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HITLER'S SECRET WEAPON—THE BOGEY OF COMMUNISM

EARL BROWDER

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THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM

EDITOR: EARL BROWDER



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ON THE VICTORY OF STALINGRAD

ROOSEVELT'S TRIBUTE TO STALIN AND THE SOVIET PEOPLE

AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF of the armed forces of the United States of America, I congratulate you on the brilliant victory at Stalingrad of the armies under your supreme command. The 162 days of epic battle for the city which has forever honored your name and the decisive result which all Americans are celebrating today will remain one of the proudest chapters in this war of the peoples united against Nazism and its emulators.

"The commanders and fighters of your armies at the front and the men and women who have supported them in factory and field have combined not only to cover with glory their country's arms, but to inspire by their example fresh determination among all the United Nations to bend every energy to bring about the final defeat and unconditional surrender of the common enemy." (Washington, February 4, 1943.)

STALIN'S REPLY TO ROOSEVELT

THANK you for your congratulations in connection with the victory of Soviet troops at Stalingrad. I express confidence that joint fighting operations by the

armed forces of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union will, in the near future, lead to victory over our common enemy." (Moscow, February 6, 1943.)

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY, AND ITS SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

Joseph Stalin, Supreme Commander-in-Chief, Red Army, Moscow

THE Communist Party of the ulations in connection with the to the mighty Red Army on the occasion of its twenty-fifth anniversarv enriched with victories hitherto unknown in the annals of war. Lenin, the father of the Red Army, foresaw the day when the peoples of the entire world would find this army their strongest friend, their best ally for their national freedom and independence. Under the leadership of Lenin's best collaborator. his continuator and successor, Comrade Joseph Stalin, who has proven himself under severest test the greatest of war captains of our time. the mighty Red Army has performed for all mankind those impossible deeds which now make possible the freeing of the entire world from the menace of universal slavery and the obliteration of three centuries of mankind's democratic and cultural progress. No longer the farsighted sections of the people alone, who always understood that this nation's welfare and security required a firm friendship with the great Socialist State, but the mass of the population, the officers, soldiers, sailors, fliers, every worker in industry and the trade unions, every American patriot and democrat, every consistent lover of his own country's national independence, today salutes the heroic Red Its achievements have ex-Army. ceeded and raised to new levels the world's standards of military skill and fortitude, have restored faith in the military capability of democracies, and by example have facilitated the rapid development of the new millionfold armies of high patriotic morale and willing discipline throughout the democratic countries of the world.

True, the repulse of the German Nazi and satellite armies, who have looked for the last time upon Soviet Rostov and Kharkov, has multiplied the fury of the Hitler-inspired defeatist forces throughout the world, moving them to new desperate efforts to save the monstrous edifice of slavery of Berlin as the main fulcrum of world reaction, although the price of such national betrayal is mirrored for all nations in the fate of Vichy. The American people's response to the heroic deeds of the Red Army is the best assur-

ance against a betrayal of our own country through the undermining of our alliance with our strongest and most steadfast friend. But the decisive answer can only be made in the form of military action, the rapid achievement of the Second Front in continental Europe, which can enable our armies and those of England and France to share the glory as participants in the present great action inaugurated by the Red Army, which we can help to make the decisive campaign of the war.

For not alone the tactical heroism of the Red Army, but also the farseeing war strategy of the great captain, Stalin, have been proven valid in the eyes of all military men and the popular masses—as the indispensable means to victory for this people's war of national liberation.

Comrades of the Red Army, salutations of love and loyal, indestructible brotherhood.

COMMUNIST PARTY, U. S. A. Earl Browder, General Secretary

HITLER'S SECRET WEAPON—THE BOGEY OF COMMUNISM*

BY EARL BROWDER

THERE is deep significance for today in the fact that we combine in this meeting the commemoration of Abraham Lincoln, America's foremost contribution to the world leadership of democratic liberation, and of Vladimir Ilych Lenin, founder of the Soviet Power which at this moment is liberating the world from the menace of Nazism.

In the joining of these two commemorations in one, we are expressing the understanding, now general among the American people, that the destinies of our two countries are intertwined, that close and ever closer relations of cooperation inevitably arise from the deepest of common interest.

At this moment the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are expressed in the goal of victory over Hitlerism. When the Axis is destroyed that common interest will lie in the reconstruction of a world order in which peoples can peacefully work out their own destinies.

Achievement of victory over Hit-

lerism is the supreme common task today. In the name of Lincoln and Lenin we devote all our capacities to that goal.

Great events are taking place. Hitler's armies on the Eastern Front are being encircled and annihilated, one after another. All history contains nothing to compare with the mighty deeds of the Red Army under the guiding genius of Stalin. They have turned the tide of war definitely in favor of the United Nations. They have brought victory within reach.

The brilliant military occupation of North Africa by American forces, the heroic actions in the South Pacific which halted the Japanese and threw them back, the resounding defeat of Rommel in Libya by the British—all these facts show that the time is ripe to deliver a concerted smashing attack by all the United Nations, which can break the backbone of the Axis.

We must be profoundly dissatisfied, however, with the contribution which our country, the United States, has so far made to winning victory in 1943.

The conference at Casablanca

^{*} An address delivered on Lincoln's Birthday, February 12, 1943, at Baltimore.

gives us promise that America's might will be thrown soon into the scales of war. It is high time that this were so. Laggards cannot win this war; victory does not come "at leisure."

Hitler's Victory in Congress

At this moment when the black clouds of doom gather over Hilter and his armies, Der Fuehrer has gained one brilliant victory. To our shame we must confess that Herr Shicklgruber's single victory was won in the United States, in Washington, in Congress. By a vote of 302 to 94, the House of Representatives endorsed Martin Dies, the clearest and most consistent exponent of Hitler's policies and slogans within the United States.

If the Congress of the United States is still an important policymaking body of our government, this latest endorsement of Martin Dies must be looked upon as one of the most sinister threats to victory in the war, and to the future of our country. For Martin Dies has declared that he hopes for the defeat of our ally, the Soviet Union; he has slanderously denounced Joseph Stalin, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Armies, as the chief enemy of our country; he has echoed all the slogans of Hitler and promoted them; and now the majority in Congress has renewed its declaration of confidence in that same Martin Dies and all he stands for.

It is small comfort to remind ourselves that Martin Dies does not represent the vast majority of the

people of our country. It is small comfort to repeat that he does not represent the Administration President Roosevelt, whose correct war policies are suported overwhelmingly by the people. For this Congress has the power, and a redefeatist actionary. coalition Hoover Republicans and Wheeler Democrats is influencing a majority of Congress to use this power, under our Constitution, to throw confusion into the war effort, to disrupt the national unity, to negate the declared policies of the President, and to serve notice on our Allies that they cannot depend upon the United States honoring the commitments which have been made by the President.

Is there anyone who can dismiss all this as merely the exaggerations of a special pleader, because I have for years been insisting upon the importance of friendship between our country and the Soviet Union?

Today this importance is recognized by conservative circles of all political ideologies.

The New York Herald Tribune is a conservative Republican newspaper. It has always hitherto supported Martin Dies. But before Congress voted this time, it called for a halt of this "play into Hitler's hands." And yesterday, enlarging upon its argument in connection with our fumbling diplemacy in North Africa, this conservative newspaper said:

"How can the oppressed Europeans believe in democracy if we give them the impression that we believe so little in it ourselves?

There are but two choices before the democracies now. One is to ccoperate with Russia in rebuilding the world—as there is an excellent chance of doing, if we believe in the strength of our own principles and prove it by applying them. The other is to get involved in intrigues with all the reactionary and anti-democratic forces in Europe, the only result of which will be to alienate the Kremlin. . . " (New York Herald Tribune, February 11, 1943.)

I could spend hours in quoting from the most serious spokesmen of all political groupings, to show the general acceptance of the fact that the future of the world and of our own country depends upon friendship, understanding and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. But the majority of Congress on Wednesday. by a vote of 302 to 94, voted no confidence in this whole line of policy by giving their confidence to Martin Dies, who is the embodiment hostility against the of Union in the full spirit of Hitler.

Evidently, the majority of Congress does not wish, or does not consider important, the friendship and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those who wish to cement that friendship are put on notice that they must defeat the majority of Congress on this question. We cannot eat our cake and have it, too; nor can we travel in opposite directions at the same time. No more can we have Martin Dies as the symbol of our policy, and also have friendship with the Soviet Union. It is a contradiction in policy and interests.

It is very interesting to examine the thought expressed by the Herald Tribune before quoted. conservative organ has come to the conclusion, reluctantly, we may be sure, that we of the United States may ally ourselves with the forces of democracy in Europe only on condition that we ally ourselves with the Soviet Union; if we reject the alliance with the Soviet Union. then inevitably we shall find ourselves plunged into intrigues with all the reactionary and anti-democratic forces in Europe. This means, further, that when our government engages in intrigues with those reactionary forces, all intelligent men everywhere understand this mean that we are thereby abandoning our alliance with the democratic forces of Europe, especially with the Soviet Union.

There is a profound truth in this thought of the Herald Tribune. Recognition of this truth is sweeping away one of the biggest lies of all history, the lie that socialism or communism is "undemocratic" or The Union of "anti-democratic." Soviet Socialist Republics is much the foremost champion of all the democratic forces in Europe that the United States, our country which for a century and a half stood in the vanguard of world democracy, can now be allied with those democratic forces in Europe only on condition that we are allied with the Soviet Union. That is not my statement, that is the statement of the New York Herald Tribune, one of the outstanding conservative newspapers of the United States. This is a mere restatement of the thought clearly expressed in the editorial which I quoted verbatim.

A Policy That Points Both Ways

Our country, in the midst of lifeand-death war, has not clearly defined its policy. Our Commanderin-Chief points in one direction with the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations, and alliance with the Soviet Union; but powerful forces in the State Department point in the opposite direction by its entanglements with Vichy, with with Mannerheim, with Franco. Mikhailovitch, with Otto of Austria, with Bethlen of Hungary, while Congress emphatically contradicts the President by voting its confidence in Martin Dies. And the same Congress emphatically refuses to express its confidence in the President.

Our national policy is ambiguous. It points both ways. And the conflict is not only within Congress and between Congress and the Executive; it is within the Executive Department itself. The President considers it necessary to conciliate a hostile Congress; even more serious, he considers it necessary to tolerate the same hostility within his own cabinet.

In the State Department we have the ineffable Mr. Adolph Berle, Jr., spinning his webs of intrigue in Europe and Latin America. This is the person whom a prominent visiting Britisher is reported to have sized up in these few words: "He is not only anti-Soviet, he is also anti-British; he is not only anti-British, he is also anti-American."

At the head of the Department of Justice we have Mr. Biddle, whose chief virtue is weakness of character which prevents from following his mischievous theories to their logical conclusions. He introduced a brief in the Supreme Court on the Schneiderman case (and argued it against Mr. Wendell Willkie) which bases itself on the conception that the Soviet Union is essentially hostile to the United States in particular and to democracy in general. He issued an order for the deportation of Harry Bridges, with a legal argument lifted bodily from Hitler's "Anti-komintern." the illiteracy and obscurantism of which can be matched only in Nazi Germany. He tried to imprison Senator Stanley Nowak of Michigan on the same basis on which he wishes to deport Harry Bridges, but had to drop it with a bald "admission of error." He shares the basic theories of Martin Dies, but is jealous of the Texan's prominence.

Yes, our national course is ambiguous. The President has charted a clear and correct policy, but it is challenged not only by Congress but also by members of his own Cabinet and executive appointees. Instead of a showdown and clarification, the nation drifts along with compromise and appeasement of irreconcilable policies.

In the North African political muddle, which followed a brilliantly executed military occupation, we experienced our first sharp example of the disastrous results of an ambiguous policy. It required the personal intervention of President

Roosevelt, flying 6,000 miles to Casablanca, to begin to bring some order and sense into that mess. The release at last of 27 French Communist Deputies, and some 900 other prisoners, did much to clear the moral atmosphere. But even on this question of the North African prisoners, it seems we have not heard the last word. Some 25,000 French patriots, Spanish Republicans and other anti-fascists, are still held behind barbed wire, and Mr. Hull has still not clarified his cryptic hints that Francisco Franco may wish to be consulted as to their fate.

In the question of the North African prisoners we are learning the first lessons on the political problems of Europe. By the way in which we handle this question the United States will be judged by the peoples of occupied Europe. Uncle Sam is preparing to enter Europe heavily armed and ready to shoot on sight; the peoples of Europe are anxious to know if Uncle Sam's eyes are keen enough to distinguish clearly between friends and enemies! In the shadow of the Stars and Stripes in North Africa, 25,000 anti-fascist fighters still languish in prisons and concentration The Nazi-inspired laws camps! against the Jews are still enforced!

We cannot leave such questions to be settled at leisure. The war goes on, and time waits for no man or nation. If our national policy, in its application, remains ambiguous, then the results it will bring to our nation will also be ambiguous.

There is a loud-mouthed cult in

our country which is willing to admit every weakness and error so long as it can blame it on the These are the dema-President. gogues of reaction. But there are also too many honest democrats, progressives, and even labor men, who weaken the President's position by leaving all problems for him to settle, by failing to take energetic action themselves to help solve all these problems. This was the main factor that enabled the President's foes to gain strength in the last elections, for the President's supporters sadly neglected that campaign with the excuse that "F. D. R. can take care of it." Now they chide the President for conciliating his enemies, but they themselves among the first concili-No one has any right to ators. criticize the President who is not himself in the midst of the hottest and most uncompromising fight to halt the mob of reaction now controlling the majority of Congress and threatening the whole country and its war effort.

Red-baiting Is Sabotage of Correct World Policy

The President has himself given more than a hint of the course all democratic Americans should follow. Speaking at a recent press conference, the President quoted from an interview given by General Giraud in North Africa. Giraud had declared his intention, following the example of De Gaulle, of uniting all Frenchmen, from conservatives to Communists, with the only condition that they unite to fight Hitler and not play politics.

The President expressed the opinion that this would seem to be a good line for any country to follow. He evidently meant that this would be a good line for the United States also.

I wish emphatically to support this proposal of the President, on behalf of the Communist Party of the United States. There are thousands of Communists and friends of our Party in the armed forces of the United States, ready and anxious to fight Hitler and not to play politics. But too many of them are being transferred out of fighting units into non-combat duties at home, and even into polite substitutes for concentration camps. We have raised this question with the authorities, but have not been able to obtain clarification of the problem. Until the Communists are permitted to fight Hitler and his accomplices on the same basis as all other Americans, we must continue to discuss this problem publicly, and press for action in the spirit of the President's expression on French unity.

Some well-meaning persons advise me not to keep raising the question of discrimination against the Communists, but that we simply keep our mouths shut, that we grin and bear it in the interest of the war and national unity; after all, they say, the Communists are only a small group in a big nation.

My intelligence compels me to reject such an easy way out of the problem. If the Communists of the U. S. are but a small group in a big nation, that is all the more reason for insisting that correct principles

be applied by the nation in relation to the Communists. If the United States is so fearful of its own small proportion of Communists that it must have special laws against them, special committees of Congress to hunt them out of governmental service, and special segregation of them into labor service in the armed forces-then it will be certainly impossible for such a fearful United States to have a realistic relationship of alliance with the Communists of Europe and Asia, who are much more powerful, and without whom it is impossible for the United States to have an alliance with the democratic forces of the world. When we fight for the full admission of American Communists as citizens of the country without discrimination, we are fighting for a correct world policy which is necessary for victory in the war.

American democracy needs more confidence in itself in order to win the war. It needs to snap out of the hypnosis induced by Hitler and Martin Dies, in which the cry of "Communist" raises hysterical fear and sets the democrats to examining one another for hidden "Reds" and protesting each his own innocence of the "terrible" charge of which few know the meaning. American democracy must grow up, and stop believing in ghosts and witches.

Above all, American democracy must throw off the fear of victory. Yes, there is being deliberately cultivated in our country the fear of victory over the Axis because that victory is being advanced today primarily by the armies of the Soviet Union. That fear is stupid and senseless, in the first place, because America still has the opportunity, despite all past delays, of striking decisive blows against Hitler and winning an honorable position in the victory by the side of the Soviet Union. We need fear only our own failure to strike in time with our full force; such a failure, truly, would endanger victory, would have terrible consequences for our national safety and the common cause of the United Nations.

That fear of victory came before a Congressional Committee last week in Washington, in the person of Herbert Hoover. That specter from an almost forgotten past mumbled a new slogan for America: "Let's not do too much, too soon."

Hoover wants to drag out the war for two, three, four or more years, with America doing little fighting. Above all, we must not strike in 1943, he intimated. He sees the good side of the war in the opportunity it affords him and his cronies to try to transform it into chiefly a form of martial law against the American working class, with unlimited profits for the capitalists. Hoover is still clutching close to his heart the banner of Chamberlain and Munich.

But the last shreds of the ghost of Munich were scattered to the four winds during the past weeks, by the events at Stalingrad, Schluesselburg, the Caucasus, and Kursk, and all the long list of smashing victories of the Red Army. Any attempt to resurrect the shameful policy of Munich can result in nothing but disaster for those who try it. That old world which produced Munichism is dead beyond recall. All those who try to follow that path now will find that it leads immediately to the grave.

We are in war, a war to the death. We are fighting to save the world from reversion to barbarism. We are fighting to save civilization from destruction by Nazism and its Italian and Japanese allies. We are fighting for the possibility of future progress for humanity. We are fighting a just war.

All this means that we must fight with all our might, not in some tomorrow but now. We must fight with a full heart, for the destruction of the enemy, his complete annihilation, the wiping of Hitlerism forever from the face of the earth. We must fight with complete good faith toward our allies, and with full confidence in them. We must strengthen the Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance in the fires of war so that it will be an indestructible instrument for an ordered peace. We must forge the United Nations as the guarantee of liberty and independence for all nations.

All this must still be won.

It can be won only by fighting.

Thanks to the Red Army the war has turned in our favor.

Let America also strike now, for victory in 1943!

THE BROWDER-WELLES CORRESPONDENCE

December 29, 1942.

Mr. Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. WELLES:
When I visited you on October
12 you were kind enough to invite
me to raise with you any questions
of our country's foreign policy in
which establishment of facts might
preclude misunderstandings harmful to the war effort. I am taking
advantage of this invitation to raise
the following question:

In the area of U.S. military occupation or influence in Africa there are confined in concentration camps some thirty-five elected members of the French Chamber of Deputies, many trade union leaders, mayors and city councillors, French and Arabian; there are also many Spanish Republicans, refugees from the Axis conquest of their country, and numerous International Brigade members of various nationalities. Their lives are in constant danger from Doriotist assassins as well as from the conditions of their impriscnment. They are all proved consistent anti-fascists of many years' standing, typified by Florimond Bonte, member of the Chamber, who visited this country in 1938 in the interest of anti-Axis unity.

I would greatly appreciate a few words with you on the policy of our Government in the question of securing the release of these prisoners in the area of U. S. military occupation.

This question vitally interests many United States citizens. It also affects the military fortunes of the war in the matter of securing the active cooperation of the populations of France and other countries. especially the labor movement. I hope to be in a position to give a word of encouragement to those who know me personally, with the assurance that the United States Government considers them an integral part of the common front against the common enemy, in the spirit of your statement of October 12 concerning China.

If you could give me some fifteen minutes of your time on this question any day prior to January 10 it would be deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Earl Browder.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

January 11, 1943.

My Dear Mr. Browder:

I have received your letter of December 29 concerning the release of internees and prisoners in North Africa. A commission consisting of British, American and French members has been constituted in Algiers to consider and deal with the entire prisoner and refugee problem. It is further anticipated that two representatives of Governor Lehman, as Director of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations, leave at an early date to look into the question of assistance and possible rehabilitation of refugees. Agreement has been reached regarding the release of certain groups of internees, notably 123 Soviet citizens most of whom were former International Brigade members.

This Government is using every effort to bring about as prompt a release of prisoners and refugees as the military situation will permit. It is felt that the representatives who are proceeding in behalf of Governor Lehman will be able to examine the entire situation in this respect and to make prompt and effective recommendations as to repatriation and release of prisoners and refugees in North Africa.

Believe me.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) Sumner Welles
Under Secretary.

January 15, 1943.

My dear Mr. Welles:

Thank you for your letter of the 11th which reached me as I was leaving New York for the West. It is encouraging to know that efforts are being made to define a policy toward the prisoners and internees in North Africa.

May I repeat my suggestion that a well-defined policy that would encourage the democratic masses in Africa and France would help improve the military as well as the political situation. Your letter will enable me, however, to publicly express with greater emphasis my conviction of the eventual solution of the problem.

Believe me,

Sincerely yours, (Signed) Earl Browder.

NOTES ON THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

THE preceding exchange of correspondence between Earl Browder and Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State, which Earl Browder has released for publication in view of the great national interest and concern that prevail regarding the political situation in North Africa generally, and the status of the anti-fascist prisoners in particular, is most imely and important.

All American patriots, all anti-Hitlerites, greeted with joy the masterful landings and military activity of the Anglo-American forces which led to the occupation of North Africa, and which, together with the great offensive of the Red Army on the decisive Eastern Front, created prerequisites for defeating new Hitler Germany and its satellites in 1943. We, together with the other peoples of the United Nations, saw in these skillful operations the growing strength of our armed forces and those of our Allies, the delivery of a heavy blow against the German-Italian coalition and the acquisition of new strategic bases for speeding the extension of the Anglo-American offensive to Europe closer to Germany's key centers.

As André Marty well stated in his article in the February issue of *The Communist*:

"The landing of American troops

in North Africa means the creation of a powerful support point for the opening of the second front on the continent of Europe. The formation of a new French army is already beginning in rich North Africa; this army will soon be able to stretch out its helping hand to the French people. And there is no doubt that the appearance of Allied armed forces on the European continent will greatly accelerate and make easier an uprising of the French people. . . ."

The correctness of this analysis of the African campaign remains fully valid, as subsequent military-political events have proved. However, this estimate must not obscure the problems, confusion and unsatisfactory political developments which have arisen in North Africa, including the urgent question of the status of the imprisoned anti-fascists, which Earl Browder referred to in his letter to Mr. Welles.

Since the exchange of these letters certain progress has been made in the direction of beginning to implement some aspects of American diplomacy in North Africa along the lines outlined in the President's statement of November 17, 1942. The first step towards rapprochement between the De Gaulle and the Giraud forces was initiated at the eventful Casablanca conference and military and economic liaison committees are being

established. The great French patriots and working class leaders, the valiant 27 French Communist Deputies, have been released, as have some 900 other anti-Hitler internees. General Giraud has stated publicly his intention to mobilize all anti-Nazi Frenchmen, from Radical Socialists, Communists, Socialists to conservative monarchists and republicans, in the fight against Hitler Germany for the liberation France-a declaration which subsequently was commended by President Roosevelt as a policy applicable for all countries.

But at this writing the political situation in North Africa is still far from settled, is still ominous. The immediate political results in Africa of the important military achievements of America's army of liberation in Algeria, Morocco and Dakar, and the important military operations now unfolding in Tunisia, are not yet commensurate with the needs and possibilities of the situation. The President's policy is being obstructed by certain appeasement forces in the State Department, symbolized by its representative in Africa, Robert Murphy, and by James Dunn, ardent Franco collaborator, who have succeeded in influencing the position of the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, and seemingly, also, the political line of certain leading officials in the War Department. It is also being impeded by the tendency of Administration circles to vacillate and conciliate these forces, especially when popular pressure is weak or absent.

Consequently, nearly 20,000

French patriots and 7,500 Spanish Republicans are still imprisoned in concentration or forced labor camps in territory under American military The Vichy version of the Nuremburg laws for the most part are still operative against the Jewish people and many fascist organizations have not yet been dissolved. Democratic liberties for the native population have not been inaugurated, the national rights of the North African peoples are being flaunted, and the Arabs, Berbers, Moroccans, etc., have not been actively mobilized for struggle against the Axis. Vichymen like Peyrouton and Nogues are still in key posts, impeding and trying to undermine the advance of the French national liberation front and struggle, and providing an uncertain rear for the Allied troops under the command of General Eisenhower.

The urgent need of decisively changing this state of affairs is only too evident. The political line pursued by the representatives of the State Department in North Africa, in keeping with the policy adopted by the State Department toward the Axis-satellite regimes οf France and Mannerheim, already has interfered with Allied military operations in Africa, has adversely affected America's national interests, and has impaired the relations between the United States and some of our Allies.

The differences which arose between Washington and London over our political course in North Africa—differences which presumably were ironed out at Casablanca—were a not unimportant factor in

retarding, for a time, the unity and advance of Allied forces in Tunisia, and, consequently, to a certain extent also constituted an additional factor (though not the central and primary one, as we have analyzed in recent issues of The Communist) which tended to delay the speediest extension of Anglo-American operations from the African springboard to Europe. Despite any advantages which may have accrued from the temporary expedient of our arrangements with Darlan, the policy of foisting and retaining in administrative power Vichymen likewise has served to slow down the tempo and scope of the broadest unification of all anti-Hitler French people, especially in North Africa.

This, too, has caused alarm and uncertainty among the peoples of the United Nations, particularly among the peoples of the occupied countries of Europe who are forging national liberation fronts and armies, embracing patriots of all political beliefs, bourgeois democrats, Communists, conservative nationalists, Catholics, etc.—united for a common goal; to fight for national freedom and the destruction of Hitlerism. Clearly, a continuation of the policy of appearement which influenced our diplomacy in North Africa, and which still lingers on, could only produce more unfavorable results for our war effort, for all the United Nations, particularly if the present diplematic line in North should influence the political policy to be followed in other countries which will be occupied by American-British military forces.

In so far as North Africa is concerned, it is true, of course, that the speed with which the main and far-reaching military decisions arrived at in the Casablanca conference are put into operation will help to resolve the political situation; this should tremendously facilitate the unification of French anti-Hitler forces in Africa in a single national-liberation front and army; this should accelerate the freedom of all anti-fascists: French, Spanish, Arabian, etc.: this should lead to the democratization of the provisional administration in North Africa. so both in respect to the decisions reached for hastening the completion of military operations in Africa and for invading Europe (which should not and must not await the conclusion of the African campaign).

But it is also true that the slowness, the procrastination and the distortions effected by the defeatists and appeasers in applying the policy which the President set forth on November 17 and again on February 12, hinder and adversely affect the tempo and the most effective fulfillment of our war policy, including the decisive military decisions, primary as these now are for winning victory and shaping political developments.

This is why it is essential, as Comrade Browder signalized in Baltimore on February 12, that the American people, especially labor, speak out, firmly and in unison, make their political influence register and be felt, resolutely combat the appeasers and Munichmen and any

tendency to conciliate them, and more actively develop mass support for the course of action outlined in the President's Lincoln Day address. This is necessary in order to facilitate more rapidly the requisite political changes in North Africa which our country bears such a heavy responsibilty to bring about. This is necessary, moreover, in order to help ensure that the crucial decisions made at Casablanca for striking new blows at Hitler's Axis in Europe shall be fully and most speedily realized in coordination with our great Soviet Ally and the decisive and historic offensive of the Red Army now sweeping forward.

In this connection it is essential to emphasize that, while he military operations in Tunisia are of great importance and need to be

boldly and resolutely carried forward to victory, the decisive theatre of the war is in Europe, and the establishment of the Second Front in Europe is more crucial than ever. And today as never before it is supremely urgent that an Anglo-American offensive against Hitler in Europe be launched now, in unison with the present Soviet offensive; that the Second Front in Europe be opened immediately, from one or more points, simultaneously as the African campaign itself is being carried through. This is necessary in order to prevent the Nazis from gaining time and regrouping their forces in Europe, as well as in Africa. This is necessary in order to guarantee victory over Hitler and Hitlerism in 1943.

EUGENE DENNIS.

MARX AND NATIONAL WARS

NOTES ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIXTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF KARL MARX

BY V. J. JEROME

IN THE magnificent counter-offensive of the Red Army, in the defense of Moscow, in the lifting of the siege of Leningrad, in the epic feat of Stalingrad, history proclaims its tribute to Karl Marx, the ideological progenitor of the first Socialist State, and to his disciples and continuators, Lenin and Stalin.

In the coalition of the United Nations ranged against the Nazi-fascist Axis, all anti-fascists, especially the working class, can find in the teachings of Marxism aid and inspiration for meeting their tasks in the national-liberation war.

In every one of the sixty years since the death of Karl Marx, the workers and the common people generally throughout the world have had before them the powerful projector of Marxism to shed light on the problems of their struggle, local and world-wide, partial and basic, day-to-day and ultimate. We today—Americans and the peoples of the United Nations as a whole—on this sixtieth anniversary of Marx's death, can derive from his teachings and his life activity in-

valuable lessons for the conduct of our national war, in conjunction with our Allies, for the destruction of fascism.

The teachings of Marxism set forth the fundamental principles that can today help the peoples in meeting the problems of nationality and national war. "In analyzing the events in Ireland, India. China, and the Central European countries like Poland and Hungary. in their time, Marx and Engels developed the basic, initial ideas of the national and colonial question."* Let us examine today selections from the writings of Marx on certain questions that are of key theoretical value in relation to the war we are waging.

The attitude of Marxism to wars is determined in each case by their political character. Marxism proceeds from the profound, dialectic assumption of the great military sci-

^{*} Joseph Stalin, in an interview with the First American Labor Delegation to the Soviet Union, September 9, 1927.

entist Clausewitz, himself influenced by Hegel, that war is an extension of political relations other (i.e., violent) means. In theory and in practice, Marxism determines its position on war, not by abstracting war as a generality, but by viewing it in the concrete; not by regarding it as something fixed and static, but by seeing it in the process of movement and develop-Ιt necessary, Lenin ment. is taught, to examine the historical conditions from which a given war arises, the class character of its leadership, and the political objectives for which it is being waged. Marxism is thus able to show that wars must be distinguished one from another; that they cannot be viewed as one indistinguishable mass: that there are, in the political sense, two general types of wars. In the classic characterization to be found in the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the two kinds of war are:

"Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism; and unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations."*

By this basic criterion, Marx, Engels, and their contemporary adherents, as later Lenin and Stalin, as well as all consistent Marxist-Leninists, shaped their policies in regard to each specific war concretely.

Perhaps the primary aspect of the entire question is that dwelt on in Marx's leter of June 20, 1866, to Engels*—the criticism of the petty-bourgeois anarchist followers of Proudhon in France for their national nihilism, for their haughty "dismissal" of nationalities and nations as nonsensical and outmoded.

Marx says of them:

"Morever, the representatives of 'Young France' (non-workers) came out with the announcement that all nationalities and even nations were 'antiquated prejudices.' Proudhonized Stirnerism. Everything to be dissolved into little 'groups' or 'communes' which will in their turn form an 'association' but no state."

With characteristic humor Marx adds:

"The English laughed very much when I began my speech by saying that our friend Lafargue, etc., who had done away with nationalities, had spoken 'French' to us, i.e., a language which nine-tenths of the audience did not understand. I also suggested that by the negation of nationalities he appeared, quite unconsciously, to understand their absorption into the model French nation."

Marx extends this criticism to the question of national wars, in a letter of the same period to Engels:

^{*} History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, International Publishers, pp. 167-68.

^{*}Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Correspondence, International Publishers. All references to letters by Marx or Engels, if not otherwise noted, will have this book as source.

"The Proudhonist clique . . . declares war to be obsolete, and nationalities an absurdity. . . . As polemics against chauvinism their agitation is useful and explainable. But as adherents of the Proudhon cult (my local very good friends Lafargue and Longuet also belong to it) who think that all Europe must and will sit quietly on its behind until the gentlemen in France will have abolished 'La misere et l'ignorance' . . . they become preposterous."*

From the outset, scientific Socialism opposed any and all tendencies to national indifferentism. Marx and Engels saw correctly that the national wars which marked the ascendant and victorious stage of capitalism—classically. from the American and Great French Revolutions to the Franco-German War of 1870-and which were connected organically with the national-state character of bourgeois society, were linked up with the forward movement of all the democratic forces. As Engels explained in an article in 1888:

"Since the end of the Middle Ages history has worked toward the formation of great national states in Europe. Only such states are the normal political constitution of the ruling European bourgeoisie and are likewise the indispensable precondition for the establishment of harmonious international cooperation of peoples, without which the rule of the proletariat cannot exist. In order to ensure international peace, all avoidable national frictions must

first of all be obviated, each people must be independent and master in its own house."*

This simple, direct statement, each people must be independent and master in its own house. declares the positive attitude of Marxism to the national question. It entails a prerequisite, now as then, for the democratic progress of the working class and the people in every country, for the creation of the conditions for further social progress, and for the peaceful coexistence of nations. It is to guarantee that each people shall be independent and master in its own house that the war of the United Nations is being waged; anti-Axis coalition embraces the existing Socialist State and the democratic States \mathbf{of} the capitalist world; that the patriotic forces of the people, of all classes and parties, build up the anti-fascist national unity.

The period of which Marx was writing-indeed, the entire epoch ushered in by the great tidal wave of the French Revolution until the Paris Commune-was marked by the vast expansion of industrial capitalism in Western and Central Europe, as well as in North America, and the establishment of the national States which that process required as an indispensable political framework. The nineteenth century, up to 1871, is an epoch of historically progressive national wars and struggles directed at decisively ridding society of the outlived and reactionary feudal insti-

^{*} Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Briefwechsel, Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, Moscow, 1935, Vol. III, pp. 402-03.

^{*} Friedrich Engels, Der Deutsch-Franzoesische Krieg, 1870-71 (a compilation), 1931, p. 13.

tutions or at throwing off the yoke of foreign oppression, to establish the independent, consolidated national State, the unified bourgeois-democratic republic.

Outstanding among those wars of national independence and national consolidation were the Revolutionary War of 1776, which established the United States as an independent nation, the wars of the Great French Revolution, the bourgeoisdemocratic revolutionary wars of 1848, the wars for the national unification of Italy and Germany, and the American Civil War.

That period is at the same time the period of the rise of the modern industrial proletariat, called into being by expanding capitalist in-The bourgeoisie could not dustry. the conquest over achieve full feudal remnants and advance toward its own political domination without rallying as allies the democratic masses of peasants and work-Where, as in Germany, the weak, vacillating bourgeoisie, in apprehension of the proletariat, failed to effect such an alliance, but gave up the struggle as soon as the workers began to fight for its successful conclusion, the democratic course of national unification from below was broken and in its place there occurred that mongrel Junker-bourgeois alliance whose reactionary impact has brought dire consequences upon the nation.

The modern national state was needed as the political framework, not only by the bourgeoisie, for the fullest development of its productive forces, but also by the working class. "For the workers everything which centralized the bourgeoisie is of course favorable," Marx declared.* "The working class could not grow strong," Lenin wrote, "could not become mature and formed, without 'constituting itself within the nation,' without being 'national' ('though not in the bourgeois sense of the word')."**

We find therefore that in the first phase of the Franco-German War. in 1870, Marx and Engels supported Germany. They saw the war as being, on the French side, aggressive and reactionary in character, while on the German side as a war begun in the interests of national preservation, a progressive war. They saw the war as having a historically progressive objective for Germany: the unification of the national State: the completion of the thwarted objectives of the bourgeois-democratic Revolution of 1848; the development of the productive forces upon a modern scale, which would bring a numerous proletariat, forward growing increasingly consolidated, with its independent working class movement: whereas a victory for Bonapartism would destroy the conditions for an independent German working class movement and continue to crush the French democratic forces. For France at that time. Marx and Engels envisaged in a French defeat the progressive historic objective of destroying Bonapartism; of freeing that country from the nightmare of the Second Empire with its regime of chauvinist. adventurist banker-politicos;

^{*} Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 213. ** V. I. Lenin, Selected Works, International Publishers, Vol. XI, p. 35.

and of re-establishing the Republic to give "elbow room" to the French proletariat, and to the forces of democracy as a whole.

For these reasons they opposed the position taken in regard to the war by Wilhelm Liebknecht, who condemned it as a dynastic war and urged the neutrality of the Party.*

"Germany has been driven by Badinguet [Napoleon III] into a war for her national existence," Engels wrote to Marx in August, 1870. "... The whole mass of the German people of every class have realized that this is first and foremost a question of national existence and have therefore at once flung themselves into it. That in these circumstances a German political party should preach total obstruction à la Wilhelm [Liebknecht] and place all sorts of secondary considerations before the main consideration, seems to me impossible."

What lessons, what wealth of guidance for subordinating secondary to main considerations the position of Marx and Engels holds for us in our day, in this greatest of national wars!

As Marx combated the anarchomutualist ideas of Proudhon, so Lenin, in a new period, took to task the French anarcho-syndicalist group of Gustave Hervé and his followers, who, parading as ultra-anti-militarists, declared that all wars are waged in the interests of capitalists and that, therefore, the proletariat must oppose every kind of war.

At the International Socialist

Congress held at Stuttgart in 1907, the Hervéists proposed a draft resolution as follows:*

"The congress demands that every declaration of war, from whatever quarter it may emanate, be answered by a military strike and insurrection."**

In exposing this anarchist adventurist phrasemongering, which draped itself with the pretext that Marx had declared that "The proletarians have no fatherland," Lenin said:

"That the 'proletarians have no fatherland' is actually stated in The Communist Manifesto. . . . But it does not follow from this . . . that it is immaterial to the proletariat fatherland which it whether it lives in monarchist Germany, republican France or despotic Turkey. The fatherland, i.e., the given political, cultural and social environment, is the most powerful factor in the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . The proletariat cannot treat the political, social and cultural conditions of its struggle with indifference or equanimity, consequently it cannot remain indifferent to the destiny of its countrv."*

The Nazis in this war have sought to influence the masses of the United Nations away from their healthy hatred of fascism by inveighing against the "plutocrats" of the democratic countries. The Trotskyite agents of Hitler, in common

^{*} The Social-Democratic Workers' Party, founded in 1869.

^{*}Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. IV, p. 327.

**Logically enough, during the World Imperialist War of 1914-18, Gustave Hervé took the position of an extreme social-imperialist, demanding a complete dismemberment of Germany. He changed his paper La Guerre Sociale (The Class Struggle) to La Victoire.

with Goebbels, have endeavored to make particular use of such shibboleths to undermine the patriotism of the peoples warring for their national liberation. But the anti-fascist masses, especially the advanced workers, of America and Britain have clearly understood from the beginning the issues involved in the anti-Axis war, the necessity for subordinating everything to the needs of victory, without which there could be no democratic liberties, no national freedom, no economic and social advance.

In this connection Stalin, in the course of his historic speech of November 6, 1941, in which, among other things, he unmasked and shattered the unbridled demagogy and the hideous nature of Hitler's "national socialism," pointedly stated:

"The Hitlerites are . . . the bitterest reactionaries and blackguards who have deprived the working class and peoples of Europe of their elementary democratic liberties. To cover up their reactionary, blackguard essence, the Hitlerites are branding the Anglo-American internal regime as a plutocratic re-But in England and the gime. United States there are elementary democratic liberties, there are trade unions of workers and employees, there are labor parties, there is a parliament, whereas the Hitler regime has abolished all these institutions in Germany. . . . The Hitler party is a party of the enemies of democratic liberties, a party of medieval reaction and of blackguard pogroms."*

In working out the program and the tactics of struggle of the proletarian party at each stage of development, Marx and Engels at all times guided themselves by their understanding of the relation between the ultimate goal—the social emancipation of the working class—and the bourgeois-democratic demands directed against feudal reaction, among the foremost of which was the demand of the right of nations to self-determination.

National self-determination for Marx was not a principle of negativism, of division and antagonism, but a principle of constructive. unfettered nationhood and national comity. That principle, as conceived and fashioned into living reality by Marxism-Leninism, is the only basis for truly bringing about federation -the overthrow of "union" by oppression and the clearing of the voluntary union. In path for this sense Marx wrote in regard to Ireland that "after the separation there may come federation." unifying essence of the Marxist-Leninist tenet of national self-determination is classically demonstrated in the brotherhood of free and equal nations federated on the principle of voluntaryism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The national-liberation movement of the subject people, Marx taught, is inalienably connected with the working class struggle in the oppressor nation. In the well-known letter of November 29, 1869, to his friend Dr. Kugelmann, for example, Marx points out that the English working class will not suc-

^{*} Joseph Stalin, The War of National Liberation, International Publishers, pp. 27-28.

ceed in its own decisive advance "until it not only makes common cause with the Irish, but actually takes the initiative in dissolving the union established in 1801 and replacing it by a free Federal relationship. And, indeed, this must be done, not as a matter of sympathy with Ireland, but as a demand made in the interests of the English proletariat."*

This important teaching is emphasized too in regard to the interrelated character of the struggles, prior to the American Civil War, of the white workers of the North and of the Negro slaves. In the famous address of the International Workingmen's Association (the First International) to Abraham Lincoln, Marx, its author, wrote:

"While the workingmen, the true political power of the North, allowed slavery to defile their own republic, while before the Negro, mastered and sold without his concurrence, they boasted it the highprerogative of the skinned laborer to sell himself and choose his own master, they were unable to attain the true freedom of labor, or to support their European brethren in their struggle for emancipation; but this barrier to progress has been swept off by the red sea of civil war."**

Marx and Engels, as master dialecticians, considered the democratic demands of their day, not in isolation, in this or that country or sphere, but in their broadest connection, on a world scale; not in abstraction, but in the concrete conditions and alignments of class forces, within the given land and internationally; not in isolation, in the given period of the middle or latter half of the nineteenth century, but in relation to the entire past, and to the unfolding future. (Thus, although championing the national movements of their day, Marx and Engels were opposed to the national movements of the Czechs and the South Slavs, characterizing these at "reactionary peothe time as ples" for serving as "outposts of Tsarism," which was then the bulwark of European reaction.)

This lesson is vital today, when the issue of Ireland has to be seen in relation to the struggles of all peoples to free the world of the incubus of fascism. The achievement of a united and independent Ireland is a historic task of the Irish people. But, as Marxism has always taught, the aspirations and the struggles for national independence must take into account the concrete conditions in each historic period, in relation to the general interests of democracy. when the freedom of all nations is contingent upon the military destruction of fascism, the lot of Ireland is pooled with the lot of all the United Nations battling for their national existence, for freedom from monstrous fascism. free Ireland is impossible in an enslaved world." The extremist, narrow-nationalist Irish Republicans fail to realize that Ireland's fight for national freedom and national consolidation can be consummated only

^{*} Marx-Engels, Selected Correspondence, p. 228. ** Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Civil War in the United States, International Publishers, pp. 280-81.

in a fighting alliance with all nations and peoples struggling to deal the death-blow to the Hitlerite Axis.

The Communist Party of Ireland, bearer of the principles of Marx, therefore declares in its manifesto of October 25, 1942:

"The future happiness and liberty of all Ireland is bound up with the momentous struggle of the nations of the world for the defeat of the fascist peril which aims at the enslavement of all humanity....

"Ireland's true allies today are the common people of Britain, America, the Soviet Union, China and the enslaved peoples of Europe. Their victory will burst asunder the shackles that bind the peoples, and will destroy fascism and its supporters all over the world. . . .

"The victory of the democratic forces will be a victory for progress, and for the friendship and unity of the peoples of the world. It will give a tremendous impetus to the achievement of a United, Independent Ireland."

The truth of Marx's doctrine is manifested today perhaps most profoundly in regard to India. where the policy of the British Government in continuing to hold that sub-continent in colonial subjection has resulted in serious obstacles to the unity and the effective mobilization of the Indian people for the war effort. Early in 1942, on the eve of the Cripps mission, the Communist Party of India, in a special resolution, warned the All-India Congress that it would be a mistake, the sheerest of illusions, to assume that India's independence would come as a gift borne from Downing Street. The people of India, the resolution declared, would achieve through national independence struggle, through anti-fascist national unity for the defense of their country against aggression by Japan and Hitler; in this struggle the people of India would gain the solidarity of all democratic peoples-as a result of mobilizing its manpower, for unified, effective participation in the great war of the United Nations to destroy beyond resurrection the Axis of fascism, the deadly enemy of the colonial peoples as of the rest of the world.

"The Charter of Freedom," stated the resolution, "will be written by the Indian people themselves. A people that has forged its unity and has achieved a successful defense of the country against the aggressor [Japan and Hitler Germany] through a total people's mobilization—such a people will not come into its own in accordance with the neatly balanced scheme of the British War Cabinet. . . .

"The final solution will be given by the Indian people who will have the last say in company with the freedom-loving peoples of the world who are bound to win the battle of world liberation against fascism, who are bound to create a world of free peoples."

* * *

Because he saw in the nationalliberation movements as a whole, and the working class component in especial, the advancing democratic forces of history, Marx envisaged the national wars in terms, solely, of offensive conduct, whether in offensive or defensive military operations.

We find Marx writing to Engels on August 17, 1870, in regard to the war of national defense Germany was then still waging:

"Kugelmann confuses a defensive war with defensive military operations. So if a fellow falls upon me in the street I may only parry his blow but not knock him down, because then I should turn into an aggressor! The want of dialectic comes out in every word these people utter."

The underlying idea of Marx's criticism is contained in Lenin's statement: "For... one can defend one's Fatherland on someone else's territory."

It is contained, too, in Stalin's declaration, in 1934:

"The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody-let alone at-We stand for tacking anybody. peace and champion the cause of peace. But we are not afraid of threats and are prepared to answer blow for blow against the instigators of war. Those who want peace and are striving for business intercourse with us will always receive our support. And those who try to attack our country will receive a stunning rebuff to teach them not to poke their pig's snout into our Soviet garden again."

Wars of national defense can take the form of offensive against actual or imminent invaders. This was the principle upon which the Soviet Union, in 1939-40, conducted its defense on the soil of Finland, whose White Guard dictatorship, as history was soon thereafter to reveal to the

entire world, had placed her in vassalage to Hitler for the assault of his Axis upon the workers' State. This is the principle upon which today the Soviet people-Red Armymen, guerrilla fighters, workers on the production front, peasants on the grain front, scientists, men and women of the professions, old people, school children-all to a man, united behind their government under the brilliant leadership of Joseph Stalin-have turned the defense of their invaded fatherland into the most magnificent offensive in all recorded time.

In regard to another great national war, of special importance to us Americans, both because of the great issues it involves and because of the conclusions it holds for us—in regard to the Civil War of the United States—Marx advanced lessons that ring their truths also in our day for American democracy embattled against the fascist slavocrats.

"The people of Europe know," Marx wrote in the New York Daily Tribune, on November 7, 1861, "that the Southern slavocracy commenced the war with the declaration that the continuance of slavocracy was no longer compatible with the continuance of the Union. Consequently, the people of Europe know that a fight for the continuance of the Union is a fight against the continuance of the slavocracythat in this contest the highest form popular self-government till now realized is giving battle to the meanest and most shameless form of man's enslaving recorded in the annals of history."*

^{*} Marx-Engels, The Civil War in the United States, pp. 23-24.

It was Marx's great contribution to have consistently stressed in his writings that to encompass the defeat of the slave power, which had launched its counter-revolutionary war, a whole series of obstacles had to be overcome, the method of waging the war had to change from a policy of remaining on the defensive and appeasing the hidden "friends of Secessia," to a policy of assuming an all-out offensive combined with a ruthless removal of appeasers and Copperhead traitors.

The main hindrances to be overcome by the North under Lincoln's leadership included the "brake" of the political influence of the border slave states, of which the half-hearted McClellan, Commander-in-Chief in the first stage of the war—the General who would not win—was the symbol.

"One can say of McClellan," wrote Marx in 1862, "what Macaulay says of Essex: 'The military mistakes of Essex sprang for the most part from political compunction. He was honestly, but by no means warmly, attached to the cause of Parliament, and next to a great defeat he feared nothing so much as a great victory.'"*

"Political compunction" as the basis of military sloth! What a floodlight from the past upon the resistance, in our own day, on the part of certain military and political leaders to the launching of the Western Front!

Marx consistently warned against the Copperheads, while urging the turn toward a resolute, offensive conduct of the war. He saw, however, that the blight of McClellanism was connected with the hesitancy in regard to the emancipation of the slaves—Lincoln's attempt at first to restrict the issue of the war simply to "Union versus Secession," i.e., to a Constitutional issue. This policy, he repeatedly pointed out, kept the war under "the domination of the border slave statesmen" and was preventing the rallying of the slaves to the side of the North.

But Marx also saw, even when certain friends of the Northern cause, disgusted with the Government's hesitations and half-measures, were cavilling at the short-comings and despairing of victory, that the forces in conflict were too inexorably locked for the slavery issue long to remain unresolved.

"In the end the North will make war seriously, adopt revolutionary methods and throw over the domination of the border slave statesmen. A single Negro regiment would have a remarkable effect on Southern nerves.

"The difficulty of geting the 300,-000 men seems to me purely political. The Northwest and New England wish to and will force the government to give up the diplomatic method of conducting war which it has used hitherto, and they are now making terms on which the 300,000 men shall come forth."*

The paramount lesson of Marx-

^{*} Ibid., p. 157.

The paramount lesson of marx

^{*} Ibid., pp. 252-53.

ism for today is the lesson of strengthening our war effort to direct the whole striking power of the nation toward decisive victory. It is the lesson of anti-fascist national unity, of releasing and implementing the full energies of the people for effective participation in the war effort. It is the lesson of the unreserved integration of the Negro people in the national unity on the basis of equality on the production front and in the armed forces. It is the lesson of bringing into full play the role of labor in the nation's victory drive, not merely as supporter of correct governmental policy, but as actual participant in the policy-forming and administrative bodies up to and including the President's Cabinet. It is at the same time the lesson that labor will the more easily attain this position, which is its due and which the war of national liberation demands, the more quickly it achieves unity within its own ranks.

It is the lesson of the full partici-

pation of all anti-fascist forces, of which the Communists are an integral and vital part, in civilian work and in the armed services—the lesson that Lincoln taught our nation by his according Army commissions to prominent Communists and by his cordial correspondence with the First International under the leadership of Karl Marx. It is the lesson of smashing the defeatists and the Fifth Column outpost of fascism in our midst. It is, above all, the lesson of the offensive conduct of the war, of full coalition warfare. of strengthening the American-Soviet-British alliance, of no quarter to the Soviet-baiters and the peddlers of "negotiated peace."

It is the lesson of making this war of national liberation in the full sense a people's war, of effecting the subordination of "all . . . secondary considerations before the main consideration"—the military defeat of the Nazi Axis and the utter annihilation of fascism throughout the world.

THE GREAT BATTLE OF STALINGRAD

BY MIKHAIL BRAGIN

(On the Occasion of the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of the Red Army's Founding)

YEARS, decades will go by. The Stalingrad epic will be studied, described and sung. It will forever remain in the memories of the Soviet people as a symbol of the heroism of Soviet men and women, of their love of country and hatred for the enemy. To the enemy it will remain a black specter of doom and defeat.

This battle will be studied in the military academies as an example of steadfast defense and as an example of street fighting, unparalleled in history. In this struggle the spearhead of the enemy's blow, directed at the heart of Stalingrad, was blunted and then broken.

The Strength and Advantages of the Germans

The German troops which broke through to Stalingrad reached the Volga, enveloping the city in a semicircle, and kept under fire all the crossings linking the city with the other bank. The left flank of the German troops was covered by the Don. In the divide between the Volga and the Don they captured all the dominating elevations and created strong defenses. Their right

flank was secured by German occupied territory.

A dense network of communications afforded the fascists the possibility of maneuvering their reserves and concentrating them for counterblows in the required directions.

The whole theatre of military operations adjoining the city of Stalingrad abounds in airdromes, from which the Germans could deliver massed blows to hold back the Soviet troops until the arrival of their ground reserves.

But the main calculation and miscalculation of Hitler consisted in that he underestimated the strength of the Red Army and overestimated that of his own troops. Embarking upon a strategic adventure in his drive toward the Volga and the Caucasus without adequate possibilities thereto, Hitler, like a reckless gambler, kept throwing new thousands of Germans into the Stalingrad mincer.

Choking with blood, the Germans crawled from doorstep to doorstep, from house to house, from shop to shop. They pressed into action tanks and flame throwers, trans-

ferred sappers from all the fronts, brought police squads from Germany specially trained in street fighting.

The history of wars knows examples of the encirclement of retreating armies routed in battle. Cases are known when encirclement has overtaken armies on terrain which afforded no possibility for maneuvering in battle or withdrawing from battle.

At Stalingrad, however, the problem was that of encircling an army which itself was engaged in the offensive on terrain where all the advantages were on its side. The problem was that of the destruction of seasoned troops, troops with fighting capacity, led by generals who had fought against the U.S.S.R. from the very first day of the war and who had fought in France, Belgium and Poland. Many of them had participated in the First World War.

There is, for example, the 8th German Army infantry corps. It started along its path of plunder in the U.S.S.R. at 3:05 A. M. on June 22, 1941. The corps broke into Grodno, passed Minsk, Smolensk and Gzhatsk, received a sound thrashing from the units of the 29th Guards division and tank brigades in October, 1941, at Borodino, fled during the rout of the Germans at Moscow, and was withdrawn behind the Dnieper for the lengthy preparations for the 1942 battles.

Along with it was the 16th tank division, part of Kleist's tank army, which passed Sokol, Dubno, Kirovograd, Dniepropetrovsk and Rostov, was beaten at Rostov in November, 1941, gained some bitter experience and was reinforced.

Hurled against Stalingrad was also the 3rd motorized division, part of Guderian's tank army, formed in Berlin. It fought at Moscow, near Tula and Voronezh, and was the first to crawl into Stalingrad.

All of Hitler's divisions were seasoned formations, well equipped and armed. They were composed of "Aryans" aged 20 to 35 and had an officers' staff consisting of fascists. This army constituted a strong force, capable of a decisive rebuff. It was necessary to put up a steel ring to tie it down and to strike heavy blows to destroy it.

The Direction of the Main Blows

The strategic foresight of the Supreme High Command of the Red Army, its profound analysis of the situation and its understanding of the enemy's designs, indicated that the blow at the Stalingrad Front, the concentrating point of Hitler's military aims, where his prestige was at stake and his crack divisions were amassed, would bring forth a large-scale counteraction on the part of the German command. Therefore it was necessary to foresee and carry out operations of such scope that they would paralyze the enemy's attempts.

The Red Army's Supreme High Command accordingly prepared and brought into motion the fronts not only at Stalingrad but also at other sectors. Moreover, the directions of the principal blows were chosen so as to determine the success of the operations. It was decided, by blows at the directions converging in the big Don Bend, to rout Hitler's troops on the flanks of his Stalingrad group, to penetrate its rear and destroy it. The operation ahead was a most difficult one. Only the skill of the concentrating shock troops resulted in numerical superiority on the Soviet side.

The terrain, cut by the Volga, the Don, the Chir and other rivers, presented special difficulties. The Don River had to be forded twice under enemy fire. The Don and the Volga separated the troops from their rear bases.

Military doctrine defines a breach of enemy defenses as a very difficult operation—an enveloping blow—a maneuver demanding a great deal of mobility and preparation of troops. At Stalingrad, however, the operations succeeded one another and also followed from one another.

Having pierced the defenses, the troops struck enveloping blows, concluding with the encirclement of the enemy.

All this demanded of the commanders a high level of operative skill and the utmost precision in calculations, since the blow from two directions was struck by the groups of three fronts; and only the full coordination of their operations A delay by one ensured success. group or a reverse suffered by another meant the undermining of the whole operation. The operations were conducted on a vast stretch separated by the enemy's camp.

With weli-calculated and persistent efforts the Soviet troops were preparing to carry out the plan of the Supreme High Command. The work had to be carried on at night. The Don began to freeze. Ferrying across was no longer possible, moving on foot over the thin ice dangerous, pontoon building very difficult.

The left bank was covered with thick brush and abounded in lakes and swamps; and farther north it bordered on shifting sand. Trucks stuck in the sand and bogs; the men and horses exhausted their strength. Bridges had to be laid over a stretch of dozens of kilometers, and since there was nothing all around but barren steppe, the materials had to be brought from afar.

To mislead the enemy dozens of crossings were put up at different points. Thousands of road builders, sappers and engineers worked ceaselessly, under the autumn rains, exposed to the cold blasts of a biting wind sweeping the Don. Labor, truly titanic labor, preceded the operation and ensured its success.

The weeks immediately preceding the offensive, the Red Army forces, conducting local operations, recaptured from the enemy height after height and ravine after ravine, preparing a springboard on the right bank. At these points the troops were concentrated and compressed like a spring, ready to leap forward. Simultaneously preparations were made for the immediate transfer of new divisions to this base as soon as the forward units began the offensive.

The staffs worked day and night planning the battles. The concentration of large masses of troops, particularly the cavalry, did not escape the enemy's attention; and he hurled hundreds of aircraft at the area of concentration and at the communication lines. Tanks and horses were hidden in the ditches and in brush. The AA defense was strengthened. The men dug in and withstood the furious Luftwaffe bombings.

The Double Breach of the Flanks

On the morning of November 19, when the Don was enveloped in a mist, the troops began to force the breach. Following heavy artillery preparations on the left flank at Kalach and south of Stalingrad, infantry divisions and tanks were rushed into the attack and an offensive ardor gripped the army men.

Three infantry divisions, the 3rd motorized and the 11 tank divisions, and 90 tanks were hurled by the Germans against the Soviet cavalry at Kalach. The Red Army forded the crossings on the Don and straight from the march broke into the town of Kalach.

The Breach South of Stalingrad Through the Eyes of the Generals Taken Prisoner

During the questioning of the Rumanian General Dimitriu, the commander of the 20th infantry division taken prisoner, he was shown a Soviet reconnaissance service map and asked to indicate the exact positions of his division at that time. The amazed general replied that the Soviet reconnaissance map reflected the positions with greater precision than the operative map of his staff.

On the sector held by the 20th Rumanian infantry division, the Soviet artillery preparation had almost completely destroyed a sapper battalion holding the defense, and heavy tanks filed into the breach. They reached the firing positions of the 40th artillery regiment and, as testified by General Dimitriu, destroyed not only the guns but even the wheels.

Another group of tanks filing into the breach struck at the rear of two regiments of the 20th division and, according to this same Dimitriu, "nothing but dust" was left of his regiments. Asked to define the exact military meaning of this statement, the general replied: "This means that it looked as if I never had these regiments."

This scene was observed by General Dimitriu's neighbor, the Commander of the 297th German infantry division, Major General von Drebber, who surrendered later. He described it as a "Russian break through." Drebber saw the movement of the Russian tanks enveloping the front of the German group. The tanks carried out a bold but dangerous flanking movement and completed it almost with impunity.

Apparently the German commander had no means for counterattacking. At any rate the 297th German division received the order to draw in its flank and change to the defensive.

The Decisive Forces at the Decisive Place at the Decisive Moment

The success was facilitated by the correctly chosen moment for en-

circling the enemy. Whereas he still continued his attacks on Stalingrad, he had already exhausted his reserves and could not support his flanks. It was also correct to strike the blow from two directions, for the enemy, rushing to counterattack the Don group, could spare less forces for counterattacking the Soviet troops advancing from the bank of the Volga.

This direction of the blows forced the Germans to fight with an inverted front, forced them, in an effort to save the situation, to throw in their reserves hurriedly and piecemeal, and by its very nature the battle was lost for the Germans. The famous triad of military doctrine—the decisive forces in the decisive place at the decisive moment—was fully reflected in this Stalinist operation.

As a result of this the Soviet tank formation advancing south of Stalingrad also broke through to Kalach. The tankmen from the banks of the Volga shook hands with the tankmen from the Don. and in November closed the steel ring around Hitler's Stalingrad The cavalry and infantry group. came up to reinforce this ring. The encirclement operation was brilliantly completed. But the even more difficult task of routing and destroying the encircled enemy troops was still ahead.

To Save Hitler's Prestige

Dismay prevailed among the enemy troops. Some of the German generals insisted upon the necessity of an immediate withdrawal from Stalingrad to break

through to Rostov; others, however, considered that this encirclement was not dangerous and would be liquidated in a few days. Then the stern order came from Berlin to hold to the last cartridge. made desperate efforts to save the situation. Trainloads of reinforcements were hastily dispatched by rail from Rostov. Two groups of three fascist tank divisions, three air-borne infantry divisions and cavalry units were concentrated on the Chir River near Kotelnikovo. These troops were christened with the sonorous name of the "Don" group.

The entire operation to liberate Stalingrad was a group synchronization action of the 6th army, the 4th tanks and the "Don" groups directed by Field Marshal von Mannstein, specially transferred there from another front. As soon as Mannstein came within 15 to 20 kilometers, crack units from among the encircled forces were to strike in a southern direction to join forces with him.

The overweening plans of the Germans were intended to trap the Soviet troops between the hammer and the anvil. This was a grave danger. The German ground forces were supported by aircraft. peril would have been greater were the Hitler command to adopt the decision to abandon Stalingrad and direct all the forces of its 22 divisions to break through to Rostov. But for the sake of maintaining his prestige Hitler did not want to abandon Stalingrad, and once again underestimated the strength of the Red Army.

The Rout of the von Mannstein Group

With the encirclement operation still under way the Soviet command took immediate steps to provide cover from the west, southwest and south to the troops encircling the enemy. Some of the cover units were locked in tense fighting with the Mannstein forces to hold back their advance. The Soviet Guards divisions descended like an avalanche from north to south, hurled back Mannstein's tank units, poorly supported by their infantry, captured Kotelnikovo and sent the whole of the "Don" group fleeing to Rostov. The hopes of the encircled fascists for routing the Soviet troops collapsed.

New Fronts Brought Into Motion

By this time, on the order of the Soviet Supreme High Command, other fronts came into motion and the enemy reserves were sent dashing from pillar to post, from front to front. The Stalingrad operation developed into a number of operations backing it up and simultaneously pursuing their independent major operative aims.

Offensive operations were being launched on the Central Front, in the South and on the Voronezh Front. A staggering blow at the Southwestern Front, struck over the whole Middle Don Area, forced a breach in the enemy's defenses, routing the Italians and a number of German and Rumanian divisions. These were battles with a decisive outcome. It can be confidently

said that throughout the area from Stalingrad to Millerovo all enemy forces were destroyed, taken prisoner or smashed.

The highly important stations captured on the Voronezh-Rostov Front railway line and the Stalingrad-Tatsinskaya line cut off all the enemy bases. With the clearing of this territory the enemy was deprived of air bases and the Luftwaffe was driven to airdromes situated far away from Stalingrad.

Tank units, dispatched to raid the German rear, captured 300 enemy planes on an airdrome near the station at Tatsinskaya, which served as a base for their flights to Stalin-The situation in the air sharply changed. The area between Stalingrad and Millerovo cleared of the enemy and the encircled Hitler's Stalingrad group was separated from its reserves deep in the rear by a vast stretch -a great factor in strategy in all wars.

The enemy was doomed; nothing could save him any longer. On February 2nd the historic battle of Stalingrad ended in a complete victory for the Red Army and the complete destruction of the German forces.

August 8, 1918, the day on which the German army on the Western Front received a crushing blow, was called by the Germans "Germany's Black Day."

Clear, sunny days and light nights now prevail at Stalingrad. The white, snow-covered steppe is liberated, free; it stretches before the victors, before Stalingrad. The air is filled with the joy of victory, and the German prisoners call the defeat at Stalingrad the black day of the German army.

But other black days must and will yet come for the Hitler army to bring about the complete rout of the German occupation forces, when they will be driven beyond the borders of the land of the Soviets.

All the people in the land of the Soviets are convinced of this, from the private to the general. This conviction is based on confidence in our own strength, the strength of a people and country which ensured the Red Army everthing that was necessary for striking crushing blows at the enemy. This conviction is based on confidence in the brilliant leadership of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the leadership which resulted in the victory of the historic battle of Stalingrad, a victory unmatched in the history of the art of warfare.

SOME PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION

BY GIL GREEN

THE tide in the war has turned in favor of the United Nations. The awe-inspiring victories of Soviet arms create the possibilities for decisive victory over Hitler in a relatively short period of time especially if these are taken advantage of by the prompt launching of a European second front. Yet, at a time when the United Nations hold the offensive on the military front, the defeatists and reactionaries have grasped the offensive on our home front.

It is this offensive of the appeasers and reactionaries at home that today constitutes the greatest menace to the national war effort. The Vandenbergs and Wheelers in Congress are leading the wolf-pack against the win-the-war policies of the National Administration, against the labor movement, against the anti-inflation program of the President. Together with the Lammot du Pont clique in the N.A.M., with the Eddie Rickenbackers and Westbrook Peglers, they are doing their best to stir up class and sectional strife, to break national unity and to create distrust and suspicion between the U.S. and its Allies.

What explains this rather anomalous situation?

In the first place, the very prospect of imminent victory over the Axis has made the defeatists more desperate and more determined to disrupt and sabotage our war effort and pave the way for a negotiated peace with Hitler.

Secondly, the improved fortunes of war have led narrow-minded circles of the ruling class to consider the war as already won and to revert to good old business-as-usual and politics-as-usual ways. Some of these have become more frightened of the consequences of a Hitler defeat than they ever were of a Hitler victory. This explains the attitude of a number of poll-tax Senators and Congressmen. Yesterday, they supported the President because they feared the menace of Hitler world conquest; today, they ignore the needs of the war, fear the consequences of a people's victory, and join hands with the reactionary Republican opposition against the National Administration.

Thirdly, there is the disquieting tendency of various Administration circles timidly to retreat in face of the reactionary attacks, fearing to take the issues to the country at large. This was expressed in the fight on the anti-poll tax bill; in the calling off of the F.E.P.C. Railroad hearing; in the fight to keep Representative Marcantonio from obtaining a seat on the Judiciary Committee of the House; in the resignation of Henderson as the head of

O.P.A.; in the failure to muster all Administration and progressive strength against Dies; in Attorney General Biddle's shameless removal of Maloney as chief prosecutor of the thirty-three indicted Nazi agents; and in numerous other instances.

Fourthly, and most decisive of all, is the fact that the defeatists and reactionaries, although weak numerically, make up for this by their unity, their high degree of organization and their political gall. The win-the-war forces on the other hand, while stronger in influence and larger in numbers, are nowhere as well organized, are still far from united and for the most part less alert and articulate when it comes to political struggle. It is this weakness of the win-the-war camp, and of important sections of the labor movement in particular, that explains the tendencies to retreat in certain Administration circles.

The numerical weakness of the defeatist camp should not be mistaken for an inability to confuse and mislead millions of people. The recent national elections showed that these reactionary forces know how to confuse the thinking and influence the actions of scores of millions. They do not, of course, dare to parade in their true colors as opponents of the war effort. But they have shown a devilish ability to pick up economic issues and grievances and utilize them for their disruptive, treacherous objectives. Bearing the main responsibility for the failure of the country to achieve a centralized planned war economy and a workable anti-inflation program, the defeatists and reactionaries have succeeded in deflecting a good deal of responsibility from themselves and onto the President and the war effort as such. It is around these issues that they smuggle in their whole defeatist position, as the following instances will show:

The country is in the throes of solving its manpower problem. This problem is in the first place one of pooling and planning, for there is no dearth of available labor supply nationally; there is only bad distribution and organization of the supply on hand, as Earl Browder has repeatedly emphasized. What is the of the defeatists reactionaries to this problem? Do they propose ways and means to utilize the vast reservoir of unused manpower in the ranks of the women and the Negro people? Hardly. Herbert Hoover takes advantage of the shortage of farm labor, not to help solve it, but to use this problem as a springboard for projecting his whole defeatist program. He argues in one breath that the war is as good as won, and, in the next, that it will last from three to five years more. The main burden of his plea is that there is no need to over-exert ourselves. time is licking Hitler and Hirohito for us. What we ought to do, according to Mr. Hoover, is demobilize a large section of our armed forces, put off the invasion of Europe to some indefinite future and thereby "solve" our manpower crisis.

Senator Bankhead has a similar "solution." Whereas we have a manpower shortage and whereas Russia and China are already in contact with the main forces of the enemy, why not a little division of labor, reasons the Senator. Let Russia and China do the fighting and the dying and America will do the producing and supplying!

In the transition to all-out war economy the nation is likewise beginning to feel the pinch of its first commodity shortages. In a sense, this is inevitable under war econcmy. It is not possible to gear our whole economy to the production of the weapons of war and the supplies necessary to wield those weapons without creating certain shortages in consumers' goods. Yet here, too, our problem is not so much one of acute shortage, but of failure to plan, to pool, to apply the principle of democratic rationing; in short, to organize. What the people object to so strenuously is not shortages per se, but that there seems to be no central plan of control, no rhyme or reason to the present disorganization and confusion. What embitters so many people is the general elasticity of price ceilings, the feeling of uncertainty as to the morrow and the knowledge those who have the most money can still get everything they want without difficulty.

How have the defeatists met this problem? They have merely exploited the issue of shortages, for which they bear primary responsibility, in order to demand an investigation of Lend-Lease, in order to poison the minds of the more backward into believing that the government is sending meat and butter and canned goods abroad for

purposes of "globaloney" instead of to our own armed forces and to those of our Allies.

The problems of war economy and economic stabilization therefore not only essential of solution in the interests of maximum war production, they are at the very heart of the complicated political problems we face. The economic dislocations arising from the transition to a total war economy produce certain strains that require delicate readjustments. The defeatists and reactionaries are exploiting these strains, are taking advantage of the slowness of the Administration in introducing a semblance of order and planning in our economic life, in order to create sharp tension and friction between various groupings leading to internecine class warfare. Earl Browder was profoundly correct when he pointed to the struggle for a centralized planned economy as the "link to mobilize the country politically against the reactionary and defeatist forces."

* * *

What at this moment is disturbing most people and creating the greatest stress and strain in our economic life and class relationships, is what James F. Byrnes, Director of Economic Stabilization, has aptly termed "creeping inflation." Industrial workers, salaried employees, whether civil service or white collar and professional workers, lower middle class groups, and poor farmers, are considerably disturbed by the continuous rise in the cost of living and the inability

of the Government to establish any degree of economic stabilization.

On this question especially, the defeatists and reactionaries adept at traveling in opposite directions at the same time. never hesitate to give their support to the inflationary demands of the so-called farm bloc, a bloc that in reality represents the interests of the food monopolies and not the farmers, and at the same time place the full responsibility for "creeping inflation" upon the Administration. As on other matters, the Administration is not getting credit for the many positive things it has accomplished in price control, but is getting the full blame even for failures that are not of its own doing but of the reactionaries in Congress.

Whence arises the danger of inflation? As a general rule, prices under capitalism are regulated by the interplay of supply and der and in market relations. When supply exceeds demand, the tendency of prices is to go down, as in periods of depression, except where artificially maintained through monopoly control. When demand exceeds supply, prices tend to shoot up, as in periods of industrial boom.

In war economy the bulk of production is no longer for the market and can therefore no longer be regulated by the market. Production in the main is for the war. At the same time, however, there takes place a great rise in the purchasing power of the masses. Reactionary employers credit this rise in purchasing power largely to increased hourly earnings on the part of workers, but this is patently false.

This expansion of purchasing power is explained primarily by the return of millions of former unemployed to production, by the inclusion of additional new millions into the working class and by a general lengthening of the work day and week for labor as a whole.

Here we come upon the paradox of war economy. In peace economy the greater the demand, the greater in time becomes the supply. In war economy, however, we face a swollen demand for consumers' goods and a relative and absolute diminishing supply, because more and more of industrial capacity is diverted to the production of arms and materials that do not find their outlet in the market but are sold under contract to the government.

The extent to which these huge government expenditures for the war call the cards in our economy today can be seen when we compare the government expenditures for economic recovery in the depression years with those for the war today. From 1935 to 1939 the government spent for industrial recovery some \$250,000,000 a month. Today, to finance the war, the government spends some \$250,000,000 a day.

It is therefore obvious that the regulating influence of the market relationships of peacetime no longer plays that role today. To permit the market relationships to determine prices during the war is to give the green light to a runaway economy—to inflation on a grand scale.

The difference between consumer income on the one hand and the value of goods available on the

other has been dubbed by bourgeois economists as the "inflation gap." James F. Byrnes declared in his recent address to the nation that the "inflation gap" at this time is as high as \$16,000,000,000. According to Mr. Byrnes, \$16,000,000,000,000 must be removed from the hands of the consumers in order to remove the pressure for higher prices.

We are not in a position to argue with Mr. Byrnes as to his figures, but it is not at all improbable that the size of this "inflation gap" has been exaggerated. However, we would like to take issue with Mr. Byrnes' premise that this excess purchasing power is responsible for the inflationary threat. When Mr. Byrnes concedes this point, he is conceding the main argument put forth by reactionary Big Business circles against the economic policies of the Administration.

In fact, this same argument is being used by the New York Times against Mr. Byrnes himself. The Times has violently objected to Mr. Byrnes's forty-eight-hour week order because of the provision for time-and-one-half pay for all weekly hours over forty. In an editorial on this question, it asks:

"At a time when the total supply of civilian goods is constantly shrinking... is it wise, is it non-inflationary, to pursue a wage policy designed to give every worker the purchasing power to command as much goods and services as ever? In other words, is it wise, is it non-inflationary, is it even in the long run possible to keep wages abreast of the rising cost of living?"

Thus, the *Times* takes a stand not merely against any wage increases but against the very principle and conception of wage stabilization. This was further indicated a few days later when the *Times* not merely came out against an upward revision of the Little Steel wage formula but against the Little Steel formula itself for "this formula, even if adhered to, is itself inflationary."

The so-called anti-inflation program of the Times, the Scripps-Howard press and the N.A.M. is little less than a plan to place the full economic burden of the war on the backs of the lower income groups through wage freezing, high taxes and a controlled rise in prices.

Why did Mr. Byrnes succumb to the leading premise of the Times? Because he has forgotten the main reason for the existence of his office. The mere fact that we have established an Office of Economic Stabilization is proof of the fact that we realize that the normal market relationships cannot under war conditions regulate or stabilize our economy. The former role of the market must now be replaced by the direct intervention control of the government, by centralized planning with democratic rationing and rigid price control.

Given democratic rationing and real price control, and the amount of money in circulation will no longer determine prices. Every man, woman and child in the nation will get only the due share of available supplies, regardless of how much money he may possess. With such democratic rationing of all essential

goods; with dollar-and-cent fixed prices; with prison sentences as the penalty for speculation and black markets; with a curb on profits and a tax program based on the ability to pay; the so-called "inflation gap" need no longer be a danger and the excess purchasing power in circulation would far more easily than to-day find its outlet in the purchase of government bonds and stamps to help finance the war.

The advantages of such a solution against that proposed by the Times are numerous. First, it would guarantee that all would receive their share of the available supply and that rich and poor alike would get the basic necessities of life. Secondly, it would heighten national morale and become a boon for increased production and strengthened national unity, as against he program of the Times, which would lead to lower morale and sharp class battles. Thirdly, it would maintain wage and health standards. Even if workers in higher wage brackets could not profitably spend all their earnings today, they would at least have the satisfaction of knowing that their employers were not taking undue advantage of them and that their savings would be used as they saw fit after the war.

When the Little Steel wage formula was accepted by labor it was done in good faith and with the understanding that not only would wages be controlled but all other wheels of our war economy. It was understood that price ceilings would be placed over all essential commodities and that these would be

rigidly enforced. It was likewise understood that excess profits would be curbed and that a \$25,000 ceiling would be established over personal earnings.

Events since then have proved to labor that only wages have thus. far been controlled. The cost of living has constantly mounted. Food prices alone have risen by 10.1% since May, 1942, and food is the largest single item in the budget of a workers' family. Many workers have lost faith in the willingness and/or ability of certain government agencies to impose rigid price ceilings, for Prentiss Brown, the new head of O.P.A., has himself endorsed a "normal" price rise of 1/2 % a month. At the same time, they note that corporation profits are at record peaks. Leon Henderson, in his last public address as head of O.P.A., exposed the fact that "corporation profits have risen \$5,300,000,000 in 1939 to approximately \$20,000,000,000 this year," and that "the corporations are able to pay higher wartime taxes and yet have as much left as in 1929. the boom year, and twice as much as what they had in 1939, the year before the war." Nor should the urge for increased war profits be as a great contributing ignored factor to speculation and inflation. This is the background for the increasing pressure within the ranks of labor for wage increases and for an upward revision in the Little Steel 15% wage formula to take into account the rise in the cost of living since May, 1942. This demand is just. To refuse to adjust wages to the increased cost of living is to

make a cynical mockery of the phrase "economic stabilization"; for there can be no stabilization if ceilings are imposed and enforced on wages alone.

Mr. Byrnes in his recent radio address correctly points out that in the year 1943 all of us will have to accept greater burdens and deprivations and that "there is no way we can hope to improve or even to sustain our customary standards of living during the coming war year." Some workers may not yet understand this but it is unquestionably true that the vast majority of the workers are ready to accept whatever sacrifices may be necessary to achieve victory.

The workers want assurance, however, that the full burden of the war will not be placed on their shoulders and that their essential needs will be met, for this is necessary in the interest of maximum production for war. That assurance does not yet exist. If anything, the opposite is true. While it is true that wages in certain industries are relatively high today, it is likewise true that millions upon millions of workers still receive substandard wages. Is it not also true that the failure to fix prices and ration has resulted in inconvenience to many and if permitted to continue will lead to widespread suffering? And is it also not true that the lowest income groups are being hit the hardest by the inflationary rise, especially in food prices?

Organized labor has many times indicated that it would prefer a basic solution to the wage problem by all-out rationing and strict price control and by the raising of substandard wages and the removal of wage inequalities. The C.I.O. has fought for this for many months. But unless and until these basic answers are applied forcefully and efficiently the pressure for increased wages corresponding to the increase in the cost of living will continue to mount.

In fighting for the upward revision of the Little Steel wage formula, the C.I.O. and A. F. of L. do not in any respect share the views and policies of the defeatist John L. Lewis. Lewis's answer to the wage question is that inflation is already here, cannot be stopped, and that the only thing for labor to do is to force the government to remove its agencies of control over wages and collective bargaining. What Lewis is striving for is to throw the country into a period of violent strike struggles. Neither the war effort nor the immediate interests of the workers, even if one could separate the interests of the workers from those of the nation at war, would benefit by such a development. The reactionary anti-labor forces in the country would like nothing better than to provoke labor to strike action as a means of arousing the farmers and middle classes against the workers and getting Congress to adopt oppressive labor legislation which would destroy the rights won by labor over years of struggle.

The present discussion on wages raises the question as to whether some formula and approach could be found that could give a more flexible and lasting answer to this question for the duration of the

war. Even if the Little Steel formula were to be revised upward, if this were not accompanied by effective price control and a tax program based on the ability to pay, the problem we face today would only repeat itself a few months later. It would be the case of the tortoise, wages, chasing the hare, prices. If the objective of economic stabilization is correct, and it is, would it not prove wise for the government to establish a formula through which wages during the war could be periodically adjusted to the rising cost of living without going through painful and protracted struggles? We note that in Canada. notwithstanding the generally low wage levels in that country, a formula is in effect which guarantees an automatic quarterly adjustment of wages to the cost of living index. Whether that index is properly weighted to take into consideration the relative importance of various items in a workers' budget we do not know, but the general approach adopted has considerable merit.

In Great Britain, by 1941, some three million organized workers had contracts with their employers taking into consideration the need for periodic wage readjustments meet higher living costs. In this country even where workers have such contracts they cannot bring about such adjustments without first having their case reviewed before the War Labor Board. All this helps to pile up thousands of cases before the Board and to create bottlenecks that become causes of dissatisfaction and unrest, thereby hampering maximum production.

The need for a more basic and long-time aproach to wage stabilization is also necessary because large numbers of workers face dilemmas to which they have no answer today. Take the plight of the civil service employees who, because of frozen salaries and because the War Labor Board has refused to take jurisdiction over them, have no court of appeal to which to turn. These workers cannot even get the 15 per cent increase to which they are entitled under the provisions of the Little Steel formula. What are they to do? The failure to meet a problem such as this only sows the seeds of disruption and makes many of these workers prey to the demagogy of John L. Lewis and other defeatists.

If some form of periodic adjustment of wages to cost of living were to be established for the duration of the war, this would help accomplish a number of things: (1) It would establish the principle of wage stabilization in a workable fashion; (2) it would provide a new impetus and incentive for enforcing price ceilings on the part of the government, for every time prices went up by 1 per cent this would result in a 1 per cent rise in wage costs for the government and the government is the largest single employer in the country today, indirectly paying the wages of all workers engaged in war production; (3) it would immediately break the botleneck in the War Labor Board, for adjustments of wages to the cost of living would no longer have to be handled separately by the Board; it could then

concentrate its attention on removing inequalities in wage rates, in guaranteeing collective bargaining, and in handling the problems of substandard wage groups; (4) the workers assured of wage stabilization would then be able to turn more of their attention to matters of production and to increasing their earnings through increased productivity.

Centralized economy and economic stabilization require special consideration of the problems of the farmers and small business. Often these groups feel that they are at loggerheads with labor and that their interests are diametrically opposed to labor's, when the opposite is true. These groups tend to view increased prices for their products as the only solution to their particular problems. This is illusory and partly due to the fact that no positive answer to their problems is being put forth by organized labor.

Let us take the matter of the Pace Bill. This bill calls for the inclusion of farm labor costs in the concept of parity. The majority of farmers, especially those who need hired hands, favor this bill, yet its adoption would increase food prices by approximately 10 per cent and would greatly contribute to the inflation spiral.

It is obvious that the Pace Bill is a chimera. But back of it is a kernel of truth, namely, that labor costs have increased for the farmers and that many farmers whose sons are in the armed forces are compelled to seek hired hands if they are to maintain production. Under such circumstances the labor movement

must support a system of government subsidies which would go directly to the individual producer as an incentive for increased production. Byrnes has indicated that such subsidies are being contemplated, although the reactionaries are out to defeat the government's request for \$100,000,000,000 for this purpose.

When Byrnes, however, states that, "There must be no further price increases unless and to the limited extent required by law to meet clearly established cost increases which cannot generally be absorbed out of profits," we are fearful that he is establishing loophole through which another price ceilings will be broken. It is obvious that in rare cases increased production costs on the part of the manufacturer cannot be absorbed out of profits, yet it would be more economical in the long run to grant subsidies to such groups as against permitting tampering with the price structure.

We recently saw a concrete example of such a problem in what took place in the New York dress industry. For five months the union had been negotiating with the employers without result. The employers insisted that they could not absorb increased labor costs withcut the O.P.A. lifting the price ceiling on dresses. The union organized a stoppage in the dress market, with the result that pressure was exerted on the O.P.A. to raise the price ceilings and on the War Labor Board to certify the dispute.

The best intentions in the world will not keep prices down if men holding the key posts of responsibility, such as Byrnes and Brown, start out by yielding to the pressure of certain business groups. That has been the fault to date—what started out as exceptions have become the rule.

None of the above problems can be resolved in the interests of the nation at war and in an atmosphere of strengthened national unity unless the united labor movement and the conscious win-the-war forces in the country become aroused to the the shameful burlesque being staged by the reactionaries in Congress today. The people of this country are not going to achieve a centralized planned economy, strict price control and democratic rationing without a political struggle, just as they cannot hope to eradicate all last traces of Darlanism in North Africa without a political struggle. This fight is not a fight between workers and employers. It is first of all a political fight to rout the defeatists and reactionaries in Congress; to destroy their paralyzing grip on our legislative bodies and to give backbone and courage to the Administration in the carrying through of its established policies.

At this particular moment the fate of the Pepper-Kilgore Bill, which calls for the establishment of an Office of War Mobilization as a first step toward a centralized planned economic administration, rests in the hands of the people. The Military Affairs Committee, to which this bill has been shunted, will never act favorably on it unless an aroused labor movement expresses itself in no uncertain terms.

Without an Office of War Mobil-

ization, without centralized planned control, we are going to continue to have confusion and chaos in our economic life. An example of this planlessness was the work-or-fight edict of McNutt. This order, despite its worthwhile objective, created confusion worse confounded in the ranks of the workers, especially in light industry centers such as New York.

Certainly, men must work where they are most needed. But are we going to accomplish this by threatening them with the draft and thereby placing the onus of draft dodgers on those in essential industry? Do we want all workers to leave their so-called non-essential job? Are we to treat a city like New York the same way as a city like Buffalo? No wonder this McNutt decree, necessary as its aims are, has only added grist to the mill of the defeatists who are trying their best to cripple our armed forces a la Herbert Hoover.

The serious political situation in the country places a great responsibility on the organized labor movement. It is the organized labor movement which must find the ways and means of uniting its ranks and rallying all other win-the-war forces of the country for the battle against those who are sabotaging and obstructing the war effort of the nation.

This requires in the first place the recognition of the fact that there can no longer be pure and simple trade unionism. Every economic issue today can only be solved in a political fashion. This the recent

C. I. O. Board recognized, in the following words:

"Our national economic problems are problems which go far beyond any question of mere negotiations with employers and the statement of grievances with employers.

"Today the War Labor Board in Washington must pass upon all wage matters. The office of Price Administration and the Department of Agriculture and other Washington agencies make policies which will decide whether we will have a really effective price control or whether prices will skyrocket upward so that wage adjustments will become meaningless.

"These same agencies in Washington decide whether we will have a fair distribution of food and other necessities of life through overall rationing or whether those with the most money will get the largest share of our limited supply. Congress passes on all of these matters and also decides whether through tax cuts there will be taken out of pay checks of our members taxes to such an extent as to cut down their food budgets and their health.

"All of this has placed on the shoulders of the C.I.O. and its members an increased responsibility which goes beyond wage negotiations and grievance adjustments. Our members paying a Victory tax out of their pay envelopes each week have realized that the real questions relating to their everyday working life are being decided in legislative and political fields."

This position of the C.I.O. represents a great step forward of one of the decisive sections of the labor movement in re-emphasizing the importance of political action.

The C.I.O. Board also drew practical conclusions from this analysis, the first of which was the need for unity on all legislative questions between the C.I.O., A. F. of L., Railroad Brotherhoods and National Farmers Union. The response of A. F. Whitney of the Railroad Brotherhood to the proposal for a great laborfarmer legislative coalition is indicative of the growing recognition of the urgent need for united labor action in all wings of the labor movement.

In addition, the C.I.O. urged all the organizations to set up legislative committees, not only in the unions and shops, but in the Congressional Districts as well.

"These local legislative committees," it declared, "must also operate jointly with A. F. of L. and Railroad Brotherhood locals, farm organizations, church and community organizations in their respective localities or Congressional Districts. The views of these groups must be brought to Congress by joint committees of these various organizations, by joint rallies or demonstrations, joint communications and delegations to the Congressmen."

If these decisions of the C.I.O. Board are translated into life; if the coalition between these great organizations is achieved; if the organized labor movement proceeds to organize for the fight against the defeatists and reactionaries in Congress in every shop, union local, locality and Congressional District, then the will of the people will make itself heard and the win-thewar policies of our Government will be more effectively implemented and carried into life.

MARX ON THE SOUTHERN BOURBONS

BY ROB FOWLER HALL

HISTORICAL parallels, as Marx would be the first to warn us, cannot be applied mechanically. The recognition of similarities is helpful, only when it does not conceal the important differences.

In this light, a reading today of International Publishers' compilation of the writings of Marx and Engels on the Civil War in the United States,* suggests certain historical similarities that have a significant bearing on this present critical period in our nation's greatest war of survival.

In 1861-65, the American nation was defending its existence against an insurrection by the Southern slaveholders, while world reaction. in the person of the British Prime Minister, Palmerston, and French Emperor, Louis Napoleon, in secret alliance with the Southern Bourbons, attempted to exploit our republic's dire extremity to crush and remove forever the "menace" of popular democracy; to crush a fast-developing rival; and to keep the South as a semi-colony selling cheap raw materials abroad, and buying from abroad rather than from the North high-priced manufactured goods.

That this evil alliance was never fully consummated and failed of its objective, even though it created many difficulties for the Union, was due in decisive part to the progressive social forces in Europe, in the first place to the British working class, which resolutely opposed every step of the Palmerston-Napoleon-Davis conspiracy.

In 1943, the American nation is again defending its existence, this time in direct warfare with world reaction represented by the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis, while the defeatists, prominently among them the Southern Bourbons, seek the same objective—the defeat of the "menace" of popular democracy. They must realize their alliance in relative secrecy, hoping to emerge openly as protagonists of the Axis if their awaited defeat of the United Nations should seem imminent.

Within the camp of defeatism, of which they are an integral part, the Southern Bourbons have a special role. By playing on sectional divisions, they weaken national unity. By holding fast to racial discrimination and prejudice, they not only weaken unity and civilian

^{*} Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Civil War in the United States.

morale, but prevent full mobilization of Negro manpower and womannower for industry and for the armed forces, undermine the prestige of the United States among the United Nations and the world's oppressed peoples, and weaken their support to the moral-political principle of the war. By retaining undemocratic practices in their own section of the country and by attempting to foist these practices on the nation as a whole, they block full participation of the people in the war. Further, because the polltaxers need not face their constituents at the polls, they can undertake for the camp of defeatism activities which most Northern Senators and Congressmen could not undertake with impunity.

The evil alliance between the Axis and the defeatists will fail as the progressive social forces represented by the United Nations guarantee that their superior military and economic power are being mobilized to deal the death-blow to German Nazism, the spearhead of world reaction, and in the course of the struggle broaden our own democracy.

But again it is necessary to warn against too facile analogies. In 1861, England, France, Russia and Spain, exhausted by petty wars, regarding each other with ill-concealed distrust, threatened by popular and revolutionary movements within, were unable to reach full agreement for concerted action in North America. Even the abortive project against the Mexico of Juarez, in support of Maximilian, failed because Britain and Spain withdrew

in fear of a double-cross by Louis Napoleon, and because of the magnificent struggle of the Mexican people.

Today, however, the forces of world reaction have achieved a more solid alliance, which is only now showing some incipient cracks resulting from the mighty Soviet blows against Hitler on the Eastern Front and from the Anglo-American triumphs in North Africa. The Axis nevertheless remains the most formidable coalition ever to challenge the democratic forces on a world scale, able to act in concert with tremendous resources, with modern super-techniques and a network of espionage and propaganda agents with connections in the rear of most of the United Nations.

It is the Southern Bourbons, with their main base in the poll-tax states, who constitute the balance of power in the 78th Congress and, together with the Copperhead defeatists of the Wheeler-Fish-Nye cabal, give the Axis a front within America which is subversive of our war effort. This fact is fully appreciated by the Northern defeatists who, speaking through the Chicago Tribune shortly after the November, 1942, elections, said:

"In the Senate there was always a stalwart group of Southern Democrats, including such men as Tydings, Byrd and George, who stood for free government under the Constitution.

"The record of recent Congresses will show that the Republican North has no monopoly of devotion to the principles of free government.

Much of the effective work in defense of our constitutional principles must be credited to the Southerners." (Chicago Tribune, Nov. 10, 1942).

Their tender solicitude for the Southern Bourbons makes perfectly clear why the Northern defeatists encouraged and permitted the shameless filibuster in the Senate last fall when the Pepper-Geyer anti-poll-tax bill was done to death, despite its passage by a large majority in the House. For it is largely due to the poll tax that Byrd, George, Rankin, Dies, Cox and their kind hold office.

These men do not represent majority opinion in the South, even among white Southerners. But neither did their ancestors in 1860 and '61 when, through terror and trickery, they dragged their states out of the Union. To Marx, far more than to any contemporary or subsequent writers, we are indebted for the factual demonstration of this truth.

In a quite detailed letter to Engels, dated July 5, 1861 (p. 228). Marx points out that "with the exception of South Carolina, there was everywhere the strongest opposition to secession." When a convention of border slave states was called, and the states were invited to hold conventions to elect their delegates, Tennessee refused hold such a convention, and was taken out of the Union only by a coup de main of the state legislature. Kentucky voted overwhelmingly against secession. North Carolina and Arkansas elected Union delegates, the former, Marx says, by a large majority. Virginia passed an ordinance of secession in secret, in fear of popular sentiment. In Alabama, Marx says, "The inhabitants neither voted on secession nor the new constitution. The Convention elected here passed the Ordinance of Secession with 61 against 39 votes. But the 39 of the Northern counties . . . represented more free men than the 61."

As for Louisiana, more Union votes than secession votes were cast in the election of delegates to the Convention; but the Union delegates deserted to the other side.

In Georgia, The Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel, the biggest paper in the State at the time, declared that "The Georgia Convention and the Confederate Congress have gone forward in their work, as none can deny, without authority from the people."

How were the 300,000 slaveholders able to thwart the will of the people? Marx gives an answer which also explains how the modern Bourbons have so long been able to maintain a stranglehold on state power in the Southern states:

"What it lacks in numbers, the slaveholders' party makes up in the means of power that many years' possession of all state offices, hereditary preoccupation with political intrigue and concentration of great wealth in a few hands have secured to it." (p. 74).

Marx's papers on the American Civil War, some of which first appeared in Dana's New York Tribune, reveal the real aims of the intrigue of the Southern Bourbons,

aims which the superficial treatment given the period by most American historians, Northern and Southern, almost completely concealed.

The oligarchy of the slave power, for instance, never felt their power safe under the Constitution of the Founding Fathers, and even though they appealed to the Constitution to justify their acts, their actual desires were revealed in the Montgomery Constitution which they hurriedly passed with little regard even for the appearance of democracy.

For the Bourbons, the Civil War was an effort to establish the domination of the handful of slaveholders, not only over their Negro slaves, but over the masses of Southern whites.

This was recognized by Christian Roselius, a Louisiana statesman, who said:

"The Montgomery Constitution is not a constitution but a conspiracy. It does not inaugurate a government of the people, but a detested and unrestricted oligarchy."

Marx pointed out that the slave power utilized the Congress of Montgomery "to revolutionize the internal constitutions of the slave states, to completely subjugate the section of the white population that had still maintained some independence under the protection and the democratic Constitution of the Union." (p. 79).

* * 4

One does not have to strain the analogy to make it fit the modern

Bourbons, with their noisy insistence on "white supremacy." Even though they level their attacks at the Negro people as "inferior" and "unfit" to associate with whites, their scorn for the white masses, whom they deprive of the ballot through poll taxes, is obvious. Consider for instance, the following excerpt from a letter written in the fall of 1942 by Gessner T. McCorvey, chairman of the State Executive Committee of the Democratic Party in Alabama, to the Democratic National Committee:

"... a great many of the thriftless, shiftless, worthless type of people, both colored and white, fail to pay their poll tax and, by reason thereof, we have a more intelligent electorate than exists in some states where all kinds of 'rabble' are permitted to vote without question." (Birmingham News, November 10, 1942).

McCorvey, Dixon, Wilkinson and company, are disturbed at the growing democratic demands of the Southern people, and it is against the whole Southern people that their conspiracy is developed.

as we have suggested earlier, not only against the Southern people. Marx long ago exploded myth that the slave-power simply wanted to be let alone. The Bourbons demanded "state's rights" which included not only the "right" of each of the slave states to secede. but their "right" to compel by force other states and territories, including the border states and the states of the Northwest, to join with them under the hegemony of the slave power. Spokesmen for the slave

power boasted openly, in speeches before the Montgomery Congress, of the great slave empire which one day would swallow completely the Union to the North and Latin America to the South. In the words of Marx, the slave power sought "not a dissolution of the Union, but a reorganization of it, a reorganization on the basis of slavery, under the recognized control of the slave-holding oligarchy." (p. 80).

The modern Bourbons are seeking, in alliance with the *Chicago Tribune* defeatists and the Copperheads of various shadings, to whittle away American democratic forms. An interesting technique to this end was recently proposed by Horace Wilkinson of Birmingham, one of the most rabid and outspoken of the white "supremacists":

"The next objective of the white people of America must be to throw the election of the President into the House of Representatives as the Constitution of the United States provides." (Birmingham News, January 1, 1943).

The Southern Bourbons patently do not want simply to be let alone, to pursue within their own bailiwicks their traditional policies of poll tax, discrimination against Negroes, lynching, and the throttling of labor's rights. In the name of "state's rights" they propose to deprive all of the 48 states of their basic and elementary rights, and to impose upon the 130,000,000 Americans these same institutions so long associated with the South of reaction.

For they know, as Marx and Lin-

coln knew, that the nation cannot exist half slave and half free, or, in the terms recently used by Vice-President Henry Wallace:

"This is a fight between a slave world and a free world . . . the world must make its decision for a complete victory one way or the other."

If this truth were as freely recognized by all of the democratic forces within our nation, there would be less of a tendency to temporize with the Southern Bourbons, less of an effort to placate and appease them, such as the failure vigorously to enforce Executive Order 8802, guaranteeing fair employment practice in defense industries, the hesitation to give whole-hearted support to the drive for Federal action for poll tax repeal, the refusal so far to prosecute the white "supremacists" for those treasonable acts of which they are guilty, and the shameful renewal of a lease of life to the anti-American Dies Committee. Appeasement policies still flourish in Washington, and Jim Crow survives in our armed forces. Communists, or even persons suspected of the "taint" of Communism, are hounded out of public office, persecuted in private employment, and segregated in the armed forces. As Earl Browder recently declared:

"Our national course is ambiguous. The President has charted a clear and correct policy; but it is challenged not only by Congress but also by members of his own cabinet and executive appointees. Instead of a showdown and clarification,

the nation drifts along with compromise and appeasement of irreconcilable policies."

But, as Browder further stated:

"There is a loud-mouthed cult in our country which is willing to admit every weakness and error so long as it can blame it on the President. These are the demagogues of reaction. But there are also too many honest democrats, progressives, and even labor men, who weaken the President's position by leaving all problems for him to settle, by failing to take energetic action themselves to help solve all these problems. This was the main factor which enabled the President's foes to gain strength in last November's elections, for the President's supporters sadly neglected campaign with the excuse that 'F.D.R. can take care of it.' Now they chide the President for conciliating his enemies, but they are themselves among the first conciliators. No one has any right to criticize the President who is not himself in the midst of the hottest and most uncompromising fight to halt the mob of reaction now controlling the majority of Congress and threatening the whole country and its war effort."*

* * *

Marx was moved to stormy indignation against all policies of appeasement during the Civil War when Lincoln vacillated and temporized with the slaveholders in the border states and the Copperheads in the North. Flowing from such appeasement policies were Lincoln's hesitation to emancipate the slaves, his slowness in organizing the Negroes into the Union army, and his retention of the treasonable and incompetent McClellan as head of the Union's armed forces. Marx wrote:

"Anxiety to keep 'loyal' slave-holders of the border states in good humor; fear of throwing them into the arms of secession; in a word, tender regard for the interests, prejudices and sensibilities of these ambiguous allies, has smitten the Union government with incurable weakness since the beginning of the war, driven it to half measures, forced it to dissemble away the principle of the war and to spare the foe's most vulnerable spot, the root of the evil—slavery itself." (pp. 81-82).

But even in the darkest days of the Union cause, Marx did not despair, because of his profound understanding of the character of the war. In a letter to Engels, dated August 7, 1862, he wrote:

"In my opinion all this will take another turn. In the end the North will make war seriously, adopt revolutionary methods and throw over the domination of the border slave statesmen." (pp. 252-253).

A year earlier he had written:

"Events themselves drive to the promulgation of the decisive slogan—emancipation of the slaves." (p. 82).

The confidence of Marx was justified. Lincoln at length issued the Emancipation Proclamation, removed McClellan, and moved against the Copperheads. In the same letter to Engels, Marx had

^{*} The Worker, February 14, 1943.

predicted the arming of the Negroes and declared, "A single Negro regiment would have a remarkable effect on Southern nerves." Lincoln eventually reached the same conclusion and the world today knows of the heroism of the 200,000 Negro volunteers in the Union army.

The realization of a clear-cut political position by the Lincoln Administration was naturally reflected in its military policies. Grant, Sherman and Hooker forged to the front and the "march to the sea" through Georgia, which Marx and Engels had cited in 1862 as the "key to Secessia" (p. 175) which would split the Confederacy, was at length undertaken in 1864.

While we criticize the vacillations of the Roosevelt Administration and oppose any tendency to appeasement of the Southern Bourbons, we are confident that the government today, backed by labor and the people, will yet have done with "dissembling away the principle of the war," and will eventually strike at "the foe's most vulnerabe spot, the root of the evil"—fascism and its race supremacy poison.

There is sufficient vitality in American democracy today for the full consolidation of the national front of all patriotic elements with labor as backbone, embracing the whole nation, excepting only the most reactionary of the bourgeoisie with their fellow conspirators from the ranks of reactionary semifeudalism, and the John L. Lewis-Norman Thomas types seeking to carry defeatism into labor's ranks.

Therefore, the win-the-war forces

should move with energy and determination, based on confidence of victory, for the full integration of the Negro people in the war effort, in industry, in civil life, in the armed forces. In this spirit, they should take up the demand for Federal action to repeal the poll tax,* to repeal the anti-Communist laws and to end the illegal persecution of Communists and those whom the Dieses and Rankins call "Communists." They should certainly strive, in accord with the decisions reached at Casablanca, for the clear-cut offensive military policy of the invasion of the European continent, striking at the Nazi metropolis as the modern parallel of the "key to Secessia."

We have guarantees today of the more rapid development of correct policies which American patriots of 1861-65 did not have—a numerically large and relatively well organized working class. Today, there are few to challenge the words of Georgi Dimitroff, that the workers are the bulwark of the nation, or those of General MacArthur that the "working class is the indestructible backbone of the nation."

But even in the American Civil War, the working class, still numerically small, gave a consistent and energetic support to the war. This is explained by Marx in a letter to President Lincoln, composed by Marx and signed by the Council of the International Workingmen's Association (First International):

^{*} In February, 1943, the Tennessee Legislature, with the overwhelming support of the people, repealed the poll tax.

"From the commencement of the titanic American strife the workingmen of Europe felt instinctively that the star-spangled banner carried the destiny of their class." (p. 279).

The working classes understood, the First International said,

"... even before the fanatic partisanship of the upper classes for the Confederate gentry had given its dismal warning, that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy crusade of property against labor, and that for the men of labor, with their hopes for the future, even their past conquests were at stake in that tremendous conflict..." (p. 280).

We have spoken of the British workers' success in preventing a British alliance with the slave power. But the contribution of the workers did not end there. Not only American but British and German workers fought in the Union armies, many of them achieving high rank. Prominent Communists were commissioned as officers by President Lincoln.

It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with labor's outstanding contribution to our national war effort. It is relevant, however, to stress again and again the urgent need for American labor to understand the deadly role of the South-

ern Bourbons, the white "supremacists." in subverting our war effort, and to combat them with vigor. Upon labor in the first place devolves the task of establishing an unbreakable unity between Negro and white, of meeting with vigilance and effective counteractions and above all with labor's unity of action, the moves of the defeatist camp with its spokesmen in Congress, and of solidly backing the government's war program and exerting influence on the Administration for the routing of this modern variation of the slave power.

Only then will our people and government, nationally united and in fighting coalition with our Allies, go forward to victory. And on victory in this war, as in the Civil War, rests the fate not only of our nation but of mankind.

It was with a similar logic that Lincoln understood the Union's destiny in 1865, as he revealed in his letter in answer to Marx, addressed to the First International:

"Nations do not exist for themselves alone, but to promote the welfare and happiness of mankind by benevolent intercourse and example. It is in this relation that the United States regard their cause in the present conflict with slavery-maintaining insurgents as the cause of human nature..." (p. 283).

THE BATTLE FOR A DEMOCRATIC WIN-THE-WAR TAX PROGRAM

BY JEAN FRANCIS

THE main objective of our economy in this war period is to maximize production of war materials while limiting production of civilian goods to the extent necessary to maintain the health, working efficiency and morale of the nation's workers. This is especially true as we approach the moment of Anglo-American offensive Europe. These goals can be realized only if the whole economy is administered on the basis of centralized control and over-all planning. Resources must be allocated between war production and civilian production, production must be scheduled, civilian rations must be established and prices fixed, all in accordance with a central overall program. With the limitation of production of consumers' goods, it becomes critically important that an effective and democratic rationing system be adopted to assure each civilian his share of the available supply. Effective price control is essential to stabilize the cost of living.

A sound wage policy must be observed in order to furnish each family with the income necessary to purchase their share of the necessities of life and in order to stimulate maximum production. The

President's budget message indicated that civilians can be supplied with an average of abut \$500 worth of goods and services during 1943—which means a minimum of \$2,000 for a family with two children. Obviously, if wages are below the level necessary to purchase this minimum share of necessities, adjustments must be made.

To stimulate production, workers should receive incentive pay and full overtime pay. The validity of these principles is recognized in the President's Executive Order of February 9 establishing for designated areas a minimum war-time work week of forty-eight hours with overtime pay after forty hours, and Economic Stabilization Director Byrnes' endorsement of wage incentives to increase production.

The problem of allocating and guaranteeing to the worker his equitable share of food, clothing and shelter can be solved basically only by a sound wage policy, by complete rationing of the available supply of essential commodities, accompanied by effective price control at all stages of the production and distribution process. These are the indispensable pillars of an effective war economy.

Role of Taxation and Fiscal Measures

Taxation or other fiscal measures cannot be a *substitute* for a centralized and planned war economy and for civilian rationing and price control. Taxation and other fiscal measures can, however, serve a secondary or supplemental objective of *supporting* the centralized war economy and direct price control and rationing, by controlling monetary forces that would otherwise disrupt and interfere with the rationing-price-control program.

Viewing fiscal policy in this light. it becomes immediately clear that a prime objective of such policy must be to permit all classes of the population to retain at least the amount of monetary spending power required to purchase their share of available consumers' goods, and no taxes should be imposed on this minimum amount of monetary spending power. There is also much to be said for permitting monetary spending power to a moderate degree in excess of the amount so needed-so that debts may be paid off and spendings permitted which are not competitive with production of war materials and which it is undesirable to choke off. For low income workers, especially, the possession of a moderate amount of liquid savings provides a margin of security which is necessary and is a great contributor to morale and efficiency-and therefore important for maximum war production.

Stating these objectives somewhat differently, it may be said that the first requirement of any program of taxes is that it shall provide adequate exemptions; that is, shall leave low income workers with enough spending power so that they can use their ration books and purchase their allocated quantity of necessaries in addition to a fair share of the commodities and services which are not rationed. The second requirement is that in drawing off excess spending power (if any) of the low income groups, major reliance should be put on voluntary savings rather than on taxes.

The burden of taxes should not fall on the millions whose standard of living is inadequate to suport productive efficiency. The burden should increase as the standard of living rises above the level required for productive efficiency.

For the higher incomes. say, above \$5,000, a policy of heavy taxation should be adopted. only is this in line with the progressive principle of taxing in accordance with ability to pay, but it is sound because recipients of large incomes, who are accustomed to a luxury standard of living, represent as a group the most likely source of efforts to undermine rationing controls in order to maintain their standards. Further, the diminution of discrepancies between low personal incomes and very high personal incomes is conducive to morale.

For the middle incomes, say between \$3,000 and \$5,000, additional taxation will also be necessary. But for these groups, in addition to whatever taxation may be necessary, supplementary provisions may have to be made to a certain extent for compulsory sayings.

A very substantial portion of the revenue needed should be raised from additional taxes on profits of corporations. The tax plank in the President's seven-point program offers the guiding principle:

"We must tax heavily and in that process keep personal and corporate profits at a reasonable rate, the word 'reasonable' being defined at a low level."

Until now, Congress has refused to tax ordinary corporate profits heavily and has failed to recapture effectively excess profits. The profound importance of excess-profits taxation to the war effort was vividly described by Secretary Morgenthau in his testimony on the 1942 revenue bill before the Senate Finance Commitee:

"There is no easier way to stir the righteous anger of the American people than to let them hear constantly of excessive wartime profits that are not being recovered by adequate taxation. . . An effective excess-profits tax does more than produce badly needed revenue in time of war. It also reassures the masses of our farmers and factory workers that industry is not being rewarded unduly for its part in the winning of the war."

This warning went unheeded and we find that profits of all corporations, after payment of taxes, will probably reach \$6,700,000,000 (according to estimates of the U. S. Department of Commerce). This is 63 per cent more than 1939 profits of \$4,200,000,000 and 22 per cent more than 1940 profits of \$5,500,000,000. It is only slightly lower than the

all-time 1941 high of \$7,200,000,000.

The failure of Congress to adopt the tax plank of the seven-point program results in vast accumulations for the wealthy stockholders while the incomes of the low paid groups are consumed by burdensome taxation and mounting living costs. National unity is thereby severely strained to the detriment of the war effort.

Clearly what is needed is heavy taxation on corporation profits to prevent war profiteering, while providing a reasonable incentive for business. Lest very high top rates leave little incentive for the maintenance of efficiency in business operation, it may be desirable in the interests of 'national unity to have an over-all maximum limitation so that taxes collected above such maximum (say 85 to 90 per cent of total profits) would be returnable after the war, providing it is spent in additional employment of labor or for new additional capital equipment.

In connection with the collection of individual income taxes, it is highly desirable to synchronize tax payments with the receipt of the income on which the tax is based. The defect in the present system arises in part because taxes on a given year's income are not payable until the following year and partly because installment payments are not timed to fit the receipt of income. The only satisfactory method of putting the millions of income tax payers on a "pay-as-you-go" basis is to deduct tax payments at the source from wages and salaries as they are earned and, if administratively practicable, out of interest and dividend checks.

To solve the problem of transition, the 1942 taxes could be payable in installments for several years. Cancellation, if any, of 1942 taxes should be limited to the low income brackets. The Ruml plan, which would cancel all 1942 taxes, would give the wealthy a bonanza that has no justification.

As for the amount of revenue to be raised, it is desirable to raise as much as possible from taxation consistent with the sound principles of a win-the-war tax policy. Revenue should not be the sole objective of tax policy. It will be found, however, that a win-the-war tax program which best fits the needs of production and the equitable distribution of available consumers' goods will also be satisfactory from the point of view of revenue.

The President's Budget Message

We turn now to the President's Budget Message, which calls for a war budget exceeding \$100,000,000,000,000 for the fiscal year 1944 (ending June 30, 1944) and recommends raising not less than \$16,000,000,000 additional revenue through "taxation, savings, or both." Under present legislation, \$35,000,000,000 will be raised during the fiscal year 1944, or 34 per cent of total estimated Federal expenditures; if the President's objective is adopted, approximately 50 per cent would be met by current receipts.

The President urged Congress to adhere to the following principles in working out the revenue program:

1. "Fiscal measures must be des-

ignated not only to provide revenue, but also to support the stabilization program as well by deterring luxury or non-essential spending."

- 2. "The cost of the war should be distributed in an equitable and fair manner."
- 3. Fiscal measures should "not impair but actually promote maximum war production."
- 4. Taxation should be simplified and put on a pay-as-you-go basis "as far as feasible."
- 5. "Fairness requires the closing of loopholes and the removal of inequities which still exist in our tax laws."

Finally, the President declared:

"I cannot ask the Congress to impose the necessarily heavy financial burdens on the lower and middle incomes unless the taxes on higher and very large incomes are made fully effective. At a time when wages and salaries are stabilized, the receipt of very large net incomes from any source constitutes a gross inequity undermining national unity."

Shortcomings in Budget Message

These principles of war financing laid down in the President's Message are sound, but, unfortunately, the failure to make specific tax proposals presents grave dangers, in view of the vicious tax-legislation record of the Congressional tax committees and the ominous character of the majority in the new Congress, headed by Vandenberg, Taft, Wheeler, and Dies. The coalition of the bipartisan defeatists and archreactionaries will utilize the absence

of specific recommendations in their efforts to saddle upon the people a soak-the-poor tax program. The Administration has not yet fully learned that on the domestic front, no less than on the military front abroad, defense and appeasement will not win.

The obstructionist cabal must be challenged, and the challenging can be done only by the President and all those in Congress and in the country, irrespective of party affiliation, for whom winning the war comes first. The labor movement especially has the job of turning on the heat and rallying the common man in the battle to forge the tax program into a powerful instrument for victory.

"Taxation to Halt Inflation"

The Budget Message reflects the tendency, dominant in the Treasury's approach, incorrectly to place emphasis upon taxation as the principal means of stabilizing the domestic economy and curbing "inflation." The financial and tax measures advocated by the Treasury are based on the conception that "inflation" is a monetary phenomenon. This conception is usually expressed in terms of an "inflationary gap" or excess of civilian spending power over available supplies and services at current prices. It is argued that prices are forced up due to this excess spending power and thus an inflationary situation is created. The obvious cure, for inflation, according to these proponents, is held to be the elimination of such excess spending power. This would be accomplished by income or expenditure taxation, compulsory saving, or by some scheme of rationing of spending power. (The most direct form of the latter would be the issue of a total spendings certificate or ration book to each individual.)

Rationing of Spending Power vs. Rationing of Commodities

Because the "inflationary gap" concept boils down logically to an advocacy for rationing spending power, the best way to analyze its defects is to contrast such rationing with direct rationing of specific scarce commodities. When generalized spending power is rationed, this is equivalent to a rationing of all commodities and services as a group by the point system with dollar value substituted for point value.

Rationing by the point system is effective when the individual commodities belong to a related group (as a group of canned fruits, or a clothing group, or a meat group). The group as a whole is rationed by rationing the total number of points for the group—without the necessity of rationing each of the specific components of the group. If the demand for one component of a group is too high then the demand for another component will fall. The more closely related the components of the group are, however, the less will be the shifts of proportionate demand among the components. When such shifts do occur the supply of one component may often be increased and another decreased since the components are often related in the nature of their production. Or the point values of components may be adjusted to relieve the situation. The effectiveness of such adjustments also depends on the degree of relatedness of the components.

However, when generalized spending power is rationed, a group of such diverse things as food, clothing, recreation, education, housing and transportation is being rationed as a group by the point system. Suppose that the effect of this generalized rationing is to cut down the demand for education and recreation, and to cause families to double up so as to save rental costs. It may turn out that the demand for food and clothing may increase. Relative to demand there will be unused supplies of educational, recreational and housing facilities with insufficient supplies of food and clothing. In one way or another the price of food and clothing will be forced up while the facilities in oversupply will go to waste. This illustrates the defect of generalized rationing of groups which are too large and diversified. The control is simply not sufficiently specific and detailed, and results exactly the opposite of what is intended may take place.

Generalized rationing assumes that commodities are abstract generalized things, or at best that they are easily interchangeable from the point of view of the resources required to produce them. Such interchangeability may be assumed only over a long period of time. In time of war, recreational facilities cannot be converted to food nor food to clothing as quickly as milk into cream, butter or cheese.

In wartime, if the supply of an

essential commodity is scarce, it cannot be successfully rationed by being included in a large total of commodities heterogeneous rationing the total. The commodity itself must be rationed either directly and specifically, or by being included in a group of related commodities which are rationed as a total by the point system. There are many commodities and especially services, for example, medium and high-priced housing, which need not be rationed at all. To ration these either directly or indirectly means to waste resources and to increase monetary demand for the scarce commodities.

Direct rationing of specific scarce commodities and of groups of related commodities will be necessary to achieve the distribution of such commodities as are required for the maintenance of the health, morale and efficiency of the working population. Two basic objections are made to direct rationing. The first tremendous bureaucracy the which, it is alleged, must be set up. The answer to this is that if the support and participation of labor and the people are enlisted in rationing administration, it can be made to function effectively at low cost and with a minimum of red tape. The second objection is that if all the emphasis is put on direct rationing and the related measures of price control, while no measures are taken to discourage excess spending on the part of those categories above the low-income groups, this will result in black markets and a general disruption of the rationing and price-control system.

There is some merit to this second objection. Clearly, fiscal measures which encourage savings and discourage luxury or non-essential spending by the middle and high-income groups are desirable. There can be no objection to such fiscal measures if they serve to support the system of direct rationing and direct price control and are not intended as a substitute for it.

The 1940-41-42 Revenue Acts

In determining upon the concrete proposals for a sound win-the-war tax program,* it is important to review the tax legislation adopted since the outbreak of war in 1939. The striking feature of revenue acts of 1940-41-42 is that they have saddled oppressive burdens on the low-income groups. Prior to 1940 the exemptions were \$1,000 for single persons and \$2,500 for married couples, plus \$400 for each dependent. These exemptions have been successively cut to the present figures of \$500, \$1,200, and \$350, respectively. Such low levels of exemption endanger the efficiency of production soldiers. Prior to 1940 the effective tax rate on the lowest taxable income bracket was 4 per cent—today it stands at 19 per cent. In addition, the 1942 Act added the so-called "Victory tax" of 5 per cent on all incomes over \$12 a week, thus increasing the rate in the lowest bracket to 24 per cent. This unjust tax was popularized by the demagogic use of the word "victory," sweetened with a postwar credit device, and by permitting a partial refund to the extent of certain savings.

Although the direct tax burden on the low-income groups was multiplied ten and twenty fold, all the prewar special privileges enjoyed by the wealthy were left untouched, providing avenues of escape from their fair share of the tax burden. Government securities remain tax-exempt (except for new Federal issues); the privilege of separate returns by husband and wife has been preserved, costing the Treasury hundreds of millions in lost revenue. Estates and gifts are still taxed at low rates, while exorbitant exemptions permit large amounts to escape all taxation.

The increases in the regular rates on corporate profits have been quite moderate. The 16 per cent rate applicable to 1939 profits of large corporations has been raised to 40 per cent on 1942 profits, although the Treasury requested a 55 per cent rate. The exorbitant depletion allowances granted oil and mining interests have not been eliminated. The excess-profits tax remains ineffective, since it permits corporations with low prewar profits a liberal earnings rate on invested capital, while the previously prosperous corporations pay only on the excess over their prewar average earnings.

Little wonder that the 1942 revenue act is considered by progressive organizations to be the most undemocratic piece of tax legislation in American history!

The lack of unity of labor, farmer and progressive organizations, the lack of mobilization of the people, and the retreat of the Administra-

^{*} See "A Wartime Tax Program for Victory," in the April, 1942, issue of The Communist.

tion in the face of the attacks of the reactionaries, made possible the adoption of such injurious taxation.

A Tax Program of Reactionaries and Defeatists

Not content with these successes, defeatists and profits-as-usual forces have begun a new drive for still heavier tax burdens for the low-income groups. The Brookings Institution, spokesman for Big Business, calls for a 10 per cent sales tax. Representative Disney of Oklahoma and America Firster Senator Taft are sponsoring such legislation. As was said by the Daily Worker:

"It is a curious coincidence that the most zealous supporters of a sales tax on the people's food and commodity supply are, at the same time, violent opponents of President Roosevelt's desire to tax the exempt billions of the upper brackets. They also denounce the President's desire to limit all incomes to \$25,000 a year. They also are in the van of the fight to curb or cripple all control of rising costs of living."

These same forces advocate increased "victory" tax rates, further lowering of exemptions—all in line with their soak-the-poor tax policy. Interestingly enough, these reactionary forces utilize the "inflationary gap" theory as a pretext for attacks on the meagre earnings of the low-income workers, arguing that the reduction of the purchasing power of the masses is necessary to halt inflation.*

The defeatists seek to sow disunity among the people by demagogically blaming the war for the heavy tax burdens which they themselves plot. It is part of their campaign to sabotage the seven-point stabilization program, aiming thus to disrupt the production front and national unity. The false theories and criminal plots of these forces must be exposed.

The C. I. O. Tax Program

To thwart the efforts of reactionary and defeatist forces to foist upon the nation a soak-the-poor tax policy, the C. I. O. has adopted a comprehensive tax program predicated upon the basic principle "that low-income groups must be left with sufficient funds to buy their share of available goods and meet their basic obligations. Whatever revenue the government needs must be obtained from other income groups and through increased corporate taxes, and the elimination of special privileges." The C. I. O. stressed the fundamental point that the health and productivity of the civilian population must be maintained, and called for a strict price control policy and the "immediate application of an over-all democratic system of rationing of all foods and other necessities."

The C. I. O. tax program included the following proposals:

1. Taxation of Low-Income Groups

It recommended the elimination of the misnamed "victory tax" which levies on all persons, whether married or single, a 5 per cent tax on gross earnings over \$12 a week.

^{*} The "inflationary gap" theory has played directly into the hands of those industrial and financial groups working for heavy sales taxation as an escape from an effective wartime tax program.

This tax places an oppressive burden on low-income workers.

It urged exempting from the individual income tax all single persons earning less than \$800 and married couples earning \$1,500, with an additional \$400 credit for each dependent. These exemptions are now \$500 and \$1,200 (plus \$350 for each dependent).

It declared its vigorous opposition to a sales tax or any other similar form of taxation.

2. Taxation of Higher Incomes

The C. I. O. called for increased rates on all individual incomes over \$3,000 a year, with rates getting increasingly sharper after \$5,000, with maximum net income to be limited to \$25,000 as urged by President Roosevelt.

It demanded the elimination of special privileges whereby the wealthy escape their fair share of the tax burden, calling for—

- (a) The abolition of the present practice of permitting husbands and wives to file separate tax returns;
- (b) The elimination of the taxexemption of the interest from state and local bonds;
- (c) The elimination of percentage depletion which allows oil and mining interests to make exorbitant deductions in computing their income taxes.

3. Taxation of Corporate Profits

Calling attention to the skyrocketing profits of Big Business, the C. I. O. urged a 55 per cent tax on corporate profits as proposed by the Treasury last year instead of the 40 per cent fixed by Congress.

It declared that for the duration no corporation should earn more than 5 per cent on its first \$10,000,-000 of invested capital and 4 per cent on all amounts above that figure. It recommended a 100 per cent excess-profits tax on profits above those levels, with proper allowance for small business concerns. It urged additional taxation on the increased earnings of those corporation whose earnings in peace times, although substantial, were less than 4 or 5 per cent of their invested capital, because of the tremendous size of their capital. In place of the flat 10 per cent postwar credit based on excess-profits which favors the wartime prosperous corporations, it recommended that postwar refunds be determined by the "real need for rehabilitation after the war."

4. Taxation of Estates and Gifts

The C. I. O. advocated a single system of graduated rates for taxation on estates and gifts "drastically increased over present levels and lowered exemptions." At present there is a \$60,000 exemption for estates and an additional exemption of \$30,000 for gifts, with tax rates shockingly low.

5. Social Security Taxes

It called for an expanded social security program with an equitable social security tax adjustment if additional funds were needed

6. Bona-Fide Pay-As-You-Go Tax Plan

The C. I. O. urged the adoption of a bonafide pay-as-you-go tax plan which would spread the liability throughout the year by deducting taxes from income as it is earned. (This has nothing in common with the proposals of certain defeatists who desire to limit war expenditures to revenue derived such from taxation and other sources.) It sharply opposed the Ruml plan on the grounds that it "has nothing to do with the true pay-as-you-go principles, but merely provides for a change of labels as to which year's tax is being paid and at the same time affords a special favor to those in the high-income brackets who would benefit from a cancellation of an entire year's taxes, particularly in a year in which their incomes happened to be excessively high."

C. I. O. Proposals Launch the Offensive

The C. I. O.'s tax proposals represent a win-the-war tax program, behind which all labor will be able to rally. On most of the main points the A. F. of L. is in essential agreement. The proposals provide a concrete basis for mobilizing labor's political strength around the vital issue of taxation. The rationing-price control-taxation program of the C. I. O. would make a reality of the goal set by President Roosevelt in his Budget Message:

"We must assure each citizen the necessities of life at prices, which he can pay."

The C. I. O.'s program hammers home the vital point that price control and rationing constitute the basic means for stabilizing the economy and halting inflation, and launches the offensive against those who urge cutting down the purchasing power of the low-income groups. This offensive is critically essential in view of the disastrous tax legislation adopted since 1939, and the threats of reactionary and defeatist forces to saddle still heavier burdens on the low-income workers.

The C. I. O. has brought forward the vital points for a win-the-war tax program. With the growing unity of labor and farmer organizations, it is to be hoped that these constructive proposals will be advanced. The projected coalition of the C. I. O., A. F. of L. Railroad Brotherhoods and National Farmers Union for united action on the legislative front could reverse the trend of reactionary tax legislation and give the nation a truly democratic win-the-war tax program.

The American people can be mobilized for a democratic tax program—as never before. Today taxation is a subject of daily discussion—the impact of the tax load is felt by every individual. The tax battle must be brought home to every American, for he has a vital stake in its outcome.

The American people, the united labor movement, together with the American farmer, must bend every effort to secure the adoption of a tax program which will maximize war production, hasten the mobilization of our resources, strengthen the unity of our people—and thus help realize with the least delay the vital decision of the Casablanca Conference for launching the second European front, and speed the day of final victory over the barbaric forces of fascism.

SOME LESSONS OF THE "FATEFUL DECADE"

BY JAMES S. ALLEN

THE State Department's White Paper, Peace and War, published recently as an introduction to a forthcoming collection of documents on foreign policy, is worth close study. Its publication at this time is in itself an act of importance.

Whatever inconsistencies are in the document, which records in round terms the American policy through the "fateful decade" of 1931-1941, the White Paper cannot be charged with failing to prove its main point—the criminal responsibility of Hitler Germany, fascist Italy and military-fascist Japan, for bringing on the war.

The aggressions of the Axis warmakers through the last decade are well known and need no review here. The document sets them all forth and proves in a convincing manner how a pattern for world domination was drawn up by the Axis powers, acting in concert. It is shown how, beginning with Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931, each act of aggression, especially after Hitler's coming to power, gathered momentum until it involved the whole world in war.

That this record should be presented officially by our Government at this time, when we are making the turn toward the offensive against Hitler Germany, is a significant reaffirmation of the intention of the Government and the people to fight until the destruction of the Nazi tyranny and the Axis. For the official record, as presented by our State Department, cannot fail to leave the impression that it is impossible for any freedom-loving people to come to terms with the Hitler criminals.

By its publication, our Government has again served notice on the appeasers and defeatists within the country that all their efforts to implement Hitler's renewed application for a negotiated peace are doomed to failure. The wily pleas of Goering and Goebbels to the "gentlemen" of the West, which arose in a wild chorus following the German catastrophe at Stalingrad, have found their response beforehand.

Official records, of course, do not produce victories. But insofar as they are a record of policy and a forewarning of intent, they serve to indicate the course of action. There is every realistic reason to believe, on the basis of the actual relations of forces in the war, taken together with announced policies,

that the deeds will be forthcoming which will speed the defeat of Hitler and the Axis, and make possible the "unconditional surrender" aim of Casablanca.

* * *

We wish to address ourselves mainly to another aspect of the White Paper, which has a vital bearing upon our role, together with the United Nations, in winning the war and establishing the peace. The State Department takes great pains to make clear that our Government, from the time of the first major aggressions, greatly disturbed by was threat to world peace and was fully aware of the Axis plan for world domination.

The document quotes numerous extracts from the reports of our ambassadors and representatives abroad, the main burden of which was to prove that war was inevitable.

As far back as June 26, 1933, George S. Messersmith, then U.S. Consul General in Berlin, warned the State Department of the real nature of the Nazi regime, which wanted to make Germany "the most capable instrument of war that there has ever existed." Among innumerable talks with Japanese representatives was one between Mr. Cordell Hull and the Ambassador from Tokio, on May 16, 1934, during which the Secretary of State made it plain that our Government viewed Japan's pressure upon China as an effort to estaboverlordship in the lish her Orient.

From Austria, where he had been transferred, Mr. Mesesrsmith continued to send sharp warnings, among them that it was Hitler's intent to take over the breadbasket of the Ukraine, and that absorption of Southeast Europe was his defi-(February, 1935). policy nite was substantiated a few This weeks later by the recorded opinion of William E. Dodd, our Am-"that no bassador to Germany. faith whatsoever could be placed in the Nazi regime and its promises, that what the Nazis were after was 'unlimited territorial expansion,' and that there was probably in existence a German-Japanese understanding, if not an alliance."

The document is replete with similarly accurate observations by our representatives abroad and spokesmen of the State Department. The record is not lacking, either, in extracts from the speeches of President Roosevelt and Mr. Hull warning of the threat to our national existence as a result of unchecked aggression throughout the world.

From the record drawn up by the State Department it is apparent that those charged with the responsibility of our foreign policy were well aware of the danger to world peace and to the country. But there is another part of the record, decisive for the whole decade, which is not even noted in the document. It barely misses mentioning the world-wide fight for collective security, and has not a word to say about the persistent Soviet efforts to obtain concerted action against aggression.

One cannot help but be amazed, now that they are itemized in consecutive order, at the persistency with which our Government at each new crisis addressed urgent appeals to preserve the peace to the leaders of the Axis powers. At least a dozen such appeals are recorded. But there does not appear a single notation in the whole document with respect to the repeated and ever more pointed appeals of the Soviet Government for the establishment of a collective against aggression.

Throughout the whole "fateful decade" the policy of the Soviet Government was directed consistently toward preserving peace by forging a system of collective security. Through the forum provided by the League of Nations, the Soviet Union spoke out clearly when Germany first violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, in 1934, when Italy invaded Ethiopia, when Germany violated the Locarno Pact, when Germany and Italy intervened in Spain, when Japan attacked China, when Germany seized Austria, when Hitler occupied the Sudetenland, and so on. At each new crisis, the Soviet Union not only warned of the Axis drive for world domination, but urged immediate concerted action against aggression and for collective security. It took steps of its own in a series of regional nonaggression pacts with bordering countries, and with France and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, it concentrated upon expanding its war industry and its armed forces,

for which the whole world must today be grateful.

In his speech before the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on March 10, 1939, Joseph Stalin exposed the anti-Soviet aims of the Munichite policy of England and France at that time, and warned that "the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them."*

It is evident that the danger of the situation was fully recognized by the Administration leaders, especially after Hitler's coming to power. Why, then, were not appropriate steps taken to check aggression by joining our efforts with those of the Soviet Union to establish a world front of the freedom-loving nations?

The document itself does not offer a satisfactory reply to this question. So effectively does the White Paper record the succession of criminal acts of aggression, our Government's awareness of their implications, and the repeated public warnings of our spokesmen, that the record of our policy is like a Greek tragedy marching majestically, fatefully and helplessly, to its preordained end.

Insofar as the State Department attempts, a reply, it places the burden for our failure upon the "isolationism" of the American people. It is not our purpose to refight the battle for the democratic front and

^{*} Joseph Stalin, Leninism: Selected Writings, International Publishers, p. 442.

collective security which grew with each crisis, from the Ethiopian war, through the Spanish War, the Sino-Japanese war and the Munich sell-out. But it is essential to understand why the fight for collective security failed, for such understanding is vital to the winning of the war.

If the main burden for the failure were placed, not upon the "isolationism" of the American people, but upon the isolationists and appeasers, we would be nearer the truth. No one can deny that the desire to prevent the outbreak of war. in which our country would inevitably be involved, was the main concern of the American people during the decade. This was expressed again and again by President Roosevelt and other spokesmen for the Administration. But this feeling was not synonymous with isolationism or pacificism, either in leading Administration circles or among the major sectors of the people. The key struggle revolved around the question of how to accomplish this end.

Starting with the election campaign of 1936, there was in effective, although unorganized, operation a democratic front of labor and all progressive and anti-fascist forces in the country. This broad front rallied to the support of the Roosevelt Administration, particularly to its program of progressive reforms at home and its endeavors to prevent aggression abroad. The threat of fascism, embodied at home in the Liberty League, in the activities of the Lindberghs, the Hearsts and the Hoovers, combined

with the menacing combination of aggressive fascist powers abroad, led to a progressive regrouping of all forces opposed to fascism. The re-election of Roosevelt in 1936, and the great popular support he enjoyed thereafter, can by no stretch of the imagination be attributed to the "isolationism" of the American people. If anything, it proves precisely the opposite: the wide backing accorded the President by the people was a rebuke to the isolationists and the appeasers, to the pro-fascists and the fifth columnists. The enthusiastic support evoked by President Roosevelt's famous "quarantine the aggressor" speech in 1937 showed the direction of popular pressure.

The dissatisfaction and uneasiness of the people arose from the fact that the Administration was not traveling fast enough toward a policy of effective collective security on a world scale, that it made too many concessions to the isolationists and the appeasers both in home and foreign policy, that it revealed too many contradictions in the realization of an anti-aggression policy, that there was too much of a gap between the word and the deed (e.g., between the "quarantine" speech of Roosevelt and "non-intervention" in Spain). The people's impatience arose from the fact that the national policy was not antiisolationist enough, that it did not more consistently unfold as a policy of collective security.

threat of fascism, embodied at home in the Liberty League, in the activities of the Lindberghs, the hearsts and the Hoovers, combined period to realize that the national

policy was lagging behind and not leading the nation. If greater and firmer pressure to strengthen and develop the Government's antiaggression policy, and to better relations with the Soviet Union, was not applied, this was due primarily to the lack of labor unity at home and abroad.

Recalling the experiences of the decade, we cannot fail to observe how well the policy of the Communist Party stands up in the light of events. It is the only party which proved correct, especially in its struggle for collective security and for cooperation with the Soviet Union, and in its persistent and untiring efforts to bring about the unity of all the anti-fascist forces. Its policy and its endeavors placed it in the forefront of all authentic patriots, concerned with the security and independence of the country.

From this, some of the most progressive elements in and out of the Administration even today fail to draw the proper conclusions. The fifth column and its dupes are still permitted to use the authority of our Congress with which to clothe the old weapon of anti-Communism in their efforts to split the nation and disrupt the United Nations. The extent of the blindness and prejudice which still exist in top Administration circles is shown by the actions directed against Communist patriots by the Attorney General and the measures taken against Communists and veterans of the Spanish War in the army, as well as by the conciliatory attitude toward the Dies Committee.

Why, then, the contradictions and vacillations of the Administration, under the pressure of the pro-fascist and appeasement forces? Why did not our Government press firmly for a policy of collective sanctions against Italy when Ethiopia was invaded? Why did it support the suicidal fakery of "non-intervention" in Spain? Why did it continue to permit the export of war materials to Japan? Why did it not intervene to prevent the Munich sellout by the appeasers then controlling the British and French Governments? Why did it not intervene in the spring and summer of 1939 to prevent these same forces from deceiving the world by their cynical pretension of negotiating with the Soviet Union for an anti-aggression front, when they had no serious intention of forming an anti-Hitler alliance?

The answer lies primarily in the existence at that time of the greatest gap of all, the gap between our nation and the Soviet Union, which our policy took no serious efforts to bridge. Among many other things, this is revealed by the way Mr. Hull presented the alternatives facing our country after the Munich sell-out. A month after the Munich agreement. which was directed against the Soviet Union and the weak nations of Europe, he made an address which the White Paper sums up as follows:

"If the nations continued along this road [increased reliance upon armed force—J.S.A.], he declared, they would be marching toward the final catastrophe of a new world war, 'the horror and destructiveness of which pass human imagination.' The other road, he said, was that of reliance on peaceful processes and the rule of law and order in personal and international relations, with the result that vast productive forces would be released for the advancement of mankind and the human mind enabled to turn once more to the arts of peace."

There was at that time too much of a disposition to attribute these vague generalities to the nature of Mr. Hull's character and training. In reality, aside from the personal element of style, these words were a truthful reflection of a policy which was retreating more and more before the concerted anti-Soviet campaign within the country and internationally. One need merely recall the venomous outpourings in connection with the Moscow trials to realize how well the appeasers had succeeded in poisoning the country. The height of the anti-Soviet folly was reached in the policy of the Administration during the period of the "phony" war and the Finnish War, which was provoked and prolonged by the Chamberlains and the whole crew of Munichites, as well as the Nazis.

* * *

The only purpose to be served by recalling these experiences now, when our nation is participating together with the Soviet Union and Britain in a war coalition against Hitler Germany, is to emphasize the lessons they provide for the purpose of reinforcing our war policy and strengthening the coalition.

Today we are in quite another

stage of the struggle against Hitlerism, a stage which demands the maximum coordination of fighting action of the whole coalition, in accordance with a single strategy for smashing Hitler this year. However, the Munichite and anti-Soviet forces whose pressures and influences led to the weakness and contradictions which marred national policy in the pre-war years continue to operate on a vast scale today. Under conditions of war they tend to restrain the development of the coalition and United Nations policy.

Above all, this influence is to be seen at work with respect to the central question of the war, the delay up to now in the realization of the full potentialities of the coalition with the Soviet Union through the opening of the Western Front in Europe. It was primarily the hesitation and vacillation in the State Department and in certain other Administration circles, as well as in other top circles of the win-the-war camp (for example, The New York Times), produced by defeatist and appeasement pressure, which prevented the opening of the Western Front last year. The same appeasement forces are now redoubling their pressure to prevent the invasion of Europe which is foreshadowed in the conference of Casablanca. They bring into play all the tricks of the anti-Soviet specialist in connection with the grand Soviet victory at Stalingrad and the swift pace of the Red Army's winter offensive. Through this renewed ideological warfare, the Munichites and defeatists seek to induce further hesitations and delays, with the

objective of preventing two-front war against Hitler Germany. Their efforts are doomed to failure, but the strength of their pressure must not be underestimated.

In a number of directions our national policy continues to exhibit harmful contradictions and inconsistencies, which plague the war effort and the unity of the United Nations. To see this, it is only necessary to mention the persistent efforts of the American authorities in North Africa to transform a "temporary military expediency" into a permanent policy of prolonging Vichydom. our disastrous policy with respect to Mikhailovich in Yugoslavia, Franco Spain, and Helsinki, the failure as yet to develop a correct coalition policy with China on the Pacific front. These and other serious weaknesses are an extension into our foreign policy of the situation at home, where a Martin Dies. supported by a conglomeration of defeatist and anti-labor forces in and out of Congress, can continue to pollute the air with his fifth-column poison.

* * *

One of the most important lessons we must draw from the record of the last decade is that the Roosevelt Administration, on many questions of domestic and foreign policy, has had to improvise a series of harmful compromises because of the pull and pressure of Munichite, anti-Soviet and reactionary forces. If this improvising on a number of important issues proved catastrophic in the past, it is primarily because

labor and the people were not sufficiently united to exert a firm influence upon national policy. The split in the trade union movement—a split which today has been narrowed considerably—was a prime factor accounting for the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the people's forces.

If today, while pursuing a main line leading toward greater coordination of the anti-Hitler coalition. our national policy still tends to stumble into dark alleys, one of the determining reasons is the inadequate role played within the national front by labor and the people's forces. As the new, the offensive stage of the struggle against Hitler Germany ripens and brings closer the fighting unity of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, on the European continent, all the pro-fascist and appeasement forces within the country desperately step up their efforts to stall the country.

In the field of foreign policy all kinds of inducements are presented to tempt us into accepting "expedient" arrangements with fascists fleeing a sinking ship. While sometimes such temporary deals may help to draw satellite countries away from the Axis and out of the war, they must not be permitted to separate us from our genuine anti-fascist allies, nor can they substitute for decisive military action against Hitler Germany and its allies. line vigorously presented by Goering-Goebbels, for an understanding with the West to save Europe from "Bolshevism," strikes a sympathetic chord among the "gentlemen" of appeasement, who immediately begin to fill the air with dire warnings and lamentations. Labor and the people dare not lose sight of the insidious power of this propaganda, its natural seepage into the vacillating and weaker sectors among certain upper circles in the rational front.

At the present juncture, the very outcome of the war and the shape of the peace are most directly dependent upon the degree of fighting unity which can be established between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. We are at one of those very decisive points in history where to leave the main course is to slip into the abyss.

If the White Paper serves no other function but to remind us of the great pitfalls of the last decade it will have proved its worth. If anything, the record contained therein must lead to the conclusion that the development of close bonds with the

Soviet Union is an imperative need for our country and must become a cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Another main lesson to be drawn from the decade is the much greater role which labor, the backbone of the people's forces, must play if we are to avoid failures like those of the past. All advanced sectors of labor, including the Communists, now face a great test. They must use their present position to strengthen all the people's forces, to hasten the common action and unity of all sectors of the labor movement. and to advance international labor unity.

In this fashion, and working in unison with all patriots, labor can make its gratest contributions to national unity, to speeding common fighting action of the whole anti-Hitler coalition, to strengthening the bonds of friendship with the Soviet Union, and to hastening a joint, anti-Hitler victory.

THE NAZI "PEACE" OFFENSIVE

BY HANS BERGER

ITLER delivered his last two speeches on September 30 and November 8, 1942. When we re-read these two speeches and compare them with the events that have taken place since then we can see even better why, on the tenth anniversary of Hitler's seizure of power, he preferred not to appear in person but let Goebbels read his proclamation and had Goering and Goebbels speak. In his speech of September 30 Hitler declared:

"For this year we have prepared for ourselves a very simple program. In the first place, under all circumstances, we must hold whatever must be held.... We must hold everything and must wait to see who tires soonest.

"In the second place, we must attack under all circumstances where attack is necessary....

"The occupation of Stalingrad, which will also be concluded, will become a gigantic success, and will deepen and strengthen the success. And you can be of the firm conviction that no human being shall ever push us away from that spot."

And in his speech of November 8, he declared in regard to Stalingrad:

"I wanted to take it. And—you know we are modest—we actually

have it. There are some very small spots left over.

"And we shall reach one aim after the other."

On October 3, at a time when not only Hitler but even many friends of the Soviet Union regarded Stalingrad's fate as sealed, Stalin wrote as follows in reply to the question of the representative of the Associated Press: "What remains of the Soviet capacity for resistance?":

"I think that the Soviet capacity of resisting the German brigands is in strength not less, if not greater, than the capacity of Fascist Germany or of any other aggressive power, to secure for itself world domination."

And in response to the felicitations of our President on the occasion of the Stalingrad victory Stalin replied:

"I express confidence that joint fighting operations by the armed forces of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the Soviet Union will, in the near future, lead to victory over our common enemy."

Stalin speaks with assurance of the possibility of victory in the very near future. However, he does not say that this victory will beachieved by the Soviet fighting forces alone, but that it can come as a result of the joint fighting operations of the Allies. And this calm, concrete estimate of the military relation of forces, by a man who has so brilliantly demonstrated that he estimates situations correctly, helps to guide the wave of optimism which has developed as a result of the mighty victories of the Red Army over the Nazis, in the right direction. Unquestionably, this direction can only be that of the speediest possible landing of British and American troops on the European continent, diverting from fifty to eighty Nazi divisions from the Eastern Front and creating the situation in which the crushing defeats of the Nazi armies on that front are transformed into the total defeat of the entire Nazi army and of the Nazis and Nazism in Germany and their entire barbaric "New Order." For, when Stalin speaks of victory in the near future, he does not mean only the ejection of the Nazis from the Soviet Union but complete victory over Nazi Germany and its vassals.

In his article on "The Second Front and the Winter of 1942-43," in *The Communist* for November, 1942, Eugene Dennis wrote regarding Hitler's September speech:

"One might have thought that the British, with our assistance, in the months between January and March, 1942, would have taken advantage of the catastrophic plight of the Nazi army on the Eastern Front by launching a powerful offensive in the West. Hitler at that time was in a desperate situation.

On the Eastern Front a demoralized and disorganized army which had suffered a frightful loss in men and matériel and which was hard beset by the attacking Red Army. . . .

"Just as a man who has been close to death is always referring to his terrifying experience, so in this last speech of his we find Hitler coming back to the winter of 1941-42. In his own words he paints us a picture which shows us just how near to 'cracking' Hitler Germany was:

"'. . . The year 1942 included many things. It was in my opinion the greatest, most fateful trial among the nations. It was the winter of 1941-42. I may say that the German people, and especially the army, was safeguarded by Providence during that winter.

"'Worse things cannot and will not come any more. That we have conquered that winter, "General Winter," that in the end the German front lines were finally maintained, and that we could attack again this spring, that is to say, in the early summer—that, I believe, is proof that Providence was satisfied with the German people.'

"These words of Hitler's show all his and the German people's dismay in the face of the facts; facts that show just how near to going to pieces the German army was last winter; facts that throw considerable light on Hitler's concern for the approaching winter....

"Had the British leaders and our own displayed the same initiative, the same daring, the same breadth of view as the political and military leaders of the Soviet people, then today, in all probability, Hitler Germany would already be vanquished. . . . For one who is really interested in fighting Hitlerism, Hitler's

September speech is one more argument for a Second Front, and for the opening of that front this year. . . ." (Italics mine.—H. B.)

The situation, now as then,

"... shows that an Anglo-American offensive now against Hitler in the West, together with a ... offensive... of the Red Army in the East, can speedily inflict a decisive defeat upon the Hitlerites, can rapidly destroy Hitlerism."

We have quoted from this article at some length, not only because it demonstrates the correctness of the Communist analysis but because what was written last November applies, to an incomparably higher degree, to the present situation. For, the things in the winter of 1942. which Hitler said could never be worse, have happened to Nazi Germany: The complete annihilation of the 6th Nazi Army at Stalingrad; the continuous and terrible blows which the Nazi armies are receiving on the Eastern Front and which have already cost the Nazis many times more, in men and matériel. than in the winter of 1941-42; Rommel's defeats in Libya; the occupation of North Africa by our troops; the great speed of the development of our army and our war production; and, last but not least, the growing disintegration and demoralization in the camp of the Nazis and their vassals.

All the recent speeches and statements by the Nazi leaders, their radio propaganda for foreign consumption and apparently also their feelers and diplomatic steps, which so far are still being kept secret, prove that they are beginning to understand quite well that they are doomed, and pretty soon at that, unless they succeed in breaking, or at least in weakening the alliance between England, ourselves and the Soviet Union, and prevent joint military action in the near future.

Just imagine if Roosevelt and Churchill had formulated their slogan of "Unconditional Surrender" let us say six months ago. What ridicule and mockery the Nazi leaders would have poured out in reply! Remember the supposedly humorous phrases of Hitler about the "stupidity" of the British and American generals about whom one could never know where they would begin their hopeless attempt to attack the "fortress of Europe"? Well, after Libya, after the increasing aerial bombardment of Germany above all, after the Nazi catastrophe at Stalingrad, and their defeats on other sectors of the Eastern Front. this ridicule has evaporated.

At a time when three days of mourning for the Nazi 6th Army are decreed throughout Germany, it is no longer possible even for a Goebbels to speak contemptuously of the Soviet might. Their reply to the defeats in Russia and to the Casablanca Conference, the results of which have undoubtedly caused the Nazi leaders the greatest anxiety, has therefore been a renewal of what one might call Hess politics. The Nazis again offer themselves to the British and us as a club, as gendarme, against the They try to convince the Union. British and us to forget everything

that has happened and to return to Munich. If we lose the war against Russia, Goebbels says, "what power on earth can save Europe from Bolshevism?" And, directing his remarks to specific addresses in England, he adds: "Perhaps even in London, there are a few clear-thinking men who could imagine what that would mean for Britain."

Marshal Goering, who of course knows very well how the pro-fascist British, French and American circles have been supporting and encouraging the blackest German reaction ever since 1918 as gendarmes against the Soviet Union. now tries to remind these same circles of this traditional watchdog's role of the most reactionary of Germany. imperialist circles Playing on the string that Nazi Germany has served as the "guarantee of Europe's destiny," he charges England with "treason to the whole Western world." Who is not reminded by these words of the phrases of the English, French and American pro-fascists about Hitler Germany's "salvation of Western civilization" at the time of his rough-riding into Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, etc.?

As can be seen from these few quotations, which could be multiplied many times and which are typical of all the propaganda directed abroad by the Nazis, these "supermen" are pleading with the "rotten Jewish democracies" not to allow them to be defeated in the East, or, to put it more concretely, not to do anything which might disrupt or nullify their desperate

counter-measures against the threatening catastrophe in the East.

* * *

The "supermen" of course have no hope, especially after the Casawinning blanca Conference, οf Roosevelt and Churchill in support of their plan to save fascism. But what they are aiming at is the mobilization of the most reactionary pro-fascist forces in America and England for the purpose of creating sufficient obstacles to delay the opening of the second front in Europe as long as possible. By means of their propaganda, they are trying to achieve at least a breathing spell. The Nazi leaders, of course, follow closely the activities and technique of the most reactionary forces in America and England.

In their dire need, it is clear that the Nazis are placing great hopes on the Dieses, the Wheelers, the Hamilton Fishes, the Hoovers, and their counterparts in England, and are probably drawing exaggerated and hasty conclusions from our entanglements with Darlanism in North Africa, as well as with Franco, Mannerheim, and Mikhailovich. But, in any case, they are doing everything in their power to place in the center of all discussions among the Allies the bogey of Bolshevism, in order to hamper our alliance with the Soviet Union and above all to keep the second front from being opened in the shortest possible time.

It would of course be foolish to say that this new campaign by the Nazis, in the spirit of Munich and Hess, has no chance to create

confusion and that it can therefore be ignored. For, even though it is an expression of the Nazis' fear, their weakness, their military defeats and their incipient internal disintegration, this type of campaign has hitherto always been the Nazis' most important method inside as well as outside Germany for winning the most reactionary circles and confusing the most backward There have been many masses. moments in the history of the Nazi movement when they were close to being destroyed but at the last moment were saved, either by the Rhenish-Westphalian large landowners and Junkers with Hindenburg (1932-33), the Chamberlains (Munich, 1938), or by the inadequate unity and the lack of decisiveness on the part of their opponents (as in the winter of 1941-42).

The Nazis have had the experience that, the closer they came to being destroyed, the stronger were the efforts of the forces friendly to the Nazis to save this bulwark of darkest reaction and to prevent its eradication. Hitler used to call this "intuition," but we of course know that this "intuition" has very substantial mundane, human names recruited from the most reactionary sections of Germany and other countries who fear nothing more than the disappearance of this bloody bulwark of reaction. Thus, for example, Hoover comes forward with proposals intimating that we should not strike decisive blows in 1943.

It is therefore not surprising that the clamor and howl of the Nazi

propaganda are finding a loud echo among the pro-fascist circles and cliques in our country. As always, they now again come promptly to the aid of the Nazis. If you listen to their speeches and read their press, you might get the impression that the Soviet victory at Stalingrad and the brilliant advance of the Soviet offensive constitute a "danger" to our nation. Every mile that the Red Army advances makes these pro-fascists the more pessimistic. And they do not refrain from describing this "danger." It is of course the same as that portrayed in endless variations by the propaganda of the Nazi leaders. It is the fairy tale about Stalin allegedly wanting to Bolshevize Germany and Europe. Thus, the defeatist New York Daily News, typical of the views of these circles, writes on February 6, 1943:

"One theory that is circulating around Washington is that the big U. S. Army is being planned primarily for peace conference purposes. That is to say, according to this theory, that if Russia is the main factor in the expected Allied victory, British and American delegates to the peace conference will be able to talk tougher to Russia with a big American Army in being than with a smaller one.

"If this is the real reason for our big-Army plans, it is understandable, and may be good peace conference insurance. Certainly Mr. Stalin understands the language of armed force and plenty of it better than he understands any other language."

The only thing which reconciles the Daily News and the circles that

think as it does to the idea of a large army is the hope that this army will be used "against Stalin" after the war. Now, of course, according to the defeatists and the cautious calculators, we do not have everything necessary for a Second Front, we do not have enough ships, enough manpower, we have difficulties on the home front; but in the opinion of the Daily News, all this would cease to play a role if the war could be transformed into a struggle against our ally, against the Soviet Union, instead of against Hitler. Not all the gentlemen (and ladies) of this stripe are so openly cynical and treasonable; many of them are more "subtle." But if anyone wants to know what they really mean, all one has to do is to study the Nazi propaganda in respect to the given situation and one will always find anew surprising parallels.

* * *

We spoke about the danger which the Nazi propaganda might hold also for circles that are for victory This danger is exin the war. emplified in certain editorials and articles in the New York Times (especially the editorial in the February 14 issue), which, seemingly alarmed by the very Soviet successes that are saving the existence of the United Nations, has turned to fantastic and divisive speculations of all sorts regarding victory because the war has turned in our favor thanks to the mighty deeds of the Red Army.

A lurid side-show of this anti-Sovietism, coupled with anti-British and anti-United Nations antics. has just taken place on the floor of Congress. It was a spectacle that, despite the leading lady's place with the win-the-war camp, might to all intents and purposes have been staged by the invisible hands of Goebbels' propaganda manipulators. The "globaloney" performance of Clare Booth Luce-her attacks upon "global thinking" (in other words global action) in this war; her shafts at "these all-out co-operationists"; her agitation for blotting out the freedom of the air to Britain, the Soviet Union, and all the nations of the world, while "keeping American wings all over the world"; and her leitmotif: "Neither the United States nor Britain can plan the peace until we know what goes on in the mind of Josef Stalin" ---delighted every fascist and near-fascist in and out of Congress. But her speech also proved to the hilt that all such preposterous speculations about our Soviet ally and its leader, Stalin, on the part of those who stand for victory, play into the hands of the traitorous camp, whose stock-intrade is Soviet baiting, inseparable from United Nations baiting, inseparable from defeatism and the "negotiated peace" formula leaving Nazism intact, inseparable from rapacious imperialism-akin to the Axis drive for world domination-against which the nationalliberation war of the United Nations is being waged.

An effective answer to all such dupes of Goebbels is contained in an impressive article in *Pravda* of February 10 by the well known

Soviet journalist David Zaslavsky. "The Red Army victories," says Zaslavsky, "frightened the German fascist masters of lies and slander. The Hitlerites are making a desperate effort to frighten other peoples with the victories of the Red Army. Inventing a terrible Soviet 'bogey,' they are displaying it to Europe and America.

"In a thievish manner they want to throw at the doorstep of the Soviet Union Hitler's shattered plan for the domination of Europe. This is not a new German trick. It never won success in the past and is clearly doomed to failure now that the people enslaved by the German invaders see that the Red Army and the armies of our Allies are bringing them liberation from the Hitler yoke.

"Like market swindlers the Hitler propagandists are dejectedly shuffling the old pack of soiled, marked cards. They realize that a sensible, honest man will not fall for the bait of the exposed and beaten swindlers. So they are fishing for simpletons or people who have no objection to being deceived. And they recently caught one.

"On January 31st the Washington Star published an article by its correspondent Constantine Brown, a very generous, magnanimous journalist. In a grand manner he presents us with almost the whole of Europe on a platter. This, for example, is what he writes: 'Bulgaria herself will seek the privilege of incorporation into the U.S.S.R. if the Russians, after the Nazi collapse, succeed in establishing a common frontier by the annexation

of Dobrudja. . . . Possibly the people of Yugoslavia may be induced to ask union with the great Slav power, Russia, thereby giving Russia an outlet to the Mediterranean."

"Constantine Brown ungrudgingly presented the Soviet Union with Czechoslovakia. Even Asia was not spared. 'Nobody in Washington would be surprised,' he says magnanimously, 'if Moscow insisted on extending its influence through Iran to the Persian Gulf. . . .'

"One cannot enumerate all the benevolent stupidities uttered by this garrulous American journalist. We can see one thing—a game is in progress on the market. The German swindlers handed out a marked card and Constantine Brown accepted it.

"The Hitler press eagerly seized at 'Brown's Plan.' At a press conference in Berlin the notorious Doctor Schmidt 'comments' in a very grave manner. The swindlers and clowns have found work. It is a crude job. Constantine Brown, with a touching expression on his face, presents us in the name of unnamed Americans . . . with Bessarabia. Perhaps in a fit of generosity he would present the United States with California or Alaska? there are even such remarkable people who are ready to present the Soviet Union with part of its own territory, as for example the Baltic Republics.

"These people feign ignorance of the fact that the union of these republics with the other republics of the Soviet Union is recorded in the basic law of our State Constitution of the U.S.S.R.; and that the Red Army is fighting for the honor, independence and integrity of our State.

"What can one expect of a Constantine Brown? But it is hardly befitting for the Washington Star to fall for the bait of the Berlin fishermen and share their unenviable laurels of buffoonery. Hitler's lies have feeble feet, and he who keeps in step with the fascists' propaganda falls together with it.

"The whole world heard and remembers the simple and clear words uttered by Stalin: 'We have not and cannot have any such war aims as the seizure of foreign territories and the subjugation of foreign peoples—whether it be peoples and territories of Europe or peoples and territories of Asia, including Iran. Our first aim is to liberate our territories and our peoples from the German fascist yoke. We have not and cannot have any such war aims as that of imposing our will and our regime upon the Slavonic or other enslaved nations of Europe who are expecting our help. aim is to help these nations in the struggle of liberation they are waging against Hitler's tyranny, and then to leave it to them quite freely to organize their life on their lands as they think fit. There must be no interference whatever in the internal affairs of other nations.'

"Here are words which resound through the world like a bell made of a clear, noble metal. How insignificant compared with this truth are the petty intrigues of the stupid Hitler politicians! Let them talk. They have no alternative in their position of beaten swindlers. But should someone unwittingly, or through unwise calculations, play into the hands of the shady company of fascist swindlers and use their marked cards, he will have no one but himself to blame for landing in the bad company of arrant swindlers and clowns."

The only effective answer to the Nazi "Hess" propaganda is, of course, the quickest possible launching of the invasion of Europe. And, as is becoming more and more evident, the Casablanca Conference not only raised the slogan of "Unconditional Surrender" but, above all, decided on those military measures which, in common action with our gallant Soviet ally, can bring this about in the shortest possible time. To help bring this about is the task of labor and all the people on the home front. We must check and defeat the defeatists. We must support and help implement the vital decisions of the Casablanca Conference. And, in the words of Earl Browder*:

"We must fight with complete good faith toward our allies, and with full confidence in them. We must strengthen the Anglo-Soviet-American Alliance in the fires of war so that it will be an indestructible instrument for an ordered peace. We must forge the United Nations as the guarantee of liberty and independence for all nations."

^{*} The Worker, February 14, 1943.

WHAT ABOUT YUGOSLAVIA?

BY ALBERT POPOVICH

Ι

THE great struggle of the Yugoslav people is one of the most fascinating chapters in the United Nations war of national liberation.

Beginning their resistance even before the Nazis actually invaded the country, the Yugoslav peoples have steadily enlarged the scope of their struggle, until today the People's Army of Liberation is engaging more Nazi divisions and has killed more fascist troops than has the whole military might of the United States one year after our entry into the war.

From scattered partisan bands, the Yugoslav forces of resistance have grown into a full-scale army which has armed itself with weapons torn out of the hands of the invaders, and by brilliant fighting has already won back as much as a third of the country from the Nazi and fascist occupation forces.

And now, to the miracle of their army of liberation, the peoples of Yugoslavia have added a government of national liberation, in the form of a Constituent Assembly, which will not only consolidate and reinforce their own heroic resistance but will strengthen the re-

sistance of the peoples of all Nazioccupied Europe.

Unquestionably, with this remarkable demonstration of their will for national survival, the Yugoslav peoples take their place among the great peoples of the world and serve as an inspiration and a model to all mankind in the fight for freedom and national independence. They are adding their own unique and glorious chapter to the great saga of humanity's struggle for liberty and progress.

Yugoslavia has come to occupy a particularly important position in the camp of the United Nations. This importance arises (1) from the fact that its struggle is an example to all other occupied countries of how to win their national liberation; (2) from its relation to the most decisive Eastern front, the magnificent struggle of the partisans constituting a major beginning of the armed resistance to the invaders on the part of the peoples of the occupied countries; (3) from its relation to Anglo-American military and political perspectives; and (4) from the fact that it has already emerged as an advanced arena of struggle between the people's forces striving

to wage a genuine war of national liberation and the forces that are trying to hamper and prevent resistance to the Axis.

people have Some tried fix the scope of this importance by comparing the role of Yugoslavia today with that of Spain in 1936. According to this view, the struggle in Yugoslavia foreshadows a new world war just as the struggle in Spain between the forces of democracy and fascism foreshadowed the present world war. The only merit in this comparison is the emphasis it gives to the far-reaching significance of the Yugoslav question in relation to the struggle of all the United Nations.

The situation inside Yugoslavia clearly presages a whole line of development affecting many of the occupied countries and the relations of the United Nations in the conduct of the war and in the solution of the problems of the peace. And just as a proper understanding of the significance of the Spanish struggle would have resulted in a far different picture today, so a correct policy with regard to Yugoslavia will save the United Nations from costly mistakes, the effects of which would not be postponed to the future but would make themselves felt now in our prospects of victory over the Axis.

 \mathbf{II}

The Yugoslav peoples began their national-liberation struggle against the Axis even before the change in the character of the war and the emergence of the United Nations. When the Cyetkovich-Prince

Paul Karageorgevich Government, which was openly collaborating with the Axis, went to Vienna on March 25, 1941, to sign Yugoslavia over to Hitler, the people repudiated this act of national treason by overthrowing the government. The Nazis answered this uprising, which occurred on March 27, the very day the traitor-ministers returned from Vienna to Belgrade, by invading Yugoslavia.

The uprising of March 27 suffered from the fact that the ruling cliques were able to retain control and prevent the full development of the people's liberation struggle. Frince Paul Karageorgevich, who was overthrown, was replaced by the child King Peter Karageorgevich, and Premier Cvetkovich was replaced by General Simovich, who differed very little from his predecessor. Later, in London, General Simovich himself declared that by taking power on March 27 "saved Yugoslavia from revolution."

Because this thought has proved to be the guiding principle of the Royal Yugoslav Government up to this day, it is important to record the deeds which it represents.

Hitler attacked Yugoslavia on April 6. General Simovich had become premier and minister of war, promising the Yugoslav people that he would "fight to the last drop of blood." On April 10, however, four days after the invasion began, this same Simovich issued an order, which he kept secret from the people and even from a part of the government, dissolving the Yugoslav army, and offering "peace" to the Nazis. This was done at a time

when the Yugoslav army still had 80 per cent of its effectives in the field and the enemy had only smashed across the frontiers of Yugoslavia, while the greater part of the country remained unoccupied.

In other words, the Royal Government and leading circles of the Yugoslav bourgeoisie were not concerned about saving the country from the invaders. Their main concern, in the words of General Simovich, was how to save Yugoslavia from revolution, that is, from the people. Instead of being placed on trial for betraying the national liberation struggle against fascism, the Royal Yugoslav Government with Simovich at its head was hailed in London as a "heroic, martyred government."

Despite these hidden aspects of the uprising of the Yugoslav peoples on March 27, 1941, it was justly acclaimed by the world as a great and decisive action which brought honor to the Yugoslav peoples for their unlimited courage and their undying will to fight for national liberation from fascist domination. And the glorious fight waged by the peoples of Yugoslavia during the past year and a half under the most difficult conditions has fully justified this judgment.

This fight against the fascist invaders was launched by the people from the very first day that Hitler announced the occupation of Yugoslavia. It was waged under the leadership of the working class and its Communist vanguard which had played an important part in rallying the masses for the overthrow of the Cyetkovich traitor

government and which, when the country was invaded, called upon the people to rise to its defense and support the new government in resistance to the invaders. Hundreds and thousands of people, especially the youth, took to the woods and mountains and, forming themselves into Partisan units, hungry and unarmed, struck at the enemy, seizing his weapons and equipping themselves for greater battles.

The magnificent resistance of the Red Army on the Eastern Front heartened the peoples of Yugoslavia and enabled them to intensify and extend the armed struggle against the fascist invaders. The great achievements of the Red Army multiplied the widespread sympathy of the working people of Yugoslavia for the Soviet Union. They understood full well that the fight against the fascist barbarians, no matter where waged, was part of the same indivisible war.

This was a mass people's movement right from the beginning; but in its first brief phase it was unconnected and in the main unorganized. In the middle of August, 1941, inspired by the great struggles of the Soviet people and the All-Slav Conference in Moscow, a National Partisan Conference was held in Bosnia which organized a central leadership of the armed forces of the People's United Front for the liberation of Yugoslavia from Hitler.

As the fight against the Germans, Italians, Hungarians and the domestic traitors developed, the ranks of the Partisans grew. Simultaneously, the national unity of all nationalities and political and religious

groups of Yugoslavia came into being. In the course of the struggle many talented commanders of units, brigades and brigade corps developed. As the Supreme Commander of the Partisan army of Yugoslavia, the Partisans selected Tito, the tested fighter and leader of the Yugoslav workers and peasants.

The armed group which refused to unite with the mass people's movement for national liberation was the group of Colonel Drazha Mikhailovich. Aiming to unite all the national forces for the struggle against the occupationists, the national leadership of the Partisan movement, shortly after it was organized, approached Mikhailovich with the proposal for joint action in the common fight. Up to October, 1941, Mikhailovich rejected every proposal for military action, insisting that any such action was premature.

By October 21, 1941, however, the Supreme Command of the Partisan army of Yugoslavia, which had held a number of conferences with Mikhailovich, was able to secure an agreement with his staff, pledging both sides to help each other loyally, even though Mikhailovich's units did not take part in any military operations and rejected proposals of a political and military nature highly important for the further development of the struggle against the Axis invader.

The day after this agreement was signed, however, the Chetniks of Mikhailovich (who was already secretly collaborating with Hitler's puppet Serbian ruler Nedich), suddenly and treacherously attacked the

Partisan positions, paving the way for a strong German offensive against the liberated territory of Yugoslavia at the end of 1941. Since the Partisans were the stronger, the treacherous Chetnik units of Mikhailovich were smashed and even the German offensive was halted.

It was not until late in the spring of 1942, when Mikhailovich had established closer ties with the occupation troops of the enemy, that he succeeded in achieving a measure of revenge against the Partisans. Some time in June, 1942, with the aid of the Italian fascists and the mercenaries of the Quisling Nedich, Mikhailovich undertook an offensive against the eastern regions of Bosnia and against Montenegro. The fascist Mikhailovich occupationists and succeeded in pushing the Partisans out of parts of these regions. As a reward for his actions, the Italians gave Mikhailovich a "free hand" in Montenegro, Two Chetnik officers, Niko Novakovich and Dobroslav Jevdjevich, were also assigned to the Italian staff as permanent political representatives of military and Mikhailovich.

This treachery of Drazha Mikhailtrue patriots ovich forced all Serbian his remaining in still chauvinist organization of Chetniks to join the Partisans. Today, even Mikhailovich's supporters acknowledge that his forces do not number more than about 20,000, while such publications as the New York Times, Time magazine and the Christian Science Monitor admit that the People's Liberation and Partisan Army numbers over 300,000 fighters. It is

worth noting that the number of Chetniks said to be led by Drazha Mikhailovich is the same as the number of Nedich's army. It is very probable that these Mikhailovich Chetniks are none other than those at the disposal of the official Quisling in Belgrade, General Nedich. The same press which for the past year and a half has been building up the Mikhailovich legend is now beginning to admit that Mikhailovich's Chetniks are dwindling in number, while the forces of the Partisans are constantly growing. Thus, in an article in the New York Times of December 22, Harold Callender declares: "The active Partisans are far more numerous than General Mikhailovich's followers, partly because this group takes a less cautious line, partly because some of General Mikhailovich's men have gone over to the Partisans."

Despite the fact that only the Partisans have been resisting the invaders, certain London circles have attributed every victory over the invaders in Yugoslavia during the past year and a half to Drazha Mikhailovich, These circles were joined later by the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, well as bv the American appeasers and the press under their control.

Despite the fact that Mikhailovich was exposed as a traitor many months ago, the press generally attempted to hide the whole thing and even accused the Daily Worker of fomenting a conspiracy against the alleged leaders of Yugoslav resistance to the Axis. Yet the quickening process of Mikhailovich's collab-

oration with the fascist occupation troops and the rapidly widening rift between him and the United Nations has made the position of the "Mikhailovich" circles in London untenable.

The roots \mathbf{of} Mikhailovich's treachery were already revealed in General Simovich's secret offer of peace to the Nazis back in April, 1941. His chief concern was not to fight the invaders, but to prevent the development of the people's movement, that is, in Simovich's words, "Save Yugoslavia from revolution"-and assure the victory of greater Serb chauvinism. All talk about "technical military" considerations for postponing the struggle until a more favorable time (an argument later linked up by Mikhailovich apologists with the claim he was waiting for the Second Front to open) is not only ridiculous on the face of it, but automatically proves that these people also lied when they attributed all the glorious victories of the Partisans on the field of battle to Mikhailovich!

Because the Partisan units actually waged war against the invaders, they grew to the point where, by the end of November, 1942, they could be reorganized into an actual army. Until then, the largest military formation in the Partisan movement had been a brigade. Now, with the transformation of the Partisan movement into an organized army, regular regiments and divisions were formed. Those who are everlastingly finding all the difficulties in the way of immediate and continuous armed resistance to the Axis are given a living answer

by the heroic and self-sacrificing people of "little" Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav Front, which is engaging some thirty Axis divisions, represents a serious step in the development of the war against Hitler in Europe. The Partisans Western themselves have understood the significance of the struggle to the war as a whole and they expect that the United States and England will do everything in their power to sustain and strengthen and extend their struggle by opening a full-fledged European front that will crush Hitler between mighty blows from east to west. The heroic battles of the Partisans have been no small contribution to the Anglo-American forces fighting in North Africa.

Yugoslavia is the closest point of contact with the heart of Axis Europe. The great fight of the Yugoslav peoples acquires added significance because of this important strategic position of Yugoslavia and of the entire Balkan peninsula in the coming European front. In the perspective of the African offensive of the American and British armies, in the perspective of an invasion of Europe, the significance of Yugoslavia can be enormous, especially since almost all of the coast of the Adriatic Sea is under the control of the People's Council elected by the Constituent Assembly and of the Supreme Command of the People's Liberation Army. Recognition of these forces and fighters for national liberation is imperative for victory over Hitler.

III

Despite the precious contributions

which the people of Yugoslavia are making to the common cause of the United Nations, despite the fact that the Mikhailovich legend has been shattered and remains only to be buried, certain Allied circles are still guilty of injustices against Yugoslavia, its Constituent Assembly and its People's Liberation Army.

Actually, the only Allied power which so far has given its moral support to the Yugoslav people's struggle for national liberation without hesitation or delay is the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the fact that powerful circles in England regard the Yugoslav Government in London and its War Minister Mikhailovich as their special protege. It is true that in establishing this fact in his previously quoted article in the New York Times of December 22, Harold Callender erroneously tries to present the Yugoslav picture as essentially a struggle between Moscow and London: but he is substantially correct when he declares that "General Mikhailovich has the backing of the British Foreign Office"; and we might add, of the British General Staff. It should be obvious that this situation cannot continue without weakening the struggle against the Axis.

The stand taken by the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, especially in reaffirming its faith in Mikhailovich despite the irrefutable evidence that he is cooperating closely with the Axis, cannot be regarded as an accident. It is difficult to believe that this government

would tie its fate to Mikhailovich if it did not have the support of strong appeasement forces in London. An alarming thing is that Mikhailovich maintains his ties with London only through the British officers who are attached to his staff. It must be said that those elements in the Yugoslav Government in London, as well as those British circles who are more afraid of what the people will do once they are liberated from Hitler than they are concerned about how to destroy Hitler in the shortest possible time. have chosen a very poor "champion" the Mikhailoviches with the Nazi put it recently:

"The process of amalgamation of the Mikhailoviches with the Nazi regime is so rapid that the farce is already played out and even our most reactionary newspapers have to begin to break the news gently. And I venture to predict that in the very near future not only will the Mikhailovich myth completely disappear but, along with it, the present Yugoslav Government-in-exile. Already a real national front and peoples' government has appeared in Yugoslavia itself." (The Worker, December 27, 1942).

Only ten days after this prediction by Browder, the cabinet of Slobodan Yovanovich, which had just finished blessing Mikhailovich while condemning the Constituent Assembly in Bihach, fell apart with such a crash that for a whole week after that a "new" cabinet could not be patched together. And the new cabinet that was finally set up differs from its predecessor only by the fact that it has freed itself of all

those members of the previous Cabinet who had any progressive democratic inclinations. The present Cabinet is distinguished by its unmitigated reactionary character.

How far the ties with Mikhailovich can lead is indicated by the frequent trips to London made by undisputed Nazi agents from the puppet Nedich command in Belgrade such as Princess Olga Karageorgevich, Dr. Sekulich and others.

It is gratifying to know that the American government is fully aware of the treachery of Mikhailovich and the untenability of the Mikhailovich myth. This has been reflected in the appearance of part of the truth about the forces and the struggle in Yugoslavia even in American newspapers that are far from friendly to the national liberation movements. There is no doubt that London and Washington do not see eye to eye on this question, although there are still plenty of people here who cling to the Mikhailovich myth long after it has died. This difference, by stimulating a more realistic investigation of the situation, may prove fruitful in helping England and the United States really to adopt a correct policy toward Yugoslavia.

On the other hand, responsible quarters in the United States have not drawn all the correct conclusions from their knowledge of the situation. It is high time that our government made public its knowledge about Mikhailovich's treachery, and if it is still in doubt about all the facts, it should hasten to accept the invitation of the Yugoslav Constituent Assembly to send

representatives to Yugoslavia to come and see for themselves.

Furthermore, our government still tolerates the presence in Washington of Konstantin Fotich as the Ambassador of Yugoslavia. Fotich, who is a half-brother of the Quisling Nedich, a brother of one of Nedich's chief advisers, and the warmest supporter of Mikhailovich in America, is the representative of the worst anti-people's forces of the Yugoslav Government-in-exile. He is the direct source of inspiration behind the greater Serb chauvinist movement among Serb-Americans. whose chief activity has been to create a pogrom atmosphere against Croatian-Americans, and generally to conduct disruptive activities of a pro-Axis character.

At the same time there are circles in America that dream of "Americanizing" the Balkans and look upon Yugoslavia as a future sphere of American influence, to be established at any price. It should be obvious that such notions and practices, no matter from what source they emanate, can only estrange the peoples of Yugoslavia from the United States. America has been very popular among the Yugoslav peoples. They are anxious to maintain close and friendly relations with our country. The recent Constituent Assembly that met at Bihach sent greetings to President Roosevelt, and the Congress of Yugoslav women, held shortly after the Constituent Assembly, sent greetings to Mrs. Roosevelt. The cause of victory and the interests of the United Nations require the fullest recognition and support of the Yugoslav People's Army of Liberation and its Constituent Assembly.

IV

The establishment of the Constituent Assembly on November 26-27, 1942, in the newly liberated town of Bihach was an historic event of deep significance, not only for Yugoslavia, but for all of the United Nations, It constitutes in effect a which. provisional government together with the Supreme Command of the 300,000-strong People's Liberation Army and Partisan Units represents a genuine power and stronghold of the United Nations inside Yugoslavia. It was made possible only because of the heroic fight of the Yugoslav peoples for the past year and a half in which they not only built up an impressive armed power but succeeded in liberating over a third of their country from fascist domination. The Bihach Constituent Assembly was attended by 53 delegates from all of the regions and nationalities of Yugoslavia and represent all antifascist parties and groups.

In a sense, the establishment of the Bihach Assembly constitutes the first practical application of the Atlantic Charter on territory liberated from the fascist occupationists. And because this is the first case of its kind, Bihach stands out today on the horizon of occupied Europe as a beacon and guidepost to the peoples of all lands and nations and as a symbol of the establishment of freedom in the liberated territories. The Bihach Assembly once more confirms the fact

that this is a people's war of national liberation and that the fruits of victory, therefore, belong to the people and all the patriotic forces of the nation. The Bihach Assembly shows the strength, the willingness to sacrifice and the fighting spirit which are present in the enslaved peoples of Europe, once they are inspired by a real people's leadership in the fight for freedom.

The Bihach Constituent Assembly was the natural outgrowth of a process which had been going on for a year and a half, during which time the Partisans established organs of civil authority in every liberated village, town, region and province in the form of local People's National Liberation Committees. These committees were elected by the people themselves, who established them in place of the defeated occupationist authorities and the old Yugoslav state apparatus which in most instances served the occupationists. In face of the need for a civil authority which would serve the cause of the liberation struggle, the Partisans had included the establishment of a national assembly as one of its proposals to Mikhailovich, which he rejected.

In describing the character of the Constituent Assembly in its issue of December 14, 1942, *Time* magazine provided an effective answer to all those enemies of the people's struggle who are anxious to misrepresent the true nature of the Assembly. "This provisional government," *Time* declared, "represented anti-Axis forces from all over the country and controlled an army estimat-

ed to be 200,000 to 300,000 strong. Neither the army nor the government is 'Communist' or 'bandit,' though some of the leaders, particularly in the army, are Communists. The National Liberation movement is mainly peasant in character, and includes many members of the Serbo-Croat Democratic Party and other peasant organizations, Croat, Serb and Slovene." The Constituent Assemby, Time magazine points out, was "prepared politically by adopting democratic methods almost unprecedented in the Balkans."

The chairman of the Executive Committee of ten set up by the Constituent Assembly is Ivan Ribar, a well-known Croatian lawyer and a prominent figure in the Independent Democratic Party. Ribar's father was the first President of the National Constituent Assembly which organized the new Yugoslav state in 1918.

Constituent Assembly is formed on the basis of a broad antifascist people's liberation front, representing all the old political parties which were devoted to the cause of national freedom and independence. The following parties, which were in existence prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, are participating actively in the Executive Committee of the People's Veche or Assembly: The Independent Democratic Party, the Serbian Agrarian Party, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and the Croatian Peasant Party. Two of the old political parties are not participating in the national assembly. These are the Slovenian Clerical Party and the Serbian Radical Party, both of which up to the end of

1942 had a number of ministers in the Royal Yugoslav Government in London. The leaders of these two parties were in power in Yugoslavia for many years, but they lost all mass support. Thus, in Slovenia, where the Clericals had a monopoly of political life, they have been replaced by a Slovenian Liberation Front (Osvobodilna Fronta) which was established as a result of the successful struggles of the Slovenian Partisans. This new movement includes 90 per cent of the Slovenian people at the present time. and the Osvobodilna Fronta is participating actively in the Executive Committee of the Constituent Assembly in Bihach.

The Bihach Assembly was a powerful blow to the apologists of Mikhailovich's treacherous ities. The declaration adopted by the Assembly, as well as its greetings to Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin, have become known to the entire world. Speaking of Mikhailovich, this declaration stated: "The Minister of War of the Yugoslav Government, Drazha Milhailovich, must be placed in the dock together with the occupationists, together with Pavelich, Nedich, Pechanac and Ljotich, for the crimes which the Ustashi and the Chetniks are committing against the Serbs, Croats, Christians and Mohammedans in Yugoslavia."

To enable the world to judge for itself, the Executive Committee of the Constituent Assembly and the Supreme Command of the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia issued an invitation over its shortwave radio station Free Yugoslavia on December 21, 1942, requesting "a

delegation of representatives of the Allied countries to visit the liberated regions of Yugoslavia, so that the delegates themselves could see that the news of so-called Mikhailovich victories is false and so that they could convince themselves of Mikhailovich's treachery."

Clearly, the events in Yugoslavia are of world-wide significance. The People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia is carrying on a heroic struggle against Hitler and the Axis. Their fight is in the interests of the United States, England and all the United Nations, and constitutes a powerful contribution to the ultimate and speedy destruction of Hitlerism. This army and its military and civilian commands deserve not only the praise but also all possible moral and material aid on our part, on the part of the American people as well as the American Government. It is gratifying to record the growing recognition of this awareness among important Yugoslav and other circles in the United States. It does not deserve the treatment it has been receiving in London and Washington for the past year and a half, and the sooner this injustice is halted, the sooner will the peoples of Yugoslavia as well as the peoples of Europe find even greater strength and enthusiasm in their struggle against Hitler and the Axis.

It cannot be overemphasized that the labor and people's movements of our country can and must play an energetic role in helping our government to crystallize and adopt a correct policy toward the developments inside Yugoslavia. The Constituent Assembly and the heroic deeds of the Liberation Army merit the widest popularization and support among the trade unions, the people's organizations and the legislative halls of our country. To stimulate and encourage this is one of the historic and immediate responsibilities of everyone devoted to a complete and crushing victory over Hitler by the United Nations in 1943.

IRELAND'S WAY FORWARD

(Resolution adopted by the Communist Party of Ireland Conference, held in Belfast, on October 24 and 25, 1942.)

The Fascist Menace to Ireland

- THIS conference of the Communist Party of Ireland declares that the defense of the rights and liberties of all Irishmen, the development of better understanding between all sections of the people, North and South, are issues of the greatest urgency in face of the dangers now threatening the nation.
- 2. Inspired by the ideals of freedom which have actuated past generations of Irishmen, and basing itself on the immediate daily interests and needs of the entire country, this conference declares that the future happiness and liberty of all Ireland are bound up with the momentous struggle of the nations of the world for the defeat of the fascist peril which aims at the enslavement of all humanity.
- 3. Progressive Ireland today recognizes in the destruction of freedom in Europe a grave menace to its own liberties and to its hopes for the future. Ireland can never be free while the peoples of Europe are in chains.
- 4. German fascism, the enemy of the peoples of Europe, is Ireland's

- main enemy. With its pro-fascist allies among sections of the rich and powerful in Britain and Ireland and all countries, it constitutes the greatest threat to the attainment of Irish unity and progress.
- 5. Ireland's true allies today are the common people of Britain, America, the Soviet Union, China and the enslaved peoples of Europe. Their victory will burst asunder the shackles that bind the peoples, and will destroy fascism and its supporters all over the world.

Anglo-Irish Relations

6. Nothing must be left undone that would win the cooperation of the whole of the people of Ireland in this struggle. This conference, therefore, welcomes the improving trading relations between Britain and Ireland, and calls upon the British Government to open negotiations for a Trade Treaty with the Irish Government. This would be an important step in winning the people's support for the anti-fascist cause.

Policy of the Andrews Government

7. In this struggle so vital to its interests Ireland has not achieved

any degree of unity. The greatest responsibility for this situation lies with the Andrews Government at Stormont. It pursues a policy that fosters and maintains disunity and does irreparable harm to the war effort of the United Nations.

8. Mr. Andrews' refusal to include Labor representatives in his Government illustrates the complete irresponsibility of the Unionist Party leadership. While the Stormont Government remains a sectarian administration. upholding Imperialist ideas which are fast becoming obsolete, it will be difficult to enlist the support of the people in the struggle against the fascist enemy. A representative Government at Stormont could offer a constructive policy to the people of Ireland, and win their cooperation in facing the urgent tasks of today. It could restrict the irresponsible statements of Northern representatives at Westminister, and encourage the improving trade relations between Britain and Eire. It could win the confidence of the workers in the North and end a situation in which workers and management are in constant friction. The Communist Party, therefore, raises ever more sharply the demand that representatives of the Labor movement be immediately included in the Stormont Government.

Northern Labor

9. On the Labor movement in the North lies the responsibility for effecting these changes. By uniting its forces, casting aside its purely oppositional policy, and coming forward with constructive proposals, it

can organize a great campaign for the resolute prosecution of the war and for a United Government, Support for the Labor movement is growing and would undoubtedly be increased by its demanding a share in the responsibility of government. A strong united movement, embracing all Labor and progressive elements, can achieve the fullest possible mobilization of the people. It can win extreme Republicanism away from its suicidal policy of terrorism, which defeats the cause it professes to advance. It can also win the thousands of Southern workers now engaged in the war industries of the North.

Issues in the South

10. This war has affected the whole of Ireland. In the neutral Twenty-six Counties difficulties of the greatest magnitude face the people, and an economic crisis unparalleled in recent history has developed. Despite wholesale emigration there is still severe unemployment and, although there has been a sharp rise in the cost of living, wage increases have been drastically restricted. The policy of the Government has tended to place the main burden on the shoulders of the working class, and its failure to anticipate and plan has aggravated the crisis.

11. In the South, as in the North, the situation now demands the creation of an all-party Government in order that the widest support and the best talents may be mobilized to meet the crisis and to defend the country against the menace of a fascist attack. The Labor Party,

now growing in strength, must place this demand in the forefront of its immediate policy. Its willingness to accept responsibility will increase its influence and place it in a stronger position to fight for the demands of the people and the removal of anti-working class legislation. The De Valera Government must be forced by the Labor movement to form a National Government.

Unity of Irish Labor

12. The Irish Labor movement as a whole faces its greatest test. The people of Ireland are today turning away from their old allegiances and seeking a new path forward. Correct leadership in this situation, together with a drive for the unity of the whole Irish movement, can win the people to the banner of Labor and bring about the unity which would smash the advance of fascism.

Immediate Demands

13. Taking its stand for the defense of the country and for progress, this conference calls upon the people to redouble their efforts in all spheres of production. More ships, tanks, planes, guns and all materials vital to the war and the resistance to aggression! To increase the production of food, not an acre of ground must be wasted. Farm workers' wages. North and South. must be immediately raised. Adequate prices for produce must be guaranteed by the Government. and more agricultural machinery made available to farmers.

14. Measures must be taken to

ensure greater efficiency in industry, the fullest possible cooperation between managements and workers by the establishment of Production and Workshop Committees, and the immediate speeding up of negotiating machinery as a means of limiting industrial disputes. In this situation strikes must be avoided at all They benefit only the enemies of the working class and weaken the anti-fascist forces. The utmost vigilance must be exercised by the workers to ensure that the existing labor laws are not violated by the employers to the detriment of the workers. Drastic remedies must be forthcoming against the restrictive policies of vested interests. Every man and woman must be found employment in work of national importance.

15. Existing inequalities hamper the unity of the people and weaken their morale. Increased oldage pensions, unemployment assistance, and other measures in defense of the people's interests must be demanded, together with greater equality of sacrifice. A more equitable distribution of food, by the extension of rationing and price control, is needed. Facilities must be provided to increase the number of women in industry, and equal pay for equal work must be conceded.

16. All these measures, and the immediate raising of pay and allowances to the men and women in the armed forces, will encourage the workers to strengthen the Defense Forces and the Civil Defense organizations, which must be radically improved to safeguard the people against attack.

Soviet Inspiration

17. The example of the Soviet Union should inspire the defense of Ireland. The Soviet people have, by their heroic defense, aroused intense admiration and interest among all sections of the Irish people. This feeling must be developed into bonds of closest friendship, and every calumny of the Clerical-Fascist press must be refuted.

18. The unity of the Soviet people has enabled them, practically alone, to withstand the concentrated attack of fascist enslaved Europe. By strengthening the ties of friendship with the Soviet State, and by associating vigorously with the demand for a Second Front in Europe and the final defeat of fascism, the Irish people will be inspired to create a similar unity in their own country.

Communist Fight for Unity

19. The growing strength of the Communist Party is an important weapon in the fight for unity and against fascism. Its great campaign is winning increasing support amongst all sections of the people, but a heavy responsibility rests on every member and supporter to fight for its policy in the mass organizations of the workers. The role of the Communist Party has today become more important than ever with the spread of Branches

and Groups to all important towns. Constant attention to Party work in all its spheres should be the sacred duty of all Communists, for on the shoulders of the Party membership lies the tremendous task of winning Ireland for the anti-fascist cause. The Communist Party particularly appeals to the youth of Ireland and it will organize and fight for their just rights.

20. The advance of the aims of the working class and Labor movement is severely handicapped by the lack of its paper, the *Irish Workers' Weekly*, and this conference calls upon the British Government to issue the necessary permit to enable publication. It calls upon all organizations to press this demand.

Conference Pledge

21. This conference pledges its members to the fight. It takes its stand confidently with the forces of freedom in the true tradition of the Irish struggle for liberation. The victory of the democratic forces will be a victory for progress, and for the friendship and unity of the peoples of the world. It will give a tremendous impetus to the achievement of a United, Independent Ireland.

For the unity of the working class and the people of Ireland!

For Production for Victory!
For the defeat of Fascism and the forward march of all peoples!

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