move into the vacuum resulting from the lack or scarcity of Marxist-Leninist education. It is not enough for the Party to be good at promoting the general line of the national democratic revolution. It is also necessary to have a good grounding on the basic principles of the revolutionary proletariat through Marxist-Leninist theoretical education.

It must be recognized that the "Left" opportunists (the military adventurists and urban insurrectionists) and the Right opportunists (advocates of Gorbachovite revisionism, bourgeois populism, liberalism, petty-bourgeois socialism, social-democracy, Trotskyism, Bukharinism, nationalism, pluralism and pacifism) emerged and rose to key positions within the Party because of the lack or scarcity of Marxist-Leninist education. All these opportunist political trends are grounded in idealist philosophy, bourgeois subjectivism and eclecticism which must be constantly combated.

All the victories won so far by the rectification movement would be unstable and ephemeral if Marxist theoretical and political education were not to be carried out correctly, promptly and relentlessly. Sooner than expected, the ringleaders of opportunism have thoroughly exposed themselves as anticommunists and counterrevolutionaries by their own proclamations and actions. This development should not make the Party complacent about the urgent and long-term need for Marxist-Leninist education.

We have defeated the anti-Party elements within the Party because of the bankruptcy of their ideological, political and organizational line and because of the speed by which they have exposed themselves as anticommunists through their own words and deeds. But if we do not move fast enough to carry out Marxist-Leninist theoretical and political education, there would be no assurance that

anti-Party elements would not emerge once more from within the Party to inflict damage on it and the revolutionary movement. We have a lot of work to do in order to raise the level of our education and to make sure that the new members of the Party get the basic Party education.

The central leadership must stress that ideological work is the most important component of the rectification movement and the entire revolutionary struggle, especially because the imperialists and the reactionaries have succeeded in recruiting quite a number of unremoulded petty-bourgeois intellectuals still posing as communists to become their special agents in an ideological and political offensive. The central leadership must set the direction and deploy sufficient personnel and resources for ideological work.

The three levels of the Party study program (basic, intermediate and advance) must be resolutely promoted. The outlines of study, the list of reading materials and the reading materials must be circulated in advance to all Party organs and units. In the exercise of leadership, the Central Committee must direct the Revolutionary School of Mao Zedong Thought as the higher Party school and the General Secretariat and, particularly its Education Department, to carry out the program of Party education. All the regional Party committees and the staff organs must go full swing into the movement of Marxist-Leninist theoretical and political education.

The basic Party course must instill the basic proletarian revolutionary stand, viewpoint and method and must clarify the basic periods of Philippine history, the semicolonial and semifeudal character of Philippine society, the new-democratic character of the current stage of the Philippine revolution, the motive forces, targets, the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war, the comprehensive tasks and the socialist perspective of the revolution.

The basic texts include: the Five Golden Rays and its Philippine version; the *Guide for Party Cadres and Members*, ("Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party", the Party Constitution and the Program for a People's Democratic Revolution); *Philippine Society and Revolution*, *Philippine Crisis and Revolution*, *On the Mode of Production*, *Our*

Urgent Tasks (OUT), Specific Characteristics of Our People's War (SCPW), and the current rectification documents, Reaffirm our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors, General Review of Important Events and Decisions from 1980 to 1991, Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism, and Unite to Raise the Fighting Will and Capabilities of the Party and the People

The intermediate Party course must require more extensive knowledge of the study materials in the basic Party course and go more deeply into our own revolutionary experience and the problems and tasks of social investigation and class analysis; building the Party, the New People's Army, the united front; economic work; and cultural work. Those taking the course can be encouraged to express themselves orally and in writing about the problems of the revolutionary struggle and recommend solutions, and to make critical studies of subjectivist and opportunist lines of thinking and action, and comparative studies of the Philippine revolution and other revolutions abroad.

The basic texts include those of the basic Party course and other documents from various levels of the Party in its 25-year history. Main references are the selected works of Comrade Mao Zedong that are most pertinent to the entire process of new democratic revolution. The Philippine selections of Mao's works originally published in the 1970s must be reproduced.

The advance Party course must provide Party cadres with a comprehensive and profound knowledge of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism in materialist philosophy, capitalist and socialist political economy, scientific socialism, the struggle against classical and modern revisionism, the theory of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship, and the history and strategy of the international communist movement.

The basic texts include mainly the concise works and extracts from the long works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao and related documents of the CPP. Those taking the advance course are encouraged to express themselves orally or in writing about the

subjects and to try to raise to the level of theory the concrete revolutionary practice of the Party.

In the course of the rectification movement, the assessment and evaluation of the achievements and errors of the Party in varying scales and in varying periods can result in good Marxist-Leninist education and strong ideological building of the Party. The errors and shortcomings can be turned into a good thing. They can serve to sharpen our understanding of the correct line and lead us to rectify them. The anti-Party elements have viciously attempted to foul up the rectification movement in an effort to conceal the serious deviations, errors and the crimes which they have committed.

The Marxist-Leninist classics and contemporary materials from the CPP and other Marxist-Leninist parties must be circulated so that they can be read and studied by individual members and by collectives ahead of the formal Party courses. Party organs and units must be encouraged to go ahead in undertaking their own programs of study for the benefit of their members ahead of any formal course run by a higher organ.

The meetings of specific organs and units to assess and evaluate work, conduct criticism and self-criticism and set new tasks are important for raising the ideological and political consciousness and militancy of all Party members. As a matter of fact, this is the most concrete and living way of acquiring a Marxist-Leninist education. Meetings regarding administrative and procedural matters must be shortened and made more efficient in order to give more time to collective study. Ideological work must be given ample time.

It is absolutely necessary for all members of the CPP to understand not only the two stages of the Philippine revolution (new democratic and socialist) under the leadership of the working class but also the crucial importance of combating revisionism and similar trends now and in the future and the theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship to consolidate socialism, combat revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism until imperialism is defeated on a global scale and communism becomes possible.

In its ideological building, the Party firmly upholds the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. We should never again deviate from the antirevisionist line. We must never be misled by any illusion that we can accelerate the victory of the revolution by depending on military and financial assistance from abroad and at the same time by departing from our Marxist-Leninist line. Had the Soviet party agreed to having "fraternal" relations with the CPP in the past, the costs in ideological and political confusion would have been subsequently devastating. No revisionist party abroad is genuinely interested in supporting the Philippine revolution. We should stop thinking that if we fell silent on the question of revisionism, someday some revisionist party would rise above its self-centered bourgeois interests and help us.

The Party resolutely seeks to realize the new democratic and socialist stages of the Philippine revolution. The ever worsening conditions of oppression and exploitation by foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism necessitate and justify the new-democratic revolution. The ever-worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system and that of the world capitalist system and the resolute strengthening of the revolutionary forces guarantee the eventual victory of the new-democratic revolution.

The socialist future of the Philippines is realizable as demonstrated in the past by the proletariat and people of several countries. As regards the question of whether socialism can be built by the Filipino proletariat and people alone on the scale of the Philippines, the answer is that by the time that the new-democratic revolution wins so many other peoples shall have made major advances in revolution in a global resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement, as a result of the now unprecedented crisis of the world capitalist system.

As regards the question of whether there is still a socialist future after the betrayal of socialism by the modern revisionists, the answer is that the achievements of Lenin, Stalin and Mao in socialist revolution and construction have become more clear. The rise and fall of revisionist regimes provide us with unforgettable lessons. The

unprecedented crisis of the world capitalist system is bound to lead to the resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. The theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship shows us the way to the socialist and communist future of mankind.

Since 1989, the crisis of the world capitalist system (including monopoly bureaucrat capitalism, with or without the mask of "socialism") has worsened so rapidly that the high-tech ideological, political and psychological offensive of the imperialists and their retinue of petty-bourgeois anticommunists, the revisionists and neorevisionists and the most backward reactionaries has become so discredited and blunted. On the scale of the Philippines, owing mainly to the grave crisis of the domestic ruling system and to the rectification movement, the Party has been able to frustrate the long-drawn scheme of the imperialists, the petty-bourgeois anticommunists and the reactionaries to discredit and wipe out Marxism-Leninism, the Party and the revolutionary movement.

It is a distinct honor for the Party to be at the vanguard of the new-democratic revolution through protracted people's war in the Philippines and to be one of the parties leading an armed revolutionary movement. It has the outstanding role of holding up the torch of armed revolution in a new period of revolutionary struggle in the world. The revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people led by the Communist Party of the Philippines is now at the forefront of the revolutionary struggles led by the proletariat in the world. The revolutionary forces in the world are still germinating or are small due to the work of neocolonialism and modern revisionism in undermining and sabotaging for several decades the anti-imperialist and socialist movement.

It is the proletarian internationalist duty of the Party to stay on the road of armed revolution and to demonstrate to the proletariat and people of the world that it is necessary and feasible to wage armed revolution against the counterrevolutionary forces and grow in strength and advance. At the same time, we should expect the imperialists and reactionaries to use all means to destroy our forces

and we should be prepared to frustrate them. In persevering on the road of armed revolution, the Party seeks not only to achieve the national liberation of the Filipino people but also to help the revolutionary forces abroad in bringing about the resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement on an unprecedented scale.

The Party upholds proletarian internationalism as the principle that guides in common and coordinates all the workers of the world now and in the long future in struggling against monopoly capitalism and in building socialism until imperialism is defeated on a global scale and communism becomes possible. In consonance with its Marxist-Leninist ideological building, the Party seeks to develop the closest fraternal relations and common understanding with Marxist-Leninist parties and organizations. It works for the closer ideological and political understanding of all Marxist-Leninist parties that are not hostile to Stalin and Mao and that wish to uphold the continuous development of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice. It also seeks to develop the broadest range of solidarity relations with parties, organizations and movements abroad on the political basis of adherence to the anti-imperialist cause.

B. Political Situation and Tasks

The semicolonial and semifeudal conditions of Philippine society have deepened and worsened since the reestablishment of the CPP in 1968. It must be stated sharply that the "Left" and Right opportunists have been utterly wrong in spreading since the late 1970s the lie that the U.S.-Marcos fascist regime was industrializing and urbanizing the Philippines, thus invalidating the analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal.

The "Left" opportunists generated false illusions about Philippine society in order to push the erroneous line of "strategic counteroffensive", "regularization", military adventurism and urban insurrectionism; and thus undermine the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war. The Right opportunists spread the same illusions in order to push the line of misdirecting the united front and

the legal struggle towards the liquidation of the Party and the armed revolution.

Now, the incorrigible opportunists of both types are out of the Party and are seeking to destroy it. They are shamelessly spreading the lie that the "Philippines 2000" (Medium-Term Development Plan) of the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique will turn the Philippines into a "newly industrializing country". They openly babble about seeking "convergences" with the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique. They have completely unmasked themselves as special psy-war agents of foreign monopoly capitalism and the local reactionary classes.

The Philippine economy remains agrarian, preindustrial and semifeudal. It is dependent mainly on a backward type of agriculture for its staple food and exports. It has no basic industries that produce basic metals, chemicals, machine tools and precision instruments. It is dependent on imported equipment, manufactured components, fuel and other raw materials. The value of its export of agricultural and mineral products and low value-added manufactures keeps on falling far below the value of its import of consumer and producer goods. The export of cheap labor (overseas contract workers) fetches more income than any of the export products.

In a country with a gross national product of around US\$49 billion and a population of 65 million, the import bill normally runs to nearly 30 percent of GNP and the export income, less than 20 percent. The trade deficit is nearly ten percent of GNP. Foreign loans are annually incurred for debt service and to cover the trade deficit and the profit remittances of the multinational firms. The current level of foreign debt is more than US\$33 billion. The annual debt service burden is at the level of US\$ 4.6 billion. The domestic public debt is more than P/570 billion (US\$20 billion).

The reactionary government's budget is one of the most absurd in the world. From 1986-1991, an average of 53 percent of it was devoted to debt service. The second largest expenditure is for the military, police, paramilitary forces and intelligence services, gobbling up more than 15 percent. Funds for education, health and infrastructures have dwindled. The approved budget for 1993 involved

the estimated expenditure of P/310 billion (US\$11 billion), the revenue of P/284 billion and the estimated deficit of P/26 billion. But the expenditures have soared and the expected deficit is far larger. There is a breakdown in infrastructures and basic social services (electricity, water and the like) and, consequently, in production.

Accumulated unemployment in a labor force of 27 million is more than 50 percent, although official statistics claim the unbelievably low unemployment rate of only nearly 10 percent and underemployment rates ranging from 31 to 33 percent. The legislated minimum daily wage is P/118 but the daily cost of living for a family of six is P/229. The inflation rate is running high but, through the statistical manipulation of the basket of basic goods, government statisticians claim an official rate of less than 10 percent. Eighty percent of the people fall below the poverty line. They belong mostly to the working class and the peasantry, and include most of the urban petty-bourgeoisie.

The working people suffer not only misery and want due to economic exploitation but also the most conspicuous forms of oppression. Official and unofficial violence is used to deprive the workers and peasants of their right to organize and seek the improvement of their conditions even where there are yet no revolutionary forces. In areas where the revolutionary forces exist, the reactionary forces unleash the most vicious forms of violence, including bombardments, arson, massacres, selective murders, illegal arrest and detention, torture, forced mass evacuations, zoning and strategic hamlets. All these are desperate measures of the enemy. They are carried out under the "total war" policy of the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique. This policy is currently operationalized as Lumbat Bitag III, the nationwide all-out enemy military offensive being carried out on the false presumption that the armed revolutionary movement has been isolated.

The new catchphrase of the ruling clique is "Philippines 2000". It is an economic plan premised on the violent suppression and capitulation of the revolutionary forces, the provision of union-free and strike-free areas for the foreign investors and the further enlargement

of the incentives long offered to the multinational firms. There is absolutely no basis for the regime to expect that foreign investments and loans would pour in to industrialize the Philippines. The current general crisis of the imperialist countries involves an unprecedented contraction of productive capital, huge inventories of unsold goods and idling of productive capacity. The economic plan of the regime ignores the land problem and seeks to perpetuate landlordism. Without a genuine and thoroughgoing land reform, there can be no industrialization in the Philippines.

The local reactionary classes of big compradors and landlords have a common interest in oppressing and exploiting the Filipino people but they are divided into rival economic and political factions. The U.S.-Ramos clique is the chief representative of the reactionaries but it faces opposition from the other factions. Conscious of the minority vote that brought him to the presidency and taking orders from the Pentagon, General Ramos has taken steps to reach an agreement on a ceasefire with the Moro National Liberation Front and to reconcile with the anti-Ramos sections of the reactionary armed forces, especially the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) and the Soldiers of the Filipino People (SFP) and the nationalist Young Officers Union (YOU). But the conditions for long-lasting mutual accommodation are limited.

The U.S.-Ramos ruling clique has gone even further than its predecessor, the U.S.-Aquino clique, in drumming up the rumor of peace talks by actually agreeing to exploratory talks abroad in 1992, resulting in The Hague Joint Declaration between the National Democratic Front and the Manila government, and asking for a second round of exploratory talks in Vietnam. The main purpose of General Ramos is to carry out psychological warfare, to misrepresent his regime as desirous of peace, conjure false illusions among the people and split the revolutionary movement. That is why the regime is providing funds and other resources to the counterrevolutionary renegades. The Party and the National Democratic Front are standing up firmly for the national and democratic rights and interests of the

people and are fending off the attempts of the counterrevolutionaries to whip up pacifism, capitulationism, reformism and liquidationism.

The socioeconomic crisis of the ruling system will keep on fueling the political crisis. There are two conceivable ways of ending the crisis of the system. One is to bring about the industrial development of the Philippines. But this way is blocked by the concurrent crises of the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system and the determination of the Ramos ruling clique to preserve big comprador and landlord interests. The other way is for the new-democratic revolution to proceed through people's war and win victory.

So long as the semicolonial and semifeudal character of the ruling system persists, its chronic crisis provides the fertile ground for the growth in strength and advance of the armed revolution. Together, the objective fact of the chronic crisis and the development of the revolutionary forces ensure the general tendency of the ruling system to disintegrate in what may be called the terminal crisis of the ruling system even if that crisis is going to be ended not so soon but by a protracted people's war.

The revolutionary forces would have been far stronger now had it not been for the "Left" opportunist errors of military adventurism and urban insurrectionism inspired by the erroneous line of the "strategic counteroffensive" and "regularization". These errors played into the hands of the enemy by skipping the necessary phases or substages in the development of the revolutionary forces in the strategic defensive, reducing the mass base, weakening the people's army and making it vulnerable to the enemy's strategic offensive (war of quick decision) and tactics of gradual constriction.

Mao Zedong has taught us since a long time ago that it suits the enemy with superior military forces to carry out the strategic offensive and that it suits the people's army to be on the strategic defensive and launch tactical offensives within a wide area of maneuver created by mass work in the countryside. The strategic line of people's war is to encircle the cities from the countryside and accumulate strength in the countryside until it is possible to seize the cities. It is foolhardy to imagine that cities can provide a revolutionary armed force far smaller

and weaker than the reactionary armed forces a wider room for maneuver than the countryside can. The dismal record of the urban insurrectionists and criminal gangs provide abundant proof.

The countryside becomes a far wider area for maneuver than the cities only if the mass base is constantly expanded and consolidated far beyond the capacity of the enemy to concentrate upon and occupy for extended periods of time. The enemy can concentrate on a guerrilla front or any portion of it but he gives away space elsewhere, allowing the revolutionary forces to grow in strength outside the enemy's points of concentration or areas under strategic enemy encirclement. It is impossible for the enemy to unfold any strategic encirclement without any gaps. The units of the people's army can launch tactical offensives against inferior enemy units inside and outside that strategic encirclement.

There must be a redeployment of the Red fighters in order to have a force structure in which 25 to 30 percent of the Red fighters are in the centers of gravity and 70 to 75 percent are in smaller units for mass work on a wide scale. Without the mass base, there can be no people's war. The current line is to conduct extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare on an ever expanding and ever deepening mass base.

It is absurd that the enemy had been the one using small units as "special operations teams" (SOTs) for psy-war and intelligence in order to effect gradual constriction while the NPA had been the one giving up the use of small units to expand and consolidate the mass base beyond the capacity of the enemy to cover. It is the long-tested winning practice of the NPA to have a wide network of guerrilla squads (divisible into armed propaganda teams), creating the mass base and coming to the call of the center of gravity for launching tactical offensives.

The record shows that small units (platoons and squads) of the NPA have been far more effective in carrying out tactical offensives than the prematurely formed companies and battalions, which are formed at the expense of the smaller units, which further convert some of the remaining smaller units into supply units or which gobble

up smaller units in the course of troop replenishment. The center of gravity in a guerrilla front may only be a platoon (itself doing mass work and in relative concentration when not engaged in a tactical offensive) but it can draw in any number of smaller units necessary to make a larger force (company-size or oversized platoon) for a tactical offensive or a series of offensives.

In the case of a large guerrilla front and at the regional level, a company may be the center of gravity, provided that it is not prematurely built at the expense of the smaller units and mass work and provided further that it is in relative concentration for mass work when it is not engaged in a worthwhile operation requiring absolute concentration.

In building the mass base, the organs of political power, the mass organizations and the local Party branches must be built. The local organs of political power must hew to the revolutionary class line, must be assisted by working committees in charge of mass organizations, public education, land reform, production, finance, defense, health, arbitration and cultural affairs, must be supported by mass organizations of the workers (if any), peasants, youth, women, cultural activists and children and must be led by the Party.

There must be mass campaigns in order to develop the power and mass participation of the people and to gain immediate social benefits for them. The key campaign in the countryside is the minimum land reform program of rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, improving the prices of farm products, and raising production in agriculture and sideline occupations. This is in accordance with the antifeudal line which is within the framework of the new-democratic revolution. There are other possible campaigns which can be undertaken by the organs of political power, its working committees and the mass organizations under the leadership of the Party.

There must be no premature proclamation of the existence of a municipal, provincial or regional organ of political power or provisional revolutionary government. In our experience, this has helped the enemy to identify our relatively strongest areas against which he concentrates his strongest armed reaction. The widespread guerrilla

warfare must be like a veil to deprive the enemy of specific fixed targets and prevent him as much as possible from effectively directing his troops.

As the vanguard of the Filipino proletariat and the entire Filipino people, the Party must wield two powerful weapons: the armed struggle and the united front. It must exercise absolute leadership over the NPA. In the united front, be this formal or informal, the National Democratic Front or the legal alliances, the Party must maintain its independence and initiative and exercise class leadership. The united front is mainly for the armed struggle and secondarily for the legal struggle.

We must repudiate the "Left" opportunists who wish to separate the NPA from the absolute leadership of the Party and who misuse certain units in the pursuit of military adventurism, urban insurrectionism and gangsterism. We must likewise repudiate the Right opportunists who also wish to liquidate the Party by replacing it as the center of the revolution with a bogus united front, which is a federation or confederation and/or a unitary organization of individuals in which the representatives of the Party are eventually, if not immediately swamped by nonproletarian or antiproletarian forces. Such an arrangement may at first be dominated by the petty-bourgeois elements but it is subsequently delivered to the big bourgeoisie under a program of bourgeois nationalism, pluralism and mixed economy.

In leading the new democratic revolution, the Party must rely mainly on the worker-peasant alliance, win over the urban petty-bourgeoisie as one more basic revolutionary force, further win over the middle bourgeoisie and take advantage of the splits among the reactionaries to isolate and destroy the most reactionary clique, which is the most subservient to foreign monopoly capitalism at every given time.

In pursuing the antifeudal line, the Party must rely mainly on the poor and lower-middle peasants, win over the middle-middle peasants, neutralize the rich peasants and the enlightened gentry, take advantage of the contradictions between the enlightened gentry

and the evil gentry in order to isolate and destroy the power of the latter. The Party should take advantage of the contradictions among the reactionaries. It will take a higher level of development in the revolutionary movement for us to be able to carry out the maximum land reform program of confiscation and free land distribution.

It is "Left" opportunism to carry out the maximum land reform program while we are still carrying out guerrilla warfare. We should not forget the bitter lessons learned from the premature application of the maximum land reform program in Tarlac in 1972 and Sorsogon in 1974 or in more recent times in Nueva Vizcaya. Singling out a despotic landlord to have his land confiscated or a landgrabber to have the land restituted to the real owners is appropriate and permissible. But provoking all landlords (including small ones and otherwise enlightened ones) to unify in armed reaction to the confiscation of their land is an altogether different matter which is impermissible. The current of peasant insurrectionism pushed by certain foreign-funded NGO bureaucrats who are in fact reformists is a malicious attempt to confuse our cadres among the peasant masses.

The principal form of revolutionary struggle is the armed struggle because it answers the central question of revolution, which is the seizure of political power and the smashing of the military and bureaucratic machinery of the counterrevolutionary state. In this regard, the legal forms of struggle are secondary. But these are indispensable and important in extending the influence of the revolutionary movement to people in their millions and in preparing the ground for the expansion of the revolutionary forces.

The Party must coordinate the urban and rural, armed and nonarmed, legal and illegal, underground and aboveground forces and forms of struggle. The coordination must bring about the development of all forces and forms of struggle. We must repudiate the Right opportunists who falsely accuse the Party of neglecting the legal struggle by waging revolutionary armed struggle and who wish the Party to cease or to "de-emphasize" this principal form of the revolutionary struggle. The fact is that the Party has been consistently

the leading force in the legal democratic movement against the imperialists and the local reactionaries.

To do better in the urban-based legal democratic movement, the Party must reduce the proportion of cadres preoccupied by office work, institutions and coalitions and it must deploy and develop more cadres in the factories, urban poor communities and schools. And instead of ceasing or "de-emphasizing" the armed struggle, the Party must rectify the reverse flow of cadres from the countryside to the cities and must dispatch more cadres and revolutionary mass activists to the countryside.

The Red fighters and the peasant masses are in dire need of Party members and revolutionary mass activists, who are willing to be trained as political officers of the people's army and who have professional and technical skills. It is fine that there is now a campaign to urge the workers, the youth and the professionals to render revolutionary service in the countryside permanently or for a certain significant period. Both the "Left" and Right opportunists sabotaged the armed revolutionary movement by drawing Party cadres to the urban areas and discouraging others to go to the countryside.

It is not the Right opportunists and their bourgeois reformist collaborators who have led and built the legal democratic movement, it is the Party. In the field of legal struggle, we have long seen the puny and inconsequential results of the reformist line and work of the Lava revisionist renegades, the bourgeois populists (popdems), the liberals, Christian democrats, the petty-bourgeois socialists and other groups that wish the party to capitulate and take their reformist line. Were the Party to go aboveground, it will become as puny and inconsequential as its bourgeois reformist detractors and will be at the mercy of the enemy.

The incorrigible "Left" and Right opportunists have left the Party after failing to destroy it from within. The work of rectification within the Party is unwittingly facilitated by their open proclamation of their anticommunist, anti-Stalin line. Now, all the Party members and the public recognize clearly what both these types of opportunists are.

counterrevolutionary Rightists and special agents of the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique. The long-running paid agents of the enemy among them are trying to whip up all of them into a new pseudo-Left party as well as into an anticommunist alliance with other groups, including the yellow organizations that are funded by U.S. and Philippine government agencies.

The political and economic position of the Ramos ruling clique is far weaker than its predecessors, the Marcos and Aquino cliques. But it has outstanding psy-war skills and has acquired the paid as well as volunteer services of factionalists, splittists and liquidationists who have gone out of the Party. But psy-war cannot alleviate the ever worsening crisis of the ruling system. The Ramos ruling clique is daydreaming when it speculates that by repealing the antiradicalism law and by buying off a few renegades to slander and threaten the Party and stage localized "peace talks", it can split, or induce or pressure the Party to take a pacifist, reformist or capitulationist line.

Before the rectification movement, when the major deviations, errors and shortcomings were not yet being comprehensively and thoroughly rectified, the Party and the revolutionary movement could withstand and frustrate Lizardo's Bitag I, II and III and negate the AFP and General Ramos' yearly prediction of NPA defeat. As a result of the rectification movement, the Ramos regime and its imperialist masters will have to contend with the heightened fighting will and capabilities of the revolutionary forces and can expect more lethal blows from the armed revolutionary movement.

The rectification movement has strengthened the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally. Its revolutionary will is steeled by theoretical and political education in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and by its dedication to the national and democratic rights and interests of the Filipino people. Its cadres and members are being redeployed to create a far wider and deeper mass base for protracted people's war.

C. Organizational Situation and Tasks

The membership of the Party runs into some tens of thousands. It is in the central leading and staff organs and in seventeen regional Party committees and organizations covering the entire country. It is in the New People's Army and in aboveground and underground mass organizations of workers, peasants, farm workers, fishermen, women, youth and professionals. It is in the Party branches in urban and rural localities. It is in the Party groups and committees at various levels of mass organizations.

There is a great and urgent need for increasing the Party membership. The Party leading organs at various levels must assess and evaluate the membership ideologically, politically and organizationally within their respective jurisdictions and see how the current membership can raise its IPO level and serve as the basis for expanding the Party membership. The plan for Party recruitment must be worked out and submitted to higher leading organs. The overall plan must ensure that the proportion of Party members from the working people must approach ninety percent, without prejudice to Party members of petty-bourgeois origin who are qualified and are ready to further remould themselves.

The Party must recruit candidate-members from the ranks of the advance revolutionary mass activists. The organizational building of the Party must be based on ideological and political work. After the application for membership is filed and the candidate-member is sworn in on the basis of the recommendation of two full members of the Party and verification of record done by a third Party member, a Party branch must take full responsibility for providing the basic theoretical and political education to the candidate-member and directing his or her trial work within the period of candidature. A major part of the trial work for the candidate-members of urban petty-bourgeois social standing must be social investigation and mass work particularly among the workers or peasants. The sale of Party literature must be a basic assignment for full and candidate-members.

The period of candidature must be followed. The Party Constitution should be the common point of reference for the Party branch and the

candidate-member regarding the question of candidature. The Party branch has the responsibility of developing a candidate-member to become a full member. A recommending Party member and a candidate-member can inquire into the reasons why full membership has not been approved in accordance with the normal period of candidature so that the latter can know what to do in order to fulfill the requirements.

The most important basic requirements for Party membership are the proletarian revolutionary attitude to serve the people, ideological and political education and active participation in a Party branch. The existing full members and candidate-members must be checked up and encouraged to raise their ideological, political and organizational level.

All Party organs, units and members must uphold, study and apply the principle of democratic centralism. This is the basic organizational principle of the Party. It must be studied in a living way against the manifestations of bureaucratism and ultrademocracy that have already occurred or are persisting within the Party.

Democratic centralism is democracy guided by centralized leadership and centralism that is based on democracy. The essence of centralism is upholding the scientific theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and the essence of democracy is the participation of the entire Party membership in electing cadres to leading organs, freely discussing the issues, making decisions through the appropriate units and organs and carrying out the decisions. There is inner Party democracy but there is also discipline.

Under the principle of democratic centralism, the Party cannot admit into its ranks anyone who opposes its basic Marxist-Leninist principles and cannot permit any Party member, group or organ to negate the responsibilities and authority of the Central Committee, speak in the name of, or directly address, the Party general membership along a line opposed to the Party and its Central Committee.

Between Party congresses, the Central Committee is the highest decision-making body. When the liquidationists argue that the Central

Committee is nothing until the next Party congress, their point is to change the line and character of the Party and liquidate it both organizationally and ideologically by decapitating it before any congress. Before the next congress, the Central Committee must be guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and must pursue the proletarian revolutionary line of the previous congress. In the course of the rectification movement, the Party can further strengthen the Party organs at every level, up to the Central Committee and the National Congress.

It is fine that the rectification movement which has been launched by the central leadership in response to the demands of the lower Party organs and organizations, has become a full mass movement and has inspired the lower Party organs and organizations to make further summings-up, criticism and self-criticism and definition of tasks. This movement removes the dross from the Party organization and strengthens the Party comprehensively.

There is bureaucratism when centralized leadership does not rely on a democratic basis, does not use democratic methods in arriving at a decision and is engaged in a one-way top-down traffic. There is ultrademocracy when a lower organ, unit or individual Party member can decide and do anything against the principles, line and policies set by the Party, issue public statements of judgment against a higher organ, declare autonomy from the Party and approach the general membership directly in order to attack the Party center.

In the entire history of the Party so far, the worst practitioners of bureaucratism were the "Left" opportunists and the Right opportunists. The "Left" opportunists promoted the line of "strategic counteroffensive", "regularization", military adventurism and insurrectionism without seeking approval by a Party congress, delayed the holding of a Party congress even as they sought to change the correct line of the Party, characteristically sent down commands within the Party and the people's army without investigation and consultations and instituted outside the people's army the practice of "political officers" as a single-person level of authority and as some kind of *deus ex machina* within the Party.

Through their access to foreign funding, the Right opportunists made themselves important in the Party by acting as "moneybags" for financing "regularization" and mass campaigns. They created so many institutional offices, became "NGO" bureaucrats, fabricated paper organizations, consortia and coalitions and used the name of the masses already organized by the Party for the narrow interests of their clique and their own individual selves. They drew away quite a number of cadres and potential ones from work with the masses and, worst of all, spread the ideas and lingo of the Western bourgeois funding agencies through a variety of publications.

The worst practitioners of ultrademocracy were also those "Left" and Right opportunists who had practiced bureaucratism while they were in positions of authority in the Party. Together, they went into a frenzy of anarchy, recognizing no authority of any leading organ but their own presumptions as unauthorized cliques and caucuses. This is unprecedented in the entire history of the Party. They had earlier manifested their ultrademocracy by building "independent kingdoms", blocking these off from higher leading organs, including the Central Committee no less, and adopting views and taking actions contrary to the Party's line and policies.

The "Left" opportunists wanted to separate the people's army for their own military adventurist, urban insurrectionist and gangster line and, to a considerable extent, actually had their way, thereby damaging the integrity, interests and prestige of the Party. The Right opportunists had also tried earlier to liquidate the vanguard role of the Party as well as the Party itself and had wanted to cut down the proletarian revolutionaries in the Party and cut off the Party from the illegal and legal united front, mass organizations and institutions.

They wanted and acted to lord over foreign-funded "NGOs" and mass organizations without direction from and accounting to the Party. Thus, some of these Right opportunists before they became blatant anticommunists had first become corrupt in the handling of foreign funds. Both the "Left and Right opportunists were the real authoritarians in their respective turfs vis-a-vis subordinates and were anarchists in relation to the Central Committee and the entire Party.

Selfish and narrow interests propel the erstwhile "Left" and Right opportunists to form a faction against the Party, seek to destroy it from within and then to stridently join up with the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique, the Lava revisionist renegades, corrupt trade union bosses, the bourgeois populists (popdems), the liberals, Christian democrats (socdems), petty-bourgeois socialists and Trotskyites to attack the Party. A number of the ringleaders of the opportunists who have blatantly become anticommunists have criminal accountabilities and have absconded with Party funds and facilities. They wish to escape accountability and therefore wish to decapitate and destroy the entire Party and the revolutionary movement.

In seeking to mislead the people, the counterrevolutionary renegades prated about there being no democratic process within the Party. But they refused to go through the appropriate organs and democratic processes within the Party and instead conspired in their so-called caucuses, attacked entire central organs and leaders of the Party and then publicly issued their statements of judgment and condemnation against the Party, the Party center and individuals whom they pillory as "Stalinists", a term they use demagogically to capitalize on the anticommunist propaganda of the imperialists and the local reactionaries.

They slap their own faces when they use the term "Stalinist" as defined by anticommunists. Some of the ringleaders of the renegades like Ricardo Reyes, Benjamin de Vera, Romulo Kintanar, Frank Gonzales and Nathan Quimpo are accountable for Kampanyang Ahas, the most vicious crime ever committed not only against the hundreds of individual victims but also against the Party and the people. Romulo Kintanar, Arturo Tabara and Filemon Lagman are notorious for their gangster activities and collaboration with lumpen elements. Among the renegades are long-time intelligence and psy-war agents of U.S. imperialism and the Philippine reactionary government like Ricardo Reyes and Arturo Tabara. In addition to Ricardo Reyes and Sixto Carlos, Jr., who emulate the anticommunist Gorbachov, longtime U.S. and Philippine psy-war and secret intelligence agents, who have never been Party members but who

deck themselves out as progressives, are among the principal formulators and disseminators of the anti-Stalin, anticommunist line and the line of delivering the Party and the revolutionary movement to the enemy. These include Joel Rocamora and Alex Magno.

To correct and compensate for its inability over a long period to assign any significant number of Party cadres from the urban to the rural areas, because of the erroneous lines, the Party is determined to inspire, encourage and guide an increasing number of Party cadres to go to the rural from the urban areas. The central organs of the Party have taken the lead in this regard by basing themselves in the countryside. It is therefore of great importance to expand the membership of the Party.

Even before the rectification movement, the Party had called for the shift of a good number of Party members to the countryside in order to replenish the loss of Party cadres. But the erroneous lines barred the way. The frequent arrests of Party cadres in urban areas pushed the Central Committee to issue the security guidelines a number of years ago and to instruct urban-based Party cadres whose identity is known to the enemy to shift to work in the countryside. But the promoters of the wrong lines, especially the former head of the NPA general command, the former secretary of the Standing Group of the Visayas Commission, the former secretary of the Manila-Rizal Party committee and the former editor of *Ang Bayan* refused to heed the decision.

Enemy agents like Ricardo Reyes, Arturo Tabara, Joel Rocamora and Alex Magno who have openly played the key role in the anticommunist propaganda campaign have collected information and delivered it to the enemy. They have swung the renegades of both "Left" and Right opportunist background to a blatant anticommunist line. The enemy has gained a considerable amount of information for use against the Party from the renegades. It is therefore of urgent necessity and importance for the Party to shift known Party cadres from the urban to the rural areas and to generate a great number of Party members who are not known to the renegades and enemy.

agents. The renegades and enemy agents must be totally deprived of information that they can use for harming the Party.

Contrary to the intrigues of the anti-Party elements since early 1992 that it would cause a big split or become a "bloody Stalinist purge" of thousands of Party members, outstripping Kampanyang Ahos, *the rectification movement has already proven to be mainly an educational movement in the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. The Central Committee has narrowed the target of the rectification movement to a handful of anti-Party ringleaders.*

These were expelled only after they had undertaken a series of flagrant anti-Party activities, such as: public dissemination of slander articles aimed at decapitating and destroying the Party starting in late 1991 and proceeding more stridently from 1992 onward, declarations of anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist positions, disruptions of legal mass organizations and alliances, declarations of autonomy and separation, and open collaboration with civil and military agencies of the U.S.-Ramos clique and with an assortment of anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups under the common slogan of *anti-Stalinism.*

For a long period, the expellees had committed serious errors of line, inflicting unprecedentedly huge damage to the Party and the revolutionary movement and are therefore subject to disciplinary action. They had also committed serious crimes, such as treason, murder, bloody witchhunts, gangsterism and gross malversation of funds and are therefore also subject to trial by the people's court. They oppose the rectification movement and wish to destroy the Party because they want to escape their accountabilities. It is completely beneficial to the Party and the revolutionary movement that they have been expelled. *They had destroyed more than they had ever contributed to the strength of the Party in the period of 1980-92 and they sought to further wreak havoc in a vain attempt to stop the rectification movement.*

The Central Committee has undertaken organizational measures as part of the rectification movement in order to combat clear and serious violations of the Party's ideological and political line and of

Party discipline and to defend the Party from the wrecking operations of the anti-Party factionalists, splittists and liquidationists. Thus, two regional Party committees have been reconstituted, one dissolved and the members of its Party organization reintegrated into two adjacent regional Party organizations and three central staff organs have been reorganized.

The policy towards those whom the anti-Party ringleaders have misled but who have not committed serious offenses against the Party and the people is to give them time to come to their senses and see the facts and the truth. They have been easily swayed by lies, slander and intrigues. They come from ideologically weak parts of the Party, are few in number and some of them are fictitious communists. It is far more productive and far more important to recruit new candidate-members of the Party from the revolutionary mass organizations than to keep on running after those who have been thoroughly disinformed and disoriented by the counterrevolutionary renegades.

There are a few dishonest elements who pose as being in the middle between the Party and the fully exposed counterrevolutionary Rightists but who are in fact against the proletarian revolutionary line and the rectification movement. Even these double-dealers have been given time to expose themselves by their own words and deeds. For instance, they call for the unity of the Party and anti-Party elements even after the latter have declared "autonomy" and organized anti-Party formations and activities and they publicly join the anti-Party elements in anticommunist rallies.

The decision of the Central Committee to launch the second great rectification movement constitutes a great historic victory of far-reaching significance and consequence to the Philippine revolution and the Filipino people. The decision has been preceded by a struggle running for several years between the proletarian revolutionary line and the bourgeois reactionary line within the Party.

In the course of the rectification movement, the proletarian revolutionaries in the Party have upheld the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and have defeated the

handful of bourgeois reactionaries. The overcoming of the major deviations, errors and shortcomings and the strengthening of the Party are victories which will lead to greater victories in the entire revolutionary movement of the proletariat and people. The Philippine revolution will advance further and continue to be a brilliant part of the world proletarian revolution.

There is much to celebrate now and there is much revolutionary work and struggle ahead. We shall surely win greater victories in the years ahead because the Party is more than ever determined to lead the people in their millions in the revolutionary struggle for national liberation and democracy against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!

Long live the Filipino proletariat and people!

Long live the Philippine revolution and the world proletarian revolution!

GENERAL DECLARATION ON MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT

Comrade Mao Zedong, the great communist thinker and leader, was born on 26 December 1883. In celebrating his 100th birth anniversary, we hereby make this declaration in order to extol his great contributions to the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism and point to their continuing significance, vitality and urgency in the contemporary world situation.

We call upon the revolutionary parties of the working class, the international proletariat and all the oppressed nations and peoples, and all the proletarian revolutionary fighters of the world to study and put into practice more resolutely than ever before the basic teachings of Mao Zedong.

Comrade Mao Zedong inherited, upheld, defended and extended the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, brought this to a new and higher level of development and bequeathed to us the immortal and powerful legacy of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism. He stands alongside the great communists Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO MARXISM-LENINISM

Mao adopted the fundamental principles in the three components of Marxism (materialist philosophy, political economy and scientific socialism) as laid down by Marx and Engels and contributed to the further development of these.

In materialist philosophy, Mao made a great contribution. Following Lenin's identification of the law of unity of opposites as the most fundamental of the laws of contradiction, he elaborated on this law and thereby deepened our understanding of materialist dialectics.

He averred that social practice encompasses production, class struggle and scientific experiment and is the source of correct ideas. He demonstrated the dialectical relationship between knowledge and

social practice as well as that one between the perceptual and the rational levels of knowledge in the process of cognition.

He agreed with all his great Marxist predecessors that in general the forces of production are primary to the relations of production and the mode of production is primary to the superstructure. But in the process of sustained revolutionary change, the new relations of production and the new superstructure can play the primary role. The former release the forces of production from the old fetters and the latter enhances the mode of production.

Mao pointed out that class character is determined not only by the ownership of the means of production, role in the production process and the distribution of the social product but also by the mode of thinking by which social production is carried out. He comprehended the dialectical relationship between social being and social consciousness and laid stress on the need for continuing revolutionization of consciousness and the process of cultural revolution.

He defined culture as the reflection of economics and politics. It has a dialectical relationship with these. In his theory of art and literature, he called for the reflection of the revolutionary class struggle and for the revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers to take their place as heroes. He was for revolutionary romanticism and wrote poetry along this line. He declared that art and literature are important methods to educate the masses.

He was inspired by the teachings of his great predecessors regarding historical materialism, particularly the state and revolution in class society. He resolutely espoused the revolutionary essence of Marxism. He asserted that the proletariat must wage the class struggle, seize political power and establish the socialist state as a class dictatorship of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.

In revolutionary practice, he stressed the importance of the concrete analysis of concrete conditions, social investigation and mass work, combating all forms of idealism, subjectivism and Right and "Left" opportunism and taking the mass line in order to transform correct ideas into a material force.

He grasped the critique of capitalism and outline of scientific socialism by Marx and Engels as well as the critique of monopoly capitalism or modern imperialism and the realization of socialist revolution and construction by Lenin and Stalin

He extended and further developed our knowledge of Marxist political economy and scientific socialism by learning the positive and negative lessons from building socialism in the Soviet Union, by leading the criticism and repudiation of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration in 1957, by unmasking the class character of the Soviet modern revisionists and the degeneration of the Soviet Union from being socialist to being monopoly bureaucrat capitalist, by revealing its general tendency towards social-fascism, by opposing the neocolonialism of the two superpowers, U.S. imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism and, most important of all, by engaging in socialist revolution and construction self-reliantly in China and in the spirit of proletarian internationalism

Mao integrated the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete semicolonial and semifeudal conditions of China and carried out the Chinese revolution under the class leadership of the proletariat and within the context of the world proletarian-socialist revolution. In leading the new democratic revolution to victory in a country as vast as China, containing one-fourth of humanity, Mao is undeniably a great communist thinker and leader whom the world proletariat and people can be proud of.

In the course of the Chinese revolution, he was guided by the teachings of the great Lenin regarding the building of the communist party as the advanced detachment of the working class. And he introduced the rectification movement as the method of ensuring the ideological, political and organizational strengthening of the proletarian revolutionary party.

He excelled as the master of political and military science in accordance with materialist dialectics. He successfully pursued the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war. To this day, his military writings are unsurpassed in comprehensiveness and richness of experience in revolutionary war. These guided the revolutionary

forces at various stages and in various forms of armed struggle to victory on so vast a scale.

He directed the communist party to engage in a revolutionary united front in order to arouse the people in their millions. At the same time, he ensured the vanguard role, independence and initiative of the working class party. Before nationwide seizure of political power, he built organs of political power along the line of the united front. Upon total victory, he established the people's democratic state with the proletarian class dictatorship at its core.

Upon the basic completion of the new democratic revolution through the seizure of political power, Mao proceeded to lead the socialist revolution and construction and improved on the example of the pioneering experience provided by the Soviet Union under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin. The communist party maintained its leading role in the socialist state with multiparty support and strived to revolutionize all aspects of society.

Mao engaged in socialist construction, transforming private into public ownership of the means of production; planning a self-reliant economic development in a well-balanced and well-proportioned way; using agriculture as the basic factor, heavy and basic industries as the leading factor, with light industry as the bridge; and raising the standard of living and culture steadily from one level to a higher one, with the highest priority given to meeting the basic needs and improving the lot of the working people.

Mao's line of socialist revolution and construction through the Great Leap Forward, "walking on two legs" and building the communes, was tested and proven correct when it did not only overcome the imperialist blockade, the revisionist sabotage and the natural calamities but resulted in strengthening the industrial foundation of China and produced the bumper crops and ample manufactures for agricultural production and the people's consumption.

Under the leadership of Mao Zedong, China was a bulwark of the world proletarian revolution. In accordance with the principle of proletarian internationalism, the Chinese communist party, proletariat and people of all nationalities did everything they could to unite and

strengthen the international communist movement along the general revolutionary line against imperialism, social-imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction.

They unselfishly supported the Korean and Indochinese peoples in their heroic and victorious struggles for national liberation against the wars of aggression launched by U.S imperialism rallied the oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America against imperialism, social-imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism and roused the proletariat and people in the capitalist and revisionist-ruled countries to fight against monopoly capitalism in order to advance the cause of socialism

Mao Zedong analyzed the basic changes in the situation of the class struggle on a global scale and adopted the correct foreign policy of socialist China concerning the concrete reality of three worlds and promoted the international united front against imperialism, social-imperialism and all reaction in line with the principle of proletarian internationalism and in opposition to the revisionist line of liquidating the world proletarian revolution.

MAO'S GREATEST ACHIEVEMENT

What may be regarded as Mao's greatest achievement and greatest contribution to Marxism-Leninism is the theory and practice of continuing revolution under proletarian class dictatorship to consolidate socialism, combat modern revisionism and prevent the restoration of capitalism.

Mao resolutely pointed out that the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the main contradiction in socialist society in an entire historical epoch. He asserted that class struggle is the key link in the progress of socialist society. If this key link is abandoned, then the waning of proletarian revolutionary consciousness results in the peaceful evolution of socialism to capitalism.

In view of the Soviet experience under Stalin, Mao declared that there must be a recognition of the distinction between contradictions

among the people and between the people and the enemy and that the contradictions among the people must be correctly handled in the manner which he clarified.

Mao took into account the problems which his great predecessors required to be solved in socialist society, such as the vestiges and persistent influence of the old exploiting classes; the contradictions between the working class and the peasantry, town and countryside, and mental and physical labor; the spontaneous generation of the bourgeoisie by petty commodity production; and the force of old habits and customs.

But it is to the great honor of Mao to be at the forefront in the struggle of the international communist movement against modern revisionism centered in the Soviet Union, to systematically study and pose the problem of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration and to put forward a series of principles to solve the problem.

He had the advantage of studying the bureaucratic bourgeois currents in the Chinese Communist Party, state and society as well as the growth abroad of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He pointed out the actual and potential factors of capitalism that undermine and destroy the factors of socialism in socialist society.

He called on mass vigilance and active resistance against individual selfishness and corruption, against the retrogression to the "theory of productive forces" of the classical revisionists Bernstein and Kautsky, against the persistent ideas and influence of the old exploiting classes, against the petty bourgeoisification of the bureaucracy and the new intelligentsia and against the rise of the new bourgeoisie.

He called for the proletariat and the people to make the socialist relations of production progressively dissolve the private ownership of the means of production, to put proletarian revolutionary politics in command of production and to revolutionize all aspects of the superstructure.

The practical application of the theory of continuing revolution under proletarian class dictatorship through the Great Proletarian

Cultural Revolution succeeded for ten years from 1966 to 1976 and created the most extensive democracy ever experienced by mankind. But after Mao's death, the counterrevolutionary Right or capitalist-roaders could make a coup d'etat and carry out the restoration of capitalism in the People's Republic of China. This must be studied and analyzed by applying the positive revolutionary outlook and method used by Karl Marx in studying and analyzing the brief success and eventual defeat of the Paris Commune of 1871.

Nonetheless, the theory of continuing revolution under the proletarian class leadership remains valid even as the positive and negative lessons from its practical application must be drawn. The failure of the Paris Commune never invalidated the theory of proletarian revolution and proletarian dictatorship and provided the lessons that would guide the eventual victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

The correctness of Mao in posing the problem of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration through peaceful evolution and in putting forward the theory of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship is proven by the crisis, weakening, disintegration and collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes and the ceaselessly worsening capitalist conditions of exploitation and oppression in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The collapse of the social-imperialist superpower confirms the analysis of Mao who in 1964 pointed out, "The coming to power of the revisionists is precisely the coming to power of the bourgeoisie."

The coming to power in China of the revisionists opposed to Mao and the reversal of Mao's theory and practice of continuing revolution under the proletarian class dictatorship have resulted in the restoration of capitalism. China is now ruled by the corrupt bureaucrat bourgeoisie and the comprador big bourgeoisie, supported by the privileged stratum of petty bourgeoisified forces in urban areas and rich peasants. The Chinese bourgeoisie is exploiting and oppressing the Chinese proletariat and people and China is being opened widely to the penetration of imperialist capital.

The state has been disemboweled of its socialist character and the communist party of its Marxist-Leninist character. It is only a matter of time that the Chinese modern revisionists and capitalist-roaders will drop off their "socialist" masks as a result of internal contradictions and the pressures of neocolonialism, as in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. But we also hope that someday the revolutionary heirs to Mao's legacy, who are the genuine Chinese communists, the proletariat and the rest of the people, will rise up once more to overthrow their oppressors and exploiters.

Without Mao's theory of continuing revolution under proletarian class dictatorship, the proletarian revolutionary parties and the international proletariat would be at a loss today in the face of the resounding disintegration of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes; the ideological and political offensive of the imperialists, their petty-bourgeois and reactionary lackeys; and the foolhardy insistence of neorevisionists that the development of Marxism-Leninism stopped with either the great communist Lenin or Stalin or even with the revisionist Brezhnev or Gorbachev.

The crisis of overproduction of the world capitalist system is now raging, unleashing unprecedented oppression and exploitation and pushing the proletariat and people to wage revolutionary struggle. This crisis is accelerated by high technology in the hands of the monopoly capitalists, by the extraction of superprofits by fewer but bigger supermonopolies, by cutthroat competition and by the use of high finance and high technology to kill jobs and to further depress the neocolonial client-states.

The resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement is necessitated and justified by the crisis. But the question always arises, will the new wave of new democratic and socialist revolutions be able to keep and develop socialism when it reemerges in several countries before the global defeat of monopoly capitalism?

The great Mao provided the answer with the theory of continuing revolution under proletarian class dictatorship. This theory is of great historic significance for having inaugurated a new and higher stage in

the development of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. This is the stage of Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism.

Armed with this theory, the proletariat and people who succeed in making socialist revolution in various countries can know what is the problem to face and solve in order to develop socialism until such time that on a world scale imperialism and all reaction can be defeated and the ultimate goal of communism can be reached.

CONCLUSION

In this declaration, we uphold the great red banner of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought or Maoism. We are resolved to study and put into practice this theory, carry out a counteroffensive against the ideological and political offensive of the imperialists and all their anticommunist lackeys and to arouse, organize and mobilize the proletariat and the people in a resurgent revolutionary movement for national liberation, democracy and socialism against imperialism and all reaction.

The proletarian revolutionaries who adhere to Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought are today the most resolute, most advanced and most consolidated detachment of the international proletariat. They understand most comprehensively and most profoundly the disintegration and collapse of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes, the ever worsening crisis of the world capitalist system, the impending resurgence of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement and the certain future of socialism and ultimate victory of communism in the world.

It is the special revolutionary and internationalist duty of all proletarian revolutionaries, their parties and organizations to promote the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought; win over other parties and organizations which are honestly desirous of learning about the fall of modern revisionism and fighting for socialism against monopoly capitalism; and generate the resurgence

of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement of the proletariat and people in a new period of revolutionary struggle in the world.

Signed by representatives of parties and organizations, and by individuals at the International Seminar on Mao Zedong Thought, Gelsenkirchen, Germany on 6-7 November 1993 and subsequently.

**Partial List of Signatories
(As of 23 December 1993)**

I. Approving Parties and Organizations

Marxist Leninist Organization of Afghanistan • Partido Comunista Revolucionario de la Argentina • Pan Africanist Congress (Azania) • Marxist Leninist Party of Germany (MLPD) • Communist Party of India (ML-Janashakti) • Communist Party of India (ML Provisional Central Committee) • Communist Party of India (ML-Towards New Democracy) • Communist Organization of Luxemburg (OCL) • Groep Marxisten-Leninisten of the Netherlands • Communist Party of the Philippines • Nucleo del Partido Comunista Revolucionario de Uruguay • L'Union de la Mouvanse Progressiste de Zaire

II. Individuals

A Xia • Q Borja • Deng-yuan Hsu • William Hinton • Jorge Ludovico Hurtado, vice general secretary, Communist Party of Peru (Partia Roja) • Meng Shao • Mian hi Hsu • Pao-yu Ching • H A Khan Rano, member, Political Bureau, Bangladesh Workers Party • Hanspeter Schaffler, Swiss Labor Party, Bern • Dr Selva Saman, member, Central Committee, Pan Africanist Congress • Prof Dr Hari P. Sharma, Simon Fraser University, Canada • Tan nan Nian • Emil de Villa, member, Central Committee, CPP • Wang yan Zhu • Yen Chen Wang

This declaration is offered for approval by parties and organizations as well as signing by the representatives of the aforementioned and individuals up to 26 December 1994. The opposite page is for signing. Please mail or fax this signature page to:

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GENERAL DECLARATION ON MAO ZEDONG THOUGHT

Hereunder I sign in approval
of the General Declaration on Mao Zedong Thought:

SIGNATURE

Signing as

Representative of Party/Organization

Individual

NAME (Please print)

PARTY ORGANIZATION

POSITION

ADDRESS

TELEPHONE & FAX

DATE