

# SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

*Volume II*

1945-1980

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**USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES**  
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# SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY 1917-1980

*in two volumes*

*FOURTH, REVISED AND ENLARGED, EDITION*

*Under the editorship of*

*A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev*



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# SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

*Volume II*

1945-1980

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## CHAPTER XIV

### THE OVERALL POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE SOVIET UNION'S INTERNATIONAL STANDING WHEN WORLD WAR II ENDED

The Second World War wrought fundamental changes in the international situation, in the world balance of strength. From the moment nazi Germany and its allies attacked the USSR, the war became primarily a struggle of imperialism's most aggressive assault forces to crush and subjugate the world's first socialist state, the Soviet Union. For the USSR it was a struggle in defence not only of its own national interests and the freedom and independence of its people and of the peoples of many other countries but, above all, of the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the socialist system created on the basis of these gains; it was a struggle against the most bellicose imperialist forces that were out to wipe out socialism. It was a test of the solidity of the socialist state and of socialism as a social system, a test by fire, iron, and blood imposed upon the USSR by the most reactionary elements of world imperialism.

The Soviet Union passed this test with flying colours. The nazi aggressors were smashed chiefly through the Soviet military effort. The end of the war saw the Soviet Union stronger than ever politically and morally, with the most powerful armed forces in the world, and an unprecedentedly enhanced international prestige. The imperialist camp as a whole found itself significantly weakened.

"The victory over fascism demonstrated that no forces exist in the world that could reverse the powerful current of revolutionary changes started by the Great October Socialist Revolution. The defeat of nazi Germany, mainstay of imperialism, in many ways predetermined the world's postwar development. This victory was the starting point of the new powerful upswing of revolution that led to capitalism's fall in many countries of the West and the East. It paved the way for dramatic changes in world politics, economics, ideology, and the thinking of millions of people.

"Since the war we have seen the birth of the socialist world system, the growth of the international working-class and communist movement, the spread of national liberation revolutions, and an active struggle of the peoples for peace, against the threat of a world thermonuclear war."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 144 (in Russian).

## Consolidation of the Soviet Union's Might and International Standing

Lenin wrote that war is a test of all the economic and organisational capability of a nation. The experience of the Civil War and the debacle of the foreign intervention at the dawn of the Soviet state's existence led him to the conclusion that the imperialists were incapable of crushing the Soviet socialist state by means of war: "No matter what attempts are made to invade Russia and no matter what military moves are made against us—and in all probability many more will be made—all these attempts will go up in smoke as we know from our actual experience, which has steeled us. After every such attempt by our enemies, we shall emerge stronger than ever."<sup>2</sup> These words were borne out eloquently by the outcome of the Second World War.

The Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War, which was the hardest-fought war in history, gave the world further convincing testimony of socialism's strength. The Soviet economic potential, the unbreakable moral and political cohesion of the Soviet people, their unity round their Communist Party and government, the close-knit fraternal friendship among all the nations of the Soviet Union, the military skill of the Soviet Army's leadership and discipline and courage of its men, and the patriotism and selflessness of the Soviet people behind the firing lines and on territory held by the nazis—all this stemmed from the socialist system. The world was amazed as it saw what could be accomplished in the face of danger by a country where all the wealth and power are in the hands of the people, by a country where exploitation of man by man has been abolished.

In the war the Soviet people were rallied and organised by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which committed all its strength, vast experience, and energy to the task of smashing the nazi aggressors. Five million people joined the CPSU during the war. Three million Soviet Communists laid down their lives on the battlefield. The Party's close bond with the people was strengthened more than ever in the crucible of the sacred struggle for the country's freedom and independence, for the destiny of socialism.

Victory in the Great Patriotic War was enormously facilitated by Soviet foreign policy, which, as events showed, was realistic. Its flexibility, Soviet diplomacy's ability to use the capitalist world's internal contradictions in the interests of peace and mankind's progress, and the active part played by the USSR in forming the broad wartime anti-Hitlerite coalition were major factors clearing the way to victory over the common enemy and to the settlement of some international problems linked to the end of the war.

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, Speech to Chairmen of Executive Committees, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 329.

The victory allowed establishing just and secure frontiers of the Soviet Union in the west and the east. The Soviet Union's encirclement by capitalist states, which had lasted for more than a quarter of a century, was brought to an end. There could be no question of the imperialists renewing their attempts to isolate the Soviet Union geographically by means of the notorious *cordon sanitaire* consisting of hostile countries, of satellites subserviently taking their orders from the principal imperialist powers. The People's Democracies formed in some Eastern, Central, and Southern European countries by the will of their peoples firmly took the road of alliance and friendship with the USSR.

By defeating the imperialist aggressors the Soviet people and their valiant armed forces safeguarded their own country's freedom and independence and, in addition, discharged the historic mission of delivering many other peoples from bondage to the fascists.

Had it not been for the Soviet Union's overriding contribution, thanks to which World War II ended in the defeat of the nazi coalition and then of its Far Eastern ally, Japanese militarism, the peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, Denmark, and Norway, as well as of many Asian countries, would have remained under foreign rule for a long time to come.

In Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Italy, whose rulers sold out national interests by accepting the role of vassals of nazi Germany, the Soviet Union's victory allowed the people to wage a successful struggle for the restoration of national independence and freedom. With the defeat of the German fascist forces in Europe Finland withdrew from the war. The Soviet Army enabled Austria to regain its state independence, which Hitler had destroyed seven years earlier. The Soviet victory brought liberation from the nazi dictatorship to the German people as well.

In the Far East the defeat of Japanese militarism and the liberation of Manchuria and North Korea by the Soviet Army in cooperation with the armed forces of the Mongolian People's Republic and with the assistance of the People's Liberation Army of China spelled out inestimable aid for the liberative revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people and also the peoples of Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma, and other countries occupied by the Japanese militarists.

The Soviet Union thus played a pre-eminent part in delivering many peoples from nazi slavery. This enormously enhanced its prestige and international standing. Throughout the world people spoke with admiration, affection, and respect of the great socialist power, of its courageous people, and its heroic armed forces.

Maurice Thorez, true son of the French people and leader of the French Communist Party, articulated the thoughts and feelings of millions of Frenchmen when he said: "The incontestable force of the

socialist system permitted the Soviet Union to play the determining role in the destruction of Hitlerite fascism and thereby save Europe from barbarous enslavement. This explains why alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union were cherished more than ever by the people of France and were more desirable than ever in the eyes of all Frenchmen fighting in defence of their country's independence."<sup>3</sup>

Wilhelm Pieck, veteran of the German working-class movement and President of the first state of German workers and peasants, the German Democratic Republic, assessed the significance of the Soviet victory to the German people with the words: "It would be no exaggeration to say that the German people owe to the Soviet Union ... not only their liberation from the bloodthirsty fascist regime—and, on one-third of German territory, from the reactionary forces of German imperialism,—but also the preservation of their national existence."<sup>4</sup>

The significance of the Soviet victory to the liberation struggle of peoples, including the peoples of China and other Asian countries, was underscored time and again by the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China. In a message of congratulation on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet Army, the Chinese leaders wrote that during the Second World War the Soviet Army "destroyed the main forces of the aggressive armies of German and Japanese fascism and thereby upheld the independence of all nations and saved human civilisation".<sup>5</sup>

Tributes of gratitude and respect to the Soviet people in connection with their victory over the aggressors were paid even by statesmen with little sympathy for the Soviet social system.

The following, for instance, are words spoken by General Charles de Gaulle, then President of the Provisional Government of the French Republic (subsequently President of France), on December 21, 1944 at a sitting of the Provisional Consultative Assembly in Paris: "By inflicting irreparable losses on the German military machine, the Russian effort was the essential condition for the liberation of our metropolitan territory... The enormous effort of millions upon millions of Soviet men and women in the common struggle on the field of battle and on the labour front behind the firing lines, the incredible sacrifices that they made, and the abilities displayed by those who led them ... moved our people so profoundly in their distress of yesterday and in their enthusiasm of today that they raised to the highest level the age-old affection that we Frenchmen have

<sup>3</sup> *L'Humanité*, November 9, 1957.

<sup>4</sup> Wilhelm Pieck, *Reden und Aufsätze*, Vol. III, *Auswahl aus den Jahren 1950-1953*, Berlin, 1954, p. 103 (in German).

<sup>5</sup> *Pravda*, February 23, 1958.

always had for the Russian people.”<sup>6</sup>

On Soviet Army Day in February 1945 the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill wrote in a message of congratulations: “The Red Army celebrates its twenty-seventh anniversary amid triumphs which have won the unstinted applause of their allies and have sealed the doom of German militarism. Future generations will acknowledge their debt to the Red Army as unreservedly as do we who have lived to witness these proud achievements.”<sup>7</sup>

I. Bonomi, head of the Italian government, wrote in his message of congratulations on the occasion of the victory over Nazi Germany: “In this hour of great victory Italy salutes the peoples of the Soviet Republics, who have shed rivers of blood to destroy the menace of fascism and nazism in the world.”<sup>8</sup>

Karl Renner, who headed the Provisional Government of Austria (and afterwards became Austria’s first President), declared in a public speech on August 19, 1945: “Generations to come will recall with gratitude that the accursed Nazi regime was destroyed as a result of the heroic exploits of the Red Army, of the selfless readiness of the Soviet soldiers for sacrifice... All mankind is indebted to them. And we, the people of this country, have special reasons for recalling these deeds with gratitude. To us these deeds and this sacrifice not only brought freedom from the chains of slavery, but enabled us to restore our own state and the rights of our people.”<sup>9</sup>

An indication of the Soviet Union’s growing international prestige was the expansion of its international relations: prior to the Great Patriotic War it had diplomatic relations with 26 countries, but by the time the war ended it had such relations with 52 states.

The tremendous growth of Soviet influence on international affairs was one of the most arresting political results of the Second World War. During the war the Soviet Union was in a position to contribute decisively to the settlement of major political issues in the interests of laying the foundations for lasting peace and international cooperation. On its initiative the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences passed crucial decisions on the settlement of many postwar problems.

The Soviet people’s victory in the Great Patriotic War created the conditions for socialism’s further consolidation on an international scale. It ushered in new epoch-making developments that unfolded on the world scene after the war.

When the war ended the Soviet Union had to tackle difficult

<sup>6</sup> *Journal Officiel de la République Française*, No. 85, December 22, 1944, p. 595.

<sup>7</sup> *The Times*, February 24, 1945.

<sup>8</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War. Documents and Other Materials*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1947, p. 543 (in Russian).

<sup>9</sup> *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 5, May 1955, p. 57.

foreign policy tasks under complicated conditions. Its economy had been seriously impaired by the war, and more than 20 million of its citizens had died in battle or fallen victim to nazi atrocities. At the other pole, the US economy, which was unaffected by the hostilities, expanded on war profits.

The task was, despite the complex postwar situation, to safeguard and consolidate the fruits of victory over fascism, to ensure the country's security under the new conditions. This task was fulfilled successfully during the early postwar years.

Relying on the advantages of the socialist system and the strong economy built up during the years of socialist construction, the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, accomplished another heroic feat: with unprecedented speed and without any external aid whatever they restored the war-ravaged segments of the economy. The imperialists miscalculated when they believed that the USSR would be economically weak for a long time. As early as 1948 the Soviet Union reached its prewar industrial output level and created the conditions for continued peaceful economic advancement far in excess of the prewar scale.

As a result, its international standing and prestige rose higher, and a more favourable climate took shape for a further powerful assault by the revolutionary forces on the imperialist positions.

### **Some European and Asian Nations Break Away from the Capitalist System and Become People's Democracies**

"The defeat of German fascism and Japanese militarism in the Second World War, in which the Soviet Union played the decisive part, created favourable conditions for the overthrow of capitalist and landlord rule by the peoples in a number of European and Asian countries."<sup>10</sup> A revolutionary situation developed in vast areas of the world. In most of the capitalist countries affected by the war the accompanying horrors and the atrocities committed by the invaders evoked the people's hatred for fascism of every stripe and shade, for its patrons, accomplices, and agents. The Resistance in the many countries occupied by the nazis or the Japanese militarists or turned by them into vassals united millions of decent people for the fight for democracy and independence. The Communists showed that they were the staunchest patriots and the most dedicated champions of the freedom of the people. The prestige of the communist parties was steadily enhanced and consolidated in the course of the anti-fascist struggle.

<sup>10</sup> *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 464.



When the aggressors were crushed and driven out of the territories held by them, democratic national governments were formed in most of the liberated countries on the basis of the Resistance with the broad participation of representatives of different anti-fascist parties and groups, including the Communists. More often than not, the Communists played the leading role. In keeping with the will of the revolutionary-minded peoples, these governments began removing traitors and collaborators from public life and instituting court proceedings against them, and embarked upon far-reaching political and social reforms. This was to be observed in most European states: Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Developments followed a similar course in France, Italy, Greece, and Belgium. In Yugoslavia, for instance, a National Liberation Army was formed under the leadership of the Communist Party, and this was followed by the setting up of an Anti-Fascist Veche (National Assembly) and then of a National Committee of Liberation, which was vested with all the powers of a people's government.

There was a revolutionary upsurge in countries liberated from the nazis by the Red Army and in countries entered by the US and British forces at the close of the war. Suffice it to note that at the 1945 and 1946 elections in France the Communists polled more than five million votes and became the most powerful political party in the nation, while the Italian Communist Party came forward after the war as the principal force in the Italian working-class movement, winning 20 per cent of the electorate. In France and Italy, and also in Belgium, Norway, and Denmark Communists were appointed to a number of ministerial posts and contributed much to the postwar restoration of the economy and the normalisation of life. Communist participation in the governments brought the working people significant social gains. In France and Italy the communist parties helped to draft the postwar constitutions. It was on account of this influence by the Communists that important democratic principles were enshrined in the new constitutions.

However, in Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and some other countries in Western and Southern Europe occupied by US and British troops, the ruling circles of the USA and Britain dealt the revolutionary forces heavy blows and prevented the development of democratic transformations.

In Greece British troops, helped by rabidly reactionary local elements and aided and abetted by the USA, turned their guns against the democratic, anti-fascist forces of the Greek people, i. e., against those who had borne the brunt of the struggle against the nazi invaders in Greece itself and in fact drove them out of their country. In France, Italy, Belgium, and other West European countries the US ruling circles acted without ceremony, bringing political and economic pressure to bear in order to set postwar political development on a

course suiting them best, suppress progressives, and, above all, remove the Communists from the governments. In its subversion against democracy in Western Europe US imperialism joined forces with the most reactionary groups of the local bourgeoisie, with former lackeys of the nazis, right-wing social-democratic leaders, and the Catholic clergy. By the spring of 1947 these concerted efforts of the enemies of democracy had led to the ousting of Communists from the governments of West European countries and to a major shift towards political reaction.

Developments followed a different pattern in Southeastern and Central European states that were liberated from the nazi invaders by the Red Army jointly with the Resistance forces, the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia, Polish and Czechoslovak military units, and (in 1944-1945) Bulgarian and Romanian armies.

The collapse of the nazi war machine paved the way for the national liberation struggle in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, and East Germany and for the evolution of that struggle first into people's democratic and then socialist revolutions. The Soviet Union upheld the national interests, sovereignty, and independence of these countries. It safeguarded them against attacks by international reaction, cutting short all the attempts of the US and British imperialists to interfere in their internal affairs and restore the capitalists and landowners to power. People's democratic governments were formed in these countries as the direct continuation of their peoples' patriotic struggle against the fascist tyrants during the war. Enjoying the support of the bulk of the population, these new regimes put fundamental democratic reforms into effect. The agrarian reform gave land to the peasants and led to the abolition of the landowner class. The property of German and Italian imperialists and of all traitors who had collaborated with the enemy during the years of fascist occupation was confiscated. Industry, banks, and transport were nationalised. These steps struck at the root of the positions of the exploiting classes.

Thus, in the liberated countries a "new form of political organisation of society, *people's democracy*, a variety of the dictatorship of the proletariat, emerged. It reflected the distinctive development of socialist revolution at a time when imperialism had been weakened and the balance of forces had tilted in favour of socialism. It also reflected the distinctive historical and national features of the various countries".<sup>11</sup>

The People's Democracies of Korea and Vietnam were formed in approximately the same way. In these countries, too, the emergence of the people's democratic system was the direct continuation of the liberation struggle against foreign invaders and the local feudal and

<sup>11</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 464.

bourgeois elite that had collaborated with them. However, to prevent the democratic development of Korea and Vietnam, foreign imperialists interfered in their internal affairs and unleashed long and exhausting wars against them.

The defeat of Japan's Kwantung Army by Soviet forces was one of the cardinal factors that led to the successes of the Chinese People's Liberation Army and the subsequent triumph of the people's revolution in China.

With the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries, socialism became a world system. This was the most significant event in world history after the triumph of the October Revolution in Russia.

The breakaway of many European and Asian countries from the capitalist system and from its colonial reserve, and the victory of socialist revolutions in some of these countries were the natural outcome of the liberation, revolutionary, and anti-imperialist struggle of their peoples under the new, postwar balance of strength in the world. The assertions of imperialist propaganda that the rise of people's democracies was the "handiwork of Moscow" were a deliberate lie designed to discredit socialism. This lie was utterly refuted by the facts. However, in assessing the developments that followed the Second World War it is impossible to ignore the tremendous role played by Soviet policy, by the Soviet Union's struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, in the destiny of the People's Democracies. The key conditions that made it possible to accomplish socialist revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries were the existence of the great socialist power, the Soviet Union, its victory over the fascist aggressors, and its policy of consistently defending the new progressive states against interference from the imperialists and extending every possible assistance and support to them.

The three-power Potsdam Conference, the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France, and China (September-October 1945), and the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain (December of the same year) were the principal landmarks of the political struggle that, less than a year after the end of the war, the Soviet Union was compelled to wage against the innumerable attempts of the Western powers to interfere in the affairs of the People's Democracies. Its firm, principled stand checked the attempts of the USA and Britain to restore bourgeois-landowner regimes in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary under the guise of "restructuring" their governments. The Soviet Union halted American plans for a ten-year "trusteeship" allowing for continued colonisation of Korea.

Soviet diplomacy upheld the rights of the People's Democracies when peace treaties with Nazi Germany's former European

allies were drafted in 1946.<sup>12</sup>

In addition to its political support for the People's Democracies the USSR extended substantial material aid to them during the first and most difficult years of their existence, despite the fact that its own economy had not yet recovered from the ravages of the war.

The part played by the Soviet Union in the destinies of these countries during their formative years was vividly shown on the example of Bulgaria in the following words written in 1948 by Georgi Dimitrov, great son of the Bulgarian people and one of the most outstanding personalities of the international communist movement:

"Had it not been for the Soviet Union the Bulgarian people would to this day have been in the vise of the German imperialists and their agents, the Bulgarian fascists.

"Had it not been for the Soviet Union's support Bulgaria would have been torn to pieces and fallen into the hands of other, no less arrogant, aggressive, and treacherous imperialists than the Hitlerite brigands.

"Had it not been for selfless assistance from the Soviet people our people would have starved during the cruel years of drought. To this day our economy would have been in a state of decline and ruin."

Dimitrov noted that this was true not only of Bulgaria but also of all the other countries that broke away from capitalism. "Had it not been for the Soviet Union," he wrote, "there would generally have been no free and independent nations in Southeastern Europe and no flourishing People's Democracies advancing towards socialism."<sup>13</sup>

### **The National Liberation Movement Spreads in Asia and North Africa. Soviet Foreign Policy and the Incipient Disintegration of Imperialism's Colonial System**

One of the main pillars of imperialism's might and wealth—the colonial system of bondage and exploitation—was shaken as a result of the Second World War unleashed by the imperialists. The peoples of China, North Vietnam, and North Korea having achieved liberation from imperialist tyranny embarked on the building of socialism. The national liberation movements spread as an unstemmable tidal wave to many other countries: colonies or semi-colonies of the imperialist states. This happened first in Asia, where the colonial peoples had been most directly involved in the hostilities and experienced the

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter XV.

<sup>13</sup> Georgi Dimitrov, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 306-07 (in Russian).

horrors and burdens of the war to the extent that their patience was worn thin and new courage was ignited in their hearts.

The heroism displayed by the peoples of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War was a source of sustained inspiration for the patriots of Asian countries in their struggle against foreign enslavers. The defeat of nazi Germany, fascist Italy, and imperialist Japan gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation movement in Asia and Africa.

The overall weakening of capitalism, including the oldest colonial powers, made the liberation of Asian and African peoples a reality.

The myth, studiously cultivated by the imperialists, that the colonialists were "invincible" was buried during the Second World War. The collapse of the aggressive fascist powers headed by nazi Germany spelled out a total debacle for the racist ideology of the fascists and the triumph of the ideals of national liberation and equality of nations. Further, the imperialists of Britain, France, the Netherlands, and even the USA showed their helplessness in Asia: they found they could not retain possession of many of their colonies. Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines were swiftly overrun by Japanese troops. Singapore, Britain's strongest military bastion in Southeast Asia, fell with hardly any resistance. Arab countries became the scene of savage military collisions between the belligerent imperialist states.

In the countries occupied by them the Japanese imperialists established an even more brutal regime of oppression, terror, and exploitation than that of the former colonial masters of these countries. This precipitated a mass movement of resistance to the invaders.

With rival imperialist groups locked in struggle, many colonies and dependent countries found themselves directly involved in the war. As a result, large quantities of armaments fell into the hands of the people in many colonial and dependent countries when the war ended. This was one of the factors that helped to form large people's armies in Indochina, Burma, the Philippines, and Indonesia. These armies embodied the militant alliance of all patriotic forces—workers, peasants, and some segments of the national bourgeoisie—an alliance in which the Communists usually played the most active, leading role.

As early as the spring of 1945, when it was obvious that the Soviet Union would defeat nazi Germany, the peoples of Southeast Asia began mounting large-scale military operations against the Japanese invaders; in most of the countries of that region this struggle reached its high point on the very eve of Japan's surrender.

In March 1945 a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indochina decided to speed up preparations for a general uprising: the first regular units of the Vietnamese People's Army had been formed by that time. A nationwide rising against the invaders commenced in the same month in Burma, where the armed

forces of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League consisted of nearly 200,000 effectives.

The Japanese invaders were driven out of almost the whole of Burma in August 1945. People's units drove the Japanese troops out of Indonesia, which was proclaimed an independent republic on August 17. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed on September 2. The Provisional Government of Laos proclaimed its country's independence in October.

The authority of revolutionary organs—people's committees that enforced democratic reforms—was established towards the end of the war on vast territories of Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines.

In India, too, the people rose to fight for liberation from the British colonialists. In 1945-1946 there were massive anti-colonial demonstrations, factory strikes, and peasant risings. India was in ferment: street fighting in Calcutta, street fighting and a strike by 200,000 workers in Bombay, a mutiny of military airmen, and a mutiny in the navy, all demanding the expulsion of the British from India and the nation's independence. In 1946, a peasant revolutionary movement, which subsequently embraced an area with a population of over five million, commenced in Telangana district of the principality of Hyderabad. The insurgents set up their own organs of power—people's committees, courts, and self-defence units—distributed landed estates among the peasants, and set up schools.

In Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon the people rose to fight for genuine national independence, for the withdrawal of British and French troops as the first step in that direction.

In the colonies and dependent countries the colonial powers responded to the upswing of the national liberation movement with a war of attrition, a bloodthirsty reign of terror, and political manoeuvres designed to deceive the people and split the revolutionary forces.

A coalition of colonialists unleashed a war against the Republic of Indonesia that was to last for a long time and take a heavy toll of life. At the close of September 1945 Indonesia was occupied by British troops. In this war against the independent Republic of Indonesia Britain used Japanese troops who had not yet laid down arms and then acted in alliance with the Dutch colonialists, who had returned, while getting massive material and technical aid from the USA.

In Malaya, as early as September 1945, a 250,000-strong British army began the demolition of the organs of power set up by the people and committed itself to a war against the Malaysian People's Liberation Army.

As early as September 1945 France started a brutal, protracted war in Vietnam, a war that was subsequently continued by US imperialism against the courageous Vietnamese patriots.

A powerful national liberation movement in the Philippines forced the USA to recognise that nation's independence in the summer of

1946. But while extending formal recognition, it imposed an "agreement" that placed the Philippines Armed Forces under US control and provided for the building of many US military bases. With US officers in command, the army of the Philippines government began military operations against the Hukbolahap, the people's guerrilla army.

The peoples of many subjugated countries still had long years of struggle ahead of them before they would achieve independence. India, Burma, and Pakistan won recognition of their state independence in 1947, but the peoples of Indonesia, the Indochina states, and other countries had to fight longer, while in Africa the independence struggle was only in its early stage. But the sentence of history had been passed: the age-old system of colonial rule was on the verge of disintegration. The period predicted by Lenin as far back as 1919 now commenced. "We know," he wrote, "that in the East the masses will rise as independent participants, as builders of a new life, because hundreds of millions of the people belong to dependent, underprivileged nations, which until now have been objects of international imperialist policy, and have only existed as material to fertilise capitalist culture and civilisation."<sup>14</sup>

Moreover, developments bore out Lenin's conclusion that "this revolutionary movement of the peoples of the East can now develop effectively, can reach a successful issue, only in direct association with the revolutionary struggle of our Soviet Republic against international imperialism".<sup>15</sup>

By its victory over imperialist aggressors in the Second World War the Soviet Union cleared the way for the indomitable actions of colonial and dependent nations against colonialism. When the war ended the Soviet Union continued acting on Lenin's behests and through its vigorous foreign policy went on extending considerable and steadily mounting support to the oppressed nations in their struggle for independence. These nations saw that the Soviet Union was a dependable and disinterested friend, consistently upholding their interests.

In the United Nations Organisation the Soviet Union has been from the very first day of that body's foundation an energetic and consistent champion of the right of all peoples to national independence. In February 1946, when the UN Security Council considered the request of the governments of Syria and Lebanon for the withdrawal of British and French forces from their countries, the Soviet Union was the only great power to speak up in defence of the sovereign rights

<sup>14</sup> V. I. Lenin, Address to the Second All-Russia Congress of Communist Organisations of the Peoples of the East, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 159.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 151.

of these two small Arab nations. Staunch Soviet support helped the Syrian and Lebanese people to secure the evacuation of French and British troops from Syria in 1946 and from Lebanon in 1947.

The USSR was the only great power that backed Egypt when its government appealed to the UN in 1947 for help to get the British troops out of Egyptian and Sudanese territory.

The Soviet Union did not for a moment relax its efforts in the UN in defence of the people of Indonesia. As early as December 1945 it drew the attention of the British government to the fact that the war Britain had begun against the Indonesian people was impermissible. In January 1946 the question of the actions of the British and Japanese troops against the population of Indonesia was raised in the UN Security Council on the initiative of the Ukrainian delegation. Resistance from the Western powers prevented the Security Council from passing a resolution calling for the termination of hostilities against the Indonesian people.

Later, in August 1947 and in June and December 1948, the Soviet Union again acted in the UN Security Council in defence of the young Indonesian Republic, which was attacked by the Dutch imperialists. In 1948, when the Indonesian Republic was held in the vise of the economic and political blockade imposed on it by the imperialist powers, at this most difficult hour for the republic, the Soviet government declared that it was prepared to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with it.

With countries that had won national independence (in many cases this was a truncated independence on account of the manipulations of the colonialists) the Soviet Union established relations based on complete equality and mutual respect without any reservations or restrictions. It established diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1943, with Syria and Lebanon in 1944, with India in 1947, and with Burma at the beginning of 1948. The foundations of friendship with young nations in Asia and Africa were laid by the Soviet Union during the war and the initial postwar years.

### **Weakening of Imperialism's Positions**

The Soviet Union's increasingly stronger position on the international scene, the breakaway of more than ten European and Asian countries from capitalism and the emergence of the socialist world system, the mounting revolutionary working-class movement in the capitalist countries, the commencing disintegration of the colonial system, and the marked weakening of some leading imperialist powers as a result of the Second World War were indications of a significant deepening of the capitalist system's general crisis.

Prior to World War II the international scene was dominated by six imperialist powers. They were called great powers and they embodied



the might of world imperialism. These powers were the USA, Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and Italy. Three of them were defeated in the war, and two others emerged from the war enfeebled militarily, economically, and politically. Subsequent years showed that this weakening was profound and long-lasting, and had become a distinctive feature of the postwar epoch.

The defeat suffered by Germany, Japan, and Italy was a heavy blow to the imperialist system as a whole, because with encouragement and assistance from the reactionary circles of the USA, Britain, and France these powers had for many years been the main strike force against the Soviet Union and against the revolutionary, democratic movements in the capitalist world. This strike force was now snuffed out.

But the point was not only that the nazi coalition was crushed. Capitalism found itself substantially weaker as a social system, particularly in Europe. Even capitalist powers like Britain and France, which had come out of the Second World War among the victors, found themselves enfeebled.

The economy of Britain, then the second richest bourgeois nation after the USA, was visibly sapped by the war. On account of the hostilities Britain lost communication with a large portion of its colonial empire and had to depend on deliveries of food and manufactured goods from the USA. Its foreign debt more than trebled during the war years, and its export diminished by more than two-thirds.

The US Administration speedily utilised Britain's war-induced dependence. In the summer of 1946 it gave Britain a loan of \$ 3,750 million, which was one of the means of harnessing that nation to Washington's plans for achieving supremacy in Europe and in the world as a whole. When the loan for Britain was debated in the US House of Representatives the majority leader John McCormack bluntly declared that on the outcome of the vote on this issue "depends whether or not... the United States will assume its place as leader, constructive leader, among the nations of the world".<sup>16</sup>

British imperialism made abortive attempts to use the defeat of Germany and the weakening of France to take over the dominant economic and political role in Europe: it encountered a stronger contender for supremacy in capitalist Europe, namely, the USA.

It was none other than the USA that wrecked the plan of the British monopolies drawn up during the war to seize control of the Ruhr and thereby make Britain the dominant economic and military power in Western Europe, and by 1947 had asserted its controlling

<sup>16</sup> William Hardy McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs. 1939-1946. America, Britain and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, London, 1953, p. 688.

influence in all matters concerning the Ruhr.

This decline of British political influence was the factor that frustrated the plan hatched out in London soon after the war for the formation of a bloc of West European colonial powers (Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands) under British leadership. When matters reached the point of setting up this bloc and signing the Brussels Pact in March 1948<sup>17</sup>, the new bloc turned out to be not an instrument of British domination in Europe but a link in the chain of military blocs formed by and serving the interests of US imperialism.

Actions by Britain's rulers such as the military intervention in Greece and the sending of troops to Indonesia in the autumn of 1945 to crush the Indonesian national liberation movement in alliance with the Dutch colonialists did little to save Britain's international prestige from falling another notch.

In the case of France, its defeat in 1940 and the German occupation kept its economy in dislocation for a long time. In 1944 industrial output in that country was only 30 per cent of the prewar level. The role played by French capital in the world market was reduced to a minimum. In 1945 France accounted for less than 1 per cent of the capitalist world's export trade. When the war ended its armed forces were, naturally, small because until mid-1944 its territory was in the hands of the enemy.

However, France's weakness was due not only to the actions of its wartime enemies but also to the policy of its Western allies. Both during and after the war the US ruling circles deliberately pursued a policy of weakening France politically and militarily in order to prepare the ground for US control of that nation. Moreover, they believed that with a weakened France their own position in Western Europe would be stronger.

During the war the US leaders mooted the idea of France's postwar disarmament.<sup>18</sup> When they were preparing for the landing of their troops in France and planning an occupation regime on French territory, the USA and Britain were set against French armed forces taking part in the landing. During the final phase of the war the US government was opposed to France's participation in the settlement of some sensitive political issues and, in particular, to inviting French representatives to the Crimea (Yalta) Conference. After the war the USA continued obstructing the consolidation of French national sovereignty. The terms of the US loans extended to France after the war were prejudicial to that nation's independence.

The United States of America was the only major capitalist power

<sup>17</sup> See Chapter XX.

<sup>18</sup> Robert Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History*, New York, 1948, p. 712.

to emerge from World War II stronger economically and militarily and with a significantly enhanced influence in the entire capitalist world.

US territory was not affected by the hostilities. During the Second World War military technology was still on a level where the ocean expanses separating America from Europe and Asia were a dependable safeguard. No American city was bombed and no American factory was destroyed as a result of hostilities. This point is made by William Z. Foster, who wrote: "While the other capitalist countries were ruining their industries in the war, the United States was developing its industrial facilities at a feverish rate. It added to its plant \$ 25 billion worth of the most modern productive capacity."<sup>19</sup>

This rapid expansion of the war industry brought the American monopolies fabulous profits. During the five years of war they netted \$ 117,000 million, in other words, compared to the five years immediately preceding the war their net profits nearly quadrupled.<sup>20</sup>

The USA kept increasing the numerical strength of its armed forces throughout the war. At the outbreak of World War II the United States Army was the 17th largest in the capitalist world. But towards the end of the war the USA was capitalism's strongest military power on the high seas, in the air, and on land.

This strengthening of the USA as a result of the war was eloquent evidence of capitalism's uneven development, particularly at its imperialist stage. US imperialism grew stronger at the expense of the exhaustion of other bourgeois countries, and this strength served as the basis for new violent contradictions in the capitalist world.

During the initial postwar years US capital took advantage of the laming of its rivals to seize control of a large portion of the capitalist world market. Whereas in 1937, prior to the war, the USA had accounted for 14.2 per cent of the capitalist world's exports, in 1947 its exports jumped to 32 per cent of the total. Moreover, US commerce with other capitalist countries bore the unilateral character of sharply pronounced trade expansion, which undermined the financial standing and economic independence of its partners.

After the war US monopoly capital launched a determined assault on the interests of other imperialist powers, chiefly Britain and France, in colonial and dependent countries: the Middle East and Southeast Asia, including India, which was one of British capital's traditional spheres of domination. In order to acquire springboards for intensified exploitation of underdeveloped Eastern countries, the USA went over to direct interference in their affairs, to undisguised support for the colonialists in their efforts to suppress the national

<sup>19</sup> William Z. Foster, *Outline Political History of the Americas*, New York, 1951, p. 452.

<sup>20</sup> N. Inozemtsev, *US Imperialism and the German Question (1941-1954)*, Moscow, 1954, p. 37 (in Russian).

liberation movement by force.

While ousting the old colonial powers, the USA used them against the peoples of Asia and Africa. It supplied arms and credits to the Netherlands, which was attempting to destroy Indonesia's independence, and to France in its protracted war against the Vietnamese people.<sup>21</sup> US aid to the old colonialists gave the whole world, above all the peoples of Asia and Africa, a vivid insight into the imperialist motivations of US policy in the colonial question.

But expansion in the world markets could not cure the postwar US economy of its basic ailment. Chronic underloading of factories that led to the idling of half the capacities in key industries and constant mass unemployment became the hallmarks of postwar economic life in the USA. Much as German imperialism in the 1930s, US imperialism began looking for a way out of this predicament in continued militarisation, in maintaining production with the aid of orders for military hardware, and in escalating the arms race to meet the reactionary, aggressive aims of its foreign policy.

Postwar US foreign policy was characterised in the following words in a resolution passed by the 20th Congress of the CPSU: "The imperialist powers headed by the American reactionaries began shortly after the war to pursue the positions of strength policy, which reflects the strivings of the most aggressive elements of these powers to crush the working-class, democratic and national liberation movements, to undermine the camp of socialism and establish their world domination. In practice this policy signifies an unrestrained arms drive, building American military bases along the borders of the USSR and the People's Democracies, and also forming aggressive blocs spearheaded against the countries of the socialist camp, prosecuting the cold war against the socialist countries, and the preparation of new bloodbaths."<sup>22</sup>

Shortly after Harry S. Truman became President of the USA he declared that the victory had devolved upon the American people a permanent responsibility for the leadership of the world.<sup>23</sup>

The USA's shortlived monopoly over the atomic bomb was a factor of no small importance in shaping this course of American policy. General Maxwell D. Taylor, former Chief of Staff of the US Army, later characterised the essence of US foreign policy of that period, writing: "The A-bomb's awesome destructiveness encouraged belief that our Air Force had an ultimate weapon that would allow the US henceforth

<sup>21</sup> *International Relations After World War II*, Vol. 1 (1945-1949), Moscow, 1962, p. 336 (in Russian).

<sup>22</sup> *The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Verbatim Record*. Moscow, 1956, p. 7.

<sup>23</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States*, Washington, 1961, p. 549.

to police the world and impose a sort of Pax Americana.”<sup>24</sup>

This period witnessed the commencement of US imperialism’s “nuclear diplomacy”. In explaining to pressmen the purport of the criminal annihilation of hundreds of thousands of civilians in the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945, US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes “did not argue that the bomb was needed to defeat Japan but rather that it should be dropped to make Russia more manageable in Europe”.<sup>25</sup>

The policy pursued by the US ruling circles after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt amounted to renunciation of dependable and mutually beneficial cooperation with the Soviet Union, a cooperation that was so effective during the Second World War, in the period of joint struggle against the nazi aggressors.

Having set their sights on the chimerical goal of achieving world supremacy, the US ruling circles unfolded an unparalleled arms race and started a cold war against the Soviet Union and the young People’s Democracies in a futile attempt to halt the growth of the socialist forces. They sought to deprive their own, capitalist allies in Western Europe of independence by subordinating them economically, politically, and militarily. This evoked the resistance of the patriotic forces in the countries concerned.

\* \* \*

The Second World War thus led to striking changes in the international situation as a whole. The international balance of strength tilted dramatically in favour of socialism, to the detriment of capitalism. This tilt was the result of the enhanced might, international prestige, and influence of the USSR, the breakaway from the capitalist world of a number of countries which embarked on the road of socialist development, socialism’s spread beyond one country, and the emergence of a socialist world community. The powerful upsurge of national liberation movements of oppressed peoples and the incipient disintegration of imperialism’s colonial system were among the factors that changed the world balance of strength.

All these developments undermined and shook the entire imperialist camp. The second phase of capitalism’s general crisis developed at the time of the Second World War and the socialist revolutions that took place in a number of European and Asian countries.<sup>26</sup>

The unevenness of the development of the imperialist powers grew

<sup>24</sup> *Look*, November 24, 1959, p. 28.

<sup>25</sup> *Foreign Affairs*. An American Quarterly Review, January 1957, p. 347.

<sup>26</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 470.

more pronounced. Most of them—not only the vanquished but also those belonging to the victorious coalition—lost their former influence in the world and found themselves dependent on the USA. “The economic and with it the political and military centre of imperialism has shifted from Europe to the United States. US monopoly capital, gorged on war profits and the arms race, has seized the most important sources of raw materials, the markets and the spheres of investment, has built up a unique kind of colonial empire and become the biggest *international exploiter*.”<sup>27</sup>

The US monopoly bourgeoisie tried to undertake the role of “saviour” of capitalism in other countries. Using its economic resources and temporary monopoly of the atomic bomb, US imperialism began forming, under its leadership, a bloc of capitalist states to fight the socialist system, the revolutionary movement in capitalist countries, and the national liberation movement in the colonies.

Soviet foreign policy, which continued to be aimed at ensuring favourable conditions for the building of socialism and communism in the USSR, faced new important international tasks: promoting fraternal friendship with the People’s Democracies and clearing the way for the utmost strengthening of the socialist world community; supporting the national liberation movements of peoples fighting to end colonial oppression; developing friendly cooperation with new states that had shaken off the yoke of colonial dependence; safeguarding peace, exposing the policy of the US imperialist circles that was threatening peace, and resolutely rebuffing their acts of aggression. In consistently implementing the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union sought to maintain mutually beneficial cooperation with capitalist states prepared to accept such cooperation in order to preserve world peace, to avert the threat of another world war.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p. 476.

## CHAPTER XV

### PROBLEMS OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT WITH GERMANY'S FORMER ALLIES

#### The Soviet Union's Struggle to Assert the Principles of a Democratic Peace

When the Second World War ended the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition were faced with, among other things, the task of achieving a peace settlement with Germany's former allies: Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. By their participation in the nazi military gamble, these states, governed by nazi Germany's clients, had inflicted considerable losses on the peoples of the countries belonging to the anti-Hitlerite coalition, but under the impact of the Red Army's victories and pressure from their own peoples they had acknowledged their defeat before nazi Germany was crushed, accepted the armistice terms offered them, and declared war on Germany.

By decision of the Potsdam Conference the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland was assigned to the Council of Foreign Ministers "as an immediate and important task". It was laid down that in drafting each treaty the Council would consist of members representing the states that had signed the terms of surrender with the given country. Further, it was agreed that when the peace settlement with Italy was considered, France would be regarded as having signed the terms of Italy's surrender. Thus, the peace treaty with Italy was to be drawn up by representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France, the peace treaties with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary by representatives of the USSR, the USA, and Britain, and the peace treaty with Finland by representatives of the USSR and Britain.

Many provisions of the future peace settlement had been worked out by the anti-Hitlerite coalition in the decisions of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences and, particularly, the armistice agreements signed with nazi Germany's former allies. They contained some agreed points on frontiers, reparations, restitutions, the disbandment of fascist organisations, and so on. This could have greatly facilitated the task of drawing up peace treaties provided, of course, the members of the coalition abided by the adopted joint decisions. But the actual work of drawing up these treaties showed that the Western powers did not always follow this line of action.

As soon as the Council of Foreign Ministers, set up by decision of the Potsdam Conference, began examining the question of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, it beca-

me evident that the Soviet Union and the Western powers were approaching the important task of Europe's postwar arrangement from entirely different angles.

The Soviet Union was determined that peace with Germany's former allies should be lasting, just, and democratic, that it should deliver the peoples from the threat of another war of aggression in Europe, create a firm foundation for European security, and give these countries the possibility for democratic development.

In directing foreign policy during the initial years following the establishment of the Soviet state, its founder, Lenin, put forward and upheld a number of extremely important provisions on what a just and democratic peace should be like. He said: "We should like to see a minimum of general assurances, solemn promises and grandiloquent formulas, and the greatest possible number of the simplest and most obvious decisions and measures that would certainly lead to peace, if not to the complete elimination of the war danger."<sup>1</sup> Speaking at the Congress of Soviets held on the day after the October Revolution triumphed, he said: "We reject all clauses on plunder and violence, but we shall welcome all clauses containing provisions for goodneighbourly relations and all economic agreements; we cannot reject these."<sup>2</sup> Lenin further noted that the equality of the two systems (socialist and capitalist) was "the only correct way out of the difficulties, chaos and danger of wars (as long as there remain two property systems)".<sup>3</sup> The Soviet stance on the question of peace treaties after the Second World War was entirely in keeping with these propositions.

The Soviet Union's point of departure was that the peace treaties with nazi Germany's former allies should envisage concrete steps to show that aggression would not go unpunished, cut off the possibility of any repetition of aggression in the future, and prevent any resurgence of fascism, which had plunged mankind into the holocaust of the Second World War. Hence the Soviet government's insistence on the merited punishment of war criminals and on the countries that had belonged to the aggressor coalition reimbursing some of the losses they had inflicted on the attacked states. It pressed for the total extirpation of fascism and the adoption of measures against its revival in the former enemy countries.

These purposes were met by the provisions in the peace treaties,

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, Interview Given to Michael Farbman, *Observer and Manchester Guardian* Correspondent, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, Speech at the Second All-Russia Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, *Collected Works*, Vol. 26, p. 255.

<sup>3</sup> V. I. Lenin, Draft Decision of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Delegation to the Genoa Conference, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 357.



unanimously agreed upon by the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, on military restrictions under which the armaments and armed forces of Nazi Germany's former allies would be purely defensive. Moreover, with the active participation of the Soviet Union provisions directed against any resurgence of German militarism were included in the peace treaties.

At the same time, the Soviet Union insisted that the terms of the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland should give these countries the possibility of freely and independently promoting their peaceful economy and establishing friendly relations with all countries. The Soviet government resolutely opposed the attempts of the Western powers to deny economic independence to the vanquished states, to harness their national economies to foreign capital.

The USSR took a firm stand against infringements from without on the free and democratic development of East European states, on the new, people's democratic system taking shape in them.

The USA and Britain counted on turning Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria into a sphere of influence of American and British monopolies. They planned to use the peace treaties to interfere in the internal affairs of these countries, depose their people's governments, and restore the power of the exploiter classes. These plans were blocked by the USSR.

The Soviet government sought to consolidate the peace that had been won at such high cost. It did all it could to continue cooperating closely with its wartime allies—the USA, Britain and France—and achieve a peace settlement in close contact with them.

But these efforts clashed with the ambition of the US-led Western powers to dominate the postwar world, impose their will on the Soviet Union, and dictate onerous peace terms to the vanquished states, interfering in their internal affairs and preventing them from enforcing effectual democratic reforms unsuitable to the imperialist circles.

As a consequence of this collision between two political lines, the drawing up of peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland dragged out for more than a year—from September 1945 to the close of 1946—in an atmosphere of intense diplomatic struggle over issues determining the future of a considerable part of Europe. This was a struggle between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, on the one hand, and the Western powers, on the other. The negotiations over the peace treaties commenced at the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September 11-October 2, 1945) and continued at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain in Moscow (December 16-26, 1945), the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris (April 25-May 16 and, after a recess, June 15-July 12, 1946),

and the Paris Peace Conference (July 29-October 15, 1946). They were completed at the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York (November 4-December 11, 1946).

Conflicting approaches to key problems of a peace settlement clashed at each of these stages. In close interaction with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia, which participated in the Paris Peace Conference, with Albania, which was invited to the conference, and with Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, which had become People's Democracies by that time, the Soviet Union pursued a course aimed at establishing a lasting peace. It wanted to achieve that peace on the basis of continued open-hearted cooperation among the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. These efforts were countered by the course of the Western powers, headed by the USA, towards an imperialist, forced peace, cessation of cooperation with the USSR, the throttling of the revolutions in the People's Democracies, the imposition of imperialist rule on the vanquished nations, and the restoration of the old order in them.

### **Soviet Defence of the Sovereignty of Vanquished States**

Hardly had the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers begun its deliberations than the Western powers peremptorily demanded the removal of the People's Democratic governments in Romania and Bulgaria. The US delegation slandered these governments and declared that it would not discuss peace treaty terms with Romania and Bulgaria until governments were set up that could be recognised by the USA. A similar stand was adopted by the British delegation.

By this time the Romanian and Bulgarian people had given effect to far-reaching democratic transformations. They were building the foundations of a people's democratic system, striking blows at the internal reaction. This development line did not suit the ruling circles of the USA and Britain, and they attempted to use the peace negotiations for flagrant interference in the internal affairs of Romania and Bulgaria in order to halt their progress along the new, democratic path, and bring the bourgeoisie and landowners back to power. Relative to Hungary the Western powers did not at the time raise the question of a change of government because one of their flunkies, Ferenc Nagy, leader of the Agrarian Party, headed the government. That government obstructed democratic reforms, much to the satisfaction of the ruling circles in the USA and Britain.

At the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the USA and Britain demanded the formation of "inspection commissions" in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary ostensibly for the purpose of verifying how the armaments limitation terms of the peace treaties were

fulfilled. Actually, this was a move to ensure the possibility of interfering in the internal affairs of these countries in the future.

But the Soviet Union did not permit the peace negotiations to be used for the overthrow of lawful governments or any other form of interference in the affairs of the People's Democracies. Its representatives firmly told the Western delegations in the Council of Foreign Ministers that these countries had democratic governments enjoying the confidence of the overwhelming majority of the population and there could be no question of foreign interference.

Failing to obtain Soviet consent for interference in the internal affairs of the People's Democracies, the Western powers proceeded to thwart the work of the Council's London session, using a question of procedure as the pretext.

As we have already noted, the Potsdam Conference distinctly defined the nations whose representatives should take part in drawing up peace treaties with one or another former ally of Germany. In contravention of this decision the US and British delegations insisted that France and Kuomintang China join in drafting the treaties with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland, although neither France nor China had even so much as declared war on these countries.

The Soviet delegation refused to depart from the Potsdam Conference decision. In response the USA and Britain presented what was virtually an ultimatum, saying that if the procedure for the Council of Foreign Ministers laid down at Potsdam were not modified they would not sign even those points to the peace treaties that had been agreed upon at the London session. The Soviet Union rejected these attempts to replace negotiations with dictation.

The USA then disrupted the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. It planned its actions carefully and well in advance. James F. Byrnes, who was the US Secretary of State at the time and led the US delegation, related in his memoirs that he had arranged with Wang Shih-Chieh, the Kuomintang delegate, to cut the session short on a day it was not presided over by the US delegate, so that outwardly the USA could not be blamed for wrecking the talks. The Kuomintang man, whose turn it was to chair the session on October 2, willingly undertook this assignment of his masters and declared the session closed.<sup>4</sup>

This was followed with an attempt by the Truman Administration to put an end to the work of this body and take the discussion of the peace treaties to a broad peace conference with a large number of participants. In suggesting this, the US counted on utilising the fact that as a result of the war most of the bourgeois nations had become

<sup>4</sup> James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York and London, 1947, p. 106.

dependent on it economically. At such a conference it hoped it would impose its will on the Soviet Union through the mechanical majority of votes it could command. Further, it demanded that the peace terms, after they were considered at the peace conference, should be finally endorsed not by the powers that had borne the main responsibility at the negotiations but by the many countries that had been at war, albeit only formally, with the given enemy state. In this case, too, its purpose was to replace negotiations with the Soviet Union with pressure, taking advantage of the circumstance that most of these countries were bourgeois states that in those years were obediently following in the wake of US policy.

However, the Soviet Union stuck by the principle of consensus among the great powers in the anti-Hitlerite coalition in the question of a peace settlement. Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador in Moscow, who had stated Truman's considerations relative to the convocation of a peace conference to J. V. Stalin, head of the Soviet government, on October 24 and 25, was told that another attempt had to be made to convene the Council of Foreign Ministers and draft the peace treaties: the best course would be first to work out common ground and then convene a conference of countries figuring in the agreed list.<sup>5</sup> The Soviet side stressed that after the peace conference the text of the peace treaties should be determined by the powers that had signed the armistice terms with the vanquished states concerned.<sup>6</sup>

The USA and Britain had to give in: they could not afford to decline participation for any length of time in the drawing up of peace treaties, for self-elimination from the peace settlement might exclude them entirely from participation in the settlement of East European affairs. Also, subversion of a peace settlement might incur censure from democratic opinion: the nations wanted durable peace. The Western powers had, therefore, to agree to resume the joint work with the USSR on the peace treaties.

A meeting of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain was held in Moscow in December 1945. Among other international issues (control of Japan, the Korea question, the problem of China, the UN Atomic Energy Commission, and so on), it considered the question of drafting peace treaties with five former allies of Germany. Formally, this meeting took place outside the framework of the Council of Foreign Ministers; it was convened under the Yalta decision on periodical meetings of the Foreign Ministers of the

<sup>5</sup> Foreign Policy Archives of the USSR (further—Soviet Foreign Policy Archives). Record of talks by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, J. V. Stalin, with the US Ambassador to the USSR, Averell Harriman, on October 24 and 25, 1945 (here and hereafter in Russian).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

USSR, the USA, and Britain.

But while they agreed to resume the talks on peace treaties, the Western powers did not abandon their attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania and Bulgaria, aiming to bring reactionary forces to power in these countries. These attempts were renewed by the USA and Britain at the Moscow meeting. The US delegation now demanded not the total replacement but a reorganisation of the Romanian government that would bring into it representatives of the bourgeois opposition (the Liberal and National-Tsaranist parties). Moreover, the Americans demanded a pledge from the Romanian government that elections would be held at a stated time, and insisted on steps that amounted to gross interference in Romania's internal affairs: the removal of the main ministries directly responsible for the conduct of election campaigns from control by any political party; a general amnesty for all political crimes committed after August 23, 1944.<sup>7</sup> This was nothing less than an attempt to reopen the door to political activity for fascists and their accomplices, for enemies of the people's power, who had committed crimes against the Romanian people. The US government made the fulfilment of these demands a mandatory condition for its recognition of a reorganised Romanian government.

In Bulgaria, too, the USA demanded the government's reorganisation through the inclusion of representatives of reactionary parties and groups.

This further attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of Romania and Bulgaria was rejected by the USSR. The US delegation was told that general democratic elections had just been held (on November 18, 1945) in Bulgaria and that they had brought a sweeping victory to the Fatherland Front, which consisted of five political parties headed by the Communist Party. Relative to the elections in Romania the US and British representatives created all sorts of difficulties, using the Romanian king for this purpose. Had it not been for their interference, elections by universal and secret ballot would have long before shown who had the support of the Romanian people.

The Soviet Union continued to combine its firm stand on questions of principle with the striving to resolve the problem of a peace settlement in agreement with its allies in the anti-Hitlerite coalition. At the Moscow meeting Soviet efforts resulted in finding the basis for a compromise which, while ruling out interference in the internal affairs of Romania and Bulgaria, allowed for ending the impasse and proceeding with the drafting of peace treaties.

It was agreed that the governments of Romania and Bulgaria would

<sup>7</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Memorandum of December 20, 1945 from the United States delegation at the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

be given friendly counsel on the desirability of each of them co-opting two representatives from opposition parties or groups. Moreover, the Romanian government was informed that it was expected to make a statement that elections would be held at the earliest possible date on the basis of universal and secret voting with the participation of all democratic and anti-fascist parties.

The USA and Britain pledged to recognise the Romanian and Bulgarian governments after these recommendations were implemented and the required assurances were received. The Soviet Union insisted on the inclusion of the important reservation that the persons co-opted into the Romanian and Bulgarian governments "will work loyally with the Government".<sup>8</sup>

The governments of Romania and Bulgaria communicated their readiness to accept the recommendations of the Moscow meeting.

The USA and Britain had to lift their objections to the drafting of peace treaties with Romania and Bulgaria. At the Moscow meeting it was decided forthwith to resume the preparatory work for the peace settlement. Further, the procedure established by the Potsdam Conference was reiterated, namely, that only those nations on the Council of Foreign Ministers which had in fact been or were considered (for instance, France relative to Italy) parties in the signing of the surrender terms with each given country would take part in drafting the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland.

The peace conference, it was agreed, would comprehensively examine the drafts of all five peace treaties drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers and work out recommendations on these treaties. The texts of these treaties would be finalised after the peace conference by the Council of Foreign Ministers in the composition established at Potsdam.

Byrnes testifies that the US delegation accepted these decisions reluctantly. It made its consent contingent on the Soviet Union's acceptance of the composition for the peace conference as proposed by the USA. The American proposal, which was accepted, was that the peace conference should consist of the five nations on the Council of Foreign Ministers and all members of the United Nations who had taken part in the war against enemy states in Europe with large contingents of troops.<sup>9</sup> The participants in the peace conference were thus to be—in addition to the five great powers—Australia, the Byelorussian SSR, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Greece, Holland, India, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, the Ukrainian SSR, the Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. Hence, nations that

<sup>8</sup> *Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, July 1, 1945-December 31, 1946*, Princeton University Press, 1948, pp. 319, 337.

<sup>9</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945. Documents and Materials*, p. 152 (in Russian).

had only a remote relation to European affairs, for instance, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, were to take part in the peace conference on an equal footing with nations that had suffered enormous losses in the war with Nazi Germany and its allies and were vitally interested in a lasting peace in Europe. It was obvious in advance that the USA and Britain wanted these countries to play a definite role, that of voting in support of their policy. However, the Moscow Conference's decisions on the procedure for finalising the texts of the peace treaties gave the Western powers no possibility for using the peace conference to impose irreversible unilateral decisions through an obedient voting machine.

The Western powers' hostile activities against the People's Democracies were continued behind the scenes at the peace conference, which opened in Paris on July 29, 1946. The largest effort was made in this direction by the Truman Administration.

On August 27, 1946, while the peace conference was in session, the US Secretary of State Byrnes had a talk with the Bulgarian representatives (Prime Minister K. Georgiev, Chairman of the National Assembly V. Kolarov, and Foreign Minister G. Kulishov), bluntly demanding a change in the composition of the Bulgarian government. He insisted that the portfolio of Internal Affairs Minister should not be held by a Communist until new elections were held in Bulgaria, again threatening that, if this condition was not met, the USA would not sign the peace treaty with Bulgaria.

The USA then demanded that the Bulgarian Government invite leaders of the Bulgarian opposition—Petkov, Lulchev, Stoyanov, and Ganev—to Paris in order to make an American-sponsored deal on changes in the Bulgarian government without the participation of the Bulgarian parliament and political parties. The US representative asserted that “this time the opposition will be more tractable”. “If necessary, a single word from Byrnes to Petkov and Lulchev will bring them into line,” he declared cynically.<sup>10</sup>

This move was rebuffed by the Bulgarian government. It rejected foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Bulgarian people. The Soviet Union gave Bulgaria every support.

At the Paris Peace Conference the Western powers made yet another attempt to interfere in the internal political life of the vanquished states. Prompted by Anglo-US diplomacy, the Australian delegation proposed the creation of a European international human rights court for the alleged purpose of verifying the fulfilment of the political terms of the peace treaties in the former enemy states. It was suggested that this court should have jurisdiction over the govern-

<sup>10</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on August 28, 1946 by the Soviet Foreign Minister with the Bulgarian delegation.

ments of these states. This idea of setting up a permanent agency to legalise interference in the affairs of the People's Democracies and also of Italy and Finland and institute a sort of trusteeship over them was unmasked by the Soviet delegation as a flagrant violation of the principle of sovereignty of independent nations. The Australian motion was defeated.

Earlier, at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet Union had rejected a US move to infringe upon Italy's sovereignty through the formation of a so-called treaty commission. As seen by the Americans, this commission was to have broad executive and juridical powers in Italy in order to ensure the fulfilment of the peace treaty. The Soviet representatives characterised this US proposal as an attempt to impose upon Italy something in the nature of a colonial capitulation regime that was incompatible with that nation's state sovereignty.

### **Political and Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaties**

The political provisions of the peace treaties, for which the foundations had been laid in the armistice agreements, mirrored the anti-fascist, liberative character of the Second World War. They called for the restoration and even extension of the rights and freedoms that had been destroyed or trampled by the fascist regimes in Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland: human rights, including freedom of speech, the press, and publication, profession of religion, political institutions, and public assembly for all citizens regardless of sex, language, or religion.

At the Paris Peace Conference the Western powers went to all lengths to prevent the inclusion of another significant political provision—on the disbandment of all fascist-type organisations and on a ban on the existence and activity of such organisations in the future—in the peace treaty with Italy. However, vigorous efforts by the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies led to the inclusion in the peace treaties with all of Germany's former allies of the extremely important provisions on the extirpation of fascism and the prevention of its resurgence. This was of great assistance to the anti-fascist forces in these countries in the struggle for their nations' democratic and peaceful development. The same purpose was served by the provisions in the peace treaties on the detention and extradition of war criminals.

On the whole, without imposing any definite social or political system, the political provisions of the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland gave these nations the possibility for genuinely democratic development in accordance with



the will of their peoples. This was a major service by the Soviet Union and its foreign policy.

The democratic, anti-fascist provisions of the peace treaties were carried out consistently and in full in countries where the new, people's democratic system was established.

At the proceedings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference it was seen that the approach of the Soviet Union, supported by the People's Democracies, to many important questions concerning the territorial provisions of the peace treaties differed from that of the Western powers.

Questions related to the frontiers of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland had in the main been settled in the armistice agreements. The territorial provisions of the peace treaties were, on the recommendation of the Soviet Union, drawn up in accordance with these agreements and then approved by the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

However, at the Paris Peace Conference it was found that the USA and Britain were again departing from earlier agreed decisions in order to back territorial claims on the People's Democracies on the part of third states.

The British and some other Western delegations supported, for instance, the claims of the reactionary Tsaldaris government in Greece to a sizable slice of Bulgarian territory on grounds of "strategic considerations". Although the conference had nothing to do with Albania, Greece demanded the southern part of Albania, comprising roughly one-third of that nation's territory.

The Soviet Union rejected these importunities. Representatives of the USSR and the Ukraine stigmatised them as unlawful and aggressive, showing that the Greek government wanted possession of historical Bulgarian land where the 300,000-strong population included only between 150 to 200 Greeks. If the subject of redemarcating the Bulgarian-Greek frontier were to be brought up, the Soviet representatives declared, it had to be acknowledged that Bulgaria would have every justification to demand the return of Western Thrace, which was unjustly torn away from it under the Neuilly Peace Treaty of 1919 with the result that Bulgaria lost its outlet to the Aegean Sea. With similar vigour the Soviet delegation rejected all claims to Albanian territory.

Upon receiving a rebuff, the Greek delegation withdrew its claims on Albania, while its demands on Bulgaria were rejected by an overwhelming majority vote in the Conference Commission on Political and Territorial Issues for Bulgaria. Further attempts by the British delegation to revise the Bulgarian frontier in favour of Greece were successfully repulsed by the Soviet Union at the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, which finalised the text of the peace treaties. The Greco-Bulgarian frontier remained immutable.

At the Paris Peace Conference the US delegation demagogically demanded a re-examination of the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers on the frontiers between Finland and the USSR and between Hungary and Romania. These were abortive attempts to sow discord in Soviet-Finnish and Romanian-Hungarian relations.

The question of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier and, particularly, of Trieste was the subject of protracted talks at all three sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Peace Conference. The Soviet Union consistently championed Yugoslavia's right to the entire border territory of the Istrian Peninsula (Julijska Kraina) which had a predominantly Slav population and came under Italian rule only after World War I, including the port city of Trieste situated in the heart of this territory and organically bound to it economically. The Western powers insisted on this territory's division between Yugoslavia and Italy. At the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the USA suggested transferring to Italy not only the city of Trieste but also adjoining territories populated by over 200,000 Yugoslavs. The French proposals was somewhat more favourable to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Union unswervingly backed the legitimate interests of Yugoslavia and the Slav population on the Istrian Peninsula. It secured the Western powers' agreement to the transfer of the larger portion of the Istrian Peninsula to Yugoslavia, but relative to the city of Trieste and its direct environs a compromise decision was adopted to place them under UN control as the Free Territory of Trieste.

There was a drawn-out struggle over the status of Trieste at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Peace Conference, and the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York. The Western powers were intent on turning this large Mediterranean port into a US and British military base.

The Soviet Union did not permit this to happen. In New York the Council of Foreign Ministers finally came to an agreement on a basically democratic status for the Free Territory of Trieste. On Soviet insistence a schedule was drawn up for the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory. The relevant provisions were included in the peace treaty with Italy.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Subsequent differences between the Security Council permanent members prevented appointing a governor for Trieste, and in 1954 Yugoslavia and Italy compromised by agreeing to divide this territory between them and notifying the UN of their agreement. Italy undertook to keep Trieste a free port in accordance with the peace treaty, and the British and US troops were evacuated. Soviet defence of Yugoslavia's legitimate interests in the period of the peace settlement played a significant role. The Italo-Yugoslav treaty on the final settlement of frontier issues was signed on November 10, 1975. This treaty ended the Trieste territory's division into zones A and B administered by Italy and Yugoslavia respectively. These zones were incorporated into the above nations.

The question of Italy's former colonies—Libya, Somalia, and Eritrea—came up when the draft peace treaty with it was considered at the London and Paris sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and it was found that there were sharp differences.

The Soviet Union wanted these former colonies in Africa to be independent as soon as possible and embark upon the path of independent national development instead of falling into the hands of other colonialists. Therefore, to prepare these territories for early independence it proposed a trusteeship over them on behalf of and controlled by the UN to be administered in some cases by one or another UN member individually and in others collectively by several states. The USSR declared that it was prepared to take part in exercising such trusteeship, as this would be a sure guarantee of the earliest possible independence of the territory concerned. The Western powers saw this proposal as a threat to the interests of colonialists and took a determined stand against it.

Britain wanted to incorporate the former Italian colonies into its own colonial empire in Africa, and at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers Ernest Bevin suggested proclaiming the "independence" of Libya (including Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) while preserving the British military presence there. Further, he suggested uniting Italian Somalia with part of Ethiopia and placing that territory under a British trusteeship. This was in fact a move to give Britain control of all the former Italian colonies.

The British plan had the sympathy of the USA. John Foster Dulles later wrote: "It [Cyrenaica] had good locations for air fields, and the British looked to it as a new strategic basing point for British power in the Mediterranean to take the place of Palestine and Egypt.... The United States government was inclined to support the British in their estimate of the strategic value of Cyrenaica."<sup>12</sup>

The US government was attracted chiefly by the possibility of setting up military bases in the former Italian colonial possessions vaguely camouflaged with references to "UN control". Hardly had the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened than Byrnes brought up the subject of "military bases in (Italian) colonies".<sup>13</sup>

Anxious about the destiny of their colonial empire, France's rulers feared the very word "independence" in reference to the African peoples. At the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault bluntly told Vyacheslav M. Molotov that the independence status "may affect French interests in Africa". "For that reason," he said, "the French delegation is emphatically opposed to granting independence to, for instance, Tripolitania

<sup>12</sup> John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, p. 60.

<sup>13</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on September 14, 1945 between the USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the US Secretary of State James F. Byrnes.

on account of the possible repercussions such an act may have in neighbouring territories, where most of the population knows nothing of politics, and has no political parties."<sup>14</sup>

Naturally, the Soviet Union could not agree to the UN trusteeship over former Italian colonies being used to enlarge the British colonial empire in Africa, to turning these territories into US military bases, or much less, condone the denial of independence to the peoples of these territories.

In the long run, the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers decided to postpone a decision on the destiny of the former Italian colonies, and in the event the four powers failed to settle this issue within a year following the signing of a peace treaty to turn it over to the UN General Assembly.<sup>15</sup>

**Economic Provisions of the Peace Treaties.  
The Soviet Union  
Champions the Economic Independence  
of Italy, Romania,  
Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland**

The Soviet Union had to make a considerable effort to prevent the vanquished states from falling into economic bondage to US and British capital. In addition to their attempts to secure a change of government and political systems in the People's Democracies, the Western powers, notably the USA, wanted the peace treaties to contain economic terms enabling foreign capital to seize commanding positions in the economy of the vanquished states and thereby making these states dependent on Washington and London.

John Campbell, who was secretary of the US delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, wrote subsequently that the USA and Britain

<sup>14</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on May 3, 1946 between the Soviet Foreign Minister and the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault.

<sup>15</sup> Decisions on the destiny of Italy's former colonies were passed by the 4th and 5th UN General Assemblies in 1949 and 1950 respectively. It was decided that Libya would be a united, independent, and sovereign state not later than January 1, 1952, and that Eritrea would be an autonomous unit in a federation with and under the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Somalia would become independent in December 1960, until which time it would be a trust territory administered by Italy on behalf of the United Nations. The Soviet Union had urged the granting of immediate independence to Libya, the evacuation of all foreign troops from these territories, and a shorter, five-year UN trusteeship over Somalia. Nonetheless, the General Assembly decisions paved the way for the national independence of Libya and Somalia.

aimed to use the peace negotiations to set foot through the door leading to Eastern Europe.<sup>16</sup> This assessment was borne out by the US proposals for the economic provisions of the peace treaties.

This course towards economic penetration of the vanquished states and their subordination to US capital was most clearly seen in the US proposal for establishing an "equality of opportunity" regime in these states. At the first London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers on September 19, 1945 the US delegation circulated a document suggesting that the peace treaties with Bulgaria and Romania should include provisions giving Allied nations guarantees of "access, on equal terms, to ... trade, raw materials and industry". Further, the US document stated that "similar provision should be made for equality of access to the use of ... ports, waterways, and aviation facilities".<sup>17</sup>

Implementation of these demands would have spelled out the economic subjugation of Bulgaria and Romania by foreign capital. At the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Western powers repeated that they wanted all five treaties to contain these onerous provisions, which could be used by the Western monopolies to seize key economic positions in the vanquished states. These pretensions were made on the pretext of safeguarding "free trade" and, as Byrnes put it, guaranteeing "equality of opportunity in economic affairs".<sup>18</sup> The Western powers stipulated similar terms at the Peace Conference.

The Soviet Union came out in defence of the economic independence of the vanquished states, rejecting the imperialist demands of the Western powers. Acting on instructions from the Soviet government, the Soviet representatives at the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Peace Conference sharply criticised the US efforts to clear the way for penetrating the economy of weak, vanquished states that had suffered in the war. The Soviet government exposed the attempts to subordinate these states to arbitrary rule by foreign monopolies, making it plain that it would not condone the striving of any countries to enslave other countries, even if the latter had been on the side of the enemy.

By rejecting the US proposals, the Soviet Union upheld the economic independence not only of the People's Democracies but also of Italy and Finland. The Soviet government instructed its delegation at the Paris Peace Conference to object strongly to demands on Italy affecting commerce, shipping, industry, and the rights of companies and individuals incompatible with its sovereignty. Further, the Soviet delegation was instructed to object to demands

<sup>16</sup> John Campbell, *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947*, New York, 1947, p. 66.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, 1945*, Vol. II, Washington, 1967, p. 265.

<sup>18</sup> James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, p. 129.

“that create hindrances to the development of a peaceful economy in Italy, to demands that do not spring from the task of abolishing the war potential in Italy and removing the threat to security and peace”.<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet Union's defence of Italy's national interests were appreciated by the Italian people and acknowledged by the Italian government. De Gasperi, Italy's Premier and Foreign Minister, called at the Soviet Embassy in France on May 6, 1946 during the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and told the Soviet Foreign Minister: “Russia's overall tendency is to secure respect for Italy's free national development. The Italian government is extremely grateful to the Soviet government for this stand. This tendency of the USSR is consistent with Italy's national requirements.”<sup>20</sup>

In the final analysis the USA's demand for “equality of opportunity” was reduced to a decision that the vanquished states would grant every member of the United Nations most favoured nation status and a national regime on the basis of reciprocity in commerce, industry, and shipping for a term of only 18 months from the day the peace treaty came into force.

At the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers and, particularly, at the Peace Conference there were heated debates over the size of the compensation to be paid by the vanquished states for damage to foreign property on their territory. The USA, Britain, and France insisted on full compensation for their property losses. This amounted to large sums of money. In Romania, for instance, British and US capital had, before the war, controlled over 30 per cent of the oil-extracting industry, 60 per cent of the oil-refining industry, and 40 per cent of the oil exports. Thus, the demand for full compensation was another indication that the USA and Britain intended to seize key economic positions in the vanquished states.

The Soviet Union in principle recognised that compensation had to be paid for property of United Nations member-states destroyed or damaged during the war. But it insisted that this should be only partial compensation. The Soviet representatives pointed out that to demand that war-ruined states compensate in full for foreign property would be tantamount to placing an unbearable burden on them. In this, as in the question of reparations, the Soviet Union suggested applying the principle of partial compensation, namely 25 per cent of the sustained losses. Although the USA and Britain insisted on full compensation for value of their losses, the Peace Confe-

<sup>19</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Additional instructions of January 7, 1946 to the Soviet delegation at the Paris Peace Conference.

<sup>20</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on May 6, 1946 by the Soviet Foreign Minister with the Prime Minister of Italy De Gasperi.

rence recommended a 75 per cent compensation, while at the third (New York) session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet Union succeeded in bringing this compensation down to 66 2/3 per cent. This eased postwar development in Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, as well as in Italy and Finland.

The Danube navigation provisions in the peace treaties with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary were of fundamental importance. The Western powers wanted the "internationalisation" of the Danube and "equality of opportunity" for navigation on that river. These demands indicated that the Western powers intended to control the Danube and dictate the terms for the river's use by the Danubian states.

Britain wanted to restore the prewar situation, when, on the basis of the 1921 Danubian Convention dictated by the Anglo-French imperialists, the Danube was controlled by Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, while the interests of the Danubian countries were relegated to the background. In 1945 at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers Bevin flatly told the Soviet Foreign Minister that he was out to recover on the Danube what the United Kingdom had lost during the war.<sup>21</sup> For its part, in advancing the idea of "internationalising" the Danube, the USA was obviously determined to join the non-Danubian powers that had formerly been in control of the Danubian basin.

In the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Peace Conference the Soviet Union maintained the view that the navigation regime on the Danube was, first and foremost, the business of the Danubian states themselves.

The Danube problem was settled only after the Peace Conference—at the third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in New York. As a result of the Soviet Union's firm stand, the Western powers had to renounce their claims to a system of foreign control in the Danube basin. In accordance with a Soviet proposal the treaties contained only some general provisions on free navigation on the Danube, equality of port and navigation dues, and other terms for merchant shipping. These provisions left no room for foreign interference in the affairs of the Danubian states. As regards the other terms for navigation on the Danube, it was decided to work them out at a special conference with the participation of the eight Danubian states. This conference, held in Belgrade in the summer of 1948, drew up a new convention on navigation on the Danube that took the rights and interests of the Danubian states into account.

<sup>21</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on September 23, 1945 by the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR with the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.

## The Reparations Problem

One of the major issues at all three sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Paris Peace Conference was that of reparations, i. e., compensation by Germany's former allies for part of the losses inflicted by them during the war on countries that had been subjected to aggression. The need for such compensation was in principle recognised at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. Specific sums to be paid as reparations by Germany's former allies were fixed in the armistice agreements. These sums were not large, covering only a fraction of the actual losses inflicted during the war.

The Soviet Union approached the reparations question mainly from the principled stand that aggression should never go unpunished and that the countries which had participated in it should bear political and material responsibility. Subsequently, in view of the friendly relations established after the war with Romania, Hungary, and Finland,<sup>22</sup> and wishing to facilitate economic restoration in these countries, the Soviet Government drastically reduced the reparations owed to the USSR.

A different approach was adopted to the reparations question by the USA and Britain. As early as at the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers it was found that in this issue, too, they were departing from the decisions adopted earlier jointly with the USSR and were pressing for reparations provisions that would help them to implement their plan of controlling Germany's former allies economically.

The Western powers took issue with the minimum reparations where they concerned compensation for losses inflicted by the aggressors on the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Albania. At the Paris Peace Conference, however, the USA and Britain supported the exorbitant reparations demanded of the vanquished states by their friends and satellites. Greece, for example, wanted \$ 2,877 million from Italy (i. e., nearly 30 times more than Italy's reparations to the Soviet Union). Even from a small country like Bulgaria the Tsaldaris government demanded nearly \$ 1,000 million.

At the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the USA and Britain were categorical in their objections to Italy paying reparations to the Soviet Union in the form of deliveries of manufactured goods. The Soviet Government publicly exposed the motivations behind these objections: deliveries of manufactured goods in lieu of reparations in cash would have helped to develop Italian industry and laid a sound foundation for the expansion of commercial relations between Italy and the USSR. This was what the British and US monopolies wanted to prevent. At the Peace Conference delegations

<sup>22</sup> Bulgaria had no reparations commitments to the USSR.



of countries belonging to the US-British bloc—Australia, Canada, and the Union of South Africa—attacked the bilateral agreements between the USSR and the countries concerned on commodity reparations in an effort to prevent deliveries of primary materials from the Soviet Union to countries paying reparations. They went so far as to suggest that reparations should be paid not in goods but in dollars or pounds sterling. The purpose of this suggestion was clearly to make all countries paying reparations financially dependent on the USA and Britain.

At the sessions of the Council of Foreign Ministers and at the Peace Conference the Soviet Union firmly insisted on reparations payment terms that would not place the vanquished states in economic bondage or prejudice their peaceful economic development.

Following long debates at the Paris session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the consistent Soviet stand led to an agreed decision. On the question of reparations from Italy, which caused the widest divergences, France supported the Soviet attitude. The USA and Britain had to withdraw their objections.

The Peace Conference negated the attempts of the USA, Australia, Canada, and some other members of the US-British bloc to torpedo decisions adopted earlier by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Council's recommendations on the question of reparations were ultimately approved by the conference.

All questions related to reparations were later finalised at the New York session of the Council of Foreign Ministers. Despite strong US and British objections, the Soviet Union secured the adoption of a number of decisions meeting the interests of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania.

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The peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland were signed in Paris on February 10, 1947 by the nations that had fought them in the war. They came into force on September 15 of the same year upon their ratification by the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain, and France.

The problem of a peace settlement with nazi Germany's former allies was thus, albeit after a hard struggle, finally resolved on, it must be underscored, the basis of cooperation among the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and with proper attention to the interests of durable peace in Europe and the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

Mankind has witnessed many wars and the signing of hundreds of peace treaties. At the conclusion of peace treaties the victors thought least of all of justice for the vanquished. But the peace treaties fol-

lowing the Second World War were, through the vigorous efforts of the great socialist power, the Soviet Union, and the young European People's Democracies, the first in history in which the principles of a genuinely just and democratic peace were reflected.

These peace treaties contained important political provisions on the total and final extirpation of fascism, and on ensuring human rights and basic democratic freedoms for all the citizens of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. Also, they contained specific provisions aimed at averting aggression in the future (for instance, articles on the punishment of war criminals, on compensation for losses inflicted by aggression, on armaments limitations, and on preventing the remilitarisation of Germany and Japan).

The territorial changes envisaged in the treaties were undertaken in keeping with the national rights of the countries concerned. The question of Italy's former colonies was in the end settled in accordance with the national liberation aspirations of their populations and with the view of safeguarding their independence.

None of the provisions in these treaties transgressed the political or economic independence of the vanquished states or the national dignity of their peoples, and none of them were an obstruction to their peaceful development. This was the direct result of the Soviet Union's untiring efforts to ensure a just and democratic peace settlement.

The imperialist states, notably the USA and Britain, were intent on using the peace settlement for interference in the internal affairs of the People's Democracies, deposing the people's governments, installing there reactionary regimes dependent on the Western powers, and hinder their socialist development.

They tried to use the signing of the peace treaties to penetrate the economy of Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland and subjugate them economically. To this end US-British diplomacy demanded, among other things, "equality of opportunity" in the industry, commerce, and transport of the vanquished states, full compensation for property losses during the war, and international control of navigation on the Danube with the participation of non-Danubian nations. The same considerations guided the stance of the Western powers in the question of reparations.

But all these calculations of the imperialists were frustrated. With the energetic support of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia and in close cooperation with Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary, the Soviet Union safeguarded the Bulgarian, Romanian, and Hungarian, as well as the Italian and Finnish peoples against foreign interference in their internal affairs and upheld their sovereignty and economic independence and their right to build their life as they saw fit.

The peace settlement with Germany's former allies in Europe facilitated the further progressive development of the People's De-

mocracies, the consolidation of their international standing, and the assertion of Finland's independent policy and Italy's national postwar development.

Questions concerning the peace settlement were ultimately resolved by agreement, on the basis of cooperation among the principal powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. This was achieved mainly through the efforts of the Soviet Union. The signing of the peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland was one of the cardinal triumphs of Soviet foreign policy after the war.

## CHAPTER XVI

### FORMATION OF THE SOCIALIST WORLD COMMUNITY AND THE SHAPING OF A NEW TYPE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

#### People's Democracy Triumphs in Central and Southeast European Countries. Growing Cooperation Among Socialist States

The defeat of nazi Germany—main bulwark of world reaction—was a historic victory of socialism over imperialism. It sparked off a powerful revolutionary and national liberation movement. Leonid Brezhnev stressed its great significance on May 8, 1965, saying: "This victory paved the way for an upswing of the revolutionary struggle of the working class, an unparalleled national liberation movement, and the downfall of the disgraceful colonial system."<sup>1</sup>

The people's democratic revolutions in Central and Southeast Europe and also in China, Korea, and Vietnam were accomplished in a difficult internal and international situation, under conditions of an uncompromising class struggle in each country and unceasing imperialist interference in its domestic affairs.

Right after the war the national bourgeoisie and the foreign monopolies still had a strong grip on the economic and political life of the People's Democracies. The bourgeoisie held important positions in the national economy and played a substantial role in political life.

A relentless struggle unfolded between reaction and the democratic forces in every People's Democracy over domestic and foreign policy. On the outcome of this struggle depended whether the old social system would remain or development would follow the socialist road. With this, naturally, was linked the basic foreign policy question of whom to side with: with the Western powers, which would signify the perpetuation of the old order and subordination to US imperialism, or with the Soviet Union, which would spell out free development along the road of people's democracy and socialism? Internal reaction and international imperialism used every possible means to isolate from the Soviet Union countries delivered from fascist tyranny and then deal summarily with the revolutionary movements of their peoples.

From this angle the efforts to consolidate the people's democratic system in Czechoslovakia and develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union were of considerable significance. Strategically located in the centre of Europe, Czechoslovakia was the westernmost of the

<sup>1</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, p. 120 (in Russian).

countries then building up a people's democratic system. Little wonder, therefore, that imperialism made an attempt to return that country to the capitalist fold in February 1948. Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald said, was the "weakest link of the common front of People's Democracies". Encouraged by international imperialist reaction, which was helping the bourgeoisie in France and Italy to remove Communists from the governments of these countries, the leaders of the Czechoslovak bourgeois parties decided to stake their all on a coup that would bring down the government headed by Gottwald, leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. To achieve this aim ministers belonging to these parties resigned from the government in order to compel Gottwald and his government to step down. This move was endorsed by President Eduard Benes, a veteran Western-oriented bourgeois politician. The latter eagerly awaited Gottwald's resignation in order to form a bourgeois government that would have reversed the nation's social development, included Czechoslovakia in the bloc of Western bourgeois states, and harnessed it to the Marshall Plan.

Contrary to the expectations of the bourgeois politicians and their foreign backers, Gottwald did not resign. Instead he suggested replacing the 12 double-dealing ministers, who had tendered their resignations, with new ministers. Further, the Gottwald government appealed to the people for support. In response to the appeal of the Communists the Czechoslovak working class took action in support of the Gottwald government. This action culminated on February 24, 1948 with a general political strike that wrecked the sinister designs of imperialist reaction. On February 25 Benes had no choice but to accept the resignation of the 12 ministers and approve a new coalition government headed by Gottwald. The February political crisis was thus settled constitutionally with massive support from the people. This reinforced Czechoslovakia's socialist orientation and friendship between the Czechoslovak and Soviet peoples.

In hard-fought Communist-led class struggles the workers of the People's Democracies, acting in close cooperation with the working peasants, gradually overcame the dogged resistance of the exploiting classes and their political parties. The radical revolutionary changes put into effect by the working class strengthened the people's power, established the dictatorship of the proletariat, and isolated and then put an end to the exploiting classes and their parties.

In 1947-1948 the anti-fascist, anti-imperialist democratic revolutions in the People's Democracies evolved into socialist revolutions. This period saw many fundamental revolutionary economic and political changes in these countries. As a result, socialist relations of production became predominant and the people's democratic system was consolidated.

The development of the People's Democracies and the strengthen-

ing of socialism's economic and political positions were facilitated to an enormous extent by assistance from the USSR. There was a steady expansion of economic, cultural, and political cooperation with the Soviet Union. The USSR and the People's Democracies united in a close-knit socialist community. Entirely new, socialist international relations founded on socialist internationalism, on close political, military, economic, and cultural cooperation and fraternal mutual assistance emerged and gradually crystallised in the course of their joint efforts to safeguard their revolutionary gains against the combined forces of internal and international reaction.

Prior to the formation of the socialist world system the international communist movement had some experience of socialist-type interstate relations: these were the relations between the Soviet republics before they united in the USSR in 1922, between Soviet Russia and the Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic over a period of many years, and between the Soviet Union and the Soviet areas of China formed in the course of the Chinese revolution. Extremely valuable experience was contributed by the relations of fraternal solidarity with Republican Spain during the armed struggle of the Spanish people against insurgents and the Italo-German fascist intervention. A powerful impetus was given to the further development of the new international relations by the joint struggle of the Soviet Union and the enslaved peoples against nazi Germany and imperialist Japan, in the course of which a militant alliance of these peoples with the peoples of the USSR was moulded. Polish and Czechoslovak military units, which fought shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Army, were formed on Soviet territory; partisan detachments of different nationalities interacted behind the enemy lines.

The formation of fundamentally new relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies was determined in large measure by the internal political situation and the alignment of political forces in the latter countries. As the revolution made headway in breadth and depth the exploiting classes were isolated and then abolished and a solid economic and political foundation was laid for the establishment and development of the new, socialist relations.

The countries that broke away from capitalism had, especially in the initial period, to tackle enormous difficulties that arose chiefly because in the past most of them had a medium or even low level of economic development. The economy of most of these countries supplied food and primary materials for the economy of the industrialised capitalist states. Moreover, it had been severely exhausted in the war. These difficulties were compounded by the subversive activities of imperialism, which made desperate efforts to prevent the countries of Central and Southeast Europe from embracing socialism, aggravate their economic situation still further, and slow down

the rehabilitation and development of their national economies.

Difficulties were encountered also in surmounting nationalistic prejudices. The communist and workers' parties of the People's Democracies pursued a policy aimed at uprooting the hostility and distrust among peoples fostered over the centuries by the exploiting classes and left as an inheritance from the innumerable protracted ethnic conflicts. Long and patient work is required of the Marxist-Leninist parties in order to eradicate a heritage of this sort, particularly bourgeois nationalism. This was noted by Lenin when he wrote: "We want a *voluntary* union of nations—a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another—a union founded on complete confidence, on a clear recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent. Such a union cannot be effected at one stroke; we have to work towards it with the greatest patience and circumspection, so as not to spoil matters and not to arouse distrust, and so that the distrust inherited from centuries of landowner and capitalist oppression, centuries of private property and the enmity caused by its divisions and redivisions may have a chance to wear off."<sup>2</sup>

#### **Socialism Becomes a World System. The USSR Signs Treaties of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with the People's Democracies. Significance of These Treaties**

The treaties of friendship, alliance, and mutual assistance signed by the USSR and the People's Democracies were the principal factor that deterred world imperialism from undertaking military gambles against these countries. It would be hard to overestimate their significance in the development of fraternal friendship between the peoples of socialist states and in safeguarding their security and economic and political independence.

These treaties were signed under different historical conditions. Treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance were signed with Czechoslovakia and Poland during the Second World War (on December 12, 1943 and April 21, 1945 respectively). The accent in the treaties, naturally, was on mutual assistance in the armed struggle against nazi Germany. Moreover, they contained provisions on joint postwar efforts to remove the threat of any repetition of aggression by Germany or of any other state joining Germany in acts of aggression directly or in any other way. There were also provisions on cooperation in all areas of economic, political, and cultural life. These

<sup>2</sup> V. I. Lenin, Letter to the Workers and Peasants of the Ukraine Apropos of the Victories Over Denikin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 293.

were acts of enormous international importance formalising allied relations and close friendship between the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Similarly the USSR and Yugoslavia signed a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Cooperation during the war, on April 11, 1945.

After the war the Soviet Union concluded treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance with Romania (February 4, 1948), Hungary (February 18, 1948), and Bulgaria (March 18, 1948), and also an agreement on supplies of Soviet equipment and primary materials on credit to Albania (April 10, 1949).

The content of these treaties was predicted on the international situation that arose soon after the Second World War, when the threat of a revival of German militarism began to appear, when the ruling elite of the USA and the reactionary circles of other imperialist powers proclaimed a frankly expansionist foreign policy and began preparing for war against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

Motivated by the stern lessons of the Second World War and taking into account the postwar international situation, the signatories of these treaties pledged, as, for example, the Soviet-Hungarian treaty declares, "to act jointly with all the means at their disposal in order to eliminate any threat of a repetition of aggression by Germany or by any other state that unites with Germany directly or in any other way".<sup>3</sup> There are identical provisions in the treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with other European People's Democracies. They provide for the participation of the signatories in all international actions aimed at ensuring world peace and security of the peoples. In the event one of the parties was involved in a war with Germany or any other state united with it in a policy of aggression, the other party was committed to render the former party all possible military and other assistance without delay. These treaties were thus spearheaded entirely against the possibility of further aggression by German imperialism, which in the past had attacked countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe time and again.

Each of the signatories committed itself to take no part in alliances and coalitions and also in actions or measures directed against the other signatory. They undertook to consult each other on all major international issues affecting their interests and to act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation to expand and strengthen economic and cultural relations in line with the principles of mutual respect, independence, national identity, and non-interference in internal affairs. The European People's Democracies signed treaties of friendship,

<sup>3</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1948, Part I, Moscow, 1950, pp. 127-30 (in Russian).*



mutual assistance, and cooperation among themselves in 1947-1949.\*

This ramified system of equitable and friendly interstate treaty-regulated relations in the socialist community thus signified a considerable expansion of cooperation among the socialist states and helped to strengthen the might of the entire socialist community and enhance its international standing. A distinctive feature of all the friendship and mutual assistance treaties between the socialist countries is that they are aimed at ensuring lasting peace and international security and preventing German aggression. This is what basically distinguishes them from the pacts signed by the USA, and its imperialist partners: they were designed as stepping stones to another war against the USSR and the other socialist states.

The friendship and mutual assistance treaties concluded between the USSR and the People's Democracies and also between the People's Democracies themselves were major instruments for strengthening peace and a barrier to imperialist plans of aggression. The close political cooperation between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies rested on their common social system, their joint defence of that system as their internationalist duty, their common objective of building the new society, and their sincere, profound common interest in safeguarding socialism and maintaining durable peace.

The year 1949 witnessed epochal events that tilted the balance of political forces in the world still further in favour of socialism. The people's revolution in China triumphed in October 1949. This victory sprang from the titanic efforts and a selfless struggle by the Chinese people led by the Communists. It was the natural outcome of the settlement of the internal contradictions in semi-feudal and semi-colonial China. The proclamation of the People's Republic of China was yet another crippling blow at world imperialism and its colonial system.

Like the victory of the peoples of the European People's Democracies, the victory of the Chinese people was made possible by the Great October Socialist Revolution, the existence and unflinching assistance of the Soviet Union, and the defeat of nazi Germany and militarist Japan. This was admitted at the time by China's leaders. Mao Tse-tung, in particular, wrote: "If the Soviet Union had not existed, if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World

\* These treaties were concluded between Poland and Czechoslovakia (March 10, 1947), Albania and Bulgaria (December 16, 1947), Bulgaria and Romania (January 16, 1948), Hungary and Romania (January 24, 1948), Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia (April 23, 1948), Bulgaria and Poland (May 29, 1948), Hungary and Poland (June 18, 1948), Bulgaria and Hungary (July 16, 1948), Romania and Czechoslovakia (July 21, 1948), Poland and Romania (January 26, 1949), and Hungary and Czechoslovakia (April 16, 1949).

War, if Japanese imperialism had not been defeated, if the People's Democracies had not come into being ... the international reactionary forces bearing down upon us would certainly be many times greater than now. In such circumstances, could we have won victory? Obviously not."<sup>4</sup> The Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance signed at the time (February 1950) was a prime factor strengthening peace and security in the Far East and the world as a whole.

Article 1 of the treaty declares: "The two High Contracting Parties pledge jointly to take all the necessary measures in their power to prevent a repetition of aggression and violation of peace by Japan or any other state that directly or indirectly unites with Japan in acts of aggression."<sup>5</sup> In the event one of the signatories was attacked by Japan or by states allied with it, the other signatory pledged to render it immediate military and other aid with all the means at its disposal. The two countries undertook to conclude no alliance directed against the other side and to participate in no coalitions, actions or measures directed against the other side.

Under Article 5 the USSR and China undertook "in a spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equal rights, mutual interests, mutual respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the other Party to develop and strengthen the economic and cultural ties between the Soviet Union and China, to render each other all possible economic assistance and to effect the necessary economic cooperation".<sup>6</sup> The Soviet-Chinese treaty was an iron-clad guarantee of China's security and a dependable brake on US imperialist plans of aggression.

Another important development was the appearance of people's democratic states in Asia: the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The proclamation of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in September 1948 was preceded by far-reaching changes in North Korea, where a Soviet military presence, authorised under inter-Allied agreements following the defeat of militarist Japan, prevented foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Korean people. This gave the nation's democratic, patriotic forces the possibility for unhampered activity. They put into effect an agrarian reform that did away with semi-feudal exploitation; industrial enterprises belonging to the Japanese capital and Korean traitors were nationalised and became public property.

In Vietnam the struggle waged by patriotic forces and the dramatic

<sup>4</sup> Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, Vol. IV, Peking, 1961, p. 416.

<sup>5</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, Moscow, 1953, p. 59 (in Russian).

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 60.

upswing of the liberation movement culminated, following the eviction of the Japanese invaders, in a nationwide armed uprising, as a result of which the people seized power and formed the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (September 1945). The DRV, like the PDRK, became a member of a socialist community.

An event of immense historic significance was the formation in October 1949 of the German Democratic Republic, the first state of workers and peasants in German history. The establishment of a people's democratic system in the eastern part of Germany substantially narrowed the base of German imperialism. The GDR at once embarked on development as a People's Democracy and then started the building of socialism after extirpating all vestiges of militarism and imperialism. From the very outset the GDR established fraternal relations with all the other socialist states. The German Democratic Republic, the westernmost outpost of socialism in Europe, was in direct confrontation with the revenge-seeking militarist forces of West Germany.

A socialist world system was thus formed towards the close of the 1940s.

The formation of this system was a complex process. The member-nations were at different levels of economic, cultural and political development. At the time the socialist world system came into being, some of them—the European People's Democracies—had established socialist relations of production and the dictatorship of the proletariat; others, in Asia, were still at the initial stage of the people's democratic revolution. They took the road of democratic development immediately after winning liberation from colonial or semi-colonial slavery. There were many other factors hindering the building of socialism in the People's Democracies. One of the main factors was that there were survivals of the past, of nationalism, which in some countries had penetrated even the ranks of the Communists.

The appearance of the socialist world system was the most momentous event in human history after the Great October Socialist Revolution. It was a major step towards, as Lenin predicted, "converting the dictatorship of the proletariat from a national dictatorship ... into an international one ... capable of exercising a decisive influence upon world politics as a whole".<sup>7</sup>

### **Economic Cooperation Among Socialist Countries. The-Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Is Formed**

In most Central and Southeast European countries where people's democratic revolutions were accomplished the people's power found a bitter economic heritage. Long rule by foreign monopolies, the fascist

<sup>7</sup> V. I. Lenin. Preliminary Draft Theses on the National and the Colonial Questions, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 148.

occupation, and the hostilities had exhausted their national economies to the extent that the end of the war found them reduced to ruin. Fascism and the war had brought some of them to the verge of economic catastrophe. At the beginning of 1947 Romania's industrial product was only 48 per cent of the 1938 level. In Bulgaria it was 64 per cent of the prewar level, while its agricultural output was less than 70 per cent. In Poland the war and the occupation diminished the national wealth by 38 per cent, destroyed more than 70 per cent of the industrial enterprises, undermined the productive forces, and drastically cut back the people's living standard, which fell behind even the low prewar level. In 1945 Hungary found itself with only 60 per cent of its industrial capacity, with output reaching not more than one-third of the 1938 level. Enormous damage was inflicted on the Yugoslav economy. Food shortages were glaring everywhere.

In the People's Democracies the difficult economic situation demanded huge efforts by the communist and workers' parties. In tackling the formidable task of restoring and developing their economies the People's Democracies were, from the very beginning, able to rely on extensive assistance from the USSR, assistance that was rendered despite the Soviet Union's own postwar difficulties and without which it would have been impossible to normalise economic life and restore the war-ravaged economies.

Soviet economic assistance was a crucial factor enabling the People's Democracies to overcome their postwar difficulties, uphold their economic, and, consequently, political independence, and build the new, socialist society. While restoring their economy with Soviet assistance, the European People's Democracies successfully resisted US imperialist economic expansion. They rejected the notorious Marshall Plan, which was the instrument for subjugating many West European nations economically and politically to the interests of the US monopolies. Moreover, in some of the People's Democracies it was found necessary to break the resistance of bourgeois elements, who were demanding acceptance of the Marshall Plan.

Soviet fraternal assistance to the People's Democracies during the early period of their existence is eloquently illustrated by the first trade agreements and the accompanying Soviet deliveries of vital primary materials, industrial equipment and food.

The USSR and Bulgaria signed their first trade agreement as early as March 14, 1945 as the "first stage in the expansion of economic relations between the two countries, which are drafting a programme for more comprehensive economic cooperation in the new situation".<sup>8</sup> On December 15 of the same year, an agreement was signed on the sale of 30,000 tons of corn and 20,000 tons of wheat to

<sup>8</sup> *Soviet-Bulgarian Relations, 1944-1948*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 117-18 (in Russian).

Bulgaria. Faced with a deteriorating food situation Bulgaria asked the USSR for additional deliveries of grain. On April 5, 1946 K. Georgiev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Bulgaria, wrote to Stalin that although the assistance already rendered "has considerably eased our crying need for food and fodder", it "will be impossible to feed the population in the next four months, a period of heightened labour strain—without additional grain supplies". He requested an additional quantity of 40,000 tons of grain.<sup>9</sup> On April 14 the Bulgarian government was informed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry that the required grain would be forthcoming in the next three or four months.<sup>10</sup>

In Moscow on April 27, 1946 Bulgaria and the USSR signed another trade agreement envisaging a 150 per cent increase of Soviet exports over the 1945 level.<sup>11</sup> In the period from 1945 to 1947 Bulgaria received from the USSR 229,000 tons of oil products and lubricants, 217,000 tons of metal and metal articles, 33,000 tons of cotton, 72,000 sets of automobile tyres, 2,020 trucks and tractors, and a large number of self-propelled combine harvesters and other farm machines, railway carriages, spare parts, and other items.

In 1945 Romania received 300,000 tons of Soviet grain on credit.<sup>12</sup> In the next year, due to another crop failure, the Soviet Union delivered 50,000 tons of grain to Romania in exchange for oil products, and exported another 80,000 tons to that country under an agreement of June 25, 1947.<sup>13</sup>

The Romanian Prime Minister Petru Groza declared on June 27, 1947: "The years of drought have placed us in a difficult situation. We had to pay in gold for corn from the West. The terms forced on us were onerous and despite this we got very little corn. We had again to knock on the door of our friends in the East. We know that they have also had a drought and yet last year they loaned us 30,000 railway car-loads of grain which they delivered without asking for any guarantees, without demanding gold, and we were unable to repay that debt. Nevertheless, we asked our friends again, and they understood us and are now again helping us."<sup>14</sup>

Reciprocal deliveries of goods between the USSR and Czechoslovakia were included into the volume and nomenclature envisaged in an agreement signed on April 12, 1946.<sup>15</sup> On the same day, a protocol was signed on emergency supplies of grain to Czechoslovakia (to

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 227.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 229.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 234-36.

<sup>12</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945*, p. 33.

<sup>13</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Annual report of the USSR Embassy in Romania for 1947.*

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations, 1945-1960*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 66-70 (in Russian).

be repaid with deliveries of Czechoslovak-made goods for the relevant sum in the course of 1946). At the Soviet-Czechoslovak talks in Moscow in mid-July 1947 agreement was reached on reciprocal deliveries for a term of five years.<sup>16</sup> This is by no means an exhaustive record of the food and other material assistance extended to the People's Democracies. Vast quantities of food were distributed to the German population by the Soviet Army after the liberation of the eastern part of Germany and Berlin. The Soviet Union met the requests of the People's Democracies despite its own difficulties in agriculture in those years.

Diverse other assistance, including financial aid, was rendered in those years to the People's Democracies. For instance, under an agreement signed on December 14, 1948 Czechoslovakia received a Soviet loan of 132,500,000 rubles (in gold bars) at an annual interest rate of 2.5 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

Trade, shipping, and other bilateral long-term agreements played a substantial role in promoting economic relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies. In Moscow on February 20, 1947 the USSR and Romania signed a trade and shipping treaty envisaging an expansion of economic relations through a "reciprocal unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation status in all matters relating to trade and shipping between the two countries, and also to industry and all forms of economic activity on their territories".<sup>18</sup> The Soviet Union signed analogous accords with other socialist countries: Hungary (July 15, 1947), Czechoslovakia (December 11, 1947), and Bulgaria (April 1, 1948). Article 1 of the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty declared that the signatories "shall, from time to time, conclude agreements defining the volume and nomenclature of reciprocal deliveries of goods for annual and long-term periods, and also other terms ensuring an uninterrupted and growing turnover between the two countries in accordance with the economic development requirements of each of them".<sup>19</sup> The USSR and the Polish People's Republic signed a trade agreement on January 26, 1948 defining basic quantities of goods deliveries worth a total of over \$ 1,000 million for the period 1948-1952. In addition, an agreement was signed on the sale to Poland of industrial plant on credit in the course of 1948-1956.

These agreements, signed in 1947-1950, were an expression of the new economic relations that were taking shape between socialist states. Underlying them was the Soviet Union's desire to help these

<sup>16</sup> Klement Gottwald, *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, pp. 164-66 (Russian translation).

<sup>17</sup> *Soviet-Czechoslovak Relations, 1945-1960*, pp. 158-60.

<sup>18</sup> *Collection of Operating Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions Concluded by the USSR with Foreign Countries*, Issue XIII, Moscow, 1956, pp. 336-42 (in Russian) (hereafter, *Collection of Operating Treaties...*).

<sup>19</sup> *Soviet-Bulgarian Relations, 1944-1948*, pp. 428-39.

countries restore their economies. Fulfilment of these agreements was accompanied by the expansion and consolidation of mutually beneficial economic relations between the USSR and the People's Democracies and a rapid growth of trade between the latter countries. At the close of 1950 the USSR went over to long-term economic agreements with the People's Democracies. For instance, it signed a five-year agreement for 1951-1955 with Czechoslovakia in November 1950, and a four-year agreement for 1952-1955 with the GDR in November 1951. Long-term agreements were concluded with Romania and Albania in 1951, and with Hungary in January 1952.

Soviet assistance and the budding economic cooperation between the People's Democracies themselves were largely the factors contributing to the successful fulfilment of the two- and three-year economic development plans of these countries and their transition to long-term planning. This created a solid foundation for expanding economic cooperation in depth and breadth, and for the appearance of new forms of economic relations between socialist states.

On this road, too, there were many difficulties, chiefly on account of the vast destruction wrought by the war and the fact that the economy of almost all the People's Democracies was formerly oriented on the West and, at the initial stage, naturally bore the imprint of subordination to the interests of capitalist monopolies. That stage witnessed the transition from the old, capitalist system of foreign trade relations to the new, socialist economic relations.

In those years the economic relations between socialist countries developed primarily on a bilateral basis. New forms of cooperation and the socialist world market were only emerging.

A large role was played by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in putting broad economic cooperation into shape among the socialist states. It was set up by decision of an economic conference of representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR in Moscow on January 5-8, 1949. In this decision it was noted that in order to coordinate the economic policy of the People's Democracies and the Soviet Union it was necessary to go over from bilateral to multilateral relations and set up a coordinating agency. It was declared that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was an open organisation that could be joined by other countries accepting its principles and desiring broad economic cooperation with its member-states.<sup>20</sup> CMEA was joined by Albania in February of the same year, and by the GDR in September 1950.

A beginning was thus laid for broad, multilateral economic cooperation among the socialist countries.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 44-45.

<sup>21</sup> V. Meshcheryakov, B. Poklad, E. Shevchenko, *CMEA: Principles, Problems, Prospects*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 31-61 (in Russian).

## Birth and Development of a New Type of International Relations

The new, socialist international relations in the socialist community gradually sank deeper roots. They differ fundamentally from the relations predominant in the capitalist world. "The world socialist system," the CPSU Programme declares, "is a new type of economic and political relationship between countries".<sup>22</sup>

"The essential nature of international relations under capitalism," Lenin wrote, was "the open robbery of the weaker."<sup>23</sup> The relations between states of the old world boiled down to economic and political domination of the weak by the strong, to the enslavement of small nations. In its international political practice imperialism constantly transgresses the common democratic provisions of international law adopted in the period of bourgeois revolutions, such as equality of states and respect for their territorial integrity, independence, and national identity.

Socialism gave rise to entirely different international relations. Lenin defined the basic content of socialist international relations, writing that "the Bolsheviks are establishing completely different international relations which make it possible for all oppressed peoples to rid themselves of the imperialist yoke".<sup>24</sup> While the relations between socialist and capitalist countries are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the relations in the socialist world community are governed by the principles of socialist internationalism. These relations are not confined to the maintenance of peace and equal cooperation. They envisage wide-ranging mutual assistance. Their substance springs from the nature of the social system in the USSR and the other socialist countries, a system founded on public property in the means of production and ruling out exploitation of man by man. "For the peoples to be able truly to unite," Marx wrote, "they must have common interests. And in order that their interests may become common, the existing property relations must be done away with, for these property relations involve the exploitation of some nations by others... The victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie is, at the same time, victory over the national and industrial conflicts which today range the peoples of the various countries against one another in hostility and enmity."<sup>25</sup>

<sup>22</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 465.

<sup>23</sup> V.I. Lenin, "Regret" and "Shame", *Collected Works*, Vol. 17, p. 189.

<sup>24</sup> V. I. Lenin, The Eighth All-Russia Congress of Soviets, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 477.

<sup>25</sup> Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 6, Moscow, 1976, p. 388.



The unity and solidarity of the Soviet and other peoples of the socialist community are determined by their common socio-economic system, by their common ideology—Marxism-Leninism, by their common interests in safeguarding revolutionary socialist gains and national independence against encroachment by imperialist reaction, and by their great common aim of building socialism and communism. All this provides the objective foundation for durable friendly state-to-state relations in the socialist community, for pooling efforts in the building of socialism and communism, for a joint struggle against imperialism and imperialist policy, and for a common defence of the international interests of all the socialist community countries. United action by the socialist countries in foreign policy is one of the cardinal factors preserving peace and ensuring progress for all mankind.<sup>26</sup>

Cooperation among socialist countries in foreign policy developed and was perfected as the People's Democracies advanced along the road of socialism.

Close interaction on the international scene, joint, coordinated actions with the view to preventing war and to safeguarding world peace, untiring efforts to establish the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different socio-economic systems, achieve disarmament, support the national liberation movement, and abolish the colonial system, and joint action against military gambles of all kinds are the hallmarks of the socialist countries' foreign policy.

The formation of the socialist world community helped to widen the framework of international relations. In the capitalist world the concept "international relations" is synonymous with "state-to-state relations". It covers only the system of relations between governments and their agencies. In the case of socialist international relations they cannot be reduced solely to relations between states, for they embrace all aspects of the life of nations. The working masses themselves—workers, peasants, and working intellectuals of all the socialist countries—take a direct and active part in strengthening the community of socialist states and, consequently, in the implementation of the principles of socialist interstate relations. A key role in promoting cooperation among socialist countries is played by the fraternal relations between communist and workers' parties adhering to the principles of Marxism-Leninism and by the friendly relations between mass organisations.

The Marxist-Leninist communist and workers' parties of the socialist countries are ruling parties, and on the basis of scientific, Marxist analysis they determine the foreign policy line of their countries. They attach paramount significance to solidarity among the socialist states and carry on work among all sections of the population

<sup>26</sup> Sh. P. Sanakoyev, *The Socialist World System*, Moscow, 1968, pp. 72-110 (in Russian).

with the purpose of surmounting survivals of nationalism and chauvinism, all sorts of national narrowness, and difficulties standing in the way of the successful development of genuinely socialist relations among nations. The nationalism that seeped into the leadership of the communist parties of China and Albania was the source of the difficulties that subsequently arose in the relations of these countries with other socialist states.

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The victory of people's democratic revolutions in a number of European and Asian countries and the breakaway of these countries from the capitalist system created the economic and political conditions for the formation of a united socialist world community. The development of the socialist revolution in the People's Democracies was accompanied by the expansion of their economic, political, and cultural links with the Soviet Union.

The emergence of the socialist world community signified that a radical turn had taken place in international relations. It changed the balance of class and political forces on the international scene decisively in favour of socialism. The socialist countries began exercising a mounting influence on the international development.

Further, the formation of this community was paralleled by the rise of international relations of a new type entirely consistent with the nature of socialism. The relations of friendship and mutual assistance between the socialist countries effectively help each nation to carry out its tasks in the building of socialism and communism and to strengthen the socialist community as a whole. They help to accelerate the attainment, through joint efforts, of the ultimate goal of the peoples of socialist countries, namely, the building of a communist society.

Socialist international relations are relations not only of peace and true equality but also of fraternal mutual assistance between the free and sovereign nations of the socialist community. They are the prototype of the relations that will in future be asserted between all the nations of the world.

## CHAPTER XVII

### SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE GERMAN QUESTION DURING THE INITIAL POSTWAR YEARS (1945-1949)

The Soviet people's victory over German fascism opened up a real possibility for achieving durable international security under which every nation would be confident about its future. To attain this objective it was imperative to resolve one of the most difficult international problems, namely, to reshape the life of Germany on democratic and peaceful principles and prevent any resurgence of German militarism that could threaten peace in Europe and the whole world. These tasks were given high priority in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government was guided by them in drafting allied decisions and in implementing practical measures in Germany.

A new Germany could not appear overnight. It was not a matter of simply giving state institutions a new coating or replacing individuals in the former ruling elite. Enormous work had to be accomplished in order to extirpate German militarism and nazism, abolish their social base, remove their proponents from state, economic, and public life, and remould the people's way of thinking.

Germany had to compensate as much as possible for the damage and losses it inflicted on the Soviet Union, Poland, France, Yugoslavia, and other countries. War criminals and those who helped to plan or carry out the nazi actions that entailed atrocities or other crimes had to answer for their deeds. The trial of the chief war criminals, which commenced in Nuremberg in November 1945 and ended on October 1, 1946 with the handing down of sentences by the International Military Tribunal, was met with approval and deep satisfaction by world public opinion. These sentences were not only an act condemning fascism, aggression, and violence in international relations but also a stern warning against any repetition of such infamies. The Nuremberg trial indicated that the victor powers could cooperate successfully in the postwar period in the lofty cause of excluding war from the life of mankind. After fascism was crushed the German people were given the opportunity of beginning a new life. In Germany there were forces that could build that new life. Although the Communist Party of Germany lost tens of thousands of its members in the struggle against the Hitler regime, it emerged unvanquished from this struggle. The stern school of nazi persecution and imprisonment brought many Social-Democrats, members of the bour-

geoisie, and intellectuals round to a sober evaluation of the developments of the past few decades that led Germany into national catastrophe. More than to anybody else, the right to speak on behalf of Germany belonged to the German working people, who paid dearly for the adventurism and greed of their rulers.

Such was the situation in Germany. The principles proclaimed in the Potsdam and other quadripartite agreements had to be embodied in the policy and actions of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France and of their military administrations in Germany.

### Democratic Reforms in East Germany

The Soviet people and government never identified the population of Germany with the nazi clique that ruled that country. The Soviet Union fought to crush the Hitlerite army, the Hitlerite government, and the Hitlerite state. Guided by the foreign policy principles laid down by Lenin, the Soviet government and its representatives acted as friends of the German working class and gave their support to all the patriotic, progressive forces in Germany. After the war the Soviet military authorities called upon the German population to join actively in remoulding their life. They gave every encouragement to the people's participation in considering and resolving questions concerning political and economic construction.

The Statutes of the Military Administration for the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany, approved by the Council of People's Commissars on June 6, 1945, stated that "their task is to verify Germany's fulfilment of the terms of unconditional surrender, administer the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, and implement the agreed decisions of the Control Council on major military, political, economic, and other issues common to the whole of Germany".<sup>1</sup>

Acting within these strictly delineated powers, the Soviet Military Administration for Germany unflinchingly observed the German people's right to self-determination. In the Soviet zone the people were given the right to decide for themselves what social system there should be in Germany. As S. Dernberg, a GDR historian, rightly noted, the Soviet Military Administration for Germany "undertook nothing to change the socio-economic system, for it considered that to be the internal affair of the German people. For that reason all the laws and instructions, which penetrated deep into the existing social orders and were important component parts of anti-fascist, democratic, revolutionary changes (the land reform, expropriation of the property of war criminals and active nazis, the creation of a public

<sup>1</sup> *For an Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany. A Collection of Documents, 1945-1949*, Moscow, 1969, p. 65 (in Russian).

sector, the democratic school reform, and so on) were not only carried out but also worked out and adopted by the democratic and patriotic forces of the German people and the parliamentary, state, and administrative agencies set up by them."<sup>2</sup>

The creation of political parties and trade unions was permitted in East Germany earlier than in the other occupation zones. In the Soviet zone the Communist Party of Germany (CPG), the Social-Democratic Party of Germany (SDPG), the Christian-Democratic Union (CDU), the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), and the Free German Trade Unions Federation were formalised organisationally in June 1945. These parties cooperated closely in the anti-fascist bloc set up by them. Together with the Free German Trade Unions Federation, this bloc played a large part in democratising socio-political life in the Soviet zone and in restoring the peaceful economy, local self-administration, and social insurance.

An important development was the merging of the CPG and SDPG in April 1946 in the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SUPG). This put an end to the split in the German working-class movement, which in the past the reactionary forces of Germany had used time and again for their own ends.

Local self-administration bodies had been formed in all the towns and rural communities of East Germany by mid-1945, while state (Länder) administrations, vested with the right to issue instructions that had the force of laws, began functioning six months after Germany's surrender.

Elections to the communal, district, and state (Länder) assemblies of people's representatives were held in East Germany in September-October 1946. These were elections by equal, direct, and secret ballot and were held under the traditional German proportional system. The elections to the district and state assemblies brought the SUPG 47.8 per cent of the votes, the CDU 26.5 per cent, and the LDP 22.7 per cent. They were thus a triumph for the anti-fascist parties, chiefly of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, which led the advanced forces of East Germany in the struggle against the intrigues of external and internal reaction.

A land reform was put into effect in the Soviet occupation zone in the course of 1945-1948. It ended the East German countryside's domination by the Junkers, who had for centuries been the main exponents of militarism. Initiated by the Communist Party with the vigorous support of other parties and organisations, this reform was a major gain not only of the German peasants but of all the working people.

Land was distributed by special commissions elected by secret ballot at meetings of farm workers, landhungry peasants, resettlers,

<sup>2</sup> *Voyenno-istorichesky zhurnal*, No. 8, 1966, p. 8.

and small tenants. These commissions, to which more than 51,000 persons were elected<sup>3</sup>, operated democratically. Some 290,000 new peasant households were formed, and a total of more than 530,000 households received land.<sup>4</sup> The reform affected more than 30 per cent of all the land, changing the make-up of the German countryside, marking a turning point in the development of the German peasantry, and involving the peasants in active participation in East Germany's political life.

In accordance with the demand of the Free German Trade Unions Federation and democratic political parties and with the will of the overwhelming majority of the population, the property of war criminals and active nazis was confiscated in the Soviet zone and turned over to the German self-administration bodies. The factories of IG Farbenindustrie, Hermann Göring Werke, AEG Siemens, Flick and other concerns passed into the hands of the people. This put an end once and for all to monopoly rule in East Germany.

In the Soviet zone German military units were disbanded and war factories, installations, and warehouses were dismantled in conformity with the Potsdam agreements. In January 1947 a commission of representatives of the four powers, which conducted an investigation on assignment from the Control Council, confirmed that the Soviet occupation authorities were conscientiously fulfilling their commitments under the Potsdam agreements. In the reports of the commanders of the four zones to the Control Council on the state of affairs on December 1, 1947 it was noted that in the Soviet zone all German military installations, projects, and materials had been destroyed.<sup>5</sup>

An immutable aim of the Soviet Union was the extirpation of fascism in all its forms and manifestations. In its work on denazification the Soviet Military Administration relied on the German working people and their political and public organisations. In Saxony, for instance, a referendum was taken on a draft law providing for the punishment of war criminals and active nazis and the uprooting of nazi influence: 2,683,401 persons (77.7 per cent) favoured the draft law, and 571,600 persons (16.5 per cent) were opposed. The working people helped to find and bring to book many leading nazi war criminals and purge the police, the press, the judiciary, the self-administration organs, and the education bodies. In the Soviet zone the denazification commission completed its work and was dissolved on March 10, 1948.

The economic and political changes carried out in East Germany

<sup>3</sup> *Die Bodenreform in Deutschland*, Berlin, 1947, p. 19.

<sup>4</sup> *3 Jahre Bodenreform in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone*, Berlin, 1948, p. 18.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Document of the Joint Military Directorate of the Control Council in Germany (Document C/II/47/49-50) of December 31, 1947.

by the Soviet Military Administration and the German self-administration bodies radically remoulded that part of the country. Once the stronghold of the Prussian Junkers, East Germany was now the champion of the German nation's democratic renewal.

### Lessons of History Ignored in the Western Occupation Zones

As in East Germany, in the Western zones the initial period after the war witnessed a demarcation of social forces. The prestige and numerical strength of the anti-fascist parties and organisations, the Communists in the first place, which had rendered the people tremendous services in the struggle against the Hitler regime, grew rapidly. At the other pole, the politicians who had compromised themselves by collaborating with the Hitler regime feared to raise their head, and their influence on public life waned. The democratic changes in the Soviet zone were strongly influencing progressive opinion in West Germany. These developments frightened the governments of the USA, Britain, and France, and they made every effort to direct them into what they considered a safer channel.

In 1946 the Landtag of Hessen (US zone), which had before it the example of the democratic reforms in the Soviet zone, included in its draft state constitution an article on nationalising mining and steel-making enterprises, power stations, and railways, and placing the management of large banks and insurance companies under state control. The US occupation authorities ordered the deletion of this article. However, the public mood prevented the Hessen government from complying. General Lucius D. Clay (the US commander-in-chief appointed in 1947) then ordered a plebescite on the article envisaging the nationalisation of some enterprises. The plebescite did not justify the general's hopes: 70 per cent of the Hessen voters were in favour of retaining the article in the constitution. Nevertheless, the US administration prevented this article from coming into force.<sup>6</sup>

This arbitrary action of the US administration in Hessen was not the only one of its kind. The Truman government in the USA and the Labour government in Britain vetoed the law on the nationalisation of heavy industry and on the alienation of the property of reactionary industrial magnates passed on August 6, 1948 by the Landtag of North Rhine-Westphalia in accordance with the will of the people of that largest industrial region of West Germany.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Weissbuch über die amerikanisch-englische Interventionspolitik in Westdeutschland und das Wiedererstehen des deutschen Imperialismus, Leipzig, 1951, p. 71.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. The Ruhr industrial region is part of North Rhine-Westphalia.

The USA, Britain, and France blocked the land reform wanted by the working peasants in West Germany.

Decartelisation was halted in the Western occupation zones. The laws passed on this question in above zones formally repeated the requirements of the Potsdam agreements, but made no provision for the implementation of these requirements. The Ferguson Committee, appointed by the US Secretary of the Army, to study progress of the decartelisation programme in West Germany noted in its report of April 15, 1949, that due to the actions of US officials none of the giant German cartels was affected by the programme.<sup>8</sup>

The Potsdam decisions prohibiting all militarist activity and organisations were not carried out. Even when, on the insistence of the Soviet Union and under pressure from German democratic opinion, the three Western powers voted in the Control Council for one progressive resolution or another, that resolution was more frequently than not promptly shelved.

In the Western occupation zones denazification was turned into a farce. The vast majority of active nazis and officials of the Hitlerite regime were not brought to trial. Many prominent Hitlerite officials and nazi industrialists were cleared by the denazification courts and retained their posts in industry, the judiciary, and the police. General Clay's deputy acknowledged that in the US zone the denazification law was adopted more to return as many people as possible to their former posts than to punish the guilty.<sup>9</sup>

Matters were no better in the British occupation zone, where most of the nazi officials, judges, and school teachers retained their posts. The Western powers thus wrecked the fulfilment of one of the main requirements of the Potsdam agreements in their zones.

At sittings of the Control Council and at sessions of the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet Union constantly had to draw attention to cases where the governments of the USA, Britain, and France had subverted agreed measures for the demilitarisation of West Germany. On November 26, 1945, for instance, the Soviet representative read a memorandum at a sitting of the Control Council noting that a Nord Army Group numbering more than 100,000 effectives had been formed of Wehrmacht units in the British zone and that in Schleswig-Holstein about a million German officers and men had not been transferred to the status of prisoners of war and were even engaged in military training. The British representatives did not deny these facts and promised the Control Council that these units would be disbanded by January 31, 1946.

Large units consisting of German military servicemen, of whom there were 580,000 in the US zone and nearly 35,000 in the French

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, April 30, 1949.

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Times*, November 6, 1946.



zone, were maintained.<sup>10</sup>

The British and US authorities kept German military units intact under the guise of "labour battalions", "guard companies", "German service groups", and "factory police". According to official US and British statistics, which give only a poor approximation of the actual state of affairs, there were in mid-1946 upwards of 150,000 men in only the "service groups" and "labour battalions" in their zones.

On Soviet initiative the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (March-April 1947) considered what had been achieved in the way of demilitarising Germany. Under the pressure of facts cited by the Soviet representative, the Western ministers had to admit that in their zones fulfilment of the inter-Allied decisions on the dismantling of military installations and war factories was proceeding very slowly. The Foreign Ministers directed the Control Council to complete demilitarisation within the shortest possible time.

But even this directive was ignored. On December 1, 1947, of the 186 war factories, warehouses, and workshops sited underground in the US zone 161 remained untouched. Nothing was done to destroy 162 permanent fortifications. In the British zone 158 anti-aircraft installations and 860 permanent fortifications were intact on the same date.<sup>11</sup>

On February 10, 1948 the Soviet representative in the Control Council proposed urgent measures to fulfil the Allied agreements on Germany's demilitarisation. This was rejected by the Western representatives. Subsequent developments showed that this was part of a calculated Western policy aimed at preserving the material and technical facilities for the revival of German militarism.

In accordance with inter-Allied agreements, one of the objectives of the occupation of Germany was to ensure Germany's fulfilment of its reparations commitments. In practice, however, the Western powers did everything to disrupt the programme of reparations from the Western zones, a programme mapped out in the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and then specified in the relevant decisions of the Control Council. Instead of the 25 per cent of the industrial plant unneeded for the German peaceful economy that it was to get from the Western zones under the Potsdam agreements, the Soviet Union received reparations valued at only \$ 12,500,000.<sup>12</sup>

West Germany's economic requirements—the pretext usually given by the USA and Britain—were by no means the motivation for this flagrant violation of Allied agreements. At the 5th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers the Soviet delegation noted with full

<sup>10</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report on the work of the Allied Control Authority in Germany, July 1945-March 1948, pp. 37-38.

<sup>11</sup> UN Document S/P/47/49-50 of December 31, 1947.

<sup>12</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, part I, p. 429 (in Russian).

grounds that industrial output in the combined Anglo-US zone was only 35 per cent of the 1938 level, while in the Soviet zone, which made its reparations deliveries, it reached 52 per cent. It was only necessary to increase industrial output in the Western zones to 70 per cent of that level to make it possible to deduct 10 per cent for current reparations deliveries, while radically improving the supply of goods for the German population.<sup>13</sup> The actual motivation of US and British behaviour in the reparations question was to hinder the post-war restoration of the Soviet economy.

This was part of a plan, contemplated already then, of imposing a trade and economic blockade on the socialist countries and starting a cold war against them.

At the same time, the Western powers more than satisfied their own reparations claims by confiscating German property abroad, patents, and gold reserves, and also by the forcible export from Germany of scarce commodities at dirt cheap prices. From official West German statistics we learn that only the confiscated German property abroad was worth at least 20,000 million marks in prewar prices.<sup>14</sup> Jacques Rueff, President of the Inter-Allied Reparations Agency, knew what he was talking about when he declared at the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers that it would be hard to distort the intentions of the compilers of the Potsdam act more than was done by the Western powers in the question of reparations.<sup>15</sup>

While in East Germany the Soviet authorities promptly responded to democratic initiatives of the German population, the military administrations in the Western occupation zones did everything to mute political activity by the people. They procrastinated in permitting German political parties to function with the argument that new German political trends could not be allowed to develop spontaneously from the grassroots.<sup>16</sup> In practice, the measures taken by the USA, Britain, and France against the "spontaneous development" of political life in West Germany resulted in the creation of obstacles to the functioning of the Communist Party and other progressive organisations determined to restore the unity of the West German working class. At the other pole they gave every support to bourgeois parties and right-wing leaders of the Social-Democratic Party. Moreover, they rejected all Soviet proposals for granting German parties

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, part II, pp. 263-64.

<sup>14</sup> *Bulletin des Presse- und Informationsamtes der Bundesregierung*, No. 140, July 5, 1958, p. 1467.

<sup>15</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Council of Foreign Ministers document 47/M/87 of March 30, 1947.

<sup>16</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report of the Control Council to the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 1947, section "Democratisation".

and trade unions the possibility of uniting nationwide. Had this possibility been opened it would have gone far towards preserving Germany's political unity.

Time and again the Soviet Government drew attention to the fact that the occupation authorities in the Western zones were having recourse to subterfuges and political manipulations in order to remove progressives from participation in self-administration bodies. An illustration of this was the following case which was brought up for examination in the Control Council. At the communal elections in the British zone in September 1946 the Social-Democratic Party polled 11,178,000 votes and received 2,549 mandates, the Communist Party polled 2,000,000 votes and received only 139 mandates, and the Christian Democratic Union polled 11,000,000 votes and received 8,583 mandates. In justifying this gross violation of democracy, spokesmen of the British authorities asserted that it was a fact that, although at the beginning this (electoral) system had been possibly alien to the German people, it had been implemented by authorised German officials with consummate skill and precision.<sup>17</sup> This is one of innumerable instances where, had Britain, the USA, and France not obstructed the amalgamation of the Communist and Social-Democratic parties of West Germany or, at least, close cooperation between them, and had they not by artificial means placed economic and political power in the hands of right-wing bourgeois groups, political development in the Western zones might have followed an entirely different direction.

In all the Western zones the trade unions and the democratic women's, youth, and other mass organisations were removed from participation in elections. Encouragement was given to reactionary forces, those self-same forces that had been the bulwark of fascism and the policy of aggression. Hatred of communism and fear of democratic reforms prompted the Western powers to support reactionary elements and ignore the lessons of history, to turn a blind eye to the role the German imperialists had played in unleashing two world wars, to the crimes committed by the German fascists.

### Clash of Two Lines in the Question of Germany's Unity

Following the war the USSR was tireless in its efforts to prevent the three Western powers from wrecking the Allied agreements on

<sup>17</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives, Report of the Control Council to the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 1947, section "Democratisation".

Germany and from using Germany or, at least, its western part in the political interests of the capitalist bloc headed by the USA. To quote US President Harry S. Truman, Germany's "nominal political unity"<sup>18</sup> had no value to the West. The USA and the other Western powers were determined to harness Germany or, at least, that part of Germany controlled by them to their plans of combatting socialism's growing influence. They never regarded the preservation of Germany's unity as an end in itself, as a factor restraining them from divisive activities, or compelling them to ponder the consequences of their scenario for eroding the quadripartite mechanism for Germany's administration and repudiating cooperation with the USSR in the German question.

Only Soviet endeavours kept vital issues for Germany's future such as the creation of the central German administrative agencies envisaged by the Potsdam Agreement, the formation of a provisional government for the whole of Germany, permission for political parties and trade unions to function throughout Germany, the working out of a single electoral system for all the occupation zones, and the implementation of economic measures for the entire country, on the agenda of the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Control Council. The Soviet Union insisted on a democratic agrarian reform and political and economic transformations throughout Germany ensuring that country's democratic rejuvenation and its conversion into a peaceful state. But the Soviet proposals ran against uncompromising resistance from the Western powers.

At the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris in 1949 the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson alleged that, among other things, the questions of currency and of German exports and imports could not be discussed on the basis of the Potsdam agreement and that that was the reason for Germany's division. He declared that Germany had automatically disintegrated into individual cells.<sup>19</sup> The existence of a united, independent, democratic, and peaceful German state on the political map of Europe did not belong to the West's postwar plans.

As early as the first session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (14 September 1945) the French Government submitted a memorandum declaring that "if it is the outcome of natural evolution and not an imposed solution, Germany's division will help to maintain security in Europe". It expressed regret that the Potsdam agreement provided for the creation of central administrative departments and some other measures that could "revive German unitary tendencies and encourage a return to a formula of a centralised

<sup>18</sup> *Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents*, Washington, 1950, p. 70.

<sup>19</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Verbatim report of the second sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 24, 1949.

German state". Further, it was suggested separating Rhine-Westphalia, including the Ruhr, from Germany.<sup>20</sup>

By acting on these guidelines the French representatives on the Control Council impeded the adoption of practical steps towards the establishment of central German departments. Together with the USA and Britain, France also assumed the responsibility for the fact that the German trade unions and political parties were denied permission to unite on a national scale.

A report by Byron Price, Truman's special envoy, who went to Germany at the close of 1945 to study the situation there, noted that it was France's policy to fragment Germany and that "we [the United States.—Ed.] must decide whether obstructions raised by the French government, which have deadlocked the four-power Control Council at Berlin, are to be permitted to defeat the underlying purposes of Allied policy".<sup>21</sup>

But the West had come to a decision long before the Price report was drawn up. However, while they were acting in the same direction as France, the USA and Britain preferred, for the time being, to withhold making their stand public.

At the second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris (April and July 1946) the Soviet government proposed the formation of a central German government that would undertake to sign a peace treaty and ensure Germany's fulfilment of the treaty's terms. It suggested the earliest possible establishment of a central administration as a transient measure.

France and Britain raised categorical objections to the Soviet proposal. French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault declared at the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 15, 1946 that Germany had been destroyed as an economic entity and that this had been justified—it had to be destroyed.<sup>22</sup> He demanded the separation of the Rhine province, the Ruhr and the Saar from Germany and the fragmentation of the rest of Germany into several independent states. At the same sitting British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted that with the exception of the French proposals for the separation of these territories from Germany, he was thinking along the same lines.<sup>23</sup>

In view of the quadripartite control of Germany's development, control in which the Soviet Union participated, the Western powers could hardly count on preserving militarist elements, bringing them to power, and openly entering into deal with them. They therefore did

<sup>20</sup> *Documents français relatifs à l'Allemagne, août 1945-février 1947*, Paris, 1947, pp. 13-14.

<sup>21</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XIII, No. 336, December 2, 1945, pp. 886.

<sup>22</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of the sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on May 15, 1946.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

all in their power to demolish the foundation of joint allied policy in Germany and remove their occupation zones from quadripartite control.

Here the initiative was taken by the USA, which at first gave this move an anti-French gloss. In a talk with General V. D. Sokolovsky, chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, on October 2, 1945, General Lucius D. Clay, representative of the US administration, declared that if the French went on opposing the creation of central German departments he would recommend agreement between his government and the government of the USSR on the creation of such departments for two zones, the US and the Soviet, and then the others would willy-nilly have to comply. Clay said he regretted that France had been given part of the territory that had earlier been in the US zone.<sup>24</sup>

In the Control Council in November 1945 the USA proposed the creation of central administrative departments for three or two zones. This was rejected by the Soviet Union on the grounds that it would contravene the principle of quadripartite administration of Germany and the treatment of Germany as a single entity.

The USA then entered into talks with Britain, in circumvention of the Control Council, on the economic and administrative fusion of their zones, and despite Soviet warnings and protests from German democratic opinion, the USA and Britain signed an agreement on December 2, 1946 on the creation of a so-called integrated zone (bizonal area).

Recalling this period many years later, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG A. A. Smimov that the USA and Britain believed that the creation of the bizonal area would disrupt the plans for bringing the Rhine-Ruhr industrial region under international control. In order to prevent this and crush France's hopes of using the Ruhr economy, the US and British governments secretly prepared the fusion of their zones and created the North Rhine-Westphalia region. Only at the final stage of the preparation Adenauer and Schumacher, Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, were summoned to Berlin in total secrecy and informed of what was taking place.<sup>25</sup>

On January 1, 1947 the USA and Britain transferred trade settlements between the bizonal area and the other zones from marks to dollars, in other words, they established a regime in German trade practised only in state-to-state trade. Even the French representatives

<sup>24</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk of General of the Army V.D. Sokolovsky, chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, with the representative of the US Military Administration in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay on October 2, 1945.

<sup>25</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk of the USSR Ambassador to the FRG with Konrad Adenauer on August 23, 1966.

in the Control Council had to acknowledge that this decision signified that the US and British zones had entirely renounced the principle of joint distribution of staple products, which was the "main element of economic unity". Renunciation of this principle "has changed Germany's monetary status, which had hitherto been regarded as one of the vital factors of economic unity... (and) leads to the creation of a separate economic entity in Germany."<sup>26</sup>

A separate German administrative apparatus for the two zones was set up in the bizonal area in mid-1947. This was followed by the establishment of joint US-British control of the Ruhr coal mines. Then, in December 1947, the USA and Britain signed an agreement, which, to quote General Clay, gave the Americans "the right of final decision in financial and economic matters" in the bizonal area.<sup>27</sup>

At the fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow (March-April 1947), the Soviet Union called upon the Western powers to abandon their separate, divisive activities. It proposed beginning forthwith the formation of a central German government. To this end it suggested immediately instituting central German administrative departments, drawing up a provisional democratic constitution, and holding free elections in all the zones in accordance with that constitution. This would be followed by the formation of a provisional German government for the whole of Germany.

The Soviet proposals detailed the question of Germany's state system. It was envisaged that "Germany shall be restored as a united peaceful state, a democratic republic, with a parliament consisting of two chambers and a central government to ensure the constitutional rights of the states in that country".<sup>28</sup> The central constitution and the constitutions of the states would guarantee democratic freedoms to all citizens and the election of all representative bodies by secret ballot on the basis of universal, equal and direct suffrage and within the framework of a proportional system. The Soviet proposals articulated the demands of German progressive parties and organisations. They took German democratic traditions into account and opened the way to the creation of a united democratic German Republic without changing the existing socio-economic relations.

The US, British and French representatives objected to the creation of a central German parliament and the formation of a central government on the basis of general elections. On April 4 the US Secretary

<sup>26</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report of the Control Council on Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers, April 1947, section "Economic Principles".

<sup>27</sup> Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, p. 178.

<sup>28</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, part I, pp. 441-42.

of State George C. Marshall bluntly declared that the US delegation did not feel elections had to be held for the formation of a provisional government.<sup>29</sup> The Western powers took a negative attitude also to the Soviet proposal for letting the Germans themselves decide the question of the state system in their country. On this point Marshall stated that he doubted the German people could reasonably approach the solution of this major issue.

Georges Bidault likewise denied support for the Soviet proposals. He said that it was "premature" to form a provisional central German government. "The French delegation," he declared, "feels that at present the paramount task of the occupation powers is to consolidate what has been done at the first stage. We should—and for our part we are trying to do this—create completely different states on a democratic basis."<sup>30</sup>

Due to this negative Western stand the talks in Moscow failed to resolve some other sensitive problems tabled by the Soviet Union, such as the drawing up of a peace treaty with Germany, and reparations. According to one of the architects of US postwar foreign policy, John Foster Dulles, the cardinal aim of the US delegation at the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was by no means to find understanding with the USSR on any aspect of the German problem. During this period the USA was set on bringing France to its side, counterposing it to the Soviet Union, and thereby forming a bloc of three powers. To gain this end the Americans backed France's claims to the Saar region and to deliveries of Ruhr coal to France.<sup>31</sup>

A report written by former US President Herbert Hoover, who went to Europe and visited West Germany on assignment from the US government, was published on March 18, 1947 while the Council of Foreign Ministers was in session. In this report to President Truman Hoover recommended setting up a separate German government for only the Western zones, concluding a separate peace treaty with it, ceasing the dismantling of war factories and decartelisation, conducting a separate monetary reform in West Germany, and returning the heads of the German wartime industry to the management of the economy.<sup>32</sup> The US government thus set its sights not on creating a united, democratic, and peaceful German state, but on the implementation of this programme of dividing Germany.

<sup>29</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Council of Foreign Ministers document 47/M/101 of April 4, 1947.

<sup>30</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Council of Foreign Ministers document 47/M/48 of March 22, 1947.

<sup>31</sup> John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, p. 103.

<sup>32</sup> *USA Congressional Records. Proceedings and Debates of the 80th Congress. First Session*, March 24, 1947, Vol. 93, No 55, Washington, Appendix, pp. A1280-83.



In this situation it is hardly to be wondered at that the Western powers did not respond to Soviet efforts to keep Germany united and preserve cooperation among the victor powers in the German question.

At the London session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (November-December 1947) the Soviet Union made yet another attempt to get the Western powers to fulfil the international agreements on Germany in the interests of the German people and peace in Europe. It proposed examining the question of an early peace settlement with Germany, stressing the immense significance of that settlement not only for Germany but also for the whole of Europe. It urged a settlement on the principles of a democratic peace that would facilitate Germany's economic rejuvenation and its restoration as an independent, democratic, and united nation.

It was proposed that together with the USSR the three Western powers should take urgent steps to form an all-German democratic government that would participate in drawing up the peace treaty. Further, the Soviet Union proposed convening a peace conference to be attended by nations whose armed forces had participated in the war against Germany, and within a period of two months drafting the principles of the peace treaty with Germany, while observing the Yalta and Potsdam decisions.<sup>33</sup>

In contrast to the Soviet efforts to settle, among other things, the question of free elections in the whole of Germany, a central German government, and the peace treaty on the basis of inter-Allied agreements, the Western powers made an attempt to retailor the Yalta and Potsdam decisions. At the talks in London they submitted their draft of so-called Additional Principles on the treatment of Germany that were to replace the previous Allied agreements and give a semblance of legality to their separate actions in West Germany.

In London the Western powers categorically opposed the Soviet Union's suggestion that representatives of the German people should be heard at the four-power talks. The British government denied entry into Britain to a delegation of the First German People's Congress, which was perhaps the broadest popular movement ever to have unfolded in Germany. This delegation had been instructed to inform the Council of Foreign Ministers that "the German people want the peace treaty to ensure the economic and political unity of Germany, or that the German people be granted the right to settle that question themselves through a nationwide referendum".<sup>34</sup>

The talks in the Council of Foreign Ministers were stalemated by the three Western powers. It was hard to have expected anything else.

<sup>33</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, part II, p. 253.

<sup>34</sup> *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question, Historical Survey*, Moscow-Berlin, 1959, p. 25 (in Russian).

While the Western ministers were pledging loyalty to the Allied commitments of the Council of Foreign Ministers sitting in London's Lancaster House, preparations were going on behind the scenes for the formalisation of a separate West German state.

A series of separate conferences of US, British, French, Belgian, Dutch, and Luxembourgian representatives, that ended with a decision to set up the Federal Republic of Germany and extend the Marshall Plan to it, was held in London in the first half of 1948 under the auspices of the US government. A separate monetary reform was enforced in West Germany on June 18, 1948 and in West Berlin on June 24 of the same year, with the result that special banknotes were introduced in the Western zones and West Berlin and the common all-German currency was declared invalid. This demolished Germany's economic unity. A common currency and common circulation of money ceased to exist in Germany. Normal economic links between the nation's individual regions were broken. The separate monetary reform was spread to West Berlin despite the earlier written assurances of the Western military commanders that no Western mark would be introduced. This reform was put into effect when through Soviet efforts agreement had been reached in the Control Council on the basic principles for a monetary reform throughout the whole of Germany. But the Western powers wanted a separate monetary reform as part of their policy of dividing the country and installing a reactionary regime hostile to the USSR in West Germany. The creation of a peaceful, democratic German state did not enter into their plans.

A conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, held in Warsaw in June 1948, denounced the decisions of the Western powers' separate talks in London as a flagrant breach of Allied duty, as a plan for turning West Germany, specifically the Ruhr heavy industry, into the means of restoring the German military potential with the purpose of using it in the interests of Western imperialist circles. The Warsaw conference demanded measures from the great powers to ensure Germany's demilitarisation, joint control of the Ruhr heavy industry for a specified period, formation of a provisional central German government consisting of representatives of German democratic parties and organisations, conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany in accordance with the Potsdam decision.<sup>35</sup>

The USA, Britain, and France moved methodically towards their goal of finally dividing Germany and setting up a separate reactionary regime in its western part. In their zones they prohibited canvassing for signatures under a demand for nationwide referendum on Germany's unity put forward by the democratic forces in the Soviet

<sup>35</sup> *For an Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany*, pp. 560-68.

zone. In West Germany they brutally suppressed the German People's Congress movement for unity and a just peace, giving their support to monopoly capital and the Junkers, to reactionary politicians prepared to cling to power even if it meant dividing the nation and selling out national interests.

On July 26, 1948 the commanders-in-chief of the three Western zones met in Frankfurt on the Main with the prime ministers of the state (Länder) governments of West Germany in order to constitutionalise the West German state. Six days later the French zone was joined to the bizonal area.

The so-called parliamentary council for the drafting of the West German constitution assembled in Bonn on September 1, 1948 under the chairmanship of the future FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The basic principles of the future constitution had been formulated by the occupation authorities. On May 8, 1949 the constitution was adopted by the selfsame parliamentary council and then endorsed by the commanders-in-chief of the US, British, and French armed forces in Germany.

The West German state was formalised on the initiative of the three Western powers in strikingly suspicious haste, in an atmosphere of political intrigues and machinations. This haste, noted in a report from the US commander-in-chief, was due to the striving to complete drafting the constitution of the future Federal Republic of Germany before the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Paris in May 1949.<sup>36</sup>

The American journalist Clark Delbert, who was for some years *The New York Times* correspondent in Germany and in that capacity privy to many secret aspects of US policy in the German question, wrote that instead of fulfilling the Potsdam decisions "surely, but not very slowly the United States Government and the British Government were undoing their wartime achievements. With a dreadful inevitability the German economy was being returned into the hands of the wreckers of the Weimar Republic, and no month went by without a fresh grant of authority to them. Bit by bit the denazification program was destroyed. The old guard again made its way into politics as well as into industry."<sup>37</sup>

The Western powers' switch to undisguised divisive actions sharply aggravated the situation in Germany and the whole of Europe. These actions put an end to the unity of Germany and Berlin. On March 20, 1948, after the three Western powers refused to inform the Control Council about the decisions of the separate conference in London, the Council was dissolved. Soon afterwards, on June 16, 1948, the Allied

<sup>36</sup> *Germany 1947-1949, The Story in Documents*, p. 281.

<sup>37</sup> Clark Delbert, *Again the Goose Step*, New York, 1949, pp. 16-17.

Kommandatura of Berlin ceased to exist as a result of the actions by the Western powers.

The Soviet Military Administration had to take steps to protect the economy of the Soviet zone and the interests of the inhabitants of East Germany. One reason that this was vitally necessary was that the Western powers had carried their divisive actions into Berlin as well, although they themselves recognised it as the capital of the Soviet occupation zone.<sup>38</sup> The unlawful monetary reform carried out in West Berlin was threatening to disorganise the circulation of money throughout the Soviet zone and inflict a paralysing blow to its population and economy. All the banknotes annulled in the Western zones were about to deluge East Germany. In order to protect the circulation of money and the economy of the whole Soviet zone, a ban was imposed on the use of the new banknotes issued in the Western occupation zones and also on the use of Reichsmarks and the marks printed by the Allied Military Command. The Soviet military authorities found themselves compelled to tighten control of the movement of goods and people between the Eastern zone, including Berlin, and the Western zones. Rigid control of communications between Berlin and the Western occupation zones was the inevitable response to the subversive actions of the three powers, to their attempts to impinge on the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union and also of the population of East Germany.

The Western sectors of Berlin retained the possibility of maintaining normal links, including economic links, with the rest of East Germany. The Soviet military administration declared it was prepared to keep supplies flowing to the population of these sectors.

However, for provocative purposes the three Western powers established a self-blockade of West Berlin. They organised a costly air lift of food, coal, and other commodities to West Berlin, turning it into a centre of the cold war.

The general tension in the world was the environment in which the USA, Britain, and France nurtured the Bonn state. The goals pursued by these powers in whipping up tension over Berlin were divulged by John Foster Dulles, then Supreme Adviser to the US Department of State, in an address to the US Overseas Writers' Association on January 10, 1949: "1. There could be a settlement of the Berlin situation at any time on the basis of a Soviet currency for Berlin and our right to

<sup>38</sup> For instance, the quadripartite report of the Control Council for Germany to the Council of Foreign Ministers (1947) states: "In view of the special status of Greater Berlin, which is a region occupied jointly by the four powers (as stated in the quadripartite agreement on the zones of occupation in Germany) and, at the same time, the capital of the Soviet zone of occupation, the Berlin central organs of these four parties likewise served as central organs for the parties in the Soviet zone."

bring in food, raw materials and fuel to the Western sectors.

"The present situation is, however, to US advantage for propaganda purposes. We are getting credit for keeping the people of Berlin from starving;<sup>39</sup> the Russians are getting the blame for their privations.

"2. If we settle Berlin, then we have to deal with Germany as a whole. We will have to deal immediately with a Russian proposal for withdrawal of all occupation troops and a return of Germany to the Germans."<sup>40</sup> This was exactly what the USA wanted to avoid. Even when Britain and France showed readiness to work out a solution that could satisfy the Soviet Union, the USA, in pursuance of its own aims, did not shrink from rejecting what it had itself suggested earlier and made agreement impossible.

After steps had been taken to protect the economy of the Soviet zone, the Soviet government removed the restrictions on communication between Berlin and the Western zones in order to ease international tension. It insisted on the USA, Britain, and France lifting their boycott of four-power cooperation and resuming the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers.<sup>41</sup>

At the four-power talks in New York the following agreement was reached on May 4, 1949:

"1) All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949;

"2) All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948 by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, or any one of them, on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Eastern zone and between the Western and Eastern zones of Germany will also be removed on May 12, 1949;

"3) Eleven days subsequent to the removal of the restrictions referred to in paragraphs one and two, namely on May 23, 1949, a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers will be convened in Paris to consider questions relating to Germany and problems arising out of the situation in Berlin, including also the question of currency in Berlin"<sup>42</sup>

The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers opened in Paris on May 23, 1949 to discuss the German question. The Soviet

<sup>39</sup> The threat of starvation existed only in West Berlin and this was exclusively due to the refusal of the USA, Britain, and France to accept the Soviet offer of food supplies for the whole of Berlin.

<sup>40</sup> Johannes Steel, *The Case for Peace*, New York, p. 8.

<sup>41</sup> *Izvestia*, June 30, 1949.

<sup>42</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, Moscow, 1953, p. 99; *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959*, Washington, 1959, pp. 59-60.

Union favoured the resumption of the work of the Control Council as the agency for coordinating the policies of the occupation authorities in Germany. It proposed the establishment of a central German State Council on the basis of the economic organs functioning in West and East Germany, and also the restoration of Berlin's unity, that was broken by the separate monetary reform and its after-effects, the resumption of the work of the Allied Kommandatura in Berlin in order to coordinate the administration of the city, the holding of free elections in the city, and the restoration of the single Berlin magistracy. Further, the Soviet Union proposed that within a period of three months the four powers should draft a peace treaty with Germany, one of whose provisions would be the withdrawal of all occupation troops from German territory within a year following the signing of the treaty. It insisted that the given (Paris) session of the Council of Foreign Ministers should complete its examination of the procedure for drafting the German peace treaty.<sup>43</sup>

What was the reply of the USA, Britain, and France to these proposals that were permeated with concern for Germany's destiny, for its unity, and world peace? They declared that the Control Council and the other four-power agencies set up in accordance with the agreements on the control mechanism in Germany were "outdated". Instead, they suggested setting up a new occupation agency, an Allied High Commission in which decisions would be passed by a majority vote, thus turning it into an instrument of the USA, Britain, and France. They refused to consent to the formation of a central agency for the whole of Germany and to hear the opinion of the Germans themselves. They opposed any steps towards the drafting of a German peace treaty.

They were particularly sharp in their objections to the Soviet proposal for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany. On June 12, 1949 Bevin stated emphatically that the British government was at present "not yet prepared to commit themselves to a definite date for the withdrawal of our troops from Germany.... I do not wish to give the Germans or anybody else false hopes. This is our attitude to the problem. I state this so that my statement is in the minutes."<sup>44</sup>

The patience and perseverance displayed by the Soviet Government at the Paris session made it possible to end the Berlin crisis. The sides agreed on the need to expand trade and economic relations and also normalise transportation between the Eastern and Western occupation zones.

However, hardly had the Paris conference ended than the Western powers violated its decisions. On June 20, 1949 they signed an agree-

<sup>43</sup> *For an Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany*, pp. 620, 625.

<sup>44</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Verbatim report of the 18th sitting of the Council of Foreign Ministers on June 12, 1949.

ment instituting the Allied High Commission, which was vested with supreme authority in West Germany and "all authority with respect to the control of Germany".<sup>45</sup> Under the "occupation statute" for West Germany, adopted earlier, on May 14, 1949, the key functions of state administration were the prerogative of the occupation authorities, while the population was in effect barred from all participation in the exercise of these functions.

In parallel they published the Occupation Statute for West Berlin, under which the Allied Kommandatura reserved the right "to ensure the security, good order and financial and economic stability of the city".<sup>46</sup> Actually, this Statute finalised Berlin's division and the separate development of its western part. It repudiated the aims adopted at Potsdam for the occupation of Germany (and Berlin).<sup>47</sup> This Statute thereby eroded the legal foundations for the presence of occupation troops in Berlin.

Elections to the parliament of a separate West German state were held in the Western zones on August 14, 1949. With the coming into force of the agreement on the Allied High Commission, the Occupation Statute, and the formation of the FRG government on September 20, 1949, Germany ceased to exist as an entity in fact and juridically. The divisive policy of the USA and its allies reached its logical end.

In a note to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on October 1, 1949 the Soviet government underscored the exceptionally grave responsibility that the Western powers were assuming by their policy in Germany, which had "resulted in the formation of an anti-popular separate government in Bonn hostile to the Potsdam decisions on the democratisation and demilitarisation of Germany and to the commitments imposed on Germany, which was incompatible with the interests of the peace-loving nations of Europe".<sup>48</sup>

The divisive policy conducted by the imperialist powers in collusion with the reactionary forces in West Germany encountered strong resistance from large segments of the German people, particularly from democratic and patriotic circles. The German People's Congress movement became active throughout Germany, demanding the earliest possible conclusion of a just and democratic peace treaty with Germany and calling upon Germans to take the destiny of their country into their own hands. On March 19, 1949, the German People's Council, elected by the Congress, approved an all-German Constitution.

<sup>45</sup> *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents, 1941-1949*, Washington, 1950, p. 603.

<sup>46</sup> *Documents on Germany, 1944-1959*, p. 61.

<sup>47</sup> *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question*, Moscow, 1959, p. 48 (in Russian).

<sup>48</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, p. 170.

The elections of delegates to the 3rd German People's Congress brought 95.2 per cent of the people eligible to vote to the polls in East Germany and in the democratic sector of Berlin. Of these 66.1 per cent, i. e., practically two-thirds of the population of East Germany voted for the candidates.

On May 30, 1949 the 3rd German People's Congress adopted the Constitution of the GDR, which declared that the "organs of State shall have the duty of maintaining and preserving friendly relations with all nations". The Constitution banned war and racist propaganda. Article 6 stated: "...incitement to boycott democratic institutions and organisations, incitement to murder democratic politicians, the profession of religious, racial or national hatred, militarist propaganda and incitement of war ... are crimes under the definition of the criminal code".<sup>49</sup> The Constitution enshrined the democratic freedoms and rights of all citizens regardless of property or social status.

On October 7, 1949, after the Federal Republic of Germany had become a fact, the People's Council unanimously passed a manifesto proclaiming the German Democratic Republic and the law enacting the Constitution of the GDR, earlier approved by the 3rd German People's Congress. The Soviet government recognised the legitimate aspiration of German democratic circles to take into their hands the country's rejuvenation on democratic and peaceful principles.<sup>50</sup>

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The Potsdam Agreement had created the conditions for Germany's democratic, peaceful development that would rule out war and aggression. A major prerequisite for the implementation of this agreement was the preservation of the cooperation shaped between the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France during the joint struggle against nazi aggression.

Shortly before US President Franklin D. Roosevelt died he said that "the fate of the United States—and of the world—for generations to come" would depend on the fulfilment of the Allied agreements on Germany. He cautioned:

"There can be no middle ground here. We shall have to take the responsibility for world collaboration, or we shall have to bear the responsibility for another world conflict."<sup>51</sup> These words were ignored by his successors.

<sup>49</sup> *Constitution of the German Democratic Republic*, Berlin, pp. 11, 12, 13.

<sup>50</sup> *For an Anti-Fascist Democratic Germany*, p. 659; *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, p. 223.

<sup>51</sup> *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-45*, Vol. XIII, *Victory and the Threshold of Peace*, New York, 1950, p. 585.



The governments of the USA, Britain, and France preferred a cold war and an arms race to cooperation with the Soviet Union. They were intent on reviving an imperialist Germany capable of returning to the notorious *Drang nach Osten* doctrine.

The course steered by the Western powers led to Germany's division. Two states following entirely different ways of development appeared on its territory. The power of monopoly capital was restored in the Federal Republic of Germany, which was given the role of the principal flashpoint of tension in Europe and a bastion of militarism and revanchism. In the other German state, the German Democratic Republic, power passed to the hands of the working people for the first time in German history. The GDR proclaimed that its policy objectives were peace and respect for international decisions aimed at consolidating peace in Europe and preventing the threat of war.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE DISARMAMENT (1946-1952)

Disarmament has been a key aim of Soviet foreign policy before and after the war. Lenin's thesis that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism"<sup>1</sup> defines one of the basic orientations of the USSR on the international scene. The task of ensuring disarmament after the war had been put forward by the Soviet Union before the Second World War ended. A declaration adopted in Moscow on October 30, 1943 by four powers—the USSR, the USA, Britain, and China—on the question of world security stated that the governments of these countries "will consult and cooperate with each other and with other members of the United Nations with the purpose of achieving a realistic universal agreement on the regulation of armaments after the war".

When the Second World War ended the Soviet Union initiated vigorous steps to ensure disarmament, steps which it is continuing to make to this day. Its consistent efforts to end the arms race and sign an international agreement on this question spring from the socialist character of Soviet society. In its approach to this problem the Soviet Union's unchanging point of departure is that the arms race has serious consequences for the peoples of all countries. It exacerbates international tension and increases the threat of another world war. Military expenditures fall squarely on the shoulders of the working masses. For that reason the struggle for disarmament pursues the great international aim of reducing the threat of war and easing the condition of the working people.

Further, since the end of the war disarmament has been dictated by the need for the earliest possible restructuring of the war economy into an economy of peace, for the restoration of a huge number of factories on Soviet territory that was occupied by the enemy, and for the development of all branches of the national economy, science, culture, the health services, and so on. Economic restoration required the transfer of a large proportion of the personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces to peaceful, civilian work. For that reason, as soon as the war in Europe ended the Soviet government began the demobilisation of officers and men. The first postwar Demobilisation Law covering a considerable segment of the personnel of the army in the

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 23, p. 95.

field was passed as early as June 23, 1945. This was followed by the demobilisation of many other categories of servicemen. The demobilisation of millions of officers and men posed the task of providing jobs, material security, and retraining. Also an urgent task was that of giving a home to the children orphaned by the war. Many other measures had to be taken in order to organise life under conditions of peace. The restoration of the nation's economy and the promotion of peaceful construction required lasting peace and the solution of the disarmament problems.

### **The Soviet Union and the Problem of Banning the Atomic Bomb in 1946-1952**

The question of banning the atomic bomb and removing it from national arsenals acquired immense significance after the war. The great scientific breakthroughs in nuclear energy had cleared the way to the utilisation of the new inexhaustible source of energy in the atomic nucleus. But, initially, the practical utilisation of these discoveries brought the peoples no benefit. They led to the development and use during the very last days of the Second World War of a lethal weapon of enormous destructive power—the atomic bomb. On July 16, 1945, after Nazi Germany was defeated and had surrendered, the first atomic tests were conducted in a desert in New Mexico, USA. The bomb was developed with the participation of scientists of many nationalities. "Science in many countries had supplied the key to controlled atomic explosions. The American scientific contribution was very small. The entire line of development leading to nuclear fission occurred mostly abroad."<sup>2</sup> Soon after this test, US President Harry S. Truman ordered atomic bombs to be dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 respectively.

There was no military necessity for using the atomic weapon against Japan, and the atomic bomb did not play the crucial role in the victory over that country. This is admitted even by prominent US and British political and military leaders. Admiral William D. Leahy, who was Chief of Staff of the US Armed Forces, declared that in his view the use of this barbarous weapon in Hiroshima and Nagasaki did not essentially aid the US war against Japan.<sup>3</sup> A similar view was stated in a report of the US President's advisory commission on military preparations published in May 1947. A leading British physicist, Professor P. M. S. Blackett, noted in this connection "that the dropping of the atomic bombs was not so much the last military act

<sup>2</sup> James S. Allen, *Atomic Energy and Society*, New York, 1949, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, New York-London-Toronto, 1950, p. 441.

of the Second World War, as one of the first major operations of the cold diplomatic war with Russia".<sup>4</sup>

The use of discoveries in nuclear physics, the development of the technology of manufacturing weapons of mass annihilation, the enormous destructive power of these weapons, and the inhuman destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki imperatively raised the problem of banning nuclear weapons, of ending the production and removing these means of warfare from national arsenals.

With the appearance of the atomic bomb the Soviet Union gave priority in its disarmament policy to the task of banning this weapon and ensuring the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes: for the welfare of mankind, for promoting the well-being and culture of the masses, for enlarging energy resources, and developing industry, agriculture, and transport. In international organisations Soviet representatives pointed out that the use of atomic weapons was incompatible with the honour and conscience of nations and offered to conclude an international agreement banning these weapons and on the use of fissionable materials exclusively for peaceful purposes with strict international control so that all nations would abide by the terms of that agreement.

For its part, the USA, which had a monopoly over atomic weapons during the early years after World War II, pursued a policy on the disarmament issues that was the direct opposite to that of the Soviet Union. In its drive for political expansion and, essentially, for world supremacy through its possession of atomic bombs, the USA sought to preserve its monopoly over that weapon and use it as a policy instrument. However, under pressure from public opinion, which was demanding the prohibition of atomic bombs, the US government endeavoured to give the impression that it was prepared to come to an agreement on the removal of nuclear weapons from national arsenals. It declared its readiness to sign an international nuclear ban agreement, but its actions belied its words. Moreover, it did everything to keep the technology of using atomic energy secret. In a joint declaration on November 15, 1945 Britain, Canada, and the USA expressed doubt about the expediency of disseminating information relative to the practical application of nuclear energy before the atomic bomb was banned, in other words, they were determined to maintain their monopoly in this sphere as long as possible although they knew that the extremely favoured position with regard to atomic devices, which the United States enjoyed at present, was only temporary. It would not last.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> P. M. S. Blackett, *Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy*, London, 1949, p. 127.

<sup>5</sup> Acheson-Lilienthal report on international control of atomic energy (*International Control of Atomic Energy. Growth of a Policy*, Washington, 1946, p. 47).

The problem of prohibiting nuclear weapons and utilising atomic energy for peaceful purposes was discussed broadly for the first time at the Moscow conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the USA, and Britain in December 1945. At that conference it was decided to institute an International Control Agency for Atomic Energy\* within the framework of the United Nations Organisation to consider this problem. A tense struggle developed in this commission between the Soviet Union and the United States over the question of banning nuclear weapons.

It was the USA's intention to prevent a ban on nuclear weapons and consolidate its nuclear monopoly.

In order to achieve this aim the US government blueprinted and submitted to the UN Commission on Atomic Energy a plan for the "internationalisation" of atomic production prohibiting all countries from setting up their own atomic industry and possessing atomic enterprises. Christened the "Baruch plan", after Bernard M. Baruch, the US representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, it was submitted by the United States to the Commission in June 1946. It envisaged a control authority, ostensibly "international", but in fact directed by the Americans and vested with extensive rights and powers. Since at the time the USA was assured of a majority of votes in the UN and in the Atomic Energy Commission, it counted on undivided domination in the "international" atomic development authority as well.

The Baruch plan proposed giving the control authority ownership of all factories producing fissionable material and vesting it with the sole and exclusive right to produce such materials and use atomic energy. The transfer of equipment, special apparatus, and primary and other materials to the ownership of the international control authority would be phased, beginning with the mining of primary material. Then control would spread to production, and lastly to explosives.

Had the task been set of removing the threat of atomic weapons, it would have been suggested that control should first be established over explosives, which are the basis of these weapons. However, since what the USA wanted was not the prohibition of atomic weapons but, in fact, command positions relative to all atomic enterprises in other countries, the Baruch plan suggested control initially of raw materials sources, then of all enterprises producing atomic materials and atomic energy, and lastly of the finished product, i. e., fissionable materials. The principle of phased control was designed to "internationalise" atomic production throughout the world, in other words, to subordinate it to US imperialism before any control was imposed on the fissionable materials and atomic bombs possessed by the USA.

\* Since January 24, 1946, the UN Commission on Atomic Energy.

Further, it was suggested giving the "international" authority the right to control, supervise, and issue all nations permission for all forms of activity in any way linked with atomic energy. Under the Baruch plan some countries would be prohibited from engaging not only in production but also in research and development in the field of atomic energy. The system of issuing countries permission for the use of atomic energy envisaged by this plan could have led to artificial restrictions on the economic development of individual countries possessing significant potentialities for using atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

The system of controlling nuclear energy proposed by the USA would have thus consolidated its nuclear weapons monopoly and given it the possibility of constantly interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and ultimately subordinating their economies to the US monopolies.

While presenting its blueprint for controlling atomic energy through the "internationalisation" of all the processes of producing and using this energy, the USA not only opposed a ban on atomic and other types of weapons of mass destruction but even suggested giving the international control authority the right to improve atomic weapons. "The Authority," the Baruch plan stated, "should be given the sole and exclusive right to conduct research in the field of atomic explosives."<sup>6</sup>

The basic objective of the Baruch plan was thus to remove atomic enterprises from all countries and turn them over to an "international" authority, through which the USA counted on managing and controlling all atomic production in the world. The Baruch plan was a detailed programme of demands which US diplomacy sought to impose on other countries. These demands went so far that their acceptance would in fact have signified the surrender of sovereign rights by the countries concerned. Enforcement of the Baruch plan would have created a situation in which the "international" authority would have become a supra-state agency. It would have interfered in the affairs of countries, and decided whether to permit or prohibit one or another enterprise linked with nuclear production, in other words, it would have influenced the economic development of different countries. By making no provision for banning nuclear weapons, this plan pursued the aim of perpetuating the USA's monopoly over nuclear weapons and utilising this monopoly in the interests of US imperialism to the detriment of the vital interests, sovereign rights, and security of other nations. This plan was an expression of the aggressive, expansionist ambitions of the US military. In proposing the Baruch plan, US diplomacy sought not only to establish an "inter-

<sup>6</sup> *International Control of Atomic Energy. Growth of a Policy*, p. 144.

national" authority as a cover for a worldwide US monopoly over the production of nuclear fuel and atomic energy, but also to legalise the production, improvement, and stockpiling of atomic weapons for military purposes. Dean Acheson, then chairman of a special committee of the US Department of State, wrote to the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes that "the plan [Baruch plan.—*Ed.*] does not require that the United States shall discontinue such manufacture [of atomic weapons.—*Ed.*] either upon the proposal of the plan or upon the inauguration of the international agency."<sup>7</sup>

On June 19, 1946, in opposition to the American plan, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a draft of an international convention on the prohibition for all time of the production and use of atomic weapons for purposes of mass destruction<sup>8</sup>. The basic provisions of this draft envisaged a commitment by the signatories to abstain from the use of nuclear weapons under all circumstances, ban the production and stockpiling of such weapons, and within three months after the coming of the convention into force to destroy all the stockpiles of finished and unfinished output of these weapons. Breaches of the convention were declared "a most heinous international crime against mankind". In parallel with the draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons the USSR proposed the drawing up of the terms of controlling the utilisation of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes and the fulfilment of the provisions of the international convention.

In proposing the prohibition of atomic weapons and the organisation of the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission the Soviet Union was intent on having atomic energy serve solely peaceful purposes and on closing the door to its use as a means of mass annihilation. "The use of this discovery only for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the peoples and widening their scientific and cultural horizons," said Andrei A. Gromyko, then the Soviet representative on the UN Atomic Energy Commission, "will help to strengthen confidence between the countries and friendly relations between them. On the other hand, to continue the use of this discovery for the production of weapons of mass destruction is likely to intensify mistrust between states and to keep the peoples of the world in continual anxiety and uncertainty."<sup>9</sup>

There was a wide positive response and support from democratic opinion of all countries, including the Western states, to the Soviet proposal for an international convention banning nuclear weapons. A memorandum published by the British Association of Scientists

<sup>7</sup> *International Control of Atomic Energy*, Washington, London, 1946, p. VI.

<sup>8</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1946*, pp. 632-633.

<sup>9</sup> Official Records, United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, Second Meeting, June 19, 1946, pp. 23-30.

declared that this convention was highly desirable and that it would be hard to justify British and American reluctance to agree with this.

However, since the banning of nuclear weapons did not enter into the USA's plans, its representatives used the then obedient plurality of votes in the UN to secure the rejection of the Soviet proposals. They had recourse to the specious argument that the Soviet Union was against atomic energy control, that the question of control did not figure in its proposals, and that its proposals contained loopholes for violating the envisaged atomic weapons ban.

There were no grounds whatever for these allegations. Their sole aim was to delude public opinion relative to the substance of the Soviet proposals. At the same time that it submitted a draft convention on a nuclear weapons ban, the Soviet Union proposed the creation of a special agency that would work out the ways and means of controlling fulfilment of the terms of the convention. On June 11, 1947, in order to expedite the settlement of this problem, the Soviet Union presented to the UN Atomic Energy Commission a detailed proposal for a system of control over atomic energy.

This proposal provided for strict international control "simultaneously over all enterprises engaged in the extraction of atomic primary materials and the production of atomic materials and atomic energy".<sup>10</sup> It suggested instituting within the framework of the Security Council a control agency—an international control commission—that would periodically inspect all such enterprises. The control agency would have wide powers, including the right of access and inspection of the work of any enterprise extracting, producing or storing atomic primary and other materials, or using atomic energy, and also the right to conduct special investigations in cases where there were grounds for suspicion that the nuclear weapons ban agreement was being violated. This proposal was clear evidence of the Soviet Union's readiness to implement all necessary measures for instituting international control in order to deliver mankind from the threat of a devastating nuclear war. Its adoption would have opened to international inspection all enterprises producing atomic materials and atomic energy. This would have given a control agency the possibility of fully ascertaining the state of affairs relative to the production and use of atomic materials in any country and at any enterprise. This proposal refuted the American propaganda allegations that the USSR was opposed to control of atomic energy.

Since the US government had set itself against banning atomic weapons, it showed no interest in the Soviet proposal for controlling atomic energy. It counted on using these weapons to expand politically and economically in different parts of the world: Europe, the

<sup>10</sup> *Fifty Years of Struggle by the USSR for Disarmament. A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1967, p. 219 (in Russian).



Middle East, Asia. Its leaders regarded the atomic bomb as a means of making US imperialism supreme in the world. Some high-ranking American politicians went so far as to urge attacking the Soviet Union with atomic bombs.

But the USA could not afford to reject the atomic weapons ban proposal out of hand. It had to reckon with world public opinion, which was demanding the earliest elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. In order to evade settling this problem, the USA rejected the Soviet proposals for controlling atomic energy on the pretext that these proposals were unacceptable. The Americans asserted that the periodical inspection and special investigations, envisaged in the Soviet proposal on control, were insufficient to guarantee against the diversion of dangerous materials from known atomic facilities.<sup>11</sup> Further, it was said that the enforcement of control only after the coming into force of the atomic weapons ban convention did not guarantee the security of countries committed to refrain from using atomic weapons and to destroy their atomic stockpiles. It was contended that the Soviet proposal gave the international control agency no means of "enforcing its rules and recommendations" other than by appealing in case of emergency to the Security Council.<sup>12</sup> The USA wanted the control to be in the hands of a supra-state agency laying down the American line of conduct in armaments and atomic policy, and also on other political issues. US diplomacy was adamant in its stand that the functions of the control agency should not be linked to the Security Council and that the UN Charter's principle of consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council, namely, the veto, should not apply to the decision of questions relating to the functions of that agency.

By demanding that the control agency should have enforcement rights in circumvention of the Security Council, the USA counted on using that agency to achieve its own political aims, one of which was to preserve its monopoly over atomic weapons. Since in those years most of the bourgeois states depended on US imperialism and submitted to its political leadership, the US government hoped that it would have a dependable majority in the control agency enabling it to dictate its will to the Soviet Union and other countries.

The USSR flatly rejected the solicitations of the USA and its Western partners to give the control agency rights and functions running counter to the UN Charter and to the powers vested in the Security Council by the Charter. It insisted on the observance of the principle of consensus in the settlement of all matters covered by the UN Charter. The Soviet representatives in the different international

<sup>11</sup> United Nations, Atomic Energy Commission 1946-1948, AEC/C.1/76, April 8, 1948.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

agencies made it clear to governments and world public opinion that the American demands were incompatible with the key provisions of the UN Charter and the sovereign rights of nations. The Soviet Union's firm stand on this question prevented the USA from utilising its obedient voting machine in the UN and its monopoly of the atomic bomb to impose its diktat on other countries.

In order to remove as many obstacles as possible to a nuclear ban agreement, the Soviet Union specified its former proposals on disarmament control. It acceded to the Western demand that a convention on control of atomic energy should be concluded not after but simultaneously with the coming into force of a ban on atomic weapons. At the 3rd UN General Assembly in 1948 the Soviet delegation proposed that the atomic weapons ban should be paralleled by verification of the fulfilment of this ban. It thereby took another major step to bring its stand closer to that of the Western powers in the question of controlling the ban on atomic weapons. Shortly afterwards it declared its acceptance of the position that control and inspection of the atomic weapons ban should be not periodic but continuous with the reservation that this did not entail interference in the internal affairs of nations. The relevant proposal was submitted to the 6th UN General Assembly in January 1952. Its purpose was to eliminate yet another barrier erected by the Western powers to the settlement of the problem of prohibiting atomic weapons.

But these Soviet proposals, too, which met the requirements of the USA and its Western partners, did not lead to any solution of the nuclear issue. It did not prove possible to conclude an agreement banning atomic weapons under international control. The USA and its allies—Britain, France, and other Western states—were moving ever farther away from peaceful coexistence with socialist countries and from quests for a political settlement of outstanding international issues. They adopted the notorious “positions of strength” policy with underlying threat of using armed force, including atomic weapons. The Western powers concentrated on forming aggressive military blocs—NATO, SEATO, and others—and feverishly stepped up the arms race. The USA laid special emphasis on increasing its nuclear weapons stockpiles, openly declaring that it would use these weapons under certain circumstances. During the Korean war, for example, influential spokesmen in the USA demanded the use of atomic bombs against the armed forces of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the Chinese volunteers.

However, they found they could not carry out these plans. The international situation had changed, a major factor of this change being that towards the beginning of the 1950s the USA had lost its atomic monopoly. On September 25, 1949 TASS reported that the Soviet Union had discovered the secret of atomic weapons and was

now in possession of such weapons.<sup>13</sup> The report quoted the Soviet Foreign Minister, who had declared on November 6, 1947 that the atomic bomb had long ceased to be a secret. This report, which was of immense international significance, showed that the Western "experts" had been wrong in believing that the Soviet Union would not have nuclear weapons for a long time to come. The USSR not only unravelled the secret of producing atomic weapons but made rapid progress in the production of the most powerful thermonuclear devices.

The Soviet Union's conspicuous achievements in science and technology, especially in nuclear and thermonuclear energy, put an end to an extremely complicated and dangerous period in history, when the USA pursued an aggressive policy based on its monopoly of nuclear weapons and believed it could dictate its will to many nations.

Postwar international developments were strongly influenced by the Soviet Union's persevering efforts to secure the controlled prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Soviet proposals created the possibility of settling sensitive international issues arising from the use of momentous scientific discoveries for destructive purposes. These Soviet proposals for a ban on nuclear weapons and control of the observance of this ban received the approval and support of large bodies of democratic opinion in all countries. A powerful expression of this opinion on the prohibition of nuclear weapons was the appeal of the Standing Committee of the World Peace Congress adopted in Stockholm in March 1950. This appeal called for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons under strict international control. The use of atomic weapons was denounced as a crime against humanity.

The historic significance of the efforts of the Soviet Union and progressives in all countries to ban atomic weapons in the period 1946-1952 was that they mobilised worldwide democratic opinion, which formed a barrier preventing US imperialism from using atomic weapons for its mercenary aims. The might of the Soviet Union, its skilled foreign policy, and the support it enjoyed from broad democratic circles in different countries did not permit the US imperialists to venture using atomic weapons when they had a monopoly over them.

### **The Soviet Union's Efforts To Reduce Conventional Armaments and Armed Forces (1946-1952)**

With the consolidation of peace and security as its objective, the Soviet Union made every effort after the war to conclude not only an international agreement banning atomic weapons but also an

<sup>13</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, p. 162.

agreement on reducing conventional armed forces and armaments. Alongside the demand for a ban on nuclear weapons this question played an important part in Soviet foreign policy. The disarmament problem acquired great significance on account of the intensified arms race started by the USA, soon after the end of the Second World War. Year after year the USA, as well as Britain, France and other Western countries, increased allocations for military purposes and the numerical strength of their armed forces. In these countries the arms race paralleled the expansion of nuclear production and the stockpiling of nuclear weapons in the USA. Evidence of the arms race is provided by statistics on the numerical growth of the armed forces of the USA and other capitalist countries after World War II. In the period from 1949 to 1957 the armed forces were increased from 1,600,000 to 2,800,000 effectives in the USA and from 589,000 to 1,200,000 effectives in France, while Britain maintained large military units.<sup>14</sup> A clearer picture is given by the upgrading of military expenditures and the growth of their proportion relative to the budgets of the Western countries. Between 1949 and 1959 military expenditures more than trebled (from \$13,500 million to \$46,600 million) in the USA, while in Britain they increased from \$2,200 million to \$4,460 million, and in France from \$1,400 million to \$3,600 million. They grew in a similar proportion in small countries after they joined NATO. In the decade we have mentioned, they were almost quadrupled (from 556 million to 2,153 million liras) in Turkey, and rose from 1,600 million to 4,700 million drachmae in Greece.<sup>15</sup> In 1949-1953 total NATO military spending went up from \$18,500 million to \$65,500 million.<sup>16</sup>

The conventional and nuclear arms race conducted by the USA and other Western powers aggravated the international situation and created tension in the relations between states. The arms race thereby hindered the settlement of many outstanding postwar issues, including the German, Austrian, and Far Eastern problems. Moreover, it intensified the cold war, into which other Western countries were drawn under pressure brought to bear by the USA. With assistance from the USA and other Western powers, countries that had belonged to the Hitlerite coalition began to arm on a large scale and were then drawn into military blocs headed by the USA.

In the Western countries the view was purveyed that the arms race was only the outcome of the volatile international situation and that

<sup>14</sup> *Militarism and Disarmament. A Book of Reference*, Moscow, 1963, p. 39; *The Soviet Union's Struggle for Disarmament*, Moscow, 1961, pp. 228-29 (both in Russian).

<sup>15</sup> *Western Europe: Militarism and Disarmament*, Moscow, 1966, pp. 8-9; *Militarism and Disarmament. A Book of Reference*, pp. 81-82 (both in Russian).

<sup>16</sup> *Economic Report of the President Transmitted to the Congress, February 1970*, Washington, 1970, p. 177.

the stronger these countries became militarily the more chances would they have of settling outstanding international problems on their own terms. Hence the conclusion that armaments and armed forces should not be reduced before the most acute international issues, particularly the German question, were settled. This approach to disarmament embodied in practice US imperialism's "positions of strength" policy.

By contrast, the policy of the Soviet Union, which wanted the normalisation of the international situation, the peaceful settlement of unresolved international problems, and an end to the arms race, was aimed at achieving the earliest possible conclusion of an agreement on disarmament. The Soviet government had every reason to regard disarmament as a means of easing international tension and thereby clearing the way to the settlement of outstanding international issues. It raised the question of reducing armaments and armed forces as early as 1946 at the 1st UN General Assembly. "In the interests of strengthening world peace and security," the Soviet draft resolution stated, "and in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Organisation the General Assembly recognises the need for a general reduction of armaments."<sup>17</sup>

In a situation where the conventional arms race was accompanied by a rapid expansion of the production of atomic weapons and the stockpiling of atomic bombs, and especially when US imperialism was using its monopoly of these bombs as the foundation of its policy, it would have been unjustified to raise the question of reducing armaments without simultaneously prohibiting atomic weapons. To remove the danger of a nuclear war the Soviet Union made the point that the conclusion of an agreement on a reduction of armaments should be accompanied by a ban on atomic weapons. The Soviet draft resolution said that the "implementation of the decision to reduce armaments should include as its immediate aim the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes".<sup>18</sup>

In raising the question of a general reduction of armaments, including the banning of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union called for proper international control. It suggested instituting two international control agencies under the supervision of the UN Security Council—a Commission for Controlling the Fulfilment of the Disarmament Agreement and a Commission for Controlling the Fulfilment of the Decision Banning the Use of Atomic Energy for Military Purposes.<sup>19</sup> To ensure effective control of disarmament the Soviet Union proposed that members of the United Nations submit information on armed forces and armaments within their national territory when the proposal for a universal reduction of armaments comes up before the

<sup>17</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1946*, pp. 429-30.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 430.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

Security Council.<sup>20</sup>

However, the Soviet programme for disarmament did not fit into the USA's plans for broad political and economic expansion in Europe, Asia, and other parts of the world. US policy was based on the accelerated production of atomic weapons, the building of a ramified network of US military bases on foreign territories, and the formation of aggressive military blocs. It interfered in the internal affairs of other nations, installing and propping up reactionary regimes, and fighting the democratic and national liberation movements. In pursuing this policy it did everything to block the settlement of the disarmament problem.

When UN agencies considered disarmament questions the USA and other Western powers made various prior conditions in the full awareness that they were unacceptable to the USSR and many other countries and would thus obstruct disarmament. These conditions included: the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan that would be consonant with US claims to supremacy in Europe and the Far East; the formation of United Nations "international" armed forces that would in fact be an instrument of US expansion; "international" control of atomic energy that would enable the USA to retain its monopoly of atomic weapons. One of the Western conditions for disarmament was the establishment of control over the existing armaments before the conclusion of an agreement on disarmament.

By setting disarmament conditions that were unacceptable to the USSR and many other countries, the Western powers wrecked the attempts to reach agreement on this question. Their propaganda blamed the Soviet Union for the breakdown of the disarmament talks. Playing on the hopes of the peoples for the earliest possible disarmament, the Western powers tried to wring political concessions from the Soviet Union in the settlement of various unresolved international problems.

For instance, while making their agreement to disarmament conditional on the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan on terms dictated by the USA,<sup>21</sup> they misrepresented Soviet policy, alleging that the Soviet Union was obstructing the postwar peace settlement. By insisting on the formation of UN "international" armed forces as a condition for a reduction of armaments, US diplomacy sought to bypass the UN Charter, one of whose provisions was that member states would place armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council, and set up what would in effect have been a US-controlled international force consisting of military contingents from different UN member countries. In those years the USA could count

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> See Chapter XVII.

on a majority vote in the UN and it meant to have command of and use these armed forces as it saw fit.

The Soviet Union saw that if a UN armed force were created it would be used as an instrument of US imperialism and in contravention of the principles of the UN Charter, and categorically rejected these US solicitations.

At the disarmament talks the Western powers invariably gave prominence to control and inspection of existing armaments. The US proposals, for example, called for the collection of information on the organisation of armed forces, their composition and deployment, their equipment and supporting services, and so on. Moreover, they envisaged information on manufacturing plants, shipbuilding yards, overhaul and repair plants, laboratories, military headquarters, supply and distribution depots, electric power supply, communications stations, and so forth.<sup>22</sup>

The other Western powers likewise accentuated control and inspection of armaments as the prior condition for any steps in this area. A document submitted by the British Government on the plan of work by the UN Commission for Conventional Armaments stated that the creation of an effective system of international control and inspection should precede the adoption of one or another system of regulating and reducing armaments.<sup>23</sup> The French proposals likewise gave prominence to control of existing armaments. They provided for a census of "military and para-military forces, active and reserve, on full-time or part-time basis" and all conventional armaments, as well as verification of the census data. Further, they stated that the "control organ should enjoy ... the greatest possible freedom of movement and access to data fully depicting the level of conventional armaments and effectives of each state".<sup>24</sup>

On the pretext of creating an "atmosphere of confidence" as a prior condition for agreement on disarmament the Western powers tried to organise on the territory of the future signatories of the disarmament agreement, the territory of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the first place, a large network of military intelligence and espionage in order to lay bare their defence systems. This approach to the disarmament problem was, of course, a threat to the security of the USSR and many other countries. "Inspection" of existing armaments and the unbaring of the defence systems of countries would have been used by the militarist circles and general staffs of the imperialist powers for preparation of aggression, for planning an attack on socialist countries. Instead of helping to resolve

<sup>22</sup> United Nations Security Council. S/C. 3/SC.3/25, 13 July, 1950.

<sup>23</sup> United Nations Security Council. S/C.3/27, 17 September, 1947.

<sup>24</sup> United Nations Security Council S/C3/SC.3/21, 26 May, 1949.

the problem of disarmament this approach would only have aggravated the international situation. The demands and prior conditions made by the USA and other Western powers prevented the conclusion of a disarmament treaty in those years, for their sole object was to delay and wreck the settlement of this problem.

Soviet diplomacy unmasked the actual trend of the policy pursued by the USA and its allies on the disarmament issue, rejecting their obviously unacceptable prior conditions for an agreement on a cut-back of armaments and armed forces. In reply to the Western demands for preliminary guarantees of international confidence and security, which were allegedly the purpose of their prior conditions, the Soviet government pointed out that disarmament would be a major factor easing international tension, building up confidence between states, and guaranteeing the security of nations. It noted that the arms race and, in particular, the production of atomic weapons was precisely what was inflaming tension and creating an immediate threat to peace and security.

Unbridled war propaganda in the USA and other Western countries and undisguised calls for an attack on the socialist states induced the USSR to submit to the 2nd UN General Assembly on September 18, 1947 a proposal on measures against propaganda of another war. It proposed the "prohibition of war propaganda in any form on pain of criminal punishment and the adoption of measures to prevent and suppress such propaganda as socially dangerous activity imperilling the vital interests and welfare of peace-loving nations".<sup>25</sup> This proposal was supported by democratic opinion in many countries. On its basis, in November 1947, the UN General Assembly passed an important resolution condemning "all forms of propaganda, in whatsoever country conducted, which is either designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression".<sup>26</sup> There was a favourable response to this resolution from all quarters interested in strengthening peace and international security.

However, as subsequent developments showed, the capitalist countries ignored this significant resolution. They continued their war propaganda, still further aggravating the international situation and creating a cold war atmosphere.

At the 3rd UN General Assembly on September 25, 1948, in order to prevent a dangerous deterioration of the international situation and help to strengthen peace, the Soviet Union proposed that as a first step towards a reduction of armaments and armed forces the five permanent members of the Security Council—the USA, the USSR,

<sup>25</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, part II, p. 150.

<sup>26</sup> *UN Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly. Resolutions. 16 September-29 November, 1947*, New York, p. 14.



China, Britain, and France—should cut back their land, naval, and air forces by one third in the course of one year. Further, it proposed the simultaneous prohibition of atomic weapons, as armaments designed for aggression, not defence.<sup>27</sup> To ensure the fulfilment of this disarmament programme it was suggested that the Security Council should set up an international control agency to which the Council's five permanent members would submit comprehensive official data on their armed forces.

In parallel with its proposals for a reduction of conventional armaments and a ban on atomic weapons, the Soviet Union submitted to the United Nations a number of significant proposals on creating an international climate of trust that would help to reach understanding on questions relating to disarmament. At the 4th General Assembly on September 23, 1949 the Soviet delegation submitted a draft resolution condemning preparations for a new war and proposing the conclusion of a pact on the strengthening of peace between the USSR, USA, China, Britain, and France.<sup>28</sup>

At a plenary meeting of the General Assembly in 1950 the Soviet delegation, concerned with strengthening peace and the security of nations and averting the threat of war, submitted a Declaration on Averting the Threat of War and Strengthening Peace and the Security of Nations.<sup>29</sup> Among other things, the Declaration would "condemn propaganda of a new war launched in a number of countries, and all governments were urged to ban such propaganda in their respective countries and hold the culprits responsible for their actions". It went on to say that "the government which would be the first to use atomic weapons against any other country ... will be regarded as war criminals". In 1951, the USSR proposed the dissolution of military blocs and the dismantling of foreign military bases on the territory of other countries. The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union to the 6th General Assembly suggested declaring "participation in the aggressive Atlantic bloc and the creation by certain states, and primarily by the United States of America, of military, naval and air bases in foreign territory incompatible with membership of the United Nations".<sup>30</sup> For its part, the Soviet Union took steps to dismantle its military bases on the territory of foreign countries. As early as February 14, 1950 it concluded an agreement with the People's Republic of China providing for, among other things, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly used naval base of Port Arthur and the transfer to People's Republic of China of all its installations.

<sup>27</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1948*, part II, pp. 224-25.

<sup>28</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, p. 541.

<sup>29</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, p. 414-15.

<sup>30</sup> UN General Assembly. Sixth Session. A/1944, 8 November, 1951.

In 1955 the USSR dismantled its military base on the Finnish Porkkala-udd Peninsula and withdrew its troops. The treaty of transfer was signed on January 26, 1956.

Not only did the Western Powers refuse to accept the Soviet proposal for the disbandment of military alliances and the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, but went ahead with their plans for enlarging the composition of the North Atlantic alliance and increasing the armaments and armed forces of its member states.

The USA tried to conceal from public opinion the militarist orientation of its policy of disrupting the disarmament talks. To this end it started a propaganda campaign over the restructuring of UN agencies. On its insistence the Commission on Atomic Energy and the Commission for Conventional Armaments were abolished and replaced with a Commission on Disarmament "for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments".<sup>31</sup> This restructuring of UN agencies handling disarmament questions took more than a year, with the result that the talks on disarmament were in fact suspended.

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In the face of the aggression-oriented policy of the Western powers, the efforts made by the Soviet Union in the period from 1946 to 1952 to secure a positive settlement of disarmament problems did not yield the desired results. The USA and its military bloc partners were by no means inclined to reach agreement on disarmament. South Korea's US-backed aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, started in the summer of 1950, aggravated the already tense international climate and raised yet another barrier to an understanding on disarmament. The arms race reached unparalleled dimensions, with the USA increasing its military allocations and continuing the numerical build up of its armed forces.

Thus, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations to secure an international agreement on a general reduction of armaments and armed forces, no progress was made in the settlement of this problem in 1946-1952. By 1952 the disarmament talks had been deadlocked. Nonetheless, these efforts were of immense significance. They strongly influenced international developments after the Second World War, exposing the aggressive character of the policy pursued by the imperialist powers, mobilising and uniting peace-loving nations and the progressive forces of all countries against the aggressive designs of the Western powers, for the defence of peace and international security. During this extremely tense period in international relations, the Soviet foreign policy of peace prevented the imperialist powers from unleashing another world war.

<sup>31</sup> UN General Assembly. Sixth Session. First Committee. A/C.1/667/Rev. I, 13 December 1951.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE USSR AND THE QUESTION OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE FAR EAST

#### The Defeat of Japan and the Problems of a Peace Settlement

The end of the Second World War and the postwar development of economic and political forces brought radical changes to the life of nations and the international situation both in Europe and the Far East. The defeat of Japan spelled out more than the downfall of a rival of the USA and Britain in the struggle for supremacy in the Pacific. It signified the defeat of the assault force of world reaction in Asia that was relentlessly fighting the national liberation movement in China and the whole of the Far East and threatening the Soviet Union.

The USSR's entry into the war against Japan and its decisive role in crushing the aggressor's land forces made a deep imprint on further developments in Asia. Its participation in the defeat of Japan and the large Soviet military presence in the Far East were a powerful factor in support of the progressive forces throughout that part of the world.

A direct result of Japan's defeat was the disintegration of the Japanese colonial empire. The Japanese invaders were driven out of China, Korea and Taiwan ceased to be Japanese colonies. The liberation movement assumed colossal dimensions in China and in other countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia.

The Soviet Union retrieved its rights to the Kuril Islands and South Sakhalin that had been turned into major military and strategic strongpoints of Japanese imperialism in the Northwest Pacific, and strengthened its position as a great Pacific power.

The conditions thus took shape for a peace settlement that could bring lasting peace and independence to the Far Eastern nations. One of the key prerequisites for this was Japan's conversion into a peaceful, democratic state.

It was the Soviet view that victory over militarist Japan should be consolidated by the nation's demilitarisation and democratisation and by the conclusion of a peace treaty that would clear the way for Japan's peaceful and independent development, for the resurgence of its economy and the expansion of its foreign trade, and exclude the possibility of Japan pursuing a policy of aggression in the future.

This view was consistent with the programme for a peace settlement in the Far East agreed upon during the war at the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The Soviet government steadfastly steered a

course towards the effective implementation of the decisions of these conferences.

However, a just settlement of the Far Eastern problems was impeded by the USA and the other imperialist powers, which were determined to crush the national liberation revolutions in Asia. The US imperialists ignored Soviet interests in the Pacific and hindered the USSR's moves to promote friendly relations with Asian countries. Moreover, the USA aimed to oust the old colonial powers—Britain, France, and the Netherlands—from their colonial possessions and take over control of the primary material resources and markets of South and Southeast Asia and the Far East. It did everything to strengthen the capitalist system in Japan and use the reactionary forces of that vanquished nation to obstruct its progressive development. It meant to turn that major East Asian industrial country into a stronghold of its influence in the Far East and the Pacific.

### US Control of Japan

Japan signed the instrument of surrender on September 2, 1945. General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the US forces in the Pacific, was appointed supreme commander of the Allied occupation troops. The US imperialists were determined to be Japan's unchallenged masters and occupy it solely with their troops, removing from participation its allies in the war against militarist Japan. The USA rejected the offer of Soviet participation in the military occupation of Japan. Besides the USA, Britain was the only other Allied power that had occupation units in Japan. These were very small and were subordinate to MacArthur.

In the evening of September 2, 1945 the Japanese Foreign Ministry received an order from MacArthur's headquarters stating that a military administration would be set up for the entire territory of Japan. Alarmed, the Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu went to see MacArthur on the next day. He pleaded with the American general to rescind the military administration order, saying that if it was the intention of the Allies to give effect to the Potsdam Declaration it would be more reasonable to conduct the occupation policy through the Japanese government.<sup>1</sup> The Japanese ruling circles hoped in this way to preserve their rule in the country and subsequently restore Japanese imperialist positions in Asia. The USA accepted the Japanese government's offer of cooperation with the occupation authorities and of serving as the medium for the implementation of occupation policy.

<sup>1</sup> *A History of the War in the Pacific*, Vol. V, Moscow, 1958, p. 93 (in Russian, translated from the Japanese); *Documents on American Foreign Relations*. Vol. VIII, Princeton, 1948, p. 267.

It intended to hold all the strings of the policy relative to the occupation of Japan in total disregard of the views of its Allies and in contravention of recent joint Allied decisions. This was stated unambiguously in a US State Department document headed "Basic Principles of US Policy Toward Japan in the Early Period of Occupation", published on September 23, 1945. This document oriented the Allied (in fact, the American) Supreme Commander on sovereign implementation of a policy tailored to the interests of US imperialism.

True, the victorious outcome of the anti-fascist war and the huge upswing of democratic activity by the Japanese people made it impossible for the US government to pass over the question of democratic reforms and changes in silence. It had to include in the "Basic Principles" a promise to demilitarise Japan, extirpate militarism, and ensure the development of a peaceful economy.<sup>2</sup>

US imperialism planned to use some reforms to weaken Japan as a rival and competitor and, at the same time, divert the popular revolutionary-democratic movement into the channel of bourgeois reforms. It intended to inject some American elements into the Japanese system of administration, reshape it to suit its own ends, and subordinate the Japanese monopolies to its control.

For its part, the Japanese government took steps to preserve the financial base of the big bourgeoisie: in the course of two weeks vast material resources at the disposal of the armed forces (valued at approximately 100,000 million yen) were distributed with frantic haste among industrialists. The Japanese army was quickly demobilised in order to preserve the officer cadre. This was done to allow for the future revival of Japanese militarism, enemy of peace and the independence of the peoples of the Far East.

This prospect worried the Soviet government. On September 22, 1945 it offered to sign a treaty with the USA against any possible resumption of aggression by Japan.<sup>3</sup> Washington delayed its reply for a long time. Finally, in March 1946, after several reminders, the US government proposed a four-power (USA, Britain, USSR, and Kuomintang China) treaty on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan.

However, the American draft treaty, handed to the Soviet government in June 1946, contained no guarantees for the effective demilitarisation of Japan and for that nation's peaceful and democratic

<sup>2</sup> *The Cairo Declaration, the Crimea Agreement, the Potsdam Declaration, the Moscow Conference, and Other Documents, Relating to Japan's Surrender, A Collection of Documents 1943-1946*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 43-44 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Secretary of State on September 22, 1945.

development. Decisions on the basic issues springing from the treaty would be passed by a majority vote, which would have placed the USSR at a disadvantage.<sup>4</sup>

In particular, Article IV of the American draft treaty stated that the Control Commission, set up on a four-power basis for purposes of inspection, would decide matters by a majority vote. In the event the provisions on disarmament and demilitarisation were violated the Soviet Union would have no right to demand effective measures against violations if the governments of the USA, Britain, and China did not share its view. The draft evoked justified objections from the USSR, but these objections were discounted by the USA.

### Decisions of the Moscow Three-Power Foreign Ministers Conference on Japan

With full right and on the basis of the relevant provisions in inter-Allied agreements, the USSR insisted on participation in controlling the implementation of occupation policy in Japan. It made several attempts to prevent US domination of the Japanese people. In a memorandum of September 24, 1945 to the Council of Foreign Ministers that had begun its first session in London, the Soviet government proposed instituting a Control Council for Japan consisting of representatives of four powers (the USA, Britain, the USSR, and China). Moreover, it suggested forming a Consultative Allied Commission that would include other countries that had been active in the war against Japan, in addition to the four principal Allied powers.<sup>5</sup> However, supported by the British representative the US Secretary of State Byrnes refused to discuss this question.<sup>6</sup>

US diplomacy decided to place the USSR and other countries before an accomplished fact. In October 1945 the USA announced the formation of a nine-power Far Eastern Consultative Commission (the USA, the USSR, China, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands, i. e., nations that had signed the instrument of Japan's surrender).

The Soviet government did not deny this commission's expediency,

<sup>4</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Letter of June 15, 1946 from the US Ambassador in the USSR Walter Bedell Smith to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with the American-drafted treaty on the disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan appended to it.

<sup>5</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945*, p. 72.

<sup>6</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on September 26, 1945 between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the US Secretary of State, and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom.

but held that in order to settle political, economic, and financial problems there should be an agency through which the four Allied powers that had played the main role in defeating Japan could coordinate their policy and bear joint responsibility, and that the formation of such an agency, Control Council for Japan, should precede the formation of the Consultative Allied Commission.<sup>7</sup>

But key issues of international politics, particularly the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany's former allies, could not be settled without taking the attitude of the Soviet Union into account. The USA was thus compelled somewhat to reappraise its stance. As a result of a correspondence between the heads of government of the USA and the USSR and also of Soviet-US talks the question was placed on the agenda of the Moscow Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain that was held in December 1945.

At this meeting a compromise decision was reached on the principles for carrying out the terms of Japan's surrender. The USA had to agree to the dissolution of the Far Eastern Consultative Commission and to the creation of two new agencies.

One of them was the Far Eastern Commission consisting of representatives of 11 nations: the USSR, the USA, Britain, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, and the Philippines. Later, the Commission was joined by Burma and Pakistan. It was based in Washington. The other agency, whose institution was considered and agreed upon by the meeting, was the four-member Allied Council for Japan consisting of one representative each from the USA, the USSR, and China, and one member representing simultaneously Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and India. The Council was based in Tokyo.

The Far Eastern Commission's terms of reference were to formulate policy, principles, and general grounds laying the guidelines for the discharge by Japan of its commitments under the terms of the surrender.<sup>8</sup> The Commission adopted decisions by a majority vote with mandatory consensus among the representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain and China. The principle of consensus among the great powers in the settlement of the Japanese question was thus established in the Commission. Some legal limits were set to the powers of the US government: it drew up and transmitted directives to the Supreme Commander, but these directives had to conform to the policy line laid down by the Far Eastern Commission. An important reservation was that directives concerning important amendments, namely the Constitution, control, change of government, and so forth, would be issued to the Supreme Commander by the US government only with the consent of the Commission.

<sup>7</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 156.

While the Far Eastern Commission was set above the Supreme Commander, the Allied Council for Japan was mainly a consultative agency for the Supreme Commander. He was obligated to consult with the Council before issuing sensitive orders.<sup>9</sup> A significant point was that any member of the Council was empowered to halt the actions of the Supreme Commander on major issues and turn the dispute over to the Far Eastern Commission.

The system of joint administration established by the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference created some grounds for joint Allied control of the actions of the Supreme Commander and for carrying out the principal aims of the occupation, namely, the democratisation and demilitarisation of Japan. At that stage the Moscow Conference's decisions were a success of Soviet diplomacy. Under the influence of the USSR, whose stand enjoyed wide support among democratic circles in many countries, and also under the influence of the people's actions in Japan itself the USA had to proclaim and implement some steps that fostered a certain measure of democratisation in Japan.

### **The Soviet Union's Struggle for the Democratisation and Demilitarisation of Japan**

While the Soviet government strove to make the inter-Allied control agencies—the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council—effective organs of international cooperation, the government of the USA regarded them as an impediment to its plans. It was intent on nullifying the role of these agencies and remove the Soviet Union entirely from the settlement of questions related to the enforcement of the occupation policy in Japan.

It took the Far Eastern Commission more than a year to draw up and, finally, on June 19, 1947, pass its decision on basic policy towards Japan after the surrender. This document defined the tasks of democratising Japan and preventing its remilitarisation.

The Commission passed important decisions on the basic principles of the new Japanese Constitution, on the principles underlying the organisation of trade unions, on a reduction of the Japanese military-industrial potential, on an agrarian reform, and on a revision of the Japanese system of education.

From 1948 onwards the USA began to ignore the Far Eastern Commission. During the first 15 months following its establishment the Commission passed 41 decisions, but in the next 18 months (until the close of 1948) it adopted only 13 decisions and, lastly, during the last 18 months of its existence (from 1949 to mid-1950) it produced

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 159.



only nine decisions.<sup>10</sup>

The US occupation authorities obstructed the Allied Council's work in every possible way in order to turn it into an inarticulate registrar of the actions of the American Supreme Commander. It was practically inactive from the second half of 1948 to its dissolution in 1952.

While the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council were functioning, most of the Soviet proposals were voted down by the USA and its allies. However, this does not mean that the efforts of Soviet diplomacy in these agencies were abortive. Criticism by Soviet representatives of the actions of the occupation authorities and of the directives of the US government, and the Soviet proposals for the fulfilment of the tasks facing the Allies contributed to the enforcement of individual democratic measures, made it difficult for the American authorities to pursue a reactionary policy and collaborate with Japanese reaction, and facilitated the struggle of progressive Japanese parties and organisations against the reactionary forces.

There was a sharp struggle over the draft of the new Japanese Constitution. The American occupation authorities regarded the imperial system as a convenient instrument for implementing US policy. MacArthur cynically declared that the emperor was worth 20 divisions.<sup>11</sup>

In order to give the imperial regime a somewhat more "democratic" image MacArthur suggested that the emperor make a statement denying his "divine origin". MacArthur appointed Prince Fumimaro Konoye, former Prime Minister, to head the redrafting of the operating 1889 Constitution. The Konoye draft provided for the preservation of the imperial system and the House of Peers. The drafts proposed by the bourgeois parties hardly differed from it.

These drafts were strongly censured abroad and in Japan itself. The Soviet Union favoured the abolition of the imperial system. China was inclined to the same view. But the USA insisted on preserving the emperor as a "symbol",<sup>12</sup> on the pattern of the British monarchy. As MacArthur later acknowledged, the USA had to yield to the Soviet Union in the enforcement of the decisions on the democratisation and demilitarisation of Japan. One of the factors here was the pressure from the democratic movement in Japan.

Amendments, notably, an article declaring that Japan renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and the use of armed force as a means of settling international conflicts, and also an article prohibiting the maintenance of armed forces by Japan were introduced into the drafts presented by the Japanese reactionaries. These were prog-

<sup>10</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 581, August 21, 1950, p. 288.

<sup>11</sup> *A History of the War in the Pacific*, Vol. V, p. 117.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

ressive amendments, but in accepting them the Americans pursued their own imperialist objective of weakening Japan and ruling out the possibility of its re-emergence as a rival in the Pacific. MacArthur and his advisers were sensitive to recollections of the paralysing defeats inflicted by Japan on the USA in the war.

The USA counted on making Kuomintang-ruled China its main stronghold and ally in the Far East.

Some basic civil freedoms, proclaimed in the Constitution, were a concession to the democratic forces in Japan and to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet government insisted on giving the Constitution a clearly-expressed democratic character. In the debate over its draft in the Far Eastern Commission the Soviet representative proposed on September 19, 1946 a more lucid definition of the sovereign rights of the people, an extension of the powers of the parliament (Diet), in particular, giving it the right to appoint not only the Prime Minister but also the other members of the cabinet, and also to elect members of the Supreme Court.<sup>13</sup> These proposals were not accepted.

In October 1946 the draft Constitution was passed by both houses of parliament, and it came into force on May 3, 1947. Despite its bourgeois limitations and inconsistency, the new Constitution was a significant step forward compared with the reactionary and archaic Constitution of 1889. Its anti-war character gave the democratic forces of the Japanese people a certain legal foundation for their struggle against the nation's remilitarisation and involvement in military blocs.

The US occupation authorities did not feel it was necessary to dismantle Japan's old state apparatus. On the contrary, they kept it intact, confining themselves to the expulsion of some militarist leaders who had deeply compromised themselves during the war, and to the punishment of some personalities known for their anti-American views. In this way they hoped to reorganise the state apparatus in a manner most advantageous to themselves and, at the same time, assert the prestige of "American democracy" among the Japanese people. A directive was issued on a purge of state and public institutions. The USA agreed to set up an International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The purge was conducted by the Japanese government, which turned it into a farce. The purge did not affect financial circles and the monopolies, who were the principal inspirers of a policy of aggression. Of the 660,000 officials who were screened, less than 7,000 were discharged.

The Soviet representative on the International Military Tribunal sought to make the trial of the chief Japanese war criminals a means

<sup>13</sup> *A Collection of Statements, Proposals, and Inquiries of the Soviet Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, Moscow, 1950, pp. 17-18 (in Russian).*

for the public condemnation of aggression, militarism, and fascism. But the USA used the court to demonstrate the military strength of the imperialist victor, to impress upon the Japanese that any attempt to fight US imperialism would be doomed.

The question of an agrarian reform was of tremendous significance. Japan's domination by feudal and militarist elements rested on the solid foundation of landownership. Consequently, one of the main demands of the democratic forces in Japan was that the countryside should be restructured.

As early as at the third sitting of the Allied Council, the Soviet representative proposed a discussion of the question of an agrarian reform, and on May 29, 1946 submitted a draft consonant with the demands of the Japanese peasants.

On October 11, 1946 the Japanese parliament passed an agrarian reform law based on a British draft that limited land possession to three hectares (to 12 hectares on Hokkaido). Land surpluses were turned over to the peasants for a compensation. Despite the limitations of the reform, it abolished most of the vestiges of the landowner system and speeded up the development of capitalist relations in the countryside.

The government and the occupation authorities had to make concessions to the peasants under pressure from the Soviet Union and from the broad peasants' movement, which in those years had intertwined with the struggle of the working class. The US imperialists and the Japanese reactionaries feared the possibility of revolutionary agrarian transformations conducted from below, by the peasants themselves.

The Japanese working class demanded a number of rights, including the right to organise trade unions and the right to stage strikes. The Soviet Union endeavoured to help it. On the initiative of the Soviet representative the question of labour legislation was brought up in the Allied Council on July 10, 1946. The Soviet representative proposed a series of provisions as the basis of new laws: guarantees for the freedom of trade unions; prohibition of dismissals and other repressions for participation in strikes; the introduction of collective agreements, an eight-hour working day, a paid two-weeks' holiday, and so on.<sup>14</sup>

On November 21, 1946 the Japanese government published a law on trade unions containing a number of concessions to the proletariat: the right of workers to unite in trade unions, collective talks with employers, and the right to strike. The struggle of the USSR against US imperialism in Japan thus helped the Japanese working classes—the workers and the peasants—to achieve some successes.

<sup>14</sup> *A Collection of Statements and Recommendations of the Soviet Member of the Allied Council for Japan, Moscow, 1949, pp. 18-22 (in Russian).*

The US occupation authorities gave wide publicity to their steps to abolish the big monopolies, known as the Zaibatsu. Actually, however, the purpose of these steps was to subordinate Japanese monopoly capital to the American. In parallel the Americans sought to weaken the Japanese industries that could compete with their American counterparts. But the American occupation authorities had no intention whatever of smashing the monopolies as such. The anti-trust and anti-cartel department at the headquarters of the occupation authorities was ironically called the "department for the preservation of the Zaibatsu".

The Soviet Union could not close its eyes to this situation. On May 12, 1947 the Soviet representative on the Allied Council condemned the fact that the big monopolies, the Zaibatsu, had been left untouched and retained their economic power and dominant position in the nation's economy.

The overall situation and the demands of democratic public opinion in Japan did not permit General MacArthur to ignore the Soviet government's statement entirely. A law on the abolition of excessive economic concentration was promulgated in July 1947. However, it contained many loopholes allowing the big monopoly corporations to hold on to their positions in the Japanese economy. Japan remained a country ruled by big monopoly capital.

### **Soviet Proposals for Ensuring Japan's Economic and Political Independence**

After the defeat of the Kuomintang and the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the US government, which had counted heavily on the Kuomintang regime, now reappraised its policy in Japan. It began to nurture plans for making Japan its principal military-strategic springboard in the Far East. US Secretary of State Dean Acheson said in January 1950: "The United States must build up Japan as one of the principal bulwarks against communism in Asia."<sup>15</sup>

In this period the Americans charted a programme for Japan's "economic stabilisation", which had little in common with the nation's economic restoration. Its purpose was to provide favourable conditions for US investments and to preserve and intensify US control of Japan's foreign trade and finances. Through the occupation authorities the US monopolies bought up the shares of many Japanese companies: oil, electrical engineering, shipbuilding, chemical, and mechanical engineering. Japan's state finances became heavily dependent on the US monopolies.

<sup>15</sup> *Nippon Times*, Tokyo, January 12, 1950.

As far as possible the Soviet Union opposed Japan's economic bondage to the US monopolies. On September 23, 1948 the Soviet representative on the Far Eastern Commission made a statement on the level of Japan's industrial development. This statement spelled out a far-reaching programme to enable Japan to achieve economic independence. It provided for the unrestricted development of peaceful industry and exports with a simultaneous ban on the restoration of the war industry. In 1949 and 1950 the Soviet delegation on the Far Eastern Commission submitted many proposals to guarantee Japan's economic independence. However, the USA refused to discuss these proposals.

The occupation authorities now took less and less trouble to conceal their policy of turning Japan into a springboard for US imperialism. The US military hastily built military bases on Japanese territory. Okinawa and Tsushima were turned into fortified regions. The restoration of the Yokosuka naval base and the air bases at Mishawa, Yokota, Itazuka, Tatikawa, and elsewhere commenced as early as the close of 1948. The Soviet representatives on the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council insisted on a halt to this activity, drawing the attention of world opinion to the dangerous course steered by the US government.

The USA's reactionary line of action was even more pronounced in Japan's domestic politics. In February 1949, with approval from the occupation authorities, the Japanese government decreed the dissolution of trade unions engaging in political activity. In September of the same year it decreed that no worker or employee of state enterprises or institutions could be a member of or help a political party or society, take part in demonstrations and rallies, and so on. On June 6, 1950 MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to outlaw 24 members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Japan. The Communist Party had to assume a semi-legal status.

### **Problem of a Peace Treaty with Japan**

The Soviet Union consistently called for the conclusion of a just peace treaty with Japan that would ensure that nation's independent, peaceful, and democratic development.

In line with the Potsdam Agreement on the institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers, its stand was that the peace treaty with Japan should be drawn up by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and China, on behalf of which the terms of Japan's surrender were signed and whose special interest in Japan's postwar development was reasserted by the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December 1945. As regards the other countries which had contributed to the victory over Japan and were represented on

the Far Eastern Commission, it was the Soviet view that their interests, too, had to be taken into account when the peace treaty was drafted.

The USA, on the other hand, sought to bypass the Council of Foreign Ministers, which functioned in accordance with the principle of consensus among its members and in which mutually acceptable decisions had to be arrived at by negotiation. The USA was determined to dictate its own terms and for that reason suggested replacing the Council by a conference of the 11 states represented on the Far Eastern Commission. It hoped that at the conference it could use its voting machine to railroad decisions unilaterally favourable to itself, without taking the trouble of finding mutually acceptable decisions.

On July 11, 1947 the US Ambassador in Moscow informed the Soviet Government that the USA was suggesting the convocation, on August 19, 1947, of a conference of representatives of the 11 states on the Far Eastern Commission to draw up a peace treaty with Japan. Without waiting for a reply from the USSR and without prior consultations with Britain and China, the USA began the preparations for a peace conference unilaterally, entering into talks on this matter with the other countries on the Far Eastern Commission. It thus ignored its international commitments, flouting the agreement among the great powers defining the procedure by which the Council of Foreign Ministers was to draw up peace treaties.

On July 22, 1947 the Soviet government declared that it could not accept this American proposal. In accordance with earlier decisions, it demanded a prior examination of the issue in the four-power Council of Foreign Ministers with the participation of the USSR, the USA, China and Britain. The US government arbitrarily interpreted the Potsdam Agreement on the institution of the Council of Foreign Ministers and went on insisting on its proposal. The talks dragged on for two years, but no understanding was reached.

Economically and politically Japan was increasingly becoming a military-strategic base of the USA. The Japanese people were becoming more insistent in demanding an end to the occupation and the assertion of Japan's independence. The US ruling circles were alarmed by the proclamation of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China and the spread of the liberation movement in Southeast Asia. They felt they had to compromise in order to maintain the continued presence of their troops in Japan.

American diplomacy worked out a plan for restoring Japan's formal independence and turning it into a "voluntary" ally of US imperialism in the Far East.

After war broke out in Korea in June 1950 the US government began to force the question of a peace treaty with Japan. The diplomatic groundwork for the treaty was assigned to a proponent of a "hard line" towards the Soviet Union, a leading personality of the US

Republican Party and adviser to the State Department, John Foster Dulles.

The general principles of the peace treaty with Japan, formulated by the US State Department, were sent to the countries on the Far Eastern Commission in the form of a memorandum on October 26, 1950.

This memorandum made it plain that the US ruling circles had no intention of including provisions on Japan's demilitarisation and democratisation in the treaty. Provision was made for Japan's renunciation of sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa (the largest in the archipelago, and the islands of Bonin and their transfer to US administration. The question of the status of Taiwan, the Pescadores, (P'enghu Liehtao Islands), South Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands<sup>16</sup> was raised, although the destiny of these territories had been determined in the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta agreement.

In the Cairo Declaration the USA, Britain, and China proclaimed that it was their aim that all the territories taken by Japan from the Chinese, for instance, Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, were to be returned to the People's Republic of China.<sup>17</sup>

In the three-power Yalta agreement on the Far East, signed by, among others, the President of the USA, it was clearly stated that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on specific terms, in particular on condition that the southern part of Sakhalin and all the adjoining islands were returned to the Soviet Union and the Kuril Islands were transferred to it.<sup>18</sup>

The heads of government of the three great powers agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union had to be satisfied unconditionally after Japan was defeated.<sup>19</sup>

The American memorandum sidestepped the question of the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japan: the USA did not intend to evacuate them. It meant to legalise its military occupation of Japan indefinitely by a special bilateral agreement with the Japanese government.

On November 20, 1950 Dulles was handed the Soviet reply, which contained a number of questions and remarks about the American memorandum: was it permissible that only some of the countries that had fought Japan should conclude a separate peace treaty with it?

<sup>16</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, September 17, 1951, Vol. XXV, No. 638, p. 455.

<sup>17</sup> *Izvestia*, December 3, 1943.

<sup>18</sup> *The Soviet Union's Participation in International Conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-45*. Vol. 4. The Conference of the Heads of States of the USSR, USA and Great Britain in Yalta, February 4-11, 1945. Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1979, p. 273 (in Russian).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 155.

Would this treaty set a deadline for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Japanese territory? Was it assumed that US military bases on Japanese territory would continue to function after a peace treaty was signed? Moreover, it was asked whether there would be provisions for the abrogation of all restrictions on the development of a peaceful Japanese economy and for giving Japan access to primary material resources, and also for its equitable participation in world trade. The Soviet memo noted that China, which had been subjected to Japanese aggression for many years, had a special interest in a peace treaty with Japan and the Soviet government would like to know what was being done to ascertain the view of the government of the People's Republic of China on this question.<sup>20</sup>

This memo demonstrated the Soviet government's sincere desire to conclude a peace treaty with Japan that would meet the interests of all the Allied powers and guarantee peace in the Far East.

Within a week the US government replied to the Soviet memo,<sup>21</sup> stating its refusal to fulfil its Allied pledge not to sign a separate peace treaty with an enemy state on the claim that it was impossible to work out peace terms that would fully satisfy each of the signatories to the treaty.

It motivated its refusal to ascertain the stand of the government of the People's Republic of China by the absence of diplomatic relations with it. On the other hand, Washington continued to insist that the USA bore what it described as a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in the region of Japan. It declared that "joint responsibility" for peace and security in the region of Japan would continue to be borne by Japanese and US organs and, possibly, other troops until "satisfactory" measures were taken to provide UN guarantees for Japan's security.

This sort of claims by Washington to a special role in the Far East testified to the fact that in contravention of the Allied agreements on Japan the USA was intent on making a deal with Japanese reaction and preparing to sign a separate peace with it. In February 1951 Dulles went to Japan, where he had talks on the terms of the peace treaty. Upon his return from Japan he declared that the question of a settlement in the Pacific was not merely a question of putting an end to the war with Japan but one of creating a strong bastion against the threat of "communist aggression" from the East.<sup>22</sup> Further, he announced that an understanding had been reached with the Japanese Prime Minister on the continued presence of US troops and military bases in Japan following the signing of the peace treaty in order to

<sup>20</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, pp. 262-264.

<sup>21</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Memorandum of December 28, 1950* from the government of the USA to the government of the USSR.

<sup>22</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, March 12, 1951, Vol. 24, No. 610.



prevent the emergence of a "vacuum of strength".

In its terms for a Japanese peace treaty, the USA thus accentuated the continued presence of American troops in Japan and the prerequisites for Japan's subsequent remilitarisation. That is why the US draft peace treaty contained no safeguards against a resurgence of Japanese militarism. This draft conflicted with the earlier decision on consummating the "physical and spiritual demilitarisation of Japan". The draft stated that Japan would renounce all right, title and claim to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands. But it passed over in silence the fact that in accordance with international agreements these territories were to be transferred to the USSR, to which they rightfully belonged.

The Soviet government considered that the draft's omission of a provision transferring Taiwan and the P'enghu Liehtao Islands to the People's Republic of China as similarly impermissible. Further, it proposed that the draft should provide for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Japan and the dismantling of foreign military bases on its territory. It repeated its insistence on the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers of Britain, China, the USSR, and the USA in order to draft the peace treaty jointly. It emphatically rejected any separate drafting of the peace treaty, declaring that all the countries that had fought in the war against Japan should join in drafting the treaty and that the agreements adopted by the Allies during the war should be honoured. The governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea officially subscribed to the Soviet proposals.

Some of the provisions in the American draft were criticised also by the governments of India, Indonesia, Australia, and the Philippines.

In a statement to the US government on August 23, 1951, the government of India noted that the American draft placed Japan and its people in a position of inequality by denying them the status of an equal and esteemed partner in international relations and by not meeting the aims of maintaining and consolidating peace in the Far East. The Indian government said that it was unjust and damaging that the draft was silent over whom the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, and Taiwan belonged to under international agreements, and that the USA should aspire to control Ryukyu, Bonin, and other islands.

A broad movement unfolded in Japan for a comprehensive peace treaty that would guarantee peace, independence, and freedom to the Japanese people.

### **The USSR and the San Francisco Conference**

In this situation US diplomacy decided to accelerate the implementation of its scenario, taking into account the Yoshida government's readiness to sign any treaty congenial to the USA. A joint

US-British draft peace treaty with Japan was published on July 12, 1951.

This joint draft hardly differed from the previous American draft. It took no account of the Soviet proposals submitted earlier to the US government. Also, it took no account of the observations of other countries, in particular, of Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, about reparations from Japan. The USA set September 4, 1951 as the date for a conference in San Francisco for the signing of the treaty. This conference was called solely for the purpose of formalising the USA's backstage compact with the governments of Britain and Japan.

No invitation was sent to China, one of the most intimately interested nations, or to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Large Asian states—India and Burma, which had been victims of Japanese aggression—refused to attend. On the other hand, representatives were sent by all the Latin American states, and also Luxembourg, Greece, and other countries that had not fought Japan and had nothing approaching a significant interest in the Japanese question. The only reason they were invited was that Washington counted on their votes. The rules of procedure excluding any serious and constructive discussion of the draft treaty were drawn up before the conference opened. Despite US diplomacy's calculations, the Soviet government accepted the invitation. It held that it would be expedient to use the conference rostrum to publicly expose the underlying imperialist nature of the US draft and also inform world public opinion of the Soviet stand and show the way to a genuinely democratic peace treaty.

When the conference opened the Soviet delegation repeated the Soviet government's view that an invitation should be extended to the People's Republic of China, which was "particularly interested in the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan and in the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East".<sup>23</sup> This move was supported by the delegates of Czechoslovakia and Poland. However, it was rejected by the majority of states, which were dependent on the USA and Britain.

Andrei A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation circumstantially criticised the US draft. He declared that "Japan's involvement in military groups, envisaged by the US-British draft peace treaty, most certainly evokes the apprehensions of nations really interested in the preservation and maintenance of peace in the Far East".<sup>24</sup> Further, he made the point that the "peace treaty with Japan should also

<sup>23</sup> *Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan*. San Francisco, California, September 4-8, 1951. *Record of Proceedings*. Released December 1951, Washington, p. 39.

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, September 7, 1951.

resolve a number of territorial issues in accordance with the provisions of the Cairo and Potsdam declarations and the Yalta agreement. The Yalta agreement, in particular, recognised the Soviet Union's indisputable right to the southern part of Sakhalin and all the adjacent islands, and also to the Kuril Islands. The draft treaty contravened the commitments undertaken by the USA and Great Britain under the Yalta agreement on the return of Sakhalin and the transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union." He criticised the economic terms of the draft as consolidating the positions acquired by the USA in Japan during the years of occupation. The Soviet government pointed out that there was nothing in the draft about giving Japan equal access with other nations to the world's resources of primary materials as envisaged in the Potsdam Declaration. The Soviet delegation submitted lucid and precise constructive proposals in the form of amendments and additions to the US-British draft. Adoption of these amendments would have significantly improved the peace treaty. They included the following provisions: Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands and, of course, renunciation by Japan of all right, title and claim to these territories, and also Japanese recognition of China's sovereignty over Manchuria, Taiwan, the Pescadores (P'enghu Liehtao Islands), and other territories. Further, the USSR proposed recognising Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parese Velo, Marcus, Tsushima, and other islands that had long been part of Japan prior to December 7, 1941 and which the USA was now unlawfully claiming.

In order to ensure genuine independence to Japan the Soviet delegation called for the withdrawal from Japan of the armed forces of the Allied powers not later than 90 days after the peace treaty came into force, "following which no Allied or associated powers, as well as no other foreign power shall have troops or military bases on Japanese territory".<sup>25</sup>

In addition to amendments, the Soviet delegation proposed eight new articles committing Japan "to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people", guarantee basic freedoms to the people—"freedom of speech, press, publication, the profession of religion, political convictions, and public assembly"—to "prevent the revival of fascist and militarist organisations", and to "refrain from entering into any coalitions or military alliances directed against any of the powers that had participated in the war against Japan with their armed forces". Provision was made for strict ceiling for the Japanese armed forces that would be used exclusively in self-defence, and also for a ban on the production of atomic weapons and other means of mass anni-

<sup>25</sup> *Pravda*, September 7, 1951.

hilation. The Soviet Union proposed that no restrictions should be imposed on Japan's peaceful industry and foreign trade. These proposals attracted public attention in Japan, the USA, and other countries.

The representatives of Czechoslovakia and Poland whole-heartedly supported the Soviet stand. Serious objections were raised against the US-British draft also by the delegations of some Asian countries.

The Soviet proposals were not taken into account. The additions and amendments proposed by other delegations were likewise not studied.

The peace treaty with Japan was signed on September 8, 1951. Representatives of the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia did not sign the treaty and did not attend the signature ceremony. India and Burma, which did not attend the conference, likewise did not sign the treaty, an act which still further emphasised that this was a separate treaty.

Most of the signatories were representatives of countries that had not taken a direct part in the war against Japan.

The peace treaty did not end the state of war between Japan, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union, China, India, Burma, and other countries (with an aggregate population of over 1,000 million), on the other.

However, the fact that the treaty was signed by Japan was clear evidence that the Japanese government renounced all claim to South Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands, for this renunciation was contained in the treaty, Article 2 of which stated: "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kuril Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905."<sup>26</sup>

Despite this perfectly obvious and clearly formal commitment, the Japanese government made a series of attempts in subsequent years to misrepresent the stand of the Japanese delegation at the San Francisco Conference, specifically on the question of territories renounced by Japan under the terms of the treaty.

A few hours after the official ceremony of signing the San Francisco peace treaty, Japan and the USA signed a "security treaty".

The main content of the latter treaty was given in Article I, which stated that Japan granted the USA "the right ... to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan". These forces "may be utilized" for the "maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East" and also "to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan".<sup>27</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. I, Washington, 1957, p. 426.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 885-86.

No time limit was set on the operation of the "security treaty". It thus formalised for many years to come Japan's virtual occupation by the USA and its status as a US military-strategic springboard in the Far East.

The treaty was at variance with the Japanese Constitution, which recorded the nation's renunciation of war and use of armed force as a means of settling international conflicts. The treaty provided for the use of Japan-based US forces in any part of the Far East, thereby threatening to drag Japan into a war with other countries at the discretion of the USA. Moreover, the US forces in Japan undertook the police function of suppressing actions by the Japanese people. The destiny of Japan was thus placed in the hands of the US military.

## CHAPTER XX

### THE SOVIET UNION'S STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF SUPPRESSING THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NATIONS AND FORMING MILITARY BLOCS (1946-1952)

The aggravation of the basic international problems in the postwar years—Germany, disarmament, the Far East, and others—was a clear indication that the USA and other Western powers had radically reappraised their foreign policy soon after the war, abandoning cooperation with the USSR and moving to undisguised hostility for and military preparations against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

The hostility of imperialism's politicians towards the socialist countries and their fear of the revolutionary movement in their own countries and of the upsurge of the liberation struggle of the colonial peoples led the ruling circles of Britain and some other West European capitalist states, which had been weakened by the war, to the hope that US imperialism would help them to remain in power. As a result, they became proponents of US policy.

The Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow in June 1969 characterised this policy of imperialism, noting: "The spearhead of the aggressive strategy of imperialism continues to be aimed first and foremost against the socialist countries. Imperialism does not forgo open armed struggle against socialism. It ceaselessly intensifies the arms race and tries to activate the military blocs organised for aggression against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. It steps up its ideological fight against them and tries to hamper the economic development of the socialist countries."<sup>1</sup>

The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were the principal landmarks of the aggressive policy pursued by US imperialism during the initial years after the war. The cold war launched by the imperialists led to a drastic deterioration of the international situation. In the Far East US-led imperialist forces went so far as to take armed action against socialist countries.<sup>2</sup> "Following the finale of the grand battle and the crushing defeat of the enemy, the chief members of the anti-Hitler coalition parted ways instead of jointly building an endur-

<sup>1</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, Prague, 1969, p. 12.*

<sup>2</sup> On the war in Korea, see Chapter XXI.

ing peace. The ink was not yet dry on the Declaration Regarding the Defeat of Germany, signed by representatives of the USSR, USA, Britain and France in Berlin, when our former allies began rupturing the ties that had held together the main combatants against German fascism."<sup>3</sup> The peace and security of nations were gravely imperilled.

In that period Soviet foreign policy was faced with the crucial tasks of safeguarding the socialist countries against the aggressive designs of the imperialists, protect the principles of respect for the sovereignty of nations and non-interference in internal affairs, uphold peace, and ensure international security.

### **Two Lines in International Politics: the Line of War and the Line of Peace**

A speech by Winston Churchill in Fulton (state of Missouri, USA) on March 5, 1946 in the presence of US President Harry S. Truman and other ranking US statesmen, spelled out a sort of an "ideological manifesto" of imperialism after the war. Punctuated with malicious slander against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, that speech urged a crusade against socialism and mapped out a programme for US-British world supremacy "not only for our time but for a century to come".<sup>4</sup>

Churchill's Fulton speech was a clarion call for the creation of an Anglo-US military and political bloc against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, and also against the national liberation movement of oppressed nations.

The world had to be warned of the danger of this course of the US and British imperialists. In a number of public statements representatives of the Soviet government assessed the war-mongering policy of Churchill and his associates in Britain and the USA as a line towards another war. It was stressed that the war-mongers had to be exposed and a broad struggle organised to ensure peace.

In opposition to the war programme of the claimants to world supremacy, the Soviet Union put forward a detailed programme for peaceful relations between countries based on equality and friendly cooperation. This was a programme for peaceful coexistence of the two systems. It contained proposals on key issues such as peaceful coexistence and cooperation among the great powers that had been members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, the strengthening of the United Nations Organisation, and disarmament. These proposals were

<sup>3</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course, Speeches and Articles*, Vol. I, Moscow, 1970, pp. 149-50 (in Russian).

<sup>4</sup> *The New York Times*, March 6, 1946.

enunciated in 1946 in statements by top officials of the Soviet government, in a series of interviews given by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, J.V. Stalin, to American and British journalists, and also in the speeches of Soviet delegations in the UN.

Briefly, the Soviet proposals were:

—*Peaceful coexistence.* The Soviet government stressed that it staunchly believed that peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition were possible between the two different social systems despite ideological differences. At the very first session of the UN General Assembly the Soviet delegation declared that the Soviet people wanted peaceful competition between states and social systems so that the nations of the world could organise closer and more diversified cooperation, and called for the strengthening of friendly relations between nations.

—*Continued cooperation between the powers that had jointly won the war.* In the above-mentioned interviews with Western journalists the confidence was expressed that friendly relations between the USSR and Western powers, notably the USA and Britain, were both possible and desirable. Some concrete considerations were stated on the ways and means of promoting such relations: a mutually beneficial agreement with the USA on loans or credits, an expansion of political, trade, and cultural relations with Britain and the USA, and periodical meetings of the leaders of the three powers to consider pressing international problems. In the UN, too, the Soviet Union drew attention to the importance of cooperation among the great powers on the basis of mutual benefit and non-interference in each other's affairs.

The Soviet government urged the renunciation of plans for the creation of closed blocs and groups directed against other states, pointing out that this was a dangerous road that, far from bridling aggressors, would only fan aggression. It reminded the world that the Soviet Union had never been a party to groups aimed against other peace-loving nations and had always advocated the further consolidation of cooperation among the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in peacetime.

—*Strengthening of the United Nations Organisation.* The Soviet Union was resolutely against this organisation becoming an instrument in the hands of any great power or group of powers. In many official Soviet statements it was noted that the strength of the UN rested on the principle of the equality of nations and not on the domination of some nations over others, and that it was vital to preserve that principle.

One of the main safeguards of the equality of nations in the UN, of their protection against imperialist dictation and arbitrary rule was consensus among the five permanent members of the Security Council, one of whom was the Soviet Union. This was felt most acutely



when there were only two socialist states in the world, the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic (the latter's admission to the UN was obstructed by the Western powers), when the People's Democracies were in fact only just emerging as states of the new type, and the liberation of colonial countries from foreign rule and the formation of independent states in Asia and Africa were only at the initial stage.

When the rule of consensus was attacked by Western countries at the very first session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union came out strongly in its defence and upheld this key condition of the UN's effectiveness.

— *Withdrawal by UN members of troops from the territory of other UN member states; a general reduction of armaments; the banning of atomic weapons.* On these issues the Soviet delegation submitted concrete proposals to the UN as early as 1946, the year that organisation began to function. Soviet proposals underlay the resolution on the principles of a general regulation and reduction of armaments passed by the UN General Assembly in December 1946.

This was the programme for peace and friendly cooperation proposed by the Soviet Union to the Western powers in 1946.

The Soviet government followed up its proposals with concrete action, which convincingly demonstrated its desire for peace and the sincerity of its calls for peaceful coexistence.

It not only denounced the arms race and called for steps to begin a reduction of armaments, but began after the war, from 1945 onwards, a massive demobilisation of troops with the result that by 1948 the Soviet Armed Forces were reduced from 11,365,000 to 2,874,000 effectives.

In the Security Council and at the General Assembly in 1946 it not only raised the question of the presence of troops of UN member states on the territory of non-enemy countries, and not only condemned the actions of the USA and Britain, which were continuing their military presence in many European, Asian, and African countries, interfering in their internal affairs and building military bases, but set the world an example of how the independence of other countries should in fact be respected and how they should be helped to return to a normal peacetime life. Soon after the war the withdrawal of Soviet troops was started from allied countries, which they had entered during the hostilities against the Nazi and Japanese aggressors. Soviet troops were withdrawn completely from Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Norway by the autumn of 1945, from the Danish island of Bornholm by April, and from China and Iran by May 1946.<sup>5</sup> By

<sup>5</sup> In early 1946 the Western powers made an attempt to raise a clamour in the UN over an alleged Soviet "refusal" to withdraw its troops from Iran. This attempt failed, for the question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country was settled by an understanding between the governments of the USSR and Iran.

the end of 1948 the Soviet government had withdrawn its troops from North Korea, but the American authorities refused to heed the request of the Supreme People's Assembly of Korea for the withdrawal of their troops from South Korea.

When the war ended the Soviet people, to whom aggressive designs and military plans were alien, dedicated all their energy to restoring their war-torn economy. The Communist Party and the Soviet government oriented the nation on resuming the building of socialism, which was interrupted by the war. The five-year plan for economic restoration and development for 1946-1950, adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, opened up prospects for the rapid growth of the nation's productive forces and the promotion of the people's living and cultural standards. The principal landmarks of a more long-term development programme were also determined. It was planned to treble the Soviet Union's industrial output during the next three five-year periods.<sup>6</sup> This was an extensive programme of peaceful economic development. The programme of peaceful cooperation based on respect for the equality and sovereignty of all nations, advanced and expounded by the Soviet government on the international scene, was entirely consistent with this economic programme.

However, peaceful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the normalisation of the international situation did not enter into the calculations of the aggressive imperialist circles. The US leaders rejected the Soviet proposals for peaceful development and went ahead with their plans for military and political blocs against the USSR and the People's Democracies, dragging capitalist nations dependent on the USA into the orbit of their adventurist policy. The first stage on this road was the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine.

### **The Soviet Union and the Truman Doctrine**

The British government's decision of February 1947 to withdraw its troops from Greece and cut off financial aid to Turkey was the signal for US imperialism to step up its expansion in Europe and openly proclaim an anti-Soviet posture.

The British architects of interference in the internal affairs of Greece had to back down, for Britain's financial resources were exhausted and the British intervention in Greece had evoked worldwide indignation, especially after the Soviet Union had raised the question of this intervention in the UN Security Council in 1946.

<sup>6</sup> The main targets of this long-term plan, made public in February 1946, were not only reached but greatly surpassed during 15 postwar years, while the targets for the output of steel, petroleum, and coal were attained in virtually ten years.

The US ruling circles took immediate advantage of Britain's weakness to seize important strategic positions in the Balkan Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean, enlarging the sphere of their military and political influence to the frontiers of the USSR and the European People's Democracies.

On March 12, 1947 Truman asked the US Congress to allocate \$400 million for urgent "aid" to Greece and Turkey. "Great Britain," he declared, "finds itself under the necessity of reducing or liquidating its commitments in several parts of the world, including Greece." The military character of the proposed "aid" was not concealed, much as no secret was made of the USA's intention to entrench itself in countries selected as recipients of "aid". Truman suggested sending military and civilian personnel to Greece and Turkey "to assist on the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervising the use of such financial and material assistance as may be furnished".<sup>7</sup>

This spelled out more than interference in the affairs of Greece and Turkey. In his address to Congress, which contained crude slander against the socialist countries, the US President raised the question of the USA undertaking the role of world policeman, so that henceforth it would interfere in the affairs of all countries on the side of reaction and counter-revolution, help crush the liberation movements of all peoples, and act openly against revolution, against the socialist development of nations. "At the present moment in world history," he said, "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life... We cannot allow changes in the status quo."<sup>8</sup>

The anti-Soviet and anti-socialist orientation of the foreign policy programme proclaimed in the Truman Doctrine was obvious from the outset.

On the day after Truman made his statement, a spokesman of the French Foreign Ministry told journalists: "They have adopted a clear-cut stand directed—it is no longer secret to anybody—against the USSR... Obviously, this marks a new stage in the relations between the USA and the Soviets. It shows that the US government desires to gain a footing in the Mediterranean." The noted US analyst Walter Lippmann wrote bluntly: "We have selected Turkey and Greece not because they are specially in need of relief, not because they are shining examples of democracy and the four freedoms, but because they are the strategic gateway to the Black Sea and the heart of the Soviet Union."<sup>9</sup>

The Soviet government and press unmasked the imperialist nature

<sup>7</sup> *Congressional Record*, Proceedings and Debates of the 80th Congress, First Session, March 10, 1947, Vol. 93, No. 45-50, pp. 1999, 2000.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*; March 12, 1947, p. 1981; In May 1947 Congress passed the bill on allocations for "aid" to Greece and Turkey, and the Truman Doctrine became the official policy of the USA.

<sup>9</sup> *The New York Herald Tribune*, April 1, 1947, p. 25.

of the Truman Doctrine. *Pravda* wrote at the time that the Doctrine meant further interference in the affairs of other nations. The USA's claims to leadership in international affairs are growing with the appetites of the interested American circles. *Pravda* noted that while acting in a new historical situation the US leaders were ignoring the fact that the old methods of the colonialists and diehard politicians had outworn themselves and were doomed.

The USSR strongly denounced the Truman doctrine in the United Nations as well, declaring that the US government's attempts to dictate its will to independent nations were incompatible with the principle proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in 1946, namely, that assistance to other nations should never be used as a political instrument.

The aggressive US stand in regions bordering on the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies led to closer unity among these countries, which were determined to safeguard peace and the sovereign rights of nations against infringement by the imperialists. An expression of this closer unity of the forces of peace and socialism was the conclusion in early 1948 of treaties of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania.

The Communist Party and the government of the USSR, of course, drew the proper conclusions from the USA's openly bellicose policy towards the Soviet Union. Steps were taken to enhance the USSR's security.

The US claims to world supremacy were made public by President Truman as far back as April 5, 1947 when he said that "the world today looks to us for leadership".<sup>10</sup>

The undisguisedly aggressive and expansionist Truman Doctrine was sharply criticised by large segments of public opinion in Western countries, including the USA itself. Harold Laski, a leading theorist of the British Labour Party, characterised the USA's efforts to halt the development of socialism in Europe, expressed in the Truman Doctrine, as the greatest threat to peace since Hitler seized power.<sup>11</sup> Former US Vice-President Henry Wallace, speaking on radio, declared: "Truman has, in effect, suggested that Americans should police all the frontiers of Russia.... If America is for opposition to change, then we have lost. America will become world's most hated nation."<sup>12</sup> Prominent American personalities, including New York's mayor La Guardia, said they were disgusted with the USA acting in circumvention of the UN and thereby exposing itself to charges of interfering in

<sup>10</sup> Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. Two, *Years of Trial and Hope*. A Signet Book. Published by the New American Library, New York, 1965, p. 131.

<sup>11</sup> *Avanti*, March 29, 1947.

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, March 15, 1947.

the affairs of other nations and of creating a threat to peace in that part of Europe.

Despite the violent indignation in the world against the Truman Doctrine, the US leaders went on interfering in the affairs of Greece and Turkey and building military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean. However, they had to think of a more subtle camouflage for their further actions towards expanding the sphere of US political and military domination.

### **The Soviet Union Exposes the Imperialist Essence of the Marshall Plan**

On June 5, 1947 the US Secretary of State George C. Marshall delivered a speech at Harvard University in which he referred to the difficult economic situation in many European countries as a result of the war and declared that the USA wanted to help these countries restore their economies. He said that this was a generous and disinterested offer, which, as he put it, was directed not against any nation or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.<sup>13</sup>

He did not specify the magnitude or terms of the proposed US assistance to European countries. Nor did he reveal the true motivations for this new American programme. The entire speech consisted of the most general, vague expressions. Subsequent developments showed that this was a well-considered, premeditated tactic of the US government.

A large section of the bourgeoisie in the European countries was frightened by the growth of socialism and democracy and welcomed Marshall's speech. He was echoed by the right-wing Socialist leaders, who sowed illusions about the motivations for the American plan. In some West European countries they spoke volubly about the "magnanimity" of the US offer. But the Soviet government saw through the implications of this new American move. It knew the worth of the US government's assurances about desiring to help countries heal their war wounds. As an ally of the USA in the war against a common enemy, an ally that had borne the brunt of the war and made the largest sacrifices for the common victory, the Soviet Union had already raised the question of long-term state credits from the USA, a country that unlike others had prospered during the war years, and placing large orders for manufactured goods and industrial plant in that country to be covered by such credits. In raising these questions it declared that it was prepared to promote postwar economic coope-

<sup>13</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, June 15, 1947, pp. 1159-60.

ration with the USA on a mutually beneficial basis, which would have been a sound earnest for building up confidence and friendship between the two nations and, consequently, for strengthening world peace. The Soviet government made repeated representations on this score to the government of the USA in 1945, 1946, and the spring of 1947 both confidentially, at summit level, and through the appropriate channels of the state apparatus. However, these representations did not get a favourable response from the USA.

The USA counted on using its economic resources not for postwar equitable cooperation with other nations but for entirely different purposes. This was demonstrated quite clearly as early as 1946 when the USA endeavoured to use the economy as a means of eroding the USSR's positions and forming an anti-Soviet front of nations dependent on Washington. When the question of a large loan to Britain was debated in the US Congress in the spring of 1946, a favourable decision was passed chiefly in the hope that this loan would help the USA to use Britain against the USSR. Senator Burton K. Wheeler declared frankly during the debate: "The only reason I can find for making the loan is to bolster the British sufficiently to head off communism in Europe."<sup>14</sup>

Also indicative was the USA's arbitrary termination, in May 1946, of reparations deliveries to the USSR from the US occupation zone in Germany (these reparations were provided for by the Potsdam Agreement) in order to bring political pressure to bear on the USSR.

In 1947 a far-reaching plan was conceived in Washington, namely, to use American economic aid as a means for consolidating US economic, political, and military domination in West European nations ruined by the war, halt the upswing of the revolutionary movement in many of these countries through US intervention, isolate the People's Democracies from the USSR, and return, at least some of them, to the capitalist fold.

Tactically, this entire action, known subsequently as the Marshall Plan, was started as a manoeuvre with a prearranged distribution of roles for misleading world public opinion. The USA did everything to give the impression that it was "totally disinterested" in how the aid promised by it to Europe would be used. The governments of Britain and France undertook to conduct the diplomatic preparations for the American project.

The British and French Foreign Ministers conferred in Paris on June 17 and 18, following which the governments of these two countries invited the Soviet government to send its Foreign Minister to consider the Marshall proposal with his British and French coun-

<sup>14</sup> Quoted in: William Hardy McNeill, *Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946. America, Britain, and Russia. Their Co-operation and Conflict, 1941-1946*, London, 1953, p. 686.

terparts. The Anglo-French memorandum of June 19, 1947 underscored that this was an "urgent" question and that wide-ranging economic programmes had to be drawn up quickly for the European nations.<sup>15</sup>

This invitation was sent with the obvious calculation that it would be turned down and that then the Soviet Union could be accused of unwillingness to help Europe receive American aid. The American media wrote at the time that George Marshall intended "to open to Russia a door that Washington felt sure she would not enter."<sup>16</sup>

But in Washington they miscalculated.

On June 22 the governments of Britain and France were informed that the USSR would take part in the three-power conference in Paris. The Soviet note stated: "The Soviet government concurs with the view that the immediate task of the European nations today is to restore as quickly as possible and further develop their war-dislocated economies. It goes without saying that fulfilment of this task could be facilitated if the United States of America, whose production potential, far from diminishing, has grown during the war, rendered assistance in conformity with the above-mentioned purposes."<sup>17</sup>

By agreeing to attend the conference the Soviet Union gave the US leaders another opportunity to prove in fact that they were ready to contribute to the restoration of the European economies on the basis of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of these nations. The Soviet government wanted to ascertain what actually lay behind Marshall's vague offers, what would be the character and terms of US economic assistance to the European states, and what dimensions were envisaged for this assistance. These were the questions that the Soviet representatives raised at the conference.

Moreover, the Soviet government's directives to its delegation stated: "At discussions of any specific proposals concerning American assistance to Europe, the Soviet delegation shall object to the aid terms that might entail infringement of the sovereignty of European nations or encroachment upon their economic independence."<sup>18</sup>

The sittings of the three-power Paris conference lasted from June 27 to July 2, 1947. It was found that Bevin and Bidault were not prepared to give any information about the American plan. They gave the lame excuse that they themselves knew only what Marshall had said in his speech on June 5, although it was public knowledge that on the eve of the conference William L. Clayton, Marshall's deputy, had

<sup>15</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Memorandum of June 19, 1947 from the governments of the United Kingdom and France.

<sup>16</sup> *The New York Times*, June 18, 1947, p. 62.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, June 23, 1947.

<sup>18</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions of June 25, 1947, of the government of the USSR to the Soviet delegation to the Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris.

long talks on this question in London with Bevin and other members of the British government. Washington was obviously disinclined to make any specific promises, particularly to the Soviet Union, which was the main obstacle to its aggressive policy.

At the conference it was seen that Bevin and Bidault were only concerned with drawing up something approaching an all-embracing coordinated four-year programme for all European countries to be submitted for approval to the government of the USA. This would have given the US government the possibility of determining the orientation of economic development in the European nations. The British and French Foreign Ministers suggested that the compilation of this programme should be entrusted to a directing committee consisting of representatives of Britain, France, the USSR, and four other countries.<sup>19</sup>

Contradicting their own statements that they were "uninformed" of the USA's intentions, the British and French Foreign Ministers insisted that if no economic programme were drawn up for the European nations the USA would withhold assistance to Europe.

The Soviet Union unmasked the meaning of these plans for an assault on the sovereignty of the European nations, showing that the Anglo-French proposals were an attempt to deprive the European states of their economic and political independence, to bring them under control, and determine their internal affairs to the extent of the development orientation of the main branches of their economies.

It warned that under these projects US credits would serve not Europe's economic recovery but the use of some European nations against others to the benefit of the powers seeking domination.

It submitted its own proposal based on respect for the sovereignty of the nations that were to receive assistance: the formation of a good offices committee to ascertain what assistance these nations needed from the USA in accordance with applications from them. On this foundation it was suggested drawing up a summary programme of required assistance and then ascertaining how much aid the USA was willing to extend. Further, it was stated that priority should be given to nations that had suffered from German aggression and contributed to the Allied victory.

These proposals were rejected out of hand by Britain and France. But they were unable to counter them with anything except a plan for interference in the affairs of European nations, a plan dictated by the Americans, and they hastily wound up the conference.

The Soviet stand thus helped the peoples to see through the objectives of the Marshall Plan. On the international scene the Soviet Union had again come forward as a consistent and staunch champion of the sovereign rights of all nations, of their independence, and of

<sup>19</sup> *Le Monde* 1 juillet 1947, p. 2.



non-interference in their internal affairs.

Despite pressure from the USA, Britain, and France, not only the USSR but also Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia refused to participate in the Marshall Plan.

The USA now lifted the camouflage from its objectives and openly engaged, with the aid of the Marshall Plan, in forming an anti-Soviet bloc of capitalist countries dependent upon US imperialism. As the Soviet government had predicted, the Marshall Plan was a scenario for dividing Europe and interfering in the internal affairs of European nations.

This was borne out strikingly on July 12, 1947 at the Paris conference of 16 West European countries that had agreed to take part in implementing the Marshall Plan. Some of them, for instance, Sweden, wanted the information submitted by the participating nations to the plan administrator (i.e., the USA) to be unrepeatable and cover only the problems directly linked to the receipt of aid from the USA. But the exponents of this view soon found that they had been politically naive. The USA imposed a procedure by which every country covered by the Marshall Plan had to present comprehensive reports on the state of their economy, the extent of the damage inflicted upon them by the war, their progress in restoring their economy, their currency reserves, and so forth.

The architects of the Marshall Plan saw restored German militarism as a major component of the military bloc the USA was forming against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Only 20 days after George C. Marshall spoke of American "aid" to Europe at Harvard University, his former deputy and subsequent successor to the post of US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, told the Credits Commission of the House of Representatives that the US government regarded the restoration of the German industry as the basic aim of the Marshall Plan.<sup>20</sup>

In his *Reminiscences*, published in 1965, Konrad Adenauer, the first head of government in West Germany, wrote that from the outset one of the basic elements of the Marshall Plan was the line towards the restoration with the aid of US capital—despite objections from France—of the heavy industry, specifically the production of steel and steelware, in West Germany (to be more exact, initially in the combined Anglo-US bizonal area which included the Ruhr). "Thus, the output of industries, whose capacities had been reduced, had to be raised to a higher level than before the war,"<sup>21</sup> Adenauer

<sup>20</sup> G. Andreyev, *Export of US Capital*, Moscow, 1957, p. 358 (in Russian).

<sup>21</sup> Konrad Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945-1953*, Vol. I, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 121.

noted, writing of the plans the USA and Britain had laid by the summer of 1947.

The Soviet government repeatedly pointed out that the aims of the Marshall Plan were hostile to the peace and independence of nations. At the 2nd UN General Assembly in September 1947 the Soviet delegation issued a statement that declared in part: "It is becoming increasingly evident to everybody that implementation of the Marshall Plan will amount to the subjection of European nations to economic and political control by the USA and to the latter's direct interference in their internal affairs.

"Further, this plan is an attempt to divide Europe into two camps and, with the aid of the United Kingdom and France, to consummate the formation of a bloc of some European countries, a bloc hostile to the interests of the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe and, chiefly, of the Soviet Union.

"A major aspect of this plan is that it is designed to bring into confrontation with the East European countries a bloc of Western countries, including West Germany. It is intended to use West Germany and the German heavy industry (Ruhr) as one of the principal economic springboards of US expansion in Europe in contravention of the interests of nations that had been victims of German aggression."<sup>22</sup> The governments of the People's Democracies likewise denounced the dangerous aims of US imperialism camouflaged with the "philanthropic" signboard of the Marshall Plan.

### **Soviet Opposition to the Imperialist Policy of Military Blocs**

The decisions of the separate conference held by the Western powers in London in February 1948 made it plain that the USA, Britain, and France were out to form a military bloc, with the participation of West Germany, spearheaded against the Soviet Union.

That same month the Soviet Information Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR published a detailed historical record under the title *Falsifiers of History*. This document cut the ground from under the attempts of the Western powers to screen their outrageous conspiracy with the West German militarists with slander against Soviet foreign policy. On the basis of innumerable facts and documents it was shown how British, French, and US support for the Nazi regime led to the Second World War, and drew the world's attention to the Western powers' continued compact with German militarism after the war.

In March 1948 Britain sponsored the formation of the first Western

<sup>22</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1947*, Part II, Moscow, 1952, p. 132.

military-political bloc against the USSR and the People's Democracies, consisting of Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg; it was called the Western Union. The preamble to the treaty on the formation of this bloc, signed on March 17 in Brussels, formally referred to the possibility of further aggression by Germany. But this was only a veil to deceive the peoples, for the architects of this anti-Soviet bloc were already then preparing to cooperate with the West German militarists.

In a note to the British government on March 6, 1948, the Soviet government declared that the formation of the Western Union was closely linked to and complemented the Marshall Plan and showed the political aims of the American plan in Europe. The note warned that both these plans were ranging Western Europe against Eastern Europe and, consequently, leading to Europe's political division. Further, it stated that the policy of the Western Union's architects "was fraught with the danger of the western part of Germany becoming the strategic base for future aggression in Europe".<sup>23</sup>

Initially, the creation of the Western Union mirrored the intention of Britain's rulers to strengthen their international position by sponsoring this bloc of West European colonial powers. However, it soon became evident that the USA did not mean to encourage this "separatism" in the camp of its allies.

The US rulers hastened to take the newly-formed Western Union officially under their stewardship. President Truman wrote in a special message to Congress on March 17, 1948, that the USA would extend to this bloc the support "which the situation requires".<sup>24</sup> *Pravda* wrote that Truman's bellicose anti-Soviet message to the US Congress on March 17, 1948 (the day the Western Union came into being) was "essentially aimed at getting the Congress, in violation of the traditional principles of United States foreign policy, to approve the USA's formal membership of a West European military-political bloc".<sup>25</sup> The relevant steps were taken officially by the US government in the Congress as early as June 1948.<sup>26</sup>

As a prelude to this action, the government of the USA took a step obviously calculated to deceive public opinion. On May 4, 1948 the US Ambassador in Moscow Walter Bedell Smith called on the Soviet

<sup>23</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1948*, Part I, Moscow, 1950, pp. 144, 145.

<sup>24</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman, January 1 to December 31, 1948*, Washington, 1964, p. 184.

<sup>25</sup> *Pravda*, March 22, 1948.

<sup>26</sup> The Vandenberg resolution passed by the US Senate on June 11, 1948 in fact meant that in pursuance of their anti-Soviet objectives the US ruling circles were making a complete break with the traditional policy of non-participation in peace-time military alliances outside the American continent.

Foreign Ministry and on behalf of his government made a statement on Soviet-US relations.<sup>27</sup> He implied that in forming military blocs against the USSR and the People's Democracies, conducting the arms race and building up a network of military bases on foreign territory his government was pursuing a policy of "mutual self-defence". To "justify" its actions, which were imperilling peace, the US government referred to the establishment of the people's democratic system in a number of East European countries. Further, the US Ambassador contended that the "communist coup" in Czechoslovakia has shocked the United States and was the reason a military bloc was formed in Europe. He alleged that there were secret articles in the treaties on mutual assistance signed by the Soviet Union with the People's Democracies.

The US government statement, which was full of inventions of this kind, ended with the unsubstantiated assertion that the USA had no hostile or aggressive intentions towards the Soviet Union, and with a proposal for a comprehensive discussion and settlement of the differences between the USSR and the USA.

On May 9, in reply to this American statement, the US Ambassador was informed that the Soviet government had taken a favourable view of the US government's desire to improve relations with the USSR and was "prepared to enter, with this purpose in mind, into a discussion and settlement of the differences existing between us". At the same time the Soviet government refuted the American inventions about Soviet policy and the USSR's relations with the People's Democracies. International tension, it said, sprang mainly from US actions such as the building of military bases in all parts of the world, bellicose threats to the USSR, and the formation of military alliances against it.<sup>28</sup>

The Soviet Union's consent to negotiate an improvement of relations with the USA and the publication of this consent clearly upset Truman's calculations. It came to light immediately that in Washington they had not counted on any sort of negotiations and had made their statement merely to erect a diplomatic screen before moving towards an enlargement of the anti-Soviet military bloc and to have the possibility of referring to this "gesture of peaceableness".

The authors of the American statement had to beat a retreat. Truman said at a press conference that his hopes for peace had not increased as a result of the exchange of statements with the government of the USSR. The US President was echoed by the British Foreign Secretary. Although there was no reference to Britain in the US and Soviet statements, Bevin considered he had to declare in parliament that he was "not anxious to enter into further conferences

<sup>27</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1948*, part I, p. 197.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

until the ground has been cleared".<sup>29</sup>

At this time the Soviet government informed the USA and the whole world of its view about a possible programme for Soviet-US talks. This was done in connection with a letter to Stalin from the former US Vice-President Henry Wallace, who suggested that the Soviet Union and the United States come to an understanding on a general reduction of armaments, the prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction, the dismantling of foreign military bases on the territory of UN member countries, non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations, the conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan, the withdrawal of foreign troops from China and Korea, and the utmost expansion of international trade.

In reply to the Wallace letter it was stated that the Soviet government felt that "Mr. Wallace's programme could be a good and constructive foundation" for agreement between the USSR and the USA. It was re-emphasised that the Soviet government believed that coexistence between the two social systems and a peaceful settlement of the differences with the USA were possible and necessary.<sup>30</sup>

This Soviet offer, too, was rejected by the Truman administration, which thereby finally demonstrated the insincerity of its statements. On May 19 the US Department of State published a statement declaring that the issues listed in the Wallace letter and the Soviet reply could not serve as the subject of bilateral discussion between the USA and the USSR.<sup>31</sup>

The US rulers now embarked openly upon the formation of an American-led military bloc of capitalist countries against the USSR and other peace-loving nations. This bloc, formed in April 1949, was the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with the USA, Britain, France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Luxembourg, and then Turkey, Greece (1952), and the FRG (1955) as its members.

The sponsors of this bloc demagogically contended that it was "purely defensive",<sup>32</sup> alleging that there was a "threat of communist aggression" against Western Europe. By constantly repeating these fabrications, the ruling circles of the USA hoped to justify their aggressive policy embodied by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

<sup>29</sup> *Parliamentary Debates* (Hansard), Fifth Series, Vol. 450, House of Commons, Official Report, Eighth Volume of Session 1947-48, London, 1948, p. 2125.

<sup>30</sup> *Pravda*, May 18, 1948.

<sup>31</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1948*, Part I, pp. 204, 205.

<sup>32</sup> *The New York Times*, March 20, 1949, The US Department of State gave the assurance this was a defensive treaty with the aim of safeguarding peace in *White Paper on Atlantic Pact*, New York, 1949, pp. 26-27.

The text of this treaty<sup>33</sup> opens with the words "faith in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter". Some of the articles contain a reference to the UN and its Charter in one way or another. But this did not obscure the fact that the creation of a military bloc was a flagrant violation of the aims and principles of the United Nations and was directed at eroding the foundations of that organisation—the cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council.

Article 3, which states that NATO members would "separately and jointly ... maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack", made the pact, in the hands of the US imperialists, an instrument by means of which the other members were enmeshed in ties of direct military dependence on the USA and turned into beachheads for US troops and nuclear and other military bases, into suppliers of the additional reserves of manpower and armaments needed by the US strategists.

Moreover, the military commitments of the signatories are so worded in the treaty (Article 5) as to give the USA complete freedom to act at its own discretion in the event of a military conflict. In a radio address on March 18, 1949, Dean Acheson, who was Secretary of State at the time the treaty was signed, made the point that the treaty "does not mean that the United States would be automatically at war if one of the nations covered by the pact is subjected to armed attack.... That decision would be taken in accordance with our constitutional procedures."<sup>34</sup>

Article 8 subordinates all other international agreements and, consequently, the entire foreign policy of the signatories to the treaty provisions. Article 13 states that the treaty would be in effect for 20 years. Acheson declared that it had no time limit, for it would be automatically prolonged upon the expiry of its term of operation.<sup>35</sup>

The NATO bloc was depicted by its organisers as a regional pact set up for the alleged purpose of "collective self-defence". It is indicated that even Dulles, who replaced Acheson as US Secretary of State, quite candidly acknowledged that when they formed NATO the leaders of the USA and the West European capitalist countries did not believe there was any threat of "aggression" from the USSR. "Generally it [the USSR.—*Ed.*]," he wrote, "avoids anything that suggests a war of nation against nation.... Some of the highest and most competent authorities in Europe have recently told me that they do not

<sup>33</sup> The text of this treaty is given in *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-1949*, Washington, 1950, pp. 1328-30.

<sup>34</sup> *Strengthening the Forces of Freedom. Selected Speeches and Statements of Secretary of State Acheson, February 1949-April 1950*, Washington, 1950, p. 85.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*

believe that the Communist Party would dare to order the Russian armies to march into Western Europe as an invading force unless Russia had first been attacked, so that it was clear to the Russian people that the operation was necessary for self-defense.... Most well-qualified persons are inclined to feel that there is no imminent danger of the Red Army's being marched out of Russia against Western Europe or Asia in a war of aggression."<sup>36</sup>

The admission by a man who contributed to laying the groundwork for the North Atlantic pact was striking evidence of the falsity of all the statements that NATO had to be formed for defence against "communist aggression".

Indeed, this pact was meant as an instrument to bring military pressure to bear on the socialist community and suppress the national liberation movement in colonial countries. The first of these purposes was expressed in that period by the makers of US foreign policy when they proclaimed their notorious doctrines of "liberating" the People's Democracies (in other words, restoring the capitalist system in these countries) and "rolling back communism". Ultimately, all this was to make US imperialism master of the world.

In a speech in the US Senate on July 6, 1949, advocating the ratification of this treaty, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, one of the inspirers of the North Atlantic pact, said: "Now we are unavoidably the leader and the reliance of freeman throughout this free world. We cannot escape from our prestige nor from its hazard."<sup>37</sup> Later, when NATO had been formed and become active, General Alfred M. Gruenther, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, declared in the United States: "The mantle of world leadership has fallen upon our shoulders. This alliance [NATO.—Ed.] will succeed, in large measure, in the degree to which we are able to exercise that leadership."<sup>38</sup>

Reality bore out Senator Robert Taft's assessment of the North Atlantic pact in 1949. He declared that "the pact ... will promote war in the world rather than peace and ... it is wholly contrary to the spirit of the obligations we assumed in the United Nations Charter."<sup>39</sup>

The Soviet government relentlessly exposed NATO's essence when that aggressive imperialist bloc was still in the making. A statement by the Soviet Foreign Ministry on January 29, 1949 noted that the purposes of the contemplated military bloc were linked closely to the

<sup>36</sup> John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace*, New York, 1957, p. 113.

<sup>37</sup> *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*, Boston, 1952, p. 494.

<sup>38</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 34, No. 870, February 27, 1956, p. 334.

<sup>39</sup> *Congressional Record*, Vol. 95, No. 123, July 11, 1949, p. 9383.

plans for the forcible establishment of US-British world supremacy under the aegis of the USA: in Western Europe, in the North Atlantic, in South America, in the Mediterranean, in Asia, in Africa—"wherever the hand can reach".<sup>40</sup>

It forewarned the countries that were being drawn into the North Atlantic alliance that the bloc's organisers would deprive them of the possibility of pursuing an independent foreign and domestic policy and use them as an auxiliary means of carrying out their plans of aggression.

The Soviet statement noted that the creation of the North Atlantic alliance was totally at variance with the UN Charter, that the alliance would undermine the UN and subvert important political agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with the USA, Britain, and France, including the Soviet-British and Soviet-French treaties of friendship and mutual assistance. The USA was sharply criticised for building military bases in European, Asian, African, and American countries.

The Soviet government identified the factors that would wreck the wild plans of NATO's stage-managers for world domination: the USSR and the People's Democracies, which were championing the great principles of friendship and equality among nations; the rapidly spreading national liberation movement of Eastern peoples; powerful support from democratic forces in other countries; the unwillingness of some countries, including those that had joined aggressive blocs, to submit unconditionally to American dictation.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry's statement closed with the conclusion: "The Soviet Union should carry on the struggle more energetically and more consistently against all warmongers, against the policy of aggression and the unleashing of another war, for a lasting democratic peace in the world.... The Soviet Union should act with greater firmness and perseverance against the subversion and destruction of the United Nations Organisation."<sup>41</sup>

The future members of NATO were informed of the Soviet view about the bloc in a memorandum on March 31, 1949.<sup>42</sup> Earlier still, on January 29, the Soviet Union sent Norway a statement drawing that nation's attention to NATO's aggressive, anti-Soviet aims and asking to be informed whether Norway was undertaking any commitments to permit NATO military bases on its territory.<sup>43</sup> The motivation for that statement was that Norway, a small and traditionally neutral country friendly to the Soviet Union in the past and now in the vise of economic dependence on the USA and Britain, interested the NATO organisers because it had a common frontier

<sup>40</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1949*, Moscow, 1953, p. 57.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 89-94.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.



with the Soviet Union in the north. The USSR could not remain indifferent to plans for moving the bridgeheads of the aggressive imperialist bloc into direct proximity of its frontiers.

On February 1 in its reply to the Soviet statement the Norwegian government gave the assurance that it "would not be a party to a policy of aggression and would not enter into any agreement with other countries committing it to cede bases for the armed forces of foreign powers on Norwegian soil as long as Norway was not subjected to invasion or the threat of attack".<sup>44</sup>

Denmark, to which the Soviet Union also made a representation, replied that it would not be associated with a policy pursuing aggressive aims and would not accept an interpretation or use of the Atlantic pact directed against the USSR "with which Denmark traditionally had peaceful and friendly relations". Sweden flatly refused to join the North Atlantic bloc in spite of strong pressure from the USA.

Thus, from the beginning the NATO organisers had in some measure to limit their plans for war preparations against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

On July 19, 1949 a Soviet note to the Italian government and also to the governments of the USA and Britain pointed out that Italy's membership of NATO and its military preparations within the framework of that bloc would be a violation of the peace treaty with it. Under the terms of that treaty Italy had pledged to take no actions against countries that had signed the treaty and also to maintain armed forces at a strength needed only for the local defence of Italian frontiers and for tasks of an internal order.

In the United Nations as well the Soviet Union waged an unremitting struggle against imperialist military blocs, for peaceful cooperation among nations. At the 4th General Assembly in September 1949 it proposed condemning the setting up of aggressive military blocs and banning atomic weapons and other means of mass destruction, and urged a five-power (USA, Britain, China, France and USSR) pact on the strengthening of peace. This recommendation was rejected by the Western powers.

Later, in the spring of 1951, when the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France were holding preliminary talks on the agenda for a projected four-power Foreign Ministers Conference, the Soviet government proposed that in the interests of improving relations between it and the Western powers there should be a frank discussion of the Atlantic pact and the US military bases in European and Middle Eastern countries. It declared that if the Western powers so desired it was prepared to discuss any of the mutual assistance pacts it had signed: with China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Finland, and also France and Britain. However this proposal was not accepted.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

In November 1951 the Soviet government denounced the aggressive designs of the USA, Britain, and France to put a yoke upon the entire Middle East. These three powers, and also Turkey, which had been drawn into their plans, attempted to set up a so-called Allied Middle East Command for the "collective defence" of that region. This would have meant the inclusion of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other Middle Eastern states in imperialist military blocs. In notes to the governments of these countries the Soviet Union underscored that implementation of the plans for a Middle East Command would spell out the military occupation of the Middle Eastern states by NATO troops, chiefly of the USA and Britain. It denounced the efforts of the NATO bosses to justify their predatory ambitions with allegations that the Middle Eastern states were "threatened" by the USSR. "From the first days of the existence of the Soviet state the Soviet government has always shown understanding and sympathy for the national aspirations of the Eastern peoples and for their struggle for national independence and sovereignty," the note declared. Further, the Soviet government warned that participation by the Middle East countries in the Middle East Command would seriously prejudice the relations of these countries with the USSR and also the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East.<sup>45</sup>

This Soviet diplomatic action did much to stiffen the resistance of the patriotic forces of the Middle East states to the attempts to involve these countries in imperialist military blocs and helped to wreck the plans for a Middle East Command. The countries of the Arab East did not join the military blocs shaped by the USA and Britain. The only exception, and even then it was temporary, was Iraq, which was involved in 1955 by the traitor clique of Nuri Al-Said and King Feisal in the Baghdad Pact, a military bloc consisting of Britain, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan (in 1959 it was renamed CENTO).<sup>46</sup>

\* \* \*

Thus, after World War II US imperialism laid claim to world supremacy and the Western powers led by the USA started a new arms race, the formation of aggressive military blocs, the suppression of the sovereignty of nations, and military preparations against the USSR and the other socialist countries.

This imperialist programme of oppression and aggression was

<sup>45</sup> *Pravda*, November 23, 1951.

<sup>46</sup> In July 1958 Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Treaty. On March 12 and 13, 1979 Pakistan and Iran respectively made announcements about their withdrawal from CENTO which thus ceased to exist.

denounced and strongly rebuffed by the Soviet Union, which countered it with a different programme calling for peaceful coexistence, the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation, respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of countries, continued cooperation of the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition in order to preserve and consolidate peace, the strengthening of the UN on the basis of the principles enunciated in its Charter, the banning of nuclear weapons, and a reduction of conventional armed forces under strict international control.

Sustained Soviet opposition to the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the creation of imperialist military blocs helped the nations of the world to understand that the US imperialist schemes were endangering peace and the freedom and independence of all countries. Millions of ordinary people throughout the world stigmatised the arms race, the formation of military blocs, and the preparations for a nuclear war. Some capitalist countries in Europe and the overwhelming majority of countries in Asia refused to be drawn into the military blocs organised by the Western powers, preferring to proclaim a policy of neutrality.

The imperialists found themselves helpless to prevent the socialist development of the People's Democracies and the growth of the national liberation movement in colonial countries.

As the Programme of the CPSU pointed out, "the facts reveal the utter incongruity of the US imperialist claims to world domination. Imperialism has proved incapable of stemming the socialist and national liberation revolutions."<sup>47</sup> This was a great victory of the peace forces, of the policy of peaceful coexistence, and of the policy of supporting the national identity, freedom, and independence of nations consistently pursued by the Soviet Union.

However, the military blocs set up by the imperialists, and particularly the restoration of militarism in West Germany under NATO stewardship were still a threat to peace. During the closing years of the 1940s and the initial years of the 1950s the international situation was extremely tense and one of the central foreign policy tasks of the USSR and other peace-loving states was to counter the war threat engendered by the imperialists.

<sup>47</sup> *The Road to Communism*, Moscow, 1962, p. 476.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION IN THE FAR EAST

#### Soviet Actions to Prevent the Division of Korea. Assistance to the Korean People

US imperialist policy assumed what were probably its most violent forms in the late 1940s and early 1950s in Korea.

The defeat of imperialist Japan and the Soviet Army's entry into Northeast China and Korea gave a further impetus to the national liberation struggle. The prospect was opened for carrying out long-awaited social reforms in the country. However, when Japanese militarism was crushed the USA hastened to take its place and consolidate itself in South Korea.

US policy in Asia called for the use of armed force to halt the national liberation movement and safeguard capitalism's positions in that important region.

In the spring of 1950 US diplomats held a long series of conferences with officials of some Southeast Asian countries ruled by reactionary regimes. At these conferences they considered ways and means of strengthening these reactionary regimes.

Korea was accorded a major place in US policy in the Far East.

Liberated from Japanese colonial rule by the Soviet Army, the Korean people wanted national independence. This was opposed by the USA, which landed troops in South Korea after Japan's surrender. Entrenched in South Korea, the Americans sought to bring the entire country under their influence. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain (December 1945), the USA requested to include in the agenda an item under the heading "The Creation of a Unified Administration for Korea Looking Toward the Establishment of an Independent Korean Government".<sup>1</sup>

At that conference the US delegation opposed the restoration of Korea's independence despite the American promises given during the war and recorded in the Cairo and Potsdam declarations. It submitted the draft of an agreement under which before becoming independent Korea would have to pass through two stages of foreign administration. At the first stage control of Korea would be exercised by the commanders of the US and Soviet troops in that country. At the second stage there would be a four-power administ-

<sup>1</sup> *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman*, Vol. II, *Years of Trial and Hope*, New York, 1956, p. 318.

ration acting on the basis of an agreement on an international trusteeship. To this end the Americans proposed setting up an administrative agency that would act on behalf of the UN. In addition to Soviet and US representatives it would have representatives from Britain and the Kuomintang government of China.

The administrative organ would have executive, legislative, and judicial powers in Korea. It was suggested that Koreans would be enlisted only as administrators, consultants, and advisers. The period of trusteeship could be prolonged to ten years.<sup>2</sup>

With an obedient majority in the UN, including the trusteeship agencies, the USA counted on smashing the democratic forces in Korea, consolidating the positions held by reaction, and setting up a puppet regime that would lead to Korea's conversion into a nation dependent politically on the Americans.

The Soviet government proposed a fundamentally different project envisaging the granting of independence to the Korean people as early as possible. Following a sharp debate the Soviet proposals were, with minor amendments, approved by the conference and underlay the Moscow Agreement on Korea.<sup>3</sup> The substance of this agreement was that a provisional Korean democratic government would be formed and given the administration of the country. Provision was made for a joint commission composed of representatives of the Soviet command in North Korea and of the US command in South Korea to expedite the formation of this government through consultations with Korean democratic parties and organisations.

However, this joint commission produced nothing positive due to obstruction by the US representatives. The USA did not want a democratic, independent Korea.

In June 1946, six months after the Moscow Conference, Truman's personal representative on reparations Pauli, who had toured South and North Korea, suggested making the USA predominant in Korea through a series of political and economic measures that did not exclude the use of armed forces. Truman approved the proposed programme.<sup>4</sup>

The US government wanted to prolong its military occupation in South Korea in order to destroy the democratic movement, support reaction, and consolidate the economic and political leverage of the US monopolies in that country. The US authorities dispersed the people's committees set up in South Korea after its liberation and established control of the military administration. They obstructed

<sup>2</sup> *The Soviet Union and the Korean Problem. Documents*, Moscow, 1948, pp. 8-12 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services on the Korean Situation. United States Senate, 81st US Congress, 2nd Session*, Washington, 1950, pp. 13-14.

the work of the joint Soviet-US commission in order to prevent the formation of a provisional Korean government. This situation brought the Soviet government to the conclusion that the Korean people should be given the possibility of forming a democratic government by themselves. On September 26, 1947 it proposed the withdrawal of Soviet and US troops from Korea.<sup>5</sup> In October 1947, as a result of the USA's refusal to accept this proposal, the joint Soviet-US commission ceased to function.

US diplomacy solicited international approval for its actions. In the autumn of 1947 the USA brought the Korea issue up for discussion at the 2nd UN General Assembly. At this discussion the Soviet representative proposed the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet and US troops from Korea. This motion was defeated by a US-orchestrated majority vote.

Flouting the norms of democracy, the US occupation authorities conducted elections on May 10, 1948 to the so-called National Assembly under conditions of undisguised terror and persecution of democratic elements and all adversaries of these separate elections. These rigged elections resulted in the creation of a South Korean government headed by the reactionary Syngman Rhee (Li Sung-man), who had resided in the USA for many years and was brought to Seoul at the close of 1945.

The formation of this government divided the nation and demonstrated that the USA was set on making South Korea a strategic base in the Far East.

Korea's democratic forces were disturbed by the actions of the US authorities, which had led to the nation's division. In June-July 1948 a combined conference of representatives of political parties and public organisations of North and South Korea passed a decision to hold democratic elections to the Supreme People's Assembly throughout the nation. In South Korea, where they were hindered by the US authorities, the elections were held secretly.

The Supreme People's Assembly was formed as a result of the general elections in August 1948. On September 8 it adopted the Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and formed its first government.

The proclamation of the PDRK was a triumph of the Korean people in their struggle for independence and the nation's democratic development. This was an event of great significance to the historical destiny of the Korean people and to the development of international relations in the Far East. It was a further blow to colonialism, for it set the peoples of Asia an example in their struggle for independence and freedom.

<sup>5</sup> *The Soviet Union and the Korean Problem. Documents*, p. 61 (in Russian).

In March 1949 the USSR and the PDRK signed agreements on economic and cultural cooperation, trade and payments, a Soviet loan, and Soviet technical assistance. The fraternal assistance extended to the Korean people under these agreements enabled them to promote their economy and consolidate their democratic system.

The United Democratic Fatherland Front, representing the political parties and public organisations of the two parts of the nation, was formed in June 1949 on the initiative of a number of political and public organisations in South Korea. In its address to the Korean people the Front put forward a programme for the country's peaceful reunification on the basis of general elections to a Korean supreme legislative body that would adopt a Constitution and form a single government.

The US ruling circles did everything to prevent the creation of a united and independent Korea. To pressure the South Korean bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie and block the nation's reunification the US Congress enacted a law on February 14, 1950 under which aid would be terminated immediately "in the event of the formation in the Republic of Korea of a coalition government which includes one or more members of the Communist Party or of the party now in control of the government of northern Korea".<sup>6</sup> This was an act of flagrant interference in Korea's internal affairs. The South Korean authorities, who were dependent on the Americans, turned down the Front's proposals. They were nurturing other plans, namely, to "unite" Korea in their own way, by armed force, by the conquest of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea.

### War in Korea Is Planned and Unleashed

The reactionary Syngman Rhee regime began preparations for the invasion of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea as soon as it came to power. On August 24, 1948 the USA and South Korea concluded a secret military agreement on the formation of a South Korean army controlled by the US Military Mission. Under the law on US aid to allies in aggressive blocs the USA allocated \$75 million in military aid to Syngman Rhee in the autumn of 1949. In 1950 the appropriations for South Korea amounted to \$110 million.

By the close of 1949 the South Korean army had over 100,000 effectives equipped with US weapons. In January 1950 Brigadier-General William L. Roberts, then chief of the American advisory group to the South Korean army told ministers of the puppet regime

<sup>6</sup> *United States Statutes at Large, 1950-1951, Vol. 64, Part I, Public Laws and Reorganisation Plans, Washington, 1952, p. 5.*

that it had been conclusively decided to attack North Korea.<sup>7</sup> On January 26, 1950 the USA and South Korea signed a mutual defence assistance agreement under which the USA pledged to supply South Korea with "equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance", while the Syngman Rhee regime undertook "to make effective use of assistance received".<sup>8</sup>

In preparing for aggression the USA and its South Korean agents did everything to strain the relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Hardly a day passed without the South Korean military provoking clashes along the 38th parallel. In the period from January 1949 to April 1950 South Korean troops and police made 1,274 incursions into PDRK territory. In addition, there were 133 intrusions of North Korea's sea and air space.

These provocations were accompanied by heightened US military and intelligence activity. US military and political leaders followed one another to South Korea in quick succession. Kenneth C. Royall, the US Under-Secretary of Defence, visited Seoul in January 1950, and in June of the same year tours of the Far East were made by the US Secretary of Defense Louis A. Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley, and last by John Foster Dulles, then advisor to the State Department. Dulles addressed the National Assembly of South Korea on June 19, assuring the South Korean authorities that the USA would give them all the necessary material and moral assistance "against communism".

All these preparations were evidence of the US ruling circles' intention of abolishing the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and placing the whole of Korea under the Syngman Rhee regime. As they saw it, the abolition of the PDRK would be a demonstration of world imperialism's strength in the eyes of the Asian peoples. Korea was to be the prelude for the invasion of the People's Republic of China.

The USA hoped that the defeat of the PDRK and the PRC would undermine the belief of the Asian peoples that imperialism could be fought successfully, weaken the national liberation movement, and bolster the position of the colonial powers.

Moreover, the US imperialists wanted a war in Korea in order to produce a general aggravation of the international situation and use the resultant tense atmosphere to strengthen the North Atlantic bloc and restore militarism in West Germany and Japan.

They counted on a war in Korea giving free rein to the arms race

<sup>7</sup> *Documents and Materials Exposing the Instigators of the Civil War in Korea*, Pyongyang, 1950, pp. 7-9; I. F. Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, London, 1952, pp. 8-9.

<sup>8</sup> *American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Washington, 1957, pp. 2529-30.



and thereby preventing an economic crisis, the symptoms of which were surfacing in the economy of the USA and some other capitalist countries. They believed that huge allocations for armaments would help to improve the deteriorating economic situation.

On June 25, 1950 South Korean troops began the US-orchestrated aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, starting a civil war. At some points they penetrated the territory of the PDRK. To repulse this aggression and ensure the nation's security the government of the PDRK ordered its troops to mount a counter-offensive, throw the enemy back, and pursue him on the territory of South Korea.

In the evening of June 25 (June 26 in Korea) Truman called a conference attended by Secretary of State Acheson, Secretary of Defense Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Bradley, and other aids, when it became obvious that the South Korean troops were in retreat. This conference recommended sending the US 7th Fleet from its base in the Philippines to the Formosa Strait using air and naval forces in South Korea under the guise of evacuating American civilians, and increasing supplies of military hardware to the Syngman Rhee army. This recommendation was put into effect at once.

On June 26 another conference at the same level, with the participation of some senators, decided to extend the intervention in the Far East. General Douglas MacArthur was instructed to use US naval and air units to help the Syngman Rhee forces.<sup>9</sup> The US military had long waited for an opportunity to send their armed forces into action in the Far East. Later, in January 1952, General James A. Van Fleet, commander of the US 8th Army, declared that "Korea was a blessing. There had to be a Korea either here or some place in the world."<sup>10</sup>

On June 25, 1950 the US 7th Fleet received orders to steam into the Formosa Strait. The commencement of the US armed intervention in Korea was thus, simultaneously, the commencement of an undeclared war against the People's Republic of China. On June 27 Truman declared that the US government decided to send infantry to Korea and use the war in that country for the occupation of Taiwan.<sup>11</sup> He went on to say that the USA was intent on crushing the national liberation movements in Asia. Aid was promised to the Philippines government for the suppression of the democratic forces in that

<sup>9</sup> *Military Situation in the Far East*. Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. Eighty-Second Congress. First session, Part II, Washington, 1951, p. 992. (*Military Situation in the Far East...* hereafter).

<sup>10</sup> I. F. Stone, *Op. cit.*, p. 348.

<sup>11</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II, p. 2539.

country and to France in its war against the Vietnamese people.

US diplomacy exploited the situation in the Security Council to use the UN flag to screen the US intervention against North Korea. Following the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union supported the PRC's demand for the expulsion of the representative of the bankrupt Chiang Kaishek clique and his replacement with its representative. Although this was unquestionably justified, the USA and its allies refused to admit China's representative to the UN. In protest against these unlawful actions the Soviet representatives ceased to participate in the work of the Security Council and other UN agencies as from January 13, 1950.

An emergency meeting of the Security Council was called on June 25 on US insistence. The US representative presented a draft resolution unfoundedly charging the People's Democratic Republic of Korea with aggression. In view of the setbacks suffered by the South Korean troops and counting on winning time the USA, in its draft, called for an end to hostilities and the withdrawal of the PDRK armed forces to the 38th parallel. The UN Commission on Korea was requested to observe the withdrawal of the armed forces to the 38th parallel. All members of the UN were called upon "to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities".<sup>12</sup> Yugoslavia's proposal that hostilities should cease forthwith, armed forces withdrawn, and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea invited to state its case before the Security Council was rejected.<sup>13</sup> The USA pushed through its resolution, which, contrary to the facts, stated that "North Korean forces had invaded the territory of the Republic of Korea".<sup>14</sup> Despite its formal approval by the majority in the Security Council, this resolution, like the two later ones, could not be valid because both in form and essence it violated and flouted the UN Charter. The Soviet representative was not present at the Council's sittings and a major issue linked to the maintenance of peace and security was unlawfully decided without the participation of a permanent member of the Security Council in contravention of the UN Charter, which requires a consensus among the five permanent members.

The consensus principle among the permanent members of the Security Council, which underlies the United Nations Organisation, was thus violated. But US diplomacy wanted the Security Council resolution as a cover for the armed interference in the affairs of Korea that had in fact already begun.

The US government was determined to secure UN approval for its armed intervention in Korea. In the event the US draft resolution was

<sup>12</sup> *UN Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period From 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950*, New York, 1950, pp. 21-22.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21.

defeated in the Security Council, the State Department had prepared a demand for the immediate convocation of the General Assembly. In violation of the UN Charter, which empowers solely the Security Council to pass decisions on the use of armed forces, the Americans counted on their voting machine to get a resolution allowing US armed forces to be sent to Korea.

On June 27 the Americans got the Security Council to pass another unlawful resolution, which recommended that the members of the United Nations furnish the Syngman Rhee regime with "such assistance ... as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area".<sup>15</sup> This resolution, too, was wanted by the US government solely to camouflage its acts of aggression, for the US armed intervention had started two days before the resolution was passed. Yugoslavia voted against it. Egypt and India abstained. Lastly, on July 7 the Security Council passed yet another resolution, which authorised the interventionists in Korea to style themselves "UN armed forces" and permitted them to use the UN flag. The resolution placed the direction of the armed intervention in Korea in the hands of the USA.<sup>16</sup> On the strength of this resolution General Douglas MacArthur, until then in fact directing military operations, was named commander-in-chief of the "UN forces".

All these unlawful resolutions, passed in contravention of the UN Charter, were adopted after the USA began its intervention. Hence their purpose was to cover the intervention with the UN flag.

Pressured by the USA 15 nations<sup>17</sup> —allies of the USA in aggressive blocs or nations entirely dependent upon it—agreed to join in the Korean war. But only two—Britain and Turkey—gave the USA military support, each sending a brigade to Korea. In addition, Britain placed its naval forces in Japanese waters at the disposal of the USA. The other nations sent only small contingents. United States units comprised 90 per cent of the so-called "United Nations armed forces".

### **The Soviet Union's Efforts to Halt the US Intervention in Korea**

The intervention in Korea sharply aggravated the international situation and created the threat of another world war. The ways and means of ending the hostilities in Korea became a top priority problem of Soviet foreign policy.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 25.

<sup>17</sup> In addition to the USA, the official participants in the intervention were Britain, France, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Greece, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, Luxembourg, and the Union of South Africa.

In a statement on the US armed intervention in Korea, published on July 4, 1950, the Soviet government cited irrefutable facts exposing the preparations that the USA had been making to attack the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and showing the illegality of the Security Council resolutions, which signified backing for the intervention started by the USA before these resolutions were adopted. The statement declared that the "government of the United States of America has committed an act of hostility against peace ... and bears the responsibility for the consequences of the armed aggression undertaken by it".<sup>18</sup> Further, the statement called for the unconditional termination of this intervention and the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

When it was notified by the UN Secretary-General about the Security Council resolutions, the Soviet government replied that the Security Council had flagrantly violated the UN Charter by passing a decision in support of the armed intervention against the Korean people, and declared that it could not recognise the validity of these resolutions.

In a note to the US Embassy on July 6, 1950 the Soviet Foreign Ministry qualified the naval blockade of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea as another act of aggression incompatible with the principles of the United Nations. It was stated that the Soviet government would consider the government of the USA "responsible for all the consequences of this act and for all the damage that may be inflicted on the interests of the Soviet Union".<sup>19</sup>

The Soviet statement was supported by the governments of the People's Republic of China and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, which regarded the US actions as undisguised aggression against the peoples of Asia. In the UN the Soviet Union had the whole-hearted support of Poland and Czechoslovakia, which declared that the Security Council resolutions were unlawful. Poland justifiably charged that the government of the United States "had begun military intervention in Korea without waiting for the consideration of the matter by the legal organs of the United Nations, thus taking unilateral action contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter".<sup>20</sup>

The pronouncements of the Soviet government and the governments of other socialist countries carried considerable weight, helping to mo-

<sup>18</sup> *Izvestia*, July 4, 1950; *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, Moscow, 1953, p. 203 (in Russian).

<sup>19</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, Moscow, 1953, p. 204 (in Russian).

<sup>20</sup> *UN Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1949 to 15 July 1950*, New York, 1950, p. 27.

bilise the peace forces to demand the cessation of the war in Korea.

Some neutral governments likewise denounced the escalation of the war in the Far East. India refused to send armed forces to Korea and denied support for the Security Council resolution that gave the army of interventionists the status of "UN forces". On July 13, in an official message to the governments of the USSR and the USA, the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru called for the earliest termination of hostilities through negotiations with the participation of the People's Republic of China. He insisted on the restoration of the PRC's lawful status in the UN.

The Soviet government subscribed to this Indian initiative. In a letter to Nehru on July 15 it stated that it shared the view that it was "expedient to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Korean question through the Security Council with the mandatory participation of representatives of the five great powers, including the people's government of China".<sup>21</sup> China responded similarly to India's initiative. But the US government categorically dismissed the possibility for negotiations.

The US military persisted in their attempts to abolish the people's system in North Korea by armed force. In order to break the resistance of the Korean people the US Air Force began the barbarous bombing of Korean towns and villages, breaching the norms of international law. US naval units acted with similar lawlessness, shelling the coast of Korea.

In this strained atmosphere the Soviet government continued doing everything in its power to end the war as quickly as possible. On August 1, 1950 the Soviet representative resumed his seat in the UN Security Council and proceeded to perform his duty as its next chairman, naming the date for its convocation. On August 4 the USSR introduced a draft resolution entitled "Peaceful Settlement of the Korean Question" and proposed inviting a representative of the PRC to the sitting and hearing representatives of the Korean people, ending the hostilities in Korea and, at the same time, withdrawing foreign troops.<sup>22</sup>

The Western powers dragged out the discussion of the Soviet draft and then opposed its adoption. The Soviet draft condemning the bombing of the Korean civilian population by US aircraft was also rejected.

The world closely followed the discussion of these issues in the Security Council. The Soviet stand received the unqualified support of democratic organisations and parties in many countries. The US

<sup>21</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, p. 27.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 321-22; *UN Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951*, New York, 1951, p. 8.

refusal to reach a peaceful settlement unbared the true face of American policy in the Korean question.

At the 5th General Assembly, in an effort to restore peace in Korea, the USSR delegation, together with the delegations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, submitted a draft resolution of October 2, 1950 prescribing an immediate cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea. Moreover, the draft envisaged measures to ensure Korea's unhampered democratic development: the holding of nationwide free elections to the National Assembly, the formation of a commission consisting of representatives of the two parts of Korea to supervise the elections, the elaboration of plans through the United Nations to help the Korean people restore their economy, and so on.<sup>23</sup>

But even this resolution was rejected by the United States and its allies. Under US pressure, the General Assembly voted down the Soviet proposal, earlier submitted to the Security Council, that US bombing of the civilian population should cease.

On September 30, 1950, in order to legalise the US aggression, the British delegate submitted on behalf of eight nations (Britain, Australia, Brazil, Cuba, the Netherlands, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Norway) a draft resolution recommending "steps .. to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea", which in the language of Western diplomacy signified the extension of the operations of the US forces to North Korea. Further, the resolution envisaged UN-controlled elections in North Korea under US occupation and on the basis of the Constitution in force in South Korea.<sup>24</sup> The UN Commission on Korea, allegedly to facilitate the reunification and rehabilitation of Korea, was formed with a clear bias. The nations participating in the intervention in Korea predominated in it (of its eight members, five were US allies in the war in Korea). The Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia voted against the "resolution of eight".

The government of the People's Republic of China lodged a complaint with the UN Security Council against the actions of the USA. The Soviet Union secured the inclusion of the protest against the armed invasion of Taiwan in the Security Council's agenda. On the insistence of the Soviet Union a representative of the PRC was invited to the discussion of this question. At the discussion, which took place in November 1950, the Soviet and Chinese representatives showed beyond the shadow of a doubt that the occupation of Taiwan by US troops was an act of aggression. The Soviet and Chinese representatives demanded the withdrawal of US troops from Taiwan and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, the prime condition for which

<sup>23</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, pp. 419-20.

<sup>24</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. II, pp. 2576-78.

were that all foreign troops should be pulled out of Korea and the Korean people given the possibility of deciding their internal affairs by themselves.<sup>25</sup> This gave the world further evidence of the aggressive character of US policy and showed how the USA was impinging on international agreements and norms of international law.

Once again the Soviet proposals were rejected by the USA and its allies, but the debates over them were a moral and political setback for the US ruling circles.

The aggression unleashed against the people of Korea encountered stiff resistance. In response to an appeal of the Korean Party of Labour and the government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea the people rallied to defend their independence and freedom. Despite US military support the Syngman Rhee army was crushed. By mid-September 1950 95 per cent of the territory of Korea and 97 per cent of its population had been liberated. Only a small bridgehead at Pusan in Southeast Korea remained in the hands of the Americans. The Syngman Rhee regime had shown its rottenness at the very first test, for it had no popular support. The ruling circles of the USA did not expect that the reactionary regime installed by them in South Korea would be so weak. But they were out to achieve their goal at all costs and demonstrate the USA's military strength. In September 1950 the US command significantly increased the scale of the intervention and mounted powerful offensives. Using its naval supremacy, it landed a large force of 50,000 infantry with artillery and tanks near Inchon, and this created a threat to the rear and communications of the PDRK. The landing was covered by 500 aircraft and 300 warships. The US forces were thus in the rear of the main PDRK forces. The US command took advantage of the situation to launch an offensive. The interventionists crossed the 38th parallel and moved northward to the Yalu and Tumen rivers.

In parallel with the hostilities against the PDRK, the US began an armed intervention against China. The 7th Fleet patrolled not only Korean waters but also the entire coast of China from Swatow in the South to Tsingtao (Shantung province, in the north). US warships fired on merchant vessels and in violation of international law obstructed freedom of navigation.

As early as August 27, 1950 US aircraft had piratically intruded into China's air space and bombed the Chinese railway station of Talitzu and the town of Antung. The government of the PRC qualified these raids as acts of direct and undisguised aggression against China. It warned the USA that "the Chinese people cannot remain indifferent in this situation caused by the invasion of Korea by the USA and its accomplices and by the threat of an

<sup>25</sup> *UN Report of the Security Council of the General Assembly Covering the Period from 16 July 1950 to 15 July 1951*, pp. 47-50.

escalation of the war".<sup>26</sup>

The US offensive in North Korea, the approach of US troops to China's frontier, and the bombing of the territory of the PRC imperiled China's security.

At the 5th General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and other socialist countries declared that the US forces had created a serious threat to the security of the People's Republic of China. The Soviet delegation proposed the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea so that the Korean question could be decided by the Korean people themselves. Moreover, the Soviet delegate stressed that an effective settlement in the Far East could only be achieved with the participation of the People's Republic of China and with account of its interests.<sup>27</sup> In addition, the US government was warned through the Indian Ambassador in Peking Panikkar and the Chinese government telegraphed the UN, declaring that urgent steps had to be taken to prevent an extension of the war.

The US command ignored these warnings and continued to escalate its military operations against the People's Republic of China. At the beginning of November 1950 US heavy bombers began raiding installations along the Yalu river.

A nationwide movement to help the Korean people and defend the Chinese frontier unfolded in the People's Republic of China. Volunteer units began to be formed. On November 12, 1950 the Chinese government announced that it had permitted volunteers to participate in the liberation struggle of the Korean people. The active involvement of Chinese volunteers in the armed struggle contributed to the failure of the US gamble in Korea.

On November 24 MacArthur announced the beginning of a general and decisive offensive in Korea. The US general was confident of success. He promised his troops that they would be home by Christmas.

But this was not to be. With all-sided assistance from the Soviet Union the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers started an offensive. The USSR supplied these forces with weapons, ammunition, vehicles, fuel, food, and medicaments. In Korea there were Soviet military advisers.

During these critical days some Soviet air divisions were transferred to the northeastern provinces of China at the request of the Chinese government. In the ensuing air battles Soviet pilots shot down dozens of US aircraft and reliably covered Northeast China against air-raids. Seasoned Soviet airmen took part in the military operations. In the event the situation deteriorated the USSR made preparations to send five divisions to Korea to help repulse the US aggression. In the

<sup>26</sup> Wu Hsiu-chuan, *The US Armed Aggression Against China*, Moscow, 1950, p. 14 (Russian translation).

<sup>27</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, pp. 588-89.



meantime, it continued to extend to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and China all possible political support.<sup>28</sup> The US-Syngman Rhee forces rolled back in the face of the onslaught of the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers. The territory of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea was liberated by mid-December.

On November 30, 1950 Truman threatened to use atomic bombs in Korea, declaring "we will take whatever steps are necessary to meet the military situation.... That includes every weapon that we have."<sup>29</sup> General MacArthur requested in categorical terms permission for the massive bombing of Northeast China. From documents published after MacArthur's death it was learned that in February 1951 he recommended dropping between 30 and 50 atomic bombs on air bases and rear installations in the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and the People's Republic of China. To prevent offensive operations by the Korean People's Army and the Chinese volunteers he intended to create a belt of radioactive cobalt running from the Sea of Japan to the Yellow Sea. Further, he insisted on the use of a force of 500,000 Nationalist Chinese in Korea.<sup>30</sup>

The American command did not confine itself to plans for war against China. Truman writes that MacArthur "was ready to risk general war".<sup>31</sup> In this MacArthur was not alone. He had influential backers in the government (Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and Navy Secretary H. Freeman Matthews), in the Senate and Congress (right-wing Republicans headed by Senator Robert Taft, and a group of Democrats associated with the Taft group). These groups wanted the war in Korea to be the starting point for a major "preventive war" against China and the USSR. Their argument was that they would have to fight anyway so why not begin now?<sup>32</sup>

However, President Truman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Defense Secretary George C. Marshall, who replaced Johnson in October 1950, and other US military and political personalities opposed these adventurist scenarios. A long and sharp struggle, the "big debate" began among the ruling circles of the USA. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that the course of action recommended by MacArthur, namely, the spread of the war on the Asian continent, would involve the USA "in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy".<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> M. S. Kapitsa, *The People's Republic of China: Three Decades—Three Policies*, Moscow, 1979, p. 53 (in Russian).

<sup>29</sup> *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. II, p. 395.

<sup>30</sup> *The New York Times*, April 9, 1964.

<sup>31</sup> *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman*, Vol. II p. 416.

<sup>32</sup> Irvin Stone, *The Hidden History of the Korean War*, p. 22.

<sup>33</sup> *Military Situation in the Far East*, Part II, Washington, 1951, p. 732.

The main motivation that held the imperialists back from attacking the People's Republic of China and sparking a world war generally was their fear of the Soviet Union's military and political might. At a hearing before a Senate committee General Marshall, then the Defense Secretary, was asked: "If you were assured that the Soviet Russia forces would not be thrown into that war [in Korea.—*Ed.*], would you be disposed to favor the recommendation of General MacArthur that we follow planes into Manchuria...?" He replied: "If, from a hypothetical point of view, there was no danger whatever of a Soviet intervention, I would say that certainly the bombing you mention would start almost immediately."<sup>34</sup> Truman's memoirs likewise contain the admission that fear of Soviet involvement was the cardinal factor compelling the rejection of the recommendations of MacArthur and his supporters and even his dismissal from the post of commander-in-chief.

By mid-1951 the fighting front in Korea had stabilised roughly along the 38th parallel.<sup>35</sup> This was evidence of the deep crisis of the US "positions of strength" policy.

US imperialism fell short of the principal objectives it had set itself in starting the war in Korea. The People's Democratic Republic of Korea repulsed the US aggression and safeguarded its freedom and independence. The Korean people had the support of progressives throughout the world, and particularly large assistance was rendered them by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The US imperialists were prevented from spreading the war by the close cooperation among the socialist states and the vigorous steps taken by the USSR.

The Korean events showed that the might of the socialist states could curb the imperialists, that it had in fact stopped them when, in the person of the USA, they decided to engage in armed aggression five years after the end of World War II.

<sup>34</sup> *The New York Times*, May 9, 1951.

<sup>35</sup> The fighting front did not run exactly along the 38th parallel: in the west PDRK troops and the Chinese volunteers controlled a territory of some 3,600 square kilometres south of the 38th parallel; in the east the interventionists were in control of a territory of 4,600 square kilometres north of the 38th parallel (*Pravda*, August 7, 1951).

## CHAPTER XXII

### THE GERMAN QUESTION AFTER THE FORMATION OF TWO GERMAN STATES (1949-1955)

#### Two German States—Two Policies

In the Soviet Union's struggle against imperialist policy the German question invariably held a special place.<sup>1</sup>

The creation of the German Democratic Republic was an immense, historic achievement of the German working people, of all Germans who valued peace. While the former Germany was an instrument of the exploiting classes and championed their aggressive ambitions and policy, which were alien to the masses, the character of the German Democratic Republic and the content and orientation of its development are determined by the working class, which has formed a lasting alliance with the peasants and the progressive intelligentsia.

The people of the German Democratic Republic took their destiny into their own hands with the firm intention of restructuring their life on the basis of social equality and true democracy, establishing relations of friendship, peace, and cooperation with other countries, and contributing to Europe's deliverance from the threat of another war.

The Soviet government assessed the creation of the GDR as a major event in European history. This was underlined in a message of greetings from J.V. Stalin, head of the Soviet government, to the GDR President Wilhelm Pieck and Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl.<sup>2</sup>

The good will displayed by the Soviet Union towards the formation of the GDR mirrored the Soviet foreign policy course towards durable peaceful development in Europe with account of the situation on the European continent following the defeat of Hitlerite fascism.

On October 12, 1949 the GDR government solemnly pledged to abide by the provisions of the Potsdam agreements. Its first statement declared in part: "Peace and friendship with the Soviet Union are the sole condition for the development and, moreover, the very existence of the German people and their state."<sup>3</sup>

Equality, respect, and fraternal mutual assistance became the

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter XVII.

<sup>2</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. Documents and Other Materials, 1949-1955*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 38-39 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> *Dokumente zur Aussenpolitik der Regierung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Vol. I, Berlin, 1954, p. 29; *Relations between the USSR and the GDR, 1949-1955*, p. 30 (in Russian).

cornerstones of the Soviet Union's relations with the GDR. On October 10, 1949 the administrative functions exercised until then by the Soviet Military Administration were turned over to the provisional government of the GDR. This government was vested with authority to act in foreign and domestic affairs in accordance with the Republic's Constitution. The Soviet Control Commission, set up to replace the Military Administration, retained the function of preventing any steps conflicting with the Potsdam Agreement and other four-power decisions relative to the demilitarisation and democratisation of Germany and its reparations obligations, and also of obtaining the necessary information from GDR agencies.<sup>4</sup>

On October 15, 1949 the Soviet Union was the first to establish diplomatic relations with the German Democratic Republic.

The radical democratic changes conducted in the GDR covered all areas of public, economic, and cultural life. These changes uprooted the pernicious traditions of the past and delivered the consciousness of the people from the heavy burden of nazism and militarism. The people began to think in terms of the finest traditions of German history and turn to the achievements of living socialism, to the ideas of proletarian internationalism.

The Federal Republic of Germany developed along an entirely different pattern. The West German reactionaries and the Western powers followed the line of re-establishing the unchallenged power of monopoly capital, suppressing the democratic forces, and restoring a climate of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. West Germany was accorded the role of the principal flashpoint of tension in Europe and a bastion of militarism and revanchism. Under a smokescreen of anti-communist slogans, these forces sought to direct the FRG towards revising the results of the Second World War, towards the road of revenge.

From the very outset there was thus a fundamental difference in the class structure, nature of political power, social consciousness, and social ideals of the GDR and the FRG. The ruins of the Nazi Reich became the arena of a most acute political struggle between different state systems.

The Soviet Union unconditionally sided with the democratic forces desiring peace and progress for their own and all other peoples. It constantly warned the USA, Britain, and France of the dangerous consequences of their policy of mustering reactionary, pro-fascist forces and, on that basis, building a militarist West German state. It demanded a reversion to the principles of Potsdam, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, and the withdrawal of the occupation troops to enable the German people to settle their affairs without

<sup>4</sup> *Documents on GDR Foreign Policy*, Moscow, 1955, p. 249 (Russian translation).

foreign interference and pressure and occupy a dignified place among the peace-loving nations of the world.

However, the Western powers were in a hurry to burn bridges and prevent a return to a coordinated policy towards Germany. Walter Bedell Smith, then the US Ambassador in Moscow, declared that "only a revolver pointed at our heart would have induced the Western powers to forgo establishing a West German government".<sup>5</sup>

Obviously, the last thing the US ruling elite thought at the time was the Potsdam accord, to say nothing of Allied fidelity and duty. The US atomic weapons monopoly was intoxicating for the hotheads in Washington. Preparations were launched for a "decisive confrontation" with communism, and plans were laid for ousting the Soviet Union from the positions it had won as a result of the defeat of fascism and militarism, and the task was set of subverting the progressive social processes in Western Europe and other parts of the world at all costs.

This was the prime motivation behind the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany. As the long-standing enemy of the Soviet Union, German militarism was a much-sought partner in the bloc of international reaction that the USA was setting up.

It is indicative that since 1948 Konrad Adenauer as Chairman of the Parliamentary Council, which drew up the Constitution for West Germany on dictation from the Western occupation authorities, had an entourage of military advisers, with Hitler's generals Hans Speidel and von Manteuffel among them. The USA and Britain had for some time been recruiting former Wehrmacht servicemen for the various auxiliary and "special" services of their forces in West Germany. On assignment from US military agencies the nazi generals were "generalising" the experience of war on the Soviet front.

At the close of the 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s the USA and the FRG formed a sort of alliance. The Americans undertook to emasculate the inter-Allied agreements, and, above all, help to preserve the socio-economic foundations of the German imperialist state, while, for their part, the Bonn politicians were prepared to pay for this by turning the FRG into the principal NATO bridgehead in the military preparations against the USSR. Both sides based their calculations on the strategic situation, the FRG's military potential and manpower resources, and the ideological affinity between the revanchist ambitions of the West German ruling circles and the "rolling back communism" doctrine, which Dulles gave the status of US official policy.

Wilfred G. Burchett, who was the correspondent of the conservative British newspaper *Daily Express* in West Germany for three years,

<sup>5</sup> Heinz Abosch, *The Menace of the Miracle. Germany from Hitler to Adenauer*, New York, 1963, p. 26.

justifiably wrote: "There was a deliberate conspiracy to restore the regime of the Junkers and Ruhr industrialists in Germany, to prevent any of the social reforms long overdue in Germany, and there was a conspiracy to prepare Germany for a future base of aggression against the Soviet Union."<sup>6</sup>

Whereas in the closing months of 1946 and the beginning of 1947 the Western powers were engaged mainly in subverting the quadripartite decisions on Germany in their occupation zones, from 1949 onwards they dropped all pretences and set about systematically destroying the treaty foundations that had defined the general policy of the anti-Hitlerite coalition.

The Allied High Commission, formed by the three Western powers, began promulgating one act after another that abrogated the laws and directives adopted by the Control Council with Soviet participation on the extirpation of German militarism and nazism, the scaling down of the monopolies, and the safeguarding of basic democratic freedoms. Laws Nos. 34 and 8 "On the Dissolution of the Wehrmacht" and "On Prohibition and Elimination of Military Training" were among those that in 1950 were declared inoperative on the territory of the Federal Republic. The Western powers turned their obligations to demilitarise and democratise Germany into a farce.<sup>7</sup>

"The truth," wrote the well-known French sociologist Professor Bernard Lavergne, "obliges us to say that there is practically no commitment taken by us relative to Germany that we have honoured. Every unbiassed person must admit that our position is indefensible before the court of history."<sup>8</sup>

While jettisoning everything that under the four-power agreements stipulated Germany's demilitarisation and democratisation, everything that was demanded by the interests of peace and security in Europe, the Western powers clung to the provisions, arbitrarily taken out of context, which Washington, London, and Paris felt would in the long run give them permanent control over the FRG and reinforce their claims relative to what they termed as "Berlin and Germany as a whole".

The militarisation plans were an end goal of the formation of the FRG, which the USA and its allies needed chiefly as NATO's assault force spearheaded at the socialist community countries. It was evident to every person with any sort of political insight that whatever the Soviet Union proposed on the German question would not be accepted by the three powers. The USA needed a military presence in the FRG in order to remain in Western Europe. It was also evident

<sup>6</sup> Wilfred G. Burchett, *Cold War in Germany*, Melbourne, 1950, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question*, Moscow, 1959, p. 83 (in Russian).

<sup>8</sup> *L'Humanité*, December 28, 1962.

that the USA had every intention of forming a West German army and including the FRG in the North Atlantic pact.

In German affairs in that period US policy was aimed not at attaining a peace settlement in keeping with the principles proclaimed at Yalta and Potsdam but at getting Western terms accepted as the sole condition for peace.

By contrast, the Soviet Union did everything it could to keep alive the principles of peace, democracy, and progress jointly worked out by the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. In its foreign policy actions it was tireless in calling for vigilance, exposing the plans for drawing the FRG into Western military blocs, and showing what would come of this course of action.

This was doubly necessary because the architects of militarisation in the FRG did not show their cards at once. On November 23, 1949 Chancellor Adenauer and the Western Allied High Commissioners signed the Petersberg agreement in which the FRG declared its "determination to maintain the demilitarisation of the Federal territory and to endeavour by all means in its power to prevent the re-creation of armed forces of any kind".<sup>9</sup>

However, in describing his stand at that time, Adenauer wrote: "For us remilitarization was a means of achieving a complete sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany. And that was the key issue of our political future".<sup>10</sup> That same month the US President Harry S. Truman stated at a press conference that "no negotiations regarding the setting up of a new German army were being conducted".<sup>11</sup> Yet, by the autumn of 1949 the arming of West Germany had been predetermined. The only questions still open were its time-table and forms.

James P. Warburg, a leading American foreign policy analyst, noted that there was a discrepancy between what the US government said and did in the German question, writing: "In 1949, our government said it would never acquiesce in German rearmament. In 1950, our government demanded German troops for NATO, but said it would never allow Germany to rebuild its own war industries. In 1959 and 1960, our government has agreed to give Germany everything except nuclear warheads and has permitted American corporations to go into partnership with Krupp, Kloeckner, Heinckel, and Messerschmidt and other German war industries in recreating German capacity to build almost every kind of war equipment."<sup>12</sup>

The FRG's armament and inclusion in the imperialist military

<sup>9</sup> *Current History*, January 1950, p. 43.

<sup>10</sup> K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen, 1945-1953*, Stuttgart, 1965, p. 345.

<sup>11</sup> *The Truth About Western Policy on the German Question*, p. 291.

<sup>12</sup> James P. Warburg, *Disarmament: the Challenge of the Nineteen Sixties*, New York, 1961, p. 140.

and political system were tantamount to widening the gulf dividing the two German states or, to be more exact, to the West's final renunciation of creating a united and peaceful German state. This did not, however, prevent the USA, Britain, and France from posing as antagonists of Germany's partition.

In February 1950 John J. McCloy, the US High Commissioner in Germany, acted on behalf of the Western powers in a bid to counter the Soviet proposals for the unification of Germany with a proposal for "free" German elections under four-power control. This was followed by the Conference of US, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London (May 11-13, 1950) which stated that "the first step toward the restoration of German unity should be the holding throughout Germany of free elections to a Constituent Assembly".<sup>13</sup> Moreover, as a condition for German unity they demanded, among other things, an end to the payment of reparations from current industrial output and the return of alienated factories to their former owners.

Formerly, when the two German states were still non-existent, when the Soviet Union pressed for the formation of central German organs of government and the holding of free elections throughout Germany on the basis of a single electoral law, and for granting to parties and trade unions the right to function throughout Germany, the Western powers used every possible pretext to evade considering these proposals. It was only after Germany had been divided by them and they had brought reactionaries to power in West Germany that the USA and its allies seized upon the idea of general elections and used it to revive in the FRG anti-communism that was cultivated by Hitler, and give a clear anti-Soviet edge to the build-up of West German armed forces.

The Soviet Union, which had brought liberation from fascism to the German people as well, was now portrayed by Western propaganda as responsible for all the sufferings of the Germans. Those who only recently had chilled the European peoples with the horror of their crimes were now proclaimed champions of the "free West". H. Abosch, a West German journalist, wrote that "all the accumulated hatred, discontent and fear, all the desire for justification and thirst for revenge engendered by defeat could now find an outlet against Russia".<sup>14</sup> By returning the West Germans to the familiar anti-communist slogans of the nazis and sowing lies and slander about the Soviet policy of peace, imperialist propaganda in effect absolved nazi Germany of the blame for unleashing war against the USSR. The

<sup>13</sup> *Documents on Germany, 1944-1961. Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate, December 1961, Washington, 1961, p. 97.*

<sup>14</sup> Heinz Abosch, *The Menace of the Miracle. Germany from Hitler to Adenauer*, p. 22.



ideology of militarism was cultivated and the FRG government's reactionary revanchist policy was justified.

The talk about unity and "free elections" were nothing more than the reverse side of the selfsame policy of dividing Germany and remilitarising its western part. When the above-mentioned conference was convened in London in May 1950 its attention was by no means focussed on the question of Germany's reunification. The discussion revolved around the question of the FRG's membership of NATO and the restoration of its military capability in the interests of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. The *Daily Compass* reported that the Western powers were considering a West German appeal for a 25,000-man-strong police force.<sup>15</sup>

At the next three-power Foreign Ministers Conference (New York, September 12-18, 1950) a decision was passed which spoke quite openly of the imminent large-scale remilitarisation of the FRG. The communique stated that the conference had approved "German participation in an integrated force for the defence of European freedom".<sup>16</sup> On September 26 the NATO Council issued a communique stating that a decision had been taken to set up an integrated armed force and that "Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of defense of Western Europe".<sup>17</sup>

Following the New York conference all the decisions of the Western powers on Germany for years ahead highlighted the restoration of the FRG's military-industrial potential and the creation of a West German army. Addressing the National Assembly in October 1950 the French Prime Minister René Pleven proposed a camouflaged form of militarisation for the FRG. He enlarged upon a plan for the creation of a "European army" that would include "German contingents", which would, where possible, be "small units". This camouflage was needed to deceive the French people, most of whom were against West Germany's remilitarisation.

The plans for arming the FRG were specified at the NATO Council meeting in Brussels on December 18-19, 1950, which declared that it had "reached unanimous agreement regarding the part which Germany might assume in the common defense".<sup>18</sup> President Truman acknowledged on December 21, 1950 that in Brussels the USA had gotten what it had set out to get<sup>19</sup>, namely the consent of its Allies to arm the Federal Republic of Germany.

<sup>15</sup> *The Daily Compass*, 4 June 1950.

<sup>16</sup> *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Washington, 1957, p. 1712.

<sup>17</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, 9 October 1950, Vol. XXIII, No. 588, p. 588.

<sup>18</sup> *The Manchester Guardian*, December 20, 1950.

<sup>19</sup> *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Harry S. Truman, 1950*, Washington, 1965, p. 755.

### Soviet Actions Against the Plans for Arming the FRG and the Western Powers' Non-Fulfilment of Their Commitments Under Allied Agreements

The Soviet Union warned the USA, Britain, and France that by deciding to revive German militarism in West Germany and concluding a military alliance with the FRG they were shouldering a grave responsibility to the nations of the world for the consequences of these steps. It urged them to return to the joint Allied policy defined in quadripartite decisions and in the Anglo-Soviet (May 26, 1942) and Franco-Soviet (December 10, 1944) treaties.

A Foreign Ministers Conference of European socialist countries—USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Romania—held in Prague in October 1950, issued a statement noting that the policy pursued by the USA, Britain, and France towards Germany signified a total departure from their commitments under Allied agreements and was “creating the threat of further aggression, of further military gambles in Europe”.<sup>20</sup> It declared that the unilateral decisions of the New York three-power Foreign Ministers Conference had no legal validity. The statement called for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany, the restoration of a united Germany, and the creation for this purpose of an All-German Constituent Assembly with equal representation from East and West Germany. Further, it underlined the need for removing all restrictions on the development of a peaceful German economy.

The USA, Britain, and France, and also the FRG, did not respond to these calls, for they ran counter to the line of action they were pursuing.

In November 1950 the Soviet Union took the initiative to propose a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USA, Britain, France, and the USSR to examine the implementation of the Potsdam agreements on the demilitarisation of Germany.<sup>21</sup> This initiative had a less than lukewarm response in Washington, London, and Paris. The governments of the USA, Britain, and France replied that they would favour a preliminary conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in order to draw up the agenda for a future session of the Foreign Ministers Council without considering the essence of the issues.

Motivated by its desire to bring the viewpoints of the sides closer, the Soviet government accepted this proposal, but the Western powers began to procrastinate. It was evident that they wanted to face the Foreign Ministers Council with the accomplished fact of West Germany's remilitarisation, the preparations for which were accelerated.

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, October 22, 1950.

<sup>21</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1950*, pp. 232-33.

The conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers opened in Paris on March 5, 1951, but the first few sittings made it clear that the Western powers had come to it with the intention of preventing the drafting of an agreed agenda for the Foreign Ministers Council and "prove" that no joint actions could be taken in German affairs on a quadripartite basis. When A.A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation, accepted one or another Western proposal, its architects immediately lost all interest in it. The US representatives endeavoured to obscure the question of Germany's demilitarisation and place on the agenda questions that had nothing to do with that country. The US representatives doggedly refused to discuss the question of signing a peace treaty without delay and the withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany, and avoided all mention of the Potsdam agreements.

On April 19 the Soviet government sent to the governments of the three powers a note, in which it assessed the progress made by the conference and positions of the sides and at the same time expressed its readiness to continue discussions on a constructive basis. However, the 74th session held on June 21, 1951 was fated to be the last.<sup>22</sup>

In the long run the USA, Britain, and France got what they wanted: they prevented the adoption of an agreed agenda for the Foreign Ministers Council. Instead of resuming quadripartite talks on the German question, as the Soviet Union had suggested, the Western powers met in Paris, where on April 18, 1951 they signed a treaty forming the European Coal and Steel Community with FRG participation (the Schuman Plan). No secret was made of the purposes of this association. Robert Schuman declared that the "plan for pooling coal and steel resources ... can pave the way for military cooperation between interested nations". This treaty came into force on July 25, 1952.

Along with its own efforts to secure a peaceful and democratic settlement of the German question, the Soviet government supported the initiatives of other socialist countries in this question. The GDR, naturally, was especially active. Throughout the period 1950-1953 it took a series of important steps with the view to establishing contacts with the Federal Republic of Germany. It urged the West German government to join in promoting cooperation between Germans in order to resolve national problems and advance concrete considerations in the forms of such cooperation. One of the major actions was the convocation of the first German National Congress in Berlin in August 1950 with broad representation from patriotic forces in the FRG.

On November 30, 1950 the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl wrote to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer proposing the formation,

<sup>22</sup> See *Pravda*, June 22, 1951.

on a parity basis, of an all-German Constituent Council that could begin preparations for free elections to the National Assembly throughout Germany. On September 15, 1951 the GDR People's Chamber contacted the West German Bundestag with the proposal for an all-German conference of GDR and FRG representatives to consider two questions, namely, the holding of all-German free elections and the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany at the earliest possible date.<sup>23</sup>

The GDR government's call for a German conference had the widest response from democratic circles in the FRG. The Bonn government found it could not mute this response. Its attempts to dismiss the GDR initiative with crude attacks against the policies of the USSR and the GDR without offering anything in return failed to convince public opinion. This induced Bonn to propose 14 points as the condition for accepting the GDR's proposals and holding all-German elections. The GDR People's Chamber responded with a statement declaring that most of these points were acceptable.

But the FRG government did not react to this statement, for the orientation of its policy had been determined long before: what it sought was not all-German elections or the conclusion of a peace treaty but rearmament and membership of NATO in any capacity. Hence its rejection of all other calls from the GDR government, President, and People's Chamber for joint action with the view to reuniting Germany.

Every possible means was used in the FRG to suppress democratic opinion. On July 11, 1951 the Bonn government rushed through the Bundestag an anti-people's law authorising FRG agencies to take legal action against any organisation or individual whose activities were regarded as "subversive". Patriotically-minded people, who urged talks with the GDR, were branded "traitors". Many members of the anti-nazi underground and champions of Germany's peaceful and democratic development were imprisoned.

Reaction prepared to strike the heaviest blow at the Communist Party of Germany, which was staunchly opposing the nation's division, the militarisation of the FRG, and the Adenauer regime, and pressing for negotiations with the GDR and the restoration of Germany's unity. In November 1951 the Adenauer government requested the Federal Constitutional Court to outlaw the Communist Party of Germany, thereby placing the Communists and all other democrats under the threat of mass repressions, terror, and persecution. On the other hand, the authorities gave their patronage to former nazi generals and officials, to everybody who was striving to revive the spirit and practices of Germany's militarist past. The Bonn government interceded to obtain the exoneration of war criminals. These moves were

<sup>23</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin, September 16, 1951.

encouraged by the Western powers. As many as 2,655 war criminals, including field marshals Albert Kesselring, Siegmund List, and Erich von Manstein, were released from imprisonment in the period from April 1950 to October 1952 alone. Many of Hitler's former myrmidons got down to building up the Bundeswehr, became members of Bonn's "brain trust", and regained positions in the punitive and judicial apparatus. People who under fascist rule had ordered mass murders escaped punishment—this was the conclusion drawn by the Chief US Prosecutor at the Nuremberg trial, US Staff Prosecutor Robert M.W. Kempner, after he had studied the situation in West Germany.<sup>24</sup>

The FRG government gradually lifted the curtain hiding yet another facet of its policy—its preparations to revise the results of the war lost by German imperialism. On May 4, 1951 it issued a statement under the heading "German Sovereignty", which unambiguously refused to recognise the postwar changes of Germany's frontiers. Adenauer went so far as to repeat Hitler's demand for a "new order in Eastern Europe".<sup>25</sup>

The Bonn government's appetite grew faster than the concessions made to it by the Western powers. Adenauer, who previously had not linked the FRG's armament to any conditions, now demanded "equality" with the other participants in the "European army". To gain this objective the Bonn government used the pronouncements of Kurt Schumacher and other leaders of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG, who had started a demagogic campaign in protest of West Germany's subordinate position in the "European army". Both the Pleven plan and NATO's Spofford Plan were declared inadequate.<sup>26</sup>

The Western powers and the FRG finally agreed on a plan for a European Defence Community approved by the US, British, and French Foreign Ministers Conference in Washington on September 10-14, 1951. Under this plan the West German contingents were to be integrated in the "European army" being formed by France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. In turn, the "European army" was to be part of the NATO armed forces. Simultaneously with the formation of the "European army" the occupation status of the FRG was subject to replacement by "treaty relations" with the three powers in accordance with the "general treaty", whose

<sup>24</sup> *Der Spiegel*, No. 16, 1964.

<sup>25</sup> *Archiv der Gegenwart*, 1951, p. 2926 (further to be referred to as AG).

<sup>26</sup> Charles M. Spofford was appointed permanent US Deputy Representative in NATO in June 1950. The Spofford Plan, drawn up as a compromise, envisaged the formation of West German tactical units of 4,000-5,000 effectives each without heavy armaments and logistic services instead of the German battalions called for in the Pleven Plan.

draft was approved by a three-power Foreign Ministers Conference with Adenauer's participation in Paris on November 22, 1951.

While refusing to consider the Soviet proposals on the German question the Western powers again demagogically brought up the issue of all-German elections at the close of 1951 in an attempt to divert public attention from the ongoing preparations for arming the FRG and demanded the setting up of a UN Commission on Germany. But what they suggested was a far cry from the elections usual in countries with a parliamentary system—they were obviously disinclined to permit genuinely free elections. They wanted the elections to be held under foreign supervision in contravention of elementary democratic requirements. Their suggestion was that the Germans should have no part in organising and conducting all-German elections. According to their scenario, the elections would be held in an atmosphere enabling them to control developments. The political analysts of those years bluntly said that the Western powers were making election conditions with the calculation that they would be rejected by the Soviet Union and the GDR.

They proposed that the UN Commission should investigate whether existing conditions permitted general elections throughout Germany. More, the work of the commission was linked to the creation, where necessary, of the appropriate conditions.<sup>27</sup> The Soviet government objected to this, believing that a commission set up by the Germans themselves and consisting of Germans would be more objective.

In December 1951 the USA, Britain, and France got the UN General Assembly to consider the question of setting up a commission. Representatives of the GDR and the FRG were invited to the debate. The Western powers succeeded in having the General Assembly adopt a resolution on the setting up of a commission, which could not be valid for it was clearly in conflict with the UN Charter. The Soviet government emphatically opposed the Western attempts to legalise interference in the internal affairs of the German people and force foreign tutelage of them. The formation of a UN commission to investigate the conditions in Germany was a stillborn idea and had no chance of success.

### **The Soviet Programme for a Peace Settlement with Germany**

The Soviet government resolutely opposed the formation of a European Defence Community. It pointed out that a "European army" was a way of legalising German militarism, which would be a

<sup>27</sup> See: *Selected Documents on Germany and the Question of Berlin, 1944-1961*, London, 1961, pp. 142-43.

threat to Europe. It stressed that the Western powers were counting on using German militarism in order to prepare for another war.

On March 10, 1952 it advanced a draft of the principles for a peace treaty with Germany,<sup>28</sup> in which it was stated that Germany had to be restored as a united and sovereign state. The draft envisaged giving Germany an equal status in the world community.

The Soviet draft called for the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany within a year after the peace treaty came into force, and also the dismantling of foreign military bases on its territory, and Germany's release from political and military commitments as provided for by the treaties and agreements signed by the governments of the FRG and the GDR.

Germany would have the right to maintain its own national armed forces for its defence and also manufacture the materiel and equipment needed for these armed forces. However, it would have to renounce participation in military coalitions and alliances directed against any country whose armed forces had taken part in the war against nazi Germany.

Moreover, the Soviet draft envisaged that the peace treaty would be worked out with the direct participation of Germany represented by an all-German government. In this connection the Soviet government suggested that the Western powers "examine the question of the conditions favouring the earliest formation of an all-German government expressing the will of the entire German people."<sup>29</sup>

The USSR followed this draft up with a note on April 9, 1952 in which it proposed that the governments of the USA, Britain, and France should forthwith consider the question of holding free elections throughout Germany. Taking the views of the Western powers into account and in order to get this question off the ground as soon as possible, the Soviet government raised no objection to the formation of a four-power commission to investigate whether the conditions for such elections existed.<sup>30</sup>

The Soviet programme for settling the German question was the only realistic way for a democratic settlement of the German question in the interests of lasting peace and security in Europe, and of the German people themselves. As soon as it was made public this programme commanded the attention of world opinion. It evoked particularly heated debates in the GDR and the FRG, where the Soviet proposals found their way to the hearts of millions of people for they made it perfectly clear that of the four occupying powers only the Soviet Union was serious in its efforts to ensure Germany's peaceful

<sup>28</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, pp. 200-03 (in Russian).

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>30</sup> *Pravda*, April 11, 1952.

development, national unity, and freedom. Little wonder that decades after the Soviet Union had advanced this programme many West German political personalities still speak of it and frankly regret that the opportunity was missed.

Despite everything, the governments of the Western powers, and also the government of the FRG again declined to examine the Soviet proposals. They assumed the grave responsibility for the consequences. The world saw that their talk about "free elections" and Germany's reunification was propaganda rhetoric.

The Soviet initiative only caused another fit of hysteria among the ruling circles of the Western powers, because every new Soviet proposal was a further obstruction to the remilitarisation of West Germany and its inclusion in aggressive military blocs.

In their note of reply on May 13, 1952 the USA, Britain, and France did not state their attitude to the problem of a peace treaty with Germany, but they found it necessary to make the reservation that they would not accept any provision forbidding Germany to enter into an association with other states. Further, they asserted that it was impossible to conduct talks at the time about the provisions of the German peace treaty on the grounds that the treaty could be drafted only if there was an all-German government, formed as a result of free elections, which would be able to discuss such a treaty freely.<sup>31</sup>

The Western tactic was to prevent any concrete discussion of the Soviet proposals. They did not venture to formulate specific counter-proposals for a settlement of the German question, preferring to confuse and compound the question of all-German elections and make it the object of an unworthy game.

In May 1952 the Soviet government declared that obviously nothing could be achieved by continuing to examine the question of a peace treaty and Germany's reunification by a further exchange of notes. This was only making an agreement more difficult to achieve. It therefore suggested immediate direct negotiations on these issues.

But, as a year earlier, talks with the Soviet Union did not fit into the plans of the USA, Britain, and France. They speeded up the conclusion of agreements with the government of the FRG. On May 26, 1952 the three Western powers signed a General Agreement on Relations with the FRG. This has come to be known as the Bonn treaty.<sup>32</sup>

To a certain extent this treaty met the interests of West Germany's ruling circles. It abrogated the occupation status, gave the FRG government wide powers in internal and external affairs, lifted many restrictions on the development of a military economy, and legalised

<sup>31</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, July 5-12, 1952, p. 12321.

<sup>32</sup> *AG*, 1952, pp. 3486-91.



the formation of a large army. On the other hand, it contained provisions that formalised the FRG's dependent, subordinate position. The Western powers retained "special rights" relative to the FRG, including rights over the country's reunification and the conclusion of a peace treaty. The possibility for Germany's unity was made dependent on the preservation of the privileges enjoyed by the USA, Britain, and France as recorded in the Bonn treaty. Under Article 5 they retained the right to declare a state of emergency in the FRG. In the event of an attack on the FRG or on West Berlin, of the fomenting of disorder with the purpose of accomplishing a coup or violating public law and order each of the Western commanders was vested with the right, if he believed there was a direct threat to the armed forces under his command, to take any measures, including the use of weapons to remove the threat. There was no time limit on the Bonn treaty. The US, Britain and France reaffirmed the right to keep their troops in the FRG with the signing of a peace or the reunification of Germany. More, many of the privileges enjoyed under conditions of official occupation were retained by the foreign military garrisons. The treaty saddled the FRG with a heavy financial burden. It was committed to cover up to 50 per cent of the hard currency expenditures on the maintenance of British, French, and US troops on its territory by purchasing armaments in Britain and the USA.

On May 27, 1952 the Foreign Ministers of France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the FRG signed a treaty in Paris forming the European Defence Community.<sup>33</sup> This gave a legal basis for the FRG's militarisation. Plainly speaking, the Paris and Bonn treaties signified the erection of insurmountable barriers to the restoration of a united democratic Germany and the attainment of a peace settlement. The destiny of the Germans was decided by the politicians in Washington, London, and Paris. In order to dot all the i's and make sure that the FRG understood the role accorded to it, the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman declared at a press conference on May 30, 1952, i.e. immediately after the Bonn and Paris treaties were signed: "The occupation of Germany will continue not because the latter wants it but because it is our right which we by no means surrender with the signing of these treaties."<sup>34</sup>

The increasing military preparations by NATO and the threat that a West German army would be formed seriously aggravated the situation in the heartland of Europe. The West's aggressive line of action was combined with undisguised obstruction to any steps or actions aimed at settling the German problem with account of the legitimate interests of other countries. All this caused grave concern.

<sup>33</sup> A 50-year time limit was set on the operation of the Paris treaty.

<sup>34</sup> *Der Kurier*, May 30, 1952.

Anxiety grew among the population of the German Democratic Republic. For some years the working people of the GDR had been concentrating on economic and cultural development. The 3rd Congress of the SUPG, held in the summer of 1950, adopted the first five-year economic development plan, which in the republic was called a plan of peace and peaceful construction.

At a rally in Berlin on May 1, 1952 President Wilhelm Pieck raised the question of forming GDR armed forces in reply to the militarisation of West Germany. The Soviet government agreed to supply armaments for the GDR people's police, which until then had been engaged only in maintaining law and order and was practically unarmed. The formation of a regular volunteer police force was started in the GDR.

A frontier regime was introduced along the demarcation line between the GDR and the FRG on the day the Bonn treaty was signed. During the next six months the SUPG leadership and the GDR government took steps to strengthen the republic as an independent state with guarded frontiers, build up its armed forces (a regular police force), and enforce its own revolutionary code of laws. This was accomplished in a situation witnessing subversive activities and direct provocations against the GDR by the FRG.

Anxiety over the Bonn and Paris treaties gripped not only the people but also influential bourgeois circles in many West European countries. The British and French governments found themselves forced to resort to subterfuges, to pretend that they were not totally deaf to the Soviet proposals a postwar arrangement in Europe.

On June 10, 1952 the British Foreign Secretary declared in the House of Commons that he was mindful of the possibility of holding a four-power conference.<sup>35</sup> Almost at the same time the French government issued a communique declaring that France was in favour of a four-power conference but the subject of the talks could not at the moment be specified.<sup>36</sup> The USA was quite obviously apprehensive that such a conference might jeopardise British and French ratification of the General Agreement and the treaty on the formation of the EDC and was therefore opposed to a quadripartite conference.

The US ruling circles counted on the military and political treaties

<sup>35</sup> Eden wrote in his memoirs that he was anxious to keep the correspondence with the USSR open, for there was always the hope that it might be possible to hold a four-power conference on the German problem "on terms we could accept", although at the time there already was complete agreement among the Western powers to press ahead with the plans for making Western Europe militarily strong (see: *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle*, London, 1960, p. 46.)

<sup>36</sup> AG, 1952, p. 3516.

with the FRG coming into force in the summer of 1952 and on the possibility of beginning the formation of West German armed forces in the latter half of the same year. The ratification of the Bonn treaty was bulldozed through the US Senate on July 1, 1952. Pressure was then brought to bear on the West European countries to hasten ratification. But this pressure worked only in the case of Britain, where the Bonn treaty received parliamentary approval on August 1, 1952.

Ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties encountered considerable difficulties in the FRG itself. In Paris in May 1952 Adenauer promised the US government that the treaties would be approved by the Bundestag in June of the same year. Reality upset this overconfident statement. A popular movement against militarisation and military blocs, for Germany's reunification and a peace treaty unfolded in the country, where the horrors of war were still fresh in people's minds. This movement reached proportions where it involved even some circles of the ruling parties—the Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian partner, the Christian Social Union. Adenauer's high-handed treatment of parliamentary principles finally enabled him to find a way out of the situation and secure the ratification of the treaties, albeit almost a year behind schedule. However, he used this delay for additional bargaining with the Western powers on the terms for the FRG's militarisation.

In France there was a particularly violent outcry against the revival of German militarism. The French people could not and did not forget the evil which the German military, especially the nazis, had brought them in the lifetime of several generations. For a long time the Pinay government did not risk submitting the draft law on the ratification of the treaties to the National Assembly. The prospect that the treaties, which had taken years to negotiate, would be rejected angered the US ruling circles. In December 1952 Truman called upon the West European states to ratify both treaties without further delay. This was followed by a decision of the NATO Council, which likewise urged speeding up the ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties. On January 27, 1953 John Foster Dulles, who became the US Secretary of State, warned in his radio and TV address that the USA would reconsider its aid programme to the European nations if it appeared there was no chance of getting effective unity in Europe.<sup>37</sup> In February of the same year he and Harold Stassen, who directed the "mutual security" programme, toured France, the FRG, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Britain with the principal objective of getting the plans for forming a "European army" off the ground.

A campaign was launched in the USA to include the FRG in

<sup>37</sup> *Department of State Bulletin*, February 9, 1953, p. 214.

NATO in the event the formation of West German armed forces on the terms of the Paris treaty was protracted any longer. This campaign was joined by ranking US government officials. The USA announced allocations amounting to \$385,000,000 to help France in its war in Indochina on the calculation of killing two birds with one stone: prompting the French to escalate the colonial war and making it easier for the French government to have the Bonn and Paris treaties ratified. But nothing came of this.

In August 1952 the Soviet Union renewed its proposal for the convocation of a four-power conference to consider the question of drawing up a peace treaty with Germany, forming a national German government, conducting free elections throughout Germany, and setting up a commission to examine if the conditions existed in Germany for such elections. Further, it suggested discussing a timetable for the withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany and declared that representatives of the GDR and the FRG should be present when the conference considered questions concerning them.<sup>38</sup>

The People's Chamber of the GDR passed a decision to send a plenipotentiary delegation to Bonn for talks with the Bundestag on 1) participation of GDR and FRG representatives at the four-power conference and 2) the formation and functioning of a German commission to check the conditions for holding elections throughout Germany.<sup>39</sup> Led by Hermann Matern, a Politbureau member, the People's Chamber delegation was received on September 19, 1952 by Hermann Ehlers, President of the Bundestag, who said he would convey the proposals of the People's Chamber to the Bundestag and the government of the FRG.

A wave of pronouncements in favour of official talks between the GDR and the FRG swept across West Germany.

The demands for a resumption of talks on the German question grew more vocal throughout Europe in the spring of 1953 under the impact of the Soviet proposals. This hamstrung the Western powers. The British were the first to see the weakness of their stand. They were evidently aware that further efforts towards the militarisation of the FRG would confront the Western powers with ever greater difficulties if they failed to mute the influence of the Soviet proposals for a peaceful settlement of the German question and neutralise the demands for talks with the USSR.

On May 11, 1953, Winston Churchill, who had been returned to power, declared in parliament that "a conference on the highest level

<sup>38</sup> *Pravda*, August 24, 1952.

<sup>39</sup> *White Book on the FRG's Aggressive Policy*, Moscow, 1959, p. 135 (in Russian).

should take place between the leading Powers without long delay".<sup>40</sup>

This statement infuriated the rulers of the USA and the FRG. Adenauer told a newspaper reporter that a "four-power conference was a hazardous enterprise". The US government demanded assurances that a meeting with Soviet leaders would yield positive results.<sup>41</sup>

On May 13, 1953 the Foreign Policy Commission of France's National Assembly declared itself in favour of the proposal for a four-power summit.<sup>42</sup>

The Alsop brothers, Joseph and Stewart, wrote in *The New York Herald Tribune*: "The prospect of renewed negotiations with the Russians about Germany fill some officials with something very like panic.... The panic is understandable. Even a seemingly serious offer by the Soviets to negotiate a reasonable German peace treaty could throw the Western alliance into an uproar.... It could persuade the Germans that only the Americans stood in the way of a united Germany."<sup>43</sup>

### Development of Friendly, Equitable Relations Between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic

The Soviet Union implemented its policy on the German question in close contact with the government of the GDR. In parallel, much was done to promote and consolidate friendly relations based on confidence and mutual respect. As early as May 1950 the Soviet government reduced by half the reparations due from the GDR and granted a postponement on the payment of the balance.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, a protocol was signed turning over to the German people 23 enterprises that had become Soviet property under the Potsdam agreement.<sup>45</sup> In June 1950 the Soviet Control Commission passed the function of protecting foreign property on the territory of the GDR to the republic's authorities.<sup>46</sup> In September of the same year the GDR was admitted to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance as a full member.<sup>47</sup>

Under SUPG leadership, the people of the GDR worked hard

<sup>40</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Fifth Series, Vol. 515. *House of Commons, Official Report. Session 1952-53*, London, 1953, col. 897.

<sup>41</sup> AG, 1953, p. 3993.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3994.

<sup>43</sup> *The New York Herald Tribune*, European Edition, April 10, 1953, p. 17.

<sup>44</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, p. 82.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 90.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 116-17.

to remove the imbalances and difficulties that were generated when the Western powers divided Germany and disrupted long-standing economic links. The economy of East Germany was traditionally dependent on supplies of manufactured goods from the western part of the country, particularly from the Ruhr. The Western occupation authorities and the FRG agencies tried to use this circumstance to obstruct the GDR's economic development. The FRG imposed an embargo on supplies of steel to the GDR and restrictions on many commodities. Matters reached a point where court proceedings were instituted against businessmen and firms desiring to have commercial relations with the GDR. The Western occupation authorities acted in flagrant violation of the New York and Paris agreements of 1949, which committed the signatories to restore the practices that had existed in commerce between West and East Germany prior to March 1, 1948 and facilitate the development of these practices. It was only the protests and energetic intervention of the Soviet Control Commission that prevented the Western powers from totally rupturing commerce between the GDR and the FRG, whose volume dropped from more than 200 million marks (in the first six months of 1951) to nine million marks in the first half of 1952.

The hindrances to trade with the FRG induced the GDR to resort to a cardinal reorientation of its economic relations. There was a marked expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic links with the Soviet Union.

The 2nd SUPG Conference was an important landmark in the life of the GDR. The conference decision stated: "Democratic and economic development and also the consciousness of the working class and the majority of other working people have reached a level where the building of socialism has become the basic task.... It must be taken into account that the aggravation of the class struggle is inevitable and that the working people must break the resistance of hostile elements."<sup>48</sup> The course towards building the foundations of socialism, a natural outcome of the evolution of the ideas pursued by the workers, peasants, and the progressive segment of the intelligentsia of the republic, was not alien to Germans. Germany was the homeland of the theory of scientific socialism, of Marx and Engels. Socialism was the product of development in Germany during the past century and a long-standing ideal of the German working-class movement, the decision said.

The Soviet Union did everything to place its relations with the GDR on a footing of equality, mutual respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. In April 1953 the Soviet government further reduced or annulled various economic commitments of the GDR, increased exports of primary materials and feeds to the republic.

<sup>48</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, July 15, 1952.

lic, and broadened scientific and technological cooperation with it. In May 1953 the Soviet Control Commission was abolished and replaced with the office of Soviet High Commissioner. The functions of this office were largely reduced to general verification of the work of the GDR organs of power from the standpoint of their compliance with the obligations under the Potsdam decisions and to maintaining contact with the US, British, and French occupation authorities.<sup>49</sup>

The building of socialism in the GDR, particularly the formation of agricultural cooperatives, aggravated the class struggle in town and countryside. Because of the breakdown of traditional external economic relations and on account of some other reasons, difficulties arose in supplying the GDR population with food and manufactured goods during the first half of 1953. On June 9 the Politbureau of the SUPG Central Committee resolved to rectify this abnormal situation. It issued a communique naming the immediate steps to be taken in the field of supply, finances, agriculture, and administrative policy. Further, some restrictions were lifted from the urban and rural bourgeoisie, and the agricultural cooperatives formed in violation of the voluntary principle were dissolved. On June 11 the GDR Council of Ministers adopted a new course.

This course, to quote the West Berlin newspaper *Der Tagesspiegel* "seriously demoralised and even disorganised"<sup>50</sup> the West German ruling circles. Subversive organisations hostile to the GDR and also Western subversive services were set in motion. They used their innumerable agents to incite backward elements disaffected with the existing situation to stage demonstrations and strikes on June 17. This was the first time since the war that the imperialist forces ventured to come out openly against the socialist system in the GDR.

The imperialist agents found no support among the majority of the people in the GDR. They managed to provoke disorders only in a few towns. True to its internationalist duty, the Soviet Union helped the GDR authorities to restore peace and order.

At its 15th plenum on July 24-26, the SUPG Central Committee charted a programme for improving the economic and political situation in the republic and raising the people's living standard. While reaffirming that the SUPG had correctly adopted the course towards building the foundations of socialism in the GDR, the plenum denounced the attempts to accelerate socialist construction.

Talks which laid a solid basis for fraternal cooperation between the USSR and the GDR were held in Moscow at government level on August 22-23, 1953. They showed that the two governments viewed the German problem from one and the same angle. The GDR firmly supported the Soviet proposal to conclude a peace treaty with

<sup>49</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, p. 266.

<sup>50</sup> *Der Tagesspiegel*, June 14, 1953.

Germany and convene a peace conference in the immediate future.

At these talks the Soviet government declared that as of January 1, 1954 it would cease collecting reparations in any form. This decision freed the GDR from paying the remaining reparations valued at 2,537 million dollars on January 1, 1954 (the total reparations due to the Soviet Union had been set at 10,000 million dollars). The Soviet Union turned over gratuitously to the GDR 33 large German factories that had earlier passed to USSR ownership as reparations, and cut back the GDR's expenditures on the maintenance of Soviet troops on its territory to 5 per cent of its state budget. Further, the GDR was released from its debt on foreign occupation and other expenditures. It was granted a large Soviet credit. The two governments agreed to reconstitute their diplomatic missions into embassies.<sup>51</sup>

#### Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin

World-wide disaffection with the Western attempts to complicate the convocation of a four-power conference compelled the governments of the USA, Britain, and France to consider this question at a conference in Washington on July 10-14, 1953. By that time the US government had come to the conclusion that it stood to lose much political ground if it ignored the widespread opinion that ways and means should be found to restore accord between the victor powers in German affairs. Actually, like its European allies, the USA had no intention of conducting constructive talks and facilitating agreement on the German question. Indicative of this was that on June 30, 1953, shortly before the Washington conference, Dulles declared that the main issue would be how the West could make the best use of "unrest" behind the "iron curtain".<sup>52</sup>

The Washington conference produced a note to the Soviet Union, of July 15, 1953, stating that the USA, Britain, and France would attend a four-power Foreign Ministers conference. However, they wanted the agenda to be confined to an examination of the question of organising all-German elections or, to be more exact, solely to one issue, namely, verifying whether the conditions existed for free elections in Germany. This was obviously designed to blame the Soviet Union for Germany's division and thereby substantiate the expediency of the West continuing its former policy.

It was not difficult to see through the Western manoeuvre. In notes to the USA, Britain, and France on August 4 and 15, 1953 the Soviet government used facts to show that their attitude to the talks could

<sup>51</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR., 1949-1955*, pp. 286-91.

<sup>52</sup> *AG*, 1953, p. 4060.



lead to nothing but a counter-productive polemic.

The Soviet government again offered to discuss all aspects of the German problem, including the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty. It had urged calling a conference without delay to consider the question of a peace treaty; the formation, on the basis of agreement between the GDR and FRG parliaments, of a provisional all-German government whose principal task would be to prepare and conduct free elections throughout Germany; and the easing of Germany's financial and economic war-induced obligations.

It also proposed that the conference should, with the participation of the People's Republic of China, consider ways and means of relaxing international tension, for the basis for such relaxation had been created through the efforts of peace-loving nations. The Soviet note of August 15, 1953<sup>53</sup> declared that as soon as the FRG joined the aggressive North Atlantic bloc it would become impossible to reunite Germany. It warned, too, that the policy of the Western powers in Germany was fraught with dangerous consequences.

For all nations it was quite clear that the Soviet Union was displaying the maximum good will and striving to find a common language with its wartime allies and deliver Europe from the menace of a resurgence of German militarism. Under these conditions the Western powers could no longer afford to block the convocation of a four-power conference, although they continued to insist on a "limited agenda".

In notes to the USSR on September 2, 1953 the three powers declared that relative to the Foreign Ministers conference they "did not make any prior condition that an investigating commission be established".<sup>54</sup> In subsequent notes the Western powers declared on October 18 that at the conference any of the four governments would have the opportunity "to state its views on any aspect of the German and Austrian questions which it may wish to present".<sup>55</sup>

The Soviet view that a four-power Foreign Ministers conference should be held thus prevailed in the long run. But this did not, of course, mean that the USA, Britain, and France were prepared to assess developments realistically and correspondingly reappraise their posture. On the contrary, they persistently defied the demands of the nations, as subsequent events demonstrated.

On the eve of the conference the US government was concerned mostly with ways and means of saving the European Defense Community.

In September 1953 the British added their voice to the US pressure on France in the question of ratifying the Bonn and Paris treaties.

<sup>53</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, pp. 277-85.

<sup>54</sup> *American Foreign Policy. 1950-1955. Basic Documents*, Vol. II, Washington, 1957, p. 1842.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1845.

There was a considerable fuss over the British government's declaration that Britain would cooperate closely with the EDC. It was felt that this declaration would make it easier for the French to decide on participation in the treaties. Nonetheless, the majority in the French National Assembly was set against the militarisation of the FRG.

The four-power Foreign Ministers conference, which gave much of its attention to the German question, began its deliberations in Berlin on January 25, 1954. This was the first meeting at that level in five years. The Soviet delegation suggested discussing the question of a peace treaty with Germany and presented a draft of the principles for that treaty. It proposed the formation of a provisional all-German government that would undertake all the preparations for and the conduct of elections throughout Germany. Since the Western powers had claimed that they had to arm the FRG, because European security was threatened, the Soviet Union offered to sign an all-European treaty on collective security as the alternative to the EDC. Acceptance of this proposal would have neutralised both German states and created the conditions for their reunification.

The idea of neutralising Germany received a hostile reception from the US government. The Western powers countered all the Soviet proposals with the so-called Eden plan for "free" elections in East and West Germany, a plan that in effect envisaged not free elections, but elections under conditions where the FRG would be a signatory of the Paris and Bonn treaties, in other words, a member of a military bloc directed against the other German state. This alone was testimony of the Western powers wanting nothing more than propaganda capital. They knew that the Eden Plan was unfeasible. It was designed to postpone the conclusion of a German peace treaty indefinitely, making no provision for guarantees that the elections would not be used to bring to power elements that would return Germany to the road of aggression.

The Western ministers conceded that the treaties signed with the FRG would not necessarily be valid for a united Germany. But they made it clear that Germany would not be banned from participation in military groups and it would be a member of NATO.

The GDR government suggested that the conference permit representatives of the GDR and the FRG to take part in the discussion of the German question. This was opposed by the Western powers on the pretext that the FRG "was not ready for contact with the regime in East Germany".

Finding that the Western powers could not be expected to agree to significant progress in the German question, the Soviet delegation suggested at the close of the conference the formation of all-German committees on trade and transport, and also on the promotion of cultural, scientific, and sports contacts between the GDR and the FRG. But no agreement was reached even on this issue.

The stance of the Western powers at the Berlin conference, which ended on February 18, 1954, prevented any advance in the German question.<sup>56</sup>

Nonetheless, the conference showed that the Soviet Union continued to lead the world in diplomatic initiatives by bringing up questions pertaining to the German problem and European security. Its proposals met with a broad response from the peoples who had a stake in strengthening peace and were opposed to the revival of militarism and revanchism in the centre of Europe.

The Western stand at the conference evoked disappointment and condemnation both in the GDR and the FRG. Knowing the mood of the West German working people, Erich Ollenhauer, Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, declared in his report to that party's 6th Congress: "Regretfully, the Soviet proposals at the Berlin conference were turned down despite the fact that they gave the starting point for a settlement consonant with the interests of democratic nations".<sup>57</sup>

Acting on an understanding with the GDR government, the government of the USSR declared on March 25, 1954 that it was establishing with the GDR "relations similar to those it has with other sovereign countries".<sup>58</sup> The GDR acquired the right to decide independently all its domestic and external affairs, including its relations with the FRG. The Soviet High Commissioner ceased his verification of the work of GDR state agencies, retaining only functions linked to "ensuring security and maintaining the relevant contacts with the occupation authorities of the USA, Britain, and France on matters of all-German significance stemming from the agreed decisions of the four power on Germany".

It was pointed out in the statement that "the occupation statute established for West Germany by the United States of America, Great Britain and France" hindered the rapprochement of the two German states and was incompatible with democratic principles and the national rights of the German people.<sup>59</sup>

### **The Soviet Bid to Prevent the FRG's Involvement in NATO. Conclusion of the Warsaw Treaty**

On August 30, 1954 the French National Assembly voted down the Paris Treaty on the formation of a European Defense Community. This was due to the broad movement against the militarisation of the

<sup>56</sup> *Pravda*, January 26-February 19, 1954.

<sup>57</sup> *Der Neue Vorwärts*, Vienna, August 1, 1954, No. 30.

<sup>58</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, pp. 377-78.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

FRG in France, Italy, West Germany, and other European countries. It left the Bonn treaty on the FRG's relations with the three Western powers, whose validity depended on the adoption of the Paris treaty, hanging in the air. The failure of the EDC plan was assessed in the Soviet Union as a major development in Europe that furnished further proof of how alien the policy of rearming the FRG and bringing it into aggressive blocs was to the nations of the world.

The Soviet government felt that France's rejection of the EDC treaty had cleared the way for bringing the attitude of the four powers on the German question closer together.

In October 1954 the ambassadors of the USA, Britain, and France in Moscow were handed notes in which the Soviet government proposed a new conference. The note emphasised the seriousness of the situation, pointing out that in this climate the four powers should consider and decide the question of Germany's unity; the restoration of German militarism and the FRG's membership of aggressive military groups, it said, would solidify and perpetuate Germany's division.

The USA and its allies ignored these warnings and moved farther towards reviving militarism in the FRG. Hardly had it become known that the plans for setting up the EDC had failed than Washington and London began working on new, analogous plans aimed at preserving, in the main, the General Treaty signed in Bonn in May 1952 and replacing the EDC treaty with a new agreement on the FRG's remilitarisation in a spirit congenial to aggressive circles. There was no misfire this time. The Paris agreements, under which the FRG became a NATO member, were signed on October 23, 1954. Moreover, an agreement was signed on the formation of a new group with FRG participation—the West European Union (Brussels Pact).

The Soviet government sharply denounced these agreements. In order to prevent an inevitable aggravation of the situation in Europe in the event the Bonn treaty and the Paris agreements were ratified, it renewed its proposal for a conference of all European countries and the USA and coming to an understanding on the creation of a system of collective security in Europe.<sup>60</sup> Once again this proposal was rejected by the Western powers on the pretext that no foundation existed for the success of this project.

A Soviet statement on January 15, 1955, which had a wide resonance throughout the world, convincingly showed the danger of rearming the FRG and its inclusion in NATO to all the European peoples, including the German people themselves. It noted that there still were untapped possibilities for reaching agreement on the reunification of Germany and, in particular, an agreement for holding all-German free elections in 1955 for this purpose. It warned the Western powers that talks on Germany's reunification would "lose all significance and

<sup>60</sup> *Pravda*, November 14, 1954.

become impossible if the Paris agreements are ratified".<sup>61</sup>

Large segments of West German opinion anxiously followed the steps taken by the Western powers to avoid considering the Soviet proposals. Erich Ollenhauer wrote to Adenauer, saying that the Soviet statement of January 15 contained proposals on all-German elections that would make the talks on this question more promising than at the Berlin conference.

But Adenauer was only concerned with the Paris agreements. Despite all warnings he persevered in his contention that talks with the Soviet Union would be successful only after the Paris agreements were ratified. Neither did the Western powers react to the Soviet warnings.

The Paris agreements and, along with them, the revised Bonn treaty as an element of these agreements, came into force on May 5, 1955. This gave the West German militarists a free hand and created a threat to the European nations.

In response to this a conference of representatives of the Soviet Union, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania<sup>62</sup> opened in Warsaw on May 11, where on May 14, 1955 they signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which became known as the Warsaw Treaty.<sup>63</sup>

Article 1 records the commitment of its signatories, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force and to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner as not to imperil international peace and security.

Article 2 states that the signatories are prepared, in a spirit of sincere cooperation, to take part in all international actions in order to safeguard international peace and security, ensure the adoption, by agreement with other states that desire to cooperate in this matter, of effective steps towards a general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of the atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction.

Article 3 provides for consultations among the signatories on major international issues affecting their common interests. This article states that the signatories will immediately consult with each other whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, there is the threat of armed attack against one or several signatories.

The commitment on mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack in Europe on one or several signatories of the treaty by any state or group of states is recorded in an unambiguous language in

<sup>61</sup> *Pravda*, January 16, 1955.

<sup>62</sup> In 1968, Albania announced its withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty.

<sup>63</sup> *Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issues XVII and XVIII, Moscow, 1960, pp. 29-33 (in Russian).

Article 4, which declares that in the event of such attack every signatory of the treaty will, in the exercise of the right to individual and collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, immediately go to its or their assistance, individually or by agreement with other signatory states with all the means it considers necessary, including the use of armed force.

Article 5 contains the decision of the signatory states to set up a joint command for the armed forces which would, by agreement among them, be placed under this command, and adopt other agreed measures needed for strengthening their defence capacity in order to protect the peaceful life of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and ensure defence against possible aggression.

A Political Consultative Committee, in which each signatory state is represented by a member of government or other specially appointed representative, was set up (Article 6) for the consultations envisaged in the treaty and for the examination of any question arising from the implementation of the treaty. No limit is set on the number of representatives of each country in the Political Consultative Committee, but regardless of the number of its representatives each signatory has one vote.

Under Article 7 the signatories pledged to refrain from taking part in any coalitions or alliances and from concluding agreements running counter to the purposes of the Warsaw Treaty.

The treaty mirrors the aspiration of its signatories to continue developing and strengthening economic and cultural relations with each other in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of non-interference in each other's internal affairs (Article 8).

Article 9 declares that the Warsaw Treaty is open to the accession of other states, regardless of their social and state system, which express readiness through participation in it to contribute to uniting the efforts of peace-loving states to safeguard world peace and security of nations.

The term of the treaty's operation was established at 20 years (Article 10). For those of the signatories who, a year prior to the expiry of this term, did not denounce the treaty, it would remain in force for another ten years. However, Article 11 notes that should a system of collective security in Europe be established and an All-European Treaty on Collective Security be concluded for this purpose, to which end the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty will bend every effort, the latter treaty will lose its validity on the day the All-European Treaty comes into force.

In content, objectives, and character, this was a purely defensive treaty directed towards assuring peace and the security of the nations

of Europe and the world as a whole.

The Warsaw Treaty was signed six years after NATO was set up and was the response of peace-loving nations to the aggressive activities of NATO and other imperialist military blocs.

At the signing of the Warsaw Treaty the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl declared that the GDR government's point of departure was that a united Germany would be freed from the commitments made by one or another part of Germany under the relevant military-political treaties and from agreements concluded prior to its reunification. This declaration had the complete understanding of and was taken into consideration by all the Warsaw Treaty member states.<sup>64</sup>

### The German Question at the Geneva Four-Power Conferences (1955)

After the Paris Agreements came into force, the question of a united Germany acquired a new dimension.

A conference of the heads of government of the four powers—the USSR, the USA, England and France—opened in Geneva on July 18, 1955. A TASS declaration published on June 14, 1955, stated that the Soviet government considered the main task of the conference to be the easing of international tension and the creation of the trust necessary for relations between states.

Speaking at the first session of the conference, the President of the USA, D. Eisenhower, insisted upon "the establishment of an all-German government on the basis of free elections", meaning that the GDR should be included within the FRG, and also insisted that "a united Germany has the right at its own discretion to exercise its right to collective self-defence" as an integral part of NATO.<sup>65</sup>

The Prime Ministers of England and France supported the American delegation. Having expressed his full approval of the speech made by D. Eisenhower, Anthony Eden added that the creation of "a demilitarised area between East and West" would guarantee the security of Eastern Europe.<sup>66</sup> During the conference the French representative, E. Faure, openly declared that "a re-united Germany would once more join the West European Union and NATO".<sup>67</sup>

In a declaration made on 18 July, the Soviet delegation pointed out that "the main obstacle to the re-unification of Germany at the present time is the remilitarisation of West Germany and its inclusion

<sup>64</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, p. 592.

<sup>65</sup> *Pravda*, 19 July, 1955.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

in the military groupings of the Western powers.<sup>68</sup>

The Soviet delegation insisted that the question of security in Europe should be given top priority at the Foreign Ministers conference and that its settlement should not be made contingent upon agreement on the German question, for this would complicate the settlement of the problem of European security.

Finding that this stand of the Soviet Union was unshakeable, the Western powers agreed that European security and the reunification of Germany were interrelated issues and that priority should be given to the question of European security. Moreover, an understanding was reached on the possibility of consultations between the four Foreign Ministers and representatives of the GDR and the FRG.

The Soviet delegation showed that the Western stance on the German question was untenable. After two states (the GDR and the FRG) with different social systems had been formed on the territory of former Germany and after they had joined opposing military blocs and it had become difficult to reunite Germany, the Western powers' proposal for "free elections" was made solely with an eye to its propaganda value. The Soviet delegation reminded the conference that the Soviet government had earlier repeatedly proposed that such elections be held and that they be placed in the hands of the Germans themselves without interference from the occupying powers. But this proposal had not been accepted by the Western powers.

Moreover, the Soviet delegation rejected the Western proposal for giving the USSR spectral "guarantees of security" in exchange for its consent to the inclusion of a united Germany in a Western military bloc directed against the USSR. While favouring the reunification of Germany, the Soviet delegation underscored that special attention and respect should be accorded to the opinion of the Germans themselves on the ways and means of resolving the German question.

On July 20, 1955, the Soviet delegation put before the conference a draft agreement on collective security in Europe, in which both the GDR and the FRG would be equal participants.

In an attempt to ease the process of agreement, the Soviet side brought forward a new proposal in Geneva, according to which a system of collective security in Europe would be introduced in two stages, thereby also facilitating the solution of the German problem.<sup>69</sup>

The Soviet proposal provided for the continuation of NATO, the Paris Agreements and the Warsaw Pact during the first stage (2-3 years) with their member states agreeing to refrain from the use of armed force against each other and to solve any disputes by peaceful

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.

<sup>69</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, pp. 610-13.



means. The Soviet side was of the opinion that the participation of the GDR and the FRG in such a treaty would help to remove distrust between the two German states.

During the second stage, the states who were parties to the treaty would fully assume all the commitments related to the creation of a system of collective security. In particular the above-mentioned treaties would cease to operate and the groupings thus formed would be disbanded and replaced by the system of collective security. This would lead to the elimination of one of the obstacles blocking the settlement of the German question, namely the fact that the GDR and the FRG were members of opposing groups.

The Western powers refused to join in a system of collective European security established before the re-unification of Germany.

As a result, the summit adopted brief directives defining the orientation of the further work of the Foreign Ministers. The section of the directives headed "European Security and Germany" stated that recognising their common responsibility for the settlement of the German question and for the reunification of Germany the heads of state had agreed that the German question and the reunification of Germany by means of free elections should be settled in accordance with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security.<sup>70</sup>

This meant that the directives combined two different theses: the Western thesis for the reunification of Germany by means of "free elections", and the Soviet thesis that the German question should be settled in accordance with the national interests of the German people and the interests of European security. Western attempts to interpret this fact differently had specific political aims—to distort the Soviet stance and abuse its desire to restore the spirit of cooperation with the Western powers in settling the German question as required by the Potsdam Agreement.

The cardinal provision of the Potsdam agreement—the blood-inscribed demand for the extirpation of militarism and nazism so that Germany should never again threaten its neighbours and world peace—would always retain its validity. Of course, the powers of the anti-Hitlerite coalition bore the responsibility for the observance of the principles proclaimed at Potsdam. In the case of the Soviet Union, it has never shirked that responsibility. This was mirrored in, among other things, the points of the directives adopted at the Geneva summit.

On its way from the Geneva conference the Soviet government delegation stopped over at Berlin, where it had talks with the government of the GDR. Upon completion of these talks, the sides enunciated their stand on the German question in a joint statement.<sup>71</sup> They

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 614.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 614-15.

held that the German question should not be an obstacle to European security and made it plain that the German question could not be settled without the participation of the Germans themselves, without agreement between the GDR and the FRG.

The sides agreed that the time had come for concluding the relevant treaty in order to consolidate the friendly relations between them and create the conditions for the further development of these relations.

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France took place on October 27–November 16, 1955. The Soviet delegation saw its main task in helping to achieve a further relaxation of international tension, strengthening world peace, and securing the adoption of agreed steps by the four powers in that direction. The Soviet government's instructions to its delegation stated: "It must be borne in mind that the representatives of the three Western powers may attempt to exacerbate the discussion of one issue or another, particularly the German question. While adhering to the Soviet Union's principled stand, the delegation shall avoid aggravating the discussion and try to give the discussion of the questions on the conference agenda a constructive and calm character... The cardinal issue is that of assuring security in Europe, while the German question is specific and should be subordinate to the settlement of the main question, that of European security. This consideration underlies the relevant agreements of the powers on the German question concluded during and after the Second World War. In these agreements it is specifically underlined that the revival of German militarism, which might again threaten peace in Europe, must be prevented... From this it follows that any postponement of a decision of the question of European security is tantamount to postponing the settlement of the question of Germany's reunification indefinitely."<sup>72</sup>

In line with these directives the Soviet delegation proposed inviting the GDR Prime Minister Otto Grotewohl and the FRG Chancellor Konrad Adenauer to Geneva in order to hear their views on the German question. This proposal was rejected.

Addressing the conference on October 28, the Soviet Foreign Minister said that "the question of European security is of decisive significance for all nations of Europe", that "the remilitarisation of Germany is incompatible with ensuring the security of all Europe".<sup>73</sup>

The Soviet delegation renewed its proposal of discussing the draft of a treaty on collective security in Europe. The USA, Britain and France rejected it. The same fate was in store for the amended draft treaty on security in Europe and all other Soviet proposals on this question that were made later.

<sup>72</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions of the USSR government to the Soviet delegation at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva on October 26, 1955.

<sup>73</sup> *Pravda*, October 29, 1955.

The West displayed no interest in combining the reunification of Germany with the interests of European security, although on Soviet insistence this provision had been included in the agreed directives of the heads of government. On the contrary, they made the reunification of Germany conditional on the militarisation of a reunified Germany and its inclusion in NATO.

The yardstick of the past could no longer be applied to the reunification of Germany. The formation of two German states as different subjects of international relations with a different way of life and different policies, and belonging to opposing military groups, had been consummated. No compromise between them was possible.

As though oblivious to these changes, the representatives of the Western powers continued to press for acceptance of the Eden Plan for all-German elections. In its new edition the plan was complemented with a draft treaty containing a reference to a "guarantee of security" for the Soviet Union in the event the reunited Germany decided to join NATO. The USSR did not, naturally, intend to place itself in a position where its security would depend on guarantees from other states.

The Western powers arbitrarily interpreted the directives of the heads of government. They did all they could to evade settling the German question in accordance with the interests of European security, which was the keynote of the agreed directives.

With the Western powers taking this attitude there could be no question of giving effect to the directives of the heads of government. This was exactly what the Western powers wanted.

### **The Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany Establish Diplomatic Relations**

A major orientation of Soviet European policy was the establishment and strengthening of the closest possible fraternal relations with the German Democratic Republic. The USSR regarded the GDR as an important factor of peace and security in Europe and a dependable bulwark against German militarism and revanchism. It noted with satisfaction that social relations were improving in the GDR, that the bloc of anti-fascist parties in it was growing stronger, and that the population's living standard was rising.

Although the policy pursued by the government of the FRG aroused serious apprehensions, the Soviet Union showed that it was prepared to normalise relations with it. On January 25, 1955 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet enacted a decree terminating the state of war with Germany. This step created the juridical conditions for normalising relations with the FRG.

In the summer of 1955 the Soviet government sent the government

of the FRG a note offering to establish direct diplomatic, commercial, and cultural relations with it. The note said that personal contact between statesmen of the Soviet Union and the FRG would be desirable.

The Bonn leaders found themselves in a difficult position. Having committed themselves to a "positions of strength" policy, they had based all their calculations on the maintenance of tension and antagonism between the West and the East, between the FRG and the Soviet Union. The Soviet initiative upset these calculations. The response it received in the FRG left no doubt that most of the citizens of that state wanted to live in peace with the USSR.

After long vacillation Bonn replied to the Soviet offer affirmatively. At the request of the West German side a preliminary exchange of views was held between the USSR and FRG Ambassadors in France. The FRG government asked for a specification of the issues that could be settled with the establishment of diplomatic relations. The Soviet government, of course, had no intention of evading a discussion of the issues in which the FRG government was interested.

An FRG government delegation led by Chancellor Adenauer arrived in Moscow on September 8, 1955. At the very first session with the Soviet government delegation Adenauer declared that he felt it was not enough to establish diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations between the two states mechanically. A prior condition, he said, was the release of Germans still imprisoned in the Soviet Union for crimes committed during World War II. Attention was drawn by the fact that before Adenauer's departure for Moscow a provocative campaign was started in the FRG demanding the return of "hundreds of thousands of German prisoners of war" allegedly still held in the USSR. The newspapers published endless "lists of prisoners of war", in which were arbitrarily included the names of all the Nazi servicemen whose fate remained unascertained at the end of the war. West German propaganda sought to re-open the wounds inflicted by the war.

The Soviet delegation noted that the German prisoners of war who had been held in the Soviet Union had all been released and sent home. On September 1, 1955 there were in the USSR 9,626 war criminals who had served in the Nazi army. These men had been sentenced by Soviet courts for grave crimes against the Soviet people, peace, and humanity.

Guided by humane principles, the Soviet government decided that the 9,626 persons would be, depending on the gravity of their deeds, either amnestied or turned over as criminals to one or the other German state where they had resided before the war. The sides agreed that the repatriation of German citizens would be considered separately and independently of the question of establishing diplomatic relations.

The talks culminated in agreement on diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG and on the opening of embassies in Bonn and Moscow.

The subject of Germany's reunification was touched upon at the talks by the FRG delegation only superficially. The Soviet side stated the view that this question could not be properly resolved without the corresponding effort by the Germans themselves.

Hardly had the talks ended than Adenauer made an attempt to whip up revanchist feeling in the FRG. On September 14, the day he was to return home, he held a press conference in Moscow at which he declared that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the USSR "does not imply recognition of the territorial composition of the two sides", <sup>74</sup> and added the absurd statement that the Federal government was authorised to represent the "entire German people" in international affairs.

In this connection TASS was authorised by the Soviet government to declare: "The Soviet government regards the Federal Republic of Germany as part of Germany. The other part is the German Democratic Republic. With the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the FRG the Soviet government feels it must be stated that the question of Germany's frontiers had been settled by the Potsdam agreements and that the Federal Republic of Germany exercises its jurisdiction in the territory under its sovereignty."<sup>75</sup>

### **Treaty on Relations Between the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic**

A GDR government delegation arrived in Moscow on September 16, 1955 to continue the talks started in Berlin in July of the same year. The meetings that Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and other GDR representatives had with members of the Soviet government showed that there was an identity of views on many questions and a common striving to promote and strengthen friendly relations between the two countries. The talks ended with the signing on September 20 of a Treaty on Relations between the USSR and the GDR.<sup>76</sup>

Article 1 reaffirmed that the relations between the two countries were based on complete equality, mutual respect for sovereignty,

<sup>74</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Statement by Adenauer on September 14, 1955, at a press conference in Moscow.

<sup>75</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR, 1949-1955*, p. 634.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 647-52.

and non-interference in internal affairs. Accordingly, the GDR was free to decide questions concerning domestic and foreign policy, including relations with the FRG, and to promote relations with other countries. Under Article 2 the sides undertook to consult each other on all crucial international issues affecting their interests and to take all the measures available to them to prevent violations of peace. Article 4 stipulated that Soviet troops would temporarily remain in the GDR with the agreement of its government on terms that were set out in an additional agreement.

The GDR took over the policing and control of its frontiers, the periphery of Greater Berlin and in Berlin, and also the communication routes between the FRG and West Berlin lying across GDR territory. The sides agreed to ensure the settlement, with the appropriate FRG authorities, of all questions concerning the transit of railway, automobile, and water transport of the FRG or West Berlin, their citizens or residents, and also of foreign states and their citizens, with the exception of military personnel and freight of the USA, Britain, and France in West Berlin. The Soviet Union retained only control of the movement of the personnel and freight of the French, British, and US military garrisons in West Berlin between the FRG and West Berlin.<sup>77</sup>

By agreement with the GDR, the Soviet government decreed the abolition of the office of Soviet High Commissioner in Germany. The Soviet Ambassador in the GDR was charged with the function of "maintaining the appropriate links with representatives of the USA, Britain, and France in the FRG on questions affecting Germany as a whole and stemming from four-power decisions".<sup>78</sup>

With the signing of the treaty of September 20, 1955 the relations between the USSR and the GDR were placed on a new, solid foundation conforming to the interests of the peoples of the two countries. The treaty facilitated the work of Party organs and state agencies of the Soviet Union and the GDR in giving shape to broad and equitable economic, cultural, scientific, and technological cooperation between the two countries and in combining their efforts to strengthen peace and security in Europe.

On September 20, 1975, on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the treaty, Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko said in a telegram to the GDR Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer: "This first political treaty between the USSR and the GDR made a large contribution to the promotion of the close cooperation between our countries in all fields of endeavour and to the establishment of genuinely fraternal relations on the unshakeable foundation of Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism."

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 650.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 653-54.

\* \* \*

Far-reaching democratic transformations were put into effect in the German Democratic Republic in 1949-1955. The Soviet Union and the GDR were now bound together by deep, sincere friendship. The relations between them rested on equality, respect for sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs; they were permeated by a spirit of mutual trust and solidarity.

During those years the Soviet Union did all in its power to consolidate peace and security in Europe, and unite Germany as a peace-loving and democratic state. But its proposals were regarded by the Western powers as an impediment to their plans for the formation of a West German army and the FRG's inclusion in the system of aggressive military blocs set up by them.

Without Germany's division the USA would have been unable to return the German militarists to power and make them allies against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Rejection of the Soviet proposals on the German question, advanced in March-April 1952, was eloquent testimony of the Western powers' reluctance to see Germany a united, democratic, and peace-loving.

Relative to the regeneration of militarism in the FRG and its conversion into NATO's strike force, the Soviet Union's firm and consistent stand compelled the Western powers to keep postponing the implementation of their plans and look for devious ways of carrying them out. Had it not been for the Soviet attitude in the German question, the FRG's militarisation would have been accomplished earlier and on a larger scale.

Little wonder that a peace treaty with Germany was not envisaged by the Western policy-makers. To achieve their imperialist aims they had to keep the basic questions of Germany's postwar development unresolved.

This situation in Germany created one of the most tangled knots of international contradictions. As the years went by this knot was drawn steadily tighter and the resultant international tension grew increasingly more acute.

## CHAPTER XXIII

### SOVIET EFFORTS TO END THE WARS IN KOREA AND VIETNAM AND ENSURE A GENERAL EASING OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION (1951-1956)

The formation of NATO, the US aggression in Korea, the arms race, and the militarisation of West Germany strained international tension almost to bursting point. US imperialism pushed its claims to world supremacy. Relying on their transient atomic superiority, the imperialist circles made preparations for another war, their objective being to destroy the socialist system, restore capitalism in countries that had rejected it, and suppress the turbulently spreading national liberation movement.

The Soviet Union's might and the consistent peace policy pursued by all the socialist countries were the principal factors preventing the imperialists from starting another world war. These factors also prevented the US imperialists from moving hostilities from Korea to China and thereby making another world war inevitable. However, the threat of another war had by no means been eliminated. This motivated the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government when they set Soviet foreign policy the task of halting any further heightening of international tension and the threat of war, and assuring the preservation of peace.

#### Termination of the War in Korea

In mid-1951 the Soviet Union undertook an important diplomatic action to restore peace. On June 23, 1951 the Soviet representative at the UN Y.A. Malik, speaking on television on the occasion of the anniversary of the United Nations Organisation, suggested that the belligerents begin talks on a cease-fire and on an armistice with a mutual withdrawal of troops from the 38th parallel.<sup>1</sup>

This was hailed by democratic opinion throughout the world. In his testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services in July 1951, George C. Marshall, then US Secretary of Defense, acknowledged that Malik's statement "has produced a very serious reaction which we are having to combat

<sup>1</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1951.



on all sides".<sup>2</sup> The US Ambassador in Moscow Alan G. Kirk inquired at the Soviet Foreign Ministry whether Malik's statement was representative of the Soviet government's attitude. Needless to say, Malik had acted on instructions from his government. This Soviet initiative gave the impulse for the commencement of peace negotiations and through them for the restoration of peace in Korea.

The US government had no choice but to accept the Soviet proposal and enter into negotiations. True, in October 1952 it suspended the talks and made another attempt to achieve its ends by armed force. But the US offensive in the winter of 1952/53 likewise bogged down.

In the spring of 1953 the USSR and the other socialist countries gave its wholehearted backing to a Chinese-Korean initiative for a resumption of the talks. This stand of the socialist countries was warmly welcomed by democratic opinion throughout the world, a welcome that was reflected also in the UN. On April 18 the 7th session of the General Assembly unanimously expressed the conviction that "a just and honourable armistice in Korea will powerfully contribute to alleviate the present international tension."<sup>3</sup>

An agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war was signed on June 8, 1953. The issue had been a major obstacle to the conclusion of an armistice. The armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. The preamble noted that the aim of the agreement was to end the Korean conflict and achieve an armistice that would ensure the total termination of hostilities and all unfriendly actions in Korea until a peace agreement was signed. The demarcation line was determined in accordance with the actual deployment of the troops of the two sides, mainly along the 38th parallel, with minor deviations in the west in favour of the Korean and Chinese troops, and in the east in favour of the "UN forces". A two-kilometre-wide demilitarised zone was established on either side of the demarcation line. The agreement prohibited the shipment of weapons to Korea throughout the period of the armistice, and defined the functions of the armistice military commission consisting of representatives of the sides, and also the functions of the armistice supervisory commission consisting of representatives of neutral countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Switzerland. The agreement established the procedure for the repatriation of prisoners of war. Provision was made for a political conference to be convened three months after the coming into force of the agreement, to consider the question of Korea's reunification and the

<sup>2</sup> *Mutual Security Act of 1951. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services. United States Senate, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, July 27, 1951, Washington, 1951, p. 41.*

<sup>3</sup> UN General Assembly Seventh Session, A/2386 16 April 1953, p. 2.

withdrawal of foreign troops.<sup>4</sup>

The armistice ended three years of bloodshed in Korea, removed a flashpoint of another world war, and helped to ease international tension. The termination of the war in Korea was a major achievement of Soviet foreign policy in its efforts to preserve peace.

This was a serious setback for the USA and spelled out the failure of many of US imperialism's aggressive plans in Asia linked to the war in Korea.

### Berlin Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference

The question of Germany was the most serious in Europe. The 1952 Soviet proposals on the German question remained without an affirmative response from the Western powers.

The steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to ease international tension had such a powerful impact on world opinion that the Western leaders found they had to somewhat alter their tactics. It was no longer possible simply to ignore the Soviet proposals for peace treaty with Germany and for that country's reunification,<sup>5</sup> and also for assuring security in Europe.

At the four-power Foreign Ministers Conference in Berlin held on January 25-February 18, 1954 the Soviet side proposed the conclusion of an All-European Treaty on Collective Security in Europe and the disbandment of military groupings.<sup>6</sup> This would have ended confrontation in Europe and that continent's division into military blocs. The treaty's signatories, including the GDR and the FRG until the reunification of Germany, would undertake to refrain from attacking each other, settle all outstanding issues by peaceful means, consult with each other in the event of a threat of military invasion in Europe, and go to the assistance of the attacked state or states with all the means at their disposal, including armed forces. It was envisaged that representatives of the USA and China would participate as observers.<sup>7</sup>

Moreover, the Soviet delegation proposed a State Treaty with Austria on the basis of earlier agreement with the simultaneous adoption of measures to guarantee Austria's neutrality and rule out the possibility of foreign countries using its manpower and material resources for aggressive purposes. However, both these proposals and the proposals on the German question were reject-

<sup>4</sup> *International Law in Selected Documents*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1957, pp. 342-53 (in Russian).

<sup>5</sup> See Chapter XXII.

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, January 26-February 19, 1954.

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, February 11, 1954.

ed by the Western powers.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to the German problem, the Austrian Treaty, and European security, the Berlin conference examined, on Soviet initiative, the possibility of convening another conference of Foreign Ministers, this time with the participation of a Chinese representative. Such a conference would work out measures to reduce international tension, examine the question of following up the armistice with a peace treaty in Korea, and the termination of the war in Indochina. The Soviet government instructed its delegation to make sure that the conference would "help ... to curb the aggressive ambitions of the imperialist camp and thereby meet the interests of consolidating peace".<sup>9</sup>

The US delegation turned down the proposal for a five-power conference. Dulles was vehement but unsuccessful in his objections to China's participation. France was losing the war in Vietnam and hoping that the conference would help it find a way out of its extremely difficult position. Britain's stance was influenced by members of the British Commonwealth (India, Pakistan, and Ceylon), which in categorical terms urged an end to the hostilities in Indochina.

As a result, agreement was reached on a conference in Geneva with China's participation.

At and after the Berlin Conference Western ministers and statesmen spread the specious allegation that the North Atlantic pact was a defensive alliance. In so doing they aimed at deflating the impression made by the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Europe. In this connection, the Soviet government sent notes to the three Western powers on March 31, 1954 offering to consider Soviet membership of the North Atlantic pact in view of the assertions that it was a defensive alliance. The Soviet government added that it saw no obstacles to US participation in the suggested treaty on collective security in Europe.<sup>10</sup>

But the Western powers refused to consider these Soviet proposals as well. They thereby admitted the anti-Soviet orientation of the North Atlantic pact and the fact that it was a closed military bloc, and gave further evidence of their reluctance to take steps to ensure security in Europe.

### 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea and Indochina

A Foreign Ministers Conference opened in Geneva on April 26, 1954 and began its deliberations with an examination of the Korean question. In addition to representatives of the five great powers, these

<sup>8</sup> This is considered in some detail on pp. 264-67.

<sup>9</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions of the Soviet government to the Soviet delegation at the Berlin Conference, January 1954.

<sup>10</sup> *Pravda*, April 1, 1954.

deliberations were attended by representatives of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea and South Korea, and of 12 countries that had taken part in the intervention in Korea.

The Soviet delegation backed the PDRK's proposal for restoring Korea's national unity by free elections to an All-Korea National Assembly under the supervision of a commission of representatives of North and South Korea. This, the proposal said, would entail the evacuation of all foreign troops. The USSR declared it was prepared to guarantee Korea's peaceful development along with other powers. At the debate the delegations of the USSR and the other socialist countries acceded to the wishes of the Western powers by agreeing that international supervision should be exercised by neutral states, that the withdrawal of foreign troops should be phased, and so on. Nonetheless, the constructive proposals of the socialist countries, which opened the way to Korea's peaceful reunification and the creation of an independent, democratic state were rejected by the USA and its allies. They were opposed to the country's reunification and genuinely free elections throughout the whole of Korea, with the result that Korea remains divided to this day.

A better climate prevailed for the talks on Indochina. True, the USA took a stand against a political settlement, wanting the war to continue. It increased its supplies of military hardware to France and promised additional financial resources amounting to 385 million dollars in 1954.<sup>11</sup> The USA regarded Indochina as an important strategic base and source of primary materials<sup>12</sup> and prepared to take a direct part in the hostilities up to the use of atomic bombs.<sup>13</sup>

However, on the eve of the Geneva Conference Britain declared it did not favour US military intervention in Vietnam. Eden persuaded Dulles to use more flexible methods, assuring him that France had pledged diplomatic support. Britain pledged to take part in a joint military action only if the Geneva negotiations failed.<sup>14</sup> British restraint was prompted by the attitude of India<sup>15</sup> and some other members of the British Commonwealth: a conference of Prime

<sup>11</sup> *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1953*, New York, 1954, pp. 350-51.

<sup>12</sup> Pierre Rouanet, *Mendès-France au pouvoir (18 juin 1954-6 février 1955)*, Paris, 1965, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> Eisenhower wrote that the "strategic importance of Indochina... is obvious". The loss of Indochina "would have meant to surrender to Communist enslavement of millions. On the material side, it would have spelled the loss of valuable deposits of tin and prodigious supplies of rubber and rice" (Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years. Mandate for Change, 1953-1956*, New York, 1963, pp. 332, 333).

<sup>14</sup> Anthony Eden, *Full Circle*, London, 1960, pp. 105-06, 109-11.

<sup>15</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 397-99.

Ministers of India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan in April 1954 had urged an immediate ceasefire and recognition of the independence of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

On May 3, 1954, shortly before the debate on Indochina started, Dulles left Geneva in order to demonstrate that the USA was not interested in an end to the hostilities in Indochina. But this gesture made hardly any impression on his partners.

On May 8 representatives of the USSR, China, and the three Western powers, together with the delegates of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and also South Vietnam began their examination of the question of restoring peace in Indochina. The day before, May 7, after a hard-fought battle lasting several months, the French garrison of the fortress of Dien Bien Phu had surrendered.

At the conference the DRV's proposal for recognition of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, the withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries, the unification of each of them by free elections and the formation of national governments without foreign interference, and a mutual exchange of prisoners of war, was strongly supported by the USSR and China. As a first step it was suggested that hostilities should cease.<sup>16</sup> But the talks progressed slowly due to the stand taken by the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, who was acting in close contact with the Americans.

In France there was growing disenchantment with the Laniel government, which was inclined to continue the dirty war in Vietnam. The anti-war movement was headed by the French Communist Party. The military setbacks of the French caused opposition feeling to spread to the bourgeoisie, as well. The Laniel government fell on June 12, 1954. Pierre Mendès-France, who headed the new government, went to Geneva with the intention of ending the costly and unpopular war, which France was losing.

On July 20 and 21, 1954 France and the DRV signed the agreements terminating the hostilities in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and a Final Declaration, under which France pledged to withdraw its troops from the Indochinese states. International commissions composed of representatives of Canada, India, and Poland were set up to supervise and verify the implementation of the agreements, which banned the introduction of foreign troops and other military personnel, arms, and munitions to all the Indochinese states. The maintenance of foreign military bases was prohibited. The governments of Laos and Cambodia declared they would not join any military alliances. Further, the agreements stated that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam would not seek membership of any military blocs, and that no foreign bases

<sup>16</sup> *Pravda*, May 11, 1954.

would be built on their territory.

In the Final Declaration the conference participants pledged to respect the sovereignty of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and to refrain from interfering in their internal affairs. The Declaration provided for free elections in Cambodia and Laos in 1955 and for a political settlement in Vietnam on the basis of its independence, unity, and territorial integrity. The settlement was to be achieved by free elections under the supervision of an international commission. The elections were set for July 1956. A temporary demarcation line was established between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam somewhat south of the 17th parallel. As Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, the Soviet and British Foreign Ministers were authorised to consider the ways and means of implementing the agreements.<sup>17</sup>

The South Vietnam authorities, who had no popular support and feared a debacle, subsequently disrupted the holding of free elections. They were aided and abetted by the USA, which soon became the dominant force in South Vietnam and turned it into a military base in Southeast Asia.

The USA did not sign the agreements on the cessation of hostilities in Indochina, but declared on July 21, 1954, that it would take note of the agreements and "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them".<sup>18</sup> Later developments showed that this was a hollow declaration.

On August 8 and 12, 1954 the US National Security Council, presided over by President Eisenhower, came to the conclusion that the Geneva agreements were "catastrophic" for the USA and "may lead to the loss of Southeast Asia".

On August 20 Eisenhower approved a National Security Council report presenting a programme for subverting the Geneva settlement.<sup>19</sup>

The agreements on Indochina were an important step reducing international tension. They consolidated the position of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

But this relaxation did not enter into the plans of the US ruling circles and was achieved despite them. To compensate for its setback at the Geneva Conference, US diplomacy hastened to begin talks on forming an aggressive military bloc in Southeast Asia—the conclusion of a Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the formation of its military organisation, SEATO. The members of the new aggressive bloc were the USA, Britain, France, Australia, and New Zealand. The US imperialists succeeded in drawing only three Asian states into the

<sup>17</sup> *International Law in Selected Documents*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1957, pp. 371-84 (in Russian); *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955*. Basic Documents. Washington, 1957, Vol. VI, pp. 750-787.

<sup>18</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, August 2, 1954, p. 162.

<sup>19</sup> *The Pentagon Papers*, New York, 1971, pp. 14-18.

bloc, namely those that were the most heavily dependent on the USA: Thailand, the Philippines, and Pakistan. These talks ended on September 8, 1954. A protocol was signed extending the operation of the treaty to the Indochinese states. This was a direct violation of the Geneva agreements and was done in spite of the clearly expressed negative attitude of the Indochinese states themselves to the extension of SEATO commitments to their territory.

The Soviet Union assessed these actions of the USA and its allies as "directed against security in Asia and the Far East and, at the same time, against the freedom and national independence of the Asian peoples".<sup>20</sup>

On October 12, 1954 the USSR and the PRC issued a joint declaration in which they emphatically denounced the creation of a military bloc in Southeast Asia as serving imperialist aims and directed against the security and independence of Asian nations.

In spite of the Geneva agreements, the USA kept up a flow of armaments and other materiel to Indochina, chiefly to South Vietnam; it subsequently sent officers and other military personnel to South Vietnam and intervened with its armed forces on the side of reaction in the internal struggle that flared up in the area.

A mutual defence treaty was signed in Washington with the Chiang Kaishek clique on December 2, 1954. Under this treaty the USA extended military aid to the Kuomintang in return for which Taiwan and the Pescadores (P'enghu Liehtao Islands) were used as American military bases. Then, on January 28, 1955, the US Congress passed a resolution authorising the US President to employ any means he deemed necessary "for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores against armed attack".<sup>21</sup> This resolution was used by the US military to widen aggression in the Far East with the result that tension increased in the area of the Chinese offshore islands and the Taiwan Strait.

The Soviet government acted vigorously in support of the People's Republic of China, against the US policy of aggression. In a talk with the British Ambassador Sir William Hayter in January 1955, the Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov declared that the situation over Taiwan had been aggravated by gross US interference in China's internal affairs and its efforts to wrest Taiwan from China.<sup>22</sup> On May 14, 1955 the situation in the Taiwan Strait was the subject of a meeting between Dulles and the Soviet Foreign Minister. Dulles alleged that the government of the People's Republic of China, which was receiving aid from the USSR, was building up a springboard

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, September 15, 1954.

<sup>21</sup> *Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955*, Vol. I, New York, 1956, p. 299.

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, January 29, 1955.

on the mainland for an attack on Taiwan. He said that the US government was under strong pressure to strike at this springboard or permit the Chiang Kaishek clique to do this. In reply he was told that the "Soviet Union was helping the PRC" and that it "regarded any Chinese build-up on Chinese territory as the internal affair of China". The Soviet Foreign Minister stressed that the "USSR wants a peaceful settlement of the situation in the region of Taiwan".<sup>23</sup>

The French intervention in Indochina was halted through the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as all other peace-loving states. That another world war did not break out at that crucial period in the Far East was due to the fact that the US aggressors were resolutely rebuffed by the Soviet Union.

The failure of imperialism's aggressive designs in the Far East was further convincing evidence that the enhanced might of the socialist world community, chiefly of the USSR, was exercising a growing influence on international relations.

#### **The Soviet Union and the State Treaty With Austria. Promotion of Friendly Relations with Finland**

The political settlement of relations with Austria was a major step taken by the Soviet government to ease international tension. To this end it had initiated measures to break the deadlock over the conclusion of a State Treaty with Austria. For a number of years the USA and its NATO partners had been blocking the settlement of this problem in the hope of including Austria in NATO and turning it into that aggressive organisation's "Alpine fortress". They reneged on articles of the State Treaty, earlier adopted by the Foreign Ministers Council, and in contravention of the understanding reached in that Council proposed a separate draft of what they termed as a "short treaty" which was totally unacceptable both to the Soviet Union and to Austria.

Every effort was made by the Soviet government to ensure the earliest restoration of an independent and democratic Austria and prevent its involvement in Western military blocs. After the Raab government came to power in 1953 the Austrian ruling circles began to show understanding for the Soviet stance. In 1953 the Soviet government took some steps to liberalise the occupation regime and normalise relations with Austria. It held that as an interested party Austria should attend the talks on the conclusion of a treaty. On Soviet initiative Austria was represented at the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference in February 1954. At the conference the Austrian

<sup>23</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on May 14, 1955 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.



representative declared that his country "has no intention of joining any military alliances".<sup>24</sup> This was an important move by Austria.

Taking the standpoint of the Austrian government into account and in order to speed the conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria, the Soviet delegation proposed at the Berlin Conference that the final text of the treaty should be completed within three months on the basis of the earlier consensus; and that the treaty should contain Austria's commitment to refrain from joining military alliances directed against any of the powers that had liberated it and to deny permission for the siting of foreign military bases on its territory. In the face of plans for West Germany's remilitarisation and the threat of another *anschluss*, the Soviet delegation suggested that the four powers maintain small contingents of troops in Austria until the peace treaty with Germany was signed and to deprive these troops of the functions of occupation.

The Western powers were disinclined to accept the Soviet proposals,<sup>25</sup> for they were still clinging to their plans for using Austria for their aggressive aims.

In order to relax international tension, reduce the number of outstanding international issues, and meet the interests of the Austrian people, the Soviet Union declared in February 1955 that it considered foreign troops could be withdrawn from Austria without waiting for the conclusion of the peace treaty with Germany. This step was taken also with account of the attitude of the other powers. However, in making this concession it insisted on a settlement "which would rule out the possibility of Germany imposing another *anschluss* on Austria".<sup>26</sup> It suggested convening a four-power Foreign Ministers Conference without delay to consider both the German and the Austrian questions. This was not accepted by the Western powers.

Soviet diplomacy then took a different approach: it was decided to begin direct talks with the government of Austria. Chancellor Julius Raab was invited to Moscow to draw up the State Treaty.

Bilateral talks between Soviet and Austrian government delegations were held in Moscow from April 12 to 15, 1955, and their results were recorded in a confidential memorandum.<sup>27</sup> The Austrian government undertook to issue a declaration stating that Austria "would in perpetuity maintain a neutrality of the type maintained by Switzerland". Further, it said it would take steps to get this declaration accepted by the Austrian parliament and receive international recognition. It bound itself to put to the Western powers the proposal that

<sup>24</sup> *Europa Archiv*, Frankfurt, Vienna, 1954, No. 8/9, p. 6521.

<sup>25</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Statement of the Soviet Foreign Minister of February 12, 1954 at the Berlin Conferences of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the United Kingdom, the USA, and France.

<sup>26</sup> *Izvestia*, February 9, 1955.

<sup>27</sup> This memorandum was later published simultaneously with the text of the State Treaty. See: *Pravda*, May 16, 1955.

the four powers should guarantee the integrity and inviolability of Austrian state territory.

For its part, the Soviet government declared it was prepared "immediately to sign the Austrian State Treaty and recognise the declaration on Austria's neutrality", and agreed that "the troops of the four powers should be withdrawn from Austria following the coming into force of the State Treaty, and not later than December 31, 1955". Disputed economic issues were also settled.

The Moscow talks provided the basis for settling the Austrian question as a whole. The Soviet initiative opened the way to the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and guaranteeing Austria's neutrality.

In Vienna on May 15, 1955 representatives of the four powers and Austria signed the State Treaty on the Re-Establishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria.<sup>28</sup> Austria committed itself to neutrality in perpetuity, which meant, among other things, that it would not join military blocs or permit foreign bases on its territory. The four powers—the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France—pledged to respect Austria's neutrality. Thus, one more country in Europe engaged to stay out of military alliances. This settlement, which met Austria's national interests and contributed to European security, was achieved through the efforts of the Soviet government.

The Austrian settlement was a major international development that reaffirmed the enormous potential for resolving international problems by negotiation.

A significant step towards consolidating peace in Northern Europe and promoting friendly relations with Finland was the signing, on September 19, 1955, of a protocol extending the operation of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance for 20 years. In view of the goodneighbourly relations that had taken shape with Finland and also the certain easing of international tension, the Soviet Union found it could renounce its lease for the Porkkala Udd naval base, which was to expire only in 1997. Having earlier given up its rights to the Port Arthur naval base, the Soviet Union thereby dismantled its last base on foreign territory. At the same time, it continued its efforts for disarmament in the face of the nuclear arms race and the threat of a nuclear war.<sup>29</sup>

### Geneva Four-Power Summit

While the signing of the Austrian State Treaty and some other developments were indications of a certain easing of international

<sup>28</sup> *Collection of Operating Treaties...*, Issues XVII and XVIII, pp. 33-73.

<sup>29</sup> See Chapter XXIV.

tension in Europe, the signing and ratification of the Paris agreements, which cleared the way to the remilitarisation of West Germany, led to its aggravation. These facts showed that the forces of war and aggression had by no means downgraded their dangerous activities, that they were continuing to obstruct the settlement of the German question.

At its session (February 1955) the Supreme Soviet of the USSR examined the international situation and the foreign policy pursued by the Soviet government. It passed a resolution approving the Soviet government's foreign policy actions and adopted a declaration on the international situation. This declaration drew world attention to the deteriorating international situation, condemned war propaganda, and stated that the "peoples are vitally interested in strengthening world peace. They are quite capable of preventing another war, for the forces of peace are growing steadily and are now more powerful than the forces of aggression and war."<sup>30</sup> It proposed direct contacts between the parliaments of all countries through exchanges of delegations as "meeting the aspirations of the peoples for friendly relations and cooperation".<sup>31</sup> As a result, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR established contacts with the parliaments of many countries. Up to November 1, 1957 the Soviet Union was visited by parliamentary delegations from 31 countries and delegations from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR visited 19 countries. This helped to mould better understanding between governments and between peoples.

In January 1955 the Soviet Union advanced the idea of convening a summit in order to improve the international climate and discuss the outstanding issues that were adversely affecting that climate. Despite the negative attitude of the USA, this idea was favoured by Britain and France. World opinion gave it strong backing.

Eisenhower admits in his memoirs that pressure from its allies and from world opinion compelled the USA to agree to a summit, writing, "not wishing to appear senselessly stubborn in my attitude toward a summit meeting—so hopefully desired by so many—I instructed Secretary Dulles to let it be known through diplomatic channels, that if other powers were genuinely interested in such a meeting we were ready to listen to their reasoning".<sup>32</sup>

At the signing of the Austrian State Treaty there was an exchange of views between the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France on the question of convening a four-power summit. The Western Foreign Ministers declared that they felt a summit could not be expected to settle major international issues such as the

<sup>30</sup> *Sittings of the 4th Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 2nd Session, Verbatim Report, Moscow, 1955, p. 527 (in Russian).*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Op. cit.*, p. 506.

German question, disarmament, and the problem of nuclear weapons. They said that in their view the summit could confine itself to giving an impetus to the work of the Foreign Ministers or other agencies of the four powers, define the procedure for the further discussion of outstanding international issues, and chart the orientation for this work.

The Soviet government declared that it wanted a meeting of heads of government to take place, feeling that it should be conducted without a specified agenda so that any questions of interest to the heads of government could be brought up. For its part, it was interested in questions such as collective security in Europe, an armaments cutback, and the prohibition of nuclear weapons.<sup>33</sup>

Through diplomatic channels it was agreed to convene a summit in Geneva on July 18, 1955. In insisting on this meeting the Soviet government proceeded from the need for a frank discussion of the international situation with the other great powers.

The instructions received by the Soviet delegation defined its tasks as follows: "The meeting of the heads of government of the four powers should focus on ways and means of easing international tension and helping to build up the necessary confidence in the relations between states. Accordingly, the talks shall be conducted in such a manner as to have the meeting adopt various decisions conforming to this aim, or at least the relevant declaration (or statement)." The Soviet delegation was instructed to rebuff all attempts to get the conference to enter into a discussion amounting to interference in the internal affairs of the USSR or countries friendly to it.<sup>34</sup> This was of the utmost importance because in the USA Dulles and like-minded people intended to bring up questions concerning the internal situation in some socialist countries and the activities of communist parties in the capitalist world.

At the jubilee session of the UN General Assembly in San Francisco on June 23, 1955 the US Secretary of State told the Soviet Foreign Minister that the summit could consider questions such as disarmament, European security, Germany, the "status" of East European countries, and the activities of "international communism". The Soviet Foreign Minister declared that the Soviet government would oppose any proposal by the US President for a discussion of the situation in East European countries or of what was termed as "international communism". He noted that no conference had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and that the summit in question should consider disarmament, collective security,

<sup>33</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with John Foster Dulles, Harold Macmillan, and Antoine Pinay on May 14, 1955.

<sup>34</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions for the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, July 1955.

and also the question of a conference on the Asian question and economic problems.<sup>35</sup>

When the Geneva Conference opened the Soviet delegation declared that the USSR was interested mainly in considering a reduction of armaments, the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the creation of a system of collective security in Europe, and problems of Asia and the Far East. Moreover, it proposed a discussion on putting an end to the cold war, building up confidence between states, guaranteeing the security of neutral nations, and withdrawing foreign troops from European countries, and also of the German problem. It was finally decided to consider the German question, European security, disarmament, and an expansion of East-West contacts.<sup>36</sup>

The Western powers gave priority to the German question. But, as Eisenhower admits in his memoirs, they had no intention of finding a mutually-acceptable settlement of the problem. He wrote: "We had obligations to Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the Federal Republic of Germany. No matter how harmless a Soviet proposal might appear, we were determined to do nothing that might injure the Chancellor or weaken Western resolution" to sustain the existing practices in the FRG.<sup>37</sup> The Western powers were eager to seize the initiative in the talks so as subsequently, to quote Eisenhower, to "keep the Soviets on the defensive by proposing series of measures which we hoped would seem logical to the peoples of the world and which we were prepared to support vigorously".<sup>38</sup>

The debate on the German question was opened by the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, who only repeated the self-same Eden Plan proposed at the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference in 1954.<sup>39</sup> He said there was no necessity for collective security in Europe, declaring that this purpose could be served by a security treaty between the nations participating in the summit and a united Germany. This treaty would give the Soviet Union "guarantees of security". The obvious implication was that Germany would be a member of the North Atlantic bloc.<sup>40</sup> This was also the stand of the USA.

The results of this debate were recorded in the form of a joint directive by the four heads of government to their Foreign Ministers.<sup>41</sup>

When European security was brought up, the Soviet delegation

<sup>35</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on June 23, 1955 between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US Secretary of State.

<sup>36</sup> *Pravda*, July 20, 1955.

<sup>37</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Op. cit.*, p. 523.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 519.

<sup>39</sup> See Chapter XXII.

<sup>40</sup> *Pravda*, July 20, 1955.

<sup>41</sup> See Chapter XXII.

declared that the security of the European peoples could only be assured by the concerted efforts of all the states in Europe. The Soviet government maintained that the two German states should take part in building up a system of security. However, because the Western powers were not prepared to dissolve their military blocs, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft treaty on collective security in Europe, in which this Western stand was taken into account.<sup>42</sup> It was proposed that at the first stage the participating states would abide by commitments under earlier treaties but would promise to refrain from the use of armed force and to settle all outstanding issues by peaceful means. At the second stage all the commitments envisaged in the treaty would come into force and the North Atlantic Pact and the Warsaw Treaty would be dissolved simultaneously.

In Geneva the Western powers made no constructive proposals whatever on the question of security. More, they made the solution of this problem contingent on Germany's reunification on their terms, namely, that a reunited Germany would be a NATO member. This was contrary to the Geneva four-power heads of government directive, which declared that the German question should be settled "in accordance with the interests of European security". Germany's membership of a military bloc directed against the USSR and other socialist countries would completely undermine European security and heighten tension on the continent. At the conclusion of the discussion the heads of government instructed their ministers to examine the proposals for a system of European security put forward by all the delegations at the Geneva conference.<sup>43</sup>

On the question of disarmament the Soviet delegation insisted on the Western powers stating their attitude to the Soviet proposals for disarmament submitted to the Disarmament Subcommittee on May 10, 1955. It suggested recording an understanding on the armed forces levels of the great powers, pointing out that the Soviet draft was based on proposals made earlier by the Western powers. Further, it proposed a quadripartite agreement to refrain from using atomic and hydrogen bombs and calling upon other states to follow this example. The Soviet delegation gave considerable attention to creating a system of international verification of armaments cutbacks and of the ban on nuclear weapons.

The Western powers displayed no desire to make meaningful efforts to get the problem of disarmament off the ground. Their proposals made no provision for disarmament but were entirely centred on verification and inspection of existing armaments and armed forces. In them there was even no mention of the need for reducing armaments and banning nuclear weapons. The American delegation suggested that

<sup>42</sup> *Pravda*, July 21, 1955.

<sup>43</sup> *Pravda*, July 24, 1955.

the USSR and the USA exchange information on their armed forces and permit aerial photography of their territories.<sup>44</sup>

On the last point of the agenda—promotion of East-West contacts—the Soviet delegation suggested that the conference should go on record as calling for broader economic, cultural, and other links between nations and for an expansion of international trade as important levers reducing international tension.

The Western delegations, the US delegation in particular, spoke generally in favour of an expansion of economic relations but made no specific proposal for ending the discriminatory measures taken by their governments relative to economic relations with the USSR. At the discussion their main concern was to give bourgeois propaganda literature, radio programmes, and so on, greater opportunities for penetrating the Soviet Union. The discussion of this point closed with instructions to the Foreign Ministers of the four powers to study materials which may lead to “a gradual lifting of the barriers to freedom of communication and peaceful trade between nations and free contacts and links mutually beneficial to the interested countries and peoples”.

At unofficial talks Soviet and Western representatives discussed the situation in Asia. Soviet representatives proposed settling the problem of Taiwan as an inalienable part of the People's Republic of China and the question of restoring the PRC's rights in the UN. Eisenhower and Dulles rejected this proposal with the contention that such a settlement required time.<sup>45</sup> The conference ended on July 23, 1955.

No understanding was reached in Geneva on key international problems. Nonetheless, the summit did for some time relax world tension. The Soviet side succeeded in making European security a top priority issue. That was a considerable achievement of the Soviet delegation.

### Geneva Four-Power Foreign Ministers Conference (1955)

In defining the tasks of the Soviet delegation at the Foreign Ministers Conference that was being convened in compliance with a decision of the Geneva summit, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government gave much of their attention to the question of organising European security. The instructions to the Soviet delegation stated: “When the question of security in Europe is considered,

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, July 22, 1955; for details see Chapter XXIV.

<sup>45</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk of the head of the Soviet delegation on July 21, 1955 with Eisenhower, Dulles, and Eden during the Geneva Conference.

the delegation shall take the stand that effective European security can best be met by creating a system of collective security in Europe, relative to which the Soviet government has submitted the corresponding proposals to the Four-Power Summit Conference in Geneva, and the conclusion, for this purpose, of the relevant treaty. In view of the fact that the substance of this proposal was not examined at the Conference of Heads of Government, the delegation shall request the representatives of the three powers to state their attitude to this proposal. When this proposal is deliberated, the point of departure must be that it is the main Soviet proposal on the question of European security."<sup>46</sup>

The Geneva Conference opened on October 27, 1955. The first item on the agenda was "European Security and Germany". The exchange of views showed at once that the USA and its Western allies were not interested in organising European security and intent on getting Soviet agreement for Germany's inclusion in the aggressive North Atlantic bloc. This attitude doomed the conference to failure, which was exactly what US diplomacy wanted.

Consistently pursuing its policy of consolidating peace, the USSR proposed that the conference consider the draft of a general European treaty on collective security, which had earlier been submitted to the Geneva summit. The Western delegations countered this move by advancing a somewhat amended Eden Plan.<sup>47</sup>

The Soviet delegation declared that since the 1954 Berlin Conference, when general elections had been possible in Germany, the situation there had undergone drastic changes: the Paris agreements had come into force, and West Germany had become a NATO member and was engaged in militarisation. In the new situation Germany could only be reunited gradually, step by step, with account of the interests of the two German states and European security.

As the head of the Soviet delegation stressed, "Nowadays it is impossible to solve the German question by disregarding the fact that there exist two German states with different social systems. One should not overlook the realities. It is obvious that the attempts aimed at having West Germany swallow East Germany are bound to fail."<sup>48</sup>

The initial Soviet draft for a security treaty in Europe was in some measure amended to make it an accord among a smaller number of states: the USSR, the USA, France, and Britain, and also the member countries of the West European alliance and the Warsaw Treaty,

<sup>46</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions of October 26, 1955 to the Soviet delegation at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva.

<sup>47</sup> See Chapter XXII.

<sup>48</sup> *Pravda*, November 17, 1955.



including the GDR and the FRG.<sup>49</sup> But this was also rejected. This rejection of a European security treaty by the USA and its allies in fact voided the decisions of the Geneva summit on the German question, since its settlement was made contingent by the heads of government on the establishment of security in Europe.

A British proposal for creating an armaments restriction and inspection zone in the centre of Europe, submitted at the Geneva summit, was directly related to the task of ensuring European security. This proposal was included in the summit directives to the Foreign Ministers Conference. These mentioned the creation of a zone between the East and West in which armed forces shall be stationed by mutual agreement. In keeping with this recommendation the USSR submitted a proposal providing for the creation of such a zone which would consist of the territories of the GDR and the FRG and also of all or some of the countries neighbouring on them. It was suggested that an agreement on this zone should fix a limit to the numerical strength of the US, Soviet, British, and French armed forces on the territory of other countries in that zone, record commitments on limiting armaments and verifying this limitation, and establish a joint inspectorate over the armed forces and armaments of the signatory states in the zone.<sup>50</sup>

These proposals, too, were rejected by the Western powers, which advanced their own draft that came into conflict with the summit directives. It mentioned a zone "along both sides of the demarcation line between a reunited Germany and Eastern Europe".<sup>51</sup> The appearance of this draft was evidence that in order to block agreement with the Soviet Union on this question the Western powers had gone to the extent of renegeing on their own proposal, submitted by Eden to the Geneva summit.

On the question of disarmament the Soviet delegation submitted on November 10, 1955 the draft of a decision recording a four-power understanding on the levels of armed forces, the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the cessation of nuclear tests, and international inspection of the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces and of the prohibition of nuclear weapons.<sup>52</sup> On the pretext that it would be technically difficult to verify a ban on nuclear weapons, the Western Foreign Ministers bluntly declared on November 10-11 that nuclear disarmament was not feasible.<sup>53</sup> It is indicative that they refused to record agreement even in issues where there

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, November 1, 1955.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>51</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. I, Washington, 1960, p. 537.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 546-48; *Pravda*, November 11, 1955.

<sup>53</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. I, Washington, 1960, pp. 548-60.

was an identity of views.

On the question of promoting East-West contacts the Soviet delegation submitted a draft decision that met the summit directives and the wishes of Western business circles, scientists, cultural personalities, and public organisations.

What the Western powers wanted was not so much to promote contacts and peaceful cooperation as to secure channels for interference in the internal affairs of the socialist states.

They refused to be moved from their course towards a further aggravation of the international climate with the result that the Foreign Ministers' Conference made no tangible progress in solving the German problem or creating a system of collective security in Europe.

### Diplomatic Relations with Japan

As we have noted earlier,<sup>54</sup> the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, India, Burma, and some other countries did not sign the peace treaty with Japan at San Francisco. This was used by US diplomacy in a bid to cut off all contact between Japan and the Soviet Union. The government in Japan at the time was headed by Shigeru Yoshida, the pro-US leader of the bourgeois "Liberal Party". Contrary to national interests, this government declined to normalise relations with the USSR and shunned economic and trade ties with it.

The Soviet government considered as abnormal the absence of diplomatic and economic relations with one of the USSR's nearest neighbours in the Far East. For that reason, when the international situation in the Far East changed with the termination of the wars in Korea and Indochina, it took vigorous steps to establish contacts with Japan. This initiative was supported by the government of the People's Republic of China. In a joint Soviet-Chinese Declaration signed in Peking on October 11, 1954 it was stated that the two countries were prepared "to take steps to normalise ... relations with Japan".<sup>55</sup>

There was a wide response in Japan to this declaration. The most diverse segments of the Japanese people urged normalisation of relations with the USSR, China, and other socialist community countries. Progressive organisations were joined by business circles in pressing for normalisation, but this was obstructed by the pro-American stance of the Yoshida cabinet.

In December 1954 the Yoshida government was forced to resign. A new cabinet was formed on December 10, 1954 by Ichiro Hatoyama, leader of the Democratic Party, which he had founded in November

<sup>54</sup> See Chapter XIX.

<sup>55</sup> *Izvestia*, October 12, 1954.

1954.<sup>56</sup> On December 11, 1954 the Foreign Minister in the new cabinet, Mamoru Shigemitsu, declared that Japan was prepared to resume relations with the USSR on mutually acceptable terms. In a number of statements Hatoyama raised the question of Japan adopting an independent policy.<sup>57</sup>

The Soviet government responded quickly to the statements of Japanese government officials. On December 16, 1954 it was reported that the Soviet Union was unchangeably pursuing a policy of establishing and developing relations with all countries desiring such relations; this policy extended to Japan as well.<sup>58</sup>

In the USA the ruling circles were against Japan embarking upon an independent foreign policy. In May 1955 Dulles sent Prime Minister Hatoyama a message stating that the course taken by the Japanese government towards expanding economic relations with China and the Soviet Union and restoring diplomatic relations with them was giving the American people and the US Congress the impression that Japan was seeking rapprochement with communist states. This, the message declared, could be an obstacle to the aid programme for Japan currently being drawn up by the US government.<sup>59</sup>

This pressure by the USA, which had many supporters among the Japanese ruling circles, affected the Japanese-Soviet talks, which commenced in London on June 3, 1955. The first months of the talks proved to be barren. The Japanese delegation made a number of prior conditions for the resumption of relations and the conclusion of a peace treaty: the satisfaction of territorial claims—the transfer to Japan of the Kuril Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin, the repatriation of Japanese war criminals sentenced in the Soviet Union, and other demands.

On June 14, 1955 the Soviet delegation presented the draft of a peace treaty, whose provisions demonstrated the USSR's willingness to meet some of Japan's demands: renunciation of reparations from Japan, readiness to support its application for membership of the United Nations, preparedness to begin talks on the conclusion of a trade agreement and a fishing convention, among others. In order to turn the Sea of Japan into a peace zone, the Soviet Union suggested that the straits connecting it with the Pacific should be open only to naval vessels of countries adjoining the Sea of Japan. For its part, Japan would undertake to refrain from joining any coalition or military alliance directed against any of the powers that

<sup>56</sup> A year later the Liberal and Democratic parties merged to form the Liberal-Democratic Party.

<sup>57</sup> L. N. Kutakov, *A History of Soviet-Japanese Diplomatic Relations*, Moscow, 1962, pp. 488-89 (in Russian).

<sup>58</sup> *Pravda*, December 17, 1954.

<sup>59</sup> *Asahi*, May 23, 1955.

had fought in the war with it.<sup>60</sup>

However, the Japanese delegation refused to discuss the question of a treaty in substance. It heavily accentuated the question of the repatriation of Japanese prisoners of war, despite the fact that all Japanese prisoners of war had been repatriated from the USSR as early as the beginning of 1950 with the exception of a small number sentenced as war criminals.

Another issue over which there were long and futile discussions was Japan's unlawful territorial claims. The Soviet Union based its stand on existing international agreements that had ended the historical injustices resulting from the Japanese aggression against Russia and restored the Soviet Union's rights to the Kurils and the southern part of Sakhalin Island. These agreements had been recognised by Japan when it signed the 1945 Instrument of Surrender and the 1951 Peace Treaty in San Francisco.

In its striving to normalise relations with Japan and taking into account the fact that the islands of Habomai and Shikotan of the Kuril group were situated in proximity of Hokkaido, the Soviet delegation declared that it was prepared to include an article on the territorial question in the treaty, namely, an article declaring that in keeping with Japan's wishes and taking Japanese interests into account, the Soviet Union would turn the Lesser Kurils (Habomai and Shikotan) over to Japan.

This generous Soviet gesture opened up good prospects for the speedy and successful consummation of the talks in London. However, it was not appreciated by the Japanese government. Its representatives insisted on the transfer to Japan not only of Habomai and Shikotan, but also the islands of Kunashir and Iturup. As regards the other Kurils and the southern part of Sakhalin, the Japanese unboundedly suggested making their status dependent on a decision to be taken by an international conference.

At the talks it was agreed that the treaty would include an article on the need for an accord regulating and limiting the salmon catch in the Northwestern Pacific in order to conserve and enlarge the fish resources. The disruption of the talks and the large-scale predatory fishing by the Japanese compelled the Soviet government to decree the protection of salmon reserves and the regulation of salmon fishing on the high seas in regions adjoining Soviet territorial waters in the Far East. Until the conclusion of a relevant agreement among the countries concerned a salmon catch quota was established in the Sea of Okhotsk, the western part of the Bering Sea and in the Pacific adjoining Soviet territorial waters.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>60</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Soviet draft peace treaty with Japan on June 14, 1955.

<sup>61</sup> *Pravda*, March 21, 1956.

With fishing interests bringing pressure to bear, the Japanese government proposed talks on a fishing accord. A fishing convention and an agreement on assistance to persons in distress on the high seas were signed on May 14, 1956. At these talks it was agreed that negotiations on the normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations would be resumed not later than July 31, 1956.

However, when the negotiations were resumed in Moscow on July 31, 1956 the Japanese continued to insist on the transfer to Japan of the islands of Kunashir and Iturup in addition to Habomai and Shikotan. This was unacceptable to the Soviet Union and it did not modify its stand.

Foreign Minister Shigemitsu, who led the Japanese delegation, informed his government of the state of the talks and urged their temporary suspension. Further, he recommended that Japan should sign the peace treaty on the terms offered by the Soviet Union.<sup>62</sup>

Once again US diplomacy interfered in the Soviet-Japanese talks. Dulles, who was in London at a conference on the Suez Canal, had three sessions with Shigemitsu during which he put pressure on Japan by stating that if under a peace treaty with the USSR Japan recognised the southern part of Sakhalin Island and the Kurils as Soviet possessions, the USA would perpetuate its occupation of Okinawa (of the Ryukyu group) and Bonin islands. At his third meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister Dulles demanded that he abandon all effort to settle the territorial issue with the Soviet Union.<sup>63</sup>

This American interference was deplored in Japan. Japanese public opinion demanded direct Japanese-Soviet talks and that the Japanese government ascertain whether it was possible to normalise relations between the two countries without a peace treaty. A Japanese government delegation led by Ichiro Hatoyama went to Moscow in October 1956.

A frank exchange of views in the Soviet capital between statesmen of the two countries facilitated the success of the talks. A joint Soviet-Japanese Declaration was signed on October 19, 1956.

This Declaration proclaimed an end to the state of war and the restoration of diplomatic and consular relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union pledged to support Japan's application for membership of the United Nations, release and repatriate all Japanese citizens sentenced in the Soviet Union, and waive its reparation claims on Japan. Meeting the wishes and interests of Japan, the USSR agreed to transfer the islands of Habomai and Shikotan on the understanding that the transfer would be

<sup>62</sup> *Mainichi*, March 9, 1956.

<sup>63</sup> *Japan. Questions of History*, Moscow, 1959, pp. 261-91 (in Russian).

effected when a peace treaty was signed.<sup>64</sup>

In agreeing to normalise relations with a vanquished World War II enemy, the Soviet Union did not demand any advantages or concessions, and did not try to impose any obligations on Japan as was done in, for instance, the Japanese-US agreements (the Security Pact and the Mutual Security Agreement).

The joint Japanese-Soviet Declaration laid the foundations for goodneighbourly relations between the Soviet Union and Japan.

### **Further Strengthening of Fraternal Friendship Between the USSR and the Other Socialist Countries**

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government were untiring in their concern to expand and strengthen friendly relations with the People's Democracies. Their guidance was Lenin's precept that it was vital to give "exclusive attention to the interests of various nations",<sup>65</sup> respect national sovereignty, and take the specific features of every nation into account.

The most significant step in this direction was the signing of the Warsaw Treaty.

Also, mention must be made of the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with Yugoslavia. The complications which arose in 1948-1949 in the relations between two socialist states—the USSR and Yugoslavia—were injurious to the peoples of these states and benefited nobody except the imperialists. In 1953 the Soviet government proposed an exchange of ambassadors. This proposal was readily accepted by the government of Yugoslavia. In October 1954 the Soviet government informed the Yugoslav ambassador that in order to improve relations and strengthen friendly ties between the peoples of the two countries steps had been taken to ensure proper press and radio coverage of matters relating to Yugoslavia.<sup>66</sup> Soon afterwards

<sup>64</sup> *Pravda*, October 20, 1956. In January 1960 Japan and the USA signed a new accord, the treaty on mutual cooperation and security directed against the USSR and the People's Republic of China. The Soviet Union could not allow a situation where the transfer of the Soviet islands of Habomai and Shikotan to Japan would enlarge the territory used by US troops. Consequently, it declared that these islands would be transferred to Japan only on condition that all foreign troops were withdrawn from Japanese territories and a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty was signed (*Pravda*, January 29, 1960).

<sup>65</sup> V. I. Lenin, Interview Given to Michael Farbman, *Observer and Manchester Guardian* Correspondent, *Collected Works*, Vol. 33, p. 386.

<sup>66</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk on October 21, 1954 by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR with the Yugoslav Ambassador Vidić.

an understanding was reached on a visit to Yugoslavia by a Soviet government delegation. The visit took place in May 1955. These moves led to a normalisation of Soviet-Yugoslav state relations. The Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration, signed on June 2, 1955, noted that there was an identity of views on some basic issues of international developments and charted a programme of economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation between the two countries.<sup>67</sup>

The further development of relations between socialist countries followed the line of expanding economic and political links and of joint international actions to safeguard peace and security.

This strengthening of relations between socialist states was expressed in the bilateral talks and the signing of agreements by the USSR with the People's Republic of China, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, and other socialist countries. On October 11, 1954, following talks between the USSR and the PRC on expanding and deepening Soviet-Chinese cooperation, a joint Declaration was published, which noted that there was a "complete identity of views relative to the growing all-round cooperation between the two countries and on international issues".<sup>68</sup> It was stated that the two governments would consult each other whenever questions arose affecting the common interests of the USSR and the PRC with the purpose of coordinating their efforts to ensure their own security and maintain peace in the Far East and the world as a whole.

Agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the jointly used naval base of Port Arthur and that that base with all its installations would be entirely at the disposal of the PRC.<sup>69</sup> It will be recalled that as a possession of the Soviet Union the Port Arthur base extended significant assistance to the Chinese People's Liberation Army against the Chiang Kaishek forces.

The Soviet government accorded considerable attention to assistance and support for the German Democratic Republic and to the promotion of relations with it. The most important step in this direction following the Soviet government statement of March 25, 1954, which accorded the GDR full sovereignty, was the conclusion of the USSR-GDR Treaty on Relations.<sup>70</sup> This treaty reaffirmed that the relations between the USSR and the GDR were based on complete equality and respect for sovereignty, and provided for mutual consultations on major international problems.

The January 1956 meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, set up in compliance with the Warsaw Treaty, showed that there

<sup>67</sup> *Pravda*, June 3, 1955.

<sup>68</sup> *Pravda*, October 12, 1954.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>70</sup> *Relations between the USSR and the GDR. 1949-1955*, pp. 377-378, 647-652.

was complete unanimity among the organisation's members in their assessment of the international situation and on the measures that had to be taken to consolidate peace and security. The Declaration adopted by the Committee noted that a system of collective security had to be created in Europe and expressed its signatories' readiness, jointly with other interested states, to consider any proposals aimed at achieving that objective.<sup>71</sup>

The Soviet Union continued rendering all possible assistance to promote the economies of all socialist countries. It helped to end the economic backwardness inherited by many of them from capitalism.<sup>72</sup> It extended substantial aid to the PRC, which in 1956, after having successfully restored its war-torn economy, launched its first five-year plan of economic development. In 1954, in addition to the first loan to the PRC in 1950, it gave that country a long-term credit amounting to 520 million rubles. Supplies of Soviet industrial plant and of primary and other materials under a trade-and-credit agreement contributed greatly to China's socialist industrialisation.

In 1953 the Soviet Union agreed to extend China economic and technical assistance in building or reconstructing 141 large industrial enterprises. In October 1954 it agreed to help China build an additional 15 industrial projects. An agreement was signed on scientific and technical cooperation through exchanges of expertise in all branches of the national economy.<sup>73</sup> Only under these agreements the equipment supplied by the USSR was worth nearly 5,600 million rubles. China's leaders spoke highly of this assistance. A telegram from Mao Tse-tung on September 15, 1953 said: "The Central People's Government unanimously considers that as a result of the consent of the government of the great Soviet Union to extend systematic economic and technical assistance to China in the building or reconstruction of 91 new enterprises and 50 projects now under construction or reconstruction, the Chinese people can, by closely studying the advanced experience and latest technical achievements of the Soviet Union, gradually build their own large heavy industry. This would be of extraordinarily great importance for China's industrialisation, for its gradual transition to socialism, and also for strengthening the camp of peace and democracy headed by the Soviet Union."<sup>74</sup>

Economic cooperation between the two countries was given a further boost by agreements signed on April 7, 1956, under which

<sup>71</sup> *Izvestia*, January 29, 1956.

<sup>72</sup> The proportion of industrial output in the GNP was 10 per cent in China (1937), 25 per cent in Bulgaria (1939), only 1.5 per cent in North Vietnam (1955), roughly 40 per cent in Romania (1937), and so on. Due to hostilities and the Second World War the proportion of the industrial output diminished still further.

<sup>73</sup> *Izvestia*, October 12, 1954.

<sup>74</sup> *Pravda*, September 17, 1953.



the Soviet Union pledged to help build 55 industrial projects over and above the 156 projects, whose construction had been started in accordance with the agreements signed in 1953 and 1954. The plant and technical assistance covered by the 1956 agreements were worth about 2,500 million rubles.<sup>75</sup>

The fact that the Soviet Union did everything to promote China's industry was acknowledged by that nation's leaders. For instance, at the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in September 1956 Zhou Enlai said: "In the fulfilment of our first five-year plan the great Soviet Union and the People's Democracies extended enormous assistance. During that period the Soviet Union gave us easy-term credits, helped to blueprint 205 industrial projects, supplied most of the plant for them, sent us many highly-trained experts, and extended substantial technical assistance in other fields.... The experts from the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies working in our country have contributed tremendously to our socialist construction. We should like to use this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies for this heartfelt, fraternal assistance."<sup>76</sup>

Most of the Chinese Communists and working people regarded Soviet support and help as the foundation for their nation's socialist reorganisation.

Similar agreements on economic assistance were signed by the Soviet Union with other socialist countries. In early 1956, under these agreements, the Soviet Union began helping the "People's Democracies to build 391 industrial projects and over 90 individual factory workshops and installations". Moreover, it granted them "long-term credits amounting to 21,000 million rubles on the easiest possible terms".<sup>77</sup>

Note must be made of Soviet assistance to the People's Democratic Republic of Korea in rehabilitating its economy, which was devastated during the US intervention. After the armistice was signed in Korea in 1953 the Soviet Union declared it would present the Korean people with 1,000 million rubles for their rehabilitation requirements. In September 1953 an understanding was reached that these funds would be used to restore the huge Suphun hydropower station on the Yalu (Amnok) River, and, among other projects, to restore or build metallurgical, chemical, and cement factories. Other socialist countries also extended considerable gratuitous assistance to the PDRK for the rehabilitation of its economy. All this assistance enabled the Korean people to restore industry and agriculture within a relatively short

<sup>75</sup> *Izvestia*, April 7, 1956.

<sup>76</sup> *Materials of the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China*, Moscow, 1956, p. 51 (Russian translation).

<sup>77</sup> *20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Verbatim Report, Vol. I, Moscow, 1956, p. 13 (in Russian).

period and surpass the prewar level as early as 1955.

Substantial Soviet assistance was rendered to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In 1955, for example, the DRV received 400 million rubles gratuitously from the Soviet Union for relief to the population and the restoration of the war-ravaged economy.

Economic links with the USSR play an important part in the development of the Mongolian People's Republic. This was noted by Yumjagiyn Tsedenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party: "With growing fraternal assistance from the Soviet Union our country has built up new branches of industry and agriculture."<sup>78</sup>

Economic cooperation has allowed the socialist countries to specialise and cooperate production, which offers the possibility for making the optimal use of production and primary material resources and combining the interests of each country with that of the socialist community as a whole.

### **Soviet Support for Peoples Fighting to Win and Consolidate Independence**

By the mid-1950s many countries in Asia and Africa had shaken off the colonial yoke and become independent. Syria, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Indonesia, which achieved state independence during the first few years after World War II, were followed by Egypt (1952), Sudan (January 1, 1956), Morocco (March 2, 1956), Tunisia (March 20, 1956), and some other nations. The peoples who won independence had to safeguard it not only against the old colonialists—Britain and France—but also, and mainly, from the USA, which after the war had become the mainstay of colonialism and neocolonialism, and the most dangerous enemy of independence.

In their struggle against the colonialists, the peoples of colonial and liberated countries have always received, and are still receiving, powerful support from the Soviet Union. The USSR has given them massive economic assistance, which helped them to safeguard their economic independence. In 1955, for instance, the USSR and India signed an agreement on Soviet assistance for the building of the large Bhilai iron-and-steel plant (its initial projected annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel was subsequently increased). In the same period the Soviet Union signed important agreements on trade and economic cooperation with Burma, Egypt, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Argentina, Uruguay, and other countries. A hallmark of Soviet assistance is that unlike the imperialist states the USSR extends aid

<sup>78</sup> Yumjagiyn Tsedenbal, *Selected Articles and Speeches*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1962, p. 313 (Russian translation).

without political strings affecting the independence of the recipient nations.

Soviet assistance to the new states was not confined to the economic field. The Soviet Union welcomed and supported the convocation of the 1955 Bandung Conference and its decisions, which were permeated with a spirit of struggle against colonialism and called for comprehensive economic and cultural cooperation among Asian and African countries on the basis of the ten principles of peaceful coexistence proclaimed by the conference.

Closer relations with Eastern countries were fostered by the visits of Soviet leaders to India, Burma, and Afghanistan at the close of 1955. The joint bilateral declarations signed during these visits reaffirmed that there was an identity of views between the Soviet Union and India, Burma, and Afghanistan on many crucial international issues. The USSR backed the Indian people's demand for the abolition of Portuguese colonial rule in Goa, Diu, and Daman and the reunification of these territories with India. The Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with Indonesia, Cambodia, and Laos, and signed agreements on trade and on economic and cultural cooperation with many Asian nations.

It took steps to improve relations with Turkey and Iran, its southern neighbours. On May 30, 1953 the Turkish Ambassador in the USSR was informed that the Soviet Union would assure its security from the direction of the Straits on terms equally acceptable to it and Turkey and that it had no territorial claims on Turkey.<sup>79</sup> This statement opened the way to a gradual improvement of Soviet-Turkish relations.

Further, the USSR took the initiative to improve its relations with Iran. A result of these steps, an agreement was signed in Tehran on December 2, 1954 on the settlement of frontier and financial issues between the two countries. This was of great political significance for the further development of relations between them. Iranian spokesmen characterised the Soviet Union's Leninist policy towards Iran as a policy of equitable rights and justice.<sup>80</sup>

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The efforts made by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government in 1951-1956 to relax international tension yielded tangible results despite opposition from the USA and other Western

<sup>79</sup> *Pravda*, July 19, 1953. In December 1945 the Soviet press published a letter signed by two Georgian scientists, who wrote that some Turkish border regions that had gone to Turkey under the 1921 treaty should be returned to Georgia. Western propaganda made wide use of this pronouncement to whip up Turkish hostility for the USSR.

<sup>80</sup> *Pravda*, July 11, 1956.

powers. The war in Korea had threatened to erupt into a world conflict, and the Soviet Union played an immense part and, in some cases, the decisive role in limiting the sphere of US aggression and then in getting armistice negotiations under way. It helped to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. The 1954 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference, which put an end to France's military operations in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos and consolidated the international standing of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam, was convened on Soviet initiative. This conference did much to ease international tension. Despite US ploys designed to prevent Japan from pursuing an independent foreign policy, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a Declaration in October 1956 restoring diplomatic relations between them. This Declaration laid the foundation for Soviet-Japanese goodneighbourly relations and the promotion of their mutual economic and political links.

As part of its unswerving policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union displayed important initiatives aimed at settling the outstanding problems left in Europe after the Second World War. Western leaders had to agree to resume talks with the USSR on pressing international issues: Germany, European security, and the expansion of East-West contacts, disarmament, to mention a few. Although these talks (1954 Berlin Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France; 1955 Geneva four-power summit, and others) did not produce agreements, they nevertheless led to some improvement of the international situation and lessened tension.

Soviet initiative made it possible to sign the State Treaty re-establishing Austria as an independent and democratic nation. This treaty guaranteed Austria's permanent neutrality, and added it to the list of those not committed to military blocs and reduced the number of unsettled postwar problems.

The Soviet initiative in disarmament likewise helped to improve the international climate. The USSR's peaceableness and its striving to strengthen friendly, goodneighbourly relations were seen in moves such as the return of the Port Arthur naval base to China and of the Porkkala Udd base to Finland.

Soviet efforts to defuse international tension and avert another world war had the close cooperation of the other socialist countries, and they helped to strengthen economic and political links and perfect socialist international relations. The Soviet government gave its utmost support for the struggle of the peoples of colonial and liberated countries against the colonialists and their allies.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU, held in February 1956, amplified and specified the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, stressing that with the world divided into two social systems these were the only

proper and reasonable principles.

The new balance of strength in the world brought the congress round to the conclusion that it was feasible to prevent another world war.

"As long as capitalism survives in the world," a Congress resolution said, "the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies ... may try to unleash war. But war is not fatalistically inevitable. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and, if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans."<sup>81</sup>

The Congress approved the foreign policy of peace pursued by the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet government, noting that together with other socialist countries the Soviet Union "took a number of timely and important foreign policy measures aimed at reinforcing peace and security",<sup>82</sup> measures that were wholeheartedly supported by all the peace-loving forces.

The Soviet Union's vigorous steps led to some improvement of the international atmosphere. But the aggressive imperialist forces continued their intrigues. In mid-1956 these intrigues brought about a new and sharp aggravation of the international climate and heightened the danger of war.

<sup>81</sup> *Resolutions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1956, p. 11 (in Russian).

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 6.

## CHAPTER XXIV

### THE SOVIET UNION AND THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM AFTER THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THERMONUCLEAR BOMB (1953-1958)

In 1953-1958 the new steps initiated by the Soviet Union to ease international tension covered the disarmament field as well. The Western rejection of the Soviet proposals for banning nuclear weapons and for a reduction of conventional armaments had deadlocked the disarmament talks.<sup>1</sup> A new approach had to be developed to the solution of the disarmament problem.

The termination of the hostilities in Korea and Vietnam, the conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria, and other moves that had helped to achieve a certain relaxation of world tension, made this task somewhat easier. In its policy of peace in the sphere of disarmament the Soviet Union made the most of the tilt of the world balance of strength in favour of the socialist community that took place during the 1950s. The impressive headway it had made in science and technology had moved it into first place in the world in many fields and branches of civilian and military production, particularly in rocketry.

During these years important discoveries were made in the USSR in the utilisation of nuclear energy. The Soviet government's announcement of August 20, 1953 that a hydrogen bomb had been tested in the USSR apprised the world of exceedingly important discoveries linked to the synthesis of the atomic nucleus. Hydrogen bombs had been tested in the USA as well. A new stage commenced in the development of armaments: a thermonuclear weapon with an explosive power exceeding that of the atom bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki hundreds and thousands of times had been added to national armouries. While the atom bomb dropped on Hiroshima comprised 20 kilotons, or 20,000 conventional tons of TNT, the explosive power of the hydrogen bomb was in the range of tens of megatons, or tens of millions of tons of TNT.

The new discoveries in nuclear energy and technology made the solution of the problem of disarmament more vital than ever. War with the use of the hydrogen bomb would have spelled out the death of many tens and, perhaps, hundreds of millions of people, the annihilation of entire nations. In this situation new energetic efforts had to be made to achieve an international agreement on disarmament.

<sup>1</sup> See Chapter XVIII.

Aware of the serious consequences of the arms race, in view of the invention of the thermonuclear weapon, the Soviet Union made every effort to halt this dangerous course of events. Following the discovery of ways of using thermonuclear energy for military purposes and after some important steps had been taken to settle outstanding international problems that were complicating the world situation, the Soviet Union made attempts to break the deadlock in the disarmament talks.

The US government tried to divert public attention from measures that could lead to disarmament. In a speech to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953, later published under the heading "Atoms for Peace", President Eisenhower suggested setting up an "international" bank of fissionable materials under UN auspices and consisting of "small" contributions from nations producing nuclear materials. The materials in this bank, the US President said, would be used exclusively for peaceful purposes: they would be turned into atomic energy for agriculture, medicine, and other peaceful activities.<sup>2</sup> The formation of this bank, he asserted, would reduce the destructive potential of the world's stockpiles of atomic energy.<sup>3</sup>

The USA, which in those years could command a plurality in the UN, put forward the proposal for setting up a fissionable materials bank in the expectation that this would be virtually at its disposal. This American proposal completely ignored the question of disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It did not offer—that was not even its purpose—a solution to the disarmament problem and the elimination of the threat of nuclear war. The contribution of "small" quantities of fissionable materials to an international agency would not have prevented the bulk of such materials to continue to be channelled into the production of nuclear weapons or the further sophistication and stockpiling of nuclear bombs. Eisenhower's "new approach" to the problem of nuclear weapons was no more than an attempt to ascertain the level of nuclear production in other countries and acquire new levers for pressuring these countries by means of an outwardly "international" but actually US nuclear materials authority.

The US proposals were analysed in detail in the statement of the Soviet government of December 22, 1953, which said that the USSR would continue to seek "recognition of the need for banning atomic weapons along with the setting up of international controls to supervise the observance of the ban and renunciation of use of these weapons"<sup>4</sup>.

The USA's reluctance to come to an agreement on disarmament

<sup>2</sup> *UN Documents. Official Reports of the 8th UN General Assembly*, p. 472 (in Russian).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> *Izvestia*, December 22, 1953.

was seen also when the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission was formed in 1954. It made sure that the subcommittee was composed mainly of NATO members. The final composition was the USA, Britain, France, and Canada from the West, and the Soviet Union from the socialist community. The Soviet government suggested including China, India, and Czechoslovakia. But the Western powers turned a deaf ear, causing the subcommittee to be so composed as to evoke worldwide dissatisfaction. This adversely affected its work.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the USA's negative stand on disarmament, the Soviet Union continued to press for a solution of this sensitive issue. It looked for ways of putting an end to the arms race, which was increasingly threatening the existence of entire nations. Alongside measures of a general political character aimed at improving the international situation, the Soviet government drafted and submitted extremely important proposals to the UN Disarmament Commission on May 10, 1955 on the questions of cutting back armaments, banning nuclear weapons, and eliminating the threat of another war. The special significance of these proposals was, first, that they linked the problem of disarmament to the settlement of other international issues that would ensure an improvement of the international atmosphere, second, that they met the wishes of the Western powers on many points and, third, that they indicated new ways of resolving the problem of verification.<sup>6</sup>

For a number of years after the Second World War, since the commencement of the talks of disarmament and up to 1952-1954, the USA and its Western allies had made essentially no move to resolve the disarmament problem. They confined themselves to proposals for armaments control and for the collection of information on them. The situation underwent some change when the USA lost its atomic monopoly: the USA, Britain, and France came forward with some proposals enunciated in the Anglo-French memorandum of July 11, 1954. Much of this document and also some other wishes of the Western powers were taken into account in the new Soviet proposals. The Western powers linked disarmament measures to the settlement of other international problems. This was mirrored in the new Soviet proposals. They envisaged the settlement of a large spectrum of general political international issues: termination of propaganda for another war and the kindling of hostility between nations; withdrawal of occupation troops from Germany; dismantling of military bases on foreign territory; broad dissemination of scientific and technological expertise in the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful

<sup>5</sup> *Izvestia*, February 19, 1955.

<sup>6</sup> See *Fifty Years of Struggle by the USSR for Disarmament*. Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1967, pp. 287-298.



purposes; settlement of outstanding problems in the Far East; an end to discrimination in interstate economic relations; expansion of international contacts and links in various fields, and so forth.

The settlement of these questions would have built up international confidence and thereby made it easier to achieve disarmament.

The Soviet Union presented its disarmament programme with the view to creating an international climate facilitating agreement on this important problem. In view of the fact that the Indochinese, Austrian and Korean questions had been settled shortly before the Soviet proposals were made it seemed that the outlook for disarmament talks was more propitious than in previous years.

On the substance of the disarmament problem, the Western powers were opposed to the Soviet proposal for reducing the armaments and armed forces of the five great powers by one-third with the argument that such a reduction would not guarantee the security of the West. They insisted on a reduction not of any proportion of existing armed forces but on bringing them down to a definite numerical level, declaring that Soviet acceptance of the "levels" principle would help to achieve agreement on other questions of disarmament. On May 28, 1952, they presented proposals that stated: "All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or lesser degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces."<sup>7</sup>

In its proposals of May 10, 1955 the Soviet Union met the Western requirements in this question as well, suggesting a cutback of the armed forces of the USA, the USSR, and China to the level of 1,000,000-1,500,000 effectives each, and of Britain and France to 650,000 effectives each. These levels had been named by the Western powers themselves.

This inclusion in the Soviet programme for disarmament of the ceilings proposed for the USSR and the USA by the Western powers cut the ground from under the Western propaganda allegations that the USSR was ignoring the problem of an equilibrium between armed forces. It also debunked the favourite Western argument against a nuclear arms ban, namely, that nuclear weapons "balanced out" their "disadvantage" in conventional weaponry and were a means of maintaining a worldwide armaments balance.

The Soviet Union accepted the Western stand on other issues affecting disarmament. For example, in their proposals of May 28, 1952 the Western powers had linked the fulfilment of the programme for a reduction of conventional armaments to a ban on nuclear weapons. They wanted a phased prohibition of these weapons directly linked to the implementation of the conventional armaments reduction

<sup>7</sup> *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. I, Washington, 1960, p. 369; *Fifty Years of Struggle by the USSR for Disarmament*. Collection of Documents, pp. 251-254.

programme. To assure success at the disarmament talks, a similar procedure for banning nuclear weapons was envisioned in the Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955.

The Western stand was taken into account also in the question of verifying disarmament worked out by the Soviet Union. For instance, the Western spokesmen had insisted on permanent verification with international inspection vested with the right of "unrestricted access to all installations and means, since this is required for the effective discharge of their duties and functions". The Soviet proposals of May 10 provided for permanent verification in the volume required to ensure fulfilment of disarmament agreements and for inspectors to have unrestricted access at any time to all verifiable installations. Provision was made for the gradual extension of the rights and functions of inspection in proportion to the fulfilment of the disarmament programme. As a new form of inspection to guard against surprise attack, the Soviet proposals called for the establishment of a warning system consisting of control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways, and at aerodromes. This system would have guaranteed security in the event the agreement was unfulfilled and prevented the control mechanism from being used for espionage and unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of nations.

While the Soviet proposals of May 10 provided for a substantial reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, prohibition of nuclear weapons and establishment of effective control of the above disarmament measures, they also listed among the top priorities the goal of ending nuclear weapons tests by states in possession of such weapons, dismantling all bases in foreign territory and stopping war propaganda.<sup>8</sup>

The Soviet proposals of May 10, 1955 were an all-embracing, realistic approach to the disarmament problem and differed significantly from all the disarmament proposals put forward earlier. The new Soviet proposals opened the door wide to settling the disarmament problem, for they marked Soviet acquiescence to the Western proposals on basic issues: ceilings for armed forces and armaments, procedure for banning nuclear weapons, and the rights and powers of international inspection.

These proposals made a deep impression throughout the world, and created a favourable climate for disarmament talks. Senior statesmen in many countries spoke highly of them. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, declared: "I believe the latest Soviet proposals on disarmament will lead to progress towards the settlement of this difficult problem."<sup>9</sup> Their great positive significance was

<sup>8</sup> *Fifty Years of Struggle by the USSR for Disarmament*. Collection of Documents, pp. 291-93.

<sup>9</sup> *Izvestia*, June 22, 1955.

acknowledged even in the Western countries. Philip Noel-Baker, a leading disarmament expert and statesman, noted that they marked a turning point in the history of postwar disarmament negotiations.<sup>10</sup> On May 12, 1955, Anthony Nutting, Minister of State and the British representative on the Sub-Committee of the UN Disarmament Commission, said that the Soviet proposals of May 10 were a step towards agreement on crucial provisions of a disarmament treaty.<sup>11</sup> Jules Moch, the French representative on the Sub-Committee, commented favourably. After consultations with his government, James J. Wadsworth, the US delegate, likewise expressed satisfaction.<sup>12</sup>

The Western powers' positive evaluation of the Soviet proposals reaffirmed that it was possible to achieve rapid progress in the talks on this problem, which were being conducted at the time in the UN Sub-Committee in London. However, no progress was made. The talks were suspended by the Western powers, and when they were resumed after an unjustifiably long interval the USA and the other Western powers went back on their own proposals for armed forces ceilings, and for the procedure and conditions for banning nuclear weapons, on which they had been insisting until then. This was eloquent confirmation of the fact that their disarmament proposals had been propaganda moves, that it was farthest from their minds to seek agreement on this problem. There could have been no more explicit indication of their reluctance to disarm.

When disarmament issues were considered at the four-power Geneva summit, significant Soviet proposals were left unanswered by the Western representatives despite their having been submitted to the summit. More, the documents on disarmament presented to the summit by the Western powers contained no mention of the need for reducing armaments and banning nuclear weapons. Their proposals on this question dealt entirely with verification and inspection of existing armaments and armed forces. For instance, as we have already noted, the US President Eisenhower suggested a mutual exchange of information between the USSR and the USA on their armaments and also unhindered aerial photography of the territory of the two countries. He proposed measures by which the two countries would give each other an overall picture of all their military installations throughout their territory, a list and the plan of these installations and the possibility of taking photographs from the air.<sup>13</sup> Far from resolving the

<sup>10</sup> Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race. A Programme for World Disarmament*, London, 1958, pp. 20-21.

<sup>11</sup> UN Disarmament Commission, *Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission. Verbatim Report of the 48th Meeting, DC/SC. 1/PV.48*, May 12, 1955, p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 23.

<sup>13</sup> UN document CF/Doc/16 of July 22, 1955.

disarmament problem, this proposal did not even concern them. All it had in mind was espionage, the collection of information of defence systems, and in this respect it was of immense interest to those who were contemplating war and working on military plans. Overflights by aircraft fitted with cameras would thus be nothing more than a means for obtaining military intelligence about the Soviet Union's defences and could only increase international tension.

At Geneva the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden suggested, as a means of building up confidence, establishing a system of joint inspection of the armed forces then confronting each other in Europe. This plan, his memorandum said, would in fact make it possible to test limited international inspections of existing armed forces.<sup>14</sup>

The US and British proposals did not go beyond inspection of existing armaments and made no provision of disarmament as such. The French proposal concerned only a reduction of military expenditures, with the nations bearing these expenditures deciding for themselves what cuts to make. Thus, all the three Western participants in the summit declined to consider the disarmament problem.

In the UN Sub-Committee, too, when disarmament talks were resumed in August 1955, the Western powers offered nothing interpretable as a proposal for an armaments reduction. They concerned themselves solely with inspection of existing armaments and obtaining intelligence on defence systems. The US representatives presented a detailed plan for implementing Eisenhower's suggestion on an exchange of military information and on aerial photography. The British submitted a memorandum on methods, objectives, and rights of verification and inspection bodies. The French wanted an agreement on financial control, and elucidation of the functions and powers of inspection of the international disarmament agency. In addition to making no proposals for disarmament as such, the Western powers formally retrenched on their own proposals for armed forces ceilings. The US delegate stated on September 6 that the United States now placed a reservation upon its proposals for armaments ceilings submitted prior to the Geneva summit to the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission, or the United Nations.<sup>15</sup>

World democratic opinion, including public opinion in the capitalist countries, was outraged by this obstructionist stand of the USA and its allies, who renounced the proposals they had been so persistently insisting on. In this situation the Western powers found they had to "explain" their clearly inconsistent attitude. This "explanation" was given by Harold Stassen, the US representative on the Disarmament Sub-Committee. "It is our view," he said, "that if an

<sup>14</sup> UN Document CF/Doc/14 of July 21, 1955.

<sup>15</sup> *UN Disarmament Commission. Official Records, 48th Meeting: 23 November 1955*, New York, p. 6.

effort is made to reduce armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures to a level that is too low, to a level that reflects weakness, it would not be conducive to stability in the world, and to the best interests of peace.... It is our view that if armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures are brought down to too low a level, then ... instead of the prospects of peace being improved, the danger of war is increased."<sup>16</sup>

Dulles, too, "explained" the US position on disarmament, declaring: "Past efforts have usually proceeded from the assumption that it is possible to establish and maintain certain defined levels of military strength and to equate these dependably as between the nations. Actually, military potentials are so imponderable that this always has been and always will be a futile pursuit."<sup>17</sup>

Statements of this kind by senior US officials, expressing their negative attitude to disarmament, reaffirmed their refusal to join in a quest for a settlement of this problem, of their refusal to reduce armaments and armed forces. This meant a renunciation of disarmament. These statements revealed that all previous Western declarations on these questions were solely propaganda aimed at covering up their refusal to decide the disarmament problem, their refusal to disarm.

This attitude led the disarmament talks into an impasse and for some time destroyed all chances of settling the problem. US policy, shared by its Western partners, foredoomed the Soviet Union's efforts to reach agreement on disarmament. The long talks that had been held on this question ever since the end of the war showed that any approach of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to disarmament was inevitably rejected by the Western powers on one pretext or another.

Despite resistance from the Western powers to a disarmament agreement, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries pressed forward with the objective of getting such an agreement and easing international tension. The contingent of Soviet troops withdrawn from Austria was demobilised. In the same year, 1955, the USSR unilaterally reduced the numerical strength of its Armed Forces by 640,000 effectives. Then, acting on a recommendation of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee, other socialist countries—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania—likewise cut back their armed forces. All these nations thereby demonstrated their readiness to bring the arms race to an end and create a better international situation. Soviet scientists took an active part in the Geneva Conference on the peaceful uses of atomic energy

<sup>16</sup> Philip Noel-Baker, *The Arms Race, A Programme for World Disarmament*, p. 29.

<sup>17</sup> *Foreign Affairs*. An American Quarterly Review, Vol. 36, No. 1, October 1957, p. 34.

convened in the autumn of 1955. They presented a series of important papers on the Soviet Union's scientific and technological achievements in this field. Notwithstanding the negative Western stand, the Soviet Union continued its quest for ways of reaching agreement on disarmament.

By contrast, the Western powers contended that nuclear weapons were maintaining a "balance" in armaments, that they were "shielding peace", and were set against banning them. They put the main accent on a reduction of conventional weapons on the specious grounds that there were no technical possibilities for verifying reserves of nuclear materials. "It is not practicable to assure the abolition of nuclear weapons," John Foster Dulles said. "...Therefore we must make our plans on the assumption that the nations which now have nuclear weapons would use them in war."<sup>18</sup> He was echoed by the US Ambassador to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, who declared that the US would make no commitment prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. At the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva in the autumn of 1955 the British representative suggested beginning disarmament with a reduction of conventional armaments, without touching atomic weapons.

In view of this Western position and desiring to achieve some tangible progress towards disarmament, the Soviet Union put forward, on March 27, 1956, a programme of initial disarmament measures providing for a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the ceilings earlier proposed by the Western powers.<sup>19</sup> Further, it also proposed the relevant control measures guaranteeing that the signatories of the suggested treaty would not violate their obligations. One of these measures was that aerial photography, on which the USA and its Western partners had insisted, would be permitted at a specified stage of disarmament.

At the same time the Soviet Union came up with the proposal to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons by creating in Central Europe a zone in which "the stationing of atomic military formations and the location of atomic and hydrogen weapons of any kind" would be prohibited.<sup>20</sup> This proposal was aimed at preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Moreover, the Soviet Union proposed again that irrespective of whether or not agreement is reached on other disarmament problems, the states should agree "to discontinue forthwith tests of thermonuclear weapons."<sup>21</sup>

Although this was a new step meeting the stand of the Western

<sup>18</sup> Philip Noel-Baker, *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

<sup>19</sup> *UN Disarmament Commission. Official Record, Supplement for January to December 1956*, New York.

<sup>20</sup> *UN Document DS/SC. 1/41* of March 27, 1956.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

powers, the latter declined to accept it even as a basis for negotiations, giving various pretexts. For their part, they suggested on April 3, 1956, a programme accentuating not disarmament but a "regulation" of armament. This programme set high ceilings for the armed forces: the USSR and the USA would have 2,500,000 effectives each (instead of the 1,000,000-1,500,000 suggested by the USSR), and Britain and France would have 750,000 effectives each. While making no provision for disarmament, the programme called for wide inspection—read: intelligence—including the commitment of each state to provide the inspection agency with a "blueprint" of its military establishments consisting of the identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of personnel units and equipment of all major land, sea, and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of conventional military plant facilities and installations with their locations; and the relevant budgetary and appropriation documents".<sup>22</sup> The sole provision for nuclear weapons was the transfer "from past production" of fissionable materials to peaceful uses and a limit on the testing of nuclear weapons.

In effect, this programme said nothing about disarmament. It was designed solely as a programme for organising inspection of existing armaments that would reveal the Soviet Union's entire system of defence. It thus boiled down to the gathering of intelligence. The proposed ceiling of 2,500,000 effectives for the US Armed Forces did not imply any reduction, for at the time their strength did not exceed that ceiling. The suggestion that some fissionable materials be placed under "international" inspection likewise had no essential significance for lessening the threat of a nuclear war. There already were large stockpiles of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Under these conditions the suggestion of inspection over some quantity of fissionable materials had only one purpose: to obtain information of the quality of fissionable materials available to the Soviet Union and use the materials turned over to an "international" agency for political purposes. In respect of nuclear tests the Western Powers confined their proposals to limiting and controlling them. That was in fact a negative attitude to the problem. The suggestion of a limit on the testing of nuclear weapons did not settle the problem of banning such weapons and preventing the contamination of the atmosphere. Its only objective was to obtain information on the nuclear devices in the possession of the other countries.

The Soviet proposal for creating a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe did not meet with a positive response from the Western powers either.

By offering no programme that could serve as the basis for disar-

<sup>22</sup> *UN Document DC/SC. 1/42* of April 3, 1956.

mament talks and by refusing to consider the Soviet proposals on this question, the Western powers doomed all further disarmament negotiations to failure. These negotiations remained in a vicious circle. No sooner would the Soviet Union accept specific Western proposals or agree with the Western approach to a settlement of disarmament problems, than the Western powers would revoke the very proposals to which they had earlier attached the utmost significance.

Nonetheless, at the UN Disarmament Sub-Committee sittings in the spring and summer of 1957 in London, the Soviet Union presented a new disarmament programme based in part on Western suggestions, specifically, a reduction of the armed forces of the USSR, the USA, and China to 2,500,000 effectives each and of Britain and France to 750,000 effectives each at the first stage of disarmament: but to this was added the stipulation that at the second stage, as had been proposed earlier by the Western powers themselves, the cutback would be down to a ceiling of 1,000,000-1,500,000 effectives each for the USSR, USA, and China, and to 650,000 each for France and Britain.

In nuclear armaments, the powers would at the first stage renounce their use and refrain from deploying them on foreign territory, and at the second stage they would cease production of these weapons and remove them from their arsenals.

Regarding inspection and verification there would be permanent inspection and verification posts to prevent surprise attack, and "aerial photography in regions of disposition of the main NATO and Warsaw Treaty armed forces in Europe to a depth of up to 800 kilometres" from the frontiers between nations of the NATO bloc and the Warsaw Treaty.<sup>23</sup> By agreeing to aerial photography as a form of inspection, the Soviet government underscored that although this did not resolve either the problem of disarmament or the problem of verifying fulfilment of an agreement on a reduction of armaments and could only serve military intelligence, this Western demand had been included in the Soviet programme because it had been made a condition for Western agreement to disarmament.

Provision was made in the Soviet programme for inspection of guided missiles, the dismantling of military bases on foreign soil, and the creation of zones of armament limitation and inspection in Europe.

But even this did not suit the Western powers. Their spokesmen now categorically repudiated the armed forces ceilings earlier proposed by them for any of the disarmament phases. They said they would agree to talks on a reduction of armed forces below the ceiling of 2,500,000 effectives for the USA and 750,000 effectives each for Britain and France only after the armaments and armed forces main-

<sup>23</sup> *Izvestia*, March 20, 1957.



tained by nations at the time had been "verified".

The US memorandum, presented to the UN Sub-Committee, proposing a partial agreement on disarmament and stipulating a ceiling of 1,900,000 effectives each for the USSR and the USA, was declared invalid by the same delegation as soon as it was seen that some of its provisions were acceptable to the Soviet Union and could serve as a basis for an understanding on partial measures in this sphere.

In the following years the USSR and other socialist countries continued to make considerable effort to break the deadlock over disarmament. In the autumn of 1957 the government of the Polish People's Republic in consultation with the other Warsaw Treaty members proposed creating a nuclear free zone in Central Europe, including the territory of the two German states—GDR and FRG, and also Poland and Czechoslovakia. According to this proposal the states in this zone would undertake not to manufacture, acquire or deploy nuclear weapons on their territory. Four Great Powers—the USSR, USA, Great Britain and France—would in turn undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to the states in this zone, deploy them there or use them against its territory.

The Soviet Union expressed its full support for this proposal, saying that the setting up of such a zone was "in the vital interest of all European states". The USSR stated it was prepared to assume the obligations envisaged in the Polish proposal, provided the USA, Britain and France followed suit.<sup>24</sup> The governments of the CSSR and GDR also supported the Polish initiative.

However, the Western powers took a negative stand on this question. The setting up of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe ran counter to their military-strategic concepts and "from positions of strength" policy. The USA said it was not going to renounce the employment of nuclear weapons in Central Europe in a contingency. "Unless equipped with nuclear weapons," its note of May 3, 1958, addressed to the government of the PPR, said, "Western forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe."

At the same time, the USA maintained that the Polish proposal was "too limited in scope to reduce the danger of nuclear war". The governments of Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany sided with the USA and took a similar attitude towards the Polish proposal. The Western powers' response was convincing evidence of their reluctance to agree to the measures proposed by Poland for reducing the threat of nuclear war in Central Europe. At the talks on disarmament in 1957 and 1958 the Western powers were only interested in intelligence, which they sought to obtain through inspection of

<sup>24</sup> *Izvestia*, February 20, 1958.

existing armaments and defence systems. They rejected all proposals on reductions of armaments and armed forces, on banning nuclear weapons, and on partial disarmament measures.

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In the period 1953-1958 resistance by the USA and its allies prevented any headway in the overriding issue of disarmament, despite the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. However, these efforts had a positive impact on international developments, for they helped ease international tension and mobilise public opinion against the arms race, in favour of disarmament. The disarmament programmes presented by the Soviet Union, programmes in which it had taken Western proposals into account, and the broad explanation of the position of the socialist countries on questions of disarmament set up many stumbling blocks for the militarist, aggressive policy of the imperialists.

The disarmament talks made it obvious to the world that the imperialist powers were indisposed to embark upon disarmament. Underlying their negative stand on this question was the fear that a disarmament agreement would undermine their international standing founded on their "positions of strength" doctrine and shake their military blocs. Another reason for their unwillingness to disarm was that all their political calculations and military plans rested on their belief that the United States had the edge over the Soviet Union in nuclear armaments and in the means of delivering these weapons. They believed that the leverage provided by large nuclear stockpiles and a powerful force of long-range bombers using innumerable military bases on foreign territory plus the support of their military bloc allies would enable the US to dictate their will to the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. This is precisely what underlay its notorious doctrines of "positions of strength", "brinkmanship", and "nuclear diplomacy".

The Soviet Union's enormous scientific and technological progress upset these calculations. In the summer of 1957 it successfully tested intercontinental ballistic missiles. These tests showed that it could launch missiles to any point in the world with deadly accuracy. Moreover, it tested new, improved types of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. In October 1957 it launched mankind's first rocket into outer space, and this rocket placed the first-ever man-made earth satellite in orbit. This was an event of historic significance, for it opened a new chapter in the life of humanity, a chapter of space exploration. Further, it demonstrated that the Soviet Union had made outstanding advances in science and technology, particularly in the development of missiles. Prior to this event, the USA with its bases in Europe and Asia could strike at the USSR and because of its own

remoteness it was practically unreachable by Soviet aircraft, which had no bases on foreign territory. But the appearance of intercontinental missiles ended the US invulnerability, while the US bases on foreign territory became sitting ducks for Soviet missiles.

Although the new technological advances had tilted the strategic balance, the Soviet government persisted in its efforts to achieve disarmament. Its point of departure was that the new discoveries in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology would make war more devastating and that, as a consequence, it was more vital than ever to all mankind that the disarmament problem should be resolved.

## CHAPTER XXV

### THE USSR IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE IMPERIALIST INTRIGUES AGAINST HUNGARY (1956-1957)

The realistic prospect that opened up for a further consolidation of peace in the mid-1950s clashed with the interests of the ruling circles of imperialist states. With the view to safeguarding their imperialist interests, chiefly the interests of the oil monopolies in the Middle East, armed aggression was undertaken against Egypt by Britain, France, and Israel simultaneously. At the same time, international reaction, headed by the imperialist circles of the USA, provoked a counter-revolutionary rising in Hungary.

Both these acts of aggression were elements of the Western imperialist policy to perpetuate colonialism, stifle the freedom and independence of nations, undermine the unity of the socialist camp, and weaken the socialist world system.

#### **The Soviet Union Supports the Arab Peoples and Cuts Short the British, French, and Israeli Aggression Against Egypt**

When the Second World War ended the Arab peoples were determined to sustain their independence and the right to manage their natural wealth themselves.

In 1952 patriotic officers of the Egyptian army deposed the corrupt regime of King Farouk, assumed power, and proclaimed a republic. The new government, of which Gamal Abdel Nasser soon became the head, adopted an anti-imperialist course and declared that Egypt would follow the socialist road of development. The Charter of the National Action, drafted by Nasser and passed by the National Congress of the United Arab Republic on June 30, 1962, states bluntly: "The socialist solution of the problem of economic and social backwardness in Egypt by the revolutionary means was not based on a choice: it was an historic necessity, in the true sense of the word, imposed by reality, by the hopes of the masses, and by the changed situation in the world in the latter half of the twentieth century".<sup>1</sup> On the international scene Egypt proclaimed its neutral-

<sup>1</sup> *Al-Ahram*, July 1, 1962.

ity and non-participation in military blocs. It asked Britain to withdraw its troops from the Suez Canal zone. Under the new balance of strength and the impact of the further consolidation of the socialist world community as the bulwark of the independence of the Asian and African nations, the British imperialists could not afford to deny Egypt's just demand. The Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the withdrawal of British troops and the dismantling of the British military base on Egyptian territory was signed in 1954. The last British soldier left Egyptian soil on June 18, 1956, ending the 74-year British occupation of Egypt. But Britain still had enormous economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. With the imperialist world growing increasingly hostile to the Arab peoples, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries went to their assistance. Agreements on supplies of Soviet, Czechoslovak, and Polish armaments to Egypt were signed in September 1955 and became a major factor giving Egypt a stronger international position and enhancing its ability to offer resistance to the imperialists.

International reaction resented imperialism's loss of its monopoly over deliveries of weapons to the Middle East. Western imperialist circles made an attempt to prevent Egypt from shaking off this monopoly and pursuing an independent policy. George V. Allen, the US Assistant Secretary of State, was sent posthaste to Cairo with extraordinary powers up to the presentation of an ultimatum demanding Egypt's official renunciation of weapons supplies from socialist countries. The Soviet government gave Egypt the necessary support, issuing a statement declaring that "its stand is that every nation has the legitimate right to look to its defences and purchase armaments for its defensive requirements from other countries on ordinary commercial terms, and no foreign nation has the right to interfere and make any unilateral claims contrary to the rights and interests of other nations".<sup>2</sup>

Egypt's firm stand and Soviet support compelled the USA to beat a retreat. Britain, too, began to act with greater caution: it abandoned its intention of presenting an ultimatum. In a number of speeches President Nasser spoke highly of Soviet assistance and noted that for Egypt it was important to free itself from the Western monopoly of armaments sales; the Western powers were selling obsolete weapons to their former colonies which they vainly sought to keep in subjugation.

The Egyptian government launched upon the abolition of the bitter consequences of British colonial rule, economic development and efforts to raise the people's living standards. It planned the building of the Aswan High Dam in order to increase the irrigated crop area by nearly one-third and provide a large power-generating facility for industrial development. In February 1956 the International

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, October 2, 1955.

Bank for Reconstruction and Development agreed to give Egypt a loan of 200 million dollars, provided 70 million were granted in the form of "aid" by the USA and Britain. This decision of the Western powers was motivated by their striving to use aid as a means of political pressure. It was planned to make Egypt dependent again on the US and British monopolies.

The Egyptian government declined the humiliating political conditions stipulated by the Western powers. In an insulting reply, on July 17, 1956, the Western powers reversed their promise of a loan to Egypt for the Aswan High Dam project.

This posed the Egyptian government with the prospect of being unable to build a vital project. But it did not succumb to imperialist pressure. More, it took a step of exceptional significance, which dovetailed with the interests not only of Egypt, but also of all other Arab nations. On July 26, 1956 it decreed the nationalisation of the Universal Suez Canal Company, which had brought large dividends to shareholders in Britain and France.

The Western powers qualified this act as a "seizure". By thus questioning Egypt's right to nationalise the Universal Suez Canal Company, the imperialists of Britain, France, and the USA deliberately linked this act to freedom of navigation in the canal.

From the very outset there were two fundamentally different attitudes to the Suez question. The Soviet Union and the other socialist-community states, and also the majority of the Afro-Asian nations and progressive forces throughout the world sided unequivocally with Egypt, supporting its lawful actions. The Soviet government publicly stated that it "considers the decision of the government of Egypt to nationalise the Suez Canal as a fully lawful act stemming from Egypt's sovereign rights".<sup>3</sup>

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal did not affect the interests of the peoples of Britain, France, the USA, or any other country. "The attempts to impose the domination of foreign capital on Egypt ... clearly smacks of colonialism," the statement declared.<sup>4</sup>

In the Suez question the imperialist states—Britain, France, and the USA—pursued a policy of infringing on the national sovereignty of the Egyptian republic and the interests of the Egyptian people. These powers had recourse to economic pressure on Egypt. Britain and France froze Egypt's sterling accounts and sequestered the Universal Suez Canal Company's assets. Similar measures were taken by the USA. Further, Britain and France began military preparations to pressure Egypt by military force, by aggression.

In its statement of August 9, 1956 the Soviet government emphatically denounced the Western acts of hostility against Egypt, qualifying

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, August 10, 1956.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

them as a threat to peace and security.<sup>5</sup>

But Britain and France continued to bring political pressure to bear on Egypt, increasingly intensifying tension in the Middle East. In another statement, of September 15, 1956, the Soviet Union noted that the Suez question had to be settled by peaceful means and declared that the British and French war preparations were evidence of an intention to seize the Suez Canal by force and were, thereby, a threat of aggression against Egypt. The USSR, the statement said, "cannot hold aloof from the Suez issue and remain unconcerned about the situation that has now taken shape as a result of the Western actions. This is understandable, because any breach of the peace in the Middle East affects Soviet security interests."<sup>6</sup>

However, a peaceful settlement of the issue did not suit the Western powers. For British and French capital the nationalisation of the Suez Canal was a severe blow that shook imperialism's positions in the economically important Middle East. The West European nations were covering most of their oil products requirements with Middle East oil. In 1956 this source had accounted for 80 per cent of British consumption and 90 per cent of French and Italian consumption. Of this oil 60 per cent had been transported via the Suez Canal and 15 per cent had gone via pipelines running from Iraq and Saudi Arabia to the Mediterranean. The annual revenue rate of the British and US oil corporations from the pillaging of Middle East oil and the exploitation of the Arab peoples had amounted to the fabulous sum of over 3,000 million dollars. The Rothschild and other leading groups of the financial oligarchy in Paris and London were closely linked with the Universal Suez Canal Company. Moreover, the Middle East, situated on the route from Europe to Asia and the Far East, was important to Western strategic plans.

The Suez crisis acquired worldwide dimensions, becoming a key clash in the great battle of the freedom-loving peoples against imperialism that was making desperate attempts to preserve the Middle East in a state of colonial enslavement.

Britain and France saw their Suez gamble as an opportunity to topple the national government in Egypt and strengthen their position in all the Arab countries. Before the armed intervention was launched against Egypt, the British Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared in the House of Commons that the Suez crisis should be used to depose President Nasser.

In the United States the reaction to the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company was as stormy as in Britain and France. The US monopoly circles feared that this action of the Egyptian government

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> *The USSR and the Arab Countries, 1917-1960. Documents and Other Materials*, Moscow, 1961, p. 207 (in Russian).

would imperil the interests of the US oil corporations in the Middle East, where they were in control of 60 per cent of the oil output.

As soon as the Suez crisis erupted the US sided with Britain and France in a bid to force Egypt to accept a disadvantageous settlement of the Suez issue.

Eisenhower and Eden conferred in Washington from January 30 to February 1, 1956. The communique stated that the USA and Britain had cleared the ground for a joint discussion of the nature of the actions they would take in the event peace was violated in the Middle East.<sup>7</sup> The differences that the USA had with Britain and France in no way affected the question of taking the canal from the hands of the Egyptian people and its government. On this point the Western powers were in full agreement. Their differences were over which of them should play the premier role in running the canal, if they managed to regain it from the Arabs. The US scenario called for taking this key waterway from its lawful owner, Egypt, and turning it over to the US monopolies.

The USA produced a plan for settling the Suez issue, known as the Dulles Plan, which envisaged the formation of an "international agency" to administer the canal.

This question was considered at an international conference in London on August 16-23, 1956. The Soviet delegation urged a peaceful settlement of the Suez issue on the basis of a just combination of Egypt's interests with those of all the nations using the canal.

It suggested informing world opinion that the "participants in the conference are trying to settle the Canal problem peacefully, by negotiations, on a basis combining the national interests of Egypt with the interests of assuring freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal".<sup>8</sup>

The Soviet delegation exposed and condemned the colonialist substance of the American plan, which left no room for talks with Egypt as an equal partner and was a camouflaged attempt to impose upon Egypt terms incompatible with its sovereignty.<sup>9</sup> On August 23, 1956 the Soviet delegation declared that the only way to resolve the Suez issue meeting obtaining conditions and the spirit of the times was to recognise the sovereignty of Egypt as an independent and equal nation, as the master of the Suez Canal. This solution would take Egypt's economic and political interests into account and assure freedom of shipping in the canal.

After the Egyptian government had categorically rejected the Dulles Plan, the USA initiated the formation of the Suez Canal Users' Association, in which the USA, Britain, and France would participate and which would "coordinate shipping in the Suez Canal" and collect

<sup>7</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, February 13, 1956, p. 233.

<sup>8</sup> *Izvestia*, August 24, 1956.

<sup>9</sup> *Izvestia*, August 18, 1956.



dues for the use of the canal. The idea of forming this "association" was patently aimed at giving the imperialists control of the canal.

In its statement of September 15, 1956 the Soviet government noted that this plan of the three Western powers could only be assessed as a dangerous provocation that would "still further exacerbate the situation over the Suez Canal and artificially create incidents that could be used as an excuse for employing force against Egypt".<sup>10</sup>

The public statements made at this time by US, British, and French spokesmen on the Suez question bore out this assessment. On September 13, 1956 the US Secretary of State Dulles told a press conference that if the Egyptian government obstructed the movement of ships of the "Users' Association" the nations using the canal would feel justified in turning the Suez question over to the United Nations or taking measures dictated by circumstances.<sup>11</sup> The British Prime Minister Anthony Eden declared that if the efforts of Britain and its allies to settle the Suez question failed, the British government would consider itself free to act in any manner it felt necessary. The French Prime Minister Guy Mollet spoke in the same vein on September 13.

The Egyptian government rebuffed the pressure of the imperialist powers. On September 15 President Nasser declared that if any ship entered the Suez Canal without the permission of the Egyptian authorities this would be regarded as a violation of Egyptian sovereignty. "Egypt will defend the canal," he said. "We are prepared to fight for it."

Western officials made it clear that from the very beginning of the Suez crisis the British and French governments had intended to use armed force against Egypt. This was later reaffirmed by Eden, who wrote: "The Government determined that our essential interests in this area must be safeguarded, if necessary, by military action...."

"But economic and political pressures alone might not succeed in checking Nasser and re-establishing international control over the canal. From the start we had to prepare to back our remonstrances with military action."<sup>12</sup>

The USA was privy to the British and French preparations for a war against Egypt. At a conference of US, British, and French Foreign Ministers in London on July 29-August 2, 1956, Dulles briefed his colleagues on the US position. "The President," Eden wrote, "did not rule out the use of force. He recognised the transcendent worth of the

<sup>10</sup> *The USSR and the Arab Countries, 1917-1960*, p. 203.

<sup>11</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, October 8, 1956, p. 546.

<sup>12</sup> *The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden. Full Circle*, London, 1960, pp. 426-27.

canal to the free world and the possibility that the eventual use of force might become necessary in order to protect international rights."<sup>13</sup> At the conference Dulles said: "A way had to be found to make Nasser disgorge what he was attempting to swallow.... We must make a genuine effort to bring world opinion to favour the international operation of the canal.... Then if a military operation had to be undertaken it would be more apt to succeed and have less grave repercussions than if it had been undertaken precipitately."<sup>14</sup>

The aggressors were thus encouraged by the USA. But reluctant to aggravate relations with the Arab states, it publicly declared on September 13 that it did not intend to clear the way through the canal by force. But Eden was given to understand something quite different. On October 1 Dulles told him that he did not rule out force "as an ultimate resort".<sup>15</sup> Assured of US backing, the French and British governments entered into secret negotiations with the government of Israel in order to plan a joint armed intervention against Egypt. Israel was accorded the role of spearheading the aggression, a role its government was eager to undertake. Although they were an instrument of the imperialist powers against the national liberation movement of the Arab peoples, the Israeli rulers had plans of aggrandisement of their own.

Israel became an independent state by decision of the UN in 1947, and soon afterwards its rulers steered a course towards the seizure of neighbouring Arab lands. In 1948-1949 Israel seized a large portion of the Arab state formed in Palestine by the same UN decision, which defined the boundaries of an independent Israel within the former British mandate territory of Palestine. Nearly a million Arabs were expelled from their homes by the Israeli government. Arab refugees found themselves without a country and without the means of subsistence. But their fate did not worry the Israeli rulers. They now hoped that a war against Egypt would bring them more territory. With the backing of Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and War Minister Moshe Dayan, some rabid extremists dreamed of an Israeli empire stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates. Large supplies of armaments arrived in Israel from the USA, Canada, Britain, and France, with the abetment of Zionist organisations.

An aggressive bloc was finally formed in the latter half of October 1956 following negotiations between French, British, and Israeli officials. In the night of October 30 Israeli armed forces suddenly struck at Egypt and entered its territory.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 436-37.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 437.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 503.

Twenty-four hours after the start of the Israeli invasion, the British and French governments presented Egypt with an ultimatum,<sup>16</sup> demanding Egypt's compliance with the following demands within 12 hours: that it

- a) stop all warlike action by land, sea, and air;
- b) withdraw all Egyptian military forces ten miles from the Suez Canal;
- c) accept occupation by British and French forces of key installations at Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez.

In the event these conditions were rejected Britain and France would take armed action.<sup>17</sup>

This outrageous ultimatum was rejected.

On October 31 Britain and France began hostilities against Egypt. British and French aircraft made massive raids into Egyptian territory. On November 2 the British Broadcasting Corporation warned all Egyptians in its Arab-language programme to keep away from railway bridges and railway stations—they were to be bombed by British aircraft. This brazen announcement was motivated by the fact that the sudden air strikes had inflicted large losses on the Egyptian air force and the aircraft of the aggressors were able to bomb any objective with impunity. On November 5 Britain and France began the occupation of the Suez Canal, landing a joint task force near Port Said. The Egyptian people rose to fight the aggressors.

The aggression assumed the character of a barbarous colonial war. Aircraft wrought destruction in many Egyptian towns and villages, killing civilians. The Anglo-French-Israeli aggression shocked democratic opinion in many countries. Declarations denouncing this triple aggression and demanding the withdrawal of the interventionists were made by the governments of the USSR and other socialist countries, and many Arab, Asian, and African nations.

On October 31 the Soviet government declared its condemnation of the British, French, and Israeli aggression against Egypt and demanded that in order to preserve peace and tranquillity in the Middle East the Security Council had to take immediate steps to end this aggression and secure the withdrawal of the interventionist troops from Egyptian territory.<sup>18</sup>

The USA, which wanted to avoid involvement in this extre-

<sup>16</sup> Formally the Anglo-French ultimatum was addressed also to Israel, but this hypocritical act, designed to portray Britain and France as "arbiters", in fact served solely their interests and legalised the seizures by Israel, which had intruded 160 miles into Egyptian territory.

<sup>17</sup> *Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly Covering the Period From 16 July 1956 to 15 July 1957*, New York, 1957, p. 35.

<sup>18</sup> *Izvestia*, November 1, 1956.

mely unpopular and, as was soon seen, abortive aggression, pursued a double-faced policy. In words it dissociated itself from its NATO allies—Britain and France<sup>19</sup>—but in fact continued supplying them with petrol and granted Britain a loan of 500 million dollars.

After Israel attacked Egypt and before the armed British and French intervention, the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council on the question of this aggression by Israel. The draft demanded an end to the hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory. Britain and France vetoed the Soviet draft.<sup>20</sup> The USA sanctimoniously abstained.

On a motion by a number of countries, the question of the armed intervention and the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egyptian territory was turned over to an extraordinary session of the General Assembly. On November 2, by an overwhelming majority vote it passed a resolution requiring Britain, France, and Israel to cease hostilities against Egypt and withdraw their troops from Egyptian territory. Only five nations voted against this resolution. They included Britain, France, and Israel, which refused to fulfil the General Assembly resolution and continued the hostilities against Egypt.

The Soviet government took a resolute step at this critical moment. On November 5, 1956, it demanded that Britain, France, and Israel halt the hostilities against Egypt immediately, denouncing this as a criminal aggression and warning of its dangerous consequences. A Soviet message to the British Prime Minister stated in part: "In what position would the United Kingdom be were it attacked by stronger nations possessing all kinds of modern destructive weapons? Such countries are in a position not to send naval or air forces to British shores, but can use other weapons, for example, missiles.... The developments in the Middle East are of deep concern to us and, guided by the interests of preserving world peace, we consider that the government of the United Kingdom should heed the voice of reason and stop the war in Egypt. We ask you, the Parliament, the Labour Party, the trade unions and the entire British people: stop the armed aggression, stop the bloodshed. The war in Egypt may spread to other countries and erupt into another world war." The message ended with the words: "We are determined to use force to crush the aggressors and restore peace in the East."<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> An American draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on October 30 required the immediate termination of hostilities and the withdrawal of Israeli troops to the 1949 armistice line.

<sup>20</sup> *Report of the Security Council to the General Assembly, Covering the Period from 16 July 1956 to 15 July 1957*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>21</sup> *Izvestia*, November 6, 1956.

In a telegram to the Security Council Chairman on November 5, 1956 the Soviet Foreign Minister suggested the adoption of a resolution requiring Britain, France, and Israel to cease hostilities within 12 hours and withdraw from Egypt within three days. The Soviet Union offered armed and other assistance to the victim of aggression, Egypt, by sending naval and air forces, troops, volunteers, instructors, materiel, and other forms of assistance in the event Britain, France, and Israel did not comply with the Security Council decision within the set time limit.<sup>22</sup>

At the same time, the Soviet government contacted the US President Eisenhower suggesting combining efforts and using the naval and air forces of the two nations without delay to halt the aggression and end further bloodshed. The US government did not accept the Soviet proposal.<sup>23</sup>

The Soviet people unanimously supported the firm and resolute actions of their government to stop the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. Protest rallies were held nationwide. In the evening of November 5 there were huge demonstrations in front of the British, French, and Israeli embassies, demanding an end to the aggression in Egypt, stigmatising the aggressors, and making it plain that the Suez Canal belonged to Egypt. Throughout the USSR the people donated money to help the Egyptian people. A striking expression of the Soviet people's warm sympathy for the people of Egypt was the request of many citizens, including pilots, tankists, artillerymen, and officer reservists, who had fought in the Great Patriotic War, for permission to go to Egypt as volunteers and help the Egyptian people drive out the aggressors.

The Soviet Union's firm stand in defence of Egypt and its resolve to take an active part in curbing the aggressors, restoring peace in the Middle East, and preventing the outbreak of another world war had a sobering effect on the rulers of Britain and France and were the factor inducing them to cease hostilities. This was admitted even by the bourgeois press. *The New York Herald Tribune* wrote on November 12, 1956 that the Soviet warning was what in fact compelled Britain, France, and Israel to pull out. The same view was offered on that day by *The New York Times*. These were only two of a host of examples.

Twenty-two hours after the Soviet messages were delivered by the Soviet Ambassadors in London and Paris, Britain and France ceased their military operations in Egypt. As a result of the heroic resistance put up by the Egyptian people and in the demand of the USSR and the majority of the UN member states, the Israeli, British,

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. XXXV, No. 908, November 19, 1956, pp. 796-97.

and French troops were withdrawn from the Egyptian territory occupied by them. This aggression ended ignominiously. A local war that threatened to bring mankind to the brink of another world war was thus extinguished by the concerted efforts of the Egyptian people, the Soviet Union, and other peace forces.

Soviet support for the just cause of the Egyptian people won warm affection for the Soviet Union throughout the East, notably among the Egyptian people and the peoples of other Arab countries.

Interviewed by Soviet journalists, President Nasser declared: "Permit me to use this opportunity to express the Egyptian people's gratitude to the Soviet people for their support for Egypt during the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression that was undertaken to conquer Egypt and deprive it of its freedom and sovereignty. The Egyptian people are highly appreciative of the support rendered them by the Soviet people. This is one of the factors of Soviet-Egyptian friendship, and I should like to see this friendship develop and grow steadily stronger."<sup>24</sup>

With the flashpoint in the Middle East quenched, broad possibilities opened up for consolidating the independence of the Arab states.

### **Counter-Revolutionary Rising in Hungary**

Motivated by the immense role played by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in countering the imperialists in the Middle East, the ruling circles of the Western powers stepped up their subversion against the European socialist countries, counting on diverting the USSR from the developments in the East. Here a particularly large role was played by West Germany, the USA's ally. In addition to the support they were getting from their American patrons, the West German revenge-seekers organised subversion against socialist countries in the calculation of deriving benefits for themselves. The developments precipitated in Hungary in October-November 1956 bore the stamp of a bourgeois fascist counter-revolution. According to its scenarists, the purpose of the rising in Hungary was, in addition to diverting the Soviet Union from Middle East problems, to abolish the historic gains won by the working class, the working peasants, and all other working people of Hungary in the ten years following the establishment of the people's democratic system.

Under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty and at the request of the Hungarian government, the Soviet military units in Hungary helped

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, December 28, 1956.

Hungarian troops to restore order in Budapest. But Imre Nagy, the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers, treacherously used the name of the government to request the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest, and the Soviet troops were withdrawn. On Nagy's orders the Hungarian troops ceased their operations against the insurgents with the result that the counter-revolutionaries gained control of the situation. They dealt summarily with the Communists, with public and political personalities siding with the people's democratic system. Many true sons and daughters of the Hungarian people were killed brutally.

Two blocs formed a coalition against the Hungarian People's Republic: the internal counter-revolution and the international reactionary forces. The social base of the counter-revolutionary rising consisted of members of the deposed landowner and capitalist classes, the petty-bourgeois elements who joined them, and also remnants of the Horthy administration and the reactionary officers living in exile abroad. The USA acted as the principal instigator of the counter-revolutionary putsch. Allen Dulles, the CIA chief, told the Senate Commission of Foreign Relations that the US government had had prior notification of the rising. In fact, he acknowledged that the United States had scripted the rising. The US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles said in a speech in Texas on October 27, i.e., four days after the rising began in Hungary, that the existing government should be replaced.<sup>25</sup> On November 2, 1956 the US government announced that it was prepared to give the Hungarian counter-revolution a loan of 20 million dollars. This received a rapturous response in the counter-revolutionary newspapers printed in Budapest. During the events in Hungary the US-controlled Radio Free Europe became in fact the headquarters coordinating the actions of the counter-revolution. It urged bandit raids on government institutions. On October 31 it broadcast a provocative call to Hungarians to scrap the Warsaw Treaty and announce that Hungary was no longer a member of that organisation. The counter-revolutionary rising was a link of imperialism's aggressive policy aimed against the freedom and independence of nations.

The counter-revolutionaries sought to take Hungary out of the socialist community and turn it into a bridgehead for aggression against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Imre Nagy, revisionist and traitor, who became an obedient instrument of these criminal designs, had been secretly preparing to overthrow the people's democratic system long before the counter-revolutionary rising broke out. To achieve this aim he had formed a group of conspirators. Saying nothing of his intentions and plans, he got himself appointed

<sup>25</sup> *Counter-Revolutionary Forces in the October Developments in Hungary*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1956, pp. 5-6 (in Russian).

head of government on October 24, 1956. In the period from October 25 to November 4, 1956 he and his accomplices set about putting their plan into effect. One of its elements was to proclaim Hungary's "neutrality". Then, in contravention of the terms of the Warsaw Treaty, he announced Hungary's withdrawal from that organisation, and on November 4 went so far as to request armed support for the Hungarian counter-revolution from imperialist countries.<sup>26</sup> Interference by the USA and other Western powers in the internal affairs of the Hungarian People's Republic would pose a direct threat to the security of the socialist community and create a new hotbed of war in Europe.

In a situation in which mortal danger hung over the Hungarian people and the democratic system created by them, the Hungarian working class, notably the working class of Budapest, found the strength to save their country. On the initiative of the working class, its finest sons—Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich, and their comrades-in-arms—formed a new government on November 3. This was the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers and Peasants' Government. It proclaimed a programme assuring the nation's independence and the unity of all patriots in defence of the people's democratic system against the counter-revolution. The Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government and the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party rallied the healthy forces of the Hungarian people against the counter-revolution.

Headed by Janos Kadar, this government, which was formed on November 3, 1956, upheld and strengthened the lawful socialist state system in Hungary and ensured the observance of the Constitution and legality. Its steps to crush the counter-revolution and consolidate the people's democratic system had the wholehearted approval of the State Assembly elected in 1953. It unanimously passed a vote of confidence in the Kadar government.

On November 4, 1956 the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government requested the command of the Soviet troops in Hungary to help the Hungarian people smash the counter-revolutionary forces and ensure law and order in the country. In order to maintain peace and security and acting on the principles of socialist internationalism, the Soviet government granted this request. It acted with determination against the imperialist export of counter-revolution.

On November 6, the Soviet Ambassador Y.V. Andropov reported, there were three rallies in Budapest attended by more than 4,000 Communists and trade unionists. The participants in these rallies marched to the assembly points in columns carrying red and national flags. They sang the *Internationale* and the *Marseillaise*, and then

<sup>26</sup> *The Counter-Revolutionary Conspiracy of Imre Nagy and His Accomplices*, Moscow, 1958, p. 139 (in Russian).



chanted "Down with anarchy! ", "We want to work! " "Fascism will not get away with it! ", and "Long live the Kadar government! ". They demanded resolute action by the Kadar government: the immediate restoration of order and security in the capital. They protested against the terrorist acts of the counter-revolutionaries.<sup>27</sup> The Soviet people responded with gratuitous fraternal assistance, sending 50,000 tons of grain and flour, 5,000 tons of sugar, 3,000 tons of meat, and other products. Moreover, medicines, primary materials, fuel, and other items were dispatched to Hungary.<sup>28</sup>

Supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, the Hungarian people crushed the counter-revolution and unmasked its inspirers. Thus, nothing came of the hopes of the imperialists that socialism would crumble in Hungary.

The Soviet Union's swift assistance to the Hungarian people against the counter-revolutionary rising was of immense international significance. In declarations published on March 28, 1957 the governments of the Soviet Union and the Hungarian People's Republic noted that the rising had seriously jeopardised the Hungarian people, Hungary, and peace and security in Europe.<sup>29</sup>

On November 26, 1956 Janos Kadar told Soviet newspapermen: "By helping the Hungarian people the Soviet government not only discharged its treaty commitments but displayed a profound understanding of the difficult situation. It helped not only to stop bloodshed and prevent the restoration of capitalism in Hungary, but also to avert the emergence of a flashpoint of war that might have broken out. Was there a threat of another war? Unquestionably."<sup>30</sup>

Soviet assistance during the tragic events of 1956 in Hungary was appreciated by the Hungarian working class and working peasantry. Janos Kadar, First Secretary of the HSWP Central Committee, expressed the gratitude of the population in his report to the 7th Party Congress (November 30, 1959), saying: "All decent Hungarians will have undying, grateful memories of the Soviet Union's assistance to the Hungarian people rendered at the request of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government in 1956, when counter-revolution broke out and the nation was threatened by imperialist intervention. This assistance enabled us to prevent the imperialists from forcing capitalism and fascism on our people and turning our country into a

<sup>27</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report from the USSR Ambassador in Hungary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR on November 6, 1956.

<sup>28</sup> *Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1948-1970*. A Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1974, p. 97 (in Russian).

<sup>29</sup> *Pravda*, March 29, 1957.

<sup>30</sup> *Soviet-Hungarian Relations, 1948-1970*, p. 100.

military bridgehead, into a battleground."<sup>31</sup>

Following their failure to overthrow the people's democratic system in Hungary by inspiring a counter-revolutionary rising, the ruling circles of some Western powers mounted a diplomatic offensive with the objective of interfering in Hungary's internal affairs under the UN flag. These powers brought up the so-called Hungarian question for discussion at the United Nations, counting on using the debate to inflame the cold war and increase world tension.

The USSR and Hungary protested against this further attempt to interfere in Hungary's internal affairs. In a declaration on March 28, 1957 they stated that the raising and discussion of this question in the UN were seriously undermining that organisation's prestige and constituted flagrant interference in Hungary's internal affairs and an intrusion into the competence of Hungary, the USSR and other members of the Warsaw Treaty. The declaration deplored the attempts of Western propaganda to use the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary to incite the country's population against the Soviet Union and thereby drive a wedge into the friendship between the two nations. It was stated that the Soviet military presence in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty was the decisive factor safeguarding that nation against imperialist intrigues and was dictated by the international situation in view of the existence of the aggressive North Atlantic alliance, the remilitarisation of Germany, the reactivation of revanchist forces, and the maintenance of many military bases by the USA and other NATO countries near the frontiers of socialist countries, their subversive activities against these countries, and refusal to reach agreement on disarmament and a ban on atomic weapons.<sup>32</sup>

Guided by these considerations, the governments of the USSR and Hungary conducted talks on the terms of the presence of Soviet military units in Hungary. On May 27, 1957 they signed an agreement on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary.

The calculations of the imperialist states on using the events in Hungary to undermine the unity and solidarity of the socialist community misfired. One of the contributing factors was the Soviet government declaration, published on October 30, 1956, on the principles underlying the development and further consolidation of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The declaration underscored that in its relations with socialist countries the USSR firmly adhered to the Leninist principles of the equality of nations and was bending every effort to achieve a further

<sup>31</sup> J. Kadar, *Selected Articles and Speeches (1957-1960)*, Moscow, 1960, p. 490 (in Russian).

<sup>32</sup> *Soviet-Hungarian Relations. 1948-1970*, p. 112.

strengthening of friendship and cooperation among socialist countries on the basis of the complete sovereignty of each one of them.

"The Soviet government," the declaration said, "expresses the confidence that the peoples of socialist countries will not let foreign and internal reactionary forces shake the foundations of the people's democratic system that had been won and consolidated by the selfless struggle and labour of the workers, peasants, and intellectuals of each country. They will make every effort to remove all the obstacles to the further consolidation of the democratic foundations, independence, and identity of their countries."<sup>33</sup>

At the close of 1956 and in early 1957 government and Party delegations from Poland, Romania, the GDR, China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the Mongolian People's Republic visited Moscow. At the talks during these visits they considered key questions of international relations with the view of further promoting friendship and equitable cooperation among socialist countries.

The principles underlying the relations between socialist countries were exhaustively defined in the Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries, held in Moscow on November 14-16, 1957. It emphasised that in the obtaining international situation it was of particularly great importance to strengthen the unity of the socialist countries, made an in-depth analysis of the principles of socialist internationalism, and mapped out the ways of further consolidating friendship and cooperation among the socialist community states. The relations between these states, the Declaration said, were based on complete equality, respect for territorial integrity, state independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in internal affairs. An inalienable factor of these relations was fraternal mutual assistance, in which socialist internationalism was effectively manifested. Further, it was noted that the solidarity and unity of the socialist countries were the sure guarantee of their independence and sovereignty. "Stronger fraternal relations and friendship between the socialist countries," the Declaration said, "call for a Marxist-Leninist internationalist policy on the part of the communist and workers' parties, for educating all the working people in the spirit of combining internationalism with patriotism, and for a determined effort to overcome the survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism. All issues pertaining to relations between socialist countries can be fully settled through comradely discussion, with strict observance of the principle of socialist internationalism."

The meeting stressed that among themselves the socialist states had established broad economic and cultural cooperation founded on complete equality, mutual benefit, and comradely mutual assistance. This cooperation, the meeting noted, was not only strengthening the

<sup>33</sup> *Pravda*, October 31, 1956.

political and economic independence of each socialist country but consolidating the socialist community as a whole. Solidarity among socialist countries served the interests of all peace-loving nations, curbing the aggressive ambitions of bellicose imperialist circles and supporting and encouraging the peace forces, which were gaining strength.<sup>34</sup>

Moreover, the collapse of the counter-revolutionary rising in Hungary was a setback to the efforts of the imperialist powers to restore capitalist order in individual socialist countries and subvert the entire socialist community. The Hungarian events made it plain that provided there was unity in the socialist community its economic and military might dependably guaranteed every socialist country against encroachment by international reaction.

### **The Soviet Union Fights Imperialist Policy in the Middle East After the Suez Crisis**

Although their undisguised aggression in the Middle East and subversion against socialist countries had failed, the Western powers did not abandon further gambles. They continued plotting against peace and security, particularly in the Middle East.

After the abortive Suez venture, the main role in pursuing a colonialist policy was undertaken by the ruling circles of the USA. They aimed at taking the place of the old colonial powers—Britain and France—in exploiting and plundering the Arab peoples and imposing the yoke of colonial rule on them in a new guise. To this end they used their agents in the person of Israel. A major instrument of this policy was the Eisenhower Doctrine, based on the thesis, officially formulated in Eisenhower's message to the Congress on January 5, 1957, that the loss of British and French influence in the Middle East following the breakdown of the Suez adventure had created a vacuum which the USA had to fill to prevent "Soviet penetration" in the countries of that region.<sup>35</sup>

Ever since the Second World War the USA had been crowding Britain and France out of the Middle East and North Africa in order to become the dominant power in these crucial regions of the world. This policy seriously aggravated the contradictions between the USA, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, intensifying the struggle between them for supremacy in the colonial exploitation of the Middle East nations.

However, the ousting of Britain and France from the Middle East was only part of the Eisenhower Doctrine. It was spearheaded chiefly against the sovereignty of all the nations in that region and was further

<sup>34</sup> *Documents of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1957, pp. 11-12 (in Russian).

<sup>35</sup> *International Affairs*, 1957, No. 4, pp. 165-66.

evidence that the USA had become the mainstay of modern colonialism. The proclamation and implementation of this colonialist doctrine finally dispersed the myth that the USA was "anti-colonialist". It showed that the USA had undertaken the function of international policeman, the strangler of the national liberation movement, of the struggle of peoples for national liberation.

The colonialist substance of the Eisenhower Doctrine was unmasked in a TASS statement on January 13, 1957 under the heading "US Policy in the Middle East". "The USA's imperialist programme of colonialism," the statement said, "is evidence that the American ruling circles have drawn no conclusions from the failure of the aggression against Egypt. They are obviously trying to revive the bankrupt 'positions of strength' policy. Far from relaxing tension in that region, all this is aggravating the situation, and increasingly imperilling peace in the Middle East.... Mr. Eisenhower's message is a voice not of peace but of war."<sup>36</sup>

The Eisenhower message demanded that the Arab countries rupture their relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This was a bid by the reactionary circles in the USA to isolate the young independent Middle East nations and, by depriving them of support from the socialist states in their efforts to consolidate their independence, leave them singlehanded against the Western powers and Israel.

The USSR tried to stem this course of development in the Middle East, for it would have endangered peace. It proposed a concrete programme to the three Western powers concerned providing for urgent and resolute steps to ensure peace and security in that region. On February 11, 1957 it presented the draft of "Basic Principles of a Declaration of the Governments of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France on Peace and Security in the Middle East and on Non-Interference in the Affairs of the Nations of That Region". Under the draft the four great powers would base their Middle East policy on the following principles:

- 1) Preservation of peace and security in the Middle East and the settlement of disputes exclusively by peaceful means on the basis of negotiations.
- 2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of Middle East states and respect for their identity and independence.
- 3) Renunciation of all attempts to involve these states in military blocs with the participation of the great powers.
- 4) The dismantling of foreign bases and withdrawal of foreign troops from the Middle East states.
- 5) Assistance for the economic development of the Middle East states without any prior political or military conditions incompatible

<sup>36</sup> *Pravda*, January 13, 1957.

with their dignity and sovereignty.<sup>37</sup>

The USA, Britain, and France took a negative stand on the Soviet proposals, whose acceptance would have denied them the possibility for unilateral actions in the Middle East.

In March 1957 the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower conferred in the Bermuda Islands with Harold Macmillan, who had taken over from Anthony Eden as Prime Minister of Britain: Eden had had to resign on account of the Suez fiasco. In particular, they discussed the situation in the Middle East. One of the principal results of this meeting was the Anglo-US agreement on the USA's active participation in the work of the Baghdad Pact Military Commission. This step, motivated by the USA's striving to "breathe life" into that military bloc, made the Baghdad bloc more dangerous than ever to the Arab states.

On April 1, 1957, the USSR moved to preserve tranquillity and peace in a region lying in direct proximity to its southern frontiers; the Soviet government issued a statement on the Bermuda conference, showing the substance of US policy in the Middle East and declaring: "Whereas hitherto the government of the USA had formally given the impression of dissociating itself from the United Kingdom's colonial policy in this region and posed as an adversary of colonial orders, an end has now come to the legend of the USA's 'anti-colonialism' so sedulously spread by American propaganda. The mask had dropped, and the USA is now acting openly in a united front with the colonial powers—the United Kingdom and France—in their efforts to restore the colonial regime in the Middle East states."<sup>38</sup>

This venture by US diplomacy was rejected by the peoples of the Middle East.

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International tension was rekindled by the attack on Egypt and the Western-sponsored rising in Hungary.

The failure of the counter-revolutionary fascist rising in Hungary and of the imperialist aggression against Egypt were further testimony of the fact that imperialist reaction was no longer in a position to dictate its will to the world, to decide arbitrarily whether there was to be war, that even with direct force imperialism could not restore the capitalist system in countries building socialism, or restore the colonial regime in countries that had won political independence, and to prevent the downfall of the colonial system. By its vigorous and resolute actions in defence of peace, the Soviet Union had given further proof that it was a dependable bulwark of the independence of nations and the main obstacle to imperialist aggression.

<sup>37</sup> *Pravda*, February 13, 1957.

<sup>38</sup> *Pravda*, September 21, 1957.

## CHAPTER XXVI

### SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE (1957-1964)

#### The USSR Contributes to the Abolition of Colonialism

The national liberation movement in colonial and dependent countries reached unparalleled proportions at the close of the 1950s and the early 1960s. The oppressed peoples rose and dealt further crushing blows to imperialism in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In Asia the colonial empires were dissolved. The Malaysian Federation and Singapore proclaimed their independence in 1957-1959. The former Portuguese colonies of Goa, Diu, and Daman were reunited with India in December 1961.

After the colonial regimes in Asia had crumbled, the imperialist powers hoped to retain Africa as a preserve of colonialism. But this hope, too, was dashed. The African peoples rose to fight for independence. Colonial regimes collapsed in most of the African states. Sudan was the first to achieve independence, and Tunisia shook off French domination soon afterwards. At the same time, France and Spain recognised the independence of Morocco.

Tropical African states likewise began to win liberation from colonial tyranny. Ghana proclaimed its independence in 1957. Guinea became independent a year later. The rise of these states was an important development facilitating the further unfolding of the national liberation movement in Africa. The year 1960, when 17 new independent states appeared on the map of Africa, is justifiably called the year of Africa.

The struggle against imperialism spread in Latin America. The dictatorships in Cuba, Venezuela, and Colombia fell under pressure from the national liberation forces. Developing in a situation marked by a new balance of strength in the world, the people's revolution in Cuba ended in total victory. The first nation taking the road of socialist construction appeared in the Western Hemisphere.

After attaining political independence the new states were faced with the task of transcending economic backwardness and building up an independent national economy. This could only be accomplished by countries that had set their sights on social progress. Socialism was the only system that could ensure the rapid growth of the economy and living standard of the people, and place all the blessings of material and intellectual culture at their disposal. Some liberated countries had already taken the road of non-capitalist development and were success-

fully enforcing radical social transformations, carrying out agrarian reforms, nationalising the property of foreign monopolies, and putting an end to feudal practices. The public sector, chiefly in industry, was expanding.

Industrial development was accompanied by a numerical growth of the working class and the remoulding of social structures.

Every possible support for peoples fighting for liberation from all forms of foreign rule was regarded as an internationalist duty by the Communist Party and government of the Soviet Union. This is stated lucidly in the Programme of the CPSU adopted at its 22nd congress: "The CPSU considers fraternal alliance with the peoples who have thrown off the colonial or semi-colonial yoke to be a cornerstone of its international policy. This alliance is based on the common vital interests of world socialism and the world national liberation movement. The CPSU regards it as its internationalist duty to assist the peoples who have set out to win and strengthen their national independence, all peoples who are fighting for the complete abolition of the colonial system."<sup>1</sup>

The way for the huge advances of the national liberation movement had been paved by the enhanced might of the USSR and the socialist world community, of their influence on world developments. The independent Asian, African, and Latin American states were not alone in their struggle to eradicate all forms of foreign domination. The socialist community countries, as sincere friends of peoples fighting for liberation from imperialist oppression and to safeguard their freedom, have been, and still are, extending every possible assistance to them. The growth of the Soviet Union's might, the increased influence of the socialist world community, and the upswing of the national liberation struggle deflated imperialism's omnipotence. The economic, political, and military strength of the USSR and the other socialist countries compelled the imperialists to meet the demands of the liberated peoples and, in many cases, to refrain from aggression, from the use of force against them.

The very fact of the existence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their readiness to assist developing nations have been, and are, a powerful deterrent for imperialism's colonial policy.

By opposing interference in the internal affairs of the new nation states the USSR enabled them to consolidate their political and economic independence and move along the road of progress. As a consequence, the former colonial and dependent countries, once the reserve of imperialism, were becoming allies of the progressive anti-imperialist forces.

By pressing for the abolition of the colonial system, the Soviet Union succeeded in getting the UN to adopt major acts in support of

<sup>1</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 497.



the national liberation movement. At the 15th General Assembly in 1960 the USSR presented the draft of a declaration on granting independence to colonial countries and peoples. This important document contained the following provisions:

1) Granting all colonial countries, trust, and other non-self-administering territories immediate complete independence and freedom to build their own national states in accordance with the freely expressed will and wishes of their peoples. The colonial regime, the colonial administration in all its forms must be entirely abolished in order to give the peoples of these territories the opportunity of determining their destiny and form of state administration themselves.

2) Abolishing all strongholds of colonialism in the shape of possessions and leased territories on foreign territory.

3) A pledge by the governments of all countries to observe without any reservations the provisions of the UN Charter and the Declaration on the equality and sovereign rights and territorial integrity of all states without exception, and to make no allowance for colonialism, for exclusive rules or advantages for some countries to the detriment of others.<sup>2</sup>

These provisions are consistent with the vital interests of all mankind. They are intrinsically linked to the basic content of Soviet foreign policy.

The discussion of the Declaration at the 15th General Assembly and the results of the voting showed that the Soviet draft had the approval of most countries, which had the overwhelming majority of the world's population. On December 14, 1960 the UN General Assembly adopted a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples worded in the spirit of the Soviet draft. All countries, with the exception of the colonial powers—the USA, Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, the Union of South Africa, Spain, Australia—and the Dominican Republic, which aligned itself with them, backed this declaration, thereby underscoring the urgent need for finally ending the disgraceful system of colonial slavery. The adoption of this declaration was a major triumph for the foreign policy of the USSR, which unremittingly champions the interests of peoples fighting for national liberation. It was also a major gain of the Asian, African, and Latin American nations.

The UN Committee on Decolonisation held a special sitting on August 22, 1975 to mark the 15th anniversary of this declaration. The UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim noted at the sitting that this historic document was a dramatic contribution to the struggle for national liberation.

In 1961, to hasten the abolition of all forms of colonialism, the

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, September 24, 1960.

Soviet Union put the question of considering the fulfilment of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples before the 16th UN General Assembly. In the relevant memorandum it suggested that the General Assembly proclaim 1962 as the year of the final abolition of colonialism and demand the immediate cessation of colonial wars and harassment of participants in the national liberation movement, the withdrawal of all foreign troops from colonies, the dismantling of foreign military bases in these territories, and the application of the sanctions provided by the UN Charter against the colonialists in the event they refused to comply with this demand. The UN, the memorandum stated, should insist on the immediate granting of broad democratic rights and freedoms to the people of every colony, the holding of democratic elections to national organs of power in these countries, and the annulment of all agreements limiting the sovereignty of the future independent states.

The national liberation movement, the struggle against imperialism's colonial system and the prospects for development in countries that had won political independence received close attention at the 1960 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow.

The documents of this meeting noted that the formation of the socialist world community had created unprecedentedly favourable conditions for a successful anti-imperialist struggle. "The existence of the world socialist system and the weakening of the positions of imperialism have provided the oppressed peoples with new opportunities of winning independence."<sup>3-4</sup>

The Statement adopted by the meeting contains a clear-cut action programme for consolidating and developing the gains of the national liberation revolutions. It declares that the creation of national democratic states was making it possible to bring the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, democratic revolutions to completion and implement the measures comprising the key condition for subsequent progressive development.

"We are in full agreement with the Asian, African, and Latin American countries that the last colonial regimes must be swept from the face of the earth," Leonid Brezhnev said in 1964. "Wherever a struggle is going on against foreign imperialist interference—Cyprus, the Congo, Southeast Asia, the Arabia Peninsula, or the Latin American states—the peoples see and tangibly feel our support for their just struggle for national and social liberation."<sup>5</sup>

The new upsurge of the national liberation movement in many Asian, African, and Latin American states, following the defeat of the imperialist aggression against Egypt, was accompanied by feverish

<sup>3-4</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1960, p. 62.

<sup>5</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, pp. 26-27 (in Russian).

attempts on the part of the colonial powers, headed by the USA, to strangle this movement by every possible means, to crush the freedom-loving spirit of the peoples who had risen to fight, and impose new forms of colonial slavery on them. Imperialism fought as it retreated, and in some cases it would have been simply impossible to smash this resistance had the embattled peoples not been supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

### **The USSR Helps to Halt Imperialist Aggression Against Arab Countries in 1957-1964**

The threat to Syria's independence mounted in 1957. At first the imperialist powers had recourse to conspiracies in order to depose the Syrian government, which refused to accept dictation from the USA. In August 1957 a coup was attempted with the participation of agents of US imperialism. The plot was uncovered in time. Three ranking officials of the US Embassy in Damascus implicated in the attempted coup were expelled.

Finding that cloak-and-dagger tactics were proving ineffective, the USA tried to organise an armed intervention. US diplomacy chose the Menderes government in Turkey as the principal instrument of its planned assault on the Syrian Republic. Loy W. Henderson, who had won notoriety as an expert in organising conspiracies, was hastily dispatched to the Middle East as the US President's special envoy. He entered into talks with Turkish government and military leaders. The Turkish General Staff, aided by American military advisers, drew up a plan for an attack on Syria.

In accordance with this plan large military forces, called the Hatai mobile group, were deployed along the Syrian frontier. The US 6th Fleet appeared in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the autumn of 1957 the US and Turkish provocations against Syria led to another serious aggravation of tension in the Middle East. The situation was similar to the one on the eve of the triple aggression against Egypt.

The Soviet government acted with determination in defence of Syria's independence in order to safeguard peace and security in the Middle East.

On September 10 the Soviet government sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes, warning the ruling circles of Turkey that there would be serious consequences if Turkey attacked Syria. It stated that "if hostilities are undertaken against Syria and war breaks out in the Middle East, Turkey may, unquestionably, only suffer as a result of participation in aggression and its position in that region will be inevitably shaken".<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> *Izvestia*, September 14, 1957.

However, egged on by the USA, Turkey went on with its military preparations against Syria, and tried to justify these preparations with the contention that Syria was "arming to an extent greatly in excess of its normal defence requirements" and was being turned into an "arsenal".<sup>7</sup>

In a counter-move the Soviet Union proposed that in the event Turkey violated the Syrian frontier and attacked Syria the UN member states should immediately extend armed assistance to Syria to halt the aggression. It declared that it "is willing that its armed forces should help to crush aggression and punish the violator of peace."<sup>8</sup>

Three days later, on October 19, 1957, it again warned the aggressive circles in Turkey and the USA through a TASS statement on the Syrian question, which declared that in the event Syria was attacked the Soviet Union would, in keeping with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the interests of its security, take all the necessary steps to help the victim of aggression.<sup>9</sup>

At the 12th UN General Assembly, which considered Syria's complaint that it was threatened with aggression, the Soviet Union unequivocally sided with Syria. The Soviet delegation denounced the intrigues of the reactionary circles of the USA and Turkey against Syria's independence and called upon the UN to act resolutely to arrest the plans for aggression against Syria and thereby prevent an armed conflict in the Middle East that could erupt into a major conflagration.

This firm stand and the steps taken by the Soviet Union in defence of Syria averted imperialist aggression against that country.

Parallel with diplomatic support, the Soviet Union helped Syria to strengthen its economy through the development of industry, technology, and electrification.

At the close of October 1957 a Soviet-Syrian agreement on economic and technological cooperation was signed in Damascus in accordance with an understanding reached during a visit to Moscow in July-August 1957 by a Syrian government delegation led by Khaled el Azem, Minister of State and Minister of National Defence of Syria. This agreement provided for assistance to Syria in the building of railways, power stations, irrigation systems, and motor roads, in geological surveys, and other projects. Syria received a Soviet credit to pay for design services and for materials and equipment from the USSR.<sup>10</sup>

In December of the same year it was agreed that the Soviet Union

<sup>7</sup> *The USSR and Arab Countries, 1917-1960. Documents and Other Materials*, Moscow, 1961, p. 819 (in Russian).

<sup>8</sup> *Izvestia*, October 18, 1957.

<sup>9</sup> *Izvestia*, October 19, 1957.

<sup>10</sup> *The USSR and Arab Countries, 1917-1960*, p. 454.

would purchase Syrian cotton and grain and that Syria would purchase Soviet manufactures, including machinery and other equipment.

The government of Syria expressed its gratitude to the government of the USSR for unfaltering Soviet support to Syria when its independence and territorial integrity were imperilled.

International tension flared up again in the Middle East in mid-1958. Imperialist reaction again had recourse to armed force against Arab peoples.

The pretext for this armed interference by the imperialists, led by the USA, in the internal affairs of Arab nations was the unrest in Lebanon resulting from the people's bitter disaffection with the anti-popular policies of the Chamoun-Solh-Malik government. This reactionary government had concluded an agreement with the USA in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine and thereby renounced its policy of neutrality, which had had the support of the people. This betrayal of national interests caused indignation, which exploded into a people's rising that embraced almost the entire country.

The Lebanese events alarmed the ruling circles of the USA and Britain, who feared losing their positions in that strategic region of the Eastern Mediterranean. US and British naval forces were sent to the shores of Lebanon.

Developments that threatened to have even more far-reaching consequences for the colonialists took place in Iraq at the same time. The monarchy and the reactionary regime of Nuri Al-Said, a flunkey of British imperialism, were overthrown on July 14, 1958. Iraq was proclaimed a republic. But in that country the Western imperialists were in control of huge oil fields, and the ruling circles of the USA and Britain quickly organised another armed intervention against Arab peoples. US troops began landing in Lebanon on July 15, 1958, i.e., on the very day after the Iraqi revolution had triumphed, while on the next day British troops overran Jordan. A request for assistance to the governments of the USA and Britain from the deposed president of Lebanon Chamoun and from King Hussein of Jordan was the formal pretext for this US-British armed intervention in Lebanon and Jordan. On September 13, 1958 Adel Osseyrane condemned Chamoun's unlawful actions and declared in a letter circulated to UN member countries that "United States armed forces landed on Lebanese soil under the pretext of defending American lives and protecting Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. This action, i.e., the landing of United States armed forces, is in itself a violation of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon."<sup>11</sup>

This armed intervention was evidence that in protecting the interests of the oil monopolies, the USA and Britain acted in accordance

<sup>11</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Background information of the USSR Foreign Ministry of September 13, 1958.

with a plan, drawn up long in advance, for the suppression of the national liberation movement in the Arab East. For the US and British imperialists Lebanon and Jordan were only stepping-stone on the road to Iraq and Syria, situated between Iraq and Lebanon. This was not concealed by either the US or the British government. In a White House statement the sending of US troops to Lebanon was linked directly to the developments in Iraq. From a statement by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan it was clear that the purpose of the intervention in Jordan was not only to suppress the Jordanian liberation movement but also to use Jordan, along with Lebanon, as a springboard for an attack on the Iraqi Republic.

On this occasion, too, the firm posture adopted by the USSR prevented the colonialists from launching an intervention to crush the revolution in Iraq and bring pressure to bear on Syria.

On July 16, 1958, the day after US troops landed in Lebanon, the Soviet government sent the Iraqi Prime Minister a telegram declaring its official recognition of the government of the Iraqi Republic. Soviet recognition of the new government at a time when danger hung over Iraq amounted to effective moral and political support for the Iraqi people and a warning to the colonialists, who were preparing to invade Iraq.

In its statement the Soviet government noted that the desire to preserve the colonial system in the Middle East countries was what actually motivated the armed US intervention in Lebanon. It urged immediate and resolute action by the UN to halt the intervention and protect the national interests of the Arab states subjected to unprovoked aggression. It reiterated its stand that it would not remain indifferent to developments that were seriously threatening peace in a region adjoining its frontiers and reserved the right to take steps dictated by the interests of peace and security.<sup>12</sup> A similar statement was issued by the Soviet Union on July 18 in connection with the British intervention in Jordan.<sup>13</sup>

On July 19 the Soviet government declared that effective steps had to be taken to extinguish the flashpoint in the Middle East as quickly as possible. It proposed a conference of the heads of government of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France, and India with the participation of the UN Secretary-General to consider the actions of the USA and Britain and the speedy withdrawal of their armed forces from Lebanon and Jordan.<sup>14</sup> Other socialist countries were likewise emphatic in their denunciation of the aggressive actions of the USA and Britain in the Middle East and demanded an immediate conference of heads of government of the great powers to examine the situation in that

<sup>12</sup> *The USSR and Arab Countries, 1917-1960*, pp. 517-20.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 524-26.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 528-40.

region and secure the prompt withdrawal of US and British troops.

The USA, still impelled by Dulles' policy of "brinkmanship", rejected talks as a way of settling the situation in the Middle East. Obstruction by the Western powers also made the Security Council powerless to ensure a quick settlement of the Middle East crisis.

On August 5, 1958 this induced the USSR to demand the convocation of an emergency session of the UN General Assembly at which it presented a programme for easing international tension in the Middle East. The Soviet demand for the immediate withdrawal of interventionist forces from Lebanon and Jordan was supported by the delegations of all socialist countries and also of many other peace-loving states, including Middle East nations. The USA's attempts to justify its aggression in the Middle East found no sympathy in the United Nations. The General Assembly unanimously passed a draft resolution submitted on August 21, 1958 by ten Arab states empowering the UN Secretary-General to take any practical steps that could help to sustain the purposes and principles of the Charter relative to Lebanon and Jordan and expedite the withdrawal of foreign troops from these countries. Finding themselves in total isolation, the aggressor states had no choice but to vote for this resolution.

A popular movement unfolded simultaneously in Lebanon and Jordan for the withdrawal of US and British troops. Lebanon's new President Fuad Chehab, elected by parliament on July 31, 1958, announced that the evacuation of the interventionist forces from Lebanese territory was one of the nation's key objectives. The demand for the immediate withdrawal of US forces was one of the first acts of the Karame government that came to power with the defeat of the reactionaries in that country. In October 1958 the USA was compelled to meet this demand. On December 10, 1958 the Lebanese government announced that Lebanon was no longer bound to the Eisenhower Doctrine. The last British soldier was pulled out of Jordan on November 2, 1958.

The forced departure of the US and British invaders from Lebanon and Jordan and the disruption of the attempts to organise an armed intervention against the Iraqi Republic provided further evidence of the Soviet Union's role as a dependable, solid bulwark of the independence of nations that had shaken off colonial tyranny. At the most critical moments, when aggressive circles pushed the world to the brink of war, the Soviet Union used the entire weight of its international prestige and strength to stay the hand of the aggressor. Its uncompromising posture in defence of the independence of nations helped Arab peoples to block the US and British moves to restore colonialism in their countries: Egypt in 1956, Syria in 1957, and Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan in 1958.

The Yemeni people, too, received substantial Soviet support for their independence struggle. In 1962, with the backing of the

people, anti-imperialist military circles in Yemen brought down the monarchy and proclaimed a republic. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries immediately recognised the new government and helped it to fight the reactionaries, who had the support of the US and British imperialists. Since then Soviet-Yemeni relations have been developing in a spirit of friendship. On March 21, 1964 the Soviet Union and the Yemeni Arab Republic signed a treaty of friendship.<sup>15</sup>

Cooperation with Iraq was given every attention. That nation received disinterested Soviet assistance and support. An illustration of this were the moves by the Soviet Union to prevent the Western powers from isolating and invading the new republic. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as neutral nations, recognised the new Kassem government which declared it would pursue an independent foreign policy. On March 16, 1959, in order to help the Iraqi people build a new life, the USSR signed an agreement with Iraq on economic and technical cooperation and granted credits amounting to 550 million rubles for the purchase of Soviet industrial plant.

However, on February 8, 1963 a military coup in Iraq swept the government headed by Abdul Karim el Kassem from power. The reactionaries used the people's disaffection with the Kassem government, which failed to meet many of the commitments it had made to democratic opinion. The new government established a reign of terror and repressions, summarily dealing with Communists and people belonging to other progressive organisations. Further, it stepped up the war of attrition against the Kurds, who were demanding autonomy within the Iraqi Republic. This led to another coup on November 18, 1963. The Aref government, which this coup brought to power, pledged to pursue an independent policy and contribute to Arab solidarity. In February 1964 it signed an accord with the Kurds ending hostilities and guaranteeing their national rights within the republic. The USSR welcomed this as an act of utmost significance to peace in the Middle East.

Also, the Soviet Union helped the Algerian people to achieve liberation from century-old French colonial oppression. An armed struggle against French colonial rule was started by Algerian patriots in 1954. The French colonialists used troops in the hope of crushing this independence movement. The flames of a devastating colonial war raged in Algeria for nearly eight years. In effect, this became a NATO war. With the consent of the US military, three French divisions of the NATO armed forces were transferred to Algeria. The USA increased its supplies of armaments to France with the purpose of prolonging the war in Algeria. While helping to suppress

<sup>15</sup> *Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXIII, Moscow, 1970, p. 42 (in Russian).



the national movement of the Arabs, the USA sought to exhaust France and thereby harness it more tightly to its foreign policy.

However, as the war continued, it became increasingly clear that the colonialists would not crush the national liberation movement. The French imperialists were unable to force the courageous Algerian people to their knees. The National Liberation Front (FLN) which headed the struggle, united large segments of the population, and in 1958 it proclaimed the creation of the Algerian Republic and the formation of a provisional government.

As soon as the national liberation war broke out in Algeria the Soviet Union's stand was that there had to be a just settlement of the Algerian problem. It held that the situation in Algeria could not be regarded as the internal affair of France. It was a matter of grave international concern and had to be settled in accordance with the legitimate rights and national interests of the Algerian people. Soviet policy in the Algerian question was aimed at extending the utmost assistance to the national liberation struggle and securing the earliest abolition of the colonial regime.

At the General Assembly on September 30, 1955 the Soviet representative V.V. Kuznetsov, speaking on behalf of the Soviet government, said that the disquieting situation in Algeria was a threat to peace in that region and could not be regarded as the internal affair of any single nation. He called upon the UN to facilitate a peaceful settlement of the Algerian question in a manner acceptable to the interested sides and with account of the legitimate rights and interests of the Algerian people.<sup>16</sup> The Soviet delegation aligned itself with the proposal of a number of Asian and African nations for placing the Algerian question on the agenda of the 10th General Assembly.

At that session France, supported by other colonial powers, torpedoed the discussion of the Algerian issue. But at subsequent sessions the socialist and Afro-Asian states ensured the inclusion of the Algerian question in the agenda. At all these sessions the Soviet Union upheld the interests of Algeria.

It was unremitting in its pressure on France to settle the Algerian question democratically in the mutual interests of both the Algerian and French peoples.

By its statement on the international character of the Algerian question it recognised the Algerians as a belligerent. In addition to moral and political support, it extended crucial assistance to Algeria, including supplies of armaments.

Representatives of the Algerian provisional government came to Moscow on September 27, 1960, and at the talks the Soviet *de facto* recognition of that government was reaffirmed. France had no choice but to enter into contact and negotiations with that government as

<sup>16</sup> *Izvestia*, October 2, 1955.

the representative of the Algerian people. The courageous struggle of the Algerians for their freedom and independence yielded positive results. The French government, after General Charles de Gaulle came to power, understood that the futile war was harming France and in March 1962 agreed to end hostilities.

On March 19, 1962, the day hostilities ceased, the Soviet government congratulated the heroic Algerian people on their victory. The USSR officially recognised the new state. "The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," the relevant statement said, "motivated by the great principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and by its profound respect for the just national aspirations of the Algerian people, proclaims its *de jure* recognition of the provisional government of the Algerian Republic and expresses its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it."<sup>17</sup> The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria was proclaimed on September 25, 1962. Soviet-Algerian economic, trade, and cultural relations made rapid headway.

In May 1964 talks were held between Soviet and Algerian leaders and culminated with the signing of a joint Soviet-Algerian communique, which was a large contribution to the further development of friendly cooperation and fraternal relations between the Soviet and Algerian peoples.<sup>18</sup>

### Soviet Support for Indonesia

Soviet efforts to safeguard the independence of peoples against imperialist aggression were not confined to the Middle East and North Africa.

In Southeast Asia the Dutch colonialists, backed by the ruling circles of the USA, did not cease their attempts to depose the lawful government of the Indonesian Republic. These attempts were part of the US policy of turning the whole of Southeast Asia into a sphere of influence. In their subversive activities the colonialists had recourse to anti-government conspiracies, acts of terrorism, wrecking, and sabotage, and also political, economic, and military pressure. They counted on support from the reactionary forces in Indonesia: the feudal landowners, the compradore bourgeoisie, and the reactionary parties and cliques articulating the latter's interests.

At the close of 1957 the colonialists staged a series of armed provocations against Indonesia. US diplomatic representatives in Jakarta openly interfered in Indonesia's internal affairs and encouraged separatist elements. Hardly had Colonel Simbolon seized power in

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, March 20, 1962.

<sup>18</sup> *Izvestia*, May 8, 1964.

North Sumatra than the US Ambassador told the Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo that the US would extend *de facto* recognition to the insurgent colonel's regime. The USA supplied the insurgents with armaments and military equipment from military bases in the member states of the SEATO military bloc.

In this complex situation the Soviet Union and other socialist countries extended diplomatic, economic, and military assistance to the Indonesian people.

On May, 14, 1958, the Soviet government issued a statement emphatically condemning foreign power interference in Indonesian affairs and acts of aggression against Indonesia: "Indonesia's conversion into an object of imperialist intrigues in Asia runs counter to the moves being made to ease international tension. The Soviet Union cannot turn a blind eye to the developments in Indonesia because the situation there is a serious threat to peace."<sup>19</sup> The USSR warned the Western powers, the USA in particular, of the responsibility they were assuming by interfering in Indonesia's internal affairs.

Despite the efforts of the colonialists, the counter-revolutionary rising in Indonesia was smashed. The support the insurgents were getting from without proved to be unavailing.

The USSR consistently sided with the Indonesian government and people in their efforts to reunite Dutch-controlled West Irian with Indonesia.

While demagogically speaking of granting the population of West Irian the "right to self-determination", the Dutch government persisted in refusing to turn the remnants of its colonial possessions in Indonesia over to the Indonesian people. To justify this policy, the apologists of colonialism described Indonesia's just demands for the liberation of West Irian as a manifestation of "Indonesian imperialism". The Netherlands had the support of influential US and British circles interested in using West Irian as a military springboard for the aggressive SEATO bloc. The Americans bought many of the uranium mines in West Irian.

The Soviet Union supported the Indonesian people and government in their legitimate demand for the immediate transfer of West Irian to Indonesia and the abolition of Dutch colonial rule in that part of Indonesian territory. This principled stand was expressed in many official documents: the Soviet-Indonesian communique, statements of the Soviet government, speeches of Soviet leaders, and declarations of Soviet representatives in the UN when this issue was discussed.

With the situation deteriorating as a result of Dutch refusal to settle the dispute with Indonesia and the escalation of Dutch military preparations in West Irian in the spring of 1960, the Soviet government noted in a memorandum to the government of the Netherlands

<sup>19</sup> *Pravda*, May 15, 1958.

on June 1, 1960 that the dispatch of large contingents of Dutch naval, air, and land forces to Indonesia was bound to increase the danger of war in Southeast Asia.<sup>20</sup>

As part of the steps it was taking to build up its armed forces in the face of the mounting tension over West Irian the Indonesian government sent a special delegation to the Soviet Union in early January 1961. The government of the Soviet Union met the wishes of the Indonesian mission to purchase the war materiel urgently required by the Indonesian armed forces. On January 6, 1961 the sides signed the relevant accord.<sup>21</sup>

In early 1962 the situation took a further turn for the worse following a piratical attack by Dutch warships on Indonesian patrol boats on the high seas.

Attention was attracted by a statement by the US 7th Fleet commander to the effect that in the event hostilities broke out between Indonesia and the Netherlands American naval forces would take action.

In a statement on West Irian on February 9, 1962 the Soviet government condemned the provocations of the Dutch imperialists and warned them that the dangerous situation over West Irian "is causing serious concern in other countries sincerely desiring to preserve peace and, naturally, they cannot remain passive observers of the provocations against the Republic of Indonesia".<sup>22</sup>

An Indonesian government delegation that included ranking army officers and officials of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry went to the Soviet Union in May 1962. This visit was motivated by the situation resulting from the tension generated by the refusal of the Dutch colonialists to resolve the West Irian problem.

The staunch stand adopted by Indonesia, which relied on Soviet assistance and the solidarity of the anti-imperialist forces, compelled the Netherlands to renounce its claims to West Irian. After long talks with UN participation in the latter half of 1962 the problem of this Indonesian territory was resolved in favour of Indonesia.

The Soviet Union extended large-scale assistance to Indonesia to enable it to carry out its economic development plans. In 1956 it concluded a general agreement on economic and technological cooperation with Indonesia, and followed this up with an analogous accord in 1960. An understanding was reached that the Soviet credits granted to Indonesia on the basis of the economic and technological assistance accord would be used to pay for Soviet help in building large projects, including a metallurgical plant with an annual output capacity of 100,000 tons of steel, an aluminium plant and a super-

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, June 3, 1960.

<sup>21</sup> *Pravda*, January 8, 1961.

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, February 9, 1962.

phosphate factory, machines and other equipment for two mechanised rice farms, and so on. Mutually beneficial trade expanded between the two countries. In a communique on a visit to the USSR by Indonesian President Sukarno in June 1961, the Indonesian government recorded its high appreciation for the Soviet Union's friendly assistance for Indonesia's economic development.<sup>23</sup>

Soviet assistance was a major factor strengthening Indonesia's political and economic independence.

### Geneva Conference on Laos

The Soviet Union did everything in its power to ensure the fulfilment of the decisions on the armistice and political settlement in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia adopted at the 1954 Geneva conference. However, its peace efforts and those of other socialist countries, as well as of neutral states, were countered by the Western powers.

The USA and its allies erected artificial barriers to the unification of Laos, unceremoniously interfering in that country's internal affairs with the objective of installing a pro-US regime that would take the nation into the SEATO military bloc.

This evoked the anger and indignation of the Laotian people and in August 9, 1960 led to a military coup that removed the US flunkys from power and brought in a government headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.

But the USA and some other SEATO members refused to abide by the will of the Laotian people and set about overthrowing the lawful government by force. A rising was engineered in the south of the country, the scenario for it having been scripted in the USA. Thailand, the Philippines, and the puppet regime in South Vietnam likewise took part in the intervention.

Laos was thus again plunged into civil war. Heavy tanks, transport and missile-carrying aircraft, helicopter gun-ships, and other armaments were airlifted and otherwise transported from Bangkok and Manila. With this massive military and technical aid from the USA and its allies, the insurgents scored temporary successes, gaining control over a large portion of the country. However, as early as the spring of 1961 the national democratic forces began to overwhelm the insurgents.

On May 3, 1961, i.e., when a cease-fire was declared, these forces were in control of at least two-thirds of Laotian territory. It was obvious that the total defeat of the insurgents was imminent.

To offset this course of events, the USA began pressuring its SEATO allies in an effort to start a collective intervention against

<sup>23</sup> *Pravda*, June 13, 1961.

Laos. There was the danger that Laos would become the arena of a major international conflict.

The Soviet Union consistently supported Laos' policy of peace and neutrality, a policy conforming with the Geneva agreements on Indochina.

In October 1960 it established normal diplomatic relations with Laos, and in accordance with an understanding reached with that country extended considerable economic assistance to it, including food and fuel.

In view of the strained political atmosphere in Laos caused by US interference, the Soviet Union in a note to Britain, as a co-chairman of the Geneva conference, on December 22, 1960 proposed an international conference to consider the situation in Laos, settle the Laotian problem, and normalise the climate in Southeast Asia. Moreover, it proposed the resumption of the work of the International Commission for Observation and Control in Laos. There was a favourable response to this proposal in Laos itself, in socialist countries, and also in India, Burma, and other neutral states. The Soviet initiative was opposed by the USA, which hoped to resolve the Laotian problem in its favour by military means.

Soviet diplomacy initiated steps to ensure the convocation of another conference on Laos. On January 16, 1961, a statement was made to the US Ambassador in Moscow noting the escalation of US interference in Laos' internal affairs and once again drawing the attention of the US government to the fact that its actions were widening the conflict in Laos and creating an extremely dangerous situation in Southeast Asia. "All this," the statement noted, "is a flagrant violation by the USA of the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina that obligated each of the signatories, including the USA, to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Laos." In conclusion, the hope was expressed that the "US government will finally end its military assistance to the insurgents, refrain from any steps that may extend the military conflict in Laos, agree to a conference on the model of the 1954 Geneva conference, and join in the efforts of countries dedicated to ensuring a peaceful settlement in Laos".<sup>24</sup>

In April 1961 the Soviet and British co-chairmen of the 1954 Geneva conference agreed to convene a conference on Laos, thanks to the persevering efforts of the Soviet government.

With developments following a course unfavourable to the US lackeys in Laos and with the division widening between the USA, on the one hand, and Britain and France, on the other, which urged a political settlement of the Laotian problem, the consistent posture of

<sup>24</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Statement of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the US Ambassador on January 16, 1961.

the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as of a number of neutral states demanding a peaceful settlement of the Laotian issue, the USA reconsidered its attitude, agreeing to the holding of a new international conference.

This conference opened in Geneva on May 16, 1961 and continued with intervals until July 23, 1962. It was attended by 14 nations: Britain, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, China, France, India, Laos, Poland, Thailand, the USSR, the USA, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and South Vietnam. As soon as the Geneva talks started it was seen that there were two diametrically different attitudes to the Laotian problem. The Soviet Union pressed for an agreement ensuring a peaceful settlement in Laos on the basis of recognition of the Laotian people's legitimate rights and meeting the interests of lasting peace in Southeast Asia.

To attain this objective the Soviet government presented a draft declaration on the neutrality of Laos recording that nation's obligation to pursue a policy of neutrality, of non-participation in military blocs, to deny its territory for foreign military bases, and some other commitments defined earlier at the 1954 Geneva conference.

A different posture was maintained at the Geneva conference by the Western powers—the USA, Britain, and France—which together with their allies in military-political blocs—Canada, Thailand, and South Vietnam—wanted decisions allowing them to pursue the old imperialist colonial policy in Southeast Asia.

On most of the key points of the Laotian issue the Soviet Union and other socialist countries obtained the understanding and support of neutral states. This compelled the Western powers gradually to retreat from their initial stand, which was to draw Laos into their system of aggressive military and political blocs. The steady consolidation of the progressive, peace forces in Laos and the support of most of the conference participants for the steps proposed by the USSR left the USA with no choice but to declare its agreement with the basic provisions of the Soviet draft.

On July 9, 1962 the Laotian government proclaimed that it would abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence and work to create a "peaceful, neutral, independent, democratic, united, and prospering Laos". This statement was included in the Geneva conference's declaration on Laos based on the provisions of the Soviet draft. The declaration called upon all countries to respect and observe the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos, and to refrain from interfering in its affairs or to involve it in any military agreements. Further, it envisaged the withdrawal from that country of foreign troops and personnel serving them. An international commission composed of representatives of Poland, India, and Canada was set up to supervise the observance of this agreement.

But at the close of 1963 there was another deterioration of the situation in Laos as a result of intervention by the USA, which, in violation of its commitments, renewed its support for Laotian right-wing groups opposed to the Geneva agreements.

On April 19, 1964, troops of a right-wing group attempted a military coup and sought to take over control of Vientiane. Representatives of the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat) in the coalition government soon had to leave the capital. There was a split in the neutralist group: some of the Laotian neutralist leaders joined the right-wing forces. Troops of the reactionary forces resumed their attacks on areas controlled by the Lao Patriotic Front. In May 1964 US aircraft began raiding the region controlled by the Patriotic Front. Peace was again unsettled in Laos and the 1962 Geneva agreements were contravened as a result of US imperialist intrigues and direct US interference in that nation's internal affairs. While exposing the USA's aggressive ambitions in Indochina, the Soviet Union continued its efforts to ensure the fulfilment of the 1962 Geneva agreements.

It denounced the actions of the reactionaries. A TASS statement on the Laotian developments noted: "The Soviet Union, which has always sided with peoples fighting for peace and the consolidation of their national independence, has rendered and will continue to render the Laotian people every possible support in their just struggle to create a peaceful, neutral, and independent Laos."<sup>25</sup>

In view of imperialism's unceasing interference in that nation's internal affairs, the Soviet government issued another statement on June 15, 1964 in which it denounced this interference. "The Soviet government," the statement said, "can no longer tolerate a situation in which the Geneva agreements on Laos are being ignored and some of the states that have signed the agreements are avoiding a discussion of this dangerous situation, which is imperilling peace and security not only in that country but also in Southeast Asia as a whole."<sup>26</sup> The USSR proposed another conference to discuss the situation.

The Soviet stand helped the nation's progressive and patriotic forces in their struggle for a peaceful, neutral, independent, united, and democratic Laos.

### Events in the Congo and the Soviet Posture

On June 30, 1960, the struggle of the Congolese people for liberation from Belgian colonial rule was crowned with the independence of the Republic of the Congo. As soon as independence was proclaimed and a national government formed under Patrice Lumumba

<sup>25</sup> *Pravda*, April 21, 1964.

<sup>26</sup> *Pravda*, July 27, 1964.



the Belgian government launched a series of provocations and then organised an armed intervention against the new republic with support from its NATO allies—the USA, Britain, the FRG, and France. The nation's vital centres were occupied by Belgian troops. This armed aggression was accompanied by attempts to fragment the nation. Moise Tschombe, puppet of foreign monopolies and self-styled "president" of Katanga, one of the nation's provinces, proclaimed the "secession" of that mineral-rich region in contravention of the Congolese Constitution.

In a statement of July 13, 1960 the Soviet government deplored the imperialist aggression in the Congo. It noted, in particular, that as soon as the independence of the Republic of the Congo was proclaimed, Belgium and other Western powers had taken actions, in violation of international law and the UN Charter, to undermine the Congo's sovereignty and trample its independence. These were the objectives of their armed intervention.

"The intervention of the colonial powers against the Republic of the Congo," the statement declared, "is an attempt to fragment that nation."<sup>27</sup> Further, it said that "any attempt to detach any province from the Republic of the Congo is an unlawful and criminal act dictated by the mercenary interests of a handful of finance and industrial magnates of the colonial powers."<sup>28</sup>

The Soviet Union declared that, like other peace-loving states, it "unconditionally condemns the perfidious aggression against the Republic of the Congo" and "wholeheartedly supports the just demands made by independent nations at Accra and Addis Abbaba on the immediate granting of independence to all countries and peoples of Africa, where the disgraceful colonial system persists".<sup>29</sup> It urged the UN Security Council to take immediate steps to end the aggression and restore the sovereign rights of the Republic of the Congo.<sup>30</sup>

Some days later the Soviet Union submitted a draft resolution to the UN Security Council, stating: "If aggression continues it will, naturally, be necessary for the United Nations and peace-loving states sympathising with the Congo to take more effective steps."<sup>31</sup> On July 14, 1960 the Security Council, using a request from the Patrice Lumumba government as the basis for its action, passed a resolution calling upon Belgium to withdraw its troops from the Congo and authorising the UN Secretary-General, in agreement with the Congo-

<sup>27</sup> *The USSR and African Countries. 1946-1962, Documents and Other Materials, Vol. I (1946-September 1960), Moscow, 1963, p. 557 (in Russian).*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> *Izvestia, July 13, 1960.*

<sup>31</sup> *The USSR and African Countries. 1946-1962, Vol. I p. 574.*

lese government, to do everything to provide the Congo "with such military assistance as may be necessary, until through the efforts of the Congolese government and with the technical assistance of the United Nations the national security forces are able, in the opinion of the government, to cope fully with their tasks".<sup>32</sup>

To help the Congolese people in their struggle against aggression, the Soviet government responded favourably to a request from the Lumumba government for means of transportation, including aircraft, to carry troops sent to the Congo by decision of the Security Council. The Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies of the USSR sent to the Congo a group of doctors and other medical personnel, and also medicaments and medical equipment. Wishing to help the Congolese government normalise economic life, dislocated by the actions of the Belgian colonialists, the Soviet government declared on July 31, 1960 that it was prepared to extend economic and technological assistance to the Congo and promote mutually beneficial economic cooperation and trade with that republic on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs, complete equality, and mutual respect for sovereignty without any political, military, or other conditions infringing on the interests and sovereign rights of the independent Republic of the Congo.<sup>33</sup>

On August 20, 1960, through its Ambassador in Leopoldville the USSR informed the Congolese government that "in keeping with its immutable policy of extending all possible support to peoples fighting to consolidate their national independence and sovereignty, it has decided to render the government of the Congo urgent assistance in the creation of a national army and in strengthening the nation's defence capability".<sup>34</sup> Prime Minister Lumumba responded with a message of gratitude.<sup>35</sup>

However, the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold and the UN command in the Congo headed by Andrew W. Cordier, of the USA, ignored the Security Council decision and helped the colonialists. UN troops were used against the Congolese army fighting to safeguard the republic's independence. They overran regions that were the stronghold of the Congolese national liberation movement. Hammarskjold refused to cooperate with the lawful Congolese government in restoring the latter's authority in Katanga province. More,

<sup>32</sup> UN Security Council S/4387, 14 July, 1960, p. 1.

<sup>33</sup> *Izvestia*, August 1, 1960.

<sup>34</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Instructions of August 20, 1960 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo.

<sup>35</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report of the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR of August 23, 1960.

the UN command obstructed the struggle of the Congolese government against the insurgents. It took over the government radio station, depriving the central government of the possibility of directly addressing the people. The Leopoldville airport was occupied and the capital's means of communication with other regions were cut on orders from the UN command, which thereby acted in contravention of the Security Council resolution and sanctioned the Congo's division by the puppet authorities of Katanga, who had the backing of the Belgian and other colonialists.

In its statement on the situation in the Congo on August 21, 1960 the Soviet government exposed the intrigues of the imperialist powers against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Congo. It deplored the attempts to depict the separatist actions of the foreign-installed puppet Tschombe against the central Congolese government as the internal affair of the Congo. Noting the unconstitutional character of the Tschombe regime, which had usurped power in Katanga by means of a rising inspired by imperialist interventionists against the lawful government of the republic, it stressed that support for the Tschombe "government" could not be condoned. It declared that the Security Council decisions were aimed at preserving the state integrity of the Republic of the Congo and provided for assistance exclusively to the central Congolese government.<sup>36</sup>

On September 6, 1960 Lumumba told the foreign Ambassadors in the Congo that "the action of the Belgians on September 4 can only be qualified as a plot against the Republic of the Congo stage-managed by the Belgian, French, and US imperialists.

"This plot was concocted with the active assistance and direct participation of the UN mission in the Congo, the troops of which are acting as an invading force."

Lumumba further noted that "from the very beginning Hammar-skjold had been engaged in criminal subversion of the Security Council decisions on the Republic of the Congo".<sup>37</sup>

In its statement of September 9, 1960 the Soviet government qualified the actions of the UN command as in fact paralysing the normal functioning of the central Congolese government, as an attempt to replace some colonialists in the Congo with others in the form of collective colonialism of the NATO states under cover of the blue flag of the United Nations. Underscoring the unseemly role undertaken relative to the Congo by the UN Secretary-General Hammar-skjold, it declared that in the overall mechanism of the UN appa-

<sup>36</sup> *Pravda*, August 21, 1960.

<sup>37</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Report of the Soviet Ambassador in the Congo to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR of September 6, 1960.

ratus its head proved to be the link acting with the least disguise in favour of the colonialists and thereby discrediting the UN. It demanded the withdrawal of the armed forces at the disposal of the UN command from all of the nation's airports, the return of the national radio station to the full and unrestricted disposal of the Congolese government, and the removal of the UN command that was misusing the forces sent to the Congo in fulfilment of the Security Council resolution.<sup>38</sup>

For his part, too, the Congolese Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba condemned the actions of the UN Secretary-General as directed at provoking war in the Congo. Lumumba sent a memorandum to the Security Council urging it to recommend that the Secretary-General and his associates in the Congo cease direct or indirect interference in the republic's internal affairs.

Meanwhile the colonialists proceeded with their scenario for deposing the Lumumba government. Lumumba and other Congolese leaders were soon unlawfully arrested. The Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly denounced this action.

It was soon learned that Lumumba was murdered. A report published in the USA in 1975 by a Senate committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities stated that the CIA had been behind the murder. The plot was conceived in the latter half of 1960. Lumumba was to be poisoned. Later, when the imperialists and their Congolese agents had Lumumba removed from the premiership and arrested, the CIA decided to use Tschombe to kill the leader of the Congolese people. Through UN guards assigned to Lumumba, a CIA agent lured Lumumba from the UN protective shield and suggested that he escape. After Lumumba "fled" he was seized by Congolese police and, on CIA advice, taken to Katanga to Tschombe, who wasted no time murdering him.<sup>39</sup>

On February 14, 1961, in a statement on Lumumba's murder, the Soviet government qualified it as an international crime and demanded the condemnation of its perpetrators and the arrest and trial of Tschombe and other agents of the colonialists.

"Within a month's time," the statement said, "the so-called UN operation in the Congo must cease and all foreign troops withdrawn from that country to give the Congolese people the possibility of deciding their internal affairs themselves. Dag Hammarskjold must be dismissed from the post of Secretary-General as an abettor and organiser of the reprisals against leading statesmen of the Republic of the Congo, as having stained the name of the United Nations Organisation."<sup>40</sup>

<sup>38</sup> *Pravda*, September 10, 1960.

<sup>39</sup> *Novoye Vremya*, No. 49, 1975, pp. 14-15.

<sup>40</sup> *Izvestia*, February 14, 1961.

UN troops were withdrawn from the Congo in early 1963 on the insistence of the USSR, other socialist countries, and many African and Asian states. However, the Western colonialists continued weaving the web of plots against the independence of the Republic of the Congo. The US imperialists displayed the greatest activity in a bid to oust the Belgians and British and take over key positions in that country.

The Adoulla government's anti-national policy sharply aggravated the political situation in the country. The economic dislocation led to growing unemployment, soaring prices, and a further decline of the population's already low living standard. Large sections of the people spoke of their disaffection more and more openly. The government tried to shore up its position by military and police measures. At the end of September 1963 President Kasavubu decreed the dissolution of the parliament, which the government regarded as a hindrance. The largest progressive parties were outlawed. Repressions were stepped up against leaders and militants of national patriotic organisations.

In order to crush all opposition, the governing clique sought to discredit the leaders of the nationalist parties. The Congolese radio and reactionary newspapers started a slander campaign against the USSR and the Soviet Embassy in the Congo. The police enforced what was virtually a blockade of the Embassy and provocatively attacked and manhandled two Soviet diplomats.<sup>41</sup> The entire Embassy staff was declared *persona non grata*.<sup>42</sup>

In reply to the arrests and persecution the nationalist parties set up a coordinating centre, the National Council for Liberation, which called upon the Congolese people to support its actions in defence of the nation's independence.

A new upsurge of the national liberation struggle began. In many provinces large insurgent units started hostilities against the imperialists and their myrmidons.

Finding that the Adoulla government could not cope with the situation, the US and Belgian imperialists decided that Tschombe, tested political agent of imperialism, was best suited to deal with the rising. In July 1964 he replaced Adoulla as premier. With Tschombe's return to the Congo from Europe, the Soviet government drew world public attention to the dangerous situation that had taken shape over the Congo and called for steps to prevent another attempt by the imperialists and their agents on the young republic's independence and integrity.<sup>43</sup>

The patriotic forces of the Congo countered the formation of a puppet regime by intensifying their struggle and rapidly liberating

<sup>41</sup> *Pravda*, November 22, 1963.

<sup>42</sup> *Pravda*, November 24, 1963.

<sup>43</sup> *Izvestia*, February 14, 1964.

most of the country. Frightened by the scale of the popular movement, the colonial powers, chiefly the USA and Belgium, had recourse to direct armed intervention. The USA sent Tschombe military adviser, armaments, and bombers, and Belgium dispatched paratroopers. Britain allowed Ascension Island to be used as a stop-over for aircraft raiding territory held by the insurgents. To save their foundering agents, the imperialists used mercenaries recruited in Western countries.

On November 24, 1964, on the pretext of protecting their nationals, the interventionists seized Stanleyville, centre of the national movement, and together with Tschombe's mercenaries butchered patriots.

Belgian paratroopers and mercenaries intervened in Congo's internal affairs in order to throttle freedom.

Progressives throughout the world stigmatised the crimes of the colonialists on Congolese soil and demanded an end to the aggression.

In a statement made to the US, Belgian, and British Ambassadors in Moscow on November 25, 1964 the Soviet government noted that the acts of aggression in the Congo "are an undisguised challenge to African states on whose behalf the Organisation of African Unity has demanded an end to foreign interference in Congolese internal affairs.... These actions are a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and are creating a threat to international peace and security".<sup>44</sup> It was demanded that the military intervention should cease forthwith and that all Belgian troops and all foreign mercenaries withdrawn from the Congo.<sup>45</sup> The Soviet government also addressed the UN Security Council.

The Soviet demand was backed up by many African and Asian countries. Twenty-one African and Asian states and Yugoslavia insisted on an immediate Security Council sitting to consider the Congo question. Representatives of the USSR, the Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, Sudan, Guinea, Mali, Kenya, Tanzania, the United Arab Republic, Morocco, and other countries showed convincingly that the NATO intervention in the Congo constituted an intolerable interference in Africa's internal affairs, a gross violation of the UN Charter, and a threat to peace and security throughout the African continent.

On December 30, 1964, the Security Council passed a resolution binding all countries to refrain from interference in Congolese internal affairs and prescribing the withdrawal of mercenaries from that country.<sup>46</sup>

The freedom and independence struggle of the Congolese as of

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, November 26, 1964.

<sup>45</sup> *Report of the Security Council, 16 July 1964-15 July 1965*, UN, New York, 1965, p. 57.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 130-36.

other peoples of colonial countries had the support and sympathy of the Soviet people.

### The USSR and the Independence of Cyprus

The USSR cordially welcomed the proclamation of Cyprus' independence in August 1960 following a selfless struggle of the island's population against British colonial rule. However, the imperialist powers forced Cyprus to accept the Zurich and Geneva agreements that substantially limited its government's sovereign rights and imposed some onerous obligations. Two large British military bases remained on the island, and Britain, Greece, and Turkey, which reserved the right to interfere in the new republic's internal affairs, were named as "guarantors" of its independence. Western imperialist circles used these onerous agreements to interfere in the affairs of Cyprus. Acting on the old colonialist recipe of "divide and rule", they provoked clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities. Incited from without, the armed clashes between these communities grew increasingly more bitter and there was loss of life on both sides. On the pretext of "pacifying" the island, the imperialists interfered in its internal affairs in order to drag it off the neutralist course proclaimed by the government and bring it under NATO military and political control. Responding to a request of the Cypriot government, the Soviet Union supported the UN Security Council resolution of March 4, 1964 on the sending of UN troops to Cyprus to prevent further bloodshed between the Greeks and Turks.

The situation grew particularly serious on the island in the summer of 1964 when Turkish aircraft bombed several Cypriot towns following fighting between the Greek and Turkish communities.

Washington and London attempted to use the exacerbation of national contradictions on Cyprus to abolish the republic as an independent state. Moreover, imperialist diplomacy was worried by the fact that the clashes between the Greek and Turkish communities had aggravated relations between Greece and Turkey with the resultant serious weakening of NATO's southern flank.

The Soviet government consistently supported the just cause of Cyprus, upholding its independence and the right of all Cypriots—Greeks and Turks—to decide their destiny themselves by peaceful agreement between the two communities and to work in tranquillity and strengthen their sovereign state. It declared on several occasions that any attempt to settle Cyprus' internal problems by interference from without could only lead to a further deterioration of the situation on and around Cyprus.

For their part, the Western powers continued inflaming nationalistic feelings among Greeks and Turks, aiming to divide the island and abolish its independence.

### **Soviet Political Relations with and Economic Assistance to New Asian and African Nations**

As we have noted earlier, the collapse of the colonial system in Asia and Africa led to the emergence of many independent nations. The USSR hailed the attainment of state sovereignty by peoples that had been reduced to colonial dependence. In the period from 1955 to 1964 it established diplomatic relations with most Asian and African countries. Identity of interests in the struggle against imperialism and for the independence of oppressed peoples facilitated the development of friendly links between the USSR and Asian and African countries. This trend was expedited by contacts at different levels between Soviet statesmen, on the one hand, and statesmen of Asian and African nations, on the other.

In the period 1957-1964 Soviet leaders visited India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, Iraq, and other states.

For its part, the Soviet Union played host to statesmen from many Asian countries, including India's President Rajendra Prasad and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, President Sukarno of Indonesia, King Mohammed Zahir Shah of Afghanistan, Prime Minister of the coalition government of Laos Souvanna Phouma, Cambodian head of state Norodom Sihanouk, and other distinguished visitors.

During this period visits were paid to the Soviet Union by statesmen from African countries: the presidents of Ghana, Guinea, and Mali, the emperor of Ethiopia, and the prime ministers of Sudan, Somalia, and Senegal, and many government and party delegations. In the course of 1963 the Soviet Union was visited by parliamentary delegations from the Tunisian Republic, the Republic of the Congo (with its capital at Leopoldville), the Federation of Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. Soviet government and parliamentary delegations toured many Asian and African countries.

In keeping with the principles of its Leninist foreign policy, which provided for all-sided support for peoples fighting for national liberation, the Soviet Union extended unstinting political and economic assistance to such peoples.

Many statesmen of these countries spoke highly of Soviet policy and assistance. In a message to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on June 8, 1964, one of them, President of Kenya Jomo Kenyatta, wrote:

"Allow me to express the sincere gratitude of the government of Kenya to you and the government of the USSR ... for the generous



assistance your government has agreed to extend to Kenya in order to give us the possibility of strengthening our independence.... I am aware that from the outset of its existence the Soviet Union has been on the front line of the struggle against colonial oppression."<sup>47</sup>

Soviet assistance to developing nations is granted without any political, military, or other prior conditions incompatible with their sovereignty and national interests. The Soviet Union does not pursue the aim of extracting profits and, more importantly, does not seek to acquire any rights in the industrial and other projects built with its assistance. Soviet financial assistance is rendered on extremely favourable terms—an annual interest rate of two to two and a half per cent and usually a twelve-year term of repayment. Easy terms of repayment are also given for credits. They are repaid with traditional export items (or local currency). The capitalist states, on the other hand, grant loans on onerous terms that include political strings. In accordance with the wishes of the developing nations concerned, the Soviet Union rendered them economic and technological assistance mainly for the public sector to enable it to play the decisive role in strengthening the economy and the economic independence of these nations.

In particular, the USSR helped many developing nations to build a heavy industry as the foundation of their economic independence.

With some African, Asian, and other nations the USSR concluded agreements providing for economic and technological assistance for national economic development plans. Such agreements were signed with, for example, India, Indonesia, Burma, Nepal, Ceylon, Afghanistan, the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Yemen, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. Altogether, agreements on economic and technological cooperation and on credits were signed with more than 20 nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

With Soviet assistance nearly 500 industrial and other projects were blueprinted and built in Asian, African, and Latin American states. Some 100 projects were completed and placed in operation by the beginning of 1962. In the period up to 1963 the Soviet Union granted India, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iraq, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Argentina, Bolivia, and other developing nations credits totalling roughly 3,000 million rubles for economic development.<sup>48</sup>

Soviet assistance contributed greatly towards satisfying the need of many nations for funds for long-term economic planning. For instance, 15 per cent of India's aggregate expenditures in foreign currency on

<sup>47</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Message of June 8, 1964 from the President of Kenya to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

<sup>48</sup> *Pravda*, August 7, 1963.

the fulfilment of its second five-year plan were covered by Soviet credits. Soviet financial assistance to the United Arab Republic accounted for 50 per cent of that nation's appropriations for economic construction. Soviet credits to Afghanistan paid for more than one-third of the total investments in that country's national economy.

Thousands of Asian and African engineers and skilled workers received their training at Soviet educational institutions and industrial enterprises.

In the 1940s India had vainly sought Western credits for the construction of heavy industry enterprises. The needed funds were offered by the Soviet Union. As we have already mentioned, a Soviet-Indian agreement on the building of the Bhilai iron-and-steel plant (with an annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel) was signed on February 2, 1955. Under that agreement India received a credit of 500 million rubles. The plant was placed in operation in 1959, following which a new agreement was signed on increasing its annual capacity to 2,500,000 tons of steel. In 1957 and 1960 India was granted new credits amounting to approximately 500 million rubles for the construction of other factories.

"The Bhilai Iron-and-Steel Works is an example of India's cooperation with the Soviet Union," Jawaharlal Nehru said. "This cooperation is extremely productive for India not only in the building of factories but also in the training of more scientists and engineers."<sup>49</sup>

The Aswan High Dam, a major national project built with Soviet economic and technical assistance (it was completed at the close of 1970), provided a firm foundation for the further economic development of the United Arab Republic.

A declaration signed by the USSR and the UAR on January 15, 1971 on the occasion of the completion and commissioning of the Aswan hydropower complex states: "Guided by the Leninist principles of friendly cooperation in all fields with peoples fighting imperialism and colonialism, for freedom and independence, the Soviet people have extended their hand in friendship to the people of Egypt and rendered them fraternal assistance without any political or other conditions..., both sides declare that friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic have deep roots and are not transient."<sup>50</sup>

The significance of economic assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries is not confined to the direct benefits derived by the developing nations concerned.

The equitable character of the Soviet Union's economic links with these nations gives them a stronger stand relative to the imperialist po-

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, June 3, 1959.

<sup>50</sup> *Pravda*, January 16, 1971.

wers, compelling the latter to make concessions, ease credit terms, and so on.

The Soviet Union considers that it would be lawful and just if foreign exploiters returned at least part of the wealth amassed by them from the exploitation of oppressed peoples, and that these funds, returned to developing nations in the form of assistance, should be used for the advancement of their economy and culture and the improvement of the living standard of their peoples.

The imperialist powers widely publicise their aid to developing nations. But this "aid" is, in fact, entirely subordinated to their military and political objectives and their efforts to preserve their influence in these countries. In effect, this so-called aid is used as a lever to impose a new, camouflaged form of colonialism on nations that have embarked upon independent development.

Soviet economic cooperation with independent African, Asian, and Latin American nations has been an important factor consolidating their political independence and helping them resist the efforts of the Western powers to keep them in economic and political bondage, to hold them within their sphere of influence. When Britain, France, and the USA organised an economic blockade of Egypt, ceased to trade with it, and froze its currency reserves in retaliation for the nationalisation of the Universal Suez Canal Company by the Egyptian government, Soviet economic assistance and trade with the USSR and other socialist countries enabled Egypt to withstand the economic blockade and the political pressure of the imperialist powers.

"We were down to one month's reserve of wheat last winter [1956/57.—Ed.]," President Nasser told the correspondent of the *American Look* magazine. "We were short of petrol. We needed to sell our cotton. We went to you, but you turned us down. So then the Russians sold us wheat and petrol. They bought our cotton. They helped us survive. Yes, and they helped us escape domination by the West."<sup>51</sup>

Relative to many regions of Asia and Africa the capitalist powers no longer possess a virtual monopoly of trade and with it they have lost one of their levers of pressurising the developing nations in these regions. By expanding trade links with the USSR and other socialist countries, these nations assure their traditional exports of a market that is free of fluctuation. Balanced trade, regulated by long-term agreements (usually on the basis of barter or clearing transactions), strengthens the economy of developing nations and gives them a favourable balance of trade and payments.

Soviet sales of plant and technical expertise are breaking the Western monopoly over the export of capital equipment, a monopoly that has been used to enslave liberated nations politically by new

<sup>51</sup> *Look*, June 25, 1957, p. 39.

forms of colonial dependence. Soviet financial assistance to these countries has delivered them from the ruinous effects of the Western monopoly over credits and loans.

Guided by its desire to help the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples to end their economic backwardness within the shortest possible time, the Soviet Union explores new effective sources of economic assistance. It has suggested, in particular, an agreement on a reduction of military spending and the use of part of the released resources for assistance to developing nations.

The Soviet Union's headway in economic construction has created the foundation for a further expansion of cooperation with Asian, African, and Latin American nations with the purpose of facilitating their independent economic and political development.

\* \* \*

The late 1950s and the early 1960s witnessed major successes by the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The way for these successes was smoothed in large measure by the enhanced might of the USSR and other socialist countries, whose economic, political, and military strength in many instances compelled the imperialists to refrain from using force against peoples who rose to fight. Soviet assistance and support for developing nations is a major obstacle to imperialist colonialist policy and time and again forces the imperialists to make concessions to the liberated peoples.

In pursuance of its policy of upholding the freedom and independence of nations, urging the abolition of the colonial system, and supporting the national liberation struggle, the Soviet Union implemented a series of major actions that are of historic significance. In 1960 it submitted to the 15th UN General Assembly the draft of a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and secured its adoption. This act was history's sentence on colonial regimes and spelled out a dramatic triumph for the diplomacy of the USSR and other socialist countries and for all the freedom-loving nations of the world.

The defeat of the imperialist aggression against Egypt in 1956 gave a powerful impetus to the national liberation movement. The US-led imperialist powers embarked upon actions designed to throttle the people's struggle, repulse the national liberation movement, and plant new forms of colonial slavery. A serious warning by the Soviet government to the USA and its allies and its statement that it was prepared to use its armed forces to crush violators of the peace averted imperialist aggression against the Syrian Republic in 1957 and 1958 and prevented the strangling of the Iraqi revolution. The Soviet Union was largely responsible for the failure of the US and British imperialist plans to restore colonialism in Arab countries. The Soviet Union

unmasked the aggressive policy of the imperialists and vigorously rebuffed the attempts at military provocations and intervention against the independence of Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, and also Indonesia, the Congo, Cyprus, and other new states.

It did not hesitate to throw its international prestige and might on the balance in order to stay the hand of the aggressor against any nation, big or small. It extended effective assistance to the independence struggle of the peoples of Algeria, the Congo, and other countries. It prevented the imperialists from forcing developing nations to abandon their independent policy and from dragging them into military blocs and the orbit of their influence. Soviet economic, scientific, technical, and financial assistance to developing Asian, African, and Latin American nations was an important factor facilitating their further advance along the road of economic and political independence. The Soviet Union helped developing nations train local cadres.

In pursuing its course towards peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, Soviet foreign policy combined determined actions against aggressive imperialist policy with diplomatic efforts to resolve outstanding issues and conflicts peacefully, by negotiation.

During the period from the Anglo-French-Israeli intervention against Egypt to the mid-1960s Western imperialist policy aimed against the young independent nations of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa sparked a series of international conflicts. The world owes the surmounting of these crises and the fact that a major military catastrophe was avoided to the flexible and far-sighted policy of the Soviet Union.

## CHAPTER XXVII

### SOVIET EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT. USSR-GDR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION (1955-1964)

In European affairs 1955 was not merely the closing year of the first postwar decade. It summed up the results of the policy pursued by the four great powers in the German question and also the results of internal development in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the German Democratic Republic.

The USA, Britain, and France continued following a course that was fundamentally at variance with the Potsdam and other Allied agreements, a course that culminated in the FRG's admission to NATO. Using the anti-communist principles underlying the policy of their new allies as their starting point, the Bonn leaders sought to get their demands for a revision of the results of World War II turned into a condition for easing international tension, a condition for disarmament and the settlement of other major world problems, and even a condition for the promotion of the bilateral relations of the NATO members with the Soviet Union.

Practically no significant provision of the Potsdam agreements, the Declaration on the Defeat of Germany, and the decisions of the Control Council was left unviolated in the Federal Republic of Germany. The FRG government acted as though Germany's defeat and unconditional surrender were merely an episode, a transient reverse, which, on top of everything, as some West German publicists hinted, overtook the Third Reich because the Americans, British, and the French realised the value of "Atlantic solidarity" belatedly.<sup>1</sup>

The hopes of the peoples that militarism would be uprooted and economic, political, and social life in the FRG democratised did not come true. The nations of Europe were once again faced acutely with the task of ensuring their security.

The two German states thus developed in diametrically opposite directions. The GDR's peaceableness, readiness to cooperate constructively in the interests of the German people and peace in Europe, and fidelity to international commitments were in contrast to the aggressiveness and adventurism of the Federal Republic of Germany. Socialist and democratic changes took place in one German state,

<sup>1</sup> Franz-Wilhelm Engel, *Handbuch der NATO*, Frankfurt/Main, 1958, p. 41.

and the positions of monopoly groups were restored and strengthened in the other.

In a situation where the two states that emerged in place of the Third Reich had acquired sovereignty and bore full responsibility for the administration of their internal affairs, where the FRG and the GDR had become members of opposing military organisations, a new approach was needed to the German question, to the various aspects of that question. Questions concerning the relations between these two sovereign states lie exclusively within the competence of the governments of the GDR and the FRG and cannot be settled without them. The function of the four great powers is to ensure that the settlement of any aspect of the German question should conform to the Potsdam and other Allied agreements and that due consideration is given to the interests of European security.

The solution of these problems affects a large number of countries. Hence the paramount need for ensuring lasting peace, for formalising the results of the Second World War for the sake of peace. Naturally, the struggle over German affairs, which sometimes grew tense and acute, was in large measure the factor determining the relations of the Soviet Union with the Federal Republic of Germany and the relations between the four great powers.

The FRG's inclusion in NATO bared the actual motivations of the Western governments in sabotaging the conclusion of a German peace treaty. The USA, Britain and France expected to benefit by the absence of a treaty, since any peace settlement founded on the Potsdam and other four-power decisions—there could be no other foundation for that settlement—would entail a serious reshaping of their military and political positions. From the very outset, i.e., before it was joined by the FRG, the North Atlantic alliance counted on using FRG territory indefinitely as the main scene of military preparations against the socialist states. Any international agreement limiting the possibility for militarising the FRG, let alone opening the prospect for its neutralisation, was regarded as alien to the strategic conceptions of that alliance and even as dooming it to withering away.

For its part, the FRG government did all it could to compound the problem of a peace settlement, having its eye on winning the time needed by Bonn, particularly for strengthening its military and political standing and influence in the Western bloc. These purposes were invariably given priority over any other objective. Statements by the Bonn leaders to the effect that by eventually playing the premier role in NATO the Federal Republic would, with the help of that military alliance, achieve a solution of the German question congenial to it either expressed a totally misconceived picture of the actual balance of strength in the world and the prospects for its development or were designed to conceal the true purposes of the Adenauer government and create better conditions for obtaining additional conces-

sions from the USA, Britain, and France. The proponents of an aggressive policy by German militarism played on the divergences between the victor powers in order to arm the FRG and educate the rising generation there to believe that everything done for the sake of the "national idea" could go unpunished and to be prepared to obey their rulers unquestioningly.

In this situation the conclusion of a German peace treaty acquired the significance not merely of a formal judicial act that would run a demarcation line between war and peace. Its purpose was to formalise the victory of the forces of freedom and democracy over fascism and militarism and deliver the relations among many countries from the effects of the war, which had heavily weighted on the situation in Europe as well. By and large, the drawing up and conclusion of a German peace treaty would give all the interested sides the possibility of solving the problems of a postwar settlement that were vital to European and world security on a basis acceptable to all.

Jointly with other socialist countries, the Soviet Union pressed for the settlement of this problem, being aware that in the existing complicated international situation, in which two sovereign German states and a special enclave, West Berlin, had emerged on the ruins of the Hitlerite Reich, there neither were nor could be simple beaten paths to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. To wait until Germany was reunited and a German government was formed would have meant dragging out the peace settlement indefinitely. At the time, this variant could only suit those who profited by the maintenance of tension in Europe, those who were building their present and future on the fragile foundation of the cold war. Generally speaking, there were no grounds for making a peace settlement dependent on how many German states and governments there were—one or two—and on what the relations between these governments were like. The important thing was that there were German governments that were in a position to undertake commitments to other countries under a peace treaty. Realistic policy had to deal with these existing governments or with an all-Germany agency set up at their discretion.

The German Democratic Republic repeatedly offered to establish cooperation with the FRG in order to achieve a peace settlement as early as possible and clear the way for settling outstanding issues in the relations between these two states. On July 27, 1957 the GDR government issued a statement headed "The Way for the German Nation to Lasting Peace and the Reunification of Germany",<sup>2</sup> in which it put forward the idea of a German Confederation, in other words, a voluntary alliance of the two existing German states based on equality that would, on behalf of the German people, sign a peace treaty with the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Within that

<sup>2</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, July 28, 1957.



alliance, the statement said, the GDR and the FRG would pursue a common policy in questions such as non-participation in military blocs, the banning of war propaganda, the renunciation of the production, acquisition or deployment of nuclear weapons on German soil, the withdrawal of foreign troops from both states, and the regulation of intra-German trade, transport, cultural links, and so forth. It was envisaged that the Confederation's jurisdiction would subsequently spread to other spheres of the political and economic life of these states.

There was a wide international response to the GDR proposal. It was supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The Soviet government declared that if the FRG and the GDR showed interest in this matter it would render practical assistance to help them narrow the gap between them. An important factor here was that with the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955 the USSR became the only great power maintaining official relations simultaneously with both these states.

Judging from the press reports at the time, the idea of a Confederation evoked interest even in the USA and some other Western countries. However, the Americans avoided coming into conflict over this with the FRG government, which rejected the proposal. Chancellor Adenauer stubbornly clung to a policy that was subsequently called a policy of lost opportunities. It was a policy that disregarded national interests in favour of restoring the positions of German imperialism.

On February 28, 1958 the Soviet government sent the US government a memorandum proposing that the question of concluding a German peace treaty should be considered at an international conference of heads of government with the participation of the governments of the GDR and the FRG. This proposal was supported by the Warsaw Treaty states in a declaration on the international situation and on steps to ease international tension, that was adopted in Moscow on May 24, 1958.

On September 5, 1958, after the Western powers had again resorted to delaying tactics over the convocation of a summit, the GDR government called upon the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France to form a commission of their representatives without delay for consultations on the drafting of a German peace treaty. It was believed that the GDR and the FRG could be enlisted into the work of that commission in an appropriate manner. Furthermore, the GDR government urged the FRG government to join it in setting up a commission of representatives of the two states to consider questions linked to the drafting of a peace treaty and discuss steps towards the creation of a united, peace-loving, and democratic German state.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> *Neues Deutschland*, September 6, 1958.

The Soviet Union declared that it was in full agreement with the GDR proposal. In a message to the governments of the USA, Britain, France, and the FRG the Soviet government expressed the hope that these countries would take a favourable attitude to the GDR initiative, which showed the way to the practical settlement of the problem of signing a German peace treaty.<sup>4</sup>

But, as in all previous cases, the ruling circles of the Western powers turned a deaf ear to this call to draw the line on the Second World War. The settlement of postwar problems did not fit into their political plans.

In the autumn of 1958 the Soviet government raised the question of normalising the situation in West Berlin. The USA, Britain, and France had come to Berlin after the war on the basis of an agreement on instituting an Allied mechanism for the quadrilateral administration of Germany. In the context of the four-power decisions on the occupation and control of Germany, the procedure was established for the quartering of occupation troops in Berlin and for the city's administration. However, Berlin was part of the Eastern zone territorially, politically, administratively, economically, and in respect of transport. This status was recognised by the three Western powers until the close of 1948.

There were no four-power agreements envisaging the indefinite and unconditional occupation of Germany or any individual region of that country. Furthermore, the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany stipulated that the occupation and Allied agencies for the control and administration of Germany were temporary and were to be terminated when Germany had fulfilled the basic provisions of the unconditional surrender.<sup>5</sup> These were provisions on demilitarisation and denazification and on the reorganisation of life in Germany on the principles of peace and democracy.

The purpose of the four-power occupation of Berlin was to symbolise their determination to extirpate German militarism and reaffirm their desire to continue cooperating in building up postwar peace in Europe. However, as a result of the policy pursued by the USA, Britain, and France, the city that had witnessed the greatest triumph of the common struggle of the anti-Hitlerite coalition against fascism became the hotbed of a serious deterioration of relations between the powers of that coalition, and one of the most dangerous sources of disagreement and conflict in the world.

After upsetting the mechanism for the joint administration of Germany and coordinated four-power action in German affairs, the USA, Britain, and France continued their occupation of West

<sup>4</sup> *Izvestia*, September 20, 1958.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Minutes of the European Consultative Commission (45), 2nd Sitting of May 1, 1945.

Berlin, as was then asserted, on the strength of the right of victors. They went further, wresting the western part of Berlin from the then already existing political, economic, and administrative organism of the German Democratic Republic.

In fact, West Berlin became an advanced NATO base spearheaded against the USSR, the GDR, and other socialist countries. The city was turned into a concentration point of imperialist intelligence and subversive agencies—US, British, French, and West German—the equal of which it was hard to find in the world. These agencies organised the illegal shipment of raw materials, manufactured goods, and currency from the GDR via West Berlin, the theft of inventions and scientific discoveries, and the enticement of specialists. This inflicted a colossal loss on the republic—not less than 3,500 million marks annually. It was a rare day that did not witness provocations on the border between West Berlin and the GDR.

This situation could not last. On November 27, 1958 the Soviet Union submitted a proposal to the USA, Britain, France, and the two German states on dismantling the outworn foreign military occupation regime in West Berlin and turning it into a free demilitarised city.

In the notes containing the proposal it was shown that the USA, Britain, and France were labouring in vain in their efforts to bury what was basic in the four-power decisions on Germany relating to its demilitarisation, denazification, and democratisation and leave intact only what suited them in these decisions, namely the stationing of their troops in West Berlin. "When the Western powers began arming West Germany and turning it into an instrument of their policy against the Soviet Union," the notes stated, "the very essence of the former Allied agreement on Berlin fell away, having been transgressed by three of its signatories, who began using it against the fourth, the Soviet Union. It would be ludicrous to expect the Soviet Union or, in its place, any other self-respecting nation to pretend it did not notice the changes that were taking place... It should be obvious to any intelligent person that the Soviet Union cannot maintain in West Berlin a situation prejudicial to its legitimate interests, its security, and the security of other socialist countries."<sup>6</sup>

Of course, the most proper line of action would have been to return West Berlin to the GDR, from which it had been artificially isolated. Guided by the interests of peace and an improvement of the situation in Europe, the GDR government had made this huge sacrifice, agreeing to the existence of West Berlin as an independent entity. The proposal to turn West Berlin into a free demilitarised city gave optimal consideration to West Berlin's status as an enclave in the GDR with a different state and social system than in the territory around it. The USSR made this proposal in order to avoid a painful

<sup>6</sup> *Izvestia*, November 28, 1958.

break-up of the West Berlin population's way of life and to allow the change required in West Berlin's status by peacetime to take place in a calm situation, without unnecessary friction, with maximum consideration for the interests of the sides involved.

The Soviet Union proposed giving the free city dependable international guarantees that its population would have the possibility of freely choosing their social system and also that the city would have unobstructed communication with all countries and that its economic viability would be assured. Essentially, only one thing was needed—recognition of the city's special status as an independent political entity and prevention of hostile subversive activities and propaganda from its territory against other countries. This would have benefitted, not least of all, the people of West Berlin, who were tired of the burden of living in a "front-line city".

The idea of turning West Berlin into a free city became part of the Soviet draft for a German peace treaty submitted to governments and peoples on January 10, 1959. This draft was a detailed programme for resolving the issues concerning Germany.<sup>7</sup>

The Soviet government called upon the nations of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to surmount the inertia of the disagreements that appeared after the victorious end of the war, drop all unnecessary polemics, and go over to the adoption of practical decisions consonant with the actual situation. The aspiration to divide the world into victors and the vanquished and the feeling of revenge towards its former military adversary were alien to the Soviet Union. Its draft peace treaty gave just consideration for the interests of the two German states and the countries that had been victims of aggression by Nazi Germany.

In the draft, frontiers were formalised in the shape they actually existed. It was recognised that Germany had the right to maintain the armed forces needed for its defence. Further, some military restrictions would be imposed on Germany, which was responsible for unleashing two world wars. This concerned chiefly Germany's non-participation in military groups directed against any country of the anti-Hitlerite coalition, its renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons and missiles, and its pledge to refrain from arming its armed forces with such weapons. These natural and understandable commitments did not impinge on the possibilities and right of Germans to contribute to collective security in Europe.

The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are the successors to the former German Reich and express German interests in international affairs. For that reason in the Soviet proposals it was stressed that they, and only they, should represent the German side at a peace conference. Of course, if a German Confederation were formed by the time the conference was

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, January 11, 1959.

held, the peace treaty could be signed by the Confederation.

The Soviet government urged the speediest convocation of a peace conference in Warsaw or Prague to draft and sign an agreed text of a German peace treaty. It agreed to a meeting of representatives of the four powers provided it was attended by the GDR and FRG as states directly interested in this question.

These were the cardinal points of the Soviet proposal of January 10, 1959 on a German peace settlement.

This Soviet initiative opened a new chapter in the struggle of socialist countries for world peace and security. There was a wide response to this initiative throughout the world. The world's progressive community saw in the Soviet programme the hope for a sharp turn for the better in the international situation.

But the prospect for abolishing the survivals of the Second World War evoked a fit of bellicose hysteria in the capitals of some NATO powers, especially in Bonn.

The Soviet Union declared that it was prepared, jointly with the USA and its allies, to work out terms of a peace settlement that would satisfy all the interested sides. But the Western powers, nonetheless, maintained that they had been presented with an ultimatum.

The USSR offered to normalise the situation in West Berlin. But the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spoke of "defending" that city, of preventing its "surrender". Matters reached the point of undisguised threats by the Americans that the Western powers did not recognise GDR sovereignty over West Berlin's communications with the external world, that they would disregard GDR control and fight their way to West Berlin.

Dangerous passions were let loose over the signing of a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin issue on its basis. However, even those who went to all lengths to obstruct agreement did not venture to earn the reputation of open opponents of talks in the eyes of the world. In accordance with a scenario they had tested repeatedly, they engaged in various manoeuvres to doom any exchange of opinion in advance in the event they failed to avoid such an exchange.

Chancellor Adenauer and his associates endeavoured to make a peace settlement conditional on the great powers reaching a prior understanding on Germany's reunification in keeping with the Bonn programme for the absorption of the GDR, and on the solution of intricate problems of disarmament and European security. A vicious circle was created deliberately.

The main argument of the opponents of a peace settlement was that there was nobody to sign it with. They declared that the Germany against which the anti-Hitlerite coalition had fought had been crushed and was no longer existent, maintaining that either together

or separately the GDR and the FRG had no authority to replace the former Germany.

These were far-fetched arguments because both the FRG and the GDR had been active in international affairs for a long time. Each had signed many international treaties. The USA and other Western powers had themselves signed various treaties with the FRG, the military Paris agreements among them. According to the logic of the Western governments, the German states could participate in military-political alliances but had no competence to deal with questions of a postwar peace settlement and undertake peace commitments in behalf of Germany.

In 1959 the Western powers painstakingly avoided all mention of their own statements on the German peace treaty made in the previous decade. A US document on the drafting of a peace treaty with Germany submitted to the Foreign Ministers Council in 1946 noted that there was no need at the time for a German government that would accept a peace treaty.<sup>8</sup> The Hoover Plan, which was mooted in US government circles in early 1947, provided for the creation of a separate West German state and the signing of a peace treaty with it.<sup>9</sup> In September 1949 none other than Chancellor Adenauer urged the signing of a peace treaty between West Germany and the Western powers. He declared that "this is very necessary", contending that if "we must wait for a peace treaty with the Soviet Union our wait is liable to be a very long one".<sup>10</sup> At the close of 1952 the leadership of the West German Social-Democratic Party likewise suggested that the FRG and the Western powers sign a "peace settlement on the model of the peace treaties with Italy and Japan".<sup>11</sup>

The Western powers thus did not see Germany's division as an insuperable obstacle to a peace settlement and allowed for the possibility of drawing up a peace treaty, regardless of whether there was a government for the whole of Germany. What then lay behind the Western powers' objections to the Soviet proposals for a German peace settlement?

In 1959, as previously, the posture of the USA and its allies reflected what was essentially their common political objective of settling the German question in violation of the interests of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. In German affairs they

<sup>8</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Foreign Ministers Council Document 46/211 of July 9, 1946.

<sup>9</sup> Analogous recommendations were made by Lewis H. Brown, who toured Germany in the spring of 1947 on behalf of a group of leading US finance and industrial monopolies (Lewis H. Brown, *A Report on Germany*, New York, 1947).

<sup>10</sup> *The Manchester Guardian*, September 9, 1949.

<sup>11</sup> AG, 1952, p. 3771.

pursued a separate line that had nothing in common with the quadrilateral Allied agreements.

On February 17, 1959 the Soviet government declared that if a peace treaty was not signed with the two German states it would sign a treaty with the German Democratic Republic with all the attendant consequences, including those for the occupation regime in West Berlin. It warned that any attempt on the sovereignty of the GDR by sea, on land, or in the air would be firmly repulsed.

Gradually, in influential circles in the West the question was asked whether there was any way out of the situation through an understanding as proposed by the Soviet Union. The efforts to speak with the USSR in the language of strength had obviously proved futile. US Secretary of State Dulles declared that American policy was reckoning with the fact that there were two German states and that recognition or non-recognition of the GDR was only a question of political expediency. He said that the "free elections" hobby-horse Western diplomacy had been riding for nearly ten years had broken down, adding, to Bonn's displeasure, that "free elections" were not mandatory and not the only way to reunify Germany.

The British government was perhaps aware to an even larger extent of the need for a compromise with the Soviet Union on the German issue. The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan made an official visit to the USSR on February 21-March 3, 1959. The Soviet and British sides recognised that the earlier settlement of questions relating to Germany, including a German peace treaty and the question of Berlin, "was of great importance for the maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world". They acknowledged the need for early negotiations between the interested governments for the settlement of differences.<sup>12</sup>

The idea of negotiations was thus paving the way for itself despite resistance from the adversaries of peaceful cooperation.

The West German Social-Democratic Party's "plan on the German question" in some measure mirrored West German public opinion at the time. It was based on the fact that there were two German states. It recognised that no progress would be made towards the reunification of Germany without the active participation of the Germans themselves, without rapprochement and cooperation between the FRG and the GDR.<sup>13</sup> However, this plan was soon buried in oblivion by its own authors: elements of the extreme right that preferred to avoid a conflict with Adenauer took over the leadership in the Social-Democratic Party.

<sup>12</sup> *Izvestia*, March 4, 1959; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1959, p. 16722.

<sup>13</sup> *Izvestia*, April 5, 1959.

## Talks Between the Soviet Union and Other Interested Nations on a German Peace Settlement

The Soviet initiative led to a Foreign Ministers Conference that sat in Geneva from May to August 1959. Besides the Soviet Union, the USA, Britain, and France, it was attended by the GDR Foreign Minister and an FRG representative.

Its purpose was to clear the ground for coordinated decisions on the conclusion of a German peace treaty and, on that basis, normalise the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet and GDR delegations sought to focus attention mainly on the proposals for a German peace treaty.

However, it was found from the outset that the Western ministers had come to Geneva with a large stock of reservations and objections to an early peace settlement. They adamantly evaded considering the concrete provisions of the Soviet draft peace treaty, talking their way out with remarks to the effect that the draft was much too "tough" on Germany.

In what did the three powers see this "toughness"? Chiefly in the provision forbidding German participation in military blocs and the stationing of foreign troops and military bases in Germany.

The Soviet side explained that it would not object if for some time the FRG and the GDR remained in NATO and the Warsaw Treaty respectively. Taking the Western considerations into account, it suggested that the peace treaty record a commitment by the four powers to help the FRG and the GDR to reunify the nation.

But the Soviet efforts to draw the positions of the sides closer together did not receive a constructive response. The bombast of the US, British, and French Foreign Ministers about "magnanimity" towards the vanquished thinly veiled the military plans and mercenary calculations of the members of the North Atlantic bloc together and separately. Wilhelm G. Grewe, who represented the FRG at the Geneva conference, admitted in September 1959: "Nobody will deny that this delay over a peace settlement of more than 14 years from the moment hostilities ended is very disappointing and, to some extent, presents even a threat to peace and international security. If lasting peace is what is wanted, it is unquestionably vital to achieve a final settlement of all the outstanding issues that led to or arose out of the war."<sup>14</sup> But that was exactly what the FRG rulers did not want. They did all they could to preserve flashpoints of tension in the hope of escalating them to a world conflict when the hour of revenge struck.

The Western powers did not explain their view of a postwar settlement, of what commitments Germany should take, and how the other

<sup>14</sup> Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit*, Stuttgart, 1960, p. 259.



issues left over from the war should be resolved either before, at, or after the 1959 Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference. They preferred to remain silent, for to put their cards on the table would have been tantamount to showing that they were in collusion with those circles in the FRG that were out to revise the results of the Second World War, that they were violating quadrilateral Allied agreements.

Instead of proposals on a peace settlement they brought up at Geneva a "comprehensive plan" that lumped together different issues: Germany, disarmament, European security. To make any progress in any one of them, there had to be a solution for all the others. This alone made the settlement of the issues touched upon infeasible.

It was suggested that a peace treaty should be signed as a final act, after Germany was reunited on Western terms. A united Germany would have "complete freedom to adopt decisions on internal and external affairs". This meant that Germany would have the right to join military blocs and allow its territory to be used for the deployment of foreign troops and for military bases.

Relative to West Berlin, the "comprehensive plan" envisaged not only reinforcing the occupation regime in that city but depriving the GDR of its capital and bringing the whole of Berlin under occupation.<sup>15</sup>

The Western plan contained some provisions (creation of a committee for the whole of Germany, the adoption of a declaration on the settlement of all international disputes peacefully, a cutback of the armed forces of the four powers, and others) that the Soviet and GDR delegations felt were of interest and could be discussed. However, the three Western Foreign Ministers declined to explain their stand on these positive elements of the "comprehensive plan", making it plain that they had no serious intention of reaching an understanding and that these provisions were included solely for their propaganda value.

One of the big questions before the Geneva Conference was the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet Union proposed settling it through the conclusion of a peace treaty, arguing that an end had to be put to the occupation regime and that West Berlin had to be turned into a free demilitarised city. The Soviet government had all-sidedly considered the question of providing iron-clad international guarantees of West Berlin's independence up to and including the temporary stationing, as guarantors, of symbolic troop contingents by the four powers or by neutral nations. For its part, the GDR government declared it would ensure West Berlin's unhindered communication with the external world.

The USA, Britain, and France acknowledged that in West Berlin

<sup>15</sup> UN Document A14 of May 18, 1959.

the situation was abnormal. They reaffirmed that the city was not part of the FRG and that the Bonn authorities had no jurisdiction in it. Nonetheless, they objected to West Berlin's conversion into a free city and the withdrawal of occupation troops. The US Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, who succeeded John Foster Dulles, declared that, although the Western powers' rights in Berlin stemmed from the war, their commitments sprang from the stewardship they had pledged to the population of Berlin until the nation's reunification removed the need for Western protection.<sup>16</sup> In other words, the USA wanted it both ways: to enjoy the rights arising from the four-power agreements on Germany and create a new judicial foundation for its presence in West Berlin on the strength of NATO decisions.

In order to find a basis for agreement, the Soviet government suggested ending the abnormal situation in West Berlin gradually, while in parallel drafting a peace treaty and working out steps for the reunification of Germany. It had the following in mind. A committee consisting of representatives of the two German states would be set up to prepare the steps towards the reunification of Germany and the conclusion of a peace treaty. While this committee would be working (a year or eighteen months), an agreement would be reached on a temporary status for West Berlin, which would include: a cutback of the armed forces of the three Western powers, an end to subversive activity and propaganda from the city against other nations, and prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons and missile installations in West Berlin. If, within the specified time, the GDR and the FRG failed to come to an understanding on the issues interesting them, the participants of the Geneva conference would consider what to do next.

The GDR government declared that in addition to a committee for the whole of Germany it favoured the formation of a Four-Power Committee to draft a peace treaty. This proposal, which met the task of achieving an early peace settlement, had the backing of the Soviet delegation.

At the discussion of the question of a temporary agreement on individual points it was noted that there was a certain drawing together of views, but no understanding was reached because the three Western powers and, chiefly, the FRG refused to set up a committee for the whole of Germany. The Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference wound up its work on August 5, 1959.

The discussion of the questions of a peace treaty and West Berlin at Geneva mirrored two clear-cut postures. The Soviet Union stood for peace and the basic interests of nations. The Western powers preferred a situation of war hysteria, which made it easier for them to turn the FRG into NATO's principal missile-nuclear base and continue using

<sup>16</sup> UN Document 34 of June 6, 1959.

West Berlin for purposes hostile to socialist countries and peace.

The Soviet Union's sincere desire to promote peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and resolve the key problems of our times won understanding and support throughout the world. The fact that it was indeed possible to ease international tension encouraged activity by progressive forces and huge sections of the people. The development of the world situation and, in particular, the change in the balance of strength on the international scene in favour of socialism compelled Western statesmen to reassess their stand in questions of war and peace. In the USA the understanding gradually grew that Bonn's revenge-seeking policy was prodding it (the USA) into an open collision with the Soviet Union, that it was time to somehow climb out of the mire of the cold war and look soberly at modern reality in all its diversity.

At the meeting of Soviet Premier N.S. Khrushchev and US President in the autumn of 1959 considerable attention was given, naturally, to the question of signing a German peace treaty and normalising the situation in West Berlin.

The Soviet side reaffirmed that it was prepared to restore cooperation and confidence between the powers that had defeated fascism in World War II. It was emphasised that joint efforts had to be made to ensure a peace settlement, which would in parallel resolve the West Berlin problem. It was noted that if the Western powers were not ready to resolve the problem of a postwar settlement immediately, it would be possible to work out a short-term agreement to give the GDR and the FRG a specified period in which to make another attempt to find the way to reunification. If they again failed to reach agreement it would then be necessary to sign a peace treaty with both the GDR and the FRG.

In official statements and in private talks the US President acknowledged that the situation in the West Berlin was abnormal and that it had to be "mended". He maintained that the USA had no intention of keeping occupation troops in that city in perpetuity and wanted an agreement that would enable it to withdraw its presence honourably. He intimated that he did not believe in an early reunification of Germany and had no sympathy for such a move. He did not deny that the USSR had, in the obtaining situation, the right to conclude a peace treaty with the GDR, but sought to ensure continued US privileges in West Berlin. He said he was prepared to look for an understanding that would safeguard the interests of the USSR, the Western powers, East and West Germany, and West Berlin.

It was agreed that the negotiations on the Berlin question had to be resumed, that no time limit would be set for them, but that they should not be protracted indefinitely.

The governments of the GDR and other socialist countries expressed their full support for the efforts of the Soviet Union to resolve

the problems of a German peace settlement in the interests of international security and detente in Europe.

The prospect that was looming for a settlement spurred the advocates of the "positions of strength" policy. Special zeal in mobilising the adversaries of peace was shown by the ruling circles of the FRG. If NATO wanted to prove its strength, Adenauer preached, it should not retreat an inch and permit no changes in the existing status of West Berlin.

A scheduled four-power summit was drawing closer. Shortly before that summit, N.S. Khrushchev, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, paid a state visit to France, where he had a series of useful talks with President Charles de Gaulle. The sides recognised that a consistent and coordinated settlement through a discussion of problems relating to Germany, including a peace treaty with Germany and the Berlin problem, would be a significant step towards maintaining and consolidating peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

On some major issues it was found that the Soviet and French stand was either close or coincided. The two governments regarded as final the German frontiers established after World War II. The French President reaffirmed the statement, made by him in the autumn of 1958, that the Germans should not "question the frontiers in the West, East, North and South". The Soviet and French heads of government called for the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin. At their meeting on April 1, 1960 de Gaulle noted that the two governments had no irreconcilable differences over the German question.

The Paris four-power summit, scheduled to begin on May 16, 1960, was to be a major landmark on the road to settling the German issue and improving East-West relations. But this summit, awaited by the whole world with such hope, was torpedoed by reactionary circles in the USA. The adversaries of cooperation with the Soviet Union took steps deliberately designed to wreck a German peace settlement and exacerbate the overall situation.

The Adenauer government and the US reactionary circles tried to compound the very possibility of resuming contacts between nations on fundamental international problems. All their actions—from the expedited arming of the Bundeswehr and plans for forming NATO nuclear forces to increasingly outrageous provocations in West Berlin—were aimed at goading the socialist countries into adopting unilateral decisions in the German question.

The Soviet Union remained true to its policy of trying every possible means of settling the problem of a German peace treaty jointly with its wartime Allies.

Having established genuinely fraternal relations with the German Democratic Republic, it offered friendship and peace also to the

Federal Republic of Germany. It urged the FRG to join in the efforts that many countries were making to settle outstanding issues in such a way as to end the cold war once and for all and bring lasting peace in place of the oppressing threat of a missile-nuclear war.

However, the Adenauer government was unable to dissociate itself from its policy of revising the results of the Second World War. It thought in the terms of empire that had brought catastrophe to the Third Reich. What it wanted was not peaceful coexistence with socialist countries but "Soviet Russia's expulsion from the centre of Europe".

In a memorandum to the FRG government on February 17, 1961 the Soviet government listed the fundamental issues in Soviet-West German relations that required a settlement. "We want," it was stated in the memorandum, "to conduct peace negotiations not behind the backs of the German people and not at the expense of their legitimate rights but with the direct participation of the Germans themselves and due respect for and account of their national interests. While working out its proposals for a peace settlement with Germany, the Soviet government was in close contact with the German Democratic Republic. We are prepared to enter into the relevant negotiations with the government of the Federal Republic at any time."<sup>17</sup> The Adenauer government described the Soviet memorandum as "the most important document in the history of relations between the FRG and the USSR" but, nonetheless, preferred to cling to its old stand.

The Republican defeat at the presidential elections in the USA in November 1960 and the assumption of the presidency by John F. Kennedy, who called for a normalisation of relations between nations, created some new conditions for a resumption of contacts on questions relating to a German peace settlement. The Soviet proposals on these questions gave the Kennedy administration the possibility of looking for mutually acceptable solutions and giving effect to the intentions proclaimed in Kennedy's programme statements.

The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the US President met in Vienna on July 3-4, 1961. The Soviet side reaffirmed its proposal for signing a peace treaty that would record the postwar situation, juridically formalise the existing German frontiers, and normalise the situation in West Berlin on the basis of a judicious account of the interests of the sides. It declared that if for various reasons the Western powers were not ready to sign a single peace treaty with the GDR and the FRG it would be possible to conclude treaties with each of these states separately. In that case the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition would sign one or both treaties at their discretion. In the event some of them did not sign a peace treaty with

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, March 4, 1961.

the GDR, it would have to be signed without them and the question of West Berlin settled on that basis.

With the coming into force of the peace treaty the Western powers would conduct their relations with the GDR in accordance with accepted legal norms. Naturally, this would cover access to West Berlin along the communication routes across GDR territory.

The Soviet-US summit in Vienna contributed to better understanding of some major international questions and of the intentions of the two sides. Furthermore, it was evidence of how difficult it was for shoots of a sober approach to international problems to break through to the surface.

There was a dual response in the West to the Soviet government's statement that a German peace treaty had to be concluded as soon as possible. On the one hand, aggressive circles in the West, particularly in the USA and the FRG, used it as a pretext for escalating military preparations and organising an unbridled anti-Soviet campaign. On the other hand, forces willing to resolve disputed problems by negotiation became active in the West. In August and September 1961 visits were made to Moscow by the Italian Prime Minister Amintore Fanfani, some senior French political leaders, and the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak. Talks with these and other personalities showed that there was considerable anxiety among all the strata in capitalist Europe, especially in the small nations, over the dangerous policy pursued by the Pentagon and the Bonn leaders, over the Western plans for new military and political acts within the NATO framework. The aspiration for negotiations with socialist countries grew as the imperialist policy of intimidation was increasingly seen as going against the will of the nations and displayed its total untenability.

### **The GDR Takes Steps to Safeguard Its Frontier with West Berlin. Soviet-US Exchange of Views on a German Peace Settlement**

In the summer of 1961 aggressive NATO circles created a highly dangerous situation in the heartland Europe in response to the Soviet proposals for drawing the line on World War II. In this situation only a determined rebuff could bring the imperialists to their senses and safeguard the interests of the socialist community.

Consultations took place among the Warsaw Treaty nations in early August 1961 in order to agree on steps to normalise the situation in Berlin. They suggested that the People's Chamber, the government, and all the working people of the GDR "establish on the frontiers of West Berlin an order that would dependably close the

road to subversion against countries of the socialist community and adequately protect and effectively control the entire territory around West Berlin, including its frontier with democratic Berlin".<sup>18</sup>

On August 12, 1961 the GDR Council of Ministers passed a decision on ensuring the security and defence of the GDR by reinforcing the protection and control of its frontiers with the western sectors of Greater Berlin. On the next day, invoking its inalienable right as a sovereign state to safeguard its frontiers, the GDR established strict control on the frontiers with West Berlin. To a large extent this paralysed the subversive activities conducted against socialist countries from West Berlin.<sup>19</sup>

The US, British, and French commandants in Berlin lodged protests with the Soviet military authorities. On August 18 the commandant of the Soviet garrison in Berlin replied that the Soviet military authorities did not interfere in the affairs of the GDR capital. He explained that the steps taken by the GDR government "were aimed at protecting the interests of the entire socialist community of nations, as had been stated by these nations in their joint message to the German Democratic Republic".<sup>20</sup>

A hysterical campaign against the GDR was started in the FRG in retaliation for the legitimate steps taken by the GDR government to protect the Republic's frontiers. This campaign was echoed by reactionaries in the USA, Britain, France, and some other countries. Threats against the GDR were accompanied by military preparations by the armed forces of the USA, Britain, and France. The NATO military machine was readied for action. The Western powers deliberately pushed the world to the brink of conflict in their effort to force the socialist countries to back down.

The USSR gave the needed support for the steps taken by the GDR. When US tanks approached the frontier dividing Berlin they were met on the other side by Soviet and GDR tanks. At the same time, the Soviet Union took measures to enhance its defence capability. In the autumn of 1961 the government increased the budget allocations for defence, halted the cutback of its armed forces, and temporarily stopped the demobilisation of troops that had served their term of conscription. New types of super-powerful nuclear weapons were tested.

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, August 14, 1961.

<sup>19</sup> Hundreds of currency exchange and other enterprises engaged in economic subversion against the GDR and growing rich at its expense were closed after the GDR established control of its frontiers with West Berlin. There was a sharp increase in the drain of capital and scientific cadres and other specialists from West Berlin to the FRG. A total of 266 firms moved their head offices from West Berlin to the FRG in the period 1962-1966 (*Berliner Zeitung*, February 2, 1967).

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, August 21, 1961.

This firm stand of the socialist countries against the imperialist forces proved effective. The USA and its allies had no option but to reckon with the new situation springing from the intensified protection and control of the frontiers with West Berlin.

The US government shortly afterwards announced that it was prepared for talks with the USSR on questions related to the conclusion of a German peace treaty. American and some other Western officials said that after an agreed solution was found for these questions the West would accept as natural the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and the GDR.

In order to ensure an agreed settlement of postwar problems the Soviet Union raised no objections to this approach. On September 19, 1961 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR told Spaak that for the Soviet Union the main thing was not the form but the content of understanding: reasonable treaties were better than hasty fights. The Soviet Union was against an endless protraction and also against unrealistic deadlines for the completion of a German peace settlement.<sup>21</sup> From the standpoint of the vital and direct interests of the USSR, the GDR, and other socialist countries, the question of a German peace treaty was no longer as pressing as it was before the adoption of protective measures in Berlin.

In the autumn of 1961 and throughout 1962 Soviet and US representatives had a series of meetings in New York, Washington, and Geneva to discuss the German peace settlement spectrum. One of the questions was the normalisation of the situation in West Berlin by abolishing the occupation regime and replacing the occupation forces with troops of neutral nations or the UN for a specified term: in this way West Berlin could have been turned from a NATO military forepost and centre of subversion against socialist countries into a free city. Another was respect for the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, particularly where access to West Berlin was concerned: the Soviet government made it clear that if the sovereignty of the GDR was not respected there could be no question of agreement with the Western powers on the issues interesting them.

Agreement was inconceivable without the relevant formalisation of the frontiers of the German states, including the frontiers between the GDR and the FRG. Further, the question was raised of the non-arming of the two German states with nuclear weapons. In practical terms, this meant the non-arming of the Bundeswehr, for the GDR government had already declared it would not equip its army with nuclear weapons provided an analogous commitment was undertaken by Bonn.

<sup>21</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a Talk Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak on September 19, 1961.



Lastly, major importance was attached to the question of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation signing a non-aggression pact.

The Soviet-US contacts brought the positions of the sides closer on many of the discussed questions linked to drawing the line on the Second World War. They included the formalisation of the existing German frontiers, respect for GDR sovereignty, nuclear non-arming of the GDR and the FRG, and the conclusion, in one form or another, of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

The West Berlin question was a serious obstacle to agreement. The problem of the capacity and flag of foreign troops in West Berlin and of how long they would be stationed there was disputed. The Soviet government suggested that the troops in West Berlin should not represent NATO, that UN contingents should be stationed in the city, and that that organisation should undertake specified international commitments and functions. The USA continued to insist on the presence of US, British, and French troops in West Berlin.

This attitude made it impossible to reach agreement on questions left over from the Second World War. The hopes of the European nations that the situation in the continent would be radically improved were again destined to remain unfulfilled as a result of the policy of the USA and its allies. On the other hand, it was growing increasingly clear that the reactionary forces were incapable to carry out their plans relative to German affairs and infringe upon the interests of the GDR and other socialist countries.

#### **Further Strengthening of Fraternal Relations Between the USSR and the GDR. Signing of the USSR-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation**

The period 1955-1964 was marked by further major advances in the all-round development of USSR-GDR relations.

Trade expanded steadily, scientific and technical links and specialisation and cooperation between factories and industries grew closer and more diversified. From 1950 to 1963, for example, trade increased more than seven-fold to exceed the volume of US-West German trade. Effective economic cooperation and exchanges of scientific information and production expertise helped to speed technological progress and the development of the productive forces of the two countries.

Also, the exchanges of cultural values between the two peoples, of achievements in culture, art, health-protection, education, and sports grew more productive and richer in content. Contacts expanded gradually between Soviet and GDR public organisations and creative associations.

The identity of aims in the struggle for peace and security, the freedom of nations, and social progress was the foundation of ever more close and friendly cooperation between the CPSU and the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and between the governments of the USSR and the GDR. Practically every proposal of any significance put forward by the two countries on European security, the German peace settlement, and other sensitive problems was the subject of consultations and comradely exchanges of opinion or, in many cases, the result of a joint study of the existing situation.

This steady expansion of fraternal relations between the USSR and the GDR was expressed in the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed by them on June 12, 1964.<sup>22</sup> This treaty formalised this historic gain of the peoples of the two countries, a gain that serves their vital interests, the interests of the entire socialist community, and also the interests of European peace and security.

In the face of the threat of aggression from militarist and revanchist forces, the USSR and the GDR solemnly declared in the treaty that the inviolability of the GDR's state frontiers was one of the basic factors of European security. They reaffirmed their determination, in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, jointly to ensure the inviolability of these frontiers and also to take all the measures required to prevent aggression by forces seeking to revise the results of the Second World War.

The treaty embodied Lenin's concepts of proletarian internationalism and the principles of complete equality and mutual respect for sovereignty. It contributed to the further expansion of USSR-GDR cooperation and to the strengthening of the relations of fraternity and solidarity between them.

The efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to consolidate European security and achieve a German peace settlement were one of the main factors that promoted and strengthened the tendency towards easing tension in Europe. An awareness of the danger harboured in the NATO aggressive line of action and in the FRG's policy of revising the results of the Second World War awakened the will of the European nations for broad peaceful cooperation, for ending the continent's division into opposing military and political groups.

The struggle for a peace settlement, to safeguard what the nations had won as a result of the defeat of fascism and the subsequent far-reaching social changes, which determine the make-up of present-day Europe, united the socialist countries. Friendship between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist states grew stronger in this struggle.

<sup>22</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*. Issue XXIII, Moscow, 1970, pp. 39-41 (in Russian).

## CHAPTER XXVIII

### THE USSR AND THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY (1957-1971)

The Programme of the CPSU declares that the principal aim of its policy and that of the Soviet government is to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of a communist society in the USSR and the development of the socialist world community. The CPSU pledged that together with all peace-loving nations it would do everything "to deliver mankind from a world war of extermination".<sup>1</sup>

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government had to take into account the fact that the ruling circles of the imperialist states had not abandoned their attempts to reverse development and change the world balance of strength in their favour, and had steered a course towards another arms race and the formation of close military-political alliances, one of which was the North Atlantic alliance. Proclaiming a policy of "positions of strength", the imperialists had started a cold war against the USSR and the other socialist countries in order to create the moral and political climate for an escalation of the arms race and their preparations for another war.

In this situation the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had to take steps to protect themselves. In order to safeguard their security and maintain peace in Europe, eight nations—Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR—signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (subsequently known as the Warsaw Treaty) in May 1955 at a conference in Warsaw on the maintenance of peace and security in Europe.

In signing this treaty these nations were guided by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and proceeded from the interests of further strengthening and promoting friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance in accordance with the principles of respect for the independence and sovereignty of nations and of non-interference in their internal affairs.<sup>2</sup>

A key feature of the Warsaw Treaty is that for its character, aims, and purposes it is purely defensive and pursues the objective of safeguarding peace and security in Europe and throughout the world.

<sup>1</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 502.

<sup>2</sup> See Chapter XXII.

This is its basic, fundamental distinction from the aggressive NATO pact.

The declaration on strengthening peace and security in Europe adopted by the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July 1966 noted that the socialist countries were against the world's division into military blocs or alliances but "as long as the North Atlantic alliance exists and the aggressive imperialist circles encroach on world peace, the socialist countries represented at this Conference will maintain a high level of vigilance and are determined to increase their might and defence capability".<sup>3</sup>

The treaty's conclusion gave a boost to political and military cooperation among the signatory nations and resulted in a further substantial expansion of links, contacts, and consultation between them on all issues.

Resting on the sound foundation of the Leninist principles of equality and fraternal mutual assistance formulated in the Soviet government declaration of October 30, 1956, the Soviet Union's relations with the other socialist countries continued to develop and expand.

As in previous years, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government gave considerable attention to strengthening the might and cohesion of the socialist community, to deepening, expanding, and improving all forms of cooperation among socialist states. The CC report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU stated that the CPSU Central Committee "puts forward for the future as one of the main orientations of the Party and the Soviet state in the sphere of foreign policy the development and consolidation of ideological, political, and organisational bonds with the Communist parties of all the socialist countries based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism; the development and consolidation of political, economic, and other bonds between the USSR and the socialist states; the promotion in every possible way of the cohesion of the socialist community and the strengthening of its might and influence."<sup>4</sup> This proposition was approved unanimously at the congress.

### **Further Development and Improvement of Soviet Economic Cooperation with Other Socialist States**

The May 1958 Conference of Representatives of Communist and Workers' Parties of CMEA Countries was an important landmark in the development of Soviet economic cooperation with other

<sup>3</sup> *The Warsaw Treaty Organisation, 1955-1975. Documents and Other Materials*, Moscow, 1975, p. 92 (in Russian).

<sup>4</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1966, p. 18.

socialist countries. This conference noted that in a situation in which economic relations between socialist states had grown much stronger and become all-sided, special importance was being acquired by "deeper specialisation and cooperation of production of related branches of the national economy of the socialist-community states".<sup>5</sup> Specialisation and cooperation of production ensures a saving of material resources and a rise of social labour productivity, the most rational utilisation of natural resources, and the economic conditions enabling the socialist countries to speed up the rate of extended socialist reproduction.

The 12th CMEA session, held in 1959, made a large contribution towards the fulfilment of these tasks. It adopted the Charter of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which came into force on April 13, 1960.

The Charter articulated the determination of the organisation's members to continue "fostering all-round economic cooperation on the basis of consistent implementation of the international socialist division of labour in the interests of building socialism and communism in their countries and ensuring a stable peace throughout the world".<sup>6</sup> The Charter defined the aims of CMEA: facilitating, by combining and coordinating the efforts of the Council's member states, planned economic development, accelerating economic and technological progress, raising the industrialisation level of countries with a less-developed industry, and securing a steady rise of labour productivity and of the living standard in the member states.

The Charter formalised the principles underlying the work of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

CMEA functions on the basis of the sovereign equality of all its members. Its activities are guided by the principles of full equality, respect for sovereignty and national interests, mutual benefit, and comradesly mutual assistance. These principles are embodied in the Charter, Article IV of which declares: "In the Council all recommendations and decisions shall be made only with the consent of the interested member countries of the Council, and each country shall be entitled to indicate its interest in any matter before the Council.

Recommendations and decisions shall not apply to the countries which possess no interest in a given matter. Each of these countries, however, may subsequently join the recommendations and decisions adopted by the other member countries of the Council."<sup>7</sup>

Whereas at the first stage of the socialist world community's development the economic relations between the countries in it

<sup>5</sup> *Izvestia*, May 25, 1958.

<sup>6</sup> *CMEA Basic Documents*, Third edition. Vol. I, Moscow, 1976, p. 9 (in Russian).

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13.

were promoted chiefly by means of bilateral trade and scientific and technological exchanges, after CMEA was set up and, particularly in the period under review, multilateral cooperation among a large number of countries grew increasingly common. Since 1956 it has become the practice to coordinate the economic development plans of the CMEA countries. This coordination is based on multilateral and bilateral trade and economic agreements and the inclusion of adopted commitments in national economic development plans. The USSR and the other CMEA countries have given close attention to the planned development of specialisation and cooperation of production, for this allows them to coordinate the growth of key branches of their national economies.<sup>8</sup>

Periodic consultations and exchanges of views between leaders of parties and governments on basic economic and political problems began to acquire growing importance.

New trends in the promotion of economic cooperation among socialist countries have helped to deepen the socialist international division of labour, promote specialisation and cooperation of production, and ensure the continued improvement of the methods of efficiently managing the socialist economy.

The June 1962 Conference of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the CMEA countries approved a significant document, "Basic Principles of the Socialist International Division of Labour", drafted at the 15th CMEA session.

This document defines the main orientation, content, and basic forms of economic cooperation among the CMEA countries at the stage of development when the conditions had been created for a methodical implementation of the socialist international division of labour. It declares that the purpose of this division of labour is "to enhance efficiency in social production, facilitate the attainment of high rates of economic growth and of the rise in the people's living standard in all socialist countries, promote industrialisation, gradually eradicate the historically-shaped disparities in the economic development levels of socialist countries, and create the material basis for their more or less simultaneous transition to communism within one and the same epoch".<sup>9</sup>

The socialist international division of labour acquired a diversity of forms. These forms of cooperation are being improved. Needless to say, the socialist division of labour is implemented with each country preserving the integrity of its economy, with the development of a rational complex of mutually-supplementing branches of its economy.

<sup>8</sup> *Planning in European Socialist Countries*, Moscow, 1962, p. 35 (in Russian).

<sup>9</sup> *Basic Principles of the Socialist International Division of Labour*, Moscow, 1964, p. 7 (in Russian).

An improvement of the forms and methods of economic cooperation was achieved on the basis of decisions passed by a conference of First Secretaries of Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties and heads of government of the CMEA countries in Moscow (July 24-26, 1963). This conference approved the schedule for coordinating plans for the five-year term (1966-1970). In addition, it approved the CMEA's recommendations for a transition to multilateral trade settlements and the institution for this purpose of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation.<sup>10</sup>

The agreement on multilateral settlements in transferable rubles and the institution of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation was signed in Moscow in October 1963. This agreement set in motion a new system of money and settlement relations among the CMEA countries consonant with the modern stage in the development of economic cooperation among them. The bank was set up to promote economic cooperation among the member-states, and contribute to their economic development and the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and other economic relations. It handles multilateral settlements in transferable rubles, provides credits for foreign trade and other operations, attracts and deposits free money in transferable rubles, manages transactions in freely convertible and other currency, keeps an account of the fulfilment of settlement obligations by the member countries, and conducts other financial operations conforming to its purposes and tasks as defined in its Charter. The Charter sets the bank's capital at 300 million transferable rubles. To quote the communication on its institution, the bank "may, on assignment from interested countries, finance and credit the building, reconstruction, or operation of industrial enterprises from resources allocated by these countries".<sup>11</sup>

Democratic principles—complete equality and respect for the sovereignty of the member countries—underlie the bank's activities. In its managerial bodies, the Council and Board of Directors, all the member countries enjoy equal rights in deciding matters relating to the bank's activities: in the bank's supreme agency, the Council, all decisions require a consensus.<sup>12</sup>

The principles underlying the operation of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation differ fundamentally from the

<sup>10</sup> *Pravda*, July 28, 1963.

<sup>11</sup> *Pravda*, October 24, 1963.

<sup>12</sup> In 1973 the mutual settlement turnover of the member countries of the International Bank for Economic Cooperation reached the sum of 47,700 million transferable rubles. That year it granted credits amounting to nearly 3,800 million transferable rubles to authorised banks of member countries (*Survey of CMEA Activity for 1973*, Moscow, 1974, p. 118 (in Russian)).

principles predominant in the monetary-finance organisations of the capitalist countries. For instance, in the management of the International Monetary Fund the USA has almost the same number of votes as 50 Asian, African, and Latin American states, while in the management of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development it has more votes than all the developing nations on its membership list.<sup>13</sup> It is not surprising that the Americans in fact run these organisations and impose decisions on them that suit the USA.

In 1970 the CMEA members set up the International Investment Bank, which extends long- and medium-term credits for the cooperation of production and the building or enlargement of key industries. It began functioning as early as January 1971. Its charter capital is set at 1,052,600,000 transferable rubles (70 per cent in transferable rubles and 30 per cent in freely convertible currency or gold).<sup>14</sup>

In addition to expanding its economic relations with European socialist countries, the Soviet Union renders them considerable assistance. The following statistics give an idea of the dimensions of Soviet assistance for the economic development of individual fraternal countries. Under the agreements signed since the war the USSR has committed itself to building or reconstructing more than 1,600 industrial and other projects in these countries. In individual socialist countries Soviet assistance has been used to build entire industries. The Soviet Union is the largest market for the other socialist states: it absorbs 58.5 per cent of their exports. The USSR accounts for 38.6 per cent of the total foreign trade of the CMEA member states.<sup>15</sup> In turn, CMEA member countries contribute to the Soviet Union's economic development. The achieved level of industrial development has enabled European socialist countries to increase their export of machinery and other equipment considerably.<sup>16</sup>

After completing the 5-7-year economic development plans in 1965, the CMEA countries entered a new five-year period (1966-1970), which was the first in the practice of international economic relations to witness a group of countries regulating large-

<sup>13</sup> *International Affairs* No. 4, 1964, p. 61.

<sup>14</sup> V. Petrov, V. Belov, A. Karenin, *The Leninist Policy of the USSR: Development and Prospects*, Moscow, 1974, p. 166 (in Russian).

<sup>15</sup> *Statistical Yearbook of the CMEA Member Countries, Secretariat*, Moscow, 1974, pp. 333-34 (in Russian).

<sup>16</sup> In the trade among the CMEA countries, which amounted to 4,595 million rubles in 1950 and soared to 47,542 million rubles in 1973, the share of machinery, equipment, and transport vehicles grew from 20.5 per cent in 1950 to 44 per cent in 1973 (*Survey of CMEA Activity for 1973*, pp. 14-15).



scale mutual sales of goods on the basis of coordinated long-term economic development plans. The adoption of these plans coincided in time with economic reforms in the CMEA countries. The purpose of these reforms was to improve the management of the economy by perfecting planning, providing economic incentives for production, promoting the initiative and economic independence of enterprises, and giving the people a larger material interest in the results of their work.

The new system of economic management in the socialist countries made it possible to improve the forms and methods of this management, end imbalances between industries, and enhance the efficiency of production. Moreover, the economic reforms contributed to the further expansion of economic cooperation among the fraternal countries and to the deepening and improvement of the international socialist division of labour.

Following the establishment of CMEA its members put important reforms into effect in all areas of economic life and made considerable headway in the development of science and technology and in raising the living standards of their peoples. Suffice it to note that in the period 1960-1973 the gross social product indicator in the CMEA countries rose (1970-100) two- or three-plus-fold. In the USSR it rose from 51 to 120, in Bulgaria from 42 to 125, in Romania from 41 to 135, and so on.<sup>17</sup> A new system of international relations based on the principles of proletarian internationalism thus came into operation.

The CMEA countries comprise the world's most rapidly developing industrial region. The gross industrial product showed an average 8.4-fold growth in the CMEA countries in the period 1951-1973: 15-fold in Bulgaria, 6.2-fold in Hungary and the GDR, 9.5-fold in Mongolia, 9.4-fold in Poland, 16-fold in Romania, 8.8-fold in the USSR, and 5.9-fold in Czechoslovakia. The annual growth rate of industrial output was highest in countries with a less-developed industry: Romania (12.9 per cent), Bulgaria (12.6 per cent), and Mongolia (10.3 per cent).<sup>18</sup>

The comprehensive development of the socialist states is paralleled by the growth of their objective need for ever closer economic association. The communist and workers' parties of the CMEA countries are doing much to consolidate the efforts of their peoples in the promotion of the national economy, gearing this work to the interests of the socialist community as a whole. The decision to draw up a long-term comprehensive programme for socialist economic integration, adopted by the 23rd CMEA special summit in Moscow at the

<sup>17</sup> *Statistical Yearbook of the CMEA Countries, Secretariat*, p. 41.

<sup>18</sup> *Survey of CMEA Activity for 1973*.

close of April 1969 did much to consolidate the unity of the socialist world community and enhance its political and economic influence.

Socialist integration, which is promoted to this day by the fraternal parties and governments of the CMEA countries, stems from the objective need for further socio-economic progress and the building of socialism, and is entirely consistent with Lenin's teaching on the creation of an "international cooperative of working people". The ways and means of integration presently being worked out in the CMEA countries and agencies and applied in practice are a further creative amplification of Lenin's teaching.

The formation of a socialist world economy embraces a long period and consists of a series of stages. The stage of economic integration sees the conscious, harmoniously regulated process of the all-sided economic association of the socialist CMEA member countries and the creation of an international economic complex.

Integration is closely linked to the scientific and technological revolution and represents a special way of achieving a steep rise of efficiency in social production and a higher phase in the employment of the advantages of the socialist world economy.

It proceeds on the basis of joint planned regulation of economic development by interested countries as the relevant international agencies and institutions are formed. A salient feature of integration is that it simultaneously covers production, circulation, and management, that it signifies a comprehensive approach to all the urgent problems of improving cooperation among the CMEA countries.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is an open organisation, which may be joined by any country wishing to participate in the economic cooperation between socialist states. It was joined by Mongolia in June 1964 and by Cuba in July 1972.

In September 1964 CMEA and Yugoslavia signed an agreement on Yugoslavia's participation in the work of some CMEA agencies. Agreements on cooperation were signed with Finland in May 1973, with Iraq in July 1975, and with Mexico in August 1975. The 23rd session called for further progress in specialising and cooperating production, a continued improvement in the coordination of economic development plans within the CMEA framework (for 1971-1975 and the subsequent period), the promotion of cooperation in scientific and technological research and development, and the formation of joint scientific centres. It considered pressing problems in the sphere of circulation and other fields comprising the wide-ranging programme of integration.<sup>19</sup>

The 24th CMEA session, held in May 1970, passed important decisions on the promotion of joint planning in key areas, namely production and circulation in the CMEA countries, and on the prac-

<sup>19</sup> *Pravda*, April 27, 1969.

tice of joint consultations in economic policy. It approved proposals on exchanges of expertise and cooperation in prognostication in the main areas of the economy, science and technology. This session decided to set up the International Institute of Economic Problems of the Socialist World Community to study economic problems from every possible angle and ensure the further deepening and improvement of cooperation among the CMEA countries. Moreover, it considered other problems linked to the expansion of cooperation among the CMEA countries, problems that were to be resolved jointly in the process of coordinating the economic development plans for 1971-1975. All this constituted the 24th CMEA session's contribution to the practical implementation of the comprehensive programme for socialist integration.

On June 7, 1969, at the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev noted:

"In many ways the situation on the front of the anti-imperialist struggle is now determined by the course of the economic competition between socialism and capitalism. It may be said with gratification that in this sphere the socialist countries have scored many achievements. If we take, for instance, the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, we shall find that during the past ten years their national income has increased 93 per cent, while in the developed capitalist states the national income rose 63 per cent in the same period. Occupying 18 per cent of the world's territory, and having only 10 per cent of the world's population, the CMEA countries now account for approximately one-third of the world's industrial product. On this foundation the people's standard of living is rising and increasing possibilities are opening for further successful economic, scientific, and cultural development."<sup>20</sup>

In July 1971 the 25th CMEA session unanimously passed a highly significant document entitled "Comprehensive Programme for the Further Extension and Improvement of Cooperation and the Development of the Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Member Countries". A programme to be carried out by stages in the course of 15-20 years, it envisages the fulfilment of highly important socio-economic tasks in each of the member countries, a further growth of the productive forces, the attainment of the highest possible level of scientific and technological progress, a rise of the people's standard of living, and a strengthening of the defence capability. It concretely defines measures aimed at improving the mechanism of joint economic planning and elaborating economic, scientific, and technological prognostication for the period up to 1980 and for a longer term.

<sup>20</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 163-64.

The CMEA Committee for Cooperation in Planning was formed to deepen and improve cooperation in planning and involve central planning agencies.<sup>21</sup> Implementation of the Comprehensive Programme covers many areas, including the selection of projects for joint planning and construction and the determination of multilateral and bilateral integrational measures by the CMEA countries for the period up to 1980. These measures concern cooperation in the fuel, power (including nuclear power), ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical, chemical, heavy engineering, radio engineering, electronics, light, and food industries, construction, and transport, the expansion of the output of consumer goods, and so forth. Cooperation is implemented with account of scientific and technological progress, coordination of investments, the development of standardisation, specialisation and cooperation of production, and the coordination of the volume of reciprocal sales.<sup>22</sup>

The Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline that annually carries up to 50 million tons of oil from the USSR to the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, the USSR-Czechoslovakia-GDR gas pipeline, and the integration of the power grids of CMEA's European member countries are among the projects completed within the framework of cooperation. In 1971 electric power exchanges reached 14,000 million kwh. Agencies have been set up to promote cooperation: Intermetal in the ferrous metallurgical industry, OSPP in the ball-bearing industry, and Interatomistrument in nuclear instrument-making.

In a move to resolve major problems in the engineering industry, the CMEA countries signed a series of agreements coordinating specialisation in the manufacture of some 1,700 types of machines. Mutually coordinated supplies were organised for the production of passenger cars in the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR and Yugoslavia, of trucks in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, of machine-tools in the USSR, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, and of a large range of chemical products (Interkhim).

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR approved the Soviet delegation's work at the 25th CMEA session, noting that they "regard the Comprehensive Programme a document of great political importance, which will enable the CMEA countries to make fuller use of the socialist economy's advantages and of the socialist international division of labour with the view to strengthening their economic and defence might and raising the living standard of their people. This will still further consolidate the unity and cohesion of the socialist community and reinforce socialism's position in the struggle

<sup>21</sup> *Pravda*, July 30, 1971.

<sup>22</sup> *Survey of CMEA Activity for 1973*, pp. 18-23.

for social progress, peace, and international security".<sup>23</sup>

The drawing up and coordination of the long-term plans for economic development of the CMEA countries are a concrete expression of the broad, long-term cooperation among fraternal communist and workers' parties.

### The USSR Strengthens Solidarity Among Socialist Countries

The October 1964 plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was an important milestone in the life of the Party, strikingly demonstrating its monolithic cohesion and unity, Leninist principles, and political maturity. It reiterated the Party's fidelity to the behests of Lenin, to Marxism-Leninism, expressed its unswerving will to abide strictly by and develop the Leninist norms of Party life and principles of leadership, and unflinchingly and resolutely remove everything obstructing the creative work of the Party and the people and the country's progress towards communism.<sup>24</sup>

The plenary meeting's decisions "underscored the growth of the Party's role of leader and guide of Soviet society and the immutability of the general line laid down by the 20th, 21st, and 22nd congresses of the CPSU. It was noted that the great work of building communism required the steadfast implementation by the Party and the Soviet government of the principles and norms worked out by Lenin and tested, corroborated, and enriched by the experience of many decades".<sup>25</sup>

The plenary meeting granted N.S. Khrushchev's request to relieve him of his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, and elected L.I. Brezhnev First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.<sup>26</sup> At the same time, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet appointed A.N. Kosygin Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

The 1960s were marked by a further expansion of fraternal cooperation among the socialist community states. This was seen in the signing of the relevant treaties. For example, on July 6, 1961 the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance,<sup>27</sup> which formalised

<sup>23</sup> *Pravda*, August 10, 1971.

<sup>24</sup> *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (4th enlarged edition), Moscow, 1974, p. 627 (in Russian).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 626.

<sup>26</sup> *The CPSU in Resolutions...*, Vol. 8, Moscow, 1972, p. 494 (in Russian).

<sup>27</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXII, Moscow, 1967, pp. 24-26.

the long-standing, firm alliance between them and enhanced their unity. On June 12, 1964 the USSR and the GDR signed a treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and cooperation, which was a further major step towards consolidating friendship between them, winning recognition of the GDR's legitimate rights as a sovereign state, demolishing the revanchist claims of the reactionary circles in Bonn, and strengthening security in Europe.<sup>28</sup>

Reciprocal visits by party and government leaders of the socialist countries and exchanges of views on fundamental issues of foreign policy and international relations cleared the way to corporate decisions on pressing problems, agreement and the working out of a common political line on crucial international issues. These reciprocal visits became a tradition, evolving into not only a major means of resolving the political problems arising in the relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries but also a means of exchanging experience. Visits by party and government delegations began to play a large role in the political cooperation among socialist states.

Members of the Political Bureau, the Secretaries of the Central Committee, and many members of the CPSU Central Committee met regularly with leaders of the communist and workers' parties of almost all the socialist countries. Soviet party and government leaders visited Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and other socialist countries. In turn the USSR was visited by Fidel Castro, Nicolae Ceausescu, Gustáv Husák, Erich Honecker, Janos Kádár, Kim Il Sung, Le Duan, Yumzhagiin Tsendenbal, Todor Zhivkov, and other comrades. In 1957-1971 there were innumerable visits and talks between party and government delegations of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at summit level. These talks, held in a constructive atmosphere, covered questions related to the further expansion of cooperation among socialist countries, many international problems, and the situation in the international communist movement.

These friendly talks resulted in the signing of another series of important bilateral treaties or the prolongation of existing treaties.

The treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed on April 8, 1965 in Warsaw by the USSR and Poland to replace the treaty of April 21, 1945, provided for closer friendship and the promotion of all-sided cooperation between the two nations and within the CMEA framework in keeping with the principles of socialist internationalism. The treaty underlined the inviolability of the Oder-Neisse frontier.

The two countries pledged to pool all the means available to them against the threat of aggression from militarist and revanchist forces in

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, Issue XXIII, Moscow, 1970, pp. 39-41.

the FRG or states joining the latter in an alliance, and also immediately to render each other every possible, including military, assistance in the event any one of them was attacked.<sup>29</sup> There are similar provisions on cooperation and mutual assistance in the USSR's treaty with Bulgaria of May 12, 1967,<sup>30</sup> with Hungary of September 7, 1967,<sup>31</sup> with Czechoslovakia of May 6, 1970,<sup>32</sup> and with Romania of July 7, 1970.<sup>33</sup>

Moreover, the Soviet-Bulgarian treaty committed the signatories to promote goodneighbourly relations, understanding, and cooperation in the Balkans and the Black Sea area.

The USSR and Czechoslovakia signed an important treaty on May 6, 1970 in Prague, in which they reaffirmed the principles of the Bratislava Statement of August 3, 1968 on the collective defence of socialism in every socialist-community country. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, the treaty stated, proceeded from their understanding that the Munich agreement "was null and void from the very outset with all the attendant consequences".<sup>34</sup>

Somewhat earlier (on January 15, 1966) the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic signed a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance,<sup>35</sup> in which the two nations pledged to pursue a policy of maintaining and strengthening friendship and cooperation among Asian countries.

In the new treaties the Soviet Union and other socialist countries reiterated their fidelity to the aims and principles recorded in preceding treaties. These new treaties proceeded from the pressing tasks confronting the USSR and other socialist countries in upholding peace and security and safeguarding the revolutionary gains of fraternal peoples. Socialist internationalism, the idea of joint defence of the socialist gains of fraternal peoples, permeates the provisions of these treaties. "Together with the Warsaw Treaty, which will continue to be consolidated and improved," Leonid Brezhnev said on June 12, 1970, "these bilateral treaties constitute a wide-ranging, integral system of reciprocal obligations of socialist countries to each other and to the socialist community as their common achievement."<sup>36</sup>

With its great military and economic potential the Soviet Union is the most dependable bulwark of peace and security for socialist countries. "The Soviet Union," Janos Kádár said, "is the most power-

<sup>29</sup> *Pravda*, April 10, 1965.

<sup>30</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXV, Moscow, 1972, pp. 35-37.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 38-40.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, Issue XXVI, Moscow, 1973, pp. 41-44.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 37-39.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, Issue XXIV, Moscow, 1971, pp. 37-39.

<sup>36</sup> L. I. Brezhnev. *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1972, p. 53 (in Russian).

ful bastion of the peoples of socialist countries and also of nations fighting for independence, a bastion of all progressive aspirations, of all people fighting for lasting peace, against the threat of a world war."<sup>37</sup>

Mutual support in foreign policy issues, in the settlement of international problems is one of the hallmarks of socialist foreign policy and diplomacy. This mutual assistance has time and again halted imperialist aggressive designs against socialist countries and brought about the failure of attempts of all sorts to bring pressure upon them.

"The combined forces of the socialist camp," the Programme of the CPSU states, "are a sure guarantee for each socialist country against encroachments by imperialist reaction. The consolidation of the socialist countries in a single camp, its increasing unity and steadily growing strength, ensures the complete victory of socialism and communism within the framework of the system as a whole."<sup>38</sup>

Also, in the CC report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU it was noted that the "armed forces of all allied powers are in a state of high readiness and are capable of guaranteeing the peaceful endeavour of the fraternal peoples".<sup>39</sup>

The consolidation of the international position held by each socialist country was the direct outcome of the formation and development of the socialist world system.

For the first time ever these countries acquired a dependable safeguard of their security and durable national independence. Formerly, the threat of aggression from German imperialism had hung like the sword of Damocles over the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and other peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe. Now their security was guaranteed by the combined might of the socialist community, including the great strength of the Soviet Union. The socialist nations were delivered once and for all from uncertainty of the future. As a member of the family of socialist states each nation, each socialist country looked to the future with confidence. The defence capability of each socialist country was now determined not only by its own military and economic potential but also by the potential of the entire socialist community. The security of the socialist countries was now guarded by the gigantic missile-nuclear strength of the Soviet Union. In this new situation the European socialist countries had the possibility of considerably enhancing their security with incomparably less

<sup>37</sup> *Messages of Congratulations to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the 50th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution*, Moscow, 1967, p. 15 (in Russian).

<sup>38</sup> *The Road to Communism*, p. 465.

<sup>39</sup> *24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, Moscow, 1971, p. 12.



outlays on defence requirements than had they not been members of the socialist camp. Membership of the socialist community now enabled the socialist states to use much more additional material and labour resources for the development of their economy and culture. Soviet might now served the defence of all countries that took the road of socialist development. The Soviet Union now stood guard over world peace and the great gains of world socialism.

The role played by the CPSU and the Soviet state was noted also at the 1960 International Meeting of Communist Parties in Moscow. Its Declaration stated that the CPSU was and remained "the most experienced and steeled contingent of the international communist movement. The experience which the CPSU has gained in the struggle for the victory of the working class, in socialist construction and in the full-scale construction of communism, is of fundamental significance for the whole of the world communist movement. The example of the CPSU and its fraternal solidarity inspire all the communist parties in their struggle for peace and socialism, and represent the revolutionary principles of proletarian internationalism applied in practice".<sup>40</sup>

The unity and cohesion of the socialist countries was now the decisive factor strengthening the forces of peace, democracy, and socialism and promoting mankind's advance along the road of social progress. The experience of the socialist world system gave convincing evidence of the need for a close alliance and cooperation among all socialist countries, for the utmost unity of action by them in the struggle for peace and security and in the building of socialism and communism. Any step aimed at undermining this unity and violating the principles of fraternal friendship between the peoples of the USSR and other socialist states evokes serious alarm among these peoples, in the international working-class movement, and in progressive opinion throughout the world.

In 1968 the growth of the socialist world's strength induced its enemies to engage in a new subversion against it. This time they attacked the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, launching one of their largest subversive actions in a bid to breach the socialist community and thereby change the balance of strength in Europe in their favour. Thus, in 1968 Czechoslovakia became a major area of the struggle between the forces of imperialist reaction and counter-revolution, on the one hand, and the forces of socialism, on the other.

With active support from international imperialist reaction, internal counter-revolutionary elements managed to cause a political crisis in that country and create a serious threat to the revolutionary gains of the Czechoslovak people. "Weakness and absence of unity in the

<sup>40</sup> *The Struggle for Peace, Democracy and Socialism*, Moscow, 1960, p. 80.

leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia," Gustáv Husák said at a meeting in Moscow on October 27, 1969, "in which there also were right-opportunist and revisionist elements, opened up wide possibilities not only for right-opportunist but also for clearly anti-socialist groups of a counter-revolutionary character that were given every possible support and encouragement by imperialist forces in the West."<sup>41</sup>

Hiding behind pseudo-socialist slogans, these forces split the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, shattered the foundations of the socialist system in Czechoslovakia, undermined its allied links to the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and subverted internationalist relations with the world communist movement.

For that reason representatives of communist and workers' parties of six countries, including Czechoslovakia, met in conference in Bratislava in early August 1968 and reaffirmed that "they will never allow anybody to drive a wedge between socialist states and undermine the foundations of the socialist social system". Further, it was stressed that "support for and the consolidation and defence of the gains won by each people at the cost of heroic effort, of selfless labour, is a common internationalist duty of all socialist countries."<sup>42</sup>

In accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Bratislava Declaration allied troops entered Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This was an extraordinary but necessary step. It was an action of internationalist assistance aimed at defending the socialist gains and socialist state of the Czechoslovak people.

In its Main Document the 1969 Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties noted that the formation of the socialist world was part of the class battles on the world scene. It emphasised that the enemies of socialism would not abandon attempts to undermine socialist state power, wreck socialist transformations of society, and restore their supremacy. It declared that the "defence of socialism is an internationalist duty of Communists".<sup>43</sup>

A detailed assessment of the situation in mid-August 1968 is given in a document, "Lessons of the Crisis Development in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in Society After the 13th Congress of the CPC", adopted by the CPC Central Committee at a plenary meeting in December 1970. It declares that at the time Czechoslovakia was on the brink of a counter-revolutionary fratricidal struggle. Hence, the "entry of allied troops into Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 averted this bloodshed and, consequently, it was a

<sup>41</sup> Gustáv Husák, *Selected Articles and Speeches. October 1969-July 1973*, Moscow, 1973, p. 8 (in Russian).

<sup>42</sup> *Pravda*, August 4, 1968.

<sup>43</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969*, p. 23.

necessary and the only correct course".<sup>44</sup>

At a Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship meeting in Moscow on October 27, 1969 Leonid Brezhnev said that "the principled attitude of Communists, the unity of the socialist countries, and their internationalist solidarity proved to be stronger than those who wanted to reverse the history of Czechoslovak society and wrest power from the hands of the working class, from the hands of the working people. Counter-revolution did not and will never pass".<sup>45</sup>

Developments in 1964-1971 convincingly bore out the correctness of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist countries in German affairs. The need for consolidating the postwar realities in Europe, chiefly the existing state frontiers, was recognised as the only possible foundation for the promotion of relations between the countries of that key part of the world.

For the German Democratic Republic these years witnessed noteworthy progress in all areas of socialist construction and the final disruption of imperialist attempts to isolate this German state of workers and peasants and prevent its emergence on the international scene.

The GDR is now among the ten most highly industrialised countries in the world. By the close of the 1960s its industrial output level was higher than that of Germany on the eve of World War II. Social relations underwent further far-reaching changes. A new, socialist entity of people welded together by a lofty sense of patriotism and responsibility for the destiny of their peace-loving and hard-working country took shape and grew strong.

At its 7th Congress in April 1967 the Socialist Unity Party of Germany set the task of building a developed socialist social system in the GDR, and a socialist Constitution was adopted in 1968 by a referendum. This Constitution declares that the GDR's policy is oriented on serving the "cause of peace and socialism", promoting "mutual understanding and security among nations", and supporting peoples fighting for freedom and independence.

From its analysis of post-Second World War development 8th SUPG Congress drew the conclusion that history had pronounced its own judgement on the national question. As a result of the policy of the Federal government, all the irreconcilable class contradictions between capital and labour, contradictions implicit in the bourgeois nation, continued to exist in the FRG. In the GDR, on the contrary, the socialist revolution had led to a renewal of all aspects of life. With the establishment of the power of workers and peasants and the

<sup>44</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy and International Relations, A Collection of Documents, 1970*, Moscow, 1971, p. 19 (in Russian).

<sup>45</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course, Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 2, p. 475 (in Russian).

building of a socialist society, a socialist nation had taken shape in the GDR.

The SUPG programme and the resolutions of its congresses make the point that the GDR is an inseparable part of the community of socialist states and characterise the strengthening of cooperation and fraternal friendship with the USSR as the foundation ensuring the vital interests of the working class and all other citizens of the Republic. These principles are embodied in the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation signed by the GDR and the USSR in 1964.

On the basis of this treaty and other government agreements and understandings the relations between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic continued to develop with fraternal cooperation and socialist mutual assistance as their keynote. For the volume of trade, the scale of scientific and technological exchanges and cultural links the GDR holds first place in the USSR's relations with foreign countries.

In 1969 USSR-GDR trade amounted to 3,031,500,000 rubles, reaching a total of over 13,000 million rubles in the 1966-1970 period.<sup>46</sup>

Increasing headway is being made by new forms of economic cooperation—coordination of economic development plans and by cooperation and specialisation on the basis of agreements between individual ministries, government departments, and scientific organisations of the USSR and the GDR, and also within the CMEA framework. The two countries are focussing attention on the most up-to-date branches of science, technology, and industry.

Identity of aims in consolidating peace in Europe, strengthening the solidarity of the socialist community, and successfully building socialism and communism have, naturally, led to a steady deepening of the links between the CPSU Central Committee and the SUPG Central Committee and between the governments of the Soviet Union and the GDR. Meetings of leaders of the parties and governments of the two states, joint discussions, and the working out of a common approach to sensitive current problems have become an inalienable element of cooperation between the two countries. In 1964-1971 visits were paid to the GDR by L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, and other ranking Soviet party officials and statesmen, and the Soviet Union time and again extended a warm welcome to Walter Ulbricht, Erich Honecker, Willi Stoph, and other GDR leaders.

The GDR is active in international political, economic and cultural cooperation and is making a large contribution to the corporate steps taken by the European socialist nations to strengthen the cohesion of the socialist community.

<sup>46</sup> *Vneshnaya torgovlya*, No. 6, 1970, p. 54.

The Soviet Union and the GDR were among the countries that initiated and helped to carry through measures aimed at consolidating European security. They were among the first to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The GDR stands for the implementation of broad disarmament measures on German soil and for a final settlement in Europe through recognition of the results of the war and postwar development. In its efforts springing from its concern for peace and respect for other states and peoples, the government of the GDR enjoys the wholehearted support of the Soviet Union.

The early 1970s saw the total failure of the imperialist attempts to boycott and discriminate against the GDR on the international scene.

The GDR's international successes are closely linked to the Soviet Union's historic achievements in easing tension and making peace more secure. They spring from Soviet-GDR alliance and from the coordinated policy of the socialist community. The strengthening of the GDR is a major achievement of socialism and, at the same time, an expression of its people's determination to prevent further aggression from German soil.

The period we are reviewing witnessed a further reinforcing of the ties of unbreakable friendship between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic, an expansion and deepening of the all-round cooperation between them, and the further development of the friendly relations between the CPSU and the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party.

The Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and the Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation, signed in February 1946, provide the political and judicial foundation of Soviet-Mongolian relations. On the basis of these fundamental documents the USSR and the MPR have signed agreements on economic, scientific, technological, and cultural cooperation, on the training of Mongolian specialists, and on many other questions. The most important of these were the 1957 trade agreement, and the 1959 agreement on Soviet assistance in the development of virgin lands and in geological surveys, under which Soviet specialists and a large quantity of equipment were sent to Mongolia. This enabled the Mongolians rapidly to develop nearly 300,000 hectares of virgin land.

In the period from 1957 to 1970 the two countries signed a series of agreements on economic and technological cooperation envisaging a substantial increase of the volume of construction. Many thousands of Soviet specialists and workers were sent to Mongolia and large credits were granted to it. All this allowed Mongolia to speed up the building of the material and technical basis of its economy.

In agriculture cooperation followed the line of intensifying farming.

The Darkhan industrial complex has come to symbolise friendship and fraternal cooperation between the peoples of socialist countries.

Another large industrial complex was built at Choibalsan. Many large industrial enterprises sprang up in other parts of Mongolia. Large-scale construction proceeded in rural localities. During the period of its fourth five-year plan Mongolia used Soviet assistance to build 13,000 premises for livestock, some 6,000 wells and watering ponds, large state farms, and repair and other projects. Schools and hospitals were built in eight Mongolian villages as a gift to the Mongolian people.

Friendly visits by statesmen did much to promote Soviet-Mongolian relations.

A Mongolian party and government delegation led by Yumzhagiin Tsendenbal visited the Soviet Union in April 1965 and resolved many basic questions pertaining to the further expansion of political and economic cooperation between the two countries.

A friendly visit to Mongolia by Leonid Brezhnev at the head of a party and government delegation in January 1966 contributed a vivid page to the chronicle of Soviet-Mongolian friendship. The most important result of that visit was the conclusion of a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which opened up new, broad possibilities for the promotion of Soviet-Mongolian relations. Developments have borne out the significance of that document.

Mongolia's advances in socialist construction and its close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other fraternal states contributed to the growth of its international prestige. In 1961 it was admitted to the United Nations Organisation and in 1962 to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It is a member of many other international organisations and has diplomatic relations with 50 nations.

Soviet recognition of the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on January 30, 1950 consolidated the bonds of friendship between the two countries. In 1955 the USSR was visited by a DRV government delegation led by President Ho Chi Minh. As a result of the talks during that visit the Soviet government granted the DRV 400 million rubles as gratuitous aid and pledged to provide assistance in training Vietnamese specialists and also technical and other assistance. In 1955-1965 the USSR gave the DRV easy-term credits and gratuitous assistance amounting to nearly 320 million rubles. Over 3,000 Soviet specialists worked in the DRV, helping to build that nation's industry and train personnel.

In 1955-1970 the Soviet Union helped to build 122 industrial projects and 37 state farms. It supplied the DRV with farm machinery, mineral fertilisers, mining equipment, vehicles, large quantities of food, and many other commodities and materials. Highly skilled specialists were trained for the DRV in the Soviet Union.

Cooperation between the two countries expanded markedly following the beginning of the US aggression. The USSR firmly sided with this fraternal nation and gave it diverse military and economic

assistance to enable it to repulse aggression and fight for the liberation of South Vietnam.<sup>47</sup> Soviet diplomacy took effective steps to isolate the aggressor politically and mobilise world opinion and all peace forces in support of the just struggle waged by the Vietnamese people.

In January 1965 a meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in the Polish capital demonstrated the unbreakable unity of that organisation's member countries against imperialist aggression. The Political Consultative Committee declared that "in the face of the imperialist threat the socialist countries are completely and solidly united and the attempts of the imperialist circles to undermine this solidarity are doomed from the start".<sup>48</sup>

At its sitting in Bucharest in July 1966 the Political Consultative Committee reiterated its principled stand on the Vietnam question and warned the US government "of the responsibility it was assuming before the whole of mankind by continuing and escalating this war, for all the unforeseen consequences that may arise from this, including for the USA itself." It issued an analogous warning about the US actions to spread the war to Laos and Cambodia. The Warsaw Treaty nations declared that it was their intention to continue extending all possible assistance to the DRV "with account of the requirements engendered by the new phase of the war in Vietnam" and also their readiness, "if this is requested by the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam", to permit volunteers to go to Vietnam.<sup>49</sup>

Support from the Soviet people, Le Duan said at the 24th Congress of the CPSU, was "a powerful stimulus inspiring the people and soldiers of our entire country to further, still greater victories; moreover, it elicits among the Vietnamese people a deeper affection for the fraternal Soviet people".<sup>50</sup>

Close friendship and diversified cooperation characterised the Soviet Union's relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. Economic relations expanded steadily. With Soviet technical assistance socialist Korea rose virtually from ruins, building more than 50 large new industrial enterprises and 30 other economically important projects. These included the Pukchan thermal power station, an oil-refinery at Ungi, and the entirely reconstructed Kim Chak Iron and Steel Works.

Soviet-Korean economic cooperation was given a powerful boost in 1967 when the bilateral inter-governmental consultative commission on economic, scientific, and technological questions was set up. This commission helps to bring to light new potentials for expanding

<sup>47</sup> Soviet-Vietnamese relations and Soviet support for the struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against imperialist aggression are discussed in some detail in Chapter XXXI.

<sup>48</sup> *Pravda*, January 21, 1965.

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, July 8, 1966.

<sup>50</sup> *Pravda*, April 1, 1971.

mutually beneficial cooperation in various economic spheres and for going over to new economic links.

The government of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea put on record its high appreciation of the Soviet specialists working at new projects in socialist Korea: 400 Soviet citizens were decorated with Korean Orders and medals in 1970-1972.

The Soviet Union holds first place in the Republic's foreign trade, accounting for 40 per cent of that trade.

Effective Soviet support for the People's Democratic Republic of Korea on the international scene is helping to enhance socialist Korea's prestige and consolidate its political positions in the world. The Soviet Union vigorously backs the efforts of the Korean people to improve the situation in the Korean Peninsula, secure the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Korea, and give the Korean people the possibility for settling the problem of the country's peaceful, democratic reunification without foreign interference.

"In the last few years," noted the CC report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "our ties with the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Korean Party of Labour have grown, and this, we are sure, meets the interests of the peoples of both countries. The Soviet Union has supported and continues to support the proposals of the KPDR government on the country's peaceful, democratic unification, and the Korean people's demands for a withdrawal of US troops from the south of Korea."<sup>51</sup>

### **The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Cuba**

In the period under review the development of the socialist world system was characterised by its spread to a country of the Western Hemisphere. In Latin America the growth of the national liberation movement was marked by the triumph of the Cuban revolution. The reactionary regime of the dictator Fulgencio Batista, a puppet of US monopolies, was overthrown in Cuba on January 1, 1959. The national liberation movement culminated in the victory of the people's revolution. A revolutionary government headed by Fidel Castro Ruz was formed.

The Soviet Union recognised the new government on January 10, 1959 and established diplomatic relations with Cuba. In April 1961 Fidel Castro proclaimed that the character of Cuban revolution was socialist. "The Cuban revolution has broken the chain of imperialist oppression in Latin America and has led to the establishment of the first socialist state on the American continent, marking a historic turning point and opening in this region a new phase of the revolu-

<sup>51</sup> 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 15.



tionary movement.”<sup>52</sup>

The triumphant outcome of the revolution in Cuba evoked the hate of the imperialists in the USA and they brought their entire armoury of means of political blackmail and economic pressure into play, stage-managing counter-revolutionary conspiracies. A report drawn up by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence noted that in the period from 1960 to 1965 the CIA organised and tried to realise a series of plots and acts of terrorism aimed at removing Fidel Castro. “We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro,” the report stated. For various reasons beyond the CIA’s control, these plots failed.<sup>53</sup> In parallel with political pressure and threats, the USA had recourse to an economic blockade of Cuba, counting on subverting the nation’s economy, generating economic difficulties artificially, and thereby compelling the Cuban government to capitulate. This was the USA’s aim when it went back on its commitments to import Cuban sugar, the main source of Cuba’s national income. As a nation dependent on the import of food and other commodities, Cuba cannot exist without exporting sugar. Knowing this, the USA in 1960 cut the Cuban sugar purchases quota by 95 per cent and placed an embargo on the sale of industrial equipment and other items to Cuba. This put Cuba in an extremely difficult position.

Diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and substantial disinterested economic assistance from the USSR allowed Cuba to withstand the imperialist pressure and cut short the economic aggression undertaken by the USA to strangle the Cuban revolution.

Ever since the proclamation of the Cuban Republic the Soviet government has bent every effort to help Cuba break the economic and trade blockade imposed by US imperialism. It helped Cuba end its isolation on the world scene. Relative to Cuba the USSR pursues a policy of extending disinterested fraternal assistance for the building of socialism in that country.

A trade and payments agreement was signed on February 13, 1960, creating the conditions for close economic cooperation with the USSR and assuring Cuba of Soviet economic assistance.<sup>54</sup>

It was in fact Cuba’s first-ever agreement founded on equality and mutual benefit. For a five-year period (1960-1964) this agreement guaranteed that Cuba would annually export a million tons of unrefined sugar and import Soviet industrial plant, and receive currency and other benefits. Fidel Castro described this agreement as “one of

<sup>52</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties*, Moscow, 1969, pp. 29-30.

<sup>53</sup> *New Times*, No. 49, 1975.

<sup>54</sup> *Pravda*, February 15, 1960.

the most advantageous agreements signed by the Republic".<sup>55</sup>

It provided for the purchase of Cuban sugar in exchange for Soviet supplies of the commodities needed by Cuba and also credits amounting to 100 million dollars to enable Cuba to purchase equipment and other goods in the USSR. An agreement on the supply of Soviet oil to Cuba was signed in June 1960. In 1960 the USSR began exporting to Cuba up to 5 million tons of oil and oil-products and importing between two and three million tons of Cuban unrefined sugar annually. Cuba received significant support also from other socialist-community states. Fidel Castro spoke highly of this support, saying on December 3, 1971: "At crucial moments of our revolution, at moments when the life and death of our country was at stake, when we were denied our entire sugar quota, when we were denied oil and our people were doomed to death from starvation or extermination, when preparations were being made to invade us, we got the Soviet market and fuel from the Soviet Union... Unfailingly, throughout all these years, it gave us the greatest assistance, which was unquestionably permeated with the spirit of internationalism."<sup>56</sup>

The Cuban people's liberation struggle against US imperialism had the complete understanding and vigorous support of the Soviet Union. Not confining itself to extending economic assistance to Cuba, the Soviet Union warned the aggressive circles in the USA that it was prepared to take the most determined steps to ensure Cuba's independence. In July 1960 the Soviet government used the occasion of a visit to the USSR by the Cuban Minister for Revolutionary Armed Forces Raoul Castro to assure the government of Cuba of its support.

Relative to Cuba the Kennedy administration, which took over from the Eisenhower administration in January 1961, continued the aggressive course that underlay the abortive policy of its predecessor.

On April 17, 1961 Cuba was piratically attacked by armed interventionists, who were given cover by US warships and aircraft.

On the next day, April 18, 1961, the Soviet government issued a

<sup>55</sup> *Noticias de Hoy*, February 20, 1960, p. 8.

An important element of the trade relations between the USSR and Cuba was the agreement on Soviet-Cuban trade for 1973-1975 signed in 1972. In order to facilitate the development of Cuba's socialist economy the Soviet Union established, on its own initiative, stable prices for the Cuban sugar imported by it, prices that were higher than those in the world sugar market. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries paid for their imports of Cuban sugar with supplies of vital commodities at a rate of 120 rubles per ton, while in the capitalist world market the price of unrefined sugar was much lower, sometimes dropping to 40-35 dollars per ton.

<sup>56</sup> Fidel Castro, *The Strength of Revolution Lies in Unity*, Moscow, 1972, p. 384 (Russian translation).

statement in which it unmasked US assistance for the interventionists, declared that it was determined to extend all the necessary assistance to the Cuban people in their struggle for freedom and independence, and demanded the termination of the aggression against Cuba. "Cuba is not alone", the statement said.<sup>57</sup> The USA could do nothing but to back down.

However, as further developments showed, the failure of the April invasion did not stop the US imperialists in their attempts to stifle revolutionary Cuba. They embarked on preparations for another attack, this time with the use of their own ground forces.

In this strained situation the Soviet Union helped Cuba to build up a strong army to guard the revolutionary gains of the Cuban people. In the summer of 1962, with the threat from the USA steadily mounting, Cuba requested additional assistance from the USSR. The two countries quickly reached an understanding on some new measures to strengthen Cuba's defence capability. On October 22 the Kennedy administration announced that it had imposed a blockade on Cuba, a blockade which was called "quarantine" to deceive public opinion.

The imposition of a blockade in peacetime is a glaring infraction of international law. Moreover, the USA began concentrating armed forces in the Caribbean and alerted its troops in Europe, the 6th and 7th fleets, and airborne, infantry, and armoured divisions, and also its air force. The threat of invasion hung over Cuba.

In the face of these menacing military preparations the Soviet Union was compelled to take defensive measures. In a statement on October 23 the Soviet government strongly warned the US administration that "it was assuming a serious responsibility for the destiny of peace and rashly playing with fire".<sup>58</sup> Further, it called upon all governments and peoples to "protest against the aggressive actions of the USA against Cuba and other countries, emphatically condemn these actions, and prevent the US government from unleashing a thermonuclear war".<sup>59</sup> The Soviet representative in the United Nations was instructed to demand the immediate convocation of the Security Council to consider the USA's violation of the UN Charter and its threat to peace.

The Soviet peace initiative aimed at settling the Cuban crisis received the wholehearted support of socialist countries and many other UN member states.

There was an exchange of messages between the head of the Soviet government and the US President, in which an agreement was reached on a settlement of the Caribbean crisis. An invasion of revolutionary Cuba was thus averted.

<sup>57</sup> *Pravda*, April 19, 1961.

<sup>58</sup> *Izvestia*, October 24, 1962.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

This most severe postwar crisis, which brought mankind face to face with the threat of a world thermonuclear catastrophe, was settled as a result of the Soviet Union's firm and flexible stand, the Cuban people's determination to uphold the just cause of their country's independence, and support for this independence by the Warsaw Treaty nations.

The peaceableness and wisdom displayed during these anxious days by the Soviet Union and its government were highly appreciated throughout the whole world, by all mankind.

The peaceful settlement of the Caribbean crisis led to a strengthening of Cuba's international positions.

Fidel Castro's visit to the USSR in April-May 1963 was an important landmark in Soviet-Cuban relations. In the joint Soviet-Cuban statement, signed at the conclusion of the talks, it was noted that the two sides were unanimous in their assessment of the existing international situation and held identical positions in the struggle to preserve and consolidate peace.<sup>60</sup>

Further, the statement underlined the successful expansion of trade and economic relations between the two countries.

Soviet-Cuban friendship and all-round cooperation continued to expand in subsequent years. In the political sphere note must be made of the reciprocal visits by party and government leaders, including a ten-day visit to the Soviet Union (January 13-23, 1964) by Fidel Castro, Prime Minister of Cuba's revolutionary government. The joint communique, issued at the close of the Soviet-Cuban talks, stated that in the exchange of views on international issues the two sides had confirmed the identity of views expressed in the joint Soviet-Cuban statement of May 23, 1963. Concerning economic relations, the communique declared that the two countries had agreed to sign a long-term trade agreement.<sup>61</sup>

President of Cuba Osvaldo Dorticos Torrado visited the Soviet Union on October 14-17, 1964. The Soviet-Cuban communique on this visit noted that there was a comprehensive exchange of views on the further development and strengthening of fraternal links and businesslike cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.<sup>62</sup>

Raoul Castro, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Deputy Prime Minister, and Minister for Armed Forces, visited the Soviet Union in October-November 1965. Soon afterwards (in December 1965) a visit was paid to the Soviet Union by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Central Committee Secretariat of the Communist Party of Cuba, and minister.

<sup>60</sup> *Pravda*, May 25, 1963.

<sup>61</sup> *Pravda*, January 23, 1964.

<sup>62</sup> *Pravda*, October 19, 1964.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A.N. Kosygin, began a visit to Havana on June 26, 1967 on the invitation of the revolutionary government of Cuba. Major questions concerning bilateral cooperation and international problems were discussed during that visit.

The Soviet Union has invariably taken an emphatic stand in defence of Cuba's sovereignty and independence against the encroachments of US imperialism. For example, on August 9, 1964 the Soviet representative at the UN sent the Security Council Chairman a Soviet government statement concerning the anti-Cuban decisions passed on July 25 at an OAS Foreign Ministers Conference. This statement strongly denounced the USA's attempts to circumvent the UN Charter and use the Organisation of American States for its aggressive policy towards Cuba, a member of the United Nations Organisation. On May 30, 1966 a TASS statement condemned the provocations of the US military against Cuba.

Since the very first years of Cuba's independence the Soviet Union began extending it the most diverse assistance, and this was noted in the Soviet-Cuban communique of May 25, 1963, which stated in part that the Soviet Union was providing Cuba with the technical expertise for geological surveys, the enlargement and reconstruction of three metallurgical plants, the building of two large thermal power stations, the enlargement of its nickel, chemical, and fishing industries, priority irrigation and land drainage projects, and in the building of a machinery factory.

The USSR is helping Cuba to develop its machine-tool, metal-working, and spare parts industry. The building of a fishing base, the most sophisticated and largest in Latin America, was started in Havana in 1962.

The completion of the fishing harbour and effective Soviet assistance in training Cuban personnel enabled Cuba to increase its output and processing of fish seven-fold.<sup>63</sup> For their part, Soviet fishing organisations received the possibility of using the Havana port for repair and servicing of vessels, thus obviating the need for returning to Soviet ports. This is yielding a significant saving for the Soviet fishing industry.

Two agreements were signed by the USSR and Cuba in 1964: on cooperation in irrigation and land reclamation for 1964-1965 and on Soviet technical assistance in the building of industrial and other projects in Cuba. In particular, the USSR committed itself to reconstruct almost the entire Cuban sugar industry. The first stage of this reconstruction commenced as early as 1965 and envisaged the reconstruction of 60 refineries.

There was a further expansion of Soviet-Cuban cooperation in

<sup>63</sup> *Granma*, January 31, 1973.

1965-1969. This is illustrated, for example, by the protocol of September 20, 1965 on technical assistance for geological surveys in Cuba, and an agreement on an expansion of economic and technological cooperation (November 23, 1965). The USSR helped Cuba to build several communications projects, a large hospital at Holguín, a car-repair works, and many other projects.

The protocol of May 7, 1967 on the second stage of reconstruction of the Cuban sugar industry provided for a long-term credit to enable Cuba to import equipment.

Since 1959 the Soviet Union has been Cuba's main supplier of machinery and other equipment, including industrial plant, farm machinery, and vehicles, which meet the most vital requirements of the Republic's developing industry, agriculture, and transport.

In only the period 1959-1970 Cuba imported 60,000 tractors, more than 8,000 automatic loaders, and a large quantity of other equipment from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to build up new material and technical facilities for agriculture.

To mechanise the harvesting of sugar-cane the Soviet Union supplied Cuba with over 10,000 automatic loaders and 13,000 sugar-cane harvesters. Under the people's power Cuba's tractor fleet has grown from 2,000 to 50,000 units.

Mention must also be made of Soviet assistance in training skilled workers, engineers, and technicians for Cuba: in the USSR, where hundreds of young Cubans study, and at training centres set up in Cuba with Soviet help.

In the period from 1961 to 1972 more than 3,000 Cubans were trained in the USSR, and 342 Cubans took practical courses at Soviet institutions of higher learning and research institutes or completed post-graduate courses. Some 500 Cubans studied scientific and technological achievements and advanced expertise in various branches of the Soviet economy. In the 1972/73 academic year there were 736 Cuban undergraduates, 30 post-graduates, and 87 trainees at Soviet institutions of higher learning, and 457 young Cubans at Soviet technical, vocational, and other specialised secondary schools.<sup>64</sup>

A new impulse was given by the decisions adopted at the close of 1970 by the Soviet and Cuban governments to establish closer trade and economic relations and coordinate their economic development plans. This qualitatively new development of economic relations between the two socialist countries is characterised by a comprehensive approach to the study and solution of key problems of economic, scientific, and technological cooperation. The Inter-Governmental Soviet-Cuban Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation was set up on December 9, 1970

<sup>64</sup> *The Soviet Union and Cuba, 15 Years of Fraternal Cooperation*, Moscow, 1973, pp. 7, 43, 133, 147 (in Russian).

to give effect to these decisions.

An important indicator of the new quality of Cuba's cooperation with the USSR and other socialist-community states was its entry into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

### **Drive of the USSR and Other Warsaw Treaty Countries to Resolve the Problems of European Security**

The fact that two world wars broke out in and brutally ravaged Europe was what motivated the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to regard European security as one of the problems requiring an immediate settlement. As the Soviet government saw it, to ensure European security meant chiefly to end all revanchist doctrines and recognise the actual situation in Europe. It expressed readiness to reach agreement on an effective, all-embracing system of collective security in Europe as an alternative to the existence of confronting military blocs.

Together with other European socialist countries the Soviet Union took the initiative in raising the question of creating an international system of security in Europe. In the view of the Soviet government, genuine security can be assured in Europe only if this problem is resolved by all the European states acting in concert, on the basis of cooperation between East and West European countries. Peace in Europe cannot be regarded durable when one military group of European states is in confrontation with another, when an arms race proceeds, and troops are concentrated on both sides. The Soviet Union stressed that this situation was in conflict with European interests and was playing into the hands only of those who wanted to keep Europe in a state of political and military tension.

The Soviet government repeatedly stated that it was prepared to sit down with all European states to examine pressing European problems and map out concrete ways and means of forming a system of security in Europe.

The principal prerequisites for ensuring European security and promoting cooperation between the European states were, in the opinion of the Soviet government, recognition of the immutability of existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse frontier and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG, the unconditional recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state, and provisions barring the FRG from access to any type of nuclear weapon. Guided by the commitments undertaken by the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition to do everything to prevent German militarism from ever again threatening its neighbours and to preserve world peace, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries were resolute in their stand against the Bonn militarists obtaining nuclear weapons.

In January 1965 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee met in Warsaw and in response to the plans to form NATO multilateral nuclear forces and give the FRG revanchists access to nuclear weapons declared that the socialist countries would be compelled to take the necessary defensive measures to assure their security. This question received considerable attention at the next sitting of the Political Consultative Committee in Bucharest in July 1966. The organisation of a system of European and world security was given high priority in the CC report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. This report outlined a detailed programme for the creation of a dependable system of security in Europe.

The persevering efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons were rewarded with success. "The Warsaw Treaty countries," Leonid Brezhnev told the 24th Congress of the CPSU, "can also undoubtedly count among their political assets the fact that the plans which had existed within NATO to give FRG militarists access to nuclear weapons have not been realised."<sup>65</sup>

The Declaration on Strengthening Peace and Security in Europe, adopted at the Bucharest conference, was of great importance for the struggle of the socialist-community states against imperialism, for peace and security of nations. The significance of the Bucharest conference was chiefly that it convincingly demonstrated the unity of the Warsaw Treaty countries—this was the vital condition determining the efficacy of their joint efforts to preserve and consolidate peace, to avert another world war. The conference analysed the complicated international situation in detail and drew up concrete proposals whose implementation could eliminate the threat of war in Europe and beneficially influence the destiny of mankind.

The participants in the Bucharest conference found it necessary to lay special emphasis on their readiness to look, along with other countries, for mutually acceptable ways of strengthening peace in Europe and also their determination to "uphold, on the international scene, the course towards peace, international cooperation, and the unity of all freedom-loving and progressive forces, to fight imperialist aggression and the policy of diktat and coercion, and support the cause of freedom, national independence, and social progress".<sup>66</sup>

They solemnly reaffirmed that they were prepared to join in the simultaneous abolition of opposing military blocs: the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. However, since the nations of the North Atlantic bloc gave no sign of readiness to take such a radical step, the Bucharest conference advanced a new proposal, namely, that what should be dismantled simultaneously was not

<sup>65</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 330.

<sup>66</sup> *Pravda*, July 9, 1966.



the Warsaw Treaty and North Atlantic alliance as such but only their military organisations and that an immediate understanding should be reached on that score. Further, the Bucharest conference noted that significant partial steps towards military detente in Europe could be taken, namely, the dismantling of foreign military bases, the withdrawal of troops stationed in foreign countries, agreed scheduled cutbacks of the armed forces of the two German states, the creation of nuclear-free zones, and the adoption by the nuclear powers of commitments not to use nuclear weapons against countries in these zones.

The Bucharest conference put on its agenda the idea of convening a European conference to consider the question of security in Europe and organising European cooperation.

The USSR and the other members of the Warsaw Treaty felt that the creation of iron-clad guarantees of peace and security in Europe was a task requiring patient and constructive discussion by all the European countries. Consequently, the proposals in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration laid no claim to being regarded as a final and conclusive programme for the creation of a system of European security. But the approach of the Warsaw Treaty states to working out a programme for European security was realistic and prospect-oriented. At that stage their proposals were confined to defining the main areas in which steps could and should be taken to strengthen security in Europe.

The idea of strengthening European security was amplified at the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties at the close of April 1967. The statement adopted by it called upon all nations to recognise the postwar realities in Europe. The action programme proclaimed in this statement<sup>67</sup> opened up a concrete prospect for peace by suggesting the replacement of the military blocs confronting each other with a system of European security.

The problem of easing tension and of European security were on the agenda of Warsaw Treaty summits. They were examined, in particular, at the 1968 Sofia and 1969 Budapest sessions of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee. The Budapest message to all European nations on the convocation of a European conference on security, adopted in March 1969, declared that "for the European nations it is vital to prevent further military conflicts and consolidate political, economic, and cultural relations among all countries on the basis of equality and respect for independence and sovereignty. A sound system of European security would create the objective possibility and need for joint efforts in big projects in power engineering, transport, the water and air basins, and health protection,

<sup>67</sup> *Pravda*, April 27, 1967.

which have a direct bearing on the welfare of the population of the entire continent. It is precisely the points in common that can and should be the foundation of European cooperation".<sup>68</sup> European security and cooperation was considered also at the 1969 Moscow and October 1969 Prague meetings of party and government leaders of the Warsaw Treaty nations. The Prague meeting produced proposals for the agenda, composition, and other matters related to a conference on European security. It was stated that the Warsaw Treaty countries felt that it would be both possible and expedient for the USA and Canada to attend such a conference.

The European conference issue continued to be discussed in 1970, in particular at a Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Conference in Budapest on June 21-22, 1970. It drafted a memorandum, which was then forwarded to the governments of the nations concerned. In this important document the socialist countries suggested placing the preparations for a European conference on a practical footing and formulated their proposals for the meeting's composition and agenda.

The memorandum said that the European conference could be attended by all European states, including the GDR and the FRG, on an identical footing among themselves and on a par with other European countries, and also by the USA and Canada. Relative to the agenda, the Budapest conference proposed a discussion of the following questions:

- the safeguarding of European security and renunciation of the threat or use of force in relations between countries in Europe;
- an expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural relations on a basis of equality and aimed at promoting political cooperation among the European nations;
- the formation by the European conference of an agency for security and cooperation in Europe.

The conference expressed the hope that these proposals, which took the opinion of many interested countries into account, would be favourably received by the governments concerned.<sup>69</sup>

Six months later, in December 1970, the question of convening a European conference was discussed at a Warsaw Treaty summit in Berlin. The statement issued by this summit noted that the efforts of the socialist countries were effectively helping to improve the situation in Europe and implement the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. It expressed the confidence that a European conference on security and cooperation would be a major step towards stabilising peace in Europe. There was, therefore, no foundation, the statement noted, for losing time in convening the conference or for making any prior conditions.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>68</sup> *Pravda*, March 18, 1969.

<sup>69</sup> *Izvestia*, June 27, 1970.

<sup>70</sup> *Pravda*, December 4, 1970.

Further, it declared that "in the main, the agenda has been traced out, the composition of the participants in the conference has been determined, and a broad foundation has been laid for understanding and achieving positive results at the conference." In their final communique the participants in the Berlin summit unanimously reiterated their readiness to do everything in their power to consolidate the security of nations.

Jointly with the fraternal communist and workers' parties, the CPSU Central Committee had steadfastly insisted that concrete steps had to be taken to relax tension and strengthen European security, placing the convocation of a European conference on the order of the day as an urgent task. The Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Conference of February 18-19, 1971 noted that bilateral contacts had created the conditions for beginning multilateral preparations for a European conference.<sup>71</sup>

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The years from 1957 to 1971 were characterised by further advances in the development of the world revolutionary process. The most important event was the triumph of a socialist revolution in the Western Hemisphere: the first socialist state, the Republic of Cuba, came into being in Latin America. With assistance and support from the USSR and other socialist countries, the Republic of Cuba is now successfully building socialism. These years saw the socialist-community states registering new outstanding achievements. Economic cooperation among them now embraced not only foreign trade but also production. Economic development plans began to be coordinated on a larger scale. The USSR continued to extend considerable fraternal assistance to other socialist countries for their economic and cultural development. The socialist integration of the economies of the CMEA countries made steady headway.

Throughout these years much was done to enhance the Soviet Union's allied relations with fraternal socialist countries. New treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance were signed with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Mongolia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Effective all-sided cooperation among the socialist states was successfully served by the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and CMEA.

To a large extent the expansion of relations between socialist countries is facilitated by the regular constructive contacts and political consultations of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government with the fraternal parties and governments at the

<sup>71</sup> *Pravda*, February 20, 1971.

most diverse levels, including meetings at the level of party general and first secretaries.

These relations are being continuously improved and developed. "As any other historic phenomenon," Leonid Brezhnev said, "the community of socialist states is in the process of development. The fraternal countries forming it are growing strong and developing and the alliance between them is deepening. The links uniting them are growing increasingly more diversified and profound, and their cooperation and interaction in different areas of internal and foreign policy are improving."<sup>72</sup>

The development of the socialist system during these years was in striking contrast to the deepening crisis of capitalism. The growth of the socialist-community countries' might and international influence led to a further change in the balance of strength. The new constructive peace initiatives of the USSR and other socialist countries struck a crippling blow at the outdated cold war concepts and the policy of imperialist aggression.

Socialism's advantages and the expansion of cooperation and mutual fraternal assistance during these years enabled the socialist countries to achieve a higher rate of economic development, make further headway in the economic competition with capitalism, and increase the economic and military might of the entire socialist community. The socialist system thus became the decisive factor of the development of human society. On June 7, 1969 Leonid Brezhnev said, characterising this period: "The 1960s will occupy a special place in the history of world socialism. It was in this decade that many fraternal countries completed the foundations of socialism and went over to the building of developed socialist society. As it matures the socialist system more and more fully reveals the advantages of its economic, social and political organisation and its inherent genuine democracy. All this is a tangible and weighty contribution to our common cause, the cause of consolidating the anti-imperialist front."<sup>73</sup>

The Soviet Union and other socialist-community states acted and continue to act in concert in the struggle for peace, for the settlement of key international problems by peaceful means. These joint actions and mutual support in questions of foreign policy have frustrated many of imperialism's aggressive designs and helped preserve peace and relax international tension.

<sup>72</sup>L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 5, Moscow, 1976, pp. 416-417 (in Russian).

<sup>73</sup>L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 163.

## CHAPTER XXIX

### NEW SOVIET INITIATIVES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DISARMAMENT (1959-1971)

#### Soviet Proposals on General and Complete Disarmament at the 14th UN General Assembly

In 1959 the Soviet government took a new important initiative in its efforts to ensure disarmament and avert the threat of war. The tense cold war atmosphere generated by the imperialist powers, the continued stockpiling of colossal quantities of atomic and hydrogen bombs, and the development of ultra-effective means of delivering these bombs were creating a serious threat to the nations of the world. Increasingly, this situation demanded resolute action by all the peace forces. Concerned for the destinies of peace, the Soviet government had to face the fact that almost 14 years of talks on disarmament in the UN agencies had, owing to the Western posture, yielded practically no results and produced a deadlock.

In the period we are reviewing the Soviet Union had recourse to the most diverse variants for resolving the problem of disarmament in order to induce the Western powers to agree to a reduction of armaments and armed forces, to steps to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war. It suggested the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons as a starting point. The Western powers rejected this approach, asserting that it would be disadvantageous to them because the USSR had the edge in conventional armed forces. The Soviet Union then suggested beginning with an agreed reduction of conventional armed forces and then going over to the elimination of atomic and hydrogen bombs. But this was also rejected by the Western powers. Further, the Soviet Union proposed the adoption of at least some initial, partial measures that could improve the international situation, on which the Western powers had earlier insisted in words. But no sooner were the relevant proposals made by the Soviet Union than the USA and its allies rejected even an understanding on the partial measures they had spoken about at length as being vital.

After weighing the international situation and the experience of past negotiations on disarmament, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government drew the conclusion that further efforts had to be made to resolve the increasingly urgent problem of disarmament and that the surest step in the existing situation would be to propose an international agreement on the *general and complete disarmament of all nations*, i.e., the destruction of all means of warfare and thereby excluding the possibility of war.

At a plenary sitting of the 14th UN General Assembly in New York on September 18, 1959 the USSR submitted a Declaration on General and Complete Disarmament.

This Declaration contained an enlargement on the basic ideas of the draft Convention on General and Complete Disarmament submitted by the Soviet Union in February 1928 to the fifth session of the Preparatory Commission and Conference on Disarmament. It offered convincing arguments in favour of such disarmament, stating in part: "The confrontation of power groups, within which tens of states are linked by mutual military commitments, and the dramatic advance of military technology—all this requires bold and far-reaching decisions to ensure peace."

Further, the Declaration noted that "any inequality of terms and the possibility of creating any military advantages for a group of countries are totally ruled out" in the implementation of general and complete disarmament.<sup>1</sup>

The substance of the Soviet proposals was that all countries should disarm completely, i.e., disband all their armed forces and destroy their armaments so that they would no longer have the means for conducting war.

The Soviet Union proposed the abolition of armies, navies, and air forces, the dismantling of general headquarters and military schools so that countries would only have the minimum internal defence (militia, police) contingents equipped with small arms and designated for the maintenance of domestic law and order.

Further, the Soviet proposals envisaged the destruction of all existing atomic and hydrogen bombs, military missiles of every range, and also all means of chemical and bacteriological warfare: poison and asphyxiating substances, and artificially developed lethal bacteria, which have the potential to spread terrible epidemic diseases. The USSR proposed that henceforth nuclear energy should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that missiles should be retained solely as a means of transport and space exploration for the welfare of all mankind.

It proposed that all these measures should be carried out under strict inspection by a special international agency composed of representatives of all countries and vested with wide powers and potentialities. It suggested that the volume of inspection and verification should conform to the level of phased disarmament. Upon the consummation of general and complete disarmament the international inspection agency would have free access to all installations subject to inspection.

It was proposed that the programme for general and complete disarmament should be consecutively phased and carried out as

<sup>1</sup> *Izvestia*, September 19, 1959.

quickly as possible—within four years. At the first phase there would be a drastic cutback of the numerical strength of the armed forces of all countries (including the USSR, the USA, and the People's Republic of China to a level of 1,700,000, and Britain and France to a level of 650,000 effectives each) with the corresponding reduction of armaments and military equipment. The second phase would see the abolition of the remaining armed forces and the destruction of conventional armaments, including military bases on foreign territory, while for the third phase it was planned that all forms of nuclear, missile, chemical, and bacteriological weapons would be destroyed and military institutions, departments, and military training abolished.

Such was the programme for general and complete disarmament proposed by the Soviet government to the United Nations. The Soviet Union urged that its implementation should be started without delay.

These Soviet proposals were a *new stage* of the Soviet Union's efforts to deliver mankind from the continuously growing burden of the arms race and the danger of wars of annihilation. It came forward with these proposals at a time when the balance of world strength had changed dramatically; the socialist world system had begun to turn into the decisive factor of world development. The problems of war and peace could no longer be approached solely from the standpoint of the operation of the predatory laws of capitalism. The enhanced might of the socialist countries had created a solid foundation for the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The USSR had begun the full-scale building of communism stronger than ever before and with its socialist economy, science, and culture flourishing. Its achievements in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the development of pin-point-accuracy intercontinental ballistic missiles and space vehicles, the launching of the world's first manmade earth satellites, and the sending of a rocket to the Moon were all eloquent evidence of its impressive successes in key sciences and the most up-to-date technology, including military technology. The USA lost its relative strategic invulnerability with the appearance of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The strategic balance of forces changed in favour of the socialist community. This was not denied even in US ruling circles. In early 1960 Thomas S. Gates, Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower administration, acknowledged at a hearing of a Senate committee that the USA was helpless against intercontinental ballistic missiles fitted with nuclear warheads, while General Thomas S. Power, who headed the US Strategic Air Command, declared that the USSR could wipe the US strike force from the face of the earth in a matter of 30 minutes.

But none of this induced the Soviet Union to use the language of military threats. On the contrary, it redoubled its calls to the peoples and governments of all countries to live in peace, to destroy all kinds of weapons, so as to free the world once and for all from the threat

of a horrible missile-nuclear war.

Throughout the world people responded warmly to the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament. A powerful movement for the acceptance of the Soviet proposals swept across all countries. The Soviet disarmament plan "has now gone deep into the hearts of all nations," the Mexican newspaper *Popular* wrote in early November 1959. "Millions upon millions of people are becoming supporters of the Soviet idea of three-phased general and complete disarmament in four years." "The Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament have been almost unanimously approved by public opinion in all parts of the world," declared the Rangoon newspaper *Burman*. Even *The New York Times*, which is close to official circles in the USA, admitted that the simple and clear Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament had strongly impressed many people, particularly in the neutral countries.

Immediately after the Soviet proposals on general and complete disarmament were submitted to the 14th UN General Assembly the governments of the socialist community nations declared their total support for them and called for their implementation. In a declaration on February 4, 1960 the Warsaw Treaty countries noted: "The disarmament proposal submitted by the Soviet government to the United Nations Organisation expresses the common stand of the Warsaw Treaty countries, of all socialist states."<sup>2</sup>

Statements approving and supporting the Soviet proposals were made also by the governments of Indonesia, Afghanistan, India, Yugoslavia, the United Arab Republic, Guinea, Ghana, and other countries.

In Britain the Labour Party demanded that the government should "in principle accept" the Soviet proposals enunciated at the UN on September 18, 1959. The leadership of the Australian Labour Party demanded a discussion of these proposals in the UN in order to reach complete agreement on them. The Consultative Council of the National Committee of the Democratic Party of the USA, which was then in opposition, declared that the US government should waste no time in using the Soviet disarmament proposals to the UN as the basis for negotiations.

The Soviet disarmament proposals received wide support in Japan. Large trade unions and the press expressed gratitude to the Soviet government for making their proposals in the UN.

In some countries religious organisations came out in support of the Soviet proposals. They were lauded by Geoffrey Francis Fischer, Archbishop of Canterbury.

Under the impact of world public opinion, which was demanding the acceptance of the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament, the governments of the Western powers did not venture

<sup>2</sup> *Pravda*, February 4, 1960.



to oppose them openly. They affected approval of the idea of general and complete disarmament but evaded adopting a concrete plan for such disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Union. Following the discussion of the Soviet proposals at the 14th UN General Assembly, a general resolution was passed on November 20, 1959 declaring in general terms that the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the world today and calling upon governments to make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem.<sup>3</sup> Under this resolution the General Assembly turned over the Soviet proposals and the disarmament proposals of other countries to the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee that was set up in the summer of 1959 by agreement between the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France.

In the General Assembly the resolution was passed unanimously. Not a single nation represented in the UN opposed the Soviet proposals openly. Moreover, after preliminary talks between the Soviet and US delegations in the UN the US government came forward together with the Soviet government as the co-sponsor of the resolution.

The adoption of this resolution on November 20, 1959 was of fundamental significance. It was the first time that all the UN members outlined a clear-cut goal—general and complete disarmament—and called upon all nations to achieve that goal as quickly as possible. This strengthened the stand of the proponents of disarmament and, to some extent, hindered the further manoeuvres of its opponents.

The Soviet proposals gave the peace forces of all countries a concrete action programme of struggle for lasting peace. However, a long and persevering struggle lay ahead for the implementation of that programme. Well aware that in the capitalist countries influential circles had taken a stand against the coexistence of states with different social systems, feared peaceful competition between the two opposing social systems, and were therefore opposed to disarmament and interested in sustaining the threat of war and in continuing the arms race, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries conducted an unflagging, vigorous struggle to expose these circles and meet the aspirations of the peoples, who wanted durable peace. General and complete disarmament became a pivotal objective of Soviet foreign policy.

The Soviet Union did not confine itself to calls for disarmament. It set an example of practical actions aimed at achieving disarmament, at creating the most favourable conditions for an international agreement on complete disarmament. On January 15, 1960, acting on the

<sup>3</sup> United Nations Resolutions adopted by General Assembly during its Fourteenth Session. 15 September-13 December, 1959, New York, 1960, p. 3.

recommendation of the Soviet government, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decided on a further substantial cutback of the Soviet armed forces, this time by 1,200,000 effectives, i.e., by one-third of their total numerical strength at the time the decision was passed. In addition, the Supreme Soviet called upon the parliaments and governments of all the nations of the world to respond to this new Soviet peace initiative and take practical steps to reduce their existing armed forces.

However, the Western powers did not reply to this Soviet initiative, continuing the arms race and increasing their military budgets.

Considerable diplomatic work in favour of general and complete disarmament was conducted by the Soviet government at bilateral talks with the governments of many nations of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America in the course of 1959-1962. Disarmament was a central issue of the meetings that Soviet leaders had with top-level statesmen of other countries. In the joint communiques signed by leaders of the Soviet Union, Guinea, India, Burma, Indonesia, Afghanistan, France, New Zealand, Cambodia, Italy, Austria, Finland, and other nations support was articulated for general and complete disarmament and a high assessment was given of the Soviet proposals on this question.

The Soviet government took special pains to explain its stand on the question of international inspection over the implementation of disarmament. This was necessary because while not venturing to speak openly against the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament the adversaries of disarmament sought to undermine trust for these proposals with allegations that the Soviet Union was proposing disarmament without inspection and intended to deceive the Western powers by inducing them to disarm unilaterally. These fabrications began to be articulated not only by the reactionary press but also by US and other Western statesmen.

Yet in the Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament submitted to the UN General Assembly on September 18, 1959 it was stated unambiguously that disarmament should proceed with inspection and verification by an international inspection agency composed of representatives of all nations. The volume of inspection and verification would correspond to the attained phase of disarmament, in other words, the disarmament measures conducted at the given moment would be inspected and verified. Further, in the Soviet programme it was underscored that the international inspection agency "would have all the material facilities for the conduct of strict inspection".

The Soviet attitude to disarmament inspection was enunciated by ranking Soviet officials in public statements, letters to foreign statesmen, interviews, and other pronouncements. It was stressed, in particular, that all disarmament measures should be under constant international inspection and that international inspectors would be

stationed in the countries concerned so that the disarmament treaty was implemented in full by every nation.

**The Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee  
and the Disruption of Its Work by the Western Powers.  
Soviet Disarmament Proposals of June 2, 1960**

The Disarmament Committee, composed of ten nations (the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, the USA, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada), to which the UN General Assembly had turned over the disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union and other countries, began its deliberations in Geneva on March 15, 1960.

The USSR and other socialist countries had agreed to participate in the committee in the hope of speeding the achievement of a concrete agreement on general and complete disarmament in accordance with the recommendations unanimously passed by the UN General Assembly. The Soviet representative was instructed to make every effort to facilitate productive work in the committee and ensure the speediest possible drafting of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The Soviet government thereby reiterated its readiness to give every consideration to the proposals of other nations for the attainment of this aim.

However, it proved that the Western powers had come to the Ten-Nation Committee with totally different objectives. Soon after the committee began its work it was found that the NATO countries, notably the USA, had no desire to speak of general and complete disarmament and were doing everything to avoid a discussion of the Soviet proposals.

They resorted to the old tactics of advancing not proposals on various disarmament measures but, in fact, solely, proposals for "inspection" of existing armaments, in other words, for a system of legalised military espionage. This inspection could yield nothing in the way of reducing the threat of war; it would only have whipped up the arms race. The so-called plan for general and all-embracing disarmament presented by the NATO members in the Ten-Nation Committee made no provision for destroying armaments—hydrogen and atomic bombs, missiles, aircraft, tanks, and warships.

The USA's obvious aim was to make the talks in the Ten-Nation Committee barren and, at the same time, protract them indefinitely as a cover for continuing the arms race. The provocative incursions of US U-2 spy planes into Soviet air space in April and May 1960, which wrecked a summit that was to take place in Paris in mid-May, showed clearly that what the USA was after was not disarmament but the maximum aggravation of the international situation.

However, the Soviet Union did not let itself be provoked. It

reiterated its desire to reach agreement on disarmament. It submitted new disarmament proposals, initially drawn up for the summit, to the governments of all countries and to the Ten-Nation Committee. These were the proposals of June 2, 1960.<sup>4</sup> They took account of de Gaulle's suggestion that disarmament should begin, at the very first phase, with the destruction of the means of delivering nuclear weapons—military aircraft, warships, missiles, and so forth—before nuclear weapons themselves were destroyed. The Soviet government declared that despite the USSR's superiority in the most sophisticated and effective means of delivering nuclear weapons, namely, intercontinental ballistic missiles, it was prepared to meet the French President's wish.

Moreover, the Soviet proposals of June 2, 1960 contained more detailed provisions on disarmament inspection as desired by the USA and other Western countries. They formulated a programme for international inspection of all disarmament measures. It was proposed that international inspectors should be stationed in such a manner as to enable them to begin carrying out their functions as soon as disarmament measures were started. The suggested volume of inspection was considerable, envisaging that at the very first phase the inspection agency would have unhindered access to factories and shipyards, earlier engaged entirely or partially in the production of missiles, aircraft, surface warships, submarines, and all other means of delivering nuclear weapons.

Also, meeting Western wishes the new Soviet proposals envisaged inspection that would ensure international peace and security when general and complete disarmament became a reality: it was suggested that whenever necessary countries would place at the disposal of the Security Council units from the contingents of police (militia) remaining after the completion of disarmaments.

These new Soviet proposals attracted the attention of political circles and public opinion in all countries and were properly assessed as further evidence of the Soviet Union's striving to achieve disarmament as soon as possible.

Statements in support of these proposals were made by the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Bulgaria, and other socialist community states. The government of Yugoslavia officially informed the Soviet government that it would wholeheartedly support its latest proposals, for they contained all the elements that could give mankind lasting peace and ensure peaceful cooperation among all nations. In a letter to the Soviet government the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that the Soviet proposals were a constructive approach to the disarmament issue and provided a sound basis for further negotiation. The government of Indonesia welcomed

<sup>4</sup> *Pravda*, June 4, 1960.

the Soviet proposals as an "effort genuinely aimed at bringing different postures together in order to materialise the idea of complete and general disarmament".<sup>5</sup>

However, the Western powers on the Ten-Nation Committee again in fact declined to consider the Soviet proposals.

The talks in the Ten-Nation Committee, which had been dragging out for months, showed that the Western powers had no desire either to ban or destroy nuclear weapons, to destroy conventional armaments or disband armed forces. Their "contribution" to the committee's work boiled down, as before, to repetitions, in different variants, of proposals on legalised espionage under the guise of "armaments inspection", and to attempts to justify their military preparations and the maintenance of a huge network of bases on foreign territories.

To continue these fruitless discussions in the Ten-Nation Committee would have been tantamount to helping the organisers of the arms race to delude the nation, to give people the false impression that something was being done to implement the UN resolution on general and complete disarmament. The fact that the Soviet Union, whose sincere desire for agreement on disarmament was well known, was a participant in the Ten-Nation Committee was used to mislead the peoples, as a screen for the arms race started by the West. The Soviet government felt that this was an intolerable situation. By agreement with the governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, which were likewise represented on the Ten-Nation Committee, it suspended its participation in the work of that committee, deciding to raise at the 15th UN General Assembly the question of disarmament and of the situation that had arisen over the fulfilment of the General Assembly's resolution of November 20, 1959 on this question. The Soviet statement, made in the committee on June 27, 1960, noted that the "Soviet Union has been and remains a consistent proponent of talks between nations on disarmament and is prepared to continue participating in such talks. But it wants talks that would contribute to a constructive and productive consideration of the disarmament problem instead of being reduced to empty argumentation". Further, it was stressed that "the question arises of enlisting some other nations, in addition to those represented on the Ten-Nation Committee, into the talks in the interests of progress".<sup>6</sup>

The other socialist countries represented on the Ten-Nation Committee likewise suspended their participation in the proceedings. This step by the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania,

<sup>5</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Letter of June 29, 1960 from the President of Indonesia to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

<sup>6</sup> *Izvestia*, June 27, 1960.

and Bulgaria was significant in that it exposed the tactics of deceit and demagoguery employed by the NATO powers in the disarmament negotiations.

In order to make the disarmament talks successful it was necessary to make them public, to bring them to the notice of public opinion throughout the world. Here the initiative was again taken by the Soviet Union, which in August 1960 suggested that the most senior statesmen should lead the delegations of their countries at the General Assembly and take a direct part in the quest for a settlement of the disarmament question.<sup>7</sup>

### The USSR and Disarmament at the 15th and 16th UN General Assemblies

Despite tenacious Western resistance, on Soviet initiative the 15th UN General Assembly, which opened on September 20, 1960, was attended by 10 heads of state, 13 heads of government, a number of the most prestigious ranking statesmen, and 57 foreign ministers. The disarmament question, which had been raised by the Soviet Union and attracted worldwide attention, became one of the central items of that session's agenda.

On this occasion, too, the Soviet Union, abided by its principle of approaching the disarmament issue constructively, without confining itself to general statements, on September 23, 1960, submitted a comprehensively elaborated proposal under the heading "Basic Principles of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament".<sup>8</sup> This draft was based on the Soviet proposals of June 2, 1960, but going further in meeting the Western stand, it contained some new important provisions that took this stand into account, in particular, the US and British contention that beginning with the first phase of disarmament it would be expedient to combine measures towards nuclear disarmament with measures towards the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

It was Soviet government's belief that even if a discussion of the entire problem of disarmament at plenary sessions of the General Assembly did not at once lead to a final settlement it would give a more specific orientation for further negotiations on disarmament. It was important that the agency which would adopt the final draft of a disarmament agreement should receive from the General Assembly lucid and binding instructions on the direction and goal of its work that would exclude evasions and misinterpretations on the part of wreckers of disarmament. Accordingly, on October 13, 1960

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, August 10, 1960.

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, September 25, 1960.

the Soviet delegation to the General Assembly submitted a draft resolution headed "On Disarmament and the Situation Relative to the Fulfilment of the General Assembly Resolution of November 20, 1959 on This Question".<sup>9</sup> This draft concisely and clearly enunciated the principles that should underlie the treaty on general and complete disarmament.

It noted also that it was necessary to restructure the UN Secretariat and the Security Council to allow the three groups of nations—socialist countries, members of the Western blocs, and neutral states—to be equitably represented in these agencies. This was dictated by the striving to create the certainty that the future international police (militia) armed forces were used properly. The raising of this question was a further indication that the Soviet approach to disarmament was not abstract: it was concerned with the feasibility of the disarmament programme being worked out.

In order to take all possible steps to prevent the barren word-banding of the Ten-Nation Committee from being repeated at the further disarmament negotiations and believing as justified that the agency drawing up the disarmament treaty should more accurately mirror the political face of the modern world, the Soviet Union raised at the 15th General Assembly the question of enlarging the composition of the Disarmament Committee. It suggested that in addition to the five socialist and five NATO states already participating in the negotiations the committee should include five neutral states from Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

At the 15th UN General Assembly, too, the Western powers had nothing to offer as an alternative to the detailed Soviet programme for general and complete disarmament and to the Soviet Union's reasonable and constructive considerations on how to expedite and advance the drafting of a disarmament treaty except the old talk about "inspection and verification". Their behaviour gave ample evidence that the ruling circles of the imperialist states did not want and feared disarmament.

The Western representatives repeated, as they had done time without number before, the assertion that the Soviet Union was proposing disarmament without inspection.

In continuing its unflagging efforts to have the programme for general and complete disarmament accepted and carried out, the Soviet Union clearly and exhaustively stated its stand on disarmament, including inspection and verification. On October 19, 1960 the Soviet representative V. A. Zorin told the Political Committee of the 15th General Assembly:

"We propose that as early as at the first phase of general and complete disarmament there should be international on-site inspection

<sup>9</sup> *Pravda*, October 15, 1960.

of the abolition of all means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, including the most sophisticated combat missiles. Moreover, we propose that international inspection teams should be sent to military bases and troop stations on foreign territories to observe the dismantling of these bases and the withdrawal of these troops to within their national boundaries. Further, we propose that there should be inspection at aerodromes and ports ensuring that these aerodromes and ports are not used for military purposes. We propose on-site inspection at all enterprises, factories, and shipyards designated for the production of missiles, aircraft, and other means of delivering nuclear weapons to the target, and we are prepared to reach agreement on the creation of permanent inspection teams at some factories and installations of this kind. The international inspection teams would be empowered to conduct comprehensive inspection of missile devices launched for peaceful scientific purposes and to be present when they are launched. International inspectors would have unhampered access to documents relating to the budget allocations of nations for military purposes. Lastly, we propose that there should be the necessary inspection of the disbandment of troops and the destruction of conventional armaments.

"We propose the organisation of similarly effective inspection of measures of the second and third phases. Also, we propose that the inspection system should continue to function even after general and complete disarmament is consummated, that it should conduct permanent observation so that no nation would resume military production or the building up of armed forces. We feel that this would be quite adequate."<sup>10</sup>

The Western powers feared meaningful disarmament talks and a wide discussion of the Soviet proposals to the extent that they sharply opposed the Soviet Union's offer to examine the disarmament problem directly at the General Assembly plenary sittings with the participation of the heads of state and government who had come to New York. However, the NATO diplomats could not prevent the Soviet Union from stating its stand on this question before all the delegates at the session. In fact, the disarmament problem was not only discussed at the plenary sittings; it was at the heart of the session's work.

The 15th General Assembly lucidly demonstrated that the majority of the UN members sincerely wanted general and complete disarmament and welcomed the Soviet Union's efforts to have the relevant agreement concluded as early as possible and get disarmament finally started. By their obstructionist tactics on disarmament, the USA and its allies found themselves, essentially speaking, in political isolation at the session, counterposing their view and will to the majority of mankind.

<sup>10</sup> UN Document A/C. 1/PV. 1085, October 19, 1960.



All the socialist countries represented in the UN unanimously urged the speediest implementation of general and complete disarmament. At the session the most prominent representatives of the neutral world likewise supported the Soviet stand on the question of general and complete disarmament.

When 12 neutral nations, including India, Indonesia, Egypt, Morocco, Iraq, and Ghana, presented a draft resolution on basic principles of general and complete disarmament, which they hoped would be a compromise solution acceptable to all sides, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries declared their positive attitude to this draft without equivocation. However, the NATO bloc was up in arms against this proposal as well. The Eisenhower administration openly opposed the adoption of any decision on general and complete disarmament. As a result, the 15th General Assembly failed to agree on directives for disarmament.

In order to miss no opportunity for agreement on general disarmament, the Soviet government regarded with understanding the new, Kennedy administration's request for time to reappraise the US stand on disarmament. It therefore did not insist on an examination of the substance of this question at the second session of the 15th General Assembly, which opened in March 1961. Meanwhile, the governments of the USSR and the USA agreed on an exchange of views on disarmament in the summer of 1961. In a special resolution the General Assembly gave its approval for this exchange.

Bilateral Soviet-US talks on disarmament were held in Washington, Moscow, and New York in June, July, and September 1961 respectively. At these talks the Soviet Union expressed the view that it was vital to have an international agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control as early as possible and presented detailed proposals on this question (including a proposal on verification). The US side refused to consider this programme, suggesting a discussion solely of general principles of disarmament. However, the "principles" proposed by it contained no provision either for the abolition of conventional armaments and armed forces, or the banning of nuclear weapons, or the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory.

The USA reconsidered its stand only at the last, New York, phase of these talks, finding that it had to meet the Soviet side halfway. As a result, the sides adopted a Joint Statement on Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations, which noted the need for agreement on a programme of general and complete disarmament that would include:

"disbanding of armed forces; dismantling of military establishments, including bases; cessation of the production of armaments; elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction; elimination of all means of delivery of

weapons of mass destruction."<sup>11</sup>

Further, it was declared that general and complete disarmament should be phased under a definite schedule and that at none of these phases should any nation or group of nations have a military advantage. However, the two governments failed to agree on the composition of the negotiating body. The Statement of Agreed Principles was submitted to the 16th UN General Assembly on September 20, 1961 as a joint Soviet-US proposal for a draft directive to a working body, whose function would be to draw up an agreement on general and complete disarmament. The Statement was approved by the Assembly.

The composition of the Disarmament Committee, a question which was not agreed upon at the Soviet-US talks due to the USA's intractable reluctance to accord neutral nations the right of equal participation in that body, was settled at the 16th General Assembly. The Ten-Nation Committee, consisting of five socialist and five Western nations, now became an Eighteen-Nation Committee, the new members being India, Burma, Brazil, Mexico, Sweden, Egypt, Ethiopia, and Nigeria.

At the 16th General Assembly, on September 26, 1961 the USSR presented a memorandum on nuclear weapons tests,<sup>12</sup> and a memorandum on "steps to relax international tension, build up confidence among nations, and thereby facilitate general and complete disarmament."<sup>13</sup>

- 1) a moratorium on military budgets (as of January 1, 1961);
- 2) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons;
- 3) prohibition of war propaganda;
- 4) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty nations;
- 5) withdrawal of troops from foreign territory;
- 6) measures against the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
- 7) creation of nuclear-free zones;
- 8) measures to reduce the danger of surprise attack.

On November 24 the General Assembly passed, by a majority vote, a resolution proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone and a declaration banning the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

The results of the 16th General Assembly thus attest to the fact that the Soviet Union and other peace-loving nations made some progress in their efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament. A growing number of nations, particularly neutral countries, supported the efforts of the socialist states to deliver mankind once and for all from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

<sup>11</sup> *Pravda*, September 22, 1961; Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1961, pp. 200, 201.

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, September 29, 1961.

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, October 1, 1961.

### The USSR's Struggle for General and Complete Disarmament in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and at the 17th UN General Assembly

The Eighteen-Nation Committee<sup>14</sup> began its sittings in Geneva in March 1962.

In order to maximise the effectiveness of this new body the Soviet government suggested that its deliberations be opened by the heads of government or state of the nations represented on it.

Kennedy and Macmillan did not support this proposal, thus making it obvious that they were reluctant to commit themselves to effort to make the talks successful. The Committee began its work at the level of Foreign Ministers and continued it at the level of deputy ministers and special representatives.

The Soviet government wanted the talks to be productive from the very outset, and on the day the Committee opened proceedings, March 15, 1962, submitted a circumstantial draft of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international inspection, in which, as A.A. Gromyko, who headed the Soviet delegation, said, "a programme of general and complete disarmament is enunciated article by article, paragraph by paragraph in the exact language of binding formulations".<sup>15</sup> This draft was based on the principles for general and complete disarmament that had been agreed upon between the USSR and the USA and approved by the 16th General Assembly.

Like the preceding Soviet proposals, it envisaged general and complete disarmament within four years in three consecutive phases. The first phase would see the elimination of all means of delivery of atomic and hydrogen weapons and the dismantling of all military bases on foreign territories, thereby removing the danger of a nuclear war. Each of the envisaged disarmament measures would be implemented from beginning to end under strict and dependable international inspection. With this draft the Soviet government solemnly reiterated its statements that it "is prepared to accept any proposal of the Western powers for disarmament inspection if these powers accept the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament".<sup>16</sup>

<sup>14</sup> Actually, only 17 nations were represented on the Committee, for the French government refused to send its representatives. However, France's seat on the Committee was reserved to it and the body was known as the Eighteen-Nation Committee. It got the name Disarmament Committee later, on August 26, 1969, when eight more nations were co-opted (the Mongolian People's Republic, Japan, Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia).

<sup>15</sup> *Pravda*, March 16, 1962.

<sup>16</sup> *Pravda*, March 17, 1962.

In keeping with the wishes of the Western powers the Soviet draft provided for a series of measures, to be implemented at the very commencement of disarmament, that would reinforce peace and security (banning the orbiting of carriers of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, international inspection of the launching of rockets for peaceful purposes, a commitment to refrain from transferring nuclear weapons to other states, and so on).

Moreover, the Soviet Union proposed the implementation, before the talks on general and complete disarmament were consummated, of some important measures that could help to upgrade confidence among nations and create more favourable conditions for disarmament, and an agreement on banning nuclear tests, the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Europe, and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO.

These detailed, carefully worked out Soviet proposals provided a sound foundation for constructive work by the Eighteen-Nation Committee aimed at the earliest drawing up of an international agreement on general and complete disarmament. That was why, despite Western opposition, the Soviet draft in effect became the basis of the work of the Disarmament Committee.

The NATO nations could not counter the concrete Soviet proposals except with the so-called Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, which was submitted by the USA in the latter half of April.

This document was a propaganda move to conceal the intentions of the USA and the other NATO nations to disrupt the efforts to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament. These deliberately vague US proposals in effect made no provision either for general and complete disarmament or for eliminating the threat of a nuclear war hanging over mankind.

The USA did not want any treaty that would commit all nations to dismantle their military machines within a specified time-limit. It refused to set an overall deadline for general and complete disarmament. The provisions of the US project were so worded as to give the Western powers the possibility of endlessly protracting disarmament or even halting the process at any moment they thought convenient. The registration of nuclear weapons for purposes of inspection was relegated to the close of the second phase. The elimination of these weapons was set for the third phase, whose duration was not specified. More, the US government insisted that after all nations had disarmed there should remain large international armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons. While suggesting a 30 per cent cutback of means of nuclear weapons delivery, including missiles, at the first phase, the USA laid claim to the retention of its military bases on foreign territory. This was obviously an attempt to gain a military advantage over the Soviet Union under the guise of disarmament.

Although the disarmament measures proposed by it were extremely limited, the USA demanded all-embracing international inspection, which could only be qualified as a system of intelligence. While the demands in the US project for self-sufficing armaments inspection were somewhat modified and presented as selective zonal inspection, their purpose remained clear, namely to collect military intelligence, in particular, to pin-point the deployment sites of Soviet missile-nuclear systems.

All these hallmarks of the US proposals, supported by the other NATO nations, were vividly and convincingly exposed by representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in the spring and summer of 1962.

However, motivated by its desire to facilitate agreement, the Soviet Union once again met its partners in negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee halfway by introducing important amendments in its draft treaty that took the Western views into account.

At the 17th UN General Assembly in September 1962 the Soviet Union took another major step to meet the Western wishes in order to speed up agreement on disarmament. Since at Geneva the USA had categorically objected to the elimination of all means of nuclear weapons delivery at the first phase and contended that a protective nuclear umbrella had to be retained for some time, the Soviet Union declared that to guard against possible violations of the treaty it would accept that the USSR and the USA should, as an exception, retain for a specified period a strictly limited, agreed number of intercontinental anti-missile and anti-aircraft ground-to-air missiles.

In a resolution passed on November 21, 1962 the 17th General Assembly repeated its call for an earliest possible agreement on general and complete disarmament. It urged the Eighteen-Nation Committee to resume its talks without delay and conduct them "expeditiously and in a spirit of constructive compromise, until agreement has been reached".<sup>17</sup>

But neither the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries nor the call of the General Assembly influenced the basically negative stand of the USA and the other Western powers. By the close of 1962 the Eighteen-Nation Committee had completed, in broad terms, only the preamble to a disarmament treaty and some general provisions.

Well aware that for all nations, for human progress it was vital to remove the threat of a nuclear world war, the Soviet Union did not relax its efforts to achieve an agreement on general and complete disarmament. A major milestone of these efforts was the World

<sup>17</sup> *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Seventeenth Session, 18 September-20 December, 1962*, UN, New York, 1963, pp. 4, 5.

Congress on General Disarmament and Peace, which opened in Moscow on July 10, 1962. The Soviet representatives at this congress comprehensively analysed the Western attitude to disarmament and clearly expounded the stand of the government and public opinion of the USSR, declaring that the Soviet Union was prepared to look for and find a mutually acceptable wording of all the provisions in the Soviet draft treaty and, where necessary, compromise if this did not prejudice general and complete disarmament.

In order to extend the front of struggle for general and complete disarmament as far as possible, make the purport of this struggle more understandable to the peoples of all countries, and pave the way to a disarmament agreement, the Soviet government submitted to the 17th UN General Assembly a new important proposal, namely, an economic programme of disarmament. In substantiating this new Soviet initiative, the Soviet delegate declared: "It is the view of the Soviet government that the United Nations Organisation should already now, without waiting for the consummation of the talks on general and complete disarmament, begin the elaboration of an international programme for the peaceful use of the funds and resources currently channelled for military purposes. The timely elaboration of this programme would make it possible not only to prepare the painless worldwide transfer of the economy of nations to peaceful endeavour immediately after an agreement on disarmament is reached but also help the peoples to have a better understanding of the need for and importance of disarmament, and thereby attract to the banner of peaceful coexistence and disarmament millions upon millions of new active proponents of this great cause."<sup>18</sup>

On December 14, 1962 the General Assembly responded to this Soviet move by unanimously passing a declaration on transferring to peaceful needs the funds and resources released as a result of disarmament. This document, drafted jointly by the Soviet and US delegations, calls upon the governments of all nations to redouble their efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control as early as possible. Moreover, the General Assembly recorded the conviction that the resources spent for military purposes (about 120,000 million dollars annually at the time) could be used for peaceful purposes in such a manner as to benefit all nations and lead to an improvement of economic and social conditions throughout the world, and that disarmament could be implemented in all countries not only without hurting their economies but also with immense advantage for the actual welfare of their peoples.<sup>19</sup> The declaration specially underscored the significance of using the money released as a result of disarmament for raising the living standard of

<sup>18</sup> *Izvestia*, September 22, 1962.

<sup>19</sup> UN Document A/5361.

the peoples of less developed countries. The declaration thus convincingly highlighted the economic significance of disarmament. It was hailed by most of the UN member nations and in fact formed the basis of a relevant international agreement drafted in the United Nations and other international agencies. Well aware of the enormous difficulties accompanying the solution of this problem in the modern world, in which rapacious imperialism was still strong, the CPSU and the Soviet government unswervingly continued their efforts to achieve the great aim of general and complete disarmament, which was vital to all the nations of the world. In these efforts the USSR had the close cooperation of other socialist countries and enjoyed the solidarity and support of all peace-loving, progressive nations, of millions upon millions of peace fighters on all continents. The question of drafting a treaty on general and complete disarmament was raised by the USSR in the UN and other international agencies. In February 1970, for example, the Soviet representative in the Geneva Disarmament Committee demanded the resumption of a detailed examination of proposed drafts and their coordination. This, he noted, was in keeping with the requirements of the world situation. Nations did not want to live in constant fear, with the threat of devastating wars.<sup>20</sup>

The CC report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU pointed out: "The struggle for the end to the arms race, both in nuclear and conventional weapons, and for disarmament—all the way to general and complete disarmament—will continue to be one of the most important lines in the foreign-policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet state."<sup>21</sup>

### **The Soviet Efforts To End Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Test (1959-1962)**

Parallel with its efforts to ensure general and complete disarmament, the Soviet Union continued its drive to put an end to atomic and hydrogen weapons tests. As early as March 31, 1958, at the suggestion of the Soviet government, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decision to "stop all types of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests."<sup>22</sup> Soviet-initiated talks between the USSR, the USA, and Britain on a cessation of nuclear tests had been going on in Geneva for more than three years (from the autumn of 1958 to the beginning of 1962). The story of these negotiations, which, as we have already noted, commenced with the submission of the Soviet draft for a test ban treaty, is one of persevering, unrelenting effort on the part

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, February 18, 1970.

<sup>21</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 353.

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, April 1, 1958.

of the Soviet Union to deliver the world once and for all from experimental explosions of atomic and hydrogen devices which contaminate the air, soil, and water of our planet, spur further perfection of weapons of mass destruction, and give an impetus to a nuclear arms race.

However, the Soviet Union's undissembling and clear stand encountered intransigent resistance from the USA, Britain, and their NATO allies. Throughout the Geneva negotiations the Western powers concentrated on hindering the elaboration of an agreement that could halt all nuclear tests. With various far-fetched arguments they dragged out the settlement of this question. Virtually all their proposals at Geneva were directed towards this end. On the contention that international control was indispensable they kept insisting on proposals that were in effect aimed at creating a system of legalised espionage against the USSR. They denied socialist countries the right to equal participation in international inspection agencies, sought to place the contemplated control agency under a single administrator through whom it would be possible to impose the Western will on the Soviet Union, and misrepresented the Soviet stand, alleging that the USSR was out to introduce the "veto" in control.

Entirely ignoring the fact that science and technology had reached a level making it possible to detect nuclear tests in any country with national means, the USA and Britain demanded an inordinate number of "verification" inspections on Soviet territory. Moreover, time and again they modified their own stand and dismissed the conclusions of their own experts. That was the situation, in particular, in early 1959 when the US government abandoned the recommendations it had endorsed together with the governments of the USSR and Britain relative to the detection of nuclear tests and, referring to "new seismic data", declared that underground tests were especially difficult to detect. This was a ploy to erect new obstacles to nuclear test ban.

To clear the way to an agreement acceptable to all the parties in the talks, the USSR subscribed to some Western proposals on important provisions of the test ban treaty that was being drawn up. This led to some progress at the first stage of the Geneva conference: by May 1959 the participants had reached agreement on 17 articles and the preamble of a nuclear test ban treaty.

Further, at the negotiations the Soviet Union advanced proposals that took the considerations of the Western powers into account. For instance, in April 1959 to settle the dispute over inspection the Soviet Union proposed using the idea, suggested earlier by the British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, of coming to an understanding on a system of selective checks, in other words, of annually conducting a specified small number of inspections on the territories of the signatory powers in the event data was obtained on phenomena that could be



regarded as nuclear explosions. Ceding to the wishes of the USA and Britain, the USSR agreed to talks between experts in the summer and autumn of 1959 on methods of detecting explosions in the atmosphere and on the scientific criteria for sending inspectors. Further, the Soviet Union in effect accepted the US proposal, submitted at Geneva in February 1960, for a "phased" cessation of tests with the reservation, however, that while the methods of detecting underground tests that did not come under the treaty were being studied, the powers involved would pledge to place a moratorium on such tests.

All these constructive Soviet proposals were either rejected out of hand or made the subject of further procrastination and endless arguments over minor technical matters, or given no answer at all. As a result, not a single new article of the draft test ban treaty was agreed in Geneva in the course of 1960.

At the Soviet-US summit in Vienna in the summer of 1961 the Soviet Union advanced a new proposal, namely, that since it was difficult to reach agreement on an end to nuclear tests this question should be resolved not separately but in the context of a treaty on general and complete disarmament. It was reiterated that if the Western powers accepted the proposal on general and complete disarmament the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept unconditionally any Western proposals on inspection and also their proposals on the cessation of nuclear tests. This would have been a radical solution removing all the difficulties confronting the three-power talks in Geneva.

But the USA and Britain obviously had no intention either of ending nuclear tests or, much less, signing a treaty on general and complete disarmament. They were categorical in their rejection of the new Soviet proposal as well.

Besides their wrecking tactics at the test ban negotiations in Geneva, the Western powers steadily stepped up their undisguisedly aggressive, provocative policy, aggravating the international situation and precipitating a new arms race, a further series of nuclear tests.

As early as December 29, 1959 President Eisenhower declared that as from the beginning of 1960 the USA would regard itself free from commitments to refrain from nuclear tests and at liberty to resume such tests at any time. This step was taken despite the UN General Assembly resolution of November 5, 1958 calling upon the participants of the Geneva talks not to resume the testing of nuclear weapons.

In the meantime, preparations were in full swing in the USA for a resumption of nuclear tests. In October 1960 John A. McCone, Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission, said that the tunnels and pits at the Nevada proving grounds were in readiness for new test

explosions.<sup>23</sup> In the summer of 1961 the US-led NATO nations began putting into effect massive military measures, including mobilisation and an intensified transfer of US troops to Europe. In connection with the situation in West Berlin ranking US officials threatened to start a war against the USSR. This left the Soviet Union with no choice but to look to the further strengthening of its own defence capability. It had no alternative to resuming nuclear tests. A statement on this question, issued on August 31, 1961, noted: "The Soviet Union has been compelled to take this step ... under pressure of the international situation being created by the imperialist countries.... In order to discourage the aggressor from criminally playing with fire he must be made to know and see that there is a force in the world fully armed and prepared to repulse any encroachment upon the independence and security of peace-loving nations and that the weapon of retribution will reach the aggressor in his own den."<sup>24</sup> At the same time, it was formally reiterated that the Soviet Union was determined to go forward with its efforts to create an atmosphere in which there would be no necessity for nuclear weapons tests and secure general and complete disarmament.

When the nuclear test ban negotiations resumed in Geneva on November 28, 1961 the Soviet Union came forward with new proposals. Underlying them were proposals made by Kennedy and Macmillan, who in messages to the head of the Soviet government on September 3 of the same year acknowledged that relative to atmospheric tests the USA and Britain were prepared to rely on existing means of detection, which they felt were adequate, and declared that they would not suggest additional control measures.<sup>25</sup> But while the US President and the British Prime Minister suggested confining the treaty to a ban solely on atmospheric tests, the Soviet Union proposed the immediate conclusion of an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, where they could be easily detected by existing national technical means. Relative to underground tests the USSR proposed that the nuclear powers take the commitment to refrain from conducting such tests until an agreement was reached on the relevant system of inspection within the framework of overall control of general and complete disarmament. Further, it raised the question of drawing France into the nuclear test ban negotiations.

The USA and Britain did not accept these proposals. Their response to them was the continuation of US underground nuclear tests started in September, and a Kennedy-Macmillan understanding on the

<sup>23</sup> *The Soviet Union's Struggle for Disarmament, 1946-1960*, Moscow, 1961, p. 411 (in Russian).

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, August 31, 1961.

<sup>25</sup> *Izvestia*, September 9, 1961.

conduct of such tests in 1962. With the connivance of Britain, which gave it the use of Christmas Island for the purpose, the USA conducted another series of atmospheric explosions, including high-altitude explosions in the upper layer of the atmosphere. While warning the Western powers that these actions would compel the USSR to conduct its own nuclear tests, the Soviet government continued its efforts to secure agreement on a nuclear test ban.

However, the USA and Britain were clearly bent on obtaining a free hand for an unbridled nuclear arms race and in January 1962 they disrupted the three-power Geneva negotiations by refusing to attend them. The Soviet government was prepared to go on with the talks, but in the face of this Western stand agreed to an attempt to settle the test issue in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. But even in that Committee, which began its deliberations in March, the Western powers stuck to their negative attitude, showing interest not so much in ending tests as to having the possibility of conducting organised espionage on Soviet territory under the guise of international inspection.

From April to August 1962 the Eighteen-Nation Committee held its sittings to the accompaniment of a huge series of atmospheric and high-altitude nuclear tests carried out by the USA with British assistance. This was a challenge to world public opinion, and it worsened the conditions for the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, and deliberately drew the USSR into a new round of race to perfect nuclear weapons.

To break the deadlock created by the NATO powers and worried by the situation, the eight neutral nations represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee (Burma, Brazil, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, Sweden, and Ethiopia) submitted a memorandum on April 16, 1962 on control over the cessation of tests. The substance of this memorandum was that inspection should be conducted with existing national networks of observation posts. It was suggested that an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly-trained scientists should be set up to process the data supplied by these posts. Further, it was recommended that the treaty signatories should invite the commission to their territory whenever questionable phenomena were detected.

The Soviet Union assessed this eight-nation initiative as a constructive step and declared it was prepared "to consider the proposals in the memorandum of the neutral nations as the basis for further talks".<sup>26</sup> This initiative of the neutral states was welcomed also by the other socialist countries represented on the committee—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Note must also be made of the fact that in a resolution passed on November 6, 1962 the 17th UN

<sup>26</sup> *Pravda*, April 20, 1962.

General Assembly underscored that the eight-nation memorandum "represents a sound, adequate and fair basis for the conduct of negotiations towards removing the outstanding differences on the question of effective control of underground tests".<sup>27</sup>

However, the Western powers ignored both the constructive proposals of the neutral states and the USSR's acceptance of them as the basis for further talks. They continued to insist on making their agreement to the prohibition of all tests dependent on the creation of a large intelligence network on Soviet territory under the guise of "control".<sup>28</sup>

In response to the 17th UN General Assembly's appeal that all nuclear tests "should cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963",<sup>29</sup> the Soviet Union declared that it was ready to do so if the Western powers likewise stopped all their tests.

### Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

In 1963 the Soviet government launched a new initiative to prevail upon the Western powers to agree to a practical settlement of the question of putting an end to the widest possible spectrum of nuclear tests. After it had thoroughly weighed the situation, the Soviet government declared on July 2, 1963 that since the Western powers were obstructing the conclusion of an agreement banning all nuclear tests it would be prepared to sign an agreement banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It had made this proposal before, but the Western powers had wrecked an agreement by making additional conditions providing for widespread inspection on Soviet territory.

The Soviet government called upon the Western powers to meet the aspirations of all nations by accepting this proposals, which would remove the danger of further radioactive contamination of the atmosphere, eliminate the health hazard to present and future generations.

As a result, representatives of the USSR, the USA, and Britain (Andrei Gromyko, Averell Harriman, and Lord Hailsham) held talks in Moscow from July 16 to 25, 1963, at which they drafted and initialled the text of an agreement proposed by the Soviet Union. On August 5 of the same year the three powers concluded the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space

<sup>27</sup> *Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly During Its Seventeenth Session, 18 September-20 December 1962*, UN, New York, 1963, p. 3.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

and Under Water in the Soviet capital.<sup>30</sup> It was signed by the Foreign Ministers of the three powers in the presence of leaders of the Communist Party and government of the USSR.

Under that treaty, now known as the Moscow treaty, the signatories pledged "to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion" in the atmosphere, beyond its limits, including outer space, under water, or in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control it is conducted.

Further, the treaty states that the principal aim of its signatories is to achieve the earliest possible agreement on general and complete disarmament under strict international control and stresses in two provisions that the signatory powers aspire to put an end to all nuclear explosions, including underground tests. The Moscow treaty came into force on October 10, 1963 after the instruments of ratification were exchanged among the three initial signatory powers.

This treaty, concluded through the untiring efforts of the Soviet Union to end nuclear tests, efforts that rested on the will of nations, was a significant triumph of the forces of peace and progress. In the course of two months the Moscow treaty was signed by more than a hundred nations.

While it was aware that by itself the partial test ban treaty would not halt the arms race or eliminate or even substantially reduce the threat of a nuclear war, the Soviet government nonetheless clearly saw its immense international importance. In addition to being a means of delivering the world from the radioactive fallout of nuclear explosions, it was a major step towards the creation of a climate conducive to the settlement of other outstanding issues between countries by negotiation. The Moscow treaty showed the world that given the desire and good will on the part of the powers it was quite possible to resolve international problems on mutually acceptable terms.

### **The USSR Opposes the Nuclear Armament of the FRG and Its Access to Any Type of Nuclear Weapon**

After the Moscow treaty was signed the Soviet Union continued its persevering efforts to promote progress in disarmament and proposed a series of steps that could contribute to placing a curb on the arms race.

At the 18th General Assembly in the autumn of 1963 it declared

<sup>30</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 31-34 (in Russian).

that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space it was vital to reach agreement with the USA on prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear-arms-carrying devices. On October 17, 1963, following talks between Soviet and US representatives, the General Assembly passed a resolution welcoming the intention of the USSR and the USA "not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction" and solemnly calling upon all states to refrain from deploying any weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

The international situation began to deteriorate dramatically in the autumn of 1964. US imperialism had attacked the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and was swiftly expanding its intervention in South Vietnam. Preparations were started for giving the Bundeswehr nuclear weapons. This was being done both in West Germany itself by the accelerated building of the facilities for manufacturing a West German nuclear weapon and by instructing Bundeswehr personnel in the handling of that weapon, and on the international level—through attempts to give the FRG access to nuclear weapons in the NATO bloc by the formation of "NATO multilateral nuclear forces" or "Atlantic nuclear forces".

The imperialist camp intensified its pressure on the national liberation movements, sponsoring counter-revolutionary conspiracies and coups in some newly-free Asian and African countries (Indonesia, Ghana) and encouraging aggression against progressive nations that had adopted the socialist orientation (developments in the Middle East in the summer of 1967).

In this situation the Soviet Union and other socialist countries had to give priority, naturally, to the utmost strengthening of the socialist world's defence capability, ensuring its closer unity, increasing vigilance relative to imperialist intrigues, and giving every possible assistance to peoples fighting imperialist aggression.

But even in this situation the Soviet Union did not relax its efforts to resolve disarmament problems and deliver mankind from the threat of another world war. "The Soviet government regards the struggle for general and complete disarmament as one of the principal orientations of its foreign policy," Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on December 9, 1964.<sup>31</sup>

On May 8, 1965, Leonid Brezhnev, First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, declared at a meeting marking the 20th anniversary of the Soviet people's victory in the Great Patriotic War:

"We shall continue our efforts in behalf of peace, of complete and general disarmament with the same determination as we concern

<sup>31</sup> A. N. Kosygin. *Towards the Great Objective. Selected Articles and Speeches*. Vol. I, Moscow, 1979, p. 238 (in Russian).

ourselves with strengthening our defence. On this score we neither have nor will have any vacillation. Positions must be won from the arms race advocates step by step. We call for the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons. Together with the peoples of all socialist countries and other peace-loving states we shall continue to seek a solution of this problem, which worries virtually the whole of mankind. We are confident that pressure from the peace-loving nations will sooner or later breach the dam being erected by imperialist militarist circles to disarmament and the destruction of nuclear weapons."<sup>32</sup>

In the new situation Soviet foreign policy in the question of disarmament was focussed chiefly on settling the most acute problems, on removing the most explosive dangers harbouring a direct threat of world war.

This implied mainly efforts to prevent the nuclear arming of West German imperialism in any form and avert the further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Simultaneously, Soviet diplomacy continued its consistent efforts to secure the implementation of partial disarmament measures that could clear the way to the settlement of basic problems worrying all nations.

The foreign policy programme enunciated in the CC report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU declared that one of the cardinal tasks was:

"To conclude an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; completely remove the question of the nuclear armament of the FRG or of giving it access to nuclear weapons in any form; implement the aspiration of the peoples for setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; secure a solemn obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to refrain from using nuclear weapons first; reach an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests—implementation of these steps would open the road for a further advance towards the complete banning and destruction of nuclear weapons."<sup>33</sup>

To prevent the nuclear armament of the FRG was one of the central foreign policy objectives of the USSR and its socialist allies in 1965-1970. Throughout this period in innumerable official documents, statements, and diplomatic notes, in talks with statesmen of other nations, and in the UN agencies the Soviet government acted vigorously and consistently on the principle that the West German revanchists should be barred from access to nuclear weapons. This principle was one of the cornerstones of peace in Europe and the whole world.<sup>34</sup>

<sup>32</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Articles and Speeches*. Vol. I, Moscow, 1970, p. 153 (in Russian).

<sup>33</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1966, p. 55.

<sup>34</sup> This is examined at length in Chapter XXIX.

In these efforts the Soviet Union was unfailingly joined by the other Warsaw Treaty nations. An important milestone in this struggle was the conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee convened on Soviet initiative in the Polish capital in January 1965. It was attended by top-level leaders of the fraternal parties and governments of these nations. The joint statement issued by them seriously warned the world of the dangers implicit in the NATO plans for giving the West German revanchists more or less camouflaged access to nuclear weapons.

"The Warsaw Treaty countries," the statement said, "are most resolutely opposed to the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Federal Republic of Germany in any form—directly or indirectly through a group of states, in sole disposal or in any form of participation in the disposal of these weapons...."

"The basic interests of all nations demand renunciation of the plans for forming NATO multilateral nuclear forces. However, if, despite the interests of peace, the NATO nations take the path of implementing the plans for the creation of multilateral nuclear forces in any form, the countries of the Warsaw Treaty will, in the face of the serious consequences that this action will have for the cause of peace and security in Europe, be forced to take the necessary defensive measures to safeguard their security."<sup>35</sup>

In Bucharest in July 1966, at its next summit conference, the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee passed a declaration in which Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union strongly reiterated their stand:

"In view of the danger to the cause of peace in Europe from the FRG's nuclear claims, nations should direct their efforts towards excluding the possibility of the FRG gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form—directly or indirectly through a group of states, in sole disposal or in any form of participation in the disposal of these weapons. The future of European, and not only European, nations will depend to a large extent on how this issue is resolved. There can be no half-way solutions of this question."<sup>36</sup>

This attitude of the socialist countries had the full support and approval of large segments of the progressive, peaceful public in scores of countries and, above all, of the vanguard of the working people, the international communist movement. At a conference of European communist and workers' parties in Karlovy Vary in April 1967, 24 fraternal parties proclaimed that one of the fundamental prerequisites of lasting peace in Europe was "the exclusion of the possibility of the FRG gaining access to nuclear weapons in any form, including the

<sup>35</sup> *Pravda*, January 22, 1965.

<sup>36</sup> *Documents of a Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee*, Moscow, 1966, p. 16 (in Russian).



so-called European multilateral or Atlantic form".<sup>37</sup>

Fusing with the struggle of all peace-loving nations, the struggle waged by the USSR and other socialist countries to prevent the West German imperialists from obtaining access to atomic and hydrogen weapons yielded positive results. The plans nurtured for a number of years in Washington, Bonn, and other NATO capitals for the creation of "multilateral" or similar nuclear forces within the North Atlantic bloc failed to materialise. This was a significant victory.

At the same time, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries pushed forward their efforts to secure an international ban on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states.

### Conclusion of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

During this period one of the main aims of Soviet policy in disarmament was the conclusion of an international treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. At the 18th and 19th UN General Assemblies and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in 1964 the Soviet Union repeatedly offered to sign an agreement preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, stressing that it would be inadmissible to give non-nuclear countries access to such weapons not only directly but also through military blocs. Acting in the spirit of the many UN General Assembly resolutions urging UN member nations to help achieve a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in agreement with its socialist allies the USSR entered into preliminary contacts with the USA with the aim of drafting a mutually acceptable international instrument on this question for its subsequent examination in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The treaty was in the main drafted by 1967, although some NATO countries, notably the FRG, continued to raise obstacles to the final acceptance of the draft, seeing it as a serious hindrance to the nuclear armament of West German imperialism.

The Soviet stand on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had the understanding and support of other socialist countries and fraternal parties. The statement of the 24 parties at the Karlovy Vary conference noted that a major aim of the peace-loving, democratic forces of Europe and the whole world was the "conclusion of a nuclear non-proliferation treaty as an important step towards ending the arms race".<sup>38</sup>

While the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was being drafted the Warsaw Treaty nations held many substantive consultations and

<sup>37</sup> *Documents of the Karlovy Vary Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, April 24-26, 1967, Moscow, 1967, p. 11 (in Russian).*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

exchanges of views. The proposals and wishes of these nations and of the other countries in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and the United Nations Organisation were specified and taken into account in the final text of the treaty, which was completed in March 1968.

At a sitting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Sofia on March 7, 1968 leaders of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic issued a statement stressing that the "prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons is an urgent task" and declared their support for the draft of a non-proliferation treaty submitted by the Soviet Union to the Eighteen-Nation Committee.<sup>39</sup>

On June 12 of the same year the Soviet Union and its allies scored an important success in their efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. By 95 votes against 4 (with 21 abstentions) the UN General Assembly approved the draft of a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons<sup>40</sup> co-sponsored by the USSR and the USA in the Eighteen-Nation Committee and expressed the hope that it would be signed by nuclear and non-nuclear states.

On July 1, 1968 the treaty was opened for signature simultaneously in the capitals of the three depository nations—the USSR, the USA, and Britain. In Moscow the treaty was signed on that day by Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko on behalf of the Soviet Union and by the US and British Ambassadors in the USSR on behalf of their countries. On the same day, the treaty was signed by another 33 nations, including Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania. By the close of 1968 the treaty had been signed by 83 nations, by the end of 1979 its membership reached the figure of 109 and in April 1980—118.

The substance of the treaty was that it unequivocally and unconditionally banned any—direct or indirect—transfer to other countries of nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. It banned the transfer of these weapons to anybody, i.e., individual non-nuclear nations and military blocs. The non-nuclear signatories of the treaty undertook neither to manufacture such weapons nor accept them from other nations.

Observance of the treaty by non-nuclear nations is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency under a procedure and in forms worked out by experts from many countries, among them the USSR and other socialist nations. IAEA inspectors include representatives of socialist countries.

The problem of nuclear non-proliferation was settled in the treaty on a long-term basis. Only after the passage of 25 years the signatories

<sup>39</sup> *Pravda*, March 9, 1968.

<sup>40</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 43-5 (in Russian).

were to decide whether it was to remain in force indefinitely or to be prolonged for a new term.

This treaty, drafted in the course of long and complex negotiations with Western powers and neutral states, contains elements of compromise. This is inevitable, for there would otherwise have been no treaty. But this compromise does not affect any of the principled attitudes insisted on by the USSR and its allies, who were determined to have effective safeguards against the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world, safeguards meeting the interests of socialism and of all peace-loving nations.

The day after the treaty was signed General Secretary of the CC CPSU Leonid Brezhnev noted: "We have reached a new and important stage. The nuclear non-proliferation treaty, fruit of vigorous effort of states over a period of many years, has been approved by a majority of nations and was opened for signature on July 1. This, comrades, is a significant success of our Leninist foreign policy.

"This treaty is important, above all, because it is a barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons and ensures the needed international control over the fulfilment by nations of their obligations in this respect. It is a document of peace aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war, at consolidating the security of nations.

"We call upon all countries to sign this momentous document and do everything to allow the treaty to come into force as soon as possible and begin to work for the benefit of peace and progress."<sup>41</sup>

The treaty was welcomed and approved by the peoples of the whole world. The act of depositing the instruments of ratification by the depository nations—the Soviet Union and the United States of America—took place on March 5, 1970. The third depository nation, Britain, had deposited its instrument of ratification in November 1969. With the treaty's ratification by another 40 nations, it came into force on March 5, 1970. After the instruments of ratification had been deposited A.N. Kosygin expressed the Soviet Union's deep satisfaction. "Now, with the coming into force of this treaty," he said, "the commitment to renounce the proliferation of nuclear weapons becomes an important norm of international law. Even the nations that have not signed the treaty have to reckon with this norm."<sup>42</sup> Further, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR said that the Soviet government was determined to reach agreements on an end to the arms race, on general and complete disarmament, and on partial arms limitation measures.

<sup>41</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 2, pp. 247-48 (in Russian).

<sup>42</sup> A. N. Kosygin, *Towards the Great Objective. Selected Articles and Speeches*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1979, p. 574 (in Russian).

## The USSR Urges Partial Disarmament Measures

Having proclaimed general and complete disarmament as one of the main orientations of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union consistently urged also partial measures that would, as a first step, at least limit the arms race.

At the 19th UN General Assembly in December 1964 the Soviet delegation stated that the results of the talks in the Eighteen-Nation Committee were absolutely unsatisfactory, that the NATO nations did not really desire disarmament, and that declarations in favour of disarmament were made more and more generously with each passing year, while in fact an unparalleled arms race was proceeding. It submitted a comprehensive memorandum on steps towards a further easing of international tension and limiting the arms race.

Motivated by its desire to clear the way to agreement on the basic issue—general and complete disarmament—the Soviet government proposed reaching an understanding on the earliest implementation of measures such as a reduction of military budgets by 10-15 per cent or any other agreed volume;<sup>43</sup> the withdrawal or reduction of troops stationed on foreign territory; the dismantling of foreign military bases; the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons; prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; the creation of nuclear-free zones in some parts of the world; the banning of underground nuclear tests (to complement the Moscow treaty banning tests in other environments); the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

In the question of partial measures to limit the arms race the stand of the Soviet Union coincided with that of allied socialist countries, the international communist movement, and other peace-loving, democratic forces.

The 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties noted that to "*preserve peace the most urgent task is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to enforce the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. In urging the ratification of the treaty, the communist parties see this as a link in the chain of measures designed to lead to nuclear disarmament and the destruction of nuclear weapon stockpiles*".<sup>44</sup> At Karlovy Vary the participating European communist and workers' parties likewise urged the "conclusion of agreements on partial settlements, chiefly in the field of disarmament, which would create a good climate for more far-reaching treaties".

<sup>43</sup> In December 1963 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a decision to reduce unilaterally the USSR military budget by 600 million rubles. (See *Izvestia*, December 20, 1963.)

<sup>44</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969, p. 32.

One of the provisions of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty binds signatory nations in a spirit of good will to conduct talks on effective steps to end the nuclear arms race in the immediate future and on nuclear disarmament, and also on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. In keeping with the spirit and letter of this commitment the Soviet government sent all the nations of the world, at the same time that it signed the treaty, a memorandum on some high-priority steps to stop the arms race and secure disarmament. In this document it proposed reaching an early agreement on these steps through the Eighteen-Nation Committee, the UN General Assembly, and a World Disarmament Conference. They included banning the use of nuclear weapons, ceasing the production of such weapons, and gradually destroying their stockpiles, limiting and subsequently reducing the means of delivery of strategic weapons; banning flights by nuclear-armed bombers beyond national frontiers and limiting the navigation zone of missile-carrying submarines; and, lastly, banning underground nuclear tests (that do not come under the 1963 treaty). All these measures were aimed at reducing and then totally eliminating the threat of a nuclear war.

Moreover, the memorandum envisaged a step of vital significance to the security of all mankind, namely, banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Also, it suggested an agreement on the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, on a series of steps towards regional disarmament (nuclear-free zones and the reduction of armaments in different parts of the world), and also on the peaceful use of the bed of seas and oceans.

While offering the government of all nations this wide-ranging and, at the same time, realistic programme of partial disarmament measures, the Soviet government reiterated in its memorandum that it was "necessary to make every effort to achieve concrete results in the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament".<sup>45</sup>

The Soviet government followed up its memorandum of July 1, 1968 with new important initiatives.

In March 1969 it submitted the draft of a treaty banning the use of the bed of seas and oceans for military purposes to the Disarmament Committee. This was followed by an extensive discussion of this question with other governments. As a result, on April 23, 1970 the Geneva Disarmament Committee was presented with the draft of a treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and in their subsoil.<sup>46</sup> This draft took additional proposals into account and was

<sup>45</sup> *Pravda*, July 2, 1968.

<sup>46</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 52-57.

agreed beforehand with a number of countries. The Soviet Union and the United States of America acted as co-sponsors of the draft. The Disarmament Committee then submitted the draft to the 25th UN General Assembly, which approved it on December 16, 1970. In characterising this treaty, A.N. Kosygin noted that it "meets with the immutable aim of our country's Leninist foreign policy—the strengthening of peace and the safeguarding of the security of nations".<sup>47</sup> On February 11, 1971 it was opened for signature in Moscow, London, and Washington. By the close of 1975 it had been signed by 91 and by April 7, 1980 by 98 nations.

The same General Assembly session passed a Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, the draft of which was submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. This declaration called upon all nations, particularly the nuclear powers, to begin prompt and coordinated efforts to secure "the cessation and reversal of the nuclear and conventional arms race at an early date, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".<sup>48</sup>

In the UN General Assembly on September 19, 1969 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union jointly presented the draft of an international convention on a key disarmament issue—the prohibition of the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of these weapons.

Both these initiatives of the Soviet Union and its socialist allies were warmly lauded by world public opinion. They showed the Disarmament Committee and the UN agencies the direct road to further concrete and productive decisions on disarmament.

\* \* \*

The struggle to rid mankind of the arms race burden and of the threat of a nuclear-missile world war had now been joined by all the peace forces in the world, by all who champion the freedom and independence of nations, by those who are fighting imperialist aggression. This struggle is led by a major power that is building communism: the Soviet Union. No country in human history has made such titanic efforts to hasten the hour of mankind's final deliverance from the curse of devastating wars that take a huge toll of life, of the materialisation

<sup>47</sup> A. N. Kosygin, *Towards the Great Objective. Selected Articles and Speeches*, Vol. I, p. 602.

<sup>48</sup> Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Twenty-Fifth Session, 15 September-17 December 1970, New-York, 1971, p. 23. *UN*.

of the age-old hope of people for a life in peace devoted entirely to creative work for the common good. The Soviet Union is waging a tireless, uncompromising struggle with the adversaries of disarmament in the imperialist camp, exposing their policies directed against the interests of all humanity, and bringing to light their subterfuges aimed at evading agreement on disarmament, which is the demand of all peoples.

The Soviet Union is conducting this struggle in close-knit, fraternal cooperation with other socialist nations and with communist and workers' parties, and in alliance with and support of all the peace forces of the world. The Appeal in Defence of Peace adopted unanimously on June 16, 1969 at the Moscow International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, of fraternal parties of all continents, said:

"Peace on earth cannot rest on a 'balance of fear'. Lasting peace is inconceivable without a cessation of the arms race.

"It is imperative to secure the creation of nuclear-free zones in different parts of the globe, the banning of all nuclear tests, the speediest possible enforcement of the treaty of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the participation of all countries in this treaty, and the banning of nuclear weapons and the destruction of their stockpiles.

"It is imperative to demand the dismantling of military bases on foreign territory, the release of countries from the aggressive military pacts forced on them, and the imposition of an effective international ban on all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

"It is necessary to work, consistently and perseveringly, towards general and complete disarmament.

"In face of all trials we Communists have preserved our boundless devotion to Lenin's ideas of peace and friendship among nations. Today, as before, we shall struggle for these lofty aims of the whole of mankind together with all who oppose the policy of militarism, aggression, and war."<sup>49</sup>

In keeping with this joint appeal, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communists of other countries are undeviatingly waging a principled struggle also against any attempts to demoralise peoples with "left", pseudo-revolutionary verbiage, to sow disbelief in the potentialities of the socialist countries and all other peace forces for cutting short the intrigues of imperialist aggressors and ensuring lasting world peace.

As a socialist country building the bright edifice of a communist society, the Soviet Union has no other aim than the happiness of nations, for which it is necessary, above all, to prevent the catastrophe of a nuclear world war, to ensure peace. This Soviet foreign policy line meets with the most vital interests of all nations, and for that reason the future belongs to it.

<sup>49</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, Moscow, 1969, p. 50.*

## CHAPTER XXX

### THE USSR COMBATS IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING NATIONS AND CAPITALIST STATES (1964-1971)

On November 6, 1964, on the occasion of the 47th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Leonid Brezhnev declared on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee that, "defined by the decisions of the latest congresses of our Party and by its Programme, the general guideline of Soviet foreign policy remains consistent and immutable".<sup>1</sup>

The 23rd Congress of the CPSU, held in March 1966, observed that on the international scene the imperialist forces had grown more aggressive and noted that in the obtaining situation a solid front of peace forces, towards whose creation much had been done by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, was indispensable in order to curb the aggressors and prevent another world war. In defining the main foreign policy orientations of the Soviet Union, the congress set the task of combining efforts with other socialist countries to secure favourable international conditions for the building of socialism and communism; strengthening the unity and cohesion, the friendship and fraternity of the socialist countries; supporting the national liberation movements and maintaining all-round cooperation with the young developing countries; upholding consistently the principle of the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems; firmly repelling the aggressive forces of imperialism and delivering mankind from the threat of a new world war.<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet Union helped to stop the Israeli war against Arab states in 1967, initiated vigorous moves to abolish the consequences of the Israeli aggression, and actively supported the liberation struggle of the Vietnamese people against US aggression. The CPSU and the Soviet government spared no effort to put an end to the cold war and reduce the danger of another world war: a good beginning was made for a turn towards easing international tension and creating an atmosphere of peaceful relations and cooperation in Europe.

<sup>1</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1970, pp. 30-31 (in Russian).

<sup>2</sup> 23rd Congress of the CPSU, pp. 287-88.



## US Aggression in Indochina and Soviet Support for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia

As early as 1954 the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had tried to prevent the termination of the war in Indochina and wreck the Geneva conference. Although nothing came of these attempts, the USA subsequently obstructed the reunification of Vietnam, blocked the holding of general elections as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva agreements, and began turning South Vietnam into a springboard against socialism and the liberation movement in Southeast Asia. The natural and legitimate striving of the population of South Vietnam for liberation from the Saigon clique of corrupt generals and bureaucrats and reunification with the northern part of the nation was brutally suppressed. Raids to "ferret out and destroy Communists" became commonplace. A reign of terror was instituted against veterans of the Resistance and against persons advocating independence and the nation's peaceful reunification in fulfilment of the 1954 Geneva agreements.

In 1955, acting in flagrant violation of the Geneva agreements, the USA began sending to South Vietnam thousands of military advisers and experts, who built up and armed the Saigon army. After organising attacks on ships and the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in August 1964, the US administration got the Congress to approve the so-called Tonkin resolution sanctioning military operations against the DRV. In 1965 the USA undertook the conduct of a war against the population of South Vietnam and then against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as well. By the beginning of 1969, besides troops of the Saigon government, this predatory war involved over 550,000 US troops and the US 7th Fleet consisting of nearly 200 warships and 80,000 effectives.

The Vietnamese people put up a heroic resistance, fighting for the liberation of South Vietnam and the reunification of the entire nation. With determined military support from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the patriots in South Vietnam struck at the Saigon regime of generals, bureaucrats, and landowners with such force that it could not be saved by the deep involvement in the war of the strongest imperialist power. A powerful movement of solidarity with embattled Vietnam swept across the whole world, embracing the socialist countries, the new nation states, the Scandinavian countries, the communist and workers' parties, and progressives in all nations. The war in Vietnam was denounced by students, intellectuals, and other segments of the population of the USA, where refusal to serve in the army and desertion from the armed forces assumed significant dimensions.

From the very outset of the US aggression, the Soviet Union adopted a firm and resolute posture, extending unremitting support

for the Vietnamese people in their war of liberation. The Soviet Union supplied Vietnam with the most up-to-date sophisticated weapons, ammunition and resources, and helped to master them; Vietnamese officers were trained in the USSR. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to take additional measures with a view to defending the DRV from the US air raids, but the Chinese regime opposed this. Throughout the war the Chinese rulers obstructed the transportation of Soviet weapons to Vietnam, holding up munition trains sometimes for several months on Chinese territory. Continuous contacts were maintained between the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, on the one hand, and the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the other. Meetings were held regularly at the highest level, at which the sides informed each other on domestic and international problems, considered questions related to Soviet assistance to fighting Vietnam, and agreed on joint political moves.

There were repeated meetings with Vietnamese leaders in the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Leonid Brezhnev took part in many of these meetings. Views were exchanged on the situation in Vietnam and on means of effectively repulsing aggression, and agreements were drafted on comprehensive assistance to Vietnam.

In early February 1965 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was visited by a Soviet delegation led by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin. A cordial, friendly, and frank exchange of views was held with President Ho Chi Minh and other DRV leaders. The sides noted their unanimity on many international problems and also on questions concerning Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet government declared that in line with the principles of socialist internationalism it would not remain indifferent to the security level of fraternal socialist countries and would render the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the assistance and support it needed.<sup>3</sup> In view of the US air raids in Vietnam, the Soviet government made a statement on February 9, 1965 to the effect that the USSR and its allies would have to take measures ensuring the security and strengthening the defence potential of the DRV. "The Soviet people," it said, "will fulfil its internationalist duty to the fraternal socialist country".<sup>4</sup>

A DRV party and government delegation led by Le Duan, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Vietnam, arrived in Moscow in April 1965. At the talks the sides agreed on supplementary moves to repulse US aggression. The further concrete forms and volume of Soviet assistance, including military assistance, were determined in accordance with the wishes of the Vietnamese

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, February 11, 1965.

<sup>4</sup> *Pravda*, February 9, 1965.

side. Following these talks leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government had a series of meetings with Le Duan, Pham Van Dong, and other leaders of the Workers' Party of Vietnam and the DRV, at which they discussed and decided questions of cooperation in the struggle against aggression and coordinated political moves to secure the earliest termination of the war and a political settlement in Vietnam.

The National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam, which established close contact with Soviet government institutions and public organisations, opened a mission in the USSR in April 1965.

Questions related to the struggle of the Vietnamese people against US intervention and assistance for this struggle received close attention at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. The congress declared that the USSR would do everything in its power to put an end to the US aggression in Vietnam, ensure the withdrawal of all US and other foreign troops from South Vietnam, and give the Vietnamese people the opportunity to decide their internal affairs by themselves. In a statement on the US aggression in Vietnam, the congress demanded, on behalf of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and all Soviet people, the termination of that aggression and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, declaring that "if the aggressors escalate the shameful war against the Vietnamese people they will have to contend with mounting support for Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other socialist friends and brothers. The Vietnamese people will be the masters of their country and nobody will ever extinguish the torch of socialism, which has been raised on high by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam".<sup>5</sup>

The Warsaw Treaty nations acted jointly on innumerable occasions in connection with the US aggression and declared that they would continue helping the Vietnamese people against that imperialist intervention. In July 1966 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee issued a statement on assistance to the people of Vietnam. This question was again examined by the Political Consultative Committee in March 1968 at its sitting in Sofia, where it passed its Declaration on the Threat to Peace from the Escalation of the US Aggression in Vietnam.

In the United Nations Organisation, too, the Soviet representatives took steps to have the US aggression in Vietnam condemned. At the same time, the Soviet government opposed the adoption of any decisions on the substance of the Vietnamese question by UN agencies on the contention that that organisation had no grounds for passing such decisions in view of the fact that the proper mechanism had been set up by the 1954 Geneva conference.

At meetings and in conversations and talks with leading statesmen

<sup>5</sup> 23rd Congress of the CPSU, p. 45.

of foreign countries, Soviet representatives set out the stand of the DRV and the National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam and urged greater pressure on the USA to compel it to cease the aggression. The Soviet government called upon the leaders of many countries to act more vigorously against the USA's adventurist policy in Vietnam.

It drew the attention of the governments of Thailand, Australia, New Zealand, and other countries with troops in South Vietnam to the responsibility they had assumed by becoming involved in the piratical war.

A nationwide movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese people unfolded in the Soviet Union. Soviet people pledged unfaltering support for the just struggle of the Vietnamese people. The Soviet Committee in Support of Vietnam was set up in March 1967. Soviet public organisations played an active part in the international movement against the US aggression, in defence of the Vietnamese people, a movement that engaged in numerous activities (rallies, demonstrations, Weeks of Solidarity with the Vietnamese People, mass international forums, the collection of funds for Vietnam) and was a significant lever of pressure on the aggressors.

The Soviet people spared neither effort nor money in order to help the DRV strengthen its defence capability and repulse the US aggression and extend assistance for the struggle for the liberation of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union sent the DRV aircraft, missiles, tanks, artillery, small arms, ammunition, and other hardware, and also sets of equipment, vehicles, oil products, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, food, chemical fertilisers, medicaments, and other items. It helped to restore factories and power stations damaged by US bombers.

Officers of all the services of the Vietnamese People's Army and also more than 10,000 students and trainees were trained in the Soviet Union. In Vietnam there was a large group of military and other Soviet experts, who helped train troops in the handling of high-technology armaments and organise the effective defence of the DRV.

Considerable assistance was extended to fighting Vietnam by Soviet public organisations. On donated money the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, the Committee in Support of Vietnam, the Leninist Young Communist League, and the Soviet Red Cross Society sent Vietnam food, textiles, medicaments, and equipment for hospitals and schools.

The CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government also gave much of their attention to the mutual coordination of actions by socialist countries in support of the struggle waged by the Vietnamese people.

Besides all-out assistance for the armed struggle of the Vietnamese people, the USSR gave every support for the political and diplomatic

actions of the DRV government, the National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam aimed at achieving a political settlement of the Vietnam problem. The principal elements of the programme for a settlement in Vietnam were: cessation of the bombing of the DRV, withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, and formation of a provisional coalition government in South Vietnam.

On March 31, 1968, in the face of the powerful and steadily mounting resistance from the Vietnamese people, who relied on active support and massive assistance from socialist states and progressive anti-imperialist forces in many countries, and confronted with the prospect of a long and exhausting war, the US government had no choice than to order a partial cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam and declare that it was prepared to negotiate with the DRV. On April 3 the DRV government said it would appoint its representative for contacts with a US representative.

The Soviet government stated on April 6, 1968 that it subscribed wholeheartedly to the stand of the DRV government, that it was convinced that what that government had proposed was a realistic way for ending the war in Vietnam, for a political settlement meeting the interests of the entire Vietnamese people and the need for normalising the situation throughout Southeast Asia.

After delays and bargaining over the venue for the Vietnamese-US talks, the US government agreed in early May 1968 to have the official talks between representatives of the DRV and the USA in Paris. These talks commenced on May 13.

The Soviet Embassy in France maintained contact with the delegations of the DRV and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. In a series of energetic moves the Soviet government called on the US government and the US President personally to end the aggression, in particular the bombings and other acts of war against the DRV, and bring the entire problem into the framework of a political settlement. In this connection the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei N. Kosygin sent a number of messages to the US President Lyndon B. Johnson.

As a result of an understanding reached by the DRV and US representatives in Paris, the USA ceased the bombing of the DRV on November 1, 1968. Political negotiations were started between representatives of the DRV, the National Front of Liberation of South Vietnam, the USA, and the Saigon administration with the purpose of working out a peaceful settlement of the Vietnam problem.

The Soviet government saw the understanding reached in Paris as an important advance towards a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. In a statement of November 3, 1968 it noted that this understanding was mainly the result of the long and selfless struggle of the fraternal

Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the whole Vietnamese people for the freedom, independence, and unity of their homeland with the active support and assistance of socialist countries and all other peace-loving and progressive forces in the world.<sup>6</sup>

However, formidable difficulties had to be overcome at the Paris negotiations. At first the representatives of the USA and the Saigon regime attempted to create the impression that these were bilateral talks, with the USA and Saigon on the side and the DRV and the National Front of Liberation on the other. The purpose of this ploy was to avoid recognising the National Front of Liberation as an equal partner in the negotiations. Then the USA insisted on an examination of military issues and on turning over the political questions of a settlement to talks with the Saigon administration.

To get the negotiations off the ground the National Front of Liberation proposed a 10-point programme for a settlement in May 1969. This programme was subsequently detailed and specified. Its principal demands were the withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam and the formation of a provisional coalition government.

While in principle agreeing to discuss the withdrawal of troops, the US representatives insisted on a simultaneous withdrawal of DRV troops from South Vietnam. They ignored the fact that the question of Vietnamese troops, as representatives of the DRV and the Revolutionary Provisional Government had declared, had to be decided by the Vietnamese themselves. The USA and the Saigon regime flatly refused to discuss the question of a coalition government.

The Congress of People's Representatives of South Vietnam held in June 1969 and the formal inauguration of the provisional revolutionary government of South Vietnam were an important milestone in the struggle for the liberation of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union recognised this government on June 13<sup>7</sup> and, for its part, took steps to help it win the broadest possible international recognition. Following its recognition by socialist countries, the new government was recognised speedily by many Asian and African nations.

Solidarity with heroic Vietnam was proclaimed by the 1969 International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties, which passed a statement saying: *"In fighting to defend their homeland the Vietnamese people exercise the sacred and inviolable right of all peoples to self-defence."*

"We call for the immediate initiation of further, still more powerful, varied and coordinated action by the anti-imperialist, peace-loving

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, November 3, 1968.

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, June 14, 1969.

forces in support of the struggle of the Vietnamese people against US aggression."<sup>8</sup>

At its conference in Berlin on December 2, 1970 the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee repeated its denunciation of the USA's acts of aggression and reiterated its solidarity with the freedom and independence struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

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In parallel with the war in Vietnam the USA steadily escalated its armed intervention in Laos, thereby violating its commitment, taken at the 1961-1962 Geneva conference, to respect the neutrality of Laos. The US strategists believed that the intervention in Laos would sap the strength out of the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle and help the USA win the war in Vietnam. Besides, the USA was intent on gaining control of the whole of Indochina.

On April 19, 1964 US-backed right-wing elements led by Kuprasit Abhai attempted a military coup to bring down the National Union government. This act was qualified in a TASS statement as a direct contravention of the Geneva agreements that had defined Laos' international status as an independent, peaceful, and neutral state, as a bid to wreck the peaceful settlement of internal political problems and again plunge Laos into a civil war.

The Co-chairmen of the 1961-1962 Geneva conference (the Soviet Foreign Minister and the British Foreign Secretary) condemned this attempt and on May 1, 1964 called for the immediate cessation of the unlawful activities of the adversaries of the Geneva Agreements and of the tripartite National Union government of Laos.

Nevertheless, without the consent of the Patriotic Front of Laos, which was one of the parties to the tripartite settlement in Laos, the composition of the government was changed: the neutralists advocating cooperation with the PFL were relieved of their posts. The patriotic forces of Laos denied recognition to the new government: it was not, they said, a government of National Union, as provided for by the tripartite agreements of 1961-1962, but a coalition of right-wing pro-US elements and supporters of Souvanna Phouma.

Soon after this, on May 17, 1964, US aircraft began a barbarous bombing of the liberated area in Laos. Following the Gulf of Tonkin provocation by the USA against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the bombing of the liberated area in Laos was intensified. On December 14, 1964 US pilots were permitted to destroy all that could be destroyed, in other words to bomb indiscriminately. At a National

<sup>8</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969, p. 42, 45.

Security Council meeting on December 12, 1964 it was decided to make no statements about US air operations in Laos if no aircraft were shot down. But even in such cases it was decided that a statement would be made to the effect that US bombers were only escorting reconnaissance planes. On April 1, 1965 President Johnson ordered the maximum escalation of the bombing in Laos.

US public opinion was outraged when in January 1965 it learned that US aircraft had been shot down over Laos and that the USA was conducting air operations in Laos. Senator William Morse declared in the Congress on April 19 that the US bombings of Laos were a contravention of the 1962 Geneva agreements, that they were flouting the rule of right in favour of the jungle law of brute force.

The protest campaign drew statements from the US government to the effect that jet aircraft escorting "reconnaissance planes" had been permitted to bomb PFL bases as "lawful defence". Then in November 1965 a senior State Department official, Alexis Johnson, declared that US military aircraft were monitoring infiltration routes running across Laos and Cambodia. Ultimately the so-called "reconnaissance flights" of US aircraft evolved into barbarous bombing raids of peaceful towns and villages, into the mass extermination of innocent people. The Pentagon used napalm, phosphorous bombs, and noxious substances against the civilian Laotian population, women and children, the sick and the old. Furthermore, the US military constantly coordinated the military operations in two theatres—Laos and South Vietnam. In early 1966 strategic B-52 bombers based in Guam and Thailand were used for bombing the liberated area in Laos.

While intensifying the bombing of that area, the USA did everything to prevent a political settlement of the Laos problem. When the three political groups of Laos held talks in Paris in August-November 1964 on a ceasefire, the re-establishment of a tripartite government of National Union, and the convocation of a new conference on Laos, the US government brought pressure to bear on Souvanna Phouma to prevent any compromise. To quote one of the authors of a secret Pentagon report, an armistice in Laos was not in the interest of the United States.

The Soviet government demanded an end to the armed intervention in Laos, stressing that observance of the Geneva Agreements was the most effective way for restoring peace and uniting that country. In a letter to President Richard M. Nixon on March 13, 1970, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR A. N. Kosygin repeated the Soviet government's condemnation of the US violation of Laos' neutrality and noted that in the obtaining situation it was unrealistic to speak of holding consultations among the nations that had participated in the Geneva conference on Laos. He reminded the US President that on March 6, 1970 the PFL Central Committee had proposed a concrete, five-point programme as a basis for a settlement.



This programme stated that international respect for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos in accordance with the provisions of the 1962 Geneva agreements, the termination of US interference in Laos' internal affairs, including the bombing of Laotian territory, Laos' renunciation of involvement in military alliances with other nations and commitment to disallow foreign troops and military bases on its territory, the holding of general free and democratic elections to the National Assembly and the formation of a democratic National Union government, the holding, during the period from the restoration of peace to the general elections, of a political consultative conference with the participation of all the interested Laotian sides to regulate all of the nation's affairs and form a provisional coalition government, and Laos' reunification through consultations between the Laotian sides on the basis of equality and national concord would lead to the restoration of peace in that country. But first and foremost it was vital that the USA should stop escalating the war and unconditionally cease the bombing of Laotian territory; only this could create the conditions for a meeting between the interested Laotian sides.

In February 1971 the USA escalated its aggression in Indochina another notch: supported by US troops, Saigon units invaded Laos in order to worsen the position of the patriotic forces in South Vietnam. This new act of aggression was strongly denounced by the Soviet government on February 26.

After it had repelled the aggression, the Patriotic Front of Laos continued its quest for a political settlement. In 1970 its Central Committee urged a ceasefire agreement. This initiative led to meetings between representatives of the PFL and the Vientiane government.

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While the war in Vietnam was raging the USA brought undisguised pressure to bear on Cambodia, conducting military provocations against that neutral nation and, in 1970, carried the war to its territory.

In this complex situation Cambodia upheld its independence and territorial integrity, firmly pursuing a policy of neutrality. This kept the nation out of the war and helped to sustain its international prestige.

On March 18, 1970, a US-supported puppet government headed by Lon Nol was set up. A mass massacre of ethnic Vietnamese was soon started in the country. The military authorities fanned ethnic discord. Hostile action was taken against the patriotic forces fighting in South Vietnam. In order to compel the Khmers to step into the role of accomplices of their policy in Vietnam, the US imperialists speeded developments. On April 29-30 US and Saigon troops invaded Cambo-

dia. The Phnom Penh regime gave them every cooperation.

The invasion of Cambodia was an act of gross lawlessness, a further glaring violation of international law. In this case, too, Washington disregarded the fact that Cambodia was a neutral state. It did not even ask the puppet Phnom Penh regime for formal consent for the entry of US troops.

In the face of the expanding US aggression the patriots of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos decided to create a united front against the common enemy. A conference of top-level people's representatives of the three nations of Indochina took place on April 24-25, 1970 to consider the organisation of joint resistance to aggression. The conference declared that the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Khmer peoples were fighting for independence, peace, and neutrality and that to achieve this aim they would strengthen their solidarity and carry forward their struggle with staunchness and heroism. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent the conference a message stating his confidence that its work would result "in the further strengthening of the united anti-imperialist front of the peoples of Indochina, which will unquestionably play an important part in smashing the aggressive designs of the imperialists".<sup>9</sup>

The Soviet government sharply censured the attack on Cambodia and the expansion of the US aggression in Indochina. In a Soviet government statement of May 4, 1970 it was noted that "the serious responsibility borne by the USA for the war against the Vietnamese people has been complemented by its responsibility for the present aggression against the people of Cambodia".<sup>10</sup> Soviet public organisations established close contacts with the National United Front of Cambodia. All-sided assistance and support were extended to the Cambodian patriots by the USSR.

The liberation struggle of the patriots of Cambodia steadily gathered momentum. The victories of the patriotic forces in Vietnam and Laos provided a further impetus to the intensification of the war of liberation. Despite considerable assistance from the USA the puppet Phnom Penh regime was disintegrating.

### **Soviet Support for Arab Countries in Repelling Israeli Aggression. The USSR Moves to Extinguish the Middle East Flashpoint**

Interested in preserving their positions in the Middle East and holding the oil wealth of the Middle East nations in their hands, the imperialists, chiefly the US imperialists, had always sought to prevent

<sup>9</sup> *Pravda*, April 30, 1970.

<sup>10</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1970.

the Arab states from consolidating their independence and hinder their advancement. Terror, conspiracies, and the provocation of friction and wars between states were all used to halt progress in the Arab countries, to prevent them from moving towards socialism, and to weaken them.

Israel and international Zionism became the main instrument of US imperialism's assault on Arab countries. The Soviet Union, which champions the freedom and independence of new nation states, took a resolute stand against Israeli aggression and vigorously supported the attacked Arab states. It was opposed not to Israel as a state but to the policy of aggression pursued by its rulers. The USSR respects all nations, big and small. Every nation has the right to its own independent national state. With this as its starting point, the USSR defined its attitude to Israel as a state when in 1947 it voted for the UN resolution on the creation of two independent states, a Jewish and an Arab, on the territory of the former British mandate territory of Palestine. In line with this principled stand, the Soviet Union then established diplomatic relations with Israel. However, ever since the foundation of Israel its rulers had pursued a policy of conquest and territorial aggrandisement at the expense of neighbouring Arab nations, expelling or even destroying the indigenous population of these territories and cynically flouting UN resolutions. Such was the case in 1948-1949, when by force of arms Israel seized a large portion of the territory of the Arab state whose formation in Palestine had been envisaged by the United Nations. More than a million Arabs were expelled from their homes and doomed to starvation, suffering, and poverty. Left without a homeland and the means of subsistence, these people are essentially exiles to this day. The acute problem of Palestinian refugees, generated by Israeli policy, remains unresolved, constantly aggravating tension in the Middle East. Israeli aggression was repeated in 1956, when Israel joined Britain and France in attacking Egypt. Already then Israel wanted to hold on to the occupied lands, but was forced to withdraw its troops beyond the armistice line defined in an agreement signed by it with Arab countries in 1949. Throughout the years that followed Israel committed acts of aggression against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The war started by Israel against Arab countries on June 5, 1967 was aimed not only at seizing Arab territory for a "great" Jewish state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Tigris and the Euphrates and blocking the Suez Canal in order to undermine the Egyptian economy, but also at bringing down progressive regimes in a number of Arab states.

Acting on the ruling of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU that aggressive forces should be resolutely rebuffed, the Soviet Union took quick and energetic steps to halt the criminal actions of the aggressor and help the Arab states. Several hours after the outbreak of the war, the Soviet government published a statement demanding the imme-

diate and unconditional cessation of hostilities against the United Arab Republic, Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries, and the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the armistice line.<sup>11</sup> By agreement with leaders of Arab nations the Soviet government quickly obtained a UN Security Council resolution on a ceasefire. At the same time, it took measures to provide these nations with effective assistance to help them surmount the adverse consequences of the Israeli invasion and organise their defence. As early as June-July 1967 a government delegation visited Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Invigorated personal contacts between Soviet leaders and the leaders of Arab states made it possible to coordinate steps to eradicate the consequences of the Israeli aggression.

During that aggression the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government kept the developments in the Middle East under scrutiny and instantly implemented the measures required by the situation. In June 1967 a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution on Soviet policy relative to the Israeli aggression in the Middle East. The task it set was to prevent the aggressor from using the results of his perfidious actions and secure the withdrawal of the invading forces to the armistice line.<sup>12</sup>

On the initiative of the CPSU Central Committee conferences of leaders of communist and workers' parties and heads of government of European socialist countries were held in Moscow and Budapest in June and July 1967. A joint line of action was agreed upon to stop the Israeli aggression and eradicate its consequences.

In the summer of 1967 an extraordinary special session of the UN General Assembly was convened at the suggestion of the Soviet Union. On June 19, 1967, speaking at the session, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, A. N. Kosygin, emphatically censured the Israeli aggressors and their patrons and declared that "committed to the ideals of peace, freedom, and independence of nations, the Soviet Union will, for its part, do everything in its power both in and outside the UN to ensure the abolition of the consequences of aggression and help establish lasting peace in that region."<sup>13</sup>

The extraordinary session was unable to chart the ways and means of eradicating the consequences of the Israeli aggression and ensuring the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The vast majority of the delegations condemned the aggressor and stood up for the interests of the Arab peoples. However, the USA and other

<sup>11</sup> *Pravda*, June 6, 1967.

<sup>12</sup> *Pravda*, June 22, 1967.

<sup>13</sup> A. N. Kosygin, *Towards the Great Objective. Selected Articles and Speeches*, Vol. 1, p. 465.

imperialist powers, that were giving Israel extensive material assistance and political support and using it as an instrument for pressuring Arab nations, were out to delay the settlement of the conflict. Their posture prevented the General Assembly from passing the relevant resolution. On November 22, 1967, however, the Security Council passed a resolution requiring a) the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab lands, b) the termination of the state of war, c) respect for and recognition of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every nation in the region and its right to live in peace within safe and recognised borders, d) freedom of shipping along international waterways, e) a fair settlement of the refugee problem, and f) assurance of the territorial integrity and political independence of each nation with the help of various measures, including the establishment of demilitarised zones. This resolution was an important milestone in the efforts to settle the Middle East crisis.

The Soviet Union voted for this resolution, believing that withdrawal of Israeli troops was the prime indispensable principle for fair and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Acting on the resolution the UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish Ambassador in the USSR as his special envoy in Middle East to establish and maintain contact with interested states with the purpose of helping to reach a peaceful and acceptable settlement of the Middle East crisis.

Feeling that as the envoy of the UN Secretary-General Jarring could help to bring the stand of the sides closer together, the Soviet government accorded him diplomatic and political support. He was officially informed that the Soviet Union regarded the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 as an acceptable basis in international law for a settlement in the Middle East and would therefore extend all possible assistance to his mission of ensuring the implementation of that resolution.

On May 9, 1968 the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad wrote to Jarring, proposing a time-table for the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution.

The Soviet government unconditionally backed this proposal, declaring that it was prepared to help the interested sides implement the proposed time-table of coordinated measures for the settlement of the Middle East problem. Other Arab countries joined Egypt in declaring their readiness to carry out all the provisions of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It was by no means easy for the Arab countries to come to this decision.

What was the Israeli response? The Israeli government offered all sorts of pretexts for evading the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution. In Tel-Aviv they spoke more and more openly about plans to annex the seized Arab lands. Contrary to the Security Council

resolution on a ceasefire, Israel daily staged acts of provocation against Arab states and pursued a course towards wrecking the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. For a long time Israel prevented Jarring from carrying out his mission.

The Soviet Union urged the use of all opportunities to normalise the situation in the Middle East. It took the initiative, advancing proposals aimed at helping to achieve a political settlement and providing, in particular, for the fulfilment of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967 in accordance with a time-table. These proposals played a positive part in an exchange of views between the governments of the Security Council permanent members—the USSR, the USA, France, and Britain—on ways and means of normalising the situation in the Middle East. Begun in April 1969, the exchange showed that the nations involved were aware that it would be dangerous to leave the situation in the Middle East unsettled. Any delay, A. A. Gromyko told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 10, 1969, would be hazardous and prejudicial to all nations. "All countries, big and small," he said, "want a normalisation of the Middle East situation. A settlement would also benefit the international situation and go on the scales in favour of peace."<sup>14</sup>

In the USSR there was complete understanding and support for the statement by Egypt and then by Israel in August 1970 on a ceasefire along the Suez Canal and their agreement to begin consultations with Jarring's mediation.

With lasting peace in the Middle East as its rationale, the Soviet government sought to avert an unnecessary and ruinous arms race in that region. It held that this question could be discussed with the interested states of the region, provided the consequences of the Israeli aggression were eliminated and Israeli troops were pulled out of all the seized Arab lands in accordance with the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. It reiterated this stand in its memorandum of July 2, 1968, on some urgent steps to end the arms race and begin disarmament.

The Soviet Union gave its constant attention to the need for preserving and strengthening Arab unity in the struggle against aggression. When an internecine clash erupted in September-October 1970 between Jordanian government troops and armed units of the Palestinian movement, the USSR took active steps to help the Arab countries settle these difficulties and prevent imperialist interference in the affairs of Jordan and Syria.

<sup>14</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Articles and Speeches*, Moscow, 1978, p. 151 (in Russian).

## Relations with Asian, African, and Latin American Nations

Soviet foreign policy is characterised by a steady expansion of relations and cooperation with the new independent developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America; by increasing support for peoples fighting for liberation from colonial and imperialist oppression; by moves to ensure the total abolition of the shameful colonial system and all forms of neocolonialism.

At the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it was noted that the "Soviet state will continue to: render the utmost support to the peoples fighting for their liberation and work for the immediate granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples; promote all-sided cooperation with countries that have won national independence and help them to develop their economy, train national cadres and oppose neocolonialism".<sup>15</sup> In accordance with this guideline the CC CPSU and the Soviet government gave the utmost attention to promoting economic and political cooperation with independent Asian, African, and Latin American states, especially with those that had adopted a non-capitalist road of development. The USSR extended active support to the national liberation struggle against imperialism, to independent Asian and African states that were seeking to uproot imperialist methods in international relations. The abrogation of unequal treaties imposed by the former colonial powers on some new states, the dismantling of foreign bases on their territories, and the cessation of all foreign interference in their political and economic life—all these demands, recorded in the decisions of the Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries and the all-Africa conference of heads of state and government in Cairo in 1964 had the unconditional backing of the Soviet government.

Objective conditions exist for a further consolidation of the anti-imperialist front of the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and the independent nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These are, in the first place, the common striving of these nations for political and economic independence, their desire to make the fullest and most comprehensive use of internal resources for their advancement, their interest in maintaining peace, their emphatic condemnation of imperialist policy, and, most importantly, their opposition to imperialist aggression.

Leonid Brezhnev characterised the Soviet Union's relations with these countries, saying: "Our sincere friendship and fruitful cooperation with India, the Arab states, and with all independent freedom-loving countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America are growing stronger and deeper. The CPSU and the Soviet state are

<sup>15</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, p. 41.

always true to this friendship; we see it as a mighty source of strength for the forces of peace and progress."<sup>16</sup>

Soviet leaders visited Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, India, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Burma, Ghana, Guinea, Pakistan, and Somalia.

Bilateral meetings and talks at summit level helped to resolve many practical problems and strengthen understanding and confidence. They focussed on questions related to the further cohesion of the forces of progress in the struggle against imperialist aggression, all forms of colonialism, and racism. In the joint documents signed as a result of these talks, the sides expressed their mutual desire for lasting peace and the promotion of international cooperation on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, and their determination to combat imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism in order to enable their peoples to build their lives as they saw fit and develop their economy without hindrance. In this period there was a wide exchange of government, parliamentary, party, and public delegations between the USSR and Asian, African, and Latin American states. The very existence of the strong Soviet Union is holding the imperialists in check, compelling them to refrain from giving effect to many of their hostile plans against the nations of these continents. This circumstance, to say nothing of the many cases of direct Soviet support, helped some other nations to win independence during these years. These nations include Mauritius, the Maldiv Islands, South Yemen, Equatorial Guinea, Guyana, Singapore, Swaziland, and Fiji.

The Soviet government opposed every attempt by the imperialist powers to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, particularly all forms of armed intervention aimed at reducing peoples to colonial bondage and supporting reactionary elements. In April 1965 it denounced US interference in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic. "Nothing can justify the US armed invasion of the territory of a sovereign nation," a TASS statement said on May 2, 1965. "An act of undisguised lawlessness of this kind is a cynical violation of elementary norms of international law and of the UN Charter, which forbids the threat or use of force in international relations against the territorial inviolability and political independence of any nation."<sup>17</sup>

The USSR attaches considerable importance to enhancing the role of the newly-free states in international affairs. The experience of African and Asian countries in the struggle for national independence eloquently proves that in many cases the role and influence of these nations depend on how united they are on the international scene.

<sup>16</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 131.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, May 2, 1965.



The Soviet government strives to help strengthen their unity. In 1964 and 1965, when preparations were under way for the second conference of Asian and African heads of state and government, the Soviet government issued two statements in which it supported the convocation of that conference, whose purpose was not only to reinforce the principles proclaimed by the 1955 Bandung conference but also to chart a joint Afro-Asian platform on major international problems.<sup>18</sup> The Soviet Union was prepared to take part in that conference. Most Asian and African nations favoured the participation of the Soviet Union as a country with two-thirds of its territory in Asia. However, on account of the stance adopted by China's leaders the conference did not take place.

The Soviet Union's attitude to the conflict between India and Pakistan was striking evidence of its desire to contribute to the broadening of cooperation between independent nations and prevent the imperialist forces from making capital out of the disputes and differences between them.

In the autumn of 1965, when hostilities resumed on the Indo-Pakistani frontier and the situation in that part of the Asian continent deteriorated sharply, the Soviet government declared its readiness to help bring the armed conflict to an end as soon as possible. It took energetic steps to stop the bloodshed, facilitate the restoration of peace in South Asia, and prevent any foreign interference in the conflict that would aggravate it and fan the flames of war.

In the firm belief that peaceful, goodneighbourly relations were in the interest of the peoples of India and Pakistan, in the interest of peace in Asia and the whole world, the USSR in messages to the Indian Prime Minister and the President of Pakistan of September 17, 1965<sup>19</sup> offered its good offices in arranging a meeting of the leaders of these two nations on Soviet territory—in Tashkent or any other city in the USSR. In the event it was desired by the two sides, the message stated, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers would be prepared to join in the meeting.

The Soviet offer was accepted. The summit, held in Tashkent in early 1966 with the participation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, was a major advance towards a settlement of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The very fact that the conference was held in Tashkent, the results, and the affirmative response of the world public were eloquent evidence of the immense international confidence in the Soviet foreign policy of peace. The Tashkent declaration of the heads of government of India and Pakistan closed with an expression of "profound gratitude to the leaders of the Soviet Union, the Soviet government, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers

<sup>18</sup> *Pravda*, May 5 and August 14, 1964.

<sup>19</sup> *Pravda*, September 20, 1965.

of the USSR personally for their constructive, friendly, and noble part in arranging the meeting, which has led to mutually satisfactory results".<sup>20</sup>

By that time the USSR and India already had relations of friendship, trust, and broad, all-sided cooperation, underlying which was the Soviet Union's respect for the non-aligned policy pursued by India. "Friendship and cooperation with India," Leonid Brezhnev said at a rally in Delhi, "is part and parcel of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. We were with you when India was under the yoke of colonialism. We were with you when new Indian statehood was emerging. We were with you in the difficult and trying periods for India. We were with you when various external forces tried to bring pressure on India, which was upholding its vital interests."<sup>21</sup> The Soviet and Indian postures are close to each other or analogous on fundamental international issues—general and complete disarmament, the struggle against colonialism and racism, and so on. India is making a large contribution to the establishment of "peaceful, truly civilised relations among states".<sup>22</sup> The Soviet Union and India march side by side in the struggle for detente, for peace and world security. Soviet-Indian relations can serve as a model of relations between countries with different social systems.

India has always relied on Soviet assistance on the international scene in safeguarding its rights against colonialist schemes. Such was the case, for instance, when India demanded the abolition of fascist Portugal's colonial possessions in Asia, including the Indian territories of Goa, Daman, and Diu. The Soviet government supported India and declared that it was confident that the question of Goa would be resolved in favour of the Indian people. The colonialists were expelled from Indian territory. The Soviet Union rebuffed the NATO powers when they tried to intervene in the conflict on the pretext of "helping to find a settlement". The Soviet Union's principled stand on the question of colonial possessions in India was highly appreciated by the Indian people and by the peoples of other developing countries.

From 1955 onwards the USSR and India have regularly exchanged visits at summit level. The talks have invariably reaffirmed an identity of views on basic international problems.

Also, there have been many reciprocal visits by Soviet and Indian statesmen and representatives of government agencies for discussions of current practical questions concerning the political and economic relations between the two countries.

Trade and economic relations, founded on a stable, mutually

<sup>20</sup> *Pravda*, January 11, 1966.

<sup>21</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 342.

<sup>22</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Moscow, 1974, p. 115.

beneficial basis, hold an important place in Soviet-Indian relations. They contribute to the development of the Indian economy and to the strengthening of India's independence.

For a number of years the USSR has been extending India economic and technical assistance to develop its key industries, chiefly the heavy industry, which is the foundation of that nation's independence. The operating iron-and-steel works at Bhilai, built with Soviet assistance, symbolises the productive cooperation between the USSR and India. With Soviet cooperation India has built other factories, notably a factory in Bokaro, oil-refineries in Burauni and Koyali, and engineering plants in Ranchi, Hardvar, and Durgapur. The factories built with Soviet assistance account for 80 per cent of India's output of metallurgical equipment.<sup>23</sup>

Relations with Pakistan began to pick up. In the period 1965-1970 the Soviet Union was visited three times by Pakistani presidents, while the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR visited Pakistan twice. The two nations signed several trade and economic agreements. However, the attempts of the Pakistani military leaders to use their ties with the Western allies and the Peking leadership to solve regional problems "from positions of strength" had an adverse effect on Soviet-Pakistani relations.

True to its internationalist duty the Soviet Union consistently sided with the independence struggle of the people of Bangladesh, its moral and material assistance and support playing a large role, helping that people win freedom.<sup>24</sup>

The Soviet Union was one of the first nations to accord Bangladesh formal recognition and establish diplomatic relations with it. Subsequently, the USSR signed agreements with Bangladesh on economic and technical cooperation, and on many occasions extended substantial assistance, which was highly appreciated by the government of Bangladesh.

At the 24th Congress of the CPSU the head of the delegation from the Communist Party of East Pakistan spoke highly of Soviet foreign policy actions in connection with the situation in the Hindustan subcontinent, including the crisis in East Pakistan, and expressed deep gratitude to the Soviet Union for its extensive and disinterested assistance to the people of East Pakistan following the disastrous hurricane and floods in 1970.

Soviet relations with Indonesia deteriorated markedly after the events of the autumn of 1965 and the accompanying dramatic political changes in that country. Economic, political, and cultural relations were folded up, and Soviet-Indonesian trade diminished. However, the Soviet government took steps to normalise relations with Indonesia

<sup>23</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1976, p. 100.

<sup>24</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 14, 1975, p. 8.

and resume trade and economic cooperation and cultural exchanges. Its efforts gradually began to yield results, and there was a visible improvement in Soviet-Indonesian relations.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik said in 1970: "The relations between our countries, formally established 20 years ago, in fact have a history of more than 25 years. Our peoples have always stood shoulder to shoulder. The Indonesian people remember the great assistance from the Soviet Union during the trying years of struggle for national liberation."<sup>25</sup>

Relations with neighbouring Afghanistan were always friendly, and there was a further expansion of political and economic cooperation with it. The 1931 Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression was prolonged for another ten years in 1965. The Soviet Union went on helping to develop its neighbour's national economy.

As a result of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation, Afghanistan used Soviet assistance to build more than 60 industrial, agricultural, and other projects. These included consumer goods and chemical industry enterprises, and automobile engineering and house-building factories.

Modern motor roads—Kushka-Kandagar and Kabul-Shirhan—which are of considerable economic significance to Afghanistan, were built with Soviet assistance.<sup>26</sup> Part of the natural gas from deposits discovered in Afghanistan by Soviet experts is exported to the Soviet Union.

There was a marked improvement in the Soviet Union's relations with two of its other southern neighbours—Turkey and Iran. In the Central Committee report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU it is stated that the "USSR has always attached great importance to relations with neighbouring countries and we are pleased to note that our good-neighbourly policy has yielded beneficial results".<sup>27</sup>

The Soviet-Iranian treaty of February 26, 1921 underlies the USSR's political and economic relations with Iran. An important event in Soviet-Iranian relations was the assurance given by the Iranian government in 1962 that it would not accord "any foreign nation the right to have any kind of missile bases on the territory of Iran" and that Iran would not be a party to aggression against the Soviet Union.

A further boost was given to these good relations by a visit to Iran by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet in

<sup>25</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. From a speech at a luncheon given by the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko in honour of the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik on February 23, 1970.

<sup>26</sup> *International Affairs*, 1974, No. 8, p. 128 (Russian edition).

<sup>27</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, p. 51.

1970. The joint Soviet-Iranian communique on that visit contained a high evaluation of the state of the relations between the two countries. The Soviet Union helped Iran to build metallurgical and heavy engineering factories. The metallurgical complex in Isfahan became operational in December 1972; with the completion of the second section the rated output capacity of this complex will increase to 1,900,000 tons of steel annually.<sup>28</sup> While this complex was under construction more than 15,000 Iranians were trained in various trades.<sup>29</sup> The trans-Iranian gas pipe-line supplying Iranian gas to the USSR was completed. Agreement was reached on payment for Iranian gas with Soviet machines and equipment for the period 1970-1985. A standing Soviet-Iranian commission for economic cooperation was set up.

Relations with Turkey improved as a result of exchanges of state visits and mutual visits by parliamentary and public delegations. During a visit to Turkey in December 1966 by A. N. Kosygin, the heads of government of the two nations reaffirmed in keeping with the traditions laid down in the days of Lenin and Kemal Ataturk they would continue promoting friendly, goodneighbourly relations and building up mutual confidence.

Touching on Soviet-Turkish relations, the Turkish President Cevdet Sunay said in 1968: "We do not forget the assistance that Turkey received from Soviet Russia in the days of Ataturk.

"In those years several textile mills were built in our country. Today we are grateful to the Soviet government for the new assistance we are now getting. The Turkish Republic is a dedicated proponent of the policy of peace. We know that the Soviet Union is strongly committed to peace. We think highly of the efforts of the Soviet leaders, who are making a large contribution to world peace."<sup>30</sup>

In 1967 the Soviet Union and Turkey signed an agreement on cooperation in the building of a number of important industrial projects in Turkey. At present completed or under construction, these include a metallurgical factory in Iskenderun with an annual output capacity of 1,000,000 tons of steel (it was in the first phase of operation at the time of writing), an aluminium factory in Seidisehir, a hydropower station on the Manavgat River, an oil-refinery in Aliaga, and a sulphuric acid factory in Bandirma. Direct air and rail communication was opened between Moscow and Istanbul in 1968. Trade and tourism are expanding between the two countries.

Welcoming Turkish President Cevdet Sunay in Moscow in Novem-

<sup>28</sup> *International Affairs*, No., 6, 1974, p. 112.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk between the Chairman of the Soviet of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet I. V. Spiridonov and the President of Turkey Cevdet Sunay on April 13, 1968.

ber 1969, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet said: "In recent years much has been done to improve Soviet-Turkish relations and a solid foundation has been laid for the future. Now the thing is to rely on what has been achieved and move further, introducing new elements into our cooperation and making it more multifaceted and richer."<sup>31</sup>

The Soviet Union's geographical proximity to Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkey creates favourable opportunities for expanding trade and other forms of economic cooperation with them.

The Soviet government has always warned against the illusion that the imperialists readily grant freedom to their colonies. It noted that unremitting efforts were needed to implement the declaration of the 15th UN General Assembly on granting independence to colonial countries passed in 1960 on the initiative of the USSR and other socialist countries. That declaration proclaimed that the subjugation of peoples to foreign tyranny and rule and their exploitation were a negation of human rights, a contravention of the United Nations Organisation Charter, and a hindrance to the development of cooperation and the establishment of peace throughout the world. In line with this resolution, the USSR wages a determined struggle in the UN for the great cause of the freedom of nations. A Committee on Decolonisation (Committee of 24), which includes a Soviet representative, was set up on the insistence of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. From the rostrum of the UN the Soviet Union continued its denunciation of colonialism. Giving the lie to the slander that colonies were incapable of self-administration, the Soviet Union noted that no nation was unprepared for freedom but that there were peoples forcibly deprived of freedom. It insisted on a concrete time limit for the final abolition of colonialism. By joint efforts the Soviet Union, other socialist countries, and Asian and African nations broke the resistance of the imperialist powers to a debate in the Security Council on colonial questions and on steps that had to be taken against the colonialists. For instance, the situation in Namibia was often debated in the Security Council in 1968 through 1970.

The Soviet Union, which ever since its proclamation had been actively opposed to all forms of social and national inequality and discrimination, to colonial and racist oppression, and advocated national freedom and independence, could not remain indifferent to the destiny of Namibia and its people. To this day it condemns the colonial-racist regime of South Africa and those imperialist powers that openly or covertly support that regime in violation of UN resolutions. The Soviet-sponsored programme of measures, whose implementation would have speeded the liberation of Namibia and the granting to its people of the possibility of deciding their destiny by

<sup>31</sup> *Pravda*, November 21, 1969.

themselves, envisages among other things, the suspension by Western countries of relations with the South Africa regime and assistance to it; the adoption by states, whose citizens and companies are engaged in industrial, financial, or trade operations in South Africa and on the territory of Namibia, of legislative, administrative, and other measures to block both private and state investments in South Africa's economy.

The Soviet government also condemned the actions of the racist government of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), demanding the restitution of the legitimate rights of the indigenous population. In 1965-1969 it issued statements on the situation in Southern Rhodesia, emphatically denouncing the policy of the Southern Rhodesian authorities and calling upon the Security Council to ensure the effective application of the political, economic, and other sanctions against the unlawful Smith regime in accordance with Article 7 of the UN Charter.

The USSR gave its unqualified support for the African nations in the question of Southern Rhodesia and showed understanding and sympathy for the steps taken by them individually or jointly in the UN and the Organisation of African Unity to defend the interests of African peoples.

It gave every support to Nigeria, the most densely populated country on the African continent, in the person of its federal government, in their struggle against separatist forces who proclaimed the creation of Biafra.

Under the "Biafra" flag foreign oil monopolies made an attempt to deprive Nigeria of its oil regions. The separatists had the support of international imperialism.

The Soviet Union was tireless in its efforts to open the eyes of world opinion to the insidious imperialist conspiracy against Nigeria. In a telegram on September 30, 1969 congratulating the government and people of Nigeria on the ninth anniversary of the nation's independence, the leaders of the Soviet Union wrote that Soviet people understood the efforts the Nigerian federal government and people were making to maintain the nation's unity and territorial integrity.

The USSR and other socialist countries actively cooperated with the Nigerian federal government, supporting its struggle to preserve the integral Nigerian state. They extended material, technical, and financial assistance to it, giving it a joint credit of 100 million dollars in 1967.

The government of Nigeria recorded its appreciation of the role played by the USSR in its struggle for independence. For example, a telegram from the Nigerian Prime Minister to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on March 3, 1970 stated: "The fact that throughout the conflict the leaders and government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics were firmly on our side

morally and materially is of enormous historic significance.... I am confident that these relations will continue to find concrete expression in genuine friendship and cooperation in many areas related to the mutual welfare of our two countries, and also as a factor strengthening international peace and security."<sup>32</sup>

Socialist countries were among the first to respond to the Nigerian government's appeal for assistance to enable the nation to transcend the difficulties and suffering it had to contend with immediately after the termination of the civil war. Food, medicines, prime necessities, and other commodities were sent to Nigeria.

Lately, there have been significant changes in Latin America, which had only recently been a dependable reserve and bulwark of international imperialism.

There is no country on that continent where a struggle is not being conducted against US imperialism and its accomplices among the local military, the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie linked to foreign monopolies.<sup>33</sup>

A hallmark of the revolutionary process now going on in Latin America is that it has two aspects: one is the widening struggle against the foreign monopolies and their allies (the reactionary military, the feudal landowners, and the bourgeoisie) and the other—that imperialism and the forces it relies upon are no longer in a position to go over to an offensive all along the line, and this compels them to concentrate on individual countries. The Latin American peoples, who no longer want to live in poverty and humiliation, are being ruthlessly exploited by monopolies. They are fighting for genuine independence and social progress, and the front of struggle is steadily growing wider.

"As to Latin America," L. I. Brezhnev said, "we firmly believe that its historical prospects are inseparable from the development of the whole of mankind—these are prospects for freedom, independence and social progress."<sup>34</sup>

The victory of the Popular Unity bloc at the 1970 elections in Chile and the election of Salvadore Allende as the President of the republic opened up a realistic prospect for anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic reforms. Textile, steel, and power enterprises and individual banks were nationalised (with the payment of compensation) and an agrarian reform was speedily enforced. The government proclaimed that in foreign policy it would abide by the principles of peace, peaceful coexistence, the self-determination of nations, and non-interference in their internal affairs.

<sup>32</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Telegram of March 3, 1970 from the head of the federal government of Nigeria to the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

<sup>33</sup> See: *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, p. 40.

<sup>34</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 370.



With foreign support the internal reaction overthrew the Popular Unity government in Chile and inflicted a heavy blow on the democratic forces in Bolivia and Uruguay. Meanwhile, with the support of their people the governments of Peru and Panama proceeded with progressive anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic reforms. The movement for true national independence gathered momentum in these countries. Some other Latin American states nationalised branches of the economy dominated by US monopolies.

The striving of the Latin American peoples for closer relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries gained strength despite the obstacles erected by imperialism and reaction. Soviet people showed their solidarity with the Latin American peoples, who were upholding their right to freedom and genuine independence, to be the masters of their homes.

A growing number of Latin American states established diplomatic and beneficial trade and economic relations with the Soviet Union. By the close of 1970 the USSR had normal relations with 15 countries of that continent. In only the period 1969-1970 diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established by Bolivia, Venezuela, Guyana, Costa Rica, Peru, and Ecuador.

The development of the capitalist world after the Second World War, particularly in the period of colonialism's downfall, was characterised by the attainment of independence by colonies, but in most cases the new nations remained economically dependent on the former colonial powers. Most of the developing nations are still in the orbit of the capitalist world economy on account of their scarcity of investment capital and the dependence of their monocrop, one-sided production on the markets of the developed consumer nations. The scientific and technological revolution is tending to deepen this dependence. The economic exploitation of the former colonies is being intensified mostly by neocolonialist means. The economic development of many former colonies is to this day controlled largely by imperialist monopolies. In this situation paramount significance has been acquired by trade and economic cooperation with the Soviet Union that helps to deliver these nations from dependence on the former colonial powers.

The Soviet Union continues, as it has done time and again, to help developing nations to surmount the difficulties confronted by them. For example, Algeria's Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika highly evaluated the Soviet government's decision to supply Algeria with 200,000 tons of grain when a drought hit that country in 1966. He said that "this fraternal assistance is evidence of the sincere friendship between the Soviet and Algerian peoples and allows Algeria to resist pressure from the USA. Assistance from the USSR enables us to preserve our national dignity, which the Americans want to take from us." Further, he stressed that this aid was strengthening Algeria's

stand against imperialism and its faith in the fraternal friendship of the Soviet Union. "This aid, coming at this time," he declared, "is a heavy blow at imperialism."<sup>35</sup>

Leaders of Asian, African, and some Latin American states have on many occasions noted the immense contribution that is being made towards the consolidation of the independence of new nations by economic cooperation and trade with the Soviet Union, which are free of political strings and based on respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, on complete equality of the sides and non-interference in internal affairs. The disinterested assistance extended by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries creates the conditions for the non-capitalist development of new nations, spelling out for them the possibility for promoting material and cultural progress and consolidating their independence. This assistance is particularly valuable when "*the struggle for national liberation in many countries has in practical terms begun to grow into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist*".<sup>36</sup>

A UN report prepared for the 2nd session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, held in Delhi in early 1968, noted that trade between developing and socialist countries had evolved into one of the most dynamic sectors of world trade. From 1960 to 1965 exports from developing nations to the socialist world market grew at an annual rate averaging 12 per cent, while their exports to the capitalist world market rose at a rate of 6 per cent. During the decade from 1955 to 1965 the share of the developing nations in the foreign trade of the socialist world almost doubled, growing from 6.7 to 11 per cent. In the period 1955-1967 the Soviet Union alone increased its imports from developing nations almost fourfold, and its trade with these nations rose 6.2-fold.<sup>37</sup> On January 1, 1965, in order to facilitate the economic development of these nations, it annulled tariffs on imports of their traditional goods.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries hold a special place in the foreign trade of socialism-oriented developing nations, buying a large proportion of their exports. In 1966, for example, 56 per cent of Egypt's exports went to the socialist community. A similar pattern was observed in the foreign trade of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and other nations.

Other forms of cooperation expanded alongside trade.

<sup>35</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. From a talk of a Soviet government delegation at the celebrations of the 12th anniversary of the Algerian revolution with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika on November 3, 1966.

<sup>36</sup> *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1971, p. 23.

<sup>37</sup> *International Yearbook, Politics and Economics, 1969*, Moscow, 1969, p. 228 (in Russian).

In 1965 the Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser spoke highly of Soviet assistance to Egypt, declaring that "this assistance, rendered to us in a spirit of sincere and fraternal cooperation, merits our highest assessment and eternal gratitude".<sup>38</sup>

Foreign monopolies use economic and technical aid to strengthen their economic and political influence in Arab and African countries and prevent them from going over to progressive development and cooperation with the Soviet Union. The Western press conducts a strident slur campaign in which it misrepresents the aims and principles of Soviet foreign economic policy.

A feature of the credits granted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries is their distinct orientation. The impressive economic and scientific progress and enormous cultural advance achieved by the Soviet Union within a short span of time evoke the developing nations' interest in the Soviet experience of economic development and planning, while an expansion of economic and technical cooperation with the USSR gives them the possibility of studying this experience. The President of Algeria's Revolutionary Council Houari Boumedienne, interviewed by a *Pravda* correspondent in 1969, said that "the Soviet experience, like that of other socialist countries, is an example that should be followed".<sup>39</sup>

The Soviet Union unstintingly shares its knowhow and experience, helping developing, primarily socialism-oriented, nations to draft scientific plans for progressive economic and social development. In so doing it has in no case forced its experience and recommendations on other countries. When the government of a given nation requests assistance, the relevant Soviet organisations scrupulously study its national and economic specifics before making recommendations and give it every possible assistance in putting these recommendations into effect.

The Soviet Union extends substantial assistance in the training of local cadres in basic professions: doctors, teachers, engineers, and technicians. More than 140 educational institutions, medical establishments, and scientific centres have been or are being built in Asian and African countries with Soviet assistance.

In Arab countries it helped to set up 83 educational institutions (45 in Egypt, 20 in Algeria, ten in Iraq, three in Syria, three in the Yemeni Arab Republic, one in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and one in Tunisia), of which 68 were functioning in 1974. Some 130,000 specialists have been or are being trained at these institutions.<sup>40</sup>

In Asia, Africa, and Latin America, wherever a struggle develops

<sup>38</sup> *Pravda*, February 21, 1965.

<sup>39</sup> *Pravda*, March 24, 1969.

<sup>40</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 9, 1974, p. 34.

against foreign imperialist intervention, the peoples tangibly feel Soviet support for their just struggle for national and social liberation. The conviction is steadily spreading that the Soviet Union is the most dependable mainstay of the freedom and independence of nations, the principal counterweight to imperialism. In the period under review this led to a perceptible expansion of the Soviet Union's relations with developing countries, with peoples fighting imperialism.

The foreign policy of the USSR and other socialist countries helps developing states to defend the freedom and independence won by them in a bitter struggle and safeguards them against imperialist aggression. One of these states is the Republic of Cyprus. The Soviet Union stood up for the Cypriots' independence struggle, for the dismantling of the NATO military bases on their island republic. It exposed all the imperialist schemes to whip up discord between the island's Greek and Turkish communities, to divide the island, and turn it into a NATO springboard against the peoples of the Middle East.

The events of November 1967, in which the Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers clashed with armed units of the Turkish community, were engineered by imperialist agents. Direct bilateral talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities to settle their differences commenced in June 1968. However, these talks did not bring a settlement.

The Soviet attitude to the Cyprus issue was clearly stated by the USSR representative in the Security Council on June 10, 1969. "The Soviet Union," he said, "is strongly opposed to any attempt to infringe on the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, to the intention of some countries to try and resolve the Cyprus question behind the backs of the people of Cyprus, to the detriment of their basic interests, to further the imperialist aims of certain NATO powers."<sup>41</sup>

Honouring the opinion and wishes of the sides directly involved, notably the government of Cyprus, the Soviet Union raised no objections to the presence of UN armed forces on the island, although from the outset it regarded this presence as unwarranted and its prolongation abnormal.

Aided by local reactionaries, international imperialist circles made repeated attempts to inflame the situation on Cyprus. They launched a campaign for "enosis" (Cyprus' incorporation in Greece), under the guise of which they counted on creating the conditions for ending the republic's independence and dealing summarily with its democratic, patriotic forces.

NATO attached growing significance to Cyprus, especially in the context of that bloc's stepped up activities in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

<sup>41</sup> UN Security Council, Document S/PV1474 of June 10, 1969.

However, these intrigues encountered mounting resistance from the people and government of Cyprus, who enjoyed support in the world, particularly in the Soviet Union. A TASS statement of February 18, 1970 on these intrigues of the reactionaries on Cyprus declared that "the Soviet Union is committed to supporting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and demands the dismantling of foreign bases on the island and a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus question without foreign interference in any form".<sup>42</sup> The statement closed with the warning that the Soviet Union was closely following developments on and around Cyprus, declaring that it was imperative to "end subversive activities against Cyprus, show restraint and common sense, and respect the sovereignty and independence on the Republic of Cyprus".<sup>43</sup>

The Soviet Union's assistance and stand on the Cyprus question were highly appreciated by the people and government of Cyprus. The diplomatic representative of Cyprus in the USSR spoke of this at a meeting of the USSR-Cyprus Society on August 18, 1968 marking the 10th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. He characterised Cypriot-Soviet relations as friendly and productive and expressed the hope that his government and people would continue having the support and sympathy of the Soviet government and people.<sup>44</sup>

### Relations with Capitalist States

Leonid Brezhnev characterised the Soviet Union's relations with capitalist states at the 1969 Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow, saying: "The relations of the Soviet Union with countries of the capitalist world are based on the principle of peaceful coexistence of states irrespective of their social system, a principle substantiated by Lenin. This principle implies that outstanding issues between countries must be settled not by force, not by war, but in a peaceful way."<sup>45</sup> Of course, this principle does not extend to relations between oppressors and oppressed, and far from excluding, it presupposes an ideological struggle.

The CPSU and the Soviet government steadfastly implemented the programme of measures defined in the Central Committee reports

<sup>42</sup> *Pravda*, February 18, 1970.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, August 19, 1968.

<sup>45</sup> *International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties*, Moscow, 1969. p.170.

to the 23rd and 24th congresses of the CPSU for resolving key international problems in the interests of the peoples and strengthening world peace and security.<sup>46</sup> The Soviet Union was tireless in its efforts to relax tension and promote political, trade, and economic relations with capitalist states.

The Soviet government has always attached considerable significance to normalising political and economic relations with the USA. This became particularly important after the Second World War when the USA emerged as the strongest power of the capitalist world. The Soviet government repeatedly declared that it wanted normal relations with the USA, that it stood for an improvement of these relations and an expansion of trade, economic, scientific, and cultural links, for that would benefit both the Soviet and the American peoples. However, the huge mechanism controlled by aggressive monopoly capital circles and the military-industrial complex, who encouraged the maintenance of the cold war situation and anti-communist propaganda, the military suppression of national liberation movements, and the organisation of subversion and provocations against socialist countries continued to function in the USA. Through the machination of these forces and especially as a result of the US attack on the Vietnamese people and support for Israeli aggression the relations between the USSR and the USA deteriorated in 1964-1970.

The Central Committee report to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU noted that as "a consequence of US aggression in Vietnam and other aggressive acts of American imperialism our relations with the United States of America have deteriorated".<sup>47</sup> By starting a war against the Vietnamese people and aggravating the international situation the USA erected obstacles to the USSR's desire to maintain normal relations with it. When US aircraft began bombing the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in February 1965, the Soviet government warned that the USA should have no illusions about the aggression against the DRV going unpunished. "The Soviet Union has always wanted normal relations with the USA, an improvement of these relations. But the development of relations is a reciprocal process, and there must be no misunderstanding on this point. This process is incompatible with manifestations of aggression in politics that can negate the various steps taken to improve Soviet-US relations."<sup>48</sup>

Another serious factor complicating Soviet-US relations was

<sup>46</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, pp. 279-89; *24th Congress of the CPSU*, pp. 210-18.

<sup>47</sup> *23rd Congress of the CPSU*, p. 45.

<sup>48</sup> *Soviet Foreign Policy and International Relations, 1964-1965*, A Collection of Documents, Moscow, 1966, p. 120 (in Russian).

the aggression started against Arab countries by Israel with the active political support of the US government and massive US assistance.

However, imperialism cannot reverse the march of history. In Washington they had to reckon with the steady growth of the economic and defence capability of the USSR and other socialist countries and with the continuous change of the world balance of strength in favour of socialism over imperialism. In the USA the proponents of a more realistic policy understood that a thermonuclear conflict between the USSR and the USA, the world's two strongest powers, would be a calamity of inestimable proportions. This explains why, despite the overall worsening of Soviet-US relations on account of the stand taken by the ruling circles in Washington, the Soviet Union and the USA reached understanding and agreement on some questions directly pertaining to the relations between them and on a number of major international problems. The Soviet-US consular convention that regulated consular relations between the two countries came into force in June 1968. Direct air communication was opened between Moscow and New York. Exchanges of students and in culture and sports commenced.

Soviet and US leaders had a number of meetings, at which they stated their views on bilateral Soviet-US relations and on many international issues. The Soviet government gave close attention to words pronounced by Richard M. Nixon after his election as US President to the effect that an era of negotiations was superseding the era of confrontation. It declared that in the event the US government acted in the spirit of these words, readiness would be shown, as it had been shown before, to find points of agreement on questions concerning the relations between the two countries and on outstanding international problems. In a report to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on July 10, 1969 the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko said that despite the significant socio-economic distinctions dividing the USSR and the USA, the Soviet Union "has always taken as its point of departure that in questions of maintaining peace the USSR and the USA can find a common language".<sup>49</sup>

In 1967-1968 the USSR and the USA cooperated in drafting the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and in its discussion at the UN General Assembly. Soviet-US agreement on this question led to the treaty's conclusion in 1969. It has since been signed by most of the nations of the world.

After protracted talks the USSR and the USA reached agreement also on a treaty renouncing the use of the bed of seas and oceans for

<sup>49</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Articles and Speeches*, p. 165 (in Russian).

military purposes.

Following preliminary contacts in Helsinki, at the close of 1969 Soviet-US talks on a limitation of strategic offensive and defensive armaments have been going on since 1970, first alternatively in Vienna and Helsinki and now in Geneva. The Soviet Union displayed a sense of responsibility and good will in its attitude to these talks on the most important aspect of the disarmament problem, believing that a reasonable agreement in this field could go a long way towards maintaining and consolidating peace.

Touching on the prospects of these talks in a speech in Kharkov in April 1970, Leonid Brezhnev noted that "if the government of the USA indeed wants agreement on limiting the strategic arms race and if US public opinion breaks the resistance of the arms manufacturers and the military, the prospects for the talks can be assessed affirmatively. The Soviet Union, in any case, will do everything it can to make these talks productive."<sup>50</sup>

To some extent the state of the Soviet Union's relations with individual capitalist countries mirrors the level of awareness by the ruling circles of these countries of the need for peaceful coexistence of nations with different social systems in the epoch of atomic and hydrogen weapons, the extent to which they take into account the changes that have taken place in the balance of strength between imperialism and socialism in favour of the latter, and also their interest in pursuing an independent national policy and avoiding the risk of their countries becoming involved in conflicts and gambles as a result of membership of NATO and, generally, of their links to US imperialism.

During the period we are considering the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence won far-flung recognition in Europe. The tendency towards broader contacts and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist states, towards the creation of a system of European collective security gained ground in the capitalist countries of Europe. This tendency encountered resistance from the USA, which did everything in its power to retain political leadership of European countries through NATO and economic pressure. In this connection there was an aggravation of the contradictions in NATO, the principal imperialist military-political bloc. Some of its members switched to a course that was more in keeping with their national interests and gave them the possibility of pursuing an independent policy. Under de Gaulle's leadership France withdrew from the NATO military organisation and steered a course towards greater cooperation with the USSR.

A noteworthy pronouncement on this score was made by de Gaulle

<sup>50</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 2, Moscow, 1970, pp. 541-42 (in Russian).



himself. In March 1964, he told the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet that "France and the USSR have no special claims on each other. Neither are there direct contradictions between them."<sup>51</sup>

This period witnessed an expansion of Soviet-French relations. Rapprochement between the two nations is dictated by history, which has proved convincingly that as two major states on the European continent the USSR and France in practical terms bear a special responsibility for the preservation of peace in Europe and the whole world.

This question has occupied a central place in the policy of the two countries. When A. A. Gromyko visited France in April 1965, de Gaulle said in a talk with him that "Europe must live in peace built together with the Soviet Union, and cooperate with the USSR in the European framework".<sup>52</sup>

The visits of General de Gaulle to the Soviet Union and of A. N. Kosygin to France in 1966 were important milestones in the development of Soviet-French relations. A wide spectrum of international issues, European problems above all, were surveyed during these visits. In the Soviet-French declaration signed on June 30, 1966, at the close of de Gaulle's visit to Moscow the two governments expressed the view that "the problems of Europe should first of all be discussed within the limits of Europe". They agreed to regard as their aim "the normalisation of relations, and then gradual development of relations between all European countries on the basis of respect for the independence of each of them and non-interference in their domestic affairs."<sup>53</sup> In order to strengthen mutual trust and expand the fields of accord and cooperation between the USSR and France, the two governments decided to hold consultations regularly.

In the joint Soviet-French statement of December 10, 1966 in connection with the return visit to France by A. N. Kosygin it was recognised that "the easing of tension is the first and indispensable step in a desirable development in the relations between European nations regardless of their political system". The two sides "stressed the usefulness of the consultations held regularly between the Soviet and French governments on European and other international problems in order to help ease international tension and strengthen peace".<sup>54</sup> These visits opened a new stage in Soviet-French relations.

<sup>51</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk between the President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the President of France Charles de Gaulle on March 2, 1964.

<sup>52</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of talks between A. A. Gromyko and the President of France Charles de Gaulle, April 1965.

<sup>53</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1966, p. 21544.

<sup>54</sup> *Soviet-French Relations, 1965-1976. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 60-62 (in Russian).

Joint efforts led to substantial headway in the development of cooperation between the two countries. Noting this, de Gaulle said in a talk with A. N. Kosygin in December 1966: "France intends to go very far in promoting cooperation with the USSR, particularly in the political field."<sup>55</sup>

There was a further expansion of Soviet-French relations following a visit to the USSR by the French President Georges Pompidou in October 1970. The Soviet-French protocol on political consultations signed on October 13 noted that the USSR and France had agreed to enter into contact with each other immediately with the object of coordinating their positions should situations arise which "create a threat to peace or a violation of peace, or which cause international tension".<sup>56</sup> Further, the protocol recorded an agreement between the sides to extend and deepen their mutual political consultations on major international problems of mutual interest, in particular, such as the "development of the situation in Europe and the promotion of a detente, cooperation and the consolidation of security on the continent; the situation in all parts of the world where international security is threatened",<sup>57</sup> and other issues. These political consultations were to be held regularly. A joint declaration was signed in which the two governments proclaimed that it was their aim "to promote peaceful relations and cooperation among all countries regardless of their ideology and system, and to do everything to strengthen international security". The results of this visit convincingly bore out the viability and efficacy of the course selected by the Soviet Union and France to implement the great potentialities "lying in the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems".<sup>58</sup>

Friendly relations were strengthened by further progress in trade between the USSR and France and in scientific and technical cooperation. A standing Soviet-French commission of high-ranking representatives of the two countries (known as the Grand Commission) was formed in accordance with the Soviet-French declaration of June 30, 1966. The communique on the third session of this commission, held from January 3 to 8, 1969 in Paris, noted that much headway had been made in Soviet-French cooperation.<sup>59</sup> It was agreed that the sides would make an effort to double the trade between them.

Joint efforts by the USSR and France to develop scientific and technical cooperation likewise yielded positive results. On March 22,

<sup>55</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of talks between A. N. Kosygin and Charles de Gaulle during a visit to France on December 1-9, 1966.

<sup>56</sup> *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1970, p. 24360.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Pravda*, October 14, 1970.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*

1965 they signed an agreement on the joint industrial development of the SECAM colour television system, and on May 4 of the same year an agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. On June 30, 1966 a Soviet-French agreement was signed in Moscow on scientific, technical and economic cooperation,<sup>60</sup> which mapped out a broader area of joint work, including the sale of patents and licenses. Simultaneously they signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,<sup>61</sup> including the use of communication satellites.

Expanding cooperation between the USSR and France in the most diverse areas is consonant with the interests not only of these countries but also of other nations, for it creates conditions for strengthening peace and is a model of developing relations and cooperation between countries with different social systems.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, then France's Minister of Economy and Finance, noted the importance of Soviet-French cooperation in September 1970, declaring that it "continues to play a paramount role in the needful detente between West and East".<sup>62</sup>

On October 2, 1970 Leonid Brezhnev gave a high assessment of the Soviet Union's relations with France, declaring that the USSR was prepared to expand and deepen them. "In recent years," he said, "the Soviet Union and France have achieved a measure of understanding, established political contacts at different levels, and laid a good foundation for a considerable development of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. We intend to do everything in our power to continue developing and deepening our relations with France on a solid, dependable basis."<sup>63</sup>

The trend in European capitalist countries towards improving relations with the USSR was to be observed in some NATO countries as well.

In the mid-1960s the policies pursued by the ruling circles of the Federal Republic of Germany resulted in a serious political crisis in that country. World developments daily refuted Bonn's claims that it had the recipe for settling European problems. The forces seeking revenge and a reshaping of Europe's political map increasingly unmasked themselves and a growing body of world opinion saw that their activities were incompatible with peace and European security.

In the course of five years there was a succession of four governments on the Rhine. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose name was

<sup>60</sup> *Soviet-French Relations, 1965-1976*. pp. 23-26.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 26-28.

<sup>62</sup> *Pravda*, September 8, 1970.

<sup>63</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course, Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1973, p. 146 (in Russian).

associated with a divisive policy, the formation of the West German state, and the membership of the NATO military bloc, had to resign. His successor, Ludwig Erhard, failed to cope with his job.

In December 1966, after a protracted government crisis, a "grand coalition" cabinet was formed of representatives of the CDU/CSU and the Social-Democratic Party with Kurt-Georg Kiesinger as Chancellor.

As one of its leaders frankly admitted, the "new" policy of the "grand coalition" was a rehash of the previous policy of revising the results of the defeat and capitulation of Nazi Germany in the Second World War. The only change was in the methods by which it was believed this aim could be achieved.

The Kiesinger government acted on the assumption that to attain their cherished goal of tranquility and security on the continent the European nations would make big concessions to meet the FRG's demands. It was contended that since the FRG now had a larger potential for influencing the stand of individual nations, it should not only depend on its NATO allies but show its own initiative for "ending the status quo peacefully".

The thesis of "ending the status quo peacefully" was read differently for different occasions. However, in all cases its constituent elements were the refusal to recognise the German Democratic Republic (i. e., the Halstein doctrine) and accept the existing frontiers in Europe as final, the demand that the FRG should be given "equal" rights with other nations in armaments, and a definitive rejection of the four-power Allied agreements envisaging measures to prevent any resurgence of German aggression.

The special danger that US militarism might form an alliance with the West German revanchists was noted at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. While using the other, each of them had their own imperialist designs. The congress resolution drew attention to the FRG's unabating attempts to gain access to missiles and nuclear weapons in order to use these armaments for its aggressive plans.

The Federal Republic of Germany was the main element behind the various projects for forming NATO nuclear forces—"multilateral", "Atlantic", "European", and so forth. It is indicative that these projects encountered opposition in the North Atlantic bloc itself. On November 5, 1964 the French Prime Minister Georges Pompidou declared at a press conference: "We are concerned about the intentions to set up this multilateral force. In short, we can ask if this project, if this multilateral force, is not destructive for Europe, a provocation for certain other countries, and ultimately directed against France in one way or another."<sup>64</sup>

The FRG endeavoured to spike the negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation that were going on at the time between the USSR and

<sup>64</sup> *Le Monde*, November 7, 1964.

the USA and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee in Geneva. Judging by everything, in Bonn it was felt that nuclear non-proliferation, which the vast majority of the nations of the world wanted, would be a further impediment to the nuclear ambitions of West German imperialism. The FRG military insisted on the creation of a "nuclear mine belt" on West German territory along the frontiers with the GDR and Czechoslovakia. Strong warnings from the Soviet Union, joint actions by the Warsaw Treaty nations, and protests from large segments of the people, including in the FRG itself, prevented the implementation of this monstrous project and also the plans for forming NATO multilateral nuclear forces.

However, the FRG's failure to break into the nuclear club in one leap did not signify that the Bundeswehr generals and their friends in influential FRG political circles had abandoned their hopes of getting the keys to nuclear weapons.

Research into, among other things, the military use of atomic energy was started in West German laboratories. Fissionable material was stockpiled. Close links were formed with the South African Republic and some other states with the object of coordinating the use of resources and building, with the help of West German expertise, atomic fuel factories in the SAR.

In 1964-1969 the world witnessed a mounting neo-nazi menace in the FRG. The nazi-oriented National Democratic Party appeared on the West German political scene with double-dyed chauvinistic slogans. At the *länder* elections in 1966-1968 its candidates won seats in the Landtags of seven out of ten regions, while at the Bundestag elections in 1969 it polled 1,400,000 votes, or twice as many as at the previous parliamentary elections. A highly symbolic fact is that far from exposing the militarist-revanchist activities of the NDP, which were a threat to peace in Europe, the CDU and the CSU virtually endeavoured to overtake that party on the right, vying with it in propounding nationalism and chauvinism.

The certain increase in the number of votes cast for the CDU and the CSU at the Landtag elections in 1970 came almost exclusively at the expense of the NDP. The revanchist forces had every reason to believe that the programmes of the Kiesinger-Strauss parties most fully embodied their demands and that these parties were becoming concentration centres of reaction.

In messages to the governments of the FRG and other Western powers the Soviet Union drew attention to the grave responsibility they were assuming by refusing to meet the terms of the Potsdam Agreement on the extirpation of German nazism. It declared that it would do everything to repulse the neo-nazi threat. It was crucial to safeguard the peoples against the intrigues of the neo-nazi forces and prevent a course of events that could lead to the appearance of a new hotbed of fascist danger in Europe and threaten world peace.

To a large extent the peace of the European peoples depended on the fulfilment of this task.

The activities of the neo-nazis would unquestionably never have acquired such dimensions had the directives on bringing nazi criminals to justice been carried out. Although the West German courts formally try individuals, the sentences passed by them often dovetail with the calls of the neo-nazis for the exoneration of the criminal Hitlerite policy and its executors, even in the cases where the latter are guilty of the most heinous crimes.

More, in 1964 the FRG leaders made an attempt to put an end to trials of nazi criminals on the basis of the "statute of limitations". This attitude evoked a wave of indignation in all socialist countries, in Western Europe, and in the developing nations. The Committee of the USSR Parliamentary Group and the Soviet government protested. Under pressure from world public the West German authorities had to postpone their plans, although they made no secret of the fact that they were still hoping to make everybody forget the past as quickly as possible.

"Extraordinary laws" were promulgated in the FRG in 1968 in flagrant contravention of the basic provisions of the Potsdam Agreement, in particular the provisions on democratisation of political and economic life and on the prevention of militarisation and excessive centralisation of power. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries showed that these were anti-democratic, militarist laws aimed at making the FRG population an obedient instrument of any policy Bonn may decide upon.

Relying on the enhanced military and economic potential, the FRG became more insistent and vociferous in its claims to a leading role in NATO. An "economic giant", the West German leaders argued, should not remain a "political dwarf". Actually, this was a bid for a "new Western policy", for economic, military, and political leadership of the capitalist world, particularly in determining the make-up of postwar Europe.

The Kiesenger government's refusal to recognise the realities in Europe and the activation of militarist and neo-nazi forces in the FRG adversely affected Soviet-West German relations. Tension remained at a high level. The individual initiatives that might have helped to create a better climate in these relations proved to be unproductive on account of the antipodal attitudes of the sides to fundamental European problems.

In 1967 Bonn proposed that the European socialist countries and the FRG undertake to refrain from using force for the settlement of outstanding issues between them. The draft documents forwarded by the FRG Foreign Ministry made it clear that the political significance of this step was to represent as "outstanding" the foundations of the situation in Europe: to cast doubt on the immutability of existing

frontiers and the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic and question the barrier preventing the FRG from gaining access to nuclear weapons. The FRG laid claim to continued interference in the affairs of West Berlin and rejected the invalidity of the Munich agreement. An exchange of declarations on a renunciation of force in these circumstances would have in effect legalised the FRG's revanchist claims and its refusal to fulfil the provisions of the Potsdam Agreement and, consequently, would only have compounded the settlement of vital European problems.

The Soviet government made a counter-proposal on the question of renouncing the use of force. On October 12 and November 21, 1967 the FRG government was given the relevant Soviet drafts, which proceeded from the immutability of the results of the Second World War and postwar development, from the interests of safeguarding European security, from the rights and interests of every European country, including the GDR.

Bonn insisted on its non-constructive stand, and this was fully mirrored in its reply of April 9, 1968. As was noted in a Soviet memorandum of July 5, 1968 to the FRG government,<sup>65</sup> the latter wanted to obtain from the socialist countries neither more nor less than "agreement with the policy of claims pursued by the FRG, with the build up of its strength in order to achieve the aims of that policy".

It was pointed out that the Federal Republic of Germany could play a major part in consolidating European security if its potential were used for peaceful cooperation and not for shattering the foundations of peace in Europe. At congresses of the CPSU, at sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in official messages to the FRG government and Bundestag it was declared that the Soviet Union wanted an improvement of relations with the FRG. However, these relations could only be improved if the FRG government adopted a realistic policy of peaceful cooperation.

There was deep concern among the FRG population over the manifest disparity between the ambitions of Adenauer and his successors and the FRG's potentialities, over the adventurism in their approach to vital issues of the day, an adventurism that was dooming the FRG population to a tormenting confrontation with other nations. Democratic and progressive forces headed by the Communists, large segments of public opinion, the trade unions, and intellectuals demanded the renunciation of this policy, which was menacing, above all, the Germans themselves. They urged the bridling of the neo-nazi movement, opposed the country's political and economic militarisation, called for an end to the FRG's one-sided orientation on the West, and called for recognition of realities.

<sup>65</sup> *Izvestia*, July 13, 1968. (Moscow evening issue).

The Bundestag elections in September 1969 were held in a situation witnessing an aggravation of the struggle of views among West German ruling circles over major aspects of Bonn's international policy, especially over its future relations with socialist countries. These elections ended the 20-year rule of the CDU and CSU on the Rhine. These parties were replaced by a coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats.

The communique on a meeting of party and government leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR (December 3-4, 1969) noted that the "results of the elections in the Federal Republic of Germany and the formation of a new government are an indication of the changes that have taken place in a segment of West German public opinion, the growth of tendencies in this segment towards a realistic policy of cooperation and understanding between nations". A welcome step was the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty by the Willy Brandt government. Further, it was stated that there had to be vigilance in face of dangerous signs of revanchism and the activation of neo-nazi forces.<sup>66</sup>

On the eve of the Bundestag elections the Soviet Union offered to enter into talks with the FRG on questions linked to their intention to renounce the use of force in their relations.

The Brandt government accepted this Soviet proposal. In the period from December 1969 to August 1970 there were exchanges of views and talks with FRG representatives.

In Moscow on August 12, 1970 the two countries signed a treaty that opened a new chapter in Soviet-West German relations. There was a worldwide response to this act, which was seen as an important milestone in European and world development, as a new important precondition for easing international tension.

The Moscow treaty recognises the actual situation resulting from the war and postwar development. The sides declared that they "have no territorial claims on any nation and will not make such claims in the future". They stated that they had no intention of resorting to the use or threat of force in their relations with each other and pledged to bring their policies into conformity with the wide-ranging interests of peace, undeviatingly to respect the territorial integrity of all European nations within their present frontiers, and to regard these frontiers, including Poland's western frontier along the Oder-Neisse and the frontier between the GDR and the FRG, as inviolable now and in the future.<sup>67</sup>

Together with the FRG's treaty with the Polish People's Republic (signed in Warsaw on December 7, 1970), its Treaty on Principles of Relations with the GDR (signed on December 21, 1971), and its

<sup>66</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1969.

<sup>67</sup> *Izvestia*, August 13, 1970.



treaty with the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (signed in Prague on December 11, 1973), which declared the Munich diktat null and void, the Moscow treaty is an important constituent element of the system of peaceful relations between European countries. The conclusion of these treaties gave an impetus to the convocation of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation, and to the commencement of negotiations on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. It is unquestionable that without the Moscow treaty there would have been no settlement of the West Berlin and other issues, which likewise helped to improve the international situation and make the prospects for a lasting peace more hopeful.

The Moscow, Warsaw, and other treaties were signed as a result of the efforts of the socialist community over a period of many years, the actions taken by the people to prevent further military collisions in Europe, and the realism and sense of political responsibility displayed by the Brandt-Scheel government.

But the savage resistance of West German reaction had to be broken before these treaties could come into force. The reactionaries used all the means available to them to prevent the ratification of these treaties and thereby halt the positive processes in international relations. Their political platform was quite frankly stated by the former FRG Ambassador in the USSR Helmut Allardt, who said: "As long as realities are not ensured in terms of law they will not have a legal status, in other words, the interested sides may amend them as they wish—to the extent they have the strength for this."<sup>68</sup>

Reaction, which had the backing of revanchist and pro-nazi elements, was ultimately defeated. The Moscow and Warsaw treaties were ratified by the Bundestag on May 17, 1972 and on May 21 they were underwritten by the Bundesrat (Federal Council). However, the experience of the struggle for the treaties showed how laboriously the new and progressive was paving the way for itself in West German reality and how powerful the political forces oriented on the past still were in the FRG.

A mutually beneficial treaty signed by independent states closes a phase of history, separates the past from the present, and contains projections into the future. It provides a legal basis and a starting point for a specific process but does not replace concrete action and efforts by the sides in translating it into life.

The Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU stated: "As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to meet the commitments it has assumed under the Soviet-West German treaty. We are prepared to cover our part of the way towards normalisation and improvement of relations between the FRG and the socialist part of Europe, provided, of course, the other side acts in accordance with

<sup>68</sup> Helmut Allardt, *H. Moskauer Tagebuch*, Düsseldorf-Vienna, 1973, p. 233.

the letter and spirit of the treaty.”<sup>69</sup> In turn, the Brandt-Scheel government declared its intention to abide by and implement the treaty consistently.

Soviet-West German relations were seriously complicated by the FRG government's arbitrary interference in the affairs of West Berlin. Although that city does not and cannot belong to the FRG, West German circles would have liked to behave there as though it were their appendage. They conducted provocative meetings in West Berlin and used it for other political demonstrations hostile to socialist countries.

The FRG's attempts, with the connivance of the US, British, and French occupation authorities, to entrench itself in West Berlin held no promise of good for itself, the West Berliners, or the interests of detente. Reluctance to reckon with realities had as its inevitable consequence the application of the relevant measures to the violators of the four-power Allied agreements to safeguard peace and security against the threat of German imperialism and militarism.

Control on the GDR's frontier with West Berlin, instituted in August 1961, closed the main channels of the subversive activities conducted from that city against socialist countries. In 1967-1969 the GDR took a series of additional defensive steps to counter the expansion of arbitrary FRG activities in West Berlin. In particular, transit across GDR territory to West Berlin was denied to Bonn ministers, Bundeswehr servicemen, and members of neo-nazi organisations. In February 1969 the ban on the shipment in and out of West Berlin via GDR territory of goods listed in Law No. 43 of the Control Council was reiterated. These steps had the agreement and support of the Soviet government.

The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic regard West Berlin as a political entity separate from the FRG. In this status the West Berliners have all the prerequisites for creating the external and internal conditions for ensuring their welfare and tranquility. West Berlin enjoys every facility for using communication routes running across the GDR, whose authorities keep the motor roads, waterways, and other lines of communication in proper repair in order to cope with the enormous flow of people and freight to and from the city. There is only one thing that the socialist countries want from city's inhabitants and authorities, and it is that they observe the principles of goodneighbourship and prevent the territory of West Berlin from being used as a base for revanchism, as a springboard for provocations against peace.

In the course of 1968 and 1969 the Soviet government repeatedly renewed its calls upon the USA, Britain, and France, and also upon the West Berlin Senate to steer a course towards the normalisation of

<sup>69</sup> 24th Congress of the CPSU, p. 32.

the situation in and around West Berlin. Under pressure of circumstances, the three powers had to agree to an exchange of views with the USSR in West Berlin.

This exchange started in March 1970 in the building that once housed the Control Council in the US sector of West Berlin and ended with the signing on September 3, 1971 of a quadripartite agreement that recorded the stand of the interested sides on the West Berlin problem.<sup>70</sup>

As in preceding years, the period 1964-1971 saw the USSR and Britain maintaining political contacts and promoting commercial relations.

There were a number of Soviet-British summits. In 1966 and in January 1968 the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson visited the USSR, while the head of the Soviet government A. N. Kosygin visited Britain in February 1967. The talks during the latter visit covered foreign policy issues and further trade and economic relations between the USSR and Britain. The joint communique on the results of that visit stated that there were good opportunities for increasing trade for the benefit of the two nations and that these opportunities should be multiplied.<sup>71</sup> British Foreign Secretaries visited Moscow several times, and at the talks the sides considered international problems and mapped out concrete steps to promote Soviet-British bilateral relations, including further trade and economic cooperation. Constructive cooperation developed successfully between the two countries during these years, as was seen by the growth of Soviet-British trade. Of the capitalist countries Britain held first place in trade with the USSR.

There was a visible expansion of Soviet-British contacts in science, technology, education, and culture. Most of the exchanges in these fields were placed on a regular and treaty basis. A consultative committee was set up to promote bilateral relations, and the Soviet-British Joint Commission was formed to monitor the fulfilment of the obligations of the sides under trade and economic agreements and to work out new possibilities for enlarging business contacts.

However, in the latter half of 1968 the British ruling circles caused a deterioration of the climate in Soviet-British relations. They were incensed by the failure of the counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia, since they were among the most active proponents of a policy of gradually separating individual European socialist countries from the socialist community. British official circles were involved in an anti-Soviet campaign and took steps to fold up Anglo-Soviet contacts and exchanges.

"While taking steps to normalise relations with the Soviet Union

<sup>70</sup> The significance of this agreement is dealt with in Chapter XXXI.

<sup>71</sup> *Pravda*, February 14, 1967.

the British government did not abandon, when it felt this was important for itself, actions prejudicing these relations. Throughout 1969 the British press, radio, television, and other propaganda channels carried pronouncements distorting Soviet foreign policy and also the principal events in the internal political life of the Soviet people".<sup>72</sup>

This line of the British ruling circles was clearly at variance with the interests of developing relations between the peoples of the USSR and Britain. In this connection, the Soviet side pointed out that hostility and the aggravation of relations with the Soviet Union leading to increased tension in Europe would bring Britain neither benefits nor advantages. It was declared that the Soviet Union did not seek a worsening of relations with Britain but that their development presupposed good will and a desire for cooperation on the part of not one but of the two sides.<sup>73</sup> This stand was reiterated when the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko went to Britain in October 1970 on an official visit. Upon his arrival in London he said: "The Soviet Union steadfastly pursues a policy of promoting relations with Britain in the belief that an expansion and improvement of the relations between our countries would meet the interests of our peoples and be a factor of no little importance in improving the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole".<sup>74</sup>

During this period there was an improvement of relations with Italy accompanied by a substantial growth of Soviet-Italian trade and economic links.

In characterising Italian policy towards the USSR, the Soviet Embassy in Rome noted: "Italy is the first of the Common Market nations to sign a long-term trade agreement with the USSR for 1966-1969 outside the framework of the 1965 agreement."<sup>75</sup>

Of the Western nations Italy is traditionally one of the Soviet Union's main trade partners.

Long-term agreements and contracts, for example, on the sale of Soviet oil and gas, the concentration of Italian uranium raw materials at Soviet factories, and the sale of large-diameter pipes to the Soviet Union, have entered the practice of business relations with Italian firms. A Soviet-Italian agreement on economic, scientific, and technological cooperation was signed in Rome on April 23, 1966, and on May 4 of the same year a protocol was signed in Turin on Fiat participation in the building of a passenger car complex in the Soviet Union.

<sup>72</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Political report of the USSR Embassy in the United Kingdom for 1969.

<sup>73</sup> *Izvestia*, December 16, 1968 (Moscow evening issue).

<sup>74</sup> *Pravda*, October 27, 1970.

<sup>75</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Political report of the USSR Embassy in Italy for 1964.

A wide spectrum of questions related to Soviet-Italian cooperation in various fields was discussed in early 1967 during the first-ever visit to Italy by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Soviet-Italian communique of January 30, 1967, at the end of the visit, said that the "sides noted with satisfaction that the relations between the Soviet Union and Italy, particularly of late, have expanded significantly in many areas" and that a "further expansion of bilateral cooperation in all areas, and stable, good relations meet with the interests of the Soviet and Italian peoples".<sup>76</sup> The sides underscored the special significance of Fiat participation in the building of a passenger car factory in the USSR for the further development of relations between the two countries and noted the importance to Italy of Soviet gas sales and the building of a gas pipe-line. During this visit an inter-governmental agreement on Soviet-Italian cooperation in cinematography was signed in Rome.

In a talk with A. A. Gromyko in New York in October 1968 the Italian Foreign Minister Giuseppe Medici declared that Italy desired broader cooperation with the USSR. He expressed the Italian government's hope that cooperation with the Soviet Union would be lasting. The Soviet Union and Italy had all the potentialities for such cooperation. Italy, he said, had permanent reasons for friendship with the USSR, and that Italy and the Soviet Union should find a common language.<sup>77</sup>

A visit to Italy by A. A. Gromyko in November 1970 provided the opportunity for discussing some important international problems and also questions related to the development of relations between the two countries. The Soviet-Italian communique on this visit stated that the sides had acknowledged the usefulness of political consultations at all levels and the continuation and deepening of such Soviet-Italian consultations in order to promote mutual understanding and draw together the two nations' viewpoints on European and world affairs.

In the process of easing international tension a role of no little significance is played by the Soviet Union's relations with neighbouring countries, including Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations are a striking example of how goodneighbourly, friendly relations and mutually beneficial economic links can be developed between countries with different socio-economic systems.

"The development of Soviet-Finnish cooperation in the past decades," L. I. Brezhnev said, "is firmly inscribed in world history as a striking example of how Lenin's principles of new inter-state relations

<sup>76</sup> *Izvestia*, January 30, 1967.

<sup>77</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Record of a talk between A. A. Gromyko and the Italian Foreign Minister Guisepppe Medici on October 8, 1968.

are translated into practice.”<sup>78</sup>

The expanding friendly relations between the USSR and Finland rest on the dependable foundation of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of April 6, 1948.

The signing of this treaty was a milestone in Soviet-Finnish relations, for it formalised the turn in these relations towards trust and friendship, and was consistent with the interests of both countries.

It was prolonged twice: most recently in July 1970 for a term of 20 years. It continues to serve as a durable basis for the development of close political relations and peaceful coexistence between the two nations. “The development of goodneighbourly relations with this friendly country,” Leonid Brezhnev said on October 2, 1970, “has now been given new clear prospects. We attach great significance to this in the context of a further strengthening of peace and security in Northern Europe.”<sup>79</sup>

A reliable legal basis was created for close and mutually beneficial cooperation with the signing of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty on the Promotion of Economic, Technical, and Industrial Cooperation in 1971. This was the first treaty of its kind signed by the Soviet Union with a capitalist country.

In parallel with the growth of commercial links, the two countries are steadily expanding links in science, education, culture, and sports. Tourist exchanges have reached large dimensions.

Headway towards mutual understanding and cooperation was also to be observed in the Soviet Union’s relations with Austria. Here a large contribution was made by mutual visits by statesmen and exchanges of delegations at various levels. During a visit to Austria in November 1966 the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet stressed the positive significance of Austria’s policy of neutrality and noted that the “steadfast observance by the Austrian federal government of its obligations under the State Treaty and its policy of permanent neutrality are a dependable and sound basis for the further growth of Austria’s international prestige and for friendship and cooperation with Soviet Union, with neighbouring countries and other nations of the world”,<sup>80</sup> The Soviet-Austrian communique on the results of this visit, published on November 22, 1966, declared that the “two sides have agreed that the State Treaty on the restoration of Austria as an independent and democratic nation, and also the proclamation of the nation’s permanent neutrality by the Austrian parliament, an act that has won worldwide recognition, are a positive

<sup>78</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin’s Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 6, p. 242 (in Russian).

<sup>79</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin’s Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 3, p. 146 (in Russian).

<sup>80</sup> *Pravda*, November 15, 1966.

contribution to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace in Europe". The Soviet side stated that "Austria's efforts to consolidate its status as a neutral sovereign nation has received and will continue to receive the Soviet Union's complete and disinterested support".

During a visit to the Soviet Union by the Austrian Federal Chancellor Josef Klaus in March 1967 the sides discussed political questions and a further expansion of bilateral trade and economic links. It was agreed, in particular, that "talks would be continued as soon as possible on the sale of Soviet natural gas to Austria and on the building of the USSR-Italy gas pipeline across Austrian territory with the participation of Austrian enterprises".<sup>81</sup>

When Chancellor Franz Jonas visited the USSR in 1968 the two countries signed an agreement on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation and set up a mixed commission to put the accord into effect. In 1969-1970 they signed a series of other agreements on economic, scientific, technical, and cultural cooperation.

The Soviet Union has friendly, goodneighbourly relations with Sweden, which is also a neutral state. Underlying these relations is the two nation's mutual interest in consolidating peace and international security, especially in Northern Europe. This creates fertile soil not only for economic and cultural exchanges but also for political cooperation on many issues.

Soviet-Swedish trade, which dates back to the 1920s, has evolved into broad mutually beneficial commerce. Time was when the then young Soviet Republic could offer the Swedish market nothing except hemp, but now the Soviet Union sells Sweden not only raw materials and semi-finished goods, but also machinery. Official statistics reveal that trade between the Soviet Union and Sweden is growing at a more rapid rate than Sweden's trade with other nations. In only the period 1965-1969 Soviet-Swedish trade increased 130 per cent to reach the sum of 213,000,000 rubles.<sup>82</sup>

Outside Europe the period under review saw a vitalisation of relations with Japan. An agreement on trade and payments for 1966-1970 and an agreement on direct air communication between Moscow and Tokyo were signed with Japan on January 21, 1966 in Moscow. Since March of the same year regular conferences between Soviet and Japanese delegations (Soviet-Japanese and Japanese-Soviet committees) have been held alternately in Moscow and Tokyo on questions of business cooperation. On July 29, 1966 the USSR and Japan signed a consular convention. In August they signed a general agreement on the purchase of Japanese equipment, machinery, materials, and other goods for the development of the

<sup>81</sup> *Izvestia*, March 21, 1967.

<sup>82</sup> *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta*, No. 24, June 1970.

Soviet Far Eastern timber industry and on sales of Soviet timber to Japan.

In an interview to the Japanese newspaper *Mainichi* in 1969 A. N. Kosygin said he believed there were excellent prospects for a further expansion of trade and economic links between the USSR and Japan and underlined that it was important to strengthen political good-neighbourly relations between them. "Moreover," he noted, "we regard these relations as a significant factor preserving peace and stabilising the situation in the Far East and Asia generally".<sup>83</sup> The Soviet Union was accordingly prepared to continue its efforts to broaden and deepen relations with Japan.

However, the state of Soviet-Japanese relations, A. N. Kosygin said, depended not only on the USSR but also on Japan. For that reason the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent to Japan's policy and actions. This was the rational of its negative attitude to the Japanese-US so-called treaty of mutual cooperation and security. "Soviet people," A. N. Kosygin declared, "furthermore, are not indifferent to the fact that there are US troops and military bases on Japanese territory in direct proximity of our frontiers".<sup>84</sup>

In Japan there was a growing chorus demanding a reassessment of the anti-war provisions in the Japanese Constitution and a revival of the Samurai spirit, the rebuilding of large naval and air forces. Indeed, the ruling circles in Japan gradually and steadily steered towards an intensive rearming of the "self-defence forces".

Militarist and undisguisedly revenge-seeking forces set up obstacles to the further development of goodneighbourly relations and constructive Japanese-Soviet cooperation by artificially arousing anti-Soviet feeling in Japan. With official encouragement and approval they started an anti-Soviet campaign demanding the return to Japan of what they claimed were its "northern territories". Unjustified territorial claims were made on the Soviet Union by the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the 25th UN General Assembly. All this, of course, poisoned the climate between the two countries.

The Soviet Union repeatedly declared that the territorial issue between it and Japan had been settled, and that this settlement had been formalised in the relevant international agreements.

The tendentious propaganda in Japan over the "territorial issue" was fanned by elements opposed to goodneighbourly relations between the two nations.

The Soviet Union's principled policy relative to Japan was incisively put by Leonid Brezhnev, who said: "We are convinced that the positive development of Soviet-Japanese relations meets the require-

<sup>83</sup> *Pravda*, January 5, 1969.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*



ments of both countries. It also meets the interests of peace and security on the Asian continent".<sup>85</sup>

### Questions of European Security in the Soviet Union's Relations with Capitalist Countries

The efforts made by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the period 1964-1970 to resolve the problem of setting up a system of collective security in Europe were dealt with in the previous chapter.

The USSR continued doing all it could to ease tension and strengthen international, notably European, security, believing that Europe was the key to world security because historically developments in it powerfully affected the world situation. Both world wars broke out in Europe. And now it was the scene of confrontation between the main forces of imperialism and the socialist community. Gigantic arsenals of missile-nuclear and other powerful weapons are concentrated there.

The proposal for a European conference on security and the promotion of peaceful cooperation, made by the Soviet Union jointly with the other Warsaw Treaty nations, had a favourable response from world democratic opinion.

It was acclaimed by the vast majority of West European governments. When the French President Georges Pompidou visited the USSR it was stated that France and the Soviet Union saw eye to eye on the question of convening a European conference. The declaration of the visit, signed in Moscow, said that the aim of that conference "must be to strengthen European security by establishing a system of undertakings which would exclude recourse to the threat or use of force in mutual relations between European states and would ensure respect for the principles of territorial integrity of states, non-interference in their domestic affairs, and the equality and independence of all states". On the subject of convening the conference, the influential French newspaper *Le Monde* wrote on November 17, 1970: "This project is imperceptibly gaining ground at every new stage of East-West negotiations".

Italy, too, showed interest in a European conference. This was demonstrated by the communique on the results of an official visit by the Soviet Foreign Minister to Italy in November 1970, which stated that the USSR and Italy "consider that in order to ensure the success of the conference it is necessary to begin all-embracing, active preparations, including the earliest possible multilateral contacts".<sup>86</sup>

<sup>85</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 457.

<sup>86</sup> *Pravda*, November 15, 1970.

Like the treaties of the USSR and Poland with the FRG, the new phase in Soviet-French cooperation improved the prospects for holding a European conference on security and cooperation. Many European states, including the Vatican, declared themselves in favour of the conference. An active role in the preparations was played by Finland. As early as May 1969 the Finnish government initiated steps to convene the conference. Acting on the Budapest appeal of the Warsaw Treaty nations the Finnish government on May 5, 1966 issued a memorandum addressed to the governments of all European states, including the GDR and the FRG, and also of the USA and Canada, declaring its readiness to host the conference and also the preliminary meetings to discuss questions linked to its convocation. Subsequently, it did not relax its efforts to induce the European states to support its initiative. At the close of November 1970 the Finnish Prime Minister Ahti Karjalainen called upon 35 nations to hold preliminary consultations on organising a European conference and offered Helsinki as the venue for the conference.<sup>87</sup> Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, and other European nations aligned themselves with the idea of a conference.

The Austrian President Franz Jonas declared that Austria had favoured the idea from the outset, saying that Austria welcomed and supported any initiative meeting the objective of strengthening security and cooperation in Europe.

However, the adversaries of detente hung on to their positions, going to all lengths to halt the relaxation of tension. Reaction and militarism attacked the proposal for holding a European conference on security and cooperation. Right-wing elements in the FRG grouped around the notorious neo-nazi "resistance action" were an active participant in the ensuing extremely sharp and tense struggle mounted by these reactionary opponents of peace and socialism over the question of a European conference.

Despite this frenzied opposition from international reaction, which did not scruple to use any means to prevent the holding of a European conference, the conviction grew steadily among various segments of European public opinion that detente, the consolidation of peace, the prevention of war, and the assertion of the principles of good-neighbourly relations were consistent with the interests of all the nations of Europe. This explained the involvement of the masses and their hardening pressure on the governments.

Further, the ruling circles of European countries could not ignore the mounting strength of democratic opinion in Europe, which was demanding the holding of a conference to establish an effective system of security and organise mutually beneficial cooperation among all the European nations. The World Peace Assembly was held

<sup>87</sup> *Diplomacy of Socialism*, Moscow, 1973, p. 199 (in Russian).

in Berlin in 1969, while a conference on security and cooperation in Europe was convened in Vienna in the same year.<sup>88</sup>

The idea of holding a conference of all European nations with the aim of assuring European security on the principles of collective security to replace the system of military alliances gradually won broader recognition and paved the way for its implementation.

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In the course of 1964-1971 Soviet foreign policy continued to move successfully towards its main objective, that of assuring favourable external conditions for building communism in the USSR and socialism in the other countries of the socialist world community. This steady advance was achieved by ensuring the preservation of peace and the promotion of constructive links with an ever larger number of nations.

The principal foreign policy successes during this period were: continued progress towards socialist integration and the strengthening of relations with members of the socialist community; the safeguarding of socialism's gains in Czechoslovakia by the joint efforts of fraternal countries; effective assistance to the Vietnamese people enabling them to repel aggression by the world's strongest imperialist power; and joint efforts by socialist countries to establish lasting peace in the Middle East on the basis of the Security Council resolution demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied Arab lands.

The signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, the Soviet-French protocol and declaration of October 13, 1970, and the USSR-FRG treaty of August 12, 1970 were acts of great positive significance.

The certain complication of relations with the USA due to its aggression against the Vietnamese people, support for Israeli aggression, and some other reasons did not prevent a substantial improvement of the USSR's relations with European nations and an increased acceptance of the idea of holding a conference on European security and cooperation.

These important changes for the better were the outcome of the new balance of strength in the world in favour of socialism, the consistent and meaningful character of Soviet foreign policy, and the spreading struggle of the peoples of capitalist countries against imperialism and aggression. The resultant improved international climate beneficially affected the internal situation in the capitalist countries, strengthening the position of the communist parties and other pro-

<sup>88</sup> V. Petrov, V. Belov, A. Korenin, *Leninist Soviet Foreign Policy of the USSR: Development and Prospects*, Moscow, 1974, p. 266 (in Russian).

gressive forces in their struggle for the interests of the working people, against reaction and militarism.

Dramatic changes took place in the Soviet Union's relations with Latin American states: diplomatic relations were established with many of them and there was an expansion of economic and other links.

Soviet cooperation with developing Asian, African, and Latin American countries continued to expand and deepen during these years. The Soviet Union rendered them diverse assistance in building up and promoting their national economies. Invariably based on the principles of equality and mutual interests, this cooperation is gradually acquiring the nature of a stable division of labour in contrast to the system of imperialist exploitation in international economic relations.

## CHAPTER XXXI

### THE SOVIET UNION IMPLEMENTS THE FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS OF THE 24TH CPSU CONGRESS. THE PEACE PROGRAMME IN ACTION (1971-1975)

#### The Soviet Peace Programme

The five years between the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU were a period of hard and imaginative work by the Soviet people in successfully carrying out the assignments of the ninth five-year plan, a period that witnessed a further significant step in the building of communism in the USSR. Other countries of the socialist community likewise made major advances in their development. This led to a further change in the world balance of class forces in favour of socialism.

Soviet foreign policy, and, to a large extent, the course of international developments as a whole were determined in this period by the decisions of the 24th Congress of the CPSU (March 30-April 9, 1971) and, in particular, by the Peace Programme unanimously passed by that congress.

The guidelines set by the 24th Congress were clear-cut: to continue bending every effort to strengthen the unity of the socialist countries and all anti-imperialist forces, and pursue a policy of active defence of peace and international cooperation.

A spectrum of concrete tasks directed towards the cardinal aim of reducing the threat of war and strengthening peace held a special place in Soviet foreign policy and in the overall course of international development. This spectrum, enunciated by Leonid Brezhnev in the Central Committee report to the 24th Congress of the CPSU, was approved by that congress, and soon afterwards became known worldwide as the Soviet Peace Programme.

Socialism and peace are inseparable. Lenin wrote: "An end to wars, peace among the nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence—such is our ideal."<sup>1</sup> This immutable fact has been borne out by the entire course of international events throughout a period of more than six decades, ever since the formation of the world's first state of workers and peasants.

Utterly devoted to Lenin's teaching, the CPSU has steadfastly abided by his injunctions and behests in foreign policy. Formalised in the decisions of the highest organs of the CPSU and the Soviet government, in the Constitution of the USSR, they comprise the un-

<sup>1</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 21, p. 293.

changeable, principled foundation of Soviet policy in international affairs. "The foreign policy of the Soviet Union," Leonid Brezhnev said, "has been and will remain a socialist, class, internationalist policy."<sup>2</sup>

The Peace Programme is an outstanding document in many respects. Its main hallmarks are that it contains concrete, realistic proposals for settling the most pressing problems that in those years stood in the way of strengthening peace and promoting peaceful cooperation among nations:

- abolishing military flashpoints in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East, and giving an immediate and firm rebuff to any acts of aggression and international piracy;

- making renunciation of the threat or use of force an international law and concluding the relevant bilateral and regional treaties;

- finally recognising the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of World War II, achieving a turn towards detente and peace on that continent, and convening and successfully completing a European conference;

- ensuring collective security in Europe and, for this purpose, disbanding the North Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Treaty or, as a first step, abolishing their military organisations;

- banning nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons, ending nuclear tests world-wide, setting up nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and securing the nuclear disarmament of all nations;

- redoubling the efforts to end all forms of the arms race;

- dismantling foreign military bases; reducing armed forces and armaments in regions where the military confrontation is particularly volatile, chiefly in Central Europe;

- reducing military spending, chiefly on the part of the big countries;

- abolishing all remaining colonial regimes and securing a world-wide condemnation and boycott of all manifestations of racism and apartheid;

- deepening mutually beneficial cooperation in all fields with nations interested in such cooperation.

The fact that the fulfilment of these tasks became feasible was due to the new balance of strength in the world. Socialism's economic and defence potential and its moral and political strength had increased enormously and its international prestige and influence on world developments had grown. At the same time, there was a substantial weakening of the imperialist camp on account of the rapid aggravation of capitalism's general crisis. Further, an active and ever more visible role began to be played on the world scene by nations that had shaken off colonial tyranny and achieved state independence and sovereignty.

<sup>2</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Moscow, 1975, p. 255.

The policy of these countries was likewise basically aimed at promoting the principles of national freedom, social progress, and peace.

Together, these changes were what in a complex situation made the Peace Programme, adopted by the 24th Congress, a profoundly realistic document of the utmost significance.

It was unanimously approved by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet people. Marked with approbation by the fraternal socialist countries it became essentially a joint foreign-policy programme of the socialist community. It was acclaimed and supported by large segments of peace-loving public in all countries and was adopted as a concrete platform of struggle for a lasting peace, for delivering humanity from the threat of another world war. The proposals in it drew the attention and interest of many statesmen and politicians in bourgeois countries, who appreciated the need for ending the cold war and preserving and consolidating peace.

Most of the tasks set in the Peace Programme were fulfilled in the interval between the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU. An end was put to the imperialist aggression in Vietnam with the result that the military flashpoint in Southeast Asia was extinguished. The hostilities that erupted in the Middle East in October 1973 were halted, and work was started on laying the foundations for a lasting peace and political settlement in that region on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions with the active participation of the Soviet Union. The principles of peaceful coexistence were recorded in mandatory form in many important treaties, agreements, and other government-to-government accords. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, attended by 33 European nations, the USA, and Canada commenced its work in 1973 and completed it at summit level in 1975. Talks on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe were started in Vienna in 1973. On April 10, 1972 an international convention was concluded banning the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons and providing for their destruction.<sup>3</sup> The USSR and the USA signed a treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, an interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, and a treaty on the limitation of underground tests of nuclear weapons.<sup>4</sup>

A major factor clearing the way to detente and enlarging the material basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was the Soviet Union's active international economic policy. In

<sup>3</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 58-64. The convention came into force on March 26, 1975.

<sup>4</sup> *Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXVIII, Moscow, 1974, pp. 31, 35.

1975 Soviet foreign trade amounted to nearly 50,000 million rubles, which was considerably in excess of the targets set in the directives of the 24th CPSU Congress for the ninth five-year plan. The industrialised capitalist countries accounted for nearly 32 per cent of Soviet foreign trade in 1975. The total trade turnover rose 130 per cent during the period of the ninth five-year plan, which also witnessed the development of new, higher forms of cooperation with foreign countries. Soviet participation in the international division of labour was steadily deepening and growing more stable and effective.

In other words, chiefly on account of the consistently peaceful, constructive foreign policy of the USSR and all the other socialist-community states a turn was seen by the mid-1970s from the cold war to detente. There was an appreciable positive advance in the relations of the USSR and other European socialist states with the leading capitalist countries.

Developments thus convincingly showed that the Peace Programme was both realistic and effective. The efforts of imperialist and Maoist circles to depict the Peace Programme as "pure propaganda" burst like a soap bubble. It was demonstrated in practice that the Peace Programme of the 24th CPSU Congress was an example of sober Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation. This document is permeated with ideas dear to the hearts of millions and consonant with the interests of all nations: the consolidation of peace in the world and the prevention of a nuclear-missile world war. That explains why it won the minds of the masses and become a potent factor of historic significance.

### **The USSR and the Further Strengthening of Unity Among Fraternal Socialist Countries**

Concern for strengthening and developing the principal factor of international peace and progress in our epoch, namely, the socialist world system, chiefly its most powerful and advanced segment—the community of socialist states united within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—continues to underlie the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

The period following the 24th Congress of the CPSU was marked by vigorous actions on the part of the socialist-community states and epoch-making successes of their joint foreign policy. In carrying out the congress decisions, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government regarded the strengthening of the positions held by world socialism as one of the basic aims of their foreign policy. These years saw a series of important initiatives and joint actions by fraternal countries aimed at promoting and deepening all-sided cooperation in



the socialist community, coordinating their actions on the world scene, fulfilling the plans for socialist economic integration, and improving the work of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the CMEA.

Multilateral and bilateral meetings held regularly between leaders of the communist and workers' parties of fraternal countries made a huge contribution to strengthening and developing the socialist community. On the initiative of Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comradesly meetings of leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union were held in the Crimea in 1971, 1972, and 1973. In addition to valuable exchanges of experience of building socialism and communism, these meetings considered urgent problems of cooperation in the socialist community, worked out a common assessment of the international situation, went deep into the general laws and trends of world development, and charted the main orientations for further coordinated actions and strategic and tactical moves by the fraternal countries on the international scene. Every such meeting was a major political event in international life and made a large contribution to the overall strengthening of the socialist community, the unity and cohesion of the fraternal parties, the further development of cooperation, and the coordination of their foreign policy, and giving them the possibility of continuing to energise their mutual cooperation and their activity in the world.

The defensive Warsaw Treaty Organisation continued to play a major part in safeguarding the security of the socialist countries, in protecting their socialist gains. For a quarter of a century that organisation has been a dependable shield of socialism, and increasingly powerful factor strengthening world peace, and an increasingly more vigorous instrument of the peace policy of the socialist states aimed at consolidating the security of all nations and promoting mutually beneficial cooperation among them on the basis of equality and mutual respect. "The history of the Warsaw Treaty," A. A. Gromyko said on May 14, 1975 at a meeting in Moscow dedicated to the 20th anniversary of that organisation, "is one of active struggle of the socialist countries for peace and detente, for the defence of the legitimate rights of nations."<sup>5</sup>

The conferences of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Prague on January 25-26, 1972 and in Warsaw on April 17-18, 1974 were of signal importance for the further strengthening of the socialist community's cohesion and the deepening of coordinated actions by the socialist countries in the world. These conferences reaffirmed the complete identity of assessments of the international

<sup>5</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy, Selected Articles and Speeches*, p. 391.

situation and endorsed the efforts of the member countries to extend and deepen detente.

At its Prague conference the Political Consultative Committee unanimously passed a Declaration on Peace, Security, and Cooperation in Europe, which amplified and specified the proposals of the socialist countries for strengthening European security set out in the 1966 Bucharest Declaration, the 1969 Budapest Appeal, and the 1970 Berlin Statement. The declaration lucidly outlined the ways and means leading to the formulation of the principles for building a system of European security and cooperation. It enunciated the basic principles for relations between European nations: inviolability of frontiers, non-use of force, peaceful coexistence, goodneighbourly relations and cooperation in the interests of peace, mutually beneficial links between nations, disarmament, and commitment to the UN. These principles mirrored the dictates of the times and won increasing recognition among the masses and prominent statesmen in West European capitalist countries as well. In effect, this document of the socialist community underlay the work of the European conference.

The declaration stated that that conference could be convened in 1972.

The Prague conference of the Political Consultative Committee made the point that an agreement on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe would help strengthen European security. Further, it adopted a statement on the continuing US aggression in Indochina, emphatically demanding an end to the US intervention in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. It reaffirmed its solidarity with the peoples of these countries, strongly denounced the USA's adventurist policy, and declared that the problem of Indochina could only be settled on the basis of the legitimate rights of the peoples of that region to decide their own future.

Developments soon confirmed the feasibility of the tasks advanced by the Warsaw Treaty nations in Prague. The European conference opened in Helsinki in July 1973. The USA had no choice but to sign the Paris Agreement and begin withdrawing its troops from Vietnam. Nineteen nations began talks in Vienna in October 1973 on a mutual cutback of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

At the next conference of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw two years later, in April 1974, attention was again devoted mainly to strengthening world peace and security. It was reaffirmed that the European conference was a great triumph for peace, a triumph for common sense in international affairs. "We shall do all we can," the Political Consultative Committee declared, "to promote the successful conclusion of the work of the conference (the all-European conference.—*Ed.*) at the earliest date so that its results should meet the aspirations of the peace-loving peoples. However, we regard the conference not as an aim but as the starting point of the historic work

of building up new relations between all the nations of the European continent. On the basis of the principles that will be worked out by the conference and formalised by the authority of thirty-three nations, the countries of Europe will be able to establish and develop large-scale cooperation among themselves for the great material and cultural benefit of each of them. We are prepared for such cooperation and call upon all the participants in the European conference to join in it."<sup>6</sup>

At the Warsaw conference much attention was given to military detente. It was stressed that the successful completion of the Vienna talks on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe on the basis of a constructive accord would be an immense contribution towards relaxing tension and creating a good climate for future similar talks embracing other parts of Europe. The conference reasserted the readiness of the Warsaw Treaty nations to annul that treaty provided the North Atlantic pact was abrogated simultaneously or, as a first step, to see the dismantling of the military organisations of the two alliances. Moreover, it was stressed that as long as the NATO bloc remained in existence and no effective disarmament steps were taken the Warsaw Treaty nations would consider it necessary to increase their defence capability and promote close cooperation among themselves in this field.<sup>7</sup>

The Warsaw conference considered the Middle East situation. Its declaration "For Durable and Just Peace in the Middle East" stressed the significance of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East and that it should be attended by the nations directly concerned and also representatives of the Arab people of Palestine. Further, the conference issued statements headed "For Durable Peace in Vietnam, for Ensuring the Just National Interests of the Vietnamese People" and "End the Lawlessness and the Persecution of Democrats in Chile".<sup>8</sup>

The communique adopted by the conference expressed solidarity with the just national liberation struggle of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, noted the mounting role played by the non-aligned movement and, in this context, emphasised the great importance of the 4th Conference of Non-Aligned States in Algiers.

Alongside collective actions, there was an ever more intensive exchange of delegations of working people, Party and government leaders, and public figures at all levels between the socialist-community nations. In particular, during the period 1971-1975 the USSR hosted many visits by leaders of fraternal parties and heads of top-level government organs of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, April 19, 1974.

<sup>7</sup> *Pravda*, April 19, 1974.

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, April 20, 1974.

GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and Yugoslavia. They had comprehensive talks with leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government and were hospitably received by the Soviet people.

Also, during these years there were visits by top-level Party and government delegations from the Soviet Union to fraternal countries. Note must be made of the significance of visits by Leonid Brezhnev in 1971-1975 to Yugoslavia, Hungary (three), Bulgaria (two), the GDR (two), Czechoslovakia (two), Poland (four), Mongolia, and Cuba for the further development of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and these fraternal states.

The close interaction of the fraternal parties on the international scene springing from an organic, practical need motivated by the identity of their international and national interests served to ensure peaceful conditions for the building of socialism and communism and helped to achieve many important foreign-policy objectives and settle pressing problems linked to ensuring the international positions of the socialist countries. The significance of coordinating the international actions of the socialist-community nations grew steadily, especially in view of the fact that despite their inter-imperialist contradictions the Western powers were continuing to coordinate their actions, particularly those directed against socialist countries.

This significance was exemplified by the developments in Vietnam. The heroic struggle of the Vietnamese people against imperialist aggression ended in victory largely on account of solidarity actions of the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty nations and of their all-sided assistance to the Vietnamese people.

A political settlement of the Vietnamese problem was found as a result of common efforts to ease international tension and quench flashpoints of military conflicts. In line with their internationalist duty the Soviet Union and other socialist states stood firmly on the side of embattled Vietnam, extending support, including military assistance, to it.

The victory of the Vietnamese people was a turning point in the situation in that part of the world: the forces of socialism grew stronger, the liberation struggle of the patriots of Laos and Cambodia was crowned with success, neutralist tendencies mounted in Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other nations, and centrifugal tendencies began to grow more clear-cut in the military-political blocs and groups set up in the region by imperialists after the Second World War.

Joint actions by socialist states led to a major common triumph—the total and final collapse of the imperialist-sponsored political and diplomatic blockade of the German Democratic Republic, and the universal recognition of its sovereignty and of the inviolability of its frontiers. In early December 1972 the GDR had diplomatic relations

with 33 nations; at the close of 1975 it was maintaining relations with 120 countries. On September 18, 1973 the GDR was admitted to UN membership (somewhat earlier it was admitted to UNCTAD, WHO, UNESCO, and other international bodies).

The Warsaw Treaty nations invariably linked their efforts on behalf of European security to ensuring the rights and interests of the fraternal German socialist state. The broad international recognition of the GDR and the normalisation of its relations with the FRG were made possible by the common successes in the struggle for European security. At the same time, to quote the GDR Foreign Minister, "membership of the United Nations Organisation by the German Democratic Republic, situated in the heartland of Europe, and the Federal Republic of Germany as two sovereign nations independent of each other and having different social systems is a further important step towards improving the situation in Europe and the world as a whole."<sup>9</sup>

The great effectiveness of joint actions in defence of socialism's interests was demonstrated vividly by the energetic steps taken by the socialist countries in support of Czechoslovakia's legitimate demand for the annulment of the 1938 Munich Agreement and for reaffirmation of the inviolability of its frontiers with the FRG. This issue was settled with the signing of a treaty on mutual relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG on December 11, 1973.<sup>10</sup> As a result, the way was cleared for the normalisation of Hungary's and Bulgaria's relations with the FRG. Thus, there was an overall strengthening of the positions of the socialist countries in Europe, a sound foundation was laid for peaceful relations with the FRG, and the conditions were improved significantly for the success of the European conference.

The socialist-community nations maintained a coordinated stand when hostilities flared up in the Middle East in October 1973, extending political and material assistance to the Arab peoples.

Combined with determined Soviet steps in support of Arab countries, the Soviet Union's constructive course towards detente and a normalisation of relations with the USA exercised a definite influence on Washington's stance, helping at first to localise and end hostilities and then achieve agreement on measures to channel the Middle East conflict towards a political settlement. To a large extent it was due to Soviet efforts that a session of the Peace Conference on the Middle East took place in Geneva on December 21, 1973.

The Soviet Union steadfastly adhered to its policy of doing everything to ensure the utmost improvement, deepening, and expansion of economic, scientific, technical, and trade links with other social-

<sup>9</sup> *International Yearbook. Politics and Economics, 1974*, Moscow, 1974, p. 63 (in Russian).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 119.

ist-community states within the framework of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. This central organisation for multilateral economic cooperation in the socialist community promotes the onward process of economic integration with the aim of gradually drawing together and levelling up the economic development of fraternal socialist countries and moulding lasting and dependable links in the basic branches of the economy and of science and technology.

The material basis for the further cohesion of the socialist-community nations was the expansion and deepening of economic cooperation between them and the planned drawing together of their economies. At its 25th session in July 1971, soon after the 24th Congress of the CPSU, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, acting on an initiative of the CPSU, adopted a 20-year Comprehensive Programme for socialist economic integration of its member nations. Meeting the basic long-term requirements of the CMEA members, this is a strategic programme for the development of economic cooperation between countries of the socialist community. The fraternal parties defined the further rise of the living standard and cultural level of their peoples as the common aim of the economic development of their countries.

The first phase of drafting the plan for coordinating the economic development of the CMEA countries for the period 1976-1980 was completed in 1974. That same year work was started on drafting a coordinated five-year plan of multilateral integration measures involving large joint projects in key branches of production, science, and technology. Specialisation and cooperation of production was promoted on a large scale in accordance with the Comprehensive Programme. The CMEA countries jointly resolved many raw materials, fuel, and energy problems. They increasingly pooled material, financial, and labour resources for large joint projects in the mining and fuel-energy industries. Unlike the capitalist countries, the fraternal states developed their energy potential by plan, laying the groundwork for a common power grid on the basis of the combined power grids of the interested CMEA nations and the integral power grid of the USSR. A general pattern began to be shaped for the development of power transmission networks between the grids of the CMEA countries for the period from 1990 onwards.

The 29th CMEA session, held in Budapest on June 24-26, 1975, approved an agreed plan of integration measures of the CMEA countries for 1976-1980, which opened a new stage in deepening and improving cooperation for the promotion of socialist economic integration.

On the basis of scientific and technological progress, major advances were made in the first half of the 1970s in improving the system of planned economic management, deepening economic cooperation, and furthering socialist economic integration. The

national incomes of the CMEA countries—the most generalised indicator of economic and social development—grew appreciably. During the five years from 1971 to 1975, for instance, they increased as a whole by 36 per cent, which is in striking contrast to the 14 per cent growth in developed capitalist states and the 12 per cent average in the Common Market.<sup>11</sup> The industrial output of the CMEA countries increased by 47 per cent, and the annual average gross farm product went up by approximately 14 per cent.<sup>12</sup>

The foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, and Mongolia likewise showed a large growth. It is important to note that in the physical volume of the foreign trade of each CMEA state the share of other socialist countries is predominant. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is now one of the largest economic organisations.<sup>13</sup>

It has never been and is not a closed economic bloc. Its member states consistently urge broad international economic cooperation. Evidence of this is the growth in the seventies of its composition and the conclusion of agreements with non-socialist nations (Finland, Mexico, Iraq).

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea had observers in some CMEA agencies, and Yugoslavia continued to participate in its work on a wide range of questions.

Further evidence of the CMEA's readiness to expand international cooperation is the establishment of contacts with the EEC. The first official meeting between CMEA Secretariat and EEC Commission officials took place, on the CMEA's initiative, on February 4-6, 1975 in Moscow. At that meeting progress was made in drafting proposals for the planned meeting of the leaders of these bodies and there was an exchange of general information on basic aspects of CMEA and EEC activities in a number of fields. It was agreed that work in that direction would be continued.

A resolution of the 29th UN General Assembly granting the CMEA observer status signified recognition of its international prestige. Moreover, this resolution was an important step strengthening the international status of that main economic organisation of the socialist countries, contributing to the growth of its prestige and influence the world over.

Throughout the period after the 24th CPSU Congress paramount importance was attached to developing the USSR's bilateral relations with the other countries of the socialist community, and the CPSU's links with fraternal parties. These relations and links were promoted at different levels and in various forms with the involvement of

<sup>11</sup> *Pravda*, November 13, 1976.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Pravda*, January 7, 1976.

large sections of society. Extremely useful activities were conducted by the friendship societies in all the socialist-community countries: these have millions of members, builders of socialism and communism. Mutual addresses by top-level leaders at congresses of ruling parties and reciprocal visits by party, state, government, and public delegations became firmly-rooted practice.

A visit by a GDR party and government delegation led by Erich Honecker to the Soviet Union in early October 1975 was an important milestone in strengthening relations and all-sided cooperation between the USSR and the GDR. During that visit, on October 7, 1975, the USSR and the GDR concluded a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance.<sup>14</sup> This treaty mirrors the noteworthy changes that have taken place in international political life and serves the cause of world peace and security. The same cause is served by the further expansion and improvement of military and political cooperation between the two countries. Under the treaty the USSR and the GDR pledged to continue joint efforts to counter any manifestation of revanchism and militarism. From beginning to end the new treaty is permeated with concern for the welfare of the peoples of the two countries, strengthening European and world peace, and extending and deepening detente. This treaty not only gave a further spur to the relations between the two socialist countries but also strengthened the socialist world community as a whole.

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the Republic of Cuba (January 28-February 3, 1974) had worldwide repercussions. The Soviet-Cuban Declaration signed at the completion of the visit summed up the two nation's 15-year experience of genuinely internationalist cooperation and charted a programme for the planned development of political, economic, and cultural relations. In their resolution "On the Visit to the Republic of Cuba by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev" the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR assessed this visit as a major event that ushered in a new stage in the promotion of fraternal friendship and all-sided cooperation between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of Cuba, and between the USSR and the Republic of Cuba.<sup>15</sup>

Participation by a CPSU delegation led by M. A. Suslov, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in the 1st Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (December 1975) and the personal message to the congress from Leonid Brezhnev were further evidence of the expanding all-sided cooperation between the two parties and countries. In

<sup>14</sup> *Pravda*, October 8, 1975.

<sup>15</sup> *Pravda*, February 7, 1975.



its message of greetings to that congress the CPSU Central Committee stated that it was an historic event and noted that "all-sided fraternal cooperation between our parties is the most solid foundation of Soviet-Cuban friendship".<sup>16</sup>

As we have already noted, all-sided assistance and support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries helped the Vietnamese people to bring their long and heroic struggle against aggression to a victorious end and contributed to the momentous successes of the national liberation struggle of other peoples in Indochina. The abolition of the hotbed of war in Southeast Asia spelled out the fulfilment of an important provision of the Soviet Peace Programme.

Finding that it could not crush the resistance of the Vietnamese people, that the US aggression could achieve nothing, the Nixon administration decided to "Vietnamise" the war. New Saigon divisions were raised and armed to replace US units. The Washington strategists believed that this would "change the color of the killed" and reduce criticism of the US government by American public opinion. "Vietnamisation" of the war was an attempt to give effect to Richard M. Nixon's Guam Doctrine, which boiled down to "compelling Asians to fight Asians." At the same time, the USA repeatedly resumed the bombing of North Vietnam and in May 1972 mined the entrances to DRV ports. Time and again this brought the negotiations in Paris to the brink of suspension.

On January 25, 1972 representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR declared at a conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee that their countries would continue giving the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the patriotic forces of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia every assistance and support in repulsing the aggressor.

In connection with the barbarous US bombing of the DRV capital, Hanoi, and the port of Haiphong on April 16, 1972, TASS issued a statement declaring, in part, that "an end is emphatically demanded in the Soviet Union to the US bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The only way to settle the Indochina problems is to conduct negotiations without attempts at blackmail and dictation".<sup>17</sup>

At the talks with the US President Richard M. Nixon in Moscow in May 1972 Leonid Brezhnev, speaking in firm terms, stated the Soviet stand in support of the just struggle of the Vietnamese people and deplored the US aggression. The Joint Soviet-US Communiqué declared: "The Soviet side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of

<sup>16</sup> *Pravda*, December 17, 1975.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, April 17, 1972.

the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal withdrawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their destiny without any outside interference." 18

The US government could not ignore this clear and insistent demand for an end to the war in Indochina and disregard the DRV's proposals for restoring peace.

A visit to Hanoi by a Soviet government delegation in June 1972 was a vivid demonstration of the Soviet Union's determination to protect Vietnam. Measures were worked out to expand military cooperation between the USSR and the DRV.

After protracted negotiations the agreement on ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973. This agreement was the outcome of the resounding victory of the Vietnamese people in their long war of resistance to imperialist aggression and a logical result of the all-sided assistance to embattled Vietnam from the Soviet Union and other socialist-community countries and of the unprecedented international movement of all of the world's peace forces in solidarity with the struggle of the Vietnamese people.

The Paris Agreement provided for respect by the USA and other countries for the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam, the withdrawal of US and other foreign troops from South Vietnam, US renunciation of interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, a political settlement in South Vietnam through negotiations between the two South Vietnamese sides, the formation of a People's Council of National Conciliation and Concord and the holding of free, democratic elections, and the phased, peaceful reunification of Vietnam through consultations and agreement between North and South Vietnam without foreign interference. The signatories of the agreement undertook to abide by the 1954 Geneva agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva agreements on Laos and reached an understanding that the internal problems of Cambodia and Laos would be decided by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

On January 27, 1973 the Soviet leaders sent the DRV leaders a telegram expressing heartfelt congratulations on the occasion of the termination of the war and restoration of peace in Vietnam. "The Soviet people", the telegram read, "sincerely rejoice in the triumphs of their Vietnamese brothers. As previously, during the years of bitter trial for the Vietnamese people, in the period of their struggle against

18 *New Times*, No. 23, 1972.

imperialist aggression, the Soviet Union will in future invariably align itself with Vietnam's just cause."<sup>19</sup>

That same day the Soviet leaders sent Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam and Huynh Tan Phat, Premier of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, a message declaring the Soviet people's determination to go on giving the fraternal Vietnamese people and the patriotic and progressive forces of South Vietnam every support in their efforts to ensure the consistent implementation of the signed agreements. "Soviet people," the message said, "are convinced that the lofty ideals, for which the South Vietnamese patriots had fought courageously for so many years, will triumph under all circumstances."<sup>20</sup>

The Vietnamese people gave the highest estimation of the Soviet Union's untiring efforts in support of their struggle. "During the war," Pham Van Dong said, "the Soviet people were the closest friends of the Vietnamese people. They have themselves fought a war and know the price of courage and sacrifice. We are certain that they rejoice most profoundly and sincerely in our victory. This indeed merits respect and affection... In accomplishing their grandiose feat during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people fought not only for their country and made sacrifices not only for themselves, but in the name of the great interests of the peoples of the world. In Vietnam, we likewise fought and made sacrifices not only for ourselves but also for those same great interests."<sup>21</sup>

An International Conference on Vietnam was held in Paris on February 26-March 2, 1973 in accordance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement. It was attended by delegations from the DRV, the USA, the Republic of South Vietnam, and Saigon, and also the USSR, France, China, Britain, and the four nations represented on the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam—Hungary, Poland, Canada, and Indonesia. Addressing that conference on February 27, the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko noted that it was vital that the sides should opportunely fulfil the articles and provisions of the Paris Agreement and called upon the participants in the conference to use the influence of the conference and of their own nations to ensure the full realisation of the agreement.<sup>22</sup>

The conference formalised the political and judicial significance of the agreement on the cessation of war and the restoration of peace in

<sup>19</sup> *Pravda*, January 28, 1973.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> *Pravda*, February 16, 1973.

<sup>22</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy, Selected Articles and Speeches*, p. 268.

Vietnam, giving it greater weight and authority. It was of immense significance that the nations which signed the Act of the International Conference on Vietnam solemnly recognised and pledged to respect the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people: independence, sovereignty, the unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, and also the right of the population of South Vietnam to self-determination.

With the signing of the Paris agreement on restoring peace in Vietnam Soviet-Vietnamese relations entered a new, important phase characterised by further Soviet all-sided cooperation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Republic of South Vietnam. At this phase the Soviet Union was motivated by the need to extend disinterested comprehensive assistance to ensure the speediest restoration of the economy of the DRV and the RSV, which had been laid waste by the long and devastating war. The Soviet attitude was stated by Leonid Brezhnev, who declared that the Soviet people would stand shoulder to shoulder with the patriots of Vietnam both in peace and in war. "Support for Vietnam," he said, "is our internationalist duty. It is the common cause of all socialist countries. Trials which no other nation has experienced since World War II fell to the lot of Vietnam. Assistance to Vietnam can and must become an act of solidarity by peoples and states regardless of their social system."<sup>23</sup> An official friendly visit by a delegation of the Vietnam Workers' Party and the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by the First Secretary of the VWP Central Committee Le Duan and member of the Political Bureau of the VWP Central Committee and Prime Minister of the DRV Pham Van Dong to the Soviet Union in July 1973 was a major landmark in the growing fraternal cooperation between the Soviet and Vietnamese peoples.

At the talks during this visit agreement was reached on an expansion of fraternal links between the CPSU and the VWP at different levels, the holding of consultations and exchanges of views on matters of mutual interest, a further deepening of economic and technical cooperation, including the training of personnel for Vietnam, the promotion of scientific and cultural links, and an exchange of experience of socialist and communist construction. It was agreed in principle that the Soviet Union would help the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to rehabilitate and develop its economy. The Soviet Union stated its readiness to restore the projects built in the DRV with its assistance and also help set up new industrial enterprises, including hydropower stations, for the promotion of North Vietnam's industrialisation. Proceeding from its unchanging internationalist stand in the question of supporting the fraternal Vietnamese people and taking the DRV's requirements into account, the Soviet Union decided to

<sup>23</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 120.

regard as gratuitous assistance the credits it had granted the DRV in previous years for economic development. Following the Soviet Union, analogous decisions were taken by other socialist-community countries. The Vietnamese party and government delegation declared that this friendly act was an enormous inspiring factor for the Vietnamese people, for which it was deeply grateful to the CPSU, the Soviet government, and the fraternal Soviet people. The meetings and rallies held during this visit were an unforgettable demonstration of Soviet-Vietnamese friendship and solidarity.

Addressing a rally at the Likhachev Auto Works in July 1973 Le Duan declared that "at all its stages the Vietnamese people's struggle over nearly half a century, which for all its difficulties and privations was marked by great victories, felt the huge impact of the October Revolution and was linked to the Soviet Union's glorious victory in the Second World War, to its brilliant achievements in the building of socialism and communism, and to powerful support and extensive and valuable assistance from the Soviet people".<sup>24</sup>

The Paris Agreement took the Vietnamese people's liberation struggle in South Vietnam into a new phase. The withdrawal of the US troops from South Vietnam, the commitment of the agreement's signatories, including Saigon, to cease hostilities, the restoration of democratic freedoms, and some other provisions of that document created more propitious conditions than ever for consummating the national-democratic revolution in South Vietnam. Thus, following the conclusion of the Paris Agreement the central practical aim of the patriots of South Vietnam was to consolidate and develop the advances that had been made, chiefly to defend and consolidate the zone controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. That government's position on the world scene and at home was greatly strengthened and its role as the one and only representative of the people of South Vietnam was steadily enhanced. Diplomatic relations were established with it by several tens of nations. Its links with international governmental and public organisations grew in vigour and breadth. An important diplomatic act that added to the international prestige of the Republic of South Vietnam was the 1973 visit by a delegation from the Republic of South Vietnam led by Dr. Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam to the USSR (this was the second visit to the USSR; the first was in November 1969) and other socialist countries, a number of non-aligned Asian and African nations, and some West European states.

In parallel with the consolidation of its international position, the Provisional Revolutionary Government won ever stronger support from and prestige among the population, including in regions con-

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, July 13, 1973.

trolled by the Saigon administration. Its just and judicious policy was consistent with the aspirations of the entire population of South Vietnam and this brought it support from ever wider sections not only of the South Vietnamese urban working people but also of the middle classes, of the national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, officials of the Saigon administration, and personnel of the Saigon army.

An important task of the Vietnamese patriots, a task which they worked on with the assistance and backing of the socialist-community nations and all other progressive forces in the world, was the utmost consolidation of the regions liberated from the rule of the Saigon administration. In the face of formidable difficulties arising from the consequences of the long war and the continued armed provocations by Saigon, the population of the liberated regions led by the Provisional Revolutionary Government got down to restoring and promoting the economy and raising the standard of living.

In the meantime, the population of Saigon-controlled regions stepped up their struggle against the anti-people Saigon administration, for the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement. The main slogans of this struggle called for an improvement of the people's economic condition, peace, democracy, independence, and national concord.

With US connivance the Saigon regime flagrantly violated the Paris Agreement: it continued its armed provocations against regions controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government and intransigently refused to release over 200,000 political prisoners.

These actions by the puppet regime antagonised the people of Vietnam. In the spring offensive of 1975 the people's armed forces supported by the roused population brought that regime down.

Saigon was liberated on April 30, 1975 and power throughout South Vietnam passed to the Provisional Revolutionary Government.<sup>25</sup> This was a momentous victory of the Vietnamese people in their titanic struggle for independence, the nation's unity, and a happy future. Leonid Brezhnev said, assessing its significance: "This victory crowns the long and heroic struggle of the patriots of Vietnam. It is the result of their skilful use of various forms of struggle: military, political and diplomatic. At the same time, this victory is a triumph of the effective and militant solidarity of the socialist countries. It is also an indication of the great moral and political importance of the sympathy and support coming from the progressive forces of the whole world..."

"We can also say with satisfaction that the elimination of the hotbed of war in Indochina creates the conditions for a further improvement of the international atmosphere. This will benefit the cause of international detente, including, as we hope, the detente in

<sup>25</sup> *Pravda*, May 1, 1975.

the relations between our country and the United States of America."<sup>26</sup>

Leaders of the Republic of South Vietnam noted the enormous significance of the all-sided and effective support received by the Vietnamese people from the Soviet Union throughout all the years of their liberation struggle. In a message to the CPSU Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and government of the USSR they wrote: "We are conscious that the victories of the Vietnamese people's revolutionary cause are inseparable from the unstinting assistance and support from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the government of the USSR, and the Soviet people, from the other socialist countries, and the entire progressive section of mankind. We take this opportunity to express our deep gratitude to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the government of the USSR, and the Soviet people for this inestimable support and assistance."<sup>27</sup>

A party and government delegation from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam led by Le Duan began a visit in the USSR at the close of October 1975. As a result of the talks that this delegation had with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders a Soviet-Vietnamese declaration was issued, which noted an identity of views on questions related to the efforts to strengthen the socialist world community, promote the cohesion of the international communist movement, relax tension in the world, and ensure the security of nations, and defined important steps aimed at expanding all-round cooperation between the CPSU and the Vietnam Workers' Party and between the USSR and the DRV. This declaration said in part: "The militant solidarity and fraternal friendship between the Soviet Union and Vietnam, united by common aims in the struggle for peace, independence of the peoples, democracy and socialism, are eternal and inviolable. Faithful to the immortal teaching of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Vietnam Workers' Party will continue doing everything necessary for the development and deepening of all-round Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in the interests of the peoples of both countries, in the interests of the consolidation of the unity of the socialist states, in the interests of peace and social progress on the planet."<sup>28</sup>

A political consultative conference on the unification of Vietnam, held in November 1975, ordered the implementation of a series of steps leading to the final reunification of Vietnam in the first half of 1976. The conference communique declared that socialism was the orientation and development trend of Vietnamese society.

<sup>26</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, pp. 557-58.

<sup>27</sup> *Pravda*, May 28, 1975.

<sup>28</sup> *New Times*, No. 45, 1975.

The victory of the Vietnamese people was an outstanding event for all the revolutionary forces in the world and an important factor of peace in Southeast Asia.

Talks between the government of Souvanna Phouma and representatives of the Patriotic Front of Laos (Neo Lao Hak Sat) opened in the Laotian capital of Vientiane in October 1972 with the cessation of the war and the attainment of national concord as its objective. The Soviet Union's constructive and consistent policy contributed to the success of these talks, which ended with the signing, on February 21, 1973, of an agreement on the restoration of peace and the achievement of national concord.

Intrigues by reactionaries delayed the implementation of this agreement. The composition of the provisional government of national unity and the Lao Political Council of National Coalition was approved only in April 1974. Souvanna Phouma became the head of the new government, while the Chairman of the Patriotic Front Central Committee Tiao Souphanouvong was appointed Chairman of the Council.

The victory of the Vietnamese people and the total collapse of imperialist policy in Indochina opened the way for further democratic development in Laos. The right-wing forces were paralysed. On December 2, 1975 the National Congress of People's Representatives proclaimed Laos a people's democratic republic. The struggle waged under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party ended with the creation of organs of the people's revolutionary power, the establishment of genuine peace, and the attainment of unity in Laos. Souphanouvong was elected President of the Laotian People's Democratic Republic and Chairman of the Supreme National Assembly, and Kaysone Phomvihane was elected Prime Minister. In a message congratulating Souphanouvong on his election, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet wrote that it afforded Soviet people great pleasure to welcome that historic event in the struggle of the friendly Laotian people against imperialist aggression and local reaction, for independence, peace, democracy, and social progress. "Faithful to the principles of proletarian internationalism and solidarity with peoples fighting for national and social liberation," the message said, "the Soviet Union has always sided with the just cause of the Laotian people and extended every possible assistance and support to them."<sup>29</sup>

While celebrating the proclamation of the republic, the Laotian people, as the leaders of the People's Revolutionary Party underscored, paid tribute to the support and assistance they received and continue to get from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, from all the forces of peace and democracy.

<sup>29</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1975.



Acting on the principles of internationalism and solidarity with peoples fighting for national liberation, the Soviet Union had from the outset supported the struggle of the Cambodian patriots, the National United Front of Kampuchea (NUFK). Although it had assistance from the USA, the anti-popular Lon Nol puppet regime existed for only about five years. Significant successes were scored by the Khmer people in their liberation struggle under the leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea.

The final disintegration of the reactionary regime began in mid-April. In an address to the United States Congress on April 10, 1975 the US President acknowledged that it was too late to do anything to save that regime. Because the situation was utterly hopeless, the USA, at long last, cut short material assistance to remnants of the Lon Nol forces. The last of these forces surrendered in the capital of Kampuchea on April 17, and then in other parts of the country.

On the occasion of the victory of the patriotic forces the Soviet leaders sent the new leadership of Kampuchea a telegram of congratulations, in which they said that the Soviet Union would "continue promoting traditional friendship and productive cooperation between our countries and help the Cambodian people build a peaceful, independent, neutral, democratic, and flourishing Cambodia".<sup>30</sup> In mid-April, the Soviet government decided to extend humanitarian material assistance to the Khmer patriots.

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The 24th Congress of the CPSU noted: "Joint proposals and political actions by the socialist states have been exerting a positive influence on the development of the whole international situation." This was eloquently borne out in the period following the congress. Suffice it to list the major events of international life during these years, the main international actions aimed at reducing the threat of war, strengthening peace, and promoting peaceful cooperation among nations. There was a radical change for the better in the relations between socialist and capitalist countries of Europe, and between socialist countries and the USA; an important international agreement was signed on West Berlin; a European conference was successfully held and negotiations were started on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe; the military flashpoint in Indochina was quenched and the military conflict between India and Pakistan was settled; a ceasefire was put into effect in the Middle East and the UN Security Council passed a resolution setting out the principles for a political settlement in that region; a peace conference on the Middle East was convened in Geneva; international treaties, agreements, and conventions of immense importance were signed on a reduction

<sup>30</sup> *Pravda*, April 19, 1975.

of strategic armaments, the prevention of nuclear war, the banning of bacteriological weapons, and other problems; the UN General Assembly passed resolutions on crucial questions, such as "On the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Perpetual Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (November 29, 1972),<sup>31</sup> "On the Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilisation of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries" (December 7, 1973),<sup>32</sup> and "On the Prohibition of Action to Influence the Environment and Climate for Military and Other Purposes Incompatible with the Maintenance of International Security, Human Well-Being and Health" (December 9, 1974)<sup>33</sup>—all these key events of international life of the period under review are linked to initiatives by the Soviet Union and other socialist-community nations and bear the imprint of their indefatigable efforts in favour of peace and friendship among nations. Indeed, no major international problem can be dependably resolved today without the participation of socialist countries, and this participation is the guarantee that the solution benefits peace and the independence and equality of nations.

#### The USSR and Capitalist States. New Successes of the Policy of Peaceful Coexistence

The first half of the 1970s witnessed a sharp aggravation of the capitalist system's general crisis. For the first time in 30 years an economic crisis simultaneously hit all the leading capitalist states: the USA, Japan, the FRG, Britain, France, and Italy. Other industrialised capitalist nations found themselves in a difficult economic situation. In addition to "classic" forms of crisis (decline of production, mass unemployment, and underloading of industrial enterprises), the capitalist world saw unrestrained inflation and a rising cost of living. Monetary, energy, and raw materials crises broke out and spread rapidly.

In only 1974 retail prices rose by an average of 12-15 per cent in many industrialised capitalist nations.<sup>34</sup> According to official statistics the aggregate number of totally unemployed in these countries was more than 15 million by the autumn of 1975 against the 10 million in the previous year: 7,800,000 million in the USA, 1,000,000 in the FRG, and over 1,000,000 each in Japan and Italy.<sup>35</sup> Another

<sup>31</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 204-205.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 219-220.

<sup>34</sup> *Monthly Bulletin of Statistics*, September 1975, Vol. XXX, No. 9, pp. 162-75.

<sup>35</sup> *Byulleten inostrannoi kommercheskoi informatsii*, September 18, 1975; *Bulletin of Labour Statistics*, International Labour Office, Geneva, 2nd Quarter, 1975, pp. 33-39.

5,000,000-plus people were transferred to a shortened working week. Western monopoly circles sought to shift the main burden of their difficulties to the shoulders of the working people, and this sparked a further exacerbation of the class struggle, a growth of the strike movement. Whereas in 1972 strikes involved 43 million people in all the developed capitalist countries, they involved 45 million people in the same countries in 1973, and nearly 48 million in 1974.

State-monopoly regulation was unable to bridle the anarchic and antagonistic character of the capitalist world economy.

That period was characterised by mounting contradictions between imperialism and the developing nations and a hardening of rivalry between and in the major groups of capitalist countries. There was a further aggravation of contradictions among the three main centres of modern capitalism: the USA, the Common Market, and Japan.

The decade-long war of aggression against the Vietnamese people, the high-handed interference in the affairs of the other peoples of Indochina, and the artificial planting of and military and financial support for the most reactionary, corrupt, anti-people puppet regimes in Southeast Asia outraged and evoked angry protests among large sections of the people in the United States of America, caused a deep split in American society, and aggravated the relations between different elements of the US state machine, including between the President and the Congress. The then US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger later conceded that the US intervention in Vietnam had divided the nation more than any event since the Civil War of 1861-1865.<sup>36</sup> The war against the freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people, a war which, as President Gerald R. Ford said in the spring of 1975, cost the USA more than 150,000 million dollars.<sup>37</sup> and the US interference in the affairs of Laos and Cambodia completely discredited, as it was bound to, the imperialist interventionists and their puppets, bringing victory to the patriotic national liberation forces of Indochina.

The world was given further evidence that the days of any form of colonialism were over, that nations were invincible when they fought for independence, freedom, and social progress, and had the powerful support of the socialist countries and all other progressive, anti-imperialist forces in the world.

On the eve of the congressional elections in 1974 and against the background of a swiftly spreading economic crisis the growth of popular indignation in the USA with the war in Vietnam fused with the sharp aggravation of internal contradictions between the two main political parties in the USA—the Republican (which controlled the executive power) and the Democratic (which held the majority in the

<sup>36</sup> *Pravda*, May 14, 1975.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

Congress)—and led to the resignation of President Nixon and his replacement by President Ford.

In Portugal, as well as in Greece, the 1970s saw the downfall of the fascist regimes and the broad enervation of democratic forces. The world's last colonial empire collapsed. In Mozambique, Angola, and other countries the embattled peoples became independent on the basis of a democratic agreement with the new Portuguese government.

In Italy the conspiracies and acts of terrorism of extreme reaction, chiefly the neofascists, evoked the nation's anger and resistance from its democratic forces. The increased political tension on the domestic scene and the severe economic crisis brought the instability of the bourgeoisie's political power, the frequent and protracted government crises into bold relief. The 1975 summer municipal elections showed the unprecedented growth of the influence enjoyed by the Communist Party, which polled one-third of the votes.

In France the 1974 Presidential elections were marked by a powerful increase of the influence of the Left: the Communist-Socialist bloc, which entered the elections with a common programme, received nearly half of the votes at these elections.

The sharp crisis in Cyprus, the attempt at a right-wing coup against the Makarios government, and the clash between Greek and Turkish troops on that island led (unexpectedly for the imperialist scenarists of that crisis) to Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military organisation and a visible cooling of Turkey's relations with the USA.

During these years it grew increasingly clear that the interests of the USA and Western Europe had diverged on some major international problems. This was seen most strikingly in October 1973 when, in connection with the flare up of hostilities in the Middle East, the USA alerted its armed forces, including its troops in Europe, without agreeing this matter with its NATO allies. France, Italy, Greece, and Turkey refused to let US aircraft carrying military supplies for Israel fly over their territories. Britain denied permission for the use of its base in Cyprus, while the FRG protested officially to the USA against the use of its territory and ports for the shipment to Israel of armaments from the US army's depots in the FRG. In reply to these actions, the USA criticised its NATO partners for what it termed as "lack of Atlantic solidarity". It sought in vain to blunt the edge of the tension in its relations with Western Europe. The Declaration on Atlantic Relations, signed by the NATO nations on US initiative, did not remove the deep-rooted contradictions between the members of the North Atlantic bloc.

US-Japanese relations, already burdened by acute economic contradictions, encountered new difficulties in October-December 1974. The differences centred over Washington's violation of the US-Japanese security treaty by secretly shipping American nuclear weapons to Japanese ports.

The energy crisis, which erupted at the close of 1973, caused an acute sharpening of the relations between capitalist and developing nations. The imperialist monopolies used the actions of the Arab petroleum-exporting countries as the pretext for artificially creating a shortage of oil in Western countries and jacking up prices while shifting the blame to the petroleum producers. Matters reached a point where some US statesmen made declarations that contained the threat of the use of military force against Arab countries. These declarations incensed the peoples of the Middle East and the whole of peace-loving mankind. In the face of pressure and threats from the imperialists, the developing nations acted with determination against encroachments on their legitimate rights and interests.

With each passing year socio-economic and political development in the capitalist world bore out more and more strikingly the 24th Congress' conclusion that the general crisis of capitalism was steadily deepening.

The mounting economic and political crisis and the aggravation of inter-imperialist contradictions strongly eroded the capitalist world system as a whole. The situation in the socialist countries was quite different. The might and unity of these countries, chiefly of the socialist community nations united by the Warsaw Treaty and the CMEA, steadily grew stronger, and their international prestige rose to new heights as a result of their consistent and active policy of consolidating peace and safeguarding the security and rights of nations. The change in the world balance of strength in favour of peace, democracy, and social progress grew more pronounced than ever.

It became increasingly obvious to the most prescient and realistically-minded statesmen and politicians of the bourgeois countries, who saw and took this process into consideration, that it was no longer possible to count on settling the historic dispute between the two social systems by force of arms, by dealing militarily with socialism as the leaders of capitalism tried to do in the 1920s, the 1930s, the 1940s, and even the 1950s. They clearly saw that there was no alternative to peaceful coexistence with the socialist states (which the latter had offered long ago) save, of course, the prospect of the death of hundreds of millions of people and the destruction of many countries in nuclear-missile world war.

In this situation the policy of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation so perseveringly pursued by the Soviet Union and its socialist allies found a response and growing understanding not only among the people but also in the ruling circles of most capitalist countries.

These were the factors that in the 1970s made it possible to achieve significant progress in the relations of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Treaty allies with France, the FRG, the USA, and other capitalist nations and, in the long run, turn from the cold war to

detente and the strengthening of world peace.

The period 1971-1975 saw a powerful Soviet peace offensive aimed at fulfilling the Peace Programme of the 24th CPSU Congress that called for an improvement of the international situation, a relaxation of tension, and the promotion of peaceful and mutually beneficial cooperation with capitalist countries.

In this area of unflagging effort impressive gains were made during the years following the 24th Congress of the CPSU. The threat of a nuclear-missile war receded, and peace became more durable.

The principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems penetrated ever deeper into the practice of international relations. Addressing the constituents of Moscow's Bauman electoral district on June 13, 1975, Leonid Brezhnev said: "In recent years the conviction that peaceful coexistence is possible and, more, necessary has strengthened in the minds of the broad masses and of the ruling circles of most countries...

"The norms of peaceful coexistence of countries have been formalised in many binding bilateral and multilateral official documents and in political declarations. Naturally, all this has not come of itself. Enormous political work had to be accomplished to put an end to the cold war and reduce the danger of another world war. It may be said that the joint work of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, and their consistent struggle against the forces of aggression and war have been decisive in achieving detente."<sup>38</sup>

While championing peaceful coexistence and the development of peaceful relations of states regardless of their social system, the Soviet Union never harboured illusions. Unquestionably, the political and, more so, the ideological struggle will continue. However, recognition of the principles of coexistence by both sides diminishes the threat of the struggle between the two social systems exploding into another world war with its unimaginable calamities for the human race. This gives the peace forces a stronger position and increases the chances of restraining imperialism's forces of aggression and preserving and consolidating world peace.

A dramatic step easing tension in Europe and improving the international climate was the signing of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin on September 3, 1971 by the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France.<sup>39</sup> A legacy of the war, this city with its special status in the heartland of the German Democratic Republic was for a long time a generator of serious tension in the centre of Europe, tension that time and again assumed dangerous forms of confrontation. The 1971

<sup>38</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 572.

<sup>39</sup> *The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and Its Implementation in 1971-1977. Documents*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 8-22 (in Russian).

agreement was the outcome of protracted negotiations and quests for mutually acceptable provisions. In this context it is a compromise—but this compromise is based on recognition of Europe's realities. Its conclusion therefore meets one of the key points of the Soviet Peace Programme relating to Europe.

The core of this agreement is the commitment of its signatories "to facilitate the elimination of tension and the prevention of complications" in West Berlin and the clearly-worded, binding provision, which states that the ties between the western sectors of Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany will be maintained and developed, taking into account that these sectors continue to remain outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The quadripartite agreement defined the procedure for representing the interests of West Berlin and its citizens in international intercourse. Of course, the FRG's desire to obtain unlimited rights to represent the city's interests could not be satisfied. Under the agreement these rights are confined to consular services for West Berlin's permanent residents, representation of West Berlin interests in international organisations and at international conferences, and granting permanent residents permission to take part in international exchanges and exhibits together with participants from the FRG. It also permits the international agreements and treaties concluded by the FRG to cover West Berlin. All this will hold good provided the city's security and status are not affected. In everything else world-wide representation of West Berlin's interests remains the prerogative of the three signatory powers.

Relative to West Berlin's communication with the external world, the agreement proceeds from the established international practice, provided for such cases, of transit across the territory of sovereign nations. This aspect was worked out in detail in the agreements signed by the GDR with the FRG on December 17, 1971 and with the West Berlin Senate on December 20, 1971.<sup>40</sup>

The USSR, the USA, Britain, and France agreed that the obtaining situation as defined in the quadripartite agreement was not subject to unilateral change. They pledged that in West Berlin they would not have recourse to the use or threat of force and that all issues would be resolved by peaceful means. The agreement provides for the settlement of possible difficulties linked to the fulfilment or non-fulfilment of the understandings through quadripartite consultations.

Under the agreement of September 3, 1971 the Soviet Union opened a Consulate General in West Berlin. Moreover, in the city there are offices of Soviet foreign trade associations and of Aeroflot and Intourist.

<sup>40</sup> *The Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin and Its Implementation in 1971-1977. Documents*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 48-62, 63-66.

The quadripartite agreement is further concrete evidence that given good will and realism the former main participants in the anti-Hitlerite coalition are able to cooperate productively under peace-time conditions for the benefit of detente and peace. In this context this agreement may be compared with the State Treaty on Austria.

An important feature of this agreement is that it was drawn up in close contact with the two German states and was complemented with a number of accords on specific matters between the German Democratic Republic, the West Berlin Senate, and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It is unquestionable that the political way to the quadripartite agreement was cleared by the 1970 Soviet-FRG treaty and the Polish-FRG treaty, which created a much better international climate in Europe and elsewhere. In turn, together with the Brezhnev-Brandt meeting in Oreanda in September 1971, the agreement on West Berlin was a major contribution to the subsequent normalisation of relations between Czechoslovakia and the FRG on the basis of recognition of the invalidity of the Hitler Munich diktat. As a result, the conditions were created enabling Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria to establish diplomatic relations with the FRG. These developments were a conspicuous achievement of the policy pursued by the socialist-community states, a major victory of the forces of realism and peace in Europe, and an important step in implementing the Soviet Peace Programme.

Commenting on the quadripartite agreement, the West German newspaper *Frankfurter Rundschau* wrote on November 4, 1971 that it "signifies that practical policy is at long last being conducted with common sense as its keynote". This estimation was correct. However, subsequent years showed that the ruling circles in the FRG had not abandoned their attempts in each specific case to sidestep the clearly-worded provisions of the treaty, attempts to assert and even extend the FRG's unlawful "political presence" in West Berlin. Giving a rebuff to these tendencies, which conflicted with the movement towards detente, became a major aspect of the European policy pursued by the USSR and the entire socialist community.

The years 1971-1975 were marked by a further deepening of Soviet-French relations, which were raised to a new level. In pursuing the course taken by General de Gaulle, the French government backed the idea of giving Soviet-French cooperation a solid legal, political, and economic foundation.

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France in October 1971 on the invitation of the French President Georges Pompidou evolved into an event of fundamental significance. His meetings and talks with the President of France and the signing of joint Soviet-French documents in Paris took the relations between the two nations to a new important stage and had a profound impact on detente, helping to assert the



principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation between states with different social systems. Special note must be made of the Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France, signed during the visit on October 30, 1971.<sup>41</sup> This document provided a long-term political basis for the relations between the Soviet Union and France and was a major step towards the elaboration of the principles of relations among all European countries. This basic document declares, in particular, that the aim of political cooperation between France and the USSR is to promote the relaxation of international tension, settle outstanding issues by peaceful means, and ensure economic development and an improvement of the living standard of nations. The two countries committed themselves to giving a new dimension to the political consultations between them through conventional diplomatic channels and special meetings of their representatives. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France and the reception given to him were an unconditional recognition of the role played by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in present-day international life by a leading bourgeois power.

The many subsequent meetings and talks between Leonid Brezhnev and the highest-ranking French leaders were an expression of growing mutual understanding and of the expansion of Soviet-French links. Such summits became a regular feature: they were held in 1970, 1971, twice in 1973, and twice in 1974. After the death of President Pompidou Leonid Brezhnev continued contacts with the new President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. Their first meeting took place in December 1974 at Rambouillet near Paris. The two nations formally reiterated the firm adherence to the policy of expanding their bilateral political, economic, and other relations, strengthening peace and world security, curbing aggression and of non-interference in the affairs of other nations. They urged the earliest possible consummation of the European Conference and a just, peaceful settlement in the Middle East, and declared themselves in favour of continuing the efforts to map out the ways and means of achieving general and complete disarmament, of which nuclear disarmament is a major component.<sup>42</sup>

At the Rambouillet meeting Leonid Brezhnev and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing found it possible to chart a further expansion of trade. They agreed that in 1975-1979 trade between the two countries would not only be doubled again but possibly trebled.

The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers considered the results of the Rambouillet summit and noted:

<sup>41</sup> *Soviet-French Relations. 1965-1975. Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1976, p. 149 (in Russian).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 183-189.

"The implementation of the signed agreements and of the understandings that were reached on a further expansion of relations between the USSR and France will be of great significance for the consolidation of peace and security in Europe and the whole world."<sup>43</sup>

The French Prime Minister Jacques Chirak's visit to the USSR in March 1975 strengthened traditional Soviet-French friendship.

A new step towards expanding Soviet-French cooperation was made when the French President Valery Giscard D'Estaing visited the Soviet Union in October 1975. This is shown by the documents signed during that visit, including the Declaration on Further Development of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and France. The report on the meeting between Brezhnev and Giscard D'Estaing on October 17 stated: "The experience of the wide-ranging mutually beneficial Soviet-French cooperation and also the headway that has been made towards detente, and particularly the results of the European Conference have created a favourable climate enabling the Soviet Union and France, by their good example of developing their mutual relations and of energetic efforts in foreign policy, to increase their contribution towards diminishing the threat of another war and strengthening peace. An urgent task today is to help consolidate and implement what 35 nations had agreed upon in Helsinki and make it possible for this experience of Europe to be used to one extent or another in other regions of the world."<sup>44</sup>

The course towards peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems required that the USSR should seek ways of peacefully settling issues also with the largest capitalist country—the USA. As early as during the lifetime of Lenin the Communist Party and Soviet government had called for a normalisation of relations with the USA. The 24th Congress of the CPSU clearly declared: "The Soviet Union is prepared to develop relations also with the United States of America, holding that this conforms with the interests both of the Soviet and the American people and those of world peace. At the same time, the Soviet Union will always firmly oppose the aggressive actions of the United States and the policy of force."<sup>45</sup>

The overall world situation and, especially, the new balance of strength between the USSR and the USA made it possible to achieve a substantial improvement of Soviet-US relations on a foundation acceptable to the Soviet Union.

The key role in achieving this improvement was played by a series of USSR-USA summits. The first took place when the US President Richard M. Nixon visited the Soviet Union in May 1972.

<sup>43</sup> *Pravda*, December 10, 1974.

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, October 18, 1975.

<sup>45</sup> *24th Congress of the CPSU*, pp. 217-18.

This visit was undertaken on US initiative. Responding to soundings by Washington, the Soviet Union agreed to the visit but made it clear that there had to be the requisite conditions and the confidence that the meeting would open the road for progress towards the settlement of outstanding international problems. Some concrete actions by the US government intimated that it evidently desired to create the necessary climate: the USA had consented to the conclusion of the quadripartite agreement on West Berlin, signed the convention banning bacteriological weapons, and conducted talks with the Soviet Union, in a constructive spirit, on the drawing up of an agreement limiting strategic weapons.

Nevertheless, it was not simple for the Soviet leadership to agree to the Nixon visit to Moscow in the spring of 1972, because that period saw a further escalation of US military operations in Vietnam. However, the adoption of a decision to receive Nixon was dictated by a broad, far-sighted approach to the question and the long-term interests of the Soviet people and its allies and friends, including the people of Vietnam. This was an opportunity to reduce the threat of another world war, limit the possibility for aggressive actions on the part of imperialist circles by political means, and dramatically advance the cause of detente and world peace.

Subsequent developments demonstrated that this decision was correct. For its political impact the Soviet-US summit ranged far beyond the bilateral relations between the two countries. They ushered in an important stage of the worldwide process of detente and consolidating international security, giving a powerful impetus to the further development of that process. The results of the talks were convincing evidence of the efficacy of the Soviet Union's Leninist policy of peaceful coexistence and of the enhanced prestige and influence enjoyed by the USSR. Moreover, these results became a factor restraining the most bellicose circles in the capitalist world and created a better climate for a political settlement of international conflicts, including the war in Vietnam.

For their part, the Soviet leaders frankly and firmly told the US President that they emphatically condemned the US war of aggression in Vietnam and urged him to end that war. At the subsequent Vietnamese-US contacts and talks on a political settlement the Soviet Union helped its Vietnamese friends to secure an acceptable understanding. The improvement in Soviet-US relations was a major factor making it possible to achieve that goal.

The first Soviet-US summit ended with the signing of a series of fundamental treaties and agreements. The most important among them was the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA, which provided the political and legal basis for the promotion of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries on the principles of peaceful coexistence. This document

stated that the two nations "are convinced that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to maintaining their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence." They committed themselves to "do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war", to "exercise restraint in their mutual relations" and "to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means." They declared that they "make no claim for themselves and would not recognise the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs."<sup>46</sup>

For the first time the USSR and the USA agreed on concrete steps to restrain and limit the arms race in its most sensitive areas. On May 26, 1972 in Moscow Brezhnev and Nixon signed a treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles and an interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.<sup>47</sup> Both these documents are based on recognition of the principle of equal security and give neither of its signatories unilateral military advantages.

Under the anti-ballistic missiles limitation agreement the sides pledged not to deploy ABM systems for defence of their territories against missile attacks. The treaty allowed each nation to have not more than 200 anti-ballistic missiles to protect two regions—the capital and an ICBM base. Compliance with these commitments would be monitored by national means. The treaty has no time limit.

Under the interim agreement the two nations declared that in the course of five years (1972-1977) they would not construct additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and also submarine-based ballistic missiles. In addition, a limitation was placed on the number of high-technology ballistic-missile-carrying submarines. A standing Consultative Commission was set up to help achieve the aims of the strategic arms limitation agreement.

In addition, the two countries signed agreements on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, in environmental protection, medical science and public health, and in science and technology. They mapped out steps to create mutually beneficial conditions for trade and other economic links.

As a follow-up of the understandings reached at the Moscow summit, agreements were signed in October 1972 on trade, mutual credits, lend-lease settlements, and some issues concerning shipping.<sup>48</sup>

Nine more accords on various aspects of Soviet-US cooperation were signed during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the USA on June

<sup>46</sup> *Pravda*, May 30, 1972.

<sup>47</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXVIII, Moscow, 1974, pp. 31-37.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 251.

18-25, 1973.<sup>49</sup> Among these documents was the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Its substance is that the two nations agreed to act in such manner as to prevent situations that could trigger a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, to avoid military confrontations, and rule out the outbreak of a nuclear war between them and between each of them and other nations. In its comments the *US Associated Press* noted that in a historic agreement the leaders of the two most powerful nuclear nations of the world had undertaken to regulate their relations in such a way as to prevent a nuclear war, and that the purpose of the agreement was to create the conditions under which the danger of a nuclear war would be reduced everywhere in the world and ultimately eliminated.<sup>50</sup>

Another document signed on June 21, 1973 during that visit was the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,<sup>51</sup> which formulated the concrete task of making serious efforts in 1973 to work out the provisions of a treaty on more far-reaching measures to limit strategic offensive arms. An understanding was reached to the effect that the limitation on strategic offensive arms could concern their number and quality.

More bilateral Soviet-US agreements were signed in 1972-1973 than throughout the preceding period since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

A further impulse to Soviet-US cooperation was given by the next talks between leaders of the two nations in Moscow and the talks between Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon in the Crimea during the latter's second visit to the USSR (June 27-July 3, 1974). As a result of these talks the USSR and the USA signed a protocol to the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, reducing the number of anti-ballistic missile deployment regions from two to one and, correspondingly, the number of such missiles.<sup>52</sup>

In addition, an understanding was reached on a coordinated limitation of underground nuclear tests, on continued efforts to limit strategic offensive arms, and on measures to conclude a convention covering the most dangerous lethal chemical means of warfare. A joint statement was also signed in which the USSR and the USA pledged to take the most effective measures possible to end the danger of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.<sup>53</sup> Noteworthy progress was also made in further expanding

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, Issue XXIX, Moscow, 1975, pp. 26, 27, 212, 214, 217, 274, 329, 331, 383.

<sup>50</sup> *Izvestia*, June 23, 1973.

<sup>51</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 126-128.

<sup>52</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 134-137, 142.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 145-146.

mutually beneficial cooperation in industry, power engineering, the health services, and housing and other construction. The relevant agreements were signed in Moscow.

This entire spectrum of agreements and understandings signified an advance towards consolidating peace and mutual confidence. The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers reviewed the results of the third Soviet-US summit, noting that it was a new major contribution to the improvement of Soviet-US relations, detente, and the assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.<sup>54</sup>

A significant point is that at the talks the USSR suggested more radical ways and means of improving the international situation. Among other things it suggested the withdrawal of nuclear-armed Soviet and US warships and submarines from the Mediterranean and the banning of underground nuclear tests. These proposals were not accepted by the USA. Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech in Warsaw in July 1974: "...We are convinced that the implementation of these proposals of ours would be a new real contribution to the strengthening of peace and would be regarded by the peoples of many countries with great satisfaction. We hope that the time will come for agreements on these matters to become possible."<sup>55</sup>

Closer Soviet-US cooperation during these years was facilitated by an expansion of mutual contacts between the parliaments, and various ministries, and government institutions of the two nations. Considerable attention was attracted by a visit to the USA by a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR led by B. N. Ponomarev, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and alternate member of the Political Bureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (May 1974).<sup>56</sup> The many meetings held by the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger did much to lay the ground for summit negotiations and to coordinate the stand of the two nations on some major international problems. These meetings were part of the political dialogue between the USSR and the USA. The heads of a number of Soviet ministries—foreign trade, merchant marine, public health, and others—visited the USA and had talks with US government officials on an extension of relations between the two countries. Working visits were made to the USSR by the US secretaries of the treasury, commerce, and health, education and welfare, statesmen, Senators, and businessmen.

Soviet-US relations continued to expand after Nixon was replaced

<sup>54</sup> *Pravda*, July 6, 1974.

<sup>55</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Part Six, Moscow, 1974, p. 42.

<sup>56</sup> *Pravda*, May 23, 1974.

in the White House by Gerald R. Ford (August 1974). This was shown, in particular, by the results of the Brezhnev-Ford meeting near Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974.<sup>57</sup> That summit reaffirmed the determination of the two countries to steadfastly discharge their mutual commitments formalised in the documents signed since May 1972. The sides came to an understanding that they would complete drawing up a new strategic arms limitation treaty to be effective for a term up to the close of 1985 and based on the principle of equality and equal security. The leaders of the two nations worked out the basic principles for the new treaty. Further, it was agreed that subsequent talks on further limitations and a possible reduction of strategic arms for the period after 1985 would begin not later than 1980-1981.

In 1975 government delegations from the two countries started negotiations in Geneva on the wording of the new treaty in line with the Vladivostok understandings.

The reshaping of Soviet-US relations on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence did not by any means proceed smoothly, chiefly on account of the adversaries of detente, who continued to act in the USA in the spirit of the cold war days.

A striking example of this was the Trade Reform Act promulgated by the US Congress in December 1974. Under that act the most favoured nation clause in trade and credits for trade, usually accorded to other countries by the USA, was in the case of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made contingent on issues that had nothing to do with trade or interstate economic links generally.

By promulgating that act the Congress vested itself with powers to decide, upon the expiry of 18 months, the question of prolonging the most favoured nation clause depending on whether, in the opinion of US congressmen, there was compliance with their "terms" for the emigration procedure in socialist countries. This was neither more nor less than an undisguised, blatant attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the USSR and other socialist-community nations.

The Soviet Union categorically rejected this dictation and interference in its internal affairs. In January 1975 the Soviet government notified the government of the USA that it would not put the Soviet-US trade agreement of 1972 into effect, thereby demonstrating that trade with socialist countries, the need for which was felt more and more acutely in the capitalist states, could and would be based exclusively on unconditional and complete equality and mutual non-interference in internal affairs.

The 1974 Trade Reform Act instantly adversely affected Soviet-US trade. For instance, whereas the Soviet Union's trade with West

<sup>57</sup> *Pravda*, November 25, 1974.

European countries rose in 1974 by 4,000 million rubles over the 1973 level, the turnover between the USSR and the USA dropped from 1,100 million to 700 million rubles during the same period.

While the USA limited credits to the USSR to 300 million dollars for a four-year period, the West European nations and Japan extended considerably larger credits on extremely favourable terms. The USSR received credits amounting to 3,200 million dollars from France, 1,800 million dollars from Britain, 1,800 million dollars from Italy, 1,500 million dollars from Japan, and 500 million dollars from Canada.

World public opinion welcomed the turn for the better in Soviet-US relations, which it saw as meeting the interests not only of the peoples of the two countries but also of all other peoples. That explained the worldwide approbation of the first Soviet-US expedition into outer space—the joint flight and junction of the spaceships *Soyuz* and *Apollo*. This coordinated space programme served as a vivid example stimulating efforts to achieve worldwide agreement on the strengthening of peace wanted by all nations.

During this period the relations with the FRG, which continued to develop on the sound basis of the USSR-FRG treaty of August 12, 1970,<sup>58</sup> remained one of the major areas of the efforts of the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government to ensure lasting peace in Europe.

USSR-FRG relations began to be remoulded in accordance with the commitments undertaken in the Moscow treaty and the proclaimed intentions long before the treaty formally came into force on June 3, 1972. Of fundamental significance here was the meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and the FRG Chancellor Willy Brandt in Oreanda, the Crimea, in September 1971. At that meeting it was declared that there were vast potentials for mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries and the sides reaffirmed their desire to conclude agreements on individual areas of bilateral relations. Brezhnev and Brandt declared themselves in favour of continuing exchanges of views and consultations at different levels on bilateral issues and on international problems.

In the next few years the USSR and the FRG signed a trade-economic and a cultural agreement, an agreement on the development of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, and an agreement on air communications. During this period two visits were paid to the Federal Republic of Germany by the Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko, and the FRG Foreign Minister Walter Scheel visited the USSR on several occasions. Meetings and consultations at the level of heads of various ministries and government agencies of the two

<sup>58</sup> *Pravda*, August 13, 1970.



countries began to be held regularly. Parliamentary contacts were established and there was an exchange of delegations from the FRG Bundestag and the USSR Supreme Soviet. A Joint Commission was formed to promote economic and scientific-technical cooperation between the USSR and the FRG.

Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in May 1973, the political results of his talks with Chancellor Willy Brandt and Vice-Chancellor Walter Scheel, and his meetings with prominent representatives of FRG business and political circles reinforced the historic turn towards new, peacetime normal relations and mutually beneficial cooperation.

During the Brezhnev visit to Bonn the sides signed an agreement on the development of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, an agreement on cultural cooperation, and an additional protocol to the agreement on air communications.<sup>59</sup> These documents were a productive addition to the operating agreements between the two countries, enriching the emergent practice of mutual links and laying a long-term basis for bilateral cooperation.

The results of this visit took understanding and constructive cooperation between the USSR and the FRG to a higher level and created a good climate for an overall improvement of the situation on the European continent.

The changes for the better in Soviet-West German relations led to a swift growth of economic links between the two countries. In 1970 trade increased more than four-fold, and in 1974 exceeded 2,200 million rubles.<sup>60</sup>

In February 1970, July 1972, and October 1974 three contracts were signed for the sale to the FRG of Soviet natural gas and the purchase, on credit, of large-diameter pipes from the Mannesmann firm, and also of technological equipment for trunk gas pipe-lines. The Soviet orders under these contracts amounted to 1,000 million rubles. The Soviet Union will sell the FRG nearly 174,000 million cubic metres of gas in the period up to the year 2000.

A general agreement was signed in 1974 on the participation of the West German firms of Salzgitter, Krupp, Korf, and Siemens in the building of a metallurgical combine near Sary Oskol, Kursk Region. The world's largest factory producing metal by the method of direct reduction of iron is now in operation.

The building of the Oskol combine marks a major step towards the realisation of the long-term perspective for the development of mutual economic, industrial, and technical cooperation signed on January 18, 1974. This cooperation embraces, among other areas, atomic power engineering, petrochemistry, heavy engineering, non-ferrous metal-

<sup>59</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXIX, pp. 226, 342, 390.

<sup>60</sup> *Vneshnaya torgovlya*, No. 6, 1975, p. 47.

lurgy, and the development of new mineral deposits.

The Soviet Union and the FRG are among the countries with a high level of scientific and technological development. It is therefore quite logical that they should pool their efforts in developing advanced technology and new types of machines, instruments, and materials. In this area special contracts have been signed with 17 West German firms. These cover notably chemistry and petrochemistry, electronics, instrument-making, heavy engineering, the pharmaceutical industry, and metallurgy.

The Soviet and FRG governments had every reason to note with satisfaction, in connection with the visit to the USSR (October 28-31, 1974) by Chancellor Helmuth Schmidt (who replaced Willy Brandt in May 1974) and the Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, that the "experience of political development has entirely borne out the significance and productiveness of the treaty of August 12, 1970". In a joint statement it was stressed that the "policy founded on the treaty meets the interests of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany in the general trends towards a deepening of European and world detente. The Moscow treaty will continue to be a dependable foundation of the further improvement of relations between the two countries and will be consistently implemented."<sup>61</sup>

As a result of the meetings and talks held by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko with the FRG Chancellor Helmuth Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher the determination was expressed to continue joint efforts to improve the relations between the two countries in various fields. It was agreed to hold regular consultations on sensitive questions of bilateral relations and also on international problems of mutual interest. The sides declared their intention to provide every facility for the expansion of mutual economic links and create the legal, organisational, and other conditions for that purpose.

On October 30, 1974 Leonid Brezhnev and Helmuth Schmidt signed an agreement on the further development of economic cooperation, which opened up additional possibilities for raising the level of economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, especially in the sphere of raw materials and energy, and ensured the basis for business links and contacts between Soviet and FRG organisations and firms. It was stressed that both sides attached significance to the conclusion of new agreements in order to expand cooperation in science, technology, culture, tourism, and other fields.

A visit by the FRG President Walter Scheel to the Soviet Union in

<sup>61</sup> *Pravda*, October 31, 1974.

November 1975 was a further step towards greater cooperation and understanding between the two countries. During Scheel's talks with Leonid Brezhnev both sides "reiterated their determination to continue giving cooperation between the USSR and the FRG a living, dynamic content and enrich it with new constructive elements".<sup>62</sup>

In the period 1970-1975 much was done by the USSR and the FRG to reshape their relations. "The task now is, apparently," Leonid Brezhnev said, "to expand and deepen what has been achieved, closing it in a strong fabric of mutually-advantageous links in most diverse fields. Opening a new chapter in the mutual relations of our states and giving it a new positive meaning also call for much strength, persistence and, I would say, political courage."<sup>63</sup> The Soviet Union is prepared to work in that direction.

For a fairly long time Soviet-British relations remained frozen on account of a series of unfriendly actions taken by the Conservative government against the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless new trends in the international situation affected the relations too.

A ten-year agreement on the development of economic, scientific, technical and industrial cooperation between the Soviet Union and Britain was signed in London on May 6, 1974. In this agreement the sides undertook to facilitate the participation of the relative organisations, firms, and enterprises in the implementation of operating and forthcoming programmes for cooperation in the building of industrial complexes, the enlargement and modernisation of factories, and scientific and technological research.<sup>64</sup>

Noteworthy positive changes took place in Soviet-British relations in 1975 after a Labour government came to power (1974). These were due above all to the visit to the USSR by the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on February 13-17, 1975, and his talks with L. I. Brezhnev, A. N. Kosygin, and other Soviet leaders. The constructive discussion of a wide range of political, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural problems ended with the signing of important documents that laid the beginning for a new stage in the relations between the two countries.<sup>65</sup>

In these documents the sides expressed their mutual agreement to make a positive contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security. A protocol on consultations was signed for the first time in the practice of relations between the USSR and Britain.

This document recorded the readiness of the sides to conduct a

<sup>62</sup> *Pravda*, November 12, 1975.

<sup>63</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Part Seven, Moscow, 1975, p. 86.

<sup>64</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 10, 1974.

<sup>65</sup> *Documents and Materials of the Soviet-British Negotiations in Moscow on February 13-17, 1975*, Moscow, 1975.

regular exchange of views at different levels on important international problems and on questions of bilateral relations.

Leonid Brezhnev and Harold Wilson signed a joint Soviet-British declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, in which they called for the widest possible subscription to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and welcomed the progress that had been made in limiting strategic arms and nuclear weapons tests. The sides declared that they would continue their efforts at the appropriate international forums, including the United Nations and the Disarmament Committee, to further the cause of disarmament.<sup>66</sup>

The intention of the two nations to promote economic, scientific, technical, and industrial cooperation was mirrored in two long-term programmes: on economic and industrial cooperation and on cooperation in science and technology. They agreed on an extensive programme of cooperation in science. A. N. Kosygin and Harold Wilson signed an agreement on cooperation in the field of medicine and public health.<sup>67</sup>

The sides agreed that there were good prospects for large-scale contracts on a mutually beneficial basis, and reached an understanding on credits for a five-year period.

World public opinion assessed the results of Wilson's talks in Moscow as an important milestone in the development of Soviet-British relations and the further improvement of the situation in Europe, as a visible change in Britain's policy in favour of detente.

Soviet-Italian relations continued to develop throughout the period 1971-1975.

At the close of October 1972 the Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti visited the USSR, where he and the head of the Soviet government A. N. Kosygin surveyed a wide range of political problems and questions linked to the promotion of trade and economic links between the two countries. On October 24, 1974, in a speech at a reception given in honour of Andreotti, Kosygin spoke highly of the accumulated experience of Soviet-Italian cooperation and made the point that the two nations "can continue to develop cooperation in many promising areas, particularly in energy (including nuclear energy), chemistry, heavy engineering, and others."<sup>68</sup>

Further, the Soviet side declared it was prepared "to take a new step forward in the promotion of Soviet-Italian relations as a whole" and "raise cooperation in all areas, including the political field, to a higher level".<sup>69</sup> One of the major instruments for achieving this aim would be the extension and deepening of Soviet-Italian consultations

<sup>66</sup> *Pravda*, February 19, 1975.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> A. N. Kosygin, *Towards the Great Objective. Selected Speeches and Articles*, Vol. II, Moscow, 1979, p. 198 (in Russian).

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*

at various levels.

The results of the talks were recorded in a Soviet-Italian protocol on consultations of October 26, 1972, which stated that in the event a situation arose in Europe, which, in the view of the sides, threatened or violated peace, or could generate volatile international complications the two governments would enter into contact in order to reach mutual understanding on the measures to be taken to normalise the situation.<sup>70</sup> The joint communique, released at the close of the talks, noted that in the Soviet-Italian protocol the desire was expressed of "taking the relations between the two countries in all areas, including the political field, to a higher level". In July 1974, when the Soviet Union was visited by the Italian Foreign Minister, attention was focussed on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Soviet and Italian Ministers signed an agreement on economic cooperation.<sup>71</sup> In line with the 1972 Soviet-Italian protocol on consultations, there were exchanges of views and consultations at different levels on bilateral relations and important international problems. Economic cooperation on the basis of long-term product-pay-back agreements began to grow in breadth and depth. The most striking example of this cooperation was the USSR-Italy gas pipe-line project to carry Soviet gas to Italy. Soviet-Italian trade is expanding. From 1973 to 1975 it doubled, considerably exceeding 1,000 million rubles annually for the first time.<sup>72</sup>

The visit to the Soviet Union by the Italian President Giovanni Leone in November 1975, the talks that were held during that visit, and the resultant documents—the joint Soviet-Italian declaration and agreement on economic cooperation for the period 1975-1979<sup>73</sup>—were evidence that considerable headway had been made in Soviet-Italian relations. The talks with the President of the Italian Republic reaffirmed that the Soviet Union and Italy "are determined to continue raising the level of their cooperation in all areas and deepen that cooperation in the interests of the peoples of the two countries, in the interests of European and world security".<sup>74</sup>

The Soviet-Italian declaration of November 20, 1975 stated that detente and peaceful cooperation between countries with different social systems were helping to strengthen peace and security. The sides undertook "strictly to abide by and implement in all fields of their mutual relations the principles of relations between nations as proclaimed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and steadfastly to implement all the provisions of the Helsinki Conference's Final Act relating to security in Europe, cooperation in

<sup>70</sup> *Pravda*, October 27, 1972.

<sup>71</sup> *Pravda*, July 30, 1974.

<sup>72</sup> *Pravda*, November 21, 1975.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*

the economic field (trade and industrial cooperation), in science, technology, and environmental protection, and also cooperation in humanitarian fields (contacts between people, information, and cooperation and exchanges in culture and education)".<sup>75</sup>

Following the 24th Congress of the CPSU the principles of peaceful coexistence continued, to penetrate ever deeper into the Soviet Union's relations with other European capitalist nations, including Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria.

The Soviet Union and Finland maintained a high level of good-neighbourly relations and cooperation which again gave ample confirmation of the words of the former Finnish President Juho Kusti Paasikivi that friendship with the USSR was the only policy which could serve Finland's national interests.

A large contribution to the development of friendly relations between the two nations in the interests of world peace was made by the Finnish President Urho Kaleva Kekkonen. His name is associated with the policy of friendly, good-neighbourly relations with the USSR, a policy supported by large sections of the Finnish people. Kekkonen's many visits to the Soviet Union and the visits of Soviet leaders to Finland, and the contacts at all levels between statesmen and civic personalities of Finland and the USSR have strengthened Soviet-Finnish friendship.

On September 19, 1974, in a statement on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Finland's withdrawal from the war President Kekkonen declared: "On behalf of the vast majority of the Finnish people I express sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union, which has fulfilled all the treaties and kept promises, and set an example in putting right relations with a small neighbouring nation that had suffered military defeat."<sup>76</sup>

Finland demonstrated considerable interest in strengthening European security. This motivated, among other things, Finland's response to the initiative of socialist states for a European conference to consider questions of security and cooperation, and its active participation in the work of that conference.

Soviet-Finnish trade likewise continued to develop successfully. After the first Soviet-Finnish long-term trade agreement was signed, the volume of the trade turnover between the two countries increased almost 28-fold to reach 1,500 million rubles in 1974. This made the USSR Finland's leading trade partner. In 1971-1974 the trade turnover almost doubled in volume. In 1974 the Soviet Union and Finland signed a new (their sixth) five-year agreement on trade and payments (for 1976-1980). This agreement provided for a two-fold growth of

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, *Finland and the Soviet Union, Articles, Speeches and Interviews. 1952-1975*, Moscow, 1975, p. 214.

trade compared with the previous five years.

A metallurgical complex was built in these years in the Finnish town of Raahe with Soviet assistance. In the town of Lovüsa the construction of two nuclear power stations was started with Soviet assistance. An ore-dressing plant was built with the participation of Finnish firms and labour in the town of Kostomuksha, Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

A large boost was given to the economic cooperation between the two countries by the agreement on the reconstruction of the Saimaan Canal. This agreement has been successfully fulfilled and the canal is in useful operation.

In the period between the CPSU's 24th and 25th congresses, political, economic, scientific, technical, and cultural relations were expanded also with Canada. The beginning for this expansion was laid by official visits by the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau to the Soviet Union and the head of the Soviet government A. N. Kosygin to Canada. A protocol on consultations providing for exchanges of opinions on international problems and questions of Soviet-Canadian relations was signed in Moscow during the Trudeau visit in May 1971. A. N. Kosygin visited Canada in October of the same year. On October 20 the two countries signed a four-year agreement on exchanges in science, technology, education, culture, and other fields. In November 1973 the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Mitchell W. Sharp visited the Soviet Union where he had talks with A. A. Gromyko on a wide range of problems, including the problems of security and cooperation in Europe, and a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. The inter-governmental agreement on using the achievements in the field of science and technology in industry, signed in January 1971, like the earlier Soviet-Canadian trade agreement, created a durable basis for the development of trade and economic links and for productive bilateral cooperation in questions related to the Arctic, in technology, and in the fields of air communications and shipping.

Soviet-Japanese relations entered a new stage in the 1970s. The Soviet Union's flexible and restrained stand was the key factor paving the way for the productive development of these relations. The Soviet Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko visited Japan in January 1972, where it was acknowledged in talks that relations had to be based on the principles of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, and mutual benefit. There was a wide-ranging exchange of opinions on the further development of economic links.

An official visit was paid to the Soviet Union in October 1973 by the Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira. From the Soviet side the top-level talks were attended by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

L. I. Brezhnev, the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin, and the USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko.

The joint Soviet-Japanese statement, released at the close of the talks, declared: "The sides have acknowledged that the strengthening of goodneighbourly, friendly relations between the USSR and Japan on the basis of the principles of non-interference in internal affairs, mutual benefit, and equality not only meets the common interests of the peoples of the two countries but is a large contribution to peace and stability in the Far East and the whole world."<sup>77</sup> Further, it noted that "the direct dialogue between the leaders of the two countries, which was held in a frank and constructive spirit, was extremely useful and gave a strong boost to the development of relations between the two countries. As the statement put it, the USSR and Japan acknowledged that it was desirable "to promote economic cooperation between the two countries in possibly wider areas on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit and equality." The USSR and Japan agreed that it was "necessary to expedite economic cooperation in, among other areas, the development of natural resources in Siberia and also in the promotion of trade and cooperation in agriculture, transportation, and other fields."

It was agreed that there would be inter-governmental consultations in order to facilitate such economic cooperation. A number of agreements were signed during that visit. Soviet-Japanese trade is steadily expanding. It topped 1,500 million rubles in 1974.<sup>78</sup>

An official visit was paid to Japan in January 1976 by A. A. Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs. Talks were held on the conclusion of a peace treaty and views were exchanged on the further expansion of bilateral relations. The meetings and talks during that visit were held in a friendly atmosphere and were useful to both sides.

Despite the absence of a peace treaty with Japan, the USSR's stand is that a sound basis exists for the development of its relations with Japan. The report presented to the 25th Congress of the CPSU by Leonid Brezhnev stated: "As we see it, goodneighbourliness and friendly cooperation should be the rule in Soviet-Japanese relations, and that is what we are working for."<sup>79</sup>

On the whole, it may be said that in the first half of the 1970s the course towards peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems steadfastly cleared the way for itself in the practice of international relations.

<sup>77</sup> *Pravda*, October 11, 1973.

<sup>78</sup> *Izvestia*, January 14, 1975.

<sup>79</sup> *Documents and Resolutions XXVth Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1976, p. 26.



## Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

The culminating point of the extensive work conducted during these years to strengthen peace in Europe was the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, whose convocation and successful completion was one of the central goals listed in the Soviet Peace Programme.

The conference was convened with the participation of 33 European nations, the USA, and Canada—a unique phenomenon that had no precedent in world politics.

Shortly before the first phase of the conference opened, Leonid Brezhnev stressed that the very fact that responsible representatives of European states, the USA, and Canada would gather together for the first time in Europe's history was of enormous significance. "But the main thing," he said, "is that at this conference its participants will have to look at the future of our continent and map out ways for the development of mutual relations between the states concerned in conditions of peaceful cooperation. This is a problem of truly historic scope. And solving it will mean not only taking a new approach in Europe, but also providing an example having wide international importance."<sup>80</sup>

The first phase of the conference was held on July 3-7, 1973 in Helsinki at the level of Foreign Ministers. It endorsed the final recommendations of multilateral consultations relating to the entire programme of conducting the conference. The Foreign Ministers stated the views of their governments on the ways and means of advancing towards peace and security in Europe, towards peaceful cooperation in politics, the economy, science, and culture. Naturally, these views were not identical in everything, while in some cases they were very different, indeed. But by and large the first phase was successful.<sup>81</sup>

At that phase the socialist countries put forward concrete proposals on all the questions on the agenda. On the first item the Soviet Union submitted the draft for the conference's basic political document—the General Declaration on the Foundations of European Security and the Principles of Relations Between States in Europe. On the second item of the agenda the GDR and Hungary presented the draft for a Joint Statement on the Development of Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Trade, Science, and Technology, and also in the Field of Environmental Protection. Bulgaria and Poland submitted a draft document on the third item—Basic Guidelines for the Development of Cultural Cooperation, Contacts and Exchanges of Information. Czechoslovakia took the floor on the fourth item of the agenda,

<sup>80</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 189.

<sup>81</sup> *Pravda*, July 8, 1973.

proposing a resolution concerning the Advisory Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The purpose of the conference's second phase was to draw up the drafts of declarations, recommendations, and other documents for endorsement at the third, closing phase; it began its proceedings in Geneva on September 18, 1973. By mid-1975 agreement had been reached at Geneva on a number of important issues, including such that to many people had seemed to be unresolvable in the immediate past.

The third, final phase was held in Helsinki from July 30 to August 1, 1975. It was attended by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, the US President, the President of France, the British Prime Minister, the Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party, the Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and the leaders of the other nations participating in the conference. They signed the Final Act.<sup>82</sup>

The conference formalised the results of the victory over fascism, finally drew the line on the Second World War, condemned the practices of the cold war, and took Europe into a new period of development.

The conference summarised, as it were, the positive changes that had taken place in the 70s in the relations between the states of Eastern and Western Europe, and in international affairs as a whole. The Final Act is a sort of charter of lasting peace and productive cooperation among European nations. It records the fundamental principles of relations between states, including respect for independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, renunciation of the use or threat of force, and non-interference in internal affairs of other countries. These are essentially the principles of peaceful coexistence for which the CPSU had been fighting since the lifetime of Lenin. Moreover, the understandings reached at the conference created a good foundation for expanding mutually beneficial, non-discriminatory economic, scientific, technical, cultural and other cooperation on the scale of the entire continent.

"In our view," Leonid Brezhnev said at the conference on July 31,

<sup>82</sup> *Pravda*, August 2, 1975.

1975, "the aggregate result of the conference is that international detente is being increasingly invested with concrete material content. It is the materialisation of detente that is the crux of the matter, the substance of all that should make peace in Europe truly durable and unshakeable."<sup>83</sup>

In their review of the results of the conference the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers noted that "this unprecedented meeting of top-level leaders of 33 European nations, the USA, and Canada was an event of immense international significance. It ushered in a new stage in detente and was a major step towards reinforcing the principles of peaceful coexistence and laying down relations of equitable cooperation between countries with different social systems."<sup>84</sup>

As Leonid Brezhnev said in his speech on December 9, 1975 at the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party, implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Conference required the creation of the appropriate moral and political atmosphere and the reinforcement of the spirit of mutual confidence and constructive cooperation, towards the attainment of which the socialist countries were bending their efforts. However, some influential quarters in the Western countries, he said, "have begun to act in the opposite direction. The campaign of misinformation and slander against the socialist countries, the pinpricks of all sorts are designed to evoke a response and poison the atmosphere—all this does not, of course, accord with the spirit of the decisions adopted by the European Conference."<sup>85</sup>

The Soviet Union—and this was made clear in the pronouncements of its top leaders—takes the stand that all the provisions in the Helsinki Final Act should be implemented in both letter and spirit. Needless to say, this concerns, above all, the key section of that document covering the principles of relations between nations. Their observance and consistent implementation by all the nations represented at the conference will give the confidence that Europe's future will be one of peace.

In the same Warsaw speech of December 9, 1975 Leonid Brezhnev stressed the important role of the socialist community, which has always worked steadfastly and purposefully to strengthen peace and promote constructive cooperation between countries with different social systems. The socialist countries have invariably declared their readiness to take concrete action to deepen the positive processes on the world scene. Brezhnev noted the urgency of complementing

<sup>83</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 580.

<sup>84</sup> *Pravda*, August 6, 1975.

<sup>85</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 5, p. 418 (in Russian).

political detente with military detente.<sup>86</sup>

He proposed a series of steps aimed at carrying out the decisions of the Helsinki Conference and consolidating the process of detente and cooperation by convening European congresses or interstate conferences on cooperation in environmental protection, transport, and energy. Broad cooperation in these vital areas would unquestionably benefit all nations.

"A steady and methodical advance along the jointly charted road would lead to a strengthening of mutual confidence without which there can be no question of a genuine burgeoning of international cooperation."<sup>87</sup>

At the meeting of the General Secretaries and First Secretaries of the Central Committees of the communist and workers' parties of socialist countries who were then attending the 7th Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw, special attention was given to the ways and means of implementing the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. It was emphasised that practical steps had to be taken to bridle the arms race and consolidate the achieved political detente with measures to bring about military detente.<sup>88</sup>

A conference of Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union took place in Moscow on December 15-16, 1975.

At this conference views were exchanged on some pressing international problems, including the situation in Europe. The Foreign Ministers noted with satisfaction that the predominant feature of the world had become the "development of peaceful and friendly relations between countries" and that this "is to a large extent the result of the dynamic and consistent policy pursued by the socialist countries, a policy that is finding an ever broader response and support from the forces of progress and peace throughout the world".<sup>89</sup>

The practical steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet government, and also by other socialist countries after the historic Helsinki conference were assessed world-wide as confirming their determination to continue their efforts to improve the international climate and steadfastly give a concrete content to all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. World opinion saw this determination as a new impulse in the struggle for the further development of detente.

### The USSR's Effort on Behalf of Disarmament

As was already noted, the Soviet Peace Programme called for a reinvigoration of the struggle to halt all forms of the arms race.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 416, 418.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 418.

<sup>88</sup> *Pravda*, December 10, 1975.

<sup>89</sup> *Pravda*, December 17, 1975.

Throughout the period after the 24th CPSU Congress the Soviet Union, with the total support of its socialist friends and allies, pursued an energetic, persevering, and meaningful policy in this direction at the UN and other international forums and in bilateral relations with other nations. This policy yielded tangible results in 1971-1975.

The Soviet Union played an effective role in the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. This treaty was opened for signature on February 11, 1971 and came into force on May 18, 1972.<sup>90</sup> Its significance is chiefly that it bans the most dangerous form of military activity on the bed of seas and oceans.

In June 1971 the Soviet government officially proposed a conference of the five nuclear powers in the immediate future and at any convenient venue to consider the question of nuclear disarmament. Formal notes on this question were sent to the governments of the USA, the People's Republic of China, France, and Britain. This Soviet initiative was welcomed by world opinion. Of the nuclear powers France gave it whole-hearted support. However, it was categorically rejected by China without any convincing arguments by the Chinese leadership. Referring to Peking's posture, the USA and Britain in effect evaded answering the Soviet proposal. The question of the nuclear powers considering disarmament thus remained unresolved.

However, the USSR did not relax its efforts for disarmament. On Soviet initiative the UN General Assembly in September 1971 placed the question of holding a world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries of the world on the agenda of its 26th session. The Soviet proposal was that agreement should be reached among all nations on a specific date and the agenda of the conference not later than 1972, and that the conference would be a long-term forum examining all aspects of disarmament, particularly the question of banning and destroying nuclear weapons. This proposal won the approval of the majority of UN member nations. Actual opposition came only from the US and Chinese delegations, but their resistance did not prevent the General Assembly from passing a resolution on December 16, 1971 approving the Soviet initiative for a world disarmament conference. Support for the Soviet initiative was so overwhelming in the UN that even its adversaries did not venture to vote against it. In December 1972 at its next session the General Assembly called upon all nations to make an effort to create the conditions making it possible to hold that conference. Moreover, it set up a special committee to consider all viewpoints

<sup>90</sup> *A Collection of Operating Treaties*, Issue XXVIII, p. 43.

about convening the conference.<sup>91</sup>

In 1971, through the efforts of the USSR and other socialist nations, progress was made in another pressing question concerning disarmament—the prohibition of bacteriological weapons. The initiative of the USSR and other socialist countries, taken in 1969, was carried further. The draft of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction was submitted to the Geneva Disarmament Committee in September 1971. In the course of long diplomatic efforts this draft was agreed in advance by the socialist countries on the committee with the USA, Britain, Italy, Canada, and the Netherlands, which likewise came forward as its coauthors. After approving the draft the Geneva Committee passed it on to the UN General Assembly. On December 16 of the same year the 26th General Assembly approved it by 110 votes with one abstention, expressed the hope that it would have the widest subscription, and called upon all nations to refrain from any further development, production and stockpiling of especially potent toxin chemical substances for military purposes. The convention became the first-ever international measure of actual disarmament.<sup>92</sup> It envisaged the destruction of bacteriological weapons, which are among the most dangerous weapons of mass annihilation.

A concrete step towards diminishing the threat of war overhanging the world during the cold war years was the signing on September 30, 1971 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War Between the USSR and the USA.<sup>93</sup> Although finite in content, this important agreement, drawn up in the course of Soviet-US negotiations on a limitation of strategic arms, started as early as the close of 1969, was yet another specific contribution to the relaxation of international tension and the stabilisation of peace.

The Soviet Union and fraternal socialist countries used the UN forum to step up the struggle of peace-loving nations for disarmament, against the arms race. In turn, this helped to enhance the UN's prestige as an instrument of peace and international cooperation.

On November 29, 1972 the UN General Assembly passed a Soviet-initiated Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and on a Perpetual Ban on the Use of Nuclear Weapons by an overwhelming majority of votes.<sup>94</sup> This document recorded important moral and political obligations of states, whose implementation would help to strengthen international security and create better conditions for ending the arms race.

<sup>91</sup> *Resolutions Adopted by General Assembly During Its 27th Session. 19 September-19 December 1972*, United Nations, New York, 1973, p. 5.

<sup>92</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 56-64.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 106-108.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

Acting on a Soviet proposal the 28th UN General Assembly passed a resolution in December 1973 on a reduction of the military budgets of the Security Council's permanent members by 10 per cent and on the use of part of the released funds for aid to developing nations.<sup>95</sup> This was an extremely important document; it had wide support in the UN (83 nations voted for it with opposition only from two nations—China and Albania). Its provisions accord with the interests of major countries bearing the largest military expenditures, and the interests of developing nations. Implementation of this resolution would have given both groups of countries much larger resources for their economic and social development, for raising the people's living standard.

A new major initiative that took the specifics of international relations into account was the proposal on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health submitted to and adopted by the 29th UN General Assembly in 1974.<sup>96</sup> The 30th UN General Assembly backed the Soviet initiative for an accord on this issue.

Jointly with other socialist countries the Soviet Union was active in convening a conference in Geneva in May 1975 to review the operation of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the conference it urged the strict and undeviating fulfilment of the treaty by all its signatories, and extension of the number of states participating in it, chiefly of states possessing nuclear weapons or having the potential for developing such weapons in the near future. Also it called for the earliest ratification of the treaty by the nations that had signed it. This conference demonstrated convincingly that the five years of the treaty's existence had fully borne out its viability, efficacy, and urgency.

In pursuing the course towards complementing political detente in Europe with military detente, the Soviet Union and its allies called for talks on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. These talks began in Vienna on October 30, 1973 and continue to this day.

Nineteen nations are taking part in the talks; of these, eleven are to work out and sign the future agreements (the USSR, the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the USA, Britain, the FRG, Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) and eight are observers (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Turkey, Greece, Italy, Denmark, and Norway). At the preparatory consultations in the period from January to June 1973 it was decided that the region where troops and armament would be cut back would embrace the territory of the FRG, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 209-210.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214-219.

From the very start the socialist countries proposed an equitable reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, i. e., both foreign and national. As envisioned by this proposal the reduction would affect all services of the armed forces and all types of weapons, in other words, ground, air, and nuclear forces in such a manner as would not upset the balance of strength formed by the totality of these elements. This would give the signatories of the future agreement equal security.

The NATO nations objected to this approach. They insisted on coming to an agreement on a reduction solely of the Soviet and US forces deployed in Central Europe. This was a move to prevent a reduction of the 500,000-strong West German Bundeswehr, the 60,000-strong British Rhine Army, and the armed forces of other NATO countries in the reduction zone. In addition, the Western nations spoke only of the ground forces of the USSR and the USA. In other words, they sidestepped the question of a reduction of air forces and nuclear weapons in Central Europe despite the fact that aircraft and nuclear units are the main strike force of modern armies and represent the greatest threat to the densely populated regions of Central Europe.

Further, the Western proposals required the Warsaw Treaty nations to reduce almost three times as many troops as the NATO states. According to the Western scenario, US troops would be withdrawn individually and in small units, and their armaments and other military equipment would remain in Central Europe. These Western proposals were quite obviously aimed at giving the North Atlantic bloc unilateral military advantages and therefore could not serve as the basis for agreement.

In the period 1974-1975, in order to move towards a mutually-acceptable agreement on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, the Soviet Union and the other socialist states involved in the talks added some new, compromise proposals to their basic proposal. These were that agreement should be reached on an initial, relatively small reduction and that this reduction should be regarded as a practical step towards a more substantial cutback; that the eleven direct participants in the talks—the USA, Britain, Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the FRG, the USSR, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia—should pledge to refrain from increasing the numerical strength of their armed forces in the reduction area as long as the talks continued; and, lastly, that the USSR and the USA should be the first to begin and complete the reduction in 1975 and 1976. This would be followed by a reduction of the armed forces and armaments of the other direct participants in the talks.<sup>97</sup> Despite these compromise proposals, the NATO

<sup>97</sup> *International Yearbook. Politics and Economics, 1974* p. 31.



countries maintained their unrealistic posture, thereby blocking the working out of mutually-acceptable agreements.

It has always been the Soviet Union's contention that a major breakthrough could be achieved in the question of reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe if, as Leonid Brezhnev said in a speech to constituents in June 1975, these talks were approached "honestly and objectively and no attempt is made to use them as an instrument for strengthening one's military position relative to the other side, as is still being attempted by the NATO countries."<sup>98</sup>

In the same speech Leonid Brezhnev proposed that nations, chiefly the big powers, should sign an agreement banning the development of new weapons and systems of mass destruction. This is a most urgent task. "The modern science and technology have reached a level", he said, "where there is the grave danger that a weapon more terrible than nuclear weapons may be developed. The reason and conscience of mankind dictate the need to erect an insuperable barrier to the appearance of such a weapon."<sup>99</sup>

Amplifying this idea, the Soviet delegation submitted to the 30th UN General Assembly formal proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons.<sup>100</sup>

This initiative had wide repercussions in the world and was welcomed by civic and political circles in many countries. "This is a proposal which should be warmly welcomed and vigorously pursued by the US," declared Senator Claiborne Pell. "Locking the lid on the Pandora's box of awesome new weapons development is not peculiarly in the interest of the Soviet government or the Russian people—it is in the interest of the American people and, indeed, all mankind."<sup>101</sup>

At the same 30th UN General Assembly the USSR submitted another proposal—for a Treaty on a Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapon Tests."<sup>102</sup>

As was noted at the UN debates on disarmament, the Soviet proposals were aimed at consolidating detente and meeting the vital interests of all mankind seeking to deliver itself from the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and a further, more dangerous spiral of the arms race. The General Assembly voted in favour of these proposals.

Moreover, it passed a resolution calling for an early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, manufacture, and stockpiling of all types of chemical weapons and their removal from

<sup>98</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 574.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 575.

<sup>100</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 237-238.

<sup>101</sup> *New Times*, No. 26, 1975, p. 4.

<sup>102</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 221-230.

all national arsenals.<sup>103</sup>

During the years following the 24th CPSU Congress the USSR did much to improve relations with capitalist countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence and reduce the danger of another world war. However, detente, which helps to strengthen world peace and security, comes not automatically but in unflagging struggle with the forces whose mercenary and narrow-class interests drive them to press for a return to the cold war atmosphere and for an escalation of the arms race.

First and foremost, this concerns NATO, which is the main military-political bloc of Western powers spearheaded at the Soviet Union and other socialist states, and at the democratic and national liberation movements. Throughout these years NATO continued stepping up the arms race, particularly the nuclear-missile arms race. The military spending of its members climbed from a total of 104,200 million dollars in 1971 to 132,000 million in 1974. The NATO military-political leadership took a categorical stand against the intention of individual member states (the Netherlands, Britain, and others) to cut back their military budgets. The danger of the arms race unleashed by NATO was that while continuing to take huge funds away from peaceful, constructive projects it enlarged the material basis for war preparations.

The NATO members persisted in maintaining a negative posture on the socialist-community nations' proposals for the simultaneous disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty or, as a first step, at least dismantle their military organisations.

In the Common Market states the adversaries of detente began to speak of forming a new military-political bloc in Western Europe and building up an independent West European military-industrial complex. The realisation of these plans would signify a step backwards in Europe's development along the road of peace and security.

"It should be clearly seen," Leonid Brezhnev said, "that the threat to peace is posed by quite concrete social groups, organisations and individuals. Thus, even on the testimony of the top-ranking leaders in the major Western countries, the sinister alliance of the professional militarists and the monopolies making fortunes out of weapons of war, usually known as the military industrial complex, has become something of a 'state within the state' in these countries and has acquired self-sufficient power."<sup>104</sup>

In the USA, for example, this complex consists of about 100 of the largest corporations in the space, aircraft, electronics, shipbuilding, and other industries that get most of the government's armaments contracts and are helped by the Defense Department to develop in-

<sup>103</sup> *Pravda*, December 13, 1975.

<sup>104</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 320.

creasingly more destructive types of nuclear-missile weapons. Precisely this military-industrial complex demands a steady growth of the US military budget, opposes agreement on disarmament, and disrupts the normalisation of Soviet-US economic relations by making conditions that amount to interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

In the FRG the neofascists of the National-Democratic Party, the ultra-rightists in the CDU/CSU, the revanchist länder associations, and other reactionaries have joined ranks in attacking detente and the efforts to strengthen peace in Europe. The guidelines of these circles are invariably revanchism and hostility for socialism and the Democratic Republic of Germany.

Under the Conservative government in Britain an overtly hostile action was taken against the USSR—the expulsion in September 1971 of a large group of staff members of the Soviet embassy and other Soviet offices on trumped-up charges. This seriously complicated Soviet-British relations and held up their development for a long time.

The detente rate was negatively affected also by the certain inconsistency of the capitalist world's politicians. Thus, while generally declaring support for detente, some government circles in the Western countries time and again urged a further build-up of the Western military potential, essentially a continuation of the "positions of strength" policy.

The Soviet Union and other fraternal socialist states conducted an unflinching struggle against the forces slowing down detente, and steadily increased their contribution to the promotion of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation among nations, to giving detente a concrete material content.

In 1971-1975 the Soviet Union took an active part in a number of international conferences, including the International Conference on the Law of the Sea (December 1973, June-August 1974, March-May 1975), the World Population Conference (August 1974), and the World Food Conference (November 1974). At all these conferences it championed peace, national liberation, social progress, and a higher living standard for the people, and consistently upheld the sovereign right of every nation to decide its own problems independently. It invariably declared its readiness to cooperate with the other countries participating in these conferences on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

During all these years, social forces, which had grown much more active, made a large contribution to the struggle for a just, democratic peace, for the security of nations and international cooperation. This was demonstrated most eloquently by the World Congress of Peace Forces (held in Moscow on October 25-31, 1973), the widest forum in the history of public movements which brought together representatives of 128 international and over 1,100 national organisations and

movements in 143 countries.<sup>105</sup>

They included representatives of communist, workers', national-democratic, socialist, and social-democratic parties, national movements, Christian-Democratic, liberal, agrarian, and other political, religious, and public organisations. This composition was evidence of the vast growth of the peace movement's social basis. A meaningful speech was delivered at the congress by Leonid Brezhnev.

The congress drew up and adopted an action programme, which was spelled out in the following documents: Appeal of the World Congress of Peace Forces, a statement For the Implementation of the UN Security Council Resolutions of October 22 and 23, 1973, Follow-Up Action document and the *communiqué*.<sup>106</sup>

The concluding political document of the congress—the *communiqué*—summed up the positive results of the debates in the various commissions. It mirrored the general approach of the delegates to key international problems and declared that the congress participants were determined to carry forward the struggle for a further relaxation of tension and the consolidation of peace; that they were in solidarity with the national liberation movement and in favour of an immediate end to the arms race, the commencement of actual disarmament, the promotion of all-sided international cooperation in various fields, and the safeguarding of human rights in the social and political fields. It noted that universal recognition and implementation of the principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems was the most durable foundation of international security.

The success of the congress was a further important step towards uniting all of the world's peace forces and reinvigorating their actions in the general channel of struggle for peace, to prevent a world war.

The second Assembly of Representatives of Public Opinion for European Security and Cooperation was held in Brussels on April 26-29, 1975 (the first took place in the same venue on June 2-5, 1972). Attended by more than 500 representatives from 29 European countries and also 48 international organisations,<sup>107</sup> it considered ways and means of further expanding cooperation among European nations, complementing political detente with military detente, and making detente irreversible. This assembly helped to unite all of the continent's peace forces and extend the sphere and scope of their work.<sup>108</sup>

The world peace movement was an important factor mobilising large numbers of people throughout the world for the struggle to end the arms race, for nuclear disarmament and international security. The

<sup>105</sup> *International Yearbook. Politics and Economics, 1974*, p. 37.

<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>107</sup> *New Times*, No. 19, 1975, p. 20.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

advances towards peace and detente led to an enlargement of the World Peace Council's mass basis and that of its constituent national organisations in 125 countries on all continents, and further enhanced its international prestige.

An active part in the work of the World Peace Council and in ensuring the success of its innumerable actions and initiatives was played, as in previous years, by the Soviet Peace Committee.

International opinion highly evaluated the contribution that was being made to detente and the strengthening of world security by the Soviet Union, by the Leninist Communist Party, and personally by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev.

The conferment upon Leonid Brezhnev in 1975 of the Frédéric Joliot-Curie Gold Peace Medal, the highest award of the world peace movement, was recognition of his outstanding efforts on behalf of world peace. This act was lauded by international opinion.

### Relations with Developing Countries

Following the 24th CPSU Congress the Soviet Union considerably expanded and strengthened its links with developing nations, which constitute a vast and increasingly more active sector of the world today. In 1975 it had diplomatic relations with more than 90 independent Asian, African, and Latin American states. These were not merely diplomatic relations, for they were complemented with mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation. The stand of the USSR and that of most developing countries are close or identical on a very large number of international problems.

The period 1971-1975 saw the further unfolding of the struggle of the new nations, that had won liberation from direct colonial dependence, for their rights, in defence of their sovereignty and right to independent development. The distinct turn during this period from the cold war to detente created the international conditions allowing the developing nations to promote their social progress, consolidate political and achieve economic independence, and devote more manpower and resources to the building of a new life.

In their turn, the greater independence enjoyed by the developing countries and the more pronounced anti-imperialist orientation of their policy still further changed the balance of strength on the international scene in favour of peace and social progress. By their vigorous anti-imperialist policy these countries helped to curb imperialism's bellicose, aggressive forces and contributed to detente and the strengthening of world security.

During these years the socialist-community nations established closer links with the national liberation movement. Developments

show that where these links are safeguarded and consolidated, success is achieved in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism and racism.

The resolution passed by the 24th CPSU Congress declared: "The CPSU is invariably true to the Leninist principle of solidarity with the peoples fighting for national liberation and social emancipation."<sup>109</sup> In keeping with this guideline the Soviet Union has throughout these years pursued a policy of strengthening solidarity with the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This was seen in the many-sided political, economic, and, whenever needed, military assistance to the national liberation movement. The Soviet Union sought to build these relations with developing nations in such a way as to bring these nations into maximum participation in international affairs as an active force enjoying equal rights with other states.

In its analysis of the situation in countries that had won liberation from colonial dependence, the 24th Congress of the CPSU noted: "The main thing is that the struggle for national liberation in many countries has in practice begun to develop into a struggle against exploitative relations, both feudal and capitalist."<sup>110</sup> This was clearly borne out in the post-congress years, mainly in the life of those newly independent nations that took the road of non-capitalist development.

During this period there was a further growth of the number of socialist-oriented nations and the role played in world politics by such countries as Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the People's Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia (after the overthrow of the monarchy in 1975), the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. Despite the disparity in the socio-economic development levels of these countries, the extent to which their domestic and foreign policies are progressive, and the balance between the forces of progress and reaction on the domestic scene, they all have proclaimed socialism as their goal. There are socialist ideas also in the programme of the Indian National Congress, the ruling party in India.

In many developing countries measures were taken in varying degree to nationalise foreign property and enterprises belonging to the local bourgeoisie, limit the landed estates, build up a public sector in industry, restructure agriculture on a cooperative basis, and enforce social reforms in the interests of the working people. These measures enlarged the material basis for non-capitalist development, helped to oust the exploiting classes from the political scene, and reduced dependence on foreign imperialism.

These processes are a major element of the progressive development taking place in the new nation states. This gave the 24th Congress of the CPSU grounds for noting in its resolution: "The Congress

<sup>109</sup> *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 215.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*

attaches special importance to extending cooperation with countries taking the socialist orientation." Soviet foreign policy in 1971-1975 exemplified fulfilment of this fundamental provision.

Soviet political, economic, and defence cooperation with socialist-oriented countries rose to a higher qualitative level in many ways after the 24th CPSU Congress.

In the political field the Soviet Union and all the other socialist-community states invariably acted in defence of the rights of many progressive countries to independence, non-intervention in their internal affairs, and social progress. At the 6th (April 1974) and 7th (September 1975) special sessions of the UN General Assembly the USSR firmly upheld the right of the new states to dispose of their natural wealth. Throughout these years it steadfastly championed the just cause of the Arab peoples in their struggle to eradicate the consequences of Israeli aggression.

The Soviet Union's principled, internationalist approach to the national liberation struggle was demonstrated convincingly during the events linked to the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Bangladesh in 1971. It was the only permanent member of the UN Security Council to support the liberation struggle of the people of Bangladesh. A Bangladesh minister assessed the Soviet stand in the following words: "The assistance which the Soviet Union extended to our people in the struggle for independence and for consolidating that independence will be written in gold letters into the history of Bangladesh."<sup>111</sup>

The Soviet Union's new relations with developing countries were exemplified by the treaties of friendship and cooperation signed with Egypt on May 27, 1971, with India on August 9, 1971, with Iraq on April 9, 1972, and with Somalia on July 11, 1974. These important documents envisaged wide-ranging political, economic, cultural, and other cooperation on the basis of complete equality, mutual respect, and friendship including regular consultations and reciprocal support on major international problems.

The relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan present a most eloquent example of expanding goodneighbourly, mutually beneficial relations. These relations have stood the test of time. A further contribution to their development was a visit paid by the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to Afghanistan in December 1975. The protocol prolonging the 1931 treaty of neutrality and mutual non-aggression, signed as a result of that visit, was evidence of the desire of the peoples of both countries to continue acting together in the struggle to preserve peace.<sup>112</sup> Political cooperation between the two nations was supplemented by many-

<sup>111</sup> *Pravda*, December 16, 1974.

<sup>112</sup> *Pravda*, December 11, 1975.

sided economic links.

Relations with Iran and other neighbouring countries continued to develop successfully in a spirit of goodneighbourliness. There was an expansion of goodneighbourly relations between the USSR and Turkey. This course was formalised in a declaration of principles of goodneighbourly relations signed in April 1972.<sup>113</sup>

The Soviet-Turkish cooperation was given a further boost by a visit to Turkey of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin at the end of December 1975.

The joint Soviet-Turkish communique signed at the close of that visit stated that "Soviet-Turkish bilateral relations have advanced in recent years" and declared that they would continue expanding and strengthening these relations. "The sides have agreed to draw up a political document on friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and Turkey, which will be signed in the immediate future at a summit meeting."<sup>114</sup> Both sides "express the intention to take the appropriate steps to ensure a further expansion of economic cooperation and a steady growth of trade between the Soviet Union and Turkey."<sup>115</sup>

The Soviet Union has done much in the field of defence cooperation, helping to safeguard progressive nations against imperialist aggression. Thanks to massive deliveries of Soviet armaments on the easiest possible terms and the assistance of Soviet military experts Egypt and Syria built up a formidable military potential that enabled them to pit force against Israeli force when war broke in the Middle East in 1973. With Soviet assistance the Arab losses in military hardware were quickly made good during and after the war, and the defences of neighbouring Iraq were strengthened.

Soviet military supplies played a role of no small importance in ensuring the success of the actions taken by India and the people of Bangladesh in 1971 during the war unleashed by the military regime in Pakistan to suppress the Bengalis. The Soviet Union and all the other countries of the socialist community extended considerable assistance to strengthen the defence capability of many other progressive Asian and African states, helping them stand up against imperialist interference in their internal affairs and build up national armed forces to defend their independence.

Disinterested Soviet military assistance to the liberation forces of countries like Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola helped the peoples of these countries in their long and bitter battles with Portuguese colonialists and hastened the day of their national liberation.

Crucial support was rendered by the Soviet Union to the people

<sup>113</sup> *Pravda*, April 18, 1972.

<sup>114</sup> *Izvestia*, December 30, 1975.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*



and lawful government of the People's Republic of Angola fighting for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity against encroachments by imperialist forces, the South African racists, and the local reactionaries serving foreign capital.

There was a further expansion of the Soviet Union's economic links with socialist-oriented nations. Lenin had stressed that the countries of the East "...are turning to us for help, and are becoming more and more aware of the economic necessity of an alliance with Soviet Russia against international imperialism".<sup>116</sup> This may be said today of the economic links maintained with the USSR by almost all the developing nations, chiefly, of course, by progressive states.

Soviet economic cooperation with these nations is a form of the victorious proletariat's solidarity with peoples fighting for complete liberation. The purpose of this cooperation is mainly to help build key branches of an industrial basis, in other words, the foundation for carrying out major economic tasks, put an end to backwardness, and strengthen economic independence.

By January 1, 1975 altogether 899 large industrial and other projects<sup>117</sup> had been built, or were being built or planned. These include giant projects such as the Helwan Combine in Egypt, the Euphrates dam in Syria, and the iron and steel plant in Bokaro, India. The USSR was helping develop the oil industry in Iraq and the power and fishing industries in Peru. All these projects, built with Soviet assistance, become without exception the national property of the developing nations concerned.

More than 70 per cent of the Soviet credits to developing nations were used for industrial requirements. Moreover, the USSR helped them in developing agriculture, organising the fishing industry, surveying for minerals, building roads and cultural facilities, training personnel, and in other fields. In Iraq, for instance, 68 per cent of Soviet assistance is channeled into the development of industry, 12 per cent into transport and communications, 8 per cent into agriculture, and 5 per cent into geological surveys. In Algeria 55 per cent of the assistance is put into industry, 17 per cent into geological surveys, 10 per cent into irrigation and agriculture, and 14 per cent into the training of specialists.

The following is an example showing the significance of Soviet assistance for the development of the public sector and basic industries in developing nations. In 1972 the enterprises built in India with Soviet participation accounted for nearly 60 per cent of that nation's oil, roughly 30 per cent of its oil-products, about 20 per cent of its electric power, 80 per cent of its capacities for the manufacture of

<sup>116</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 477.

<sup>117</sup> *The Soviet National Economy in 1974, Statistical Yearbook*, Moscow, 1975, p. 774 (in Russian).

heavy metallurgical equipment, and about 60 per cent of its capacities for the manufacture of electrical equipment.<sup>118</sup> As a result of Soviet assistance India is successfully carrying out its plans for economic construction and has been able to form a strong public sector, which has greatly reinforced its ability to withstand economic pressure from the imperialist monopolies.

In the 1970s new forms of economic links complemented those already in existence. For instance, the socialist-community nations launched joint economic projects under the CMEA Comprehensive Programme for socialist economic integration. The CMEA International Investment Bank set up a special fund to finance economic and technical assistance to developing countries. The fund began to function on January 1, 1974 with its financial resources set at 1,000 million transferable rubles by the founding nations.<sup>119</sup>

Economic cooperation by the CMEA countries with African nations in 1971-1975 too continued to make a large contribution to the development of relations between them and was helping to strengthen friendship and draw nations closer together.

The credits extended to African countries by European socialist states exceeded 3,000 million rubles in 1973. More than half of this money came from the Soviet Union. These credits were channeled mainly into key branches of the economy. In the countries of Tropical Africa, for instance, roughly half of the credits from the USSR were used to build and enlarge industrial and power generating facilities, 12 per cent for geological surveys, and 11 per cent for agricultural development.<sup>120</sup> Some 170 industrial and 70 agricultural projects have been built in Africa with Soviet assistance. These include thermal and diesel electric power stations in Ethiopia, Mali, and Zambia, and an oil-refinery in Assaba, which meets all of Ethiopia's requirements in gasoline and other oil-products.

The USSR has helped Guinea to build a bauxite-mining combine, a cannery plant, a saw-mill, a polytechnical institute, a radio station, a refrigeration plant, a sports stadium, a hotel, and livestock-breeding farms.

Approximately 90 projects were built in Africa with Czechoslovak assistance; one of these is a large factory in Ethiopia with an annual output capacity of 100,000 car tyres. More than 70 industrial projects were built with assistance from Hungary and 50 with assistance from Bulgaria.

Hundreds of Africans were studying at institutions of higher learning in the CMEA countries. CMEA set up a scholarship grants fund in

<sup>118</sup> V. N. Asov, *Soviet Foreign Trade*, Moscow, 1973, p. 32 (in Russian).

<sup>119</sup> *Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, 1974, p. 474.

<sup>120</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 5, 1975, p. 137.

1974 to help developing countries train skilled specialists.

A large role in developing agriculture in Africa was played by machinery sold on easy terms by the USSR to the Congo, Chad, Upper Volta, Guinea, Mali, the Cameroon, Benin, and the Central African Republic. Machine hire and repair facilities were established in these countries.<sup>121</sup>

Responding to requests from Arab and African countries the Soviet Union has sent thousands of specialists to help them build and run various projects.

On the whole, the developing nations now hold an important place in the Soviet Union's foreign economic links. In 1974 this group of countries accounted for 14.6 per cent of the Soviet Union's foreign trade as against 5.2 per cent in 1955. The trade turnover in the period from 1955 to 1974 increased 19-fold, rising from 300 million to 5,800 million rubles.<sup>122</sup> The USSR traded with nearly 80 developing states, mostly on the basis of trade and payments agreements. There were stable mutually beneficial trade and economic links with Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Argentina, Brazil, and many other nations. For many years, on account of pressure from US monopolies the Latin American states (with the exception, of course, of socialist Cuba) refrained from expanding economic ties with the USSR. In the period following the 24th CPSU Congress the situation began to change for the better, and there was a substantial growth of Soviet trade with a number of Latin American states. In 1974 this trade increased to 419 million rubles (exclusive of Cuba) as against 118 million rubles in 1971.<sup>123</sup>

The pattern of Soviet trade with developing nations underwent some modifications in the 1970s. While formerly Soviet industrial plant was exchanged mainly for raw materials and tropical goods, in that period there was an increase of the proportion of manufactured goods imported from these nations; besides this proportion exceeded the average in their total export.

One of the most characteristic features of the new type of relations that took shape between the Soviet Union and developing nations was the extensive assistance to these countries in training specialists for industry, agriculture, medicine, education, research, and state administration. This assistance is a major concrete expression of the internationalism of Soviet foreign policy. Its volume and range increased markedly after the 24th Congress of the CPSU.

Young people from more than 100 countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (data for mid-1975) were receiving a free higher or

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 137-38.

<sup>122</sup> Soviet Foreign Policy Archives. Communication from the USSR Central Board of Statistics of October 30, 1975 (in Russian).

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*

secondary special education in the Soviet Union. Over 100 institutions of higher learning and technical and vocational schools were built in developing countries with Soviet assistance. These offer training in the most vital trades and professions for tens of thousands of young people who will take an active part in promoting the national economy of their countries.

The day-to-day economic links of the Soviet Union with developing nations are becoming a good school for cadres. In the building and operation of projects with Soviet assistance, Soviet specialists helped to train more than 300,000 skilled workers and technicians in these countries. All this was being done in order to help the new states acquire genuine independence, get on their feet, and create the conditions for further economic and cultural progress.

In 1975 the Soviet Union had bilateral agreements on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with 54 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Today when every step taken towards socialism by peoples winning liberation meets with savage resistance, both overt and disguised, from not only local reactionary forces but also international imperialism, the strengthening of friendship and all-sided cooperation with socialist nations, chiefly with the USSR, is a vital condition for the attainment of freedom, independence, social justice, and prosperity. The atmosphere of detente, which the Soviet Union wants to consolidate and deepen, creates the best conditions for the free, independent advancement of the new states. That this is so has been eloquently demonstrated by developments.

By and large, it may be said that without reliance on the USSR and other socialist countries, without their political, defence, and economic support (to say nothing of existing socialism's force of attraction) the non-capitalist development of the former colonies, their socialist orientation, and the abolition of dependence on imperialism would have been inconceivable.

However, no assistance and support from without, including from socialist countries, can resolve the basic problems of economic and social progress confronting the nations that have opted for non-capitalist development. These can be resolved mainly through the efforts of the peoples of these countries. They have "to raise the productive forces to the level required by socialism, establish totally new relations of production, change the psychology of the people and set up a new administrative apparatus relying on the support of the masses".<sup>124</sup>

During the first half of the 1970s the world witnessed organised collective action by countries that have shaken off colonial tyranny against imperialism, in defence of their independence, their political

<sup>124</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, p. 301.

and economic rights. Actions by developing countries within the framework of individual regions, entire continents or on a global scale have become an increasingly conspicuous feature of international life. Moreover, it is highly significant that not only political but also economic means of struggle were used in these actions. True to the Leninist principles of its foreign policy and acting on the directive of the 24th CPSU Congress on solidarity with peoples fighting for national and social liberation, the Soviet Union has invariably welcomed and supported just, progressive international actions by developing nations and their organisations.

A large contribution to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and apartheid has been made by the non-aligned movement, which united in 1975 nearly 80 nations. The Fourth Non-Aligned Nations' Summit Conference held during this period (Algiers, September 5-9, 1973), passed a number of important anti-imperialist decisions.<sup>125</sup> The legitimate demands put forward by the Algiers Conference were mirrored in the resolutions of the UN General Assembly's 6th special session on problems of raw materials and economic development convened on the initiative of non-aligned states. These resolutions make it clear that nations have the inalienable right to dispose of their resources and, more, to nationalise the property of foreign monopolies. On the whole, these resolutions were a blow to imperialism from the combined forces of socialism and the national liberation movement.<sup>126</sup>

Together with fraternal socialist states, the Soviet Union actively backed the decisions of the Algiers Conference and the principled stand taken by developing countries on basic problems at the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly. Speaking in Tashkent on September 24, 1973, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "For our part, we have every respect for the anti-imperialist programme drawn up in Algiers, and we wish the participants in the movement of non-aligned countries success in putting it into effect".<sup>127</sup> On April 11, 1974, when questions related to economic development were debated at the sixth special session of the UN General Assembly, A. A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation, declared that the Soviet Union "is emphatically against stronger states using their superior development level to impose unequal cooperation on less-developed countries. It hardly needs saying that it is impermissible to use economic levers for interference in the internal affairs of nations, for bringing political pressure to bear upon them".<sup>128</sup>

<sup>125</sup> *International Yearbook. Politics and Economics, 1974*, p. 289.

<sup>126</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1975.

<sup>127</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow 1975, p. 291.

<sup>128</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy. Selected Articles and Speeches*, p. 332.

In December 1974, despite opposition from the imperialist powers, the next, 29th UN General Assembly, with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as the sponsors, passed the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States by an overwhelming majority of votes. This was one of the most significant documents ever passed by the United Nations Organisation.<sup>129</sup> It formalised just, democratic principles that must underlie not only economic but also political and other relations between countries, including the principle of peaceful coexistence.

The first half of the 1970s saw the further strengthening of united action by the anti-imperialist forces in Africa. The Organisation of African Unity, of which all African states, with the exception of South Africa, are members, acted vigorously against the imperialist-encouraged racist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, extending material and military assistance to peoples fighting for freedom and independence.

There were more actions by Latin American states in defence of national interests, against US interference in their internal affairs, and the domination of foreign monopolies. In the Organisation of American States, which for many years was in effect controlled by the USA, there was an increasingly vocal demand for the lifting of the boycott of socialist Cuba which the Latin American states had been pressed to join.

On July 29, 1975 the 16th Consultative Conference of OAS Foreign Ministers in San José, Costa Rica, passed a resolution by a 16-vote majority repealing the anti-Cuban sanctions introduced by the OAS in 1964.

In October 1975 a conference in Panama of 25 Latin American countries, including Cuba, signed a treaty setting up the Latin American Economic System. The purpose of this new regional organisation is to help strengthen cooperation among Latin American states with a view to accelerating national development. The Cuban Minister for Foreign Trade assessed the creation of the Latin American Economic System as "an exceedingly important step aimed at normalising and developing relations among the Latin American states".<sup>130</sup>

The national liberation movement of the Arab peoples rose to a higher level at the first half of the 70s. They made extremely effective use of their huge oil resources as an instrument of struggle against the forces supporting Israeli aggression and plundering the natural wealth of the Arab East. On October 17, 1973, during the fourth Arab-Israeli war in October 1973, an extraordinary session of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries decided on a 5 per cent monthly

<sup>129</sup> *Pravda*, December 20, 1974.

<sup>130</sup> *Pravda*, August 4, 1975.

cut-back of their oil output.<sup>131</sup> In parallel, oil deliveries were stopped to the USA, the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa. In November 1973 the Arab summit in Algiers decided to continue using oil as a weapon of pressure, in particular making oil sales to any country conditional on its attitude to the Arab-Israeli conflict. At a conference of leaders of 20 Arab nations and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (Rabat, October 26-30, 1974) a united stand was adopted relative to the Palestine issue and the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. Further, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the PLO came to an agreement on coordinating their actions. The petroleum exporting nations decided to set up a fund of 2,000 million dollars to help victims of Israeli aggression.<sup>132</sup>

The USSR gave its unconditional backing to the Rabat conference as a step towards the unity of Arab nations in the struggle for their rights and a just peace in the Middle East. In a message of greetings to the conference, the Soviet government said in part: "In the Soviet Union your conference is regarded as an important step strengthening the anti-imperialist solidarity of the Arab peoples."<sup>133</sup>

The solidarity displayed by the Arab nations at the 29th UN General Assembly was largely instrumental in winning recognition for the PLO as the lawful representative of the Arab people of Palestine and securing for it the status of an observer in the UN.

In early December 1975, with the Soviet representative playing an active part, the UN Security Council passed its first-ever decision, by a majority vote, to invite a PLO representative to a sitting called to consider the latest act of Israeli aggression against Lebanon.

Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East conflict was lucidly defined in the resolution of the 24th CPSU congress: "The Soviet Union will seek a just political settlement in the area, which implies withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied territories, exercise by each state of its right to an independent existence, and also satisfying the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine."<sup>134</sup>

In a Soviet government statement released on October 8 in connection with the resumption of hostilities, it was noted that the "responsibility for the present developments in the Middle East and their consequences fall squarely on Israel and those external reactionary circles that constantly connive at Israel's aggressive ambitions."<sup>135</sup>

In that war, relying on the powerful and swift support of the USSR and other socialist countries and displaying a high level of cohesion

<sup>131</sup> Ye. Dmitriev, V. Ladeikin, *The Road to Peace in the Middle East*, Moscow, 1974, p. 11 (in Russian).

<sup>132</sup> *Pravda*, November 2, 1974.

<sup>133</sup> *Pravda*, October 27, 1974.

<sup>134</sup> *24th Congress of the CPSU*, p. 217.

<sup>135</sup> *Pravda*, October 8, 1973.

and unity of action, the Arab countries gave a resolute rebuff to Israel, struck strongly at the invaders, and inflicted telling casualties on them. The myth about the Israeli army's "invincibility" was dispersed. In that period the Soviet Union rendered considerable assistance to the armed forces of Egypt and Syria, speedily supplying them, by air and sea, the up-to-date armaments needed for the battles against the aggressor.

Addressing Egypt's People's Assembly on December 8, 1973, the Egyptian Prime Minister Mohammed Abdel Kader Hatem declared that "the assistance rendered to Arabs by the Soviet Union and the Soviet armaments with which we opposed aggression will be one of the strongest factors of friendship linking our two great peoples".<sup>136</sup> The excellence of the Soviet armaments supplied to Arab armies and their huge role in determining the course of the hostilities had to be admitted even by Western military experts.

However, it should be noted that at a certain stage the situation grew complicated on the fighting fronts. Israel received new huge supplies of US armaments, hurriedly transported across the ocean, and there was the threat that the war would be protracted.

These developments were closely followed by the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee. In response to the wishes of the Arab leaders, the Soviet Union made the most energetic and diverse efforts to settle the conflict politically. The Soviet leadership maintained constant contact with the leaders of Arab nations, notably Egypt and Syria. A. N. Kosygin and A. A. Gromyko visited these countries. At the same time, in Moscow, Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders exhaustively considered the situation at the fighting fronts and the best ways and means of helping Arab friends with the President of Algeria Houari Boumedienne. Talks were also held in Moscow with the Foreign Minister of Iraq.

Acting in agreement with Arab states the Soviet Union took measures to secure an early cease-fire and begin an advance towards a political settlement. To this end use was made of contacts with leaders of the USA and also of the UN Security Council rostrum. The question of the USSR and the USA acting together in restoring peace in the Middle East was raised by Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko with Henry Kissinger in Moscow in October 1973 and in messages of the Soviet leadership to the US President Richard M. Nixon.

As a result, on October 22, 1973 the UN Security Council passed the Soviet-US-sponsored resolution No. 338,<sup>137</sup> which called on the parties to cease all hostilities immediately and begin talks to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East on the basis of the Securi-

<sup>136</sup> Ye. Dmitriev, V. Ladeikin, Op. cit., p. 218.

<sup>137</sup> *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council 1973*. United Nations, New York, 1974, p. 10.



ty Council resolution No. 242 of November 22, 1967.<sup>138</sup> Thus, through the active role of the Soviet Union, it became possible, for the first time since the Arab-Israeli conflict erupted, to link a cease-fire directly to the eradication of the general causes of the conflict. This resolution in fact charted the outlines of a future settlement.

The hostilities were ended and the bloodshed halted, but an explosive situation remained in the Middle East. The mission of working out a cardinal solution of this problem was given to the Peace Conference that opened on December 21, 1973 in Geneva with the participation of the USSR, the USA, Egypt, Jordan, and Israel.<sup>139</sup> The USSR and the USA were the co-chairmen. A. A. Gromyko, who led the Soviet delegation, stated the basic principles that could serve as the basis for a just political settlement of the Middle East conflict. These called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab lands occupied in 1967, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of all Middle East nations, including Israel, and the safeguarding of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine.<sup>140</sup>

In the course of the conference's first phase, which ended on December 22, 1973, the mechanism was created for settling the Middle East problem. It was envisaged that the conference would not be suspended, that it would continue on the level of specially appointed ambassadors.

This mechanism subsequently broke down through the opposition of Israel, which relied on backing from the USA. To please Israel and in circumvention of the Geneva Conference, the USA set out to substitute partial, separate steps on a bilateral basis for the cardinal solution of the principal questions of Middle East settlement. To this end it centred its main efforts on prying away Egypt from other Arab states and reorienting foreign policy from cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries to cooperation with the West.

By that time the actions of Egyptian President Sadat also betrayed intentions of concluding a separate agreement with Israel and going back on commitments to his Arab allies.

That was the nature of the agreements on the disengagement of Israeli and Egyptian troops signed through the active mediation of the USA on January 18, 1974 and September 4, 1975.<sup>141</sup> The

<sup>138</sup> *Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council. 1967*, United Nations, New York, 1968, p. 8.

<sup>139</sup> Syria did not participate in the conference, but the right to join in its work was reserved to it.

<sup>140</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *For the Triumph of the Leninist Foreign Policy, Selected Articles and Speeches*, p. 300.

<sup>141</sup> In compliance with the agreements Israel withdrew its troops from the Suez Canal Zone (15 to 30 km) in exchange for Egypt's commitment that in essence amounted to the end of hostilities.

implementation of these agreements did not improve the overall situation and rather delayed than brought nearer the achievement of a comprehensive and just settlement in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union did not in principle reject the possibility of some intermediate steps. Leonid Brezhnev stressed that "in themselves, partial steps such as, for example, the withdrawal of the invaders from various parts of seized Arab lands and their return to the Arabs are useful, but only in the event they are steps towards the earliest actual peace settlement and are not used as a pretext for freezing the situation as a whole, for dragging out a peace settlement, for undermining the unity of the Arab nations."<sup>142</sup>

These words were borne out by developments. The repeated visits to the Middle East by the US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in 1973-1975, his talks with the conflicting sides, and new attempts to limit the solution of the Middle East problem to partial measures made the situation still more complicated. Even to those, who had doubts, it became clear that a just and durable peace in the Middle East could not be achieved without the solution of the crucial problems created by the Israeli aggression and without the active participation in a peace settlement of the Soviet Union, whom the Arabs regard as a dependable friend.

Questions linked to the destiny of the Arab people of Palestine, questions that grew particularly acute in the mid-1970s, were part and parcel of a Middle East settlement. By that time the national liberation forces of the Palestinian Arabs had consolidated firmly around the Palestine Liberation Organisation which demanded that the Arab people of Palestine should have the right to the creation of their own state.

Together with other socialist countries and also with non-aligned nations the Soviet Union insisted upon the inclusion in the agenda of the 29th UN General Assembly (1974) of the question of Palestine as a separate point and then voted for a resolution which recognised the PLO as the lawful representative of the Arab people of Palestine.

The sides undertook to refrain from the threat or use of force and military blockades relative to each other. An understanding was reached on a new deployment of Egyptian and Israeli forces, on a limitation of the numerical strength of the troops and armaments of the two sides in the Sinai, and also on the enlistment of American experts for duty at early warning stations. The agreement permitted non-military freight to be shipped to and from Israel via the Suez Canal. Israel declared that it would return to Egypt part of the occupied lands, including the Abu-Rudeis oil field.

This agreement was sharply denounced by many Arab nations and wide segments of public opinion in the Arab world because it did not link the problems of an overall settlement of the Middle East conflict to the interests of the struggle of other Arab peoples.

<sup>142</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *On the Foreign Policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, Speeches and Articles*, 2nd enlarged edition, p. 818.

During a visit to the USSR by Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee (April-May 1975), the Soviet Union declared its firm belief that peace and tranquility would not come to the Middle East without a solution of the Palestine problem in the interests of the Arab people of Palestine.<sup>143</sup>

Yasser Arafat made his second visit to the USSR on November 24-28, 1975. He and the members of his delegation had an exhaustive exchange of opinions with A. A. Gromyko, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, and B. N. Ponomarev, alternate member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on the situation in the Middle East, including the Palestine problem. The communique on the results of this visit said that the PLO representatives expressed profound gratitude to the Soviet Union "for its unfailing support of the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their national aspirations, against the intrigues of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction".<sup>144</sup>

On December 2-4, 1975 an official visit was paid to Moscow by the Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah. His talks with A. N. Kosygin and A. A. Gromyko were further evidence that friendly relations were expanding between the USSR and Arab nations.

Alongside other issues, special attention was given at the talks to the Middle East problem. The Soviet Union and Kuwait reaffirmed their conviction that a just and durable peace could only be established in the Middle East if Israel withdrew its forces from all occupied Arab lands and the demands of the Arab people of Palestine for the restoration of their legitimate rights were satisfied. In their exchange of views on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone the sides noted that the conditions for consolidating peace and security in that zone were non-interference by foreign powers in the affairs of the nations of the zone, free navigation in the Persian Gulf, and cooperation among all the countries of the zone. They reiterated their determination to continue easing international tension, seeking an end to the arms race, and achieving disarmament. The Soviet-Kuwaiti talks contributed to the further development of relations between the two countries.<sup>145</sup>

"We did not for a moment lose sight of the Middle East and will continue, as we have been doing, to champion the legitimate demands of the Arab states," Leonid Brezhnev declared on March 10, 1974.<sup>146</sup>

<sup>143</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1975.

<sup>144</sup> *Pravda*, November 29, 1975.

<sup>145</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1975.

<sup>146</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 4, p. 433 (in Russian).

In early November 1975 the Soviet Union initiated a new step to facilitate a cardinal settlement of the Middle East conflict. It suggested to the USA that as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East the USSR and the USA should jointly call for a resumption of its work in full volume. "Of course," the message said, "from the very outset of its resumption the Geneva Conference must be attended, on a basis of equality, by all the directly interested sides—Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the PLO as the representative of the Arab people of Palestine, and Israel—and also by the USSR and the USA as its co-chairmen. Quite obviously, as was determined from the very beginning, the task of the resumed conference must be to achieve an all-embracing, cardinal political settlement of the Middle East conflict in keeping with the relevant UN resolutions."

The aim of the Soviet proposal was precisely to achieve a cardinal settlement of the conflict that would bring a genuinely just and durable peace, for lasting peace can be established in the Middle East only by the joint, concerted efforts of all the sides directly involved.

At the 30th UN General Assembly the Soviet Union gave its whole-hearted support to a resolution condemning Israeli policy towards Arab peoples.

By an overwhelming majority vote on November 11, 1975 the UN General Assembly passed a resolution on ending all forms of racial discrimination. The General Assembly noted that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination". This resolution was a justified condemnation of Israeli aggression and thereby spelled out enormous support for the struggle of the Arab peoples.

The situation in and around Cyprus was another dangerous focal point of international tension, which Soviet diplomacy was making every effort to extinguish. A rising against the lawful government of President Makarios, organised by the reactionary Greek military with the support of some NATO circles, erupted in Cyprus on July 15, 1974. The insurgents gained control of a large part of the island and declared their intention to achieve "enosis" with Greece, i. e., the abolition of the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus.

Turkish troops landed in Cyprus on July 20. Turkey claimed that this was necessary to protect the island's Turkish community. The Soviet Union emphatically denounced the armed putsch in Cyprus, exposed the attempts of the Greek junta, then in power, to conceal its complicity and portray these events as the result of an internal struggle, and showed the actual role played by NATO in the Cyprus tragedy. It did much to have the Security Council adopt resolution No. 353 of July 20, which called for an end to foreign military intervention and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the island.

The Soviet government statement of August 22, 1974 unmasked the attempts to "settle" the Cyprus issue behind the back of the

Cypriot people and in violation of its interests in a narrow circle of NATO countries and in circumvention of the relevant Security Council resolution.<sup>147</sup>

The USSR urged the examination of the Cyprus problem by a representative international forum reflecting the political face of the modern world. In this connection it proposed that the United Nations sponsor an international conference with the participation of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and all the Security Council's permanent members with the possible attendance of other nations, particularly non-aligned nations.

This proposal was supported by the Republic of Cyprus and many other nations, but there was strong opposition from the NATO countries and China's leadership.

At the Cyprus-initiated debate on the Cyprus issue at the 29th UN General Assembly, the Soviet delegation exposed the imperialist intrigues aimed at eliminating Cyprus as an independent non-aligned state and stressed that an international conference on Cyprus should be held under UN aegis and that the Security Council's permanent members should give effective guarantees of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

A TASS statement of February 17, 1975 declared that the USSR condemned the unilateral action of the Turkish Cypriot community's leadership in setting up a separate state entity on the part of the island occupied by Turkish troops, and regarded this action as "another attempt of certain NATO circles to wreck the process of settlement and divide the island in contravention of the interests of the Cypriot people".<sup>148</sup>

In the Security Council the Soviet Union voted for resolution No. 367 of March 12, 1975, in which the Council expressed its regret over the unilateral decision proclaiming a "federated Turkish state" on part of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, instructed the UN Secretary-General to undertake a good services mission, and urged the immediate implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on Cyprus.

Soviet support for the Cypriot people's struggle for independence and sovereignty was highly evaluated by them and their government.

Speaking of Soviet policy, the President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios said: "The people of Cyprus are grateful to the Soviet Union for supporting their struggle for the restoration of their country's complete independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, for deliverance from all foreign troops."<sup>149</sup>

A telegram sent by the Cypriot Foreign Minister John Christophi-

<sup>147</sup> *Pravda*, August 22, 1974.

<sup>148</sup> *Pravda*, February 17, 1975.

<sup>149</sup> *Pravda*, August 19, 1975.

des to A. A. Gromyko on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of Soviet-Cypriot diplomatic relations stated that the "main outcome of Soviet-Cypriot relations during this period is expressed in the obtaining friendship and wide cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Cyprus."<sup>150</sup>

That the Soviet Union gave close attention to the Cypriot problem is borne out also by the Soviet-Turkish communique on the results of talks that the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers A. N. Kosygin had with leaders of the Turkish Republic in Ankara at the close of December 1975. The USSR steadfastly maintained the posture that Cyprus had to remain an independent, sovereign, and territorially integral nation. This was the only basis on which the dangerous tension over Cyprus could be ended and the Cyprus question settled.

The Cyprus resolution was passed by the 30th UN General Assembly by a huge majority of votes. This resolution demanded the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from the island and the cessation of all foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Cypriot people. It stated that the Cyprus issue had to be settled promptly by peaceful means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. This resolution was a strong denunciation of the actions of certain NATO circles who wanted to control this strategically important island even if it meant that Cyprus had to relinquish its statehood and territorial integrity.

With the help of local reactionaries in Asian, African, and Latin American states Western imperialist circles took the most diverse actions to slow down and halt the liberation of the peoples of developing countries, bring down progressive regimes, and isolate the national liberation movement from its natural ally, the community of socialist states. In some countries (for instance, Bolivia and Uruguay) they succeeded in engineering counter-revolutionary coups. The lawfully elected progressive regime in Chile was brutally crushed (September 1973) and a military-fascist dictatorship was set up by a reactionary military junta with the active outside support and encouragement—mainly, by the US.<sup>151</sup>

In 1975, with barely camouflaged approval by Western imperialist propaganda, reactionary circles in India started a drive to remove Prime Minister Indira Gandhi from her post and from the political scene. Local and foreign reactionary forces brought pressure to bear also on Egypt, whose policy already in these years was unstable and erratic. In the face of these indications of the class struggle in and

<sup>150</sup> Ibid.

<sup>151</sup> This report, released on November 20, 1975, laid bare facts about US subversion against the democratic government of Salvador Allende in Chile (*The New York Times*, November 21 and 22, 1975).

around developing nations, chiefly socialist-oriented states, the Soviet Union, while strictly adhering to the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, invariably and actively sided with the forces of national liberation and progress, giving them moral and political support and exposing imperialist intrigues.

It strongly condemned the fascist coup in Chile and the heinous murder of the democratically elected President Salvador Allende, and protested vigorously against the reign of terror against tens of thousands of Chilean patriots. It broke off diplomatic relations with the fascist regime in Santiago.

### The Soviet Union and Security in Asia

A major initiative by the Soviet Union was its proposal for the creation of a system of security in Asia. While working to promote detente in all directions and displaying sincere concern for the destiny of peace throughout the world, its aim was to achieve global detente. Leonid Brezhnev stressed that "...we think it is important that Asia should join this process on a broad scale."<sup>152</sup>

Following the 24th CPSU Congress the Soviet Union adopted a vigorous line towards strengthening the pillars of peace in Asia on the basis of its earlier proposals for security in that region. This line, which is part of the overall Soviet course in international affairs, was the logical continuation of the consistent Leninist policy of safeguarding peace and the freedom and independence of the Asian peoples. Lenin said that it was the aim of the Soviet Union in Asia, as in Europe, to ensure "peaceful coexistence with all peoples".<sup>153</sup>

The substance of this line was clearly defined by Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. "Collective security in Asia," Leonid Brezhnev said at the 15th Congress of the Soviet Trade Unions in 1972, "must, in our view, be based on such principles as repudiation of the use of force in relations between states, respect for the sovereignty and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, and broad development of economic and other cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual benefit. We advocate and shall continue to advocate such collective security in Asia and are ready to cooperate with all countries to make this idea a reality."<sup>154</sup>

The Soviet Union's approach to the quest for ways and means of strengthening peace and security in Asia has always been flexible and realistic. It takes into account the fact that the Asian states may have various considerations about how this pressing problem should be

<sup>152</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 250.

<sup>153</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 30, p. 365.

<sup>154</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 31.

resolved. In line with the views and wishes expressed by Asian statesmen, politicians, and civic personalities (the idea of Southeast Asia becoming a neutral zone and the search for formulas of relations among South Asian states ensuring goodneighbourly cooperation among them, the conversion of the Indian Ocean into a peace zone, and plans for regional cooperation), the Soviet Union developed and specified the idea of ensuring security on the Asian continent. Increasing importance was acquired by the struggle for the implementation of fundamental principles such as respect for the right of every nation to decide its own destiny, the impermissibility of territorial annexations by aggression, the settlement of all international disputes by peaceful means, and recognition and observance of the right of each nation to sovereign control and exploitation of its natural resources and the implementation of socio-economic changes.

The Soviet Union did not, of course, close its eyes to the fact that the struggle to strengthen peace and security in Asia is proceeding under difficult conditions. The bitter legacy left in this area by the colonialists had to be reckoned with: economic backwardness, mutual distrust and suspicion, tribalism, and prejudice, in short, everything that was generated by the policy of "divide and rule".

The imperialist circles did not abandoned their attempts to split the Asian countries, to set them against each other, to breathe life into the CENTO and SEATO<sup>155</sup> blocs, and set up new closed regional military-political groups.

Specious pretexts were used in efforts to exclude the Soviet Union, a country with two-thirds of its territory on the Asian continent and which had time and again proved by word and deed that it was a loyal friend of the Asian peoples, from participating in Asian affairs.

Despite everything, the relations among Asian states were developing in the direction of peaceful coexistence and cooperation. In the view of the Soviet Union, Asia's peaceful future was the common concern of all Asian states without exception.

The establishment of relations of peace, security, and cooperation in Asia was urged by Mongolia, India, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Syria, and Iraq, and by leading political and civic personalities in Japan, Indonesia, Nepal, and other countries. This was further confirmation that the idea of ensuring security in Asia was increasingly entering the political life of this huge continent.

Speaking in India in November 1973 Leonid Brezhnev noted: "There is growing confidence in the countries of Asia in a lasting peace and a stable situation conducive to the concentration of the efforts of these countries on the urgent tasks of internal development. The search is being stepped up for practical ways and specific steps, both of a partial and general nature, leading to the establishment and

<sup>155</sup> This bloc disintegrated in 1975.



consolidation of the security of Asian states. It is precisely these problems that the Asian public is considering now, and we regard this as a major achievement."<sup>156</sup>

Bilateral efforts to establish goodneighbourly relations among Asian states were the starting point of the process of building up security. In some sense these efforts served as a prototype. The Indian weekly *Blitz* wrote that if the principles underlying the Indian-Soviet treaty spread throughout Asia they would ultimately lead to the creation of a system of collective security.<sup>157</sup>

The question of achieving security in Asia by common effort was increasingly highlighted at international congresses and conferences. A large contribution was made in this direction by the International Conference for Security and Cooperation in Asia held in Bangladesh in May 1973 and by the World Congress of Peace Forces held in Moscow in October 1973.

The Soviet Union, attaching great significance to getting the problem of Asian security resolved on the basis of equality and cooperation among all of the continent's peoples, took a firm stand on the side of heroic Vietnam and other countries in Indochina, and of the Arab peoples in their struggle against aggressors. It continues its unswerving line of helping the Asian countries strengthen their political sovereignty and promote their economic development. A large contribution to strengthening peace was the historic victory of the Vietnamese people and the downfall of the reactionary regime in Laos. Significant efforts linked to the normalisation of relations in the South Asian subcontinent were made by India.

Needless to say, the peoples of Asia can stand up to imperialism and safeguard their vital national interests more effectively by concerted effort, by founding the relations among themselves and with other nations on the principles of peace.

"In our view," Leonid Brezhnev wrote in a message to the 12th Session of the Council of the Organisation of Afro-Asian Solidarity, "the fundamental principles of the Helsinki Final Act range beyond the European continent. They may be applied in other continents."<sup>158</sup> Above all, this concerns Asia.

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In the period between the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU the Soviet Union, acting in close cooperation with fraternal socialist countries and relying on the support of the forces of peace and freedom in all countries, conducted immense and productive work in

<sup>156</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1975, p. 358.

<sup>157</sup> *Blitz*, December 2, 1973.

<sup>158</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Vol. 5, p. 348 (in Russian).

virtually all directions of its foreign policy, upholding the freedom, independence, and security of nations and making every effort to reduce the threat of another world war and consolidate peace on the planet.

As always, the efforts of the CPSU and the Soviet government to strengthen peace and international cooperation have been inseparable from the CPSU's internationalist principles, from the defence of the interests of the working masses throughout the world, from the interests of mankind's social progress. They merged with the public movement of peace forces acting against the threat of another war, for detente and cooperation under conditions of coexistence.

These noble efforts are being continued unflinchingly. In their message "To Peoples, Parliaments, and Governments" on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Soviet people's historic victory in the Great Patriotic War the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the government of the Soviet Union wrote:

"Expressing the will and fervent desire of all Soviet people we shall work for:

"—the full and all-sided assertion of the principles of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems in the practice of international relations;

"—the irreversibility of the process of detente;

"—the limitation and cessation of the race for all kinds and types of armaments and a steady advance to general and complete disarmament;

"—the abolition of existing hotbeds of the war threat with the indispensable recognition of and respect for the right of every nation to independence and equal security;

--the creation of regional and general systems of security and equitable cooperation among states;

"—the utmost promotion of mutually beneficial links in the fields of economics, science, technology, and culture with the observance of the unconditional right of each country to dispose of its natural resources and safeguard its laws and customs;

"—the provision of real guarantees of the effective and equitable participation of all countries and peoples in world politics; the abolition of neocolonialism and all discrimination against all countries;

"—the creation of an international climate in which potential aggressors, lovers of gambles and sword-rattling will everywhere receive a resolute rebuff and in which security and confidence in a peaceful future will be assured to all countries and peoples."<sup>159</sup>

## CHAPTER XXXII

### **Carrying Through the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples Adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress (1976-1980)**

The 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which took place between February 24 and March 5, 1976, was an event of world-wide importance. The decisions adopted by the Congress determined the course to be followed by the Soviet people in their continuing advance towards communism, and laid down new goals to be attained in the socio-economic development of the Soviet Union. They also provided answers to the fundamental issues troubling people throughout the world—war and peace, international security and cooperation, and the defence of the legitimate rights and interests of the peoples of the world. The 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU provided a scientific-theoretical analysis of the key problems in contemporary international relations. The reports made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, and the decisions of the congresses contain a review of the present stage in the general crisis of capitalism, define revolution as the result of the internal development of a given country and a powerful means of social renewal, indicate ways and means of defending revolutionary gains, reveal the link between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism, and point to the decisive role being played by the three major revolutionary forces of the modern world—world socialism, the international working class and the national liberation movement—in the historic battle against imperialism, emphasising the need to unify their activity. It is clearly of utmost importance that the purity of Marxism-Leninism be maintained and that proletarian internationalism be strengthened.

The foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU continued and developed the Peace Programme of the 24th Congress and examined the prospects for further assuring international security and the advance of mankind along the path of peace and progress. The congress put forward a number of new, far-reaching and concrete proposals for extending and securing detente.

The foreign policy decisions adopted by the 25th Congress of the CPSU cover all the major aspects of international politics and international relations, the entire gamut of foreign policy tasks facing the CPSU and the Soviet state, clearly and precisely formulated in a special section of the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU

entitled "The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples".<sup>1</sup>

Among the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy, the congress gave priority to the following: "While steadily strengthening their unity and expanding their all-round cooperation in building the new society, the fraternal socialist states must augment their joint active contribution to the consolidation of peace".<sup>2</sup>

The congress also emphasised the importance of another objective of Soviet foreign policy, namely the policy of increased cooperation with countries that have freed themselves from colonial dependence, and support for peoples fighting for their independence.<sup>3</sup>

The Report also stated that, in accord with the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union would consistently pursue a policy of developing long-term cooperation on the basis of mutual advantage in various spheres—politics, economics, science and culture—with capitalist states.

The congress noted that Soviet-American relations are of decisive importance in reducing the risk of a new world war and normalising the international situation, and expressed its firm resolution to seek agreement with the United States of America on major international problems in the interests of the peoples of both countries and in the interests of peace. At the same time, the congress emphasised that the Soviet Union would decisively oppose any actions on the part of the USA that threatened the freedom and independence of the peoples of the world and constituted interference in their internal affairs.

The congress paid special attention to the problem of halting the arms race as one of the main objectives of the struggle for peace in the contemporary world. In its decisions, the congress proposed that active measures be taken to halt the continuing dangerous growth in armaments, to reduce existing stocks of arms and to achieve disarmament,<sup>4</sup> to "do everything to complete preparations of a new Soviet-US agreement on limiting and reducing strategic armaments and conclude international treaties on universal and complete termination of nuclear weapons tests, on banning and destroying chemical weapons, on banning development of new types and systems of mass annihilation weapons, and also banning modification of the

<sup>1</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, XXV Congress of the CPSU*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 44.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>4</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy, XXV Congress of the CPSU*, p. 44.

natural environment for military or other hostile purposes".<sup>5</sup> Other measures aimed at military detente were also proposed.

Among the most important issues demanding a solution in the name of peace and international security, the 25th Congress, in its foreign policy programme, stressed the vital need to "do everything to deepen international detente, to embody it in concrete forms of mutually beneficial cooperation between states. Work vigorously for the full implementation of the Final Act of the European Conference, and for greater peaceful co-existence in Europe",<sup>6</sup> to extend detente beyond Europe to other regions of the world, and particularly to "work for ensuring Asian security based on joint efforts by the states of that continent".<sup>7</sup>

The congress proposed that an international agreement be signed on renouncing the use of force in international relations. According to the Soviet proposal, the signatories to this agreement, including the nuclear powers, would pledge themselves not to use any kind of weapons, including nuclear weapons, in solving their disputes. Such an agreement would be an important step in implementing the Helsinki accords on European security and cooperation and would constitute a major contribution to the cause of world peace.

The congress named as one of the major foreign policy tasks facing the USSR in the coming period the total elimination of all vestiges of imperialist colonial oppression, the violation of national independence and equality among nations, all forms of colonialism and racism. It also urged the necessity of removing discrimination, imposition and exploitation from international economic relations.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU affirmed that the USSR was prepared to cooperate with all peace-loving states and governments who are striving not only in word but in deed to strengthen international security, check the arms race and cooperate on a basis of equality.

The Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples convincingly demonstrates that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is a class-based policy aimed at defending the interests of world socialism, the democratic development of all mankind and also at providing consistent support for the national liberation struggle. The policy of detente being pursued by the Soviet Union impedes the manoeuvres of the aggressive forces of imperialism and their attempts to export counter-revolution, and promotes the creation of an international situation favourable both for the working people of the capitalist countries in their struggle to attain democracy and the

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

satisfaction of their interests, and also for the national liberation movement.

The congress gave clear warning of the fact that pursuit of the foreign policy objectives mentioned above would provoke bitter opposition from the most aggressive imperialist and militarist circles in the West, and also from the Peking leaders, whose political aims run directly counter to the interests of most of mankind.

Development on the international scene following the 25th Congress of the CPSU fully confirmed this prognosis. International affairs were characterised by a struggle between two opposing policies: the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries, directed at securing favourable conditions for building socialism and communism, at securing social and national liberation for the peoples of the world and strengthening peace and security, and the aggressive policy of imperialism, which opposed the forces of socialism, the national liberation movement and the progressive development of mankind.

The events of the second half of the 1970s convincingly demonstrate the growing influence of world socialism on international life and on social progress throughout the world.

The new balance of forces on the international scene and, more importantly, the growing strength of the socialist community and the systematic restriction of imperialism, the elimination of colonial systems and the emergence of newly-independent states taking an active part in international affairs, have made it possible to accelerate the historical process of reshaping and normalising international relations, to enshrine in law the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different socio-economic structures in a broad area of international practice, and to carry out large-scale international activity aimed at averting the threat of a new world war and promoting peace and international cooperation.

Carrying through the foreign policy decisions of the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU was one of the major objectives of the Central Committee of the CPSU and its Politbureau, and was frequently discussed at plenary meetings of the Central Committee.

Having considered the report "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" made by Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, the June (1980) Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU expressed its full and unreserved approval of the activity of the Politbureau and of the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Leonid Brezhnev, in implementing the Leninist foreign policy programme of the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU.<sup>8</sup> The

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1980.

plenary meeting of the Central Committee noted the improvement that had taken place in the international situation during the 1970s, mainly as a result of the wide-ranging activity of the USSR and all the countries of the socialist community. However, towards the end of the past decade, imperialist forces, the leaders of the NATO military bloc and, first and foremost, the USA, opposed detente and the objective process of renewing international relations with a policy based on an unwillingness to recognise the realities of the present period, the growing strength of socialism, the successes of the national liberation movement and the overall increase in freedom-loving, democratic force. Imperialism adopted a policy aimed at stimulating the arms race and encouraging provocation against socialist and other independent countries.

The present rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, particularly the USA, and the hegemonic Peking leadership is anti-Soviet in its nature and dangerous to the cause of peace. The imperialist powers are attempting to disrupt the equilibrium in strategic arms that has been achieved between the socialist and capitalist systems, an equilibrium that operates as a decisive factor restraining imperialist aggression and corresponds to the interests of all the peoples of the world. "Anti-Sovietism and anti-communism," declares a resolution adopted by the Plenum of the CC CPSU, "are being used to accelerate the arms race, are being used as a weapon to attack not just the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, not just Communists, but all opponents of war, all peace-loving forces, as a means of subverting detente."<sup>9</sup> However, the CC CPSU also reaffirmed its conviction that there still exist in the world objective possibilities and socio-political forces capable of preventing a return to a new cold war and ensuring peaceful coexistence among states with different social structures, thus averting the threat of nuclear war. This aim can be achieved by negotiations conducted on the principles of equitability and equal security. Such an approach, noted the plenum, is entirely applicable to Soviet-American relations.

Given the present international situation, in which the adventurist activities of the USA and their confederates have increased the threat of war, the Plenum of the CC CPSU has set as one of its objectives the continuation of the policy formulated at the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU. This policy consists in strengthening the fraternal alliance of the socialist states by every possible means, supporting the just struggle for freedom and national independence, promoting peaceful coexistence, restraining the arms race, preserving and developing détente and mutually advantageous cooperation in the fields of economics, science and culture.

In one of its resolutions the Plenum also declared that the intrigues

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

of imperialists and other enemies of peace made it necessary to be constantly on the alert and to do everything possible to strengthen the defence capacity of the Soviet state in order to frustrate imperialist plans aimed at achieving military superiority and world hegemony.

The CPSU Central Committee also noted that in the present international situation the Soviet people had united more closely than ever around the Communist Party and gave their whole-hearted support to the domestic and foreign policy of the party and the state.

### **Securing the Basic Principles of Leninist Foreign Policy in the Constitution of the USSR**

The world-wide historical and progressive role of socialism in world politics and the vast experience of the Soviet Union in international affairs have found their concentrated and legislative expression in the Constitution of the USSR, promulgated on October 7, 1977.<sup>10</sup> The Constitution reflects the class nature of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and its social and political ideals.

In the preamble to the Constitution, promoting peace and international cooperation is named as one of the main objectives of the socialist state of the whole people. "Our new Constitution," declared Leonid Brezhnev in his report to the May (1977) Plenum of the CC CPSU, "is convincing proof of the fact that the first state of victorious socialism has permanently inscribed on its banner the word 'peace' as the supreme principle guiding its foreign policy, a policy that corresponds to the interests of both its own people and the people of the world."<sup>11</sup>

The Constitution proclaims that the foreign policy of the USSR is aimed at strengthening the position of world socialism, at supporting the struggle for national liberation and social progress, at preventing aggressive wars, at achieving general and complete disarmament and at consistently implementing the principles of peaceful coexistence among states with different social structures (Article 28). The Constitution particularly emphasises the role of the Soviet Union, the cornerstone of the world socialist system, in developing and strengthening friendship, cooperation and fraternal aid among the socialist countries on the basis of socialist internationalism, and its active participation in economic integration and the international socialist

<sup>10</sup> See *Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977.

<sup>11</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches and Articles*, Vol. 6, Moscow, 1978, p. 387 (in Russian).



division of labour (Article 30). Unswerving adherence to these principles serves to consolidate unity, to bring the fraternal countries and peoples ever closer together and to advance the world socialist system along the path of regular transition to ever higher forms of international intercourse and cooperation.

The Constitution of the USSR gives the force of law to the fundamental principles underlying relations between the Soviet state and other countries: sovereign equality; refusal by both sides to use force or the threat of force; the inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; non-interference in internal affairs; respect for human rights and basic freedoms; equality and the right of each people to decide its own destiny; cooperation between states; conscientious fulfilment of obligations springing from universally accepted norms of international law and international agreements concluded by the USSR (Article 29). The principle of peaceful coexistence among states with different social and political structures is a constitutional norm. The Constitution also gives clear expression to the obligations that the USSR assumed in accord with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Articles of the Soviet Constitution reveal the popular democratic nature of Soviet foreign policy and the coincidence of its aims with the interests of the peoples of other countries. "In developing on the Peace Programme of the 24th and 25th CPSU congresses," wrote Andrei Gromyko, "the Constitution sets new targets and lines of advance for Soviet foreign policy. It is directed to the further deepening and consolidation of the positive tendencies in present-day international life, and to turning detente into a continuous, ever more viable, universal, and irreversible process, to broad and mutually beneficial cooperation among peoples. With new strength it demonstrates the peaceable mission of socialism. The laconic language of the Constitution shows all mankind that the Soviet Union is a mighty and unconquerable bulwark of peace, a beacon illuminating the peoples' historical path of transition from capitalism to socialism."<sup>12</sup>

### Further Strengthening the Position of World Socialism

The second half of the 1970s saw a continuing increase in the strength of socialism, the expansion of the world revolutionary process

<sup>12</sup> Andrei Gromyko, "Soviet Foreign Policy: A Mighty Weapon of the Communist Party in the Struggle for Peace and Social Progress. Preface to the Book *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, in: Andrei Gromyko, *Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy. Articles and Speeches 1944-1980*, Progress Publishers, 1979, pp. 402-03.

and the activation of all progressive forces throughout the world.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries reflects the interests of all peoples and states striving for peace, democracy and social progress, which explains their growing role in deciding the major international problems facing mankind. With increasing vigour the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Soviet government are implementing their policy of further consolidating the socialist community, which is one of the most important factors contributing to peace and progress.

The socialist countries have achieved enormous successes in every sphere, both within the socialist community itself and in strengthening its position within the world, in increasing its influence on the entire historical process.

A large number of states in Asia, Africa and Central America have started to reshape their society on the basis of the principles of socialism. Colonialism and racism are suffering defeat in the south of Africa. A broad, revolutionary, anti-imperialist front is on the move in Central America. With increasing frequency the newly-liberated nations are striving to carry through a socialist-oriented socio-economic transformation of their country.

Against the background of growing general crisis within the capitalist system during the 1970s, the demand of the working people for radical social change, for socialism, is ever more clearly pronounced. Linked to this is the growing influence of the communist parties, who constitute a political force on a national scale, the vanguard of the working people of the nation. "Today no problem of international importance, no fundamental issue facing the modern world, can be decided without the communist movement, and particularly without its integral component—the ruling parties of the countries of the socialist community."<sup>13</sup>

In 1977, the world socialist system covered 26 per cent of the surface of the Earth and comprised roughly one-third of the population of the world. The economic development that took place in the countries of the socialist community during the second half of the 1970s, is evidence of their dynamic progress and of their new successes in various branches of the economy. The economy of the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance continued to develop apace. The national income of this powerful and monolithic core of world socialism increased by 62 per cent over the 1971-1979 period, while the volume of its industrial production grew by 79 per cent. These figures are double those of the developed capitalist countries.<sup>14</sup> CMEA accounts for 21 per cent of world electric power generation, 27 per cent of world coal and anthracite

<sup>13</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 1, 1980, p. 11.

<sup>14</sup> *Pravda*, June 23, 1980.

production, almost 20 per cent of world oil extraction, more than 28 per cent of world steel production, and 25 per cent of world mineral fertiliser production.<sup>15</sup> In 1979, the national income of the CMEA member countries was about 8 times higher than in 1950, while in the EEC national income was only just above 3 times higher. Whereas in 1950 the volume of industrial production in the CMEA countries was lower than that in the countries which are now members of the EEC, by 1980 the volume of industrial production in the CMEA was double that of the EEC.<sup>16</sup>

By the beginning of 1980, the member countries of the CMEA, with a population of just over 10 per cent of the total world population, accounted for roughly one third of world industrial production, one fifth of agricultural production and one quarter of the total world income.<sup>17</sup>

In the middle of the 1970s, the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance became a powerful economic body. In terms of absolute volume of production it has no equal.

The successes achieved by socialist and communist construction, the increase in the economic, scientific and technological potential of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, the consolidation of their collective defensive power and the strategic parity with the USA ensured by the Soviet Union have all served to alter the balance of forces on the international scene and strengthen the position and role of the socialist community.

The world fraternal community of the people of the socialist countries is a new type of international alliance. The socialist states are voluntarily developing amongst themselves a comprehensive form of cooperation based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international solidarity, respect for the equality and sovereignty of each state, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and fraternal mutual aid. The ideological unity and political solidarity of the fraternal countries has been put on a solid foundation. The mechanisms ensuring coordinated activity in foreign affairs are well established and function smoothly. Economic co-operation is developing rapidly. A long-term Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA member countries has been developed and is now being implemented. Ideological and cultural links are expanding.

“Strengthening the solidarity of the socialist countries and developing still further the ties of fraternal friendship between their Marxist-Leninist parties increases their united power and the influence of socialism on the course of international events. The community of

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 5, 1980, p. 39.

<sup>17</sup> *Pravda*, June 30, 1979, *International Affairs*, No. 5, 1980, p. 39.

socialist states is now the most dynamic economic force in the world and the main factor in international politics."<sup>18</sup>

### Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the Socialist Countries

Strengthening and expanding the many links between the USSR and the fraternal socialist countries and their joint contribution to the cause of peace and the struggle for freedom and national independence on the basis of socialist internationalism was and remains the main objective of Soviet foreign policy. "The exceptionally wide-ranging and constantly increasing cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries is a firm priority for our party and state in their foreign relations,"<sup>19</sup> emphasised Leonid Brezhnev. Cooperation between the fraternal parties of the socialist countries is the core of their relations in every sphere of public life and international politics.

Regular meetings and consultations among the leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist states are of particular importance in deciding upon agreed positions on foreign policy questions. Following the 25th Congress of the CPSU, such meetings and consultations took place during official visits, during the Berlin Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe, held in June 1976, and during the meetings of the Political Consultative Committee (PCC) of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. The documents of the communist parties underline the vital importance of close contacts at the highest level between the party and state leaders of the fraternal socialist countries.

Friendly meetings between Leonid Brezhnev and the leaders of the communist and workers' parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania which took place in the Crimea and Moscow in 1977, 1978-1979 and 1980 became an effective means of consolidating cooperation among the fraternal countries and coordinating their joint efforts to improve international relations and secure peace. Such meetings, commented Leonid Brezhnev, are "of utmost importance for the party, involving as they do our relations with our closest friends, allies and fellow fighters for common communist goals".<sup>20</sup>

During these meetings, the participants discussed current issues relating to the socio-economic life of their countries, exchanged

<sup>18</sup> "On the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution". A Resolution of the CPSU Central Committee, January 31, 1977, Moscow, 1977, pp. 16-17 (in Russian).

<sup>19</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, Moscow, 1979, p. 543 (in Russian).

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 475.

experience in the building of socialism and communism and discussed international affairs and trends in world development; agreement was reached on the main objectives of further joint activity and decisions were taken on the strategy and tactics of the socialist countries on the international scene. The complex problems arising in the process of developing and strengthening the community were also examined. The frankness, mutual understanding and friendly atmosphere characteristic of consultations among the leaders of the fraternal parties and states enabled these problems to be solved within the context of the interests of each socialist state, the common interests of the socialist community, the interests of all the forces of peace and progress and the cause of international security. These meetings between the leaders of the socialist community were highly appreciated by all the participating fraternal parties.

Comprehensive links between the party and state leaders of the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist countries are also achieved by means of regular exchange of official and friendly visits. After the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev went on friendly visits to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Other leaders of the CPSU and Soviet state also paid regular visits to the fraternal socialist states for consultations, exchange of experience and negotiations. In their turn, party leaders and heads of state from the fraternal socialist countries paid several visits to the Soviet Union. These visits provided the occasion for consultations and negotiations on carrying through the national economic plans on bilateral programmes for coordinating these plans over the long term and on joint activity with regard to wide range of international issues.

The socio-economic successes and the increasing effectiveness of the multifold cooperation among the states of the socialist community are inseparably linked with the creative, guiding activity of the Marxist-Leninist parties.

Regular meetings of the secretaries of the central committees of the communist and workers' parties on international and ideological issues have also helped to further strengthen inter-party links among the fraternal countries. Those taking part in such a meeting held in Budapest (February-March 1978) emphasised that the further expansion of cooperation "facilitates the examination of issues that are of common interest to all, and also assists the spreading of information about the socialist countries' achievements and their domestic and foreign policy".<sup>21</sup>

In his report to the All-Union Conference of Ideological Workers, Mikhail Suslov, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, insisted: "The conclusion drawn by the 25th

<sup>21</sup> *Pravda*, March 2, 1978.

congress about the growing unity in politics, economics and culture is being confirmed by the entire course of social development. This unity is revealed in the similarity of the main tasks in ideological work. The enthusiasm and interests that was shown in the resolution of the Central Committee on ideological work in the parties of the socialist community countries was eloquent testimony of this fact".<sup>22</sup>

The ideological and political unity of the countries of the socialist community was clearly demonstrated in the mass celebration in 1977 of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in the celebration in 1979 of such important dates as the 30th anniversary of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the GDR, and the 20th anniversary of the Cuban revolution, and in the celebration in 1980 of the 110th anniversary of the birth of Lenin, the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, the 35th anniversary of the defeat of nazi Germany and the 35th anniversary of the formation of the first workers' and peasants' state in Southeast Asia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

More than thirty years' experience in developing the socialist community, the steady strengthening and expansion of inter-party and inter-state links, the ideological unity and increasing solidarity of the fraternal countries all serve as irrefutable evidence of the historical superiority of real socialism as an international social system.

The unity of the fraternal socialist countries in their struggle for peace and international security finds its most concentrated expression in the activity of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Following the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the heads of state of the Warsaw Treaty member countries met several times at sessions of the Political Consultative Committee.

The meeting of Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Bucharest, November 25-26, 1976, was an important event in the life of the countries of the socialist community. The meeting reviewed major issues in international relations and the positive changes that had occurred on the international scene thanks to the agreed foreign policy being pursued by the fraternal countries. Great attention was paid to the problems of disarmament. The participants at the meeting expressed concern that militarist circles in the imperialist states were accelerating the arms race. During the meeting, the socialist countries unanimously opposed the division of the world into opposing camps and declared their readiness to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organisation simultaneously with the disbanding of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, with the first step being the disbandment of their military organisations. In addition to this proposal, they called upon all states not to engage in activity

<sup>22</sup> *Pravda*, October 17, 1979.

that could lead to the expansion of existing or the creation of new exclusive groupings and military-political alliances. The meeting adopted the declaration "For the Further Advancement of Detente and for the Consolidation of Security and the Development of Cooperation in Europe", which contained a comprehensive analysis of the international situation, pin-pointed the obstacles to detente and put forward proposals that meet the vital interests of the people of the world.

The meeting of the PCC in Bucharest also discussed the expansion of economic cooperation among states having opposing social systems. The member countries of the Warsaw Treaty affirmed the need to create conditions favourable for such cooperation on the basis of equality, justice and mutual advantage. They decisively rejected attempts by certain Western circles to use economic links as a means of exerting political pressure on other states, and condemned the policy of restricting trade with the socialist countries.

The declaration adopted at the Bucharest meeting of the PCC also expressed the willingness of the socialist countries to promote not only economic cooperation in Europe, but also cooperation in culture, science, education, information and personal contacts. The declaration also pointed out that certain circles in the West were attempting to use these links and contacts for purposes alien to mutual understanding and friendship, to interfere in the internal affairs of other states.<sup>23</sup>

The foreign policy proposals of the Soviet Union and the other member states of the Warsaw Treaty were clear evidence of the fact that it was the socialist states who are taking the initiative on the issue of improving relations between states with different social structures.

In order to further improve the machinery of political cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation in accord with Article 6 of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance dated May 14, 1955, the Bucharest meeting of the Political Consultative Committee adopted a decision to establish the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers' Committee as an organ of the PCC. The functions of this committee include an exchange of opinion and information on foreign policy issues, preparing recommendations for the PCC, drawing up proposals on carrying through the decisions of the PCC and also examining questions put before it by the PCC.<sup>24</sup>

The same resolution included the creation of a joint secretariat attached to the PCC, whose functions include the organisational and technical servicing of the work of the Political Consultative Com-

<sup>23</sup> See *The Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Member States. Bucharest, November 25-26, 1976*, Moscow, 1976, p. 18 (in Russian).

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, November 27, 1976.

mittee and the Foreign Ministers' Committee, and also carrying through work assigned to it by these organs.<sup>25-26</sup>

The next regular meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee was held in Moscow in November 22-23, 1978, at a time when positive changes in the world were accompanied by a noticeable increase in activity on the part of the forces of imperialism and reaction aimed at slowing down the process of detente and halting any further improvement in the international climate. In these circumstances it was important to decisively counter the imperialist policy of wrecking detente, accelerating the arms race and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries with a different policy, namely the collective efforts of the socialist countries to defend international peace, the legitimate rights of peoples struggling for national independence and social progress.

The Moscow Meeting of the PCC examined urgent issues relating to further developments on the European scene. There was also an exchange of opinion on certain international issues. The declaration adopted at the meeting calls upon all states and governments to increase their efforts to conclude negotiations on limiting and halting the arms race, and to further advance the cause of military detente in Europe. This appeal by the Moscow Meeting of the PCC became a programme for joint action not only for the fraternal socialist states, but also for all peace-loving and realistically-minded people throughout the world.

Demonstrating justifiable concern over the continuing intrigues by those opposed to peace and detente, the member states of the Warsaw Treaty examined the question of increasing the defence capacity of the fraternal countries.

Having reviewed the resolutions of the Moscow Meeting of the PCC, the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR specifically declared: "Given the continuing acceleration of the arms race by the member states of NATO, the Soviet Union considers it essential to preserve and strengthen the defence potential of the joint armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty."<sup>27</sup>

The members of the PCC stressed the importance of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation as a many-sided military-political alliance serving as a secure defensive shield for its members, the fraternal socialist states, and as a powerful factor in securing international peace.

A meeting of the Warsaw Treaty PCC was held in Warsaw on May 14-15, 1980. The participants reviewed the activity of the socialist defence alliance over the previous 25 years, discussed urgent problems and objectives in the struggle for detente and security in Europe and

<sup>25-26</sup> *Pravda*, November 27, 1976.

<sup>27</sup> *Pravda*, November 30, 1978.



peace throughout the world. The declaration adopted by the PCC provided a profound analysis of the contemporary international situation, and proposals were made concerning further measures to develop the process of political and military detente on the continent of Europe, halt the arms race and improve the international political climate.

In contrast to the dangerous policy being pursued by NATO, whose military organs were meeting in Brussels at the same time, the Warsaw Treaty states put forward a broad action programme to avert the threat of a renewal of the cold war and to channel events towards peace. "Washington is once more trying to talk to us in the language of cold war, as it did ten years ago," remarked Dmitry Ustinov, member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Minister of Defence. "However, this is a futile stratagem. The Soviet Union was not to be frightened in the past, and even less so is it to be frightened now. This country has the necessary self-restraint and her defensive capacity is secure."<sup>28</sup>

The Foreign Ministers' Committee enjoys considerable authority as an organ of the PCC and plays an important role in the joint diplomatic activity of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty. At regularly convened meetings (May 25-26, 1977 in Moscow; April 24-25, 1978 in Sophia; May 14-15, 1979 in Budapest; December 5-6, 1979 in Berlin; and October 19-20, 1980 in Warsaw) it discussed a wide range of foreign policy issues and, in accord with resolutions adopted by the PCC, put forward constructive proposals for securing and strengthening detente, halting the arms race and achieving disarmament, and for elaborating measures to extend European cooperation.

"The Warsaw Treaty Organisation," declared Andrei Gromyko, "is, and has always been, the main coordinating centre for the foreign policy of the fraternal countries. We do not hesitate to say that the foreign policy of the socialist states is a policy conducted by accord. We are proud of this, because our foreign policy derives its force precisely from the fact that all its important aspects are jointly elaborated and jointly carried out."<sup>29</sup>

Bilateral consultations and negotiations between Ministers for Foreign Affairs are a most effective means of consolidating and expanding joint action on the part of the states of the socialist community with a view to achieving a radical improvement in the international situation. Socialism in Europe is now more secure than ever, the joint foreign policy of the fraternal countries is having a beneficial effect on international relations, and European detente, now

<sup>28</sup> *Pravda*, February 22, 1980.

<sup>29</sup> Andrei Gromyko, "Report to a Meeting of Moscow Working People and Servicemen of the USSR Armed Forces on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty. 14 May 1975", in: Andrei Gromyko, *Lenin and the Soviet Peace Policy*, p. 286.

securely based, is expanding as never before. Cooperation among European states with different social structures serves as practical confirmation of the fact that peace is inseparably bound up with socialism, and that the more secure that position of socialism in Europe the more secure is the objective basis for peaceful relations among all the states of Europe.

Although the Warsaw Treaty is a regional organisation, the leaders of the fraternal countries could not but express concern during their talks and in their joint statements over the dangerous flash points created by the NATO countries, led by the USA, in other regions of the world. The member countries of the Warsaw Treaty are irrevocably committed to solidarity with peoples struggling for national liberation, and give their firm support to freedom and independence for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. "The influence of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation on international affairs," commented Andrei Gromyko, "reaches far beyond the limits of Europe, and this has become apparent to all, to the whole world."<sup>30</sup>

A relaxation of international tension is essential for Asia as it is for Europe and other regions of the world. In connection with this, Leonid Brezhnev, speaking during the Crimea meetings in 1980 with the leaders of fraternal parties and states, emphasised the necessity of a total refusal to use force or the threat of force and declared that friendship, joint action and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the fraternal socialist states of Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and People's Democratic Republic of Korea was a most important factor for peace and stability in Asia.

The CPSU and the Soviet government attach great importance to the further development of comprehensive and friendly cooperation with socialist countries who are not members of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, countries such as Yugoslavia, Cuba, Mongolia, Vietnam, the People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Laos and Kampuchea. The CPSU and the Soviet government are firmly in favour of developing relations with Yugoslavia in every sphere. This European country plays a prominent role in the non-aligned movement and in the struggle for peace and security.

The visit paid by Leonid Brezhnev to Yugoslavia in 1976 and the return visits paid by President Broz Tito in 1977 and 1979 marked a new stage in the development of friendly relations between the two countries. The documents signed during these meetings confirmed the intention of both sides to strengthen the ties of friendship between the peoples of the USSR and Yugoslavia, and defined concrete measures for further developing cooperation between the two parties and states. The Soviet-Yugoslav communiqué issued on November 17,

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 288.

1976 declares: "Friendly relations and wide-ranging cooperation continue to serve the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia and the cause of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism. Both sides once more express their determination to continue the development of comprehensive cooperation on the basis of equality between the USSR and the SFRY, between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and to constantly strengthen Soviet-Yugoslav friendship and mutual trust."<sup>31</sup>

Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Chairman of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, an outstanding leader of the Yugoslav people and a prominent member of the international communist and working-class movement, died on May 4, 1980. During a meeting with the Yugoslav leadership, Leonid Brezhnev, who headed the party and state delegation from the USSR, expressed on behalf of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Soviet government, the Soviet people and himself personally sincere condolences on the occasion of the heavy loss suffered by the Yugoslav people in the death of President Tito, and assured the people of Yugoslavia that in the Soviet Union they had a sincere and reliable friend. It has always been the wish of the Soviet people to see Yugoslavia united and prosperous country successfully building socialism."<sup>32</sup>

For their part, the Yugoslav leaders expressed the value they placed on Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation in every sphere, both between the states and between the parties. Both sides declared their firm resolve to expand cooperation both between the CPSU and the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and between the USSR and the SFRY.<sup>33</sup> On July 8-13, 1980, a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, headed by Vasily Kuznetsov, candidate member of the Politbureau of the CPSU Central Committee and First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia to discuss important questions relating to the development of Soviet-Yugoslav cooperation and a number of international problems. This visit greatly contributed to the successful all-round development of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and revealed their diversity and stability.<sup>34</sup>

The Soviet Union resolutely opposes the anti-Cuban policy being pursued by the USA and is giving socialist Cuba broad political, economic and other support. "We rejoice fraternally over the achievements of our Cuban comrades and heartily wish them complete

<sup>31</sup> *The Visit by Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, November 15-17, 1976: Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1976, p. 34 (in Russian).

<sup>32</sup> *Pravda*, May 8, 1980.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Pravda*, June 10, 1980.

success in their efforts to assure the flowering of the socialist Republic of Cuba",<sup>35</sup> reads the Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th Congress of the Party.

Soviet-Cuban links and contacts in every sphere, at both party and state level, have continued to develop. In September 1978, Fidel Castro, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and Chairman of the State Council and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, paid a visit to the USSR, to be followed, in February 1979, by Raul Castro, member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and First Deputy Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba. The Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Isodoro Malmierca Peoli visited the Soviet Union in April 1979, and Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, member of the Politbureau of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba and Deputy Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers, came in September of the same year. The Soviet party and government delegation headed by Pyotr Masherov, candidate member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and First Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Belyorussia, visited Cuba in July, to be followed in December by a Soviet party and state delegation headed by Grigory Romanov, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and First Secretary of the Leningrad regional committee of the CPSU, and other delegations.

The USSR fully supports the legitimate demands of the Cuban government that the American economic blockade be lifted, that flights by spy-planes over the sovereign territory of the Republic of Cuba be ended and that the marine base of Guantanamo, illegally retained and used by the USA, be returned to Cuba.

On September 16-18, 1980, at the request of the leadership of the Communist Party and government of Cuba, Andrei Gromyko paid an official friendly visit to Havana to have talks with Fidel Castro. Andrei Gromyko informed Fidel Castro of the preparations in the Soviet Union for the 26th Congress of the CPSU, and Fidel Castro spoke of arrangements in connection with the convocation of the 2nd Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba. Both sides placed a high value on the level of cooperation already achieved between the USSR and Cuba and the prospects for its further development on the basis of the Soviet-Cuban declaration signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro in 1974. The importance and fruitfulness of personal contacts between Soviet and Cuban leaders in developing wide-ranging cooperation between the two countries was noted, and in particular the meetings between Leonid Brezhnev and Fidel Castro, during which the two leaders discussed fundamental issues relating to Soviet-Cuban

<sup>35</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee...*, p. 12.

relations and the international situation. During the exchange of opinion on international issues, both sides strongly condemned the hostile policy of the USA towards Cuba, referred to the important role played by the United Nations in securing peace and international security and in the struggle for detente and disarmament, and discussed a number of issues relating to the work of the Thirty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly. Both sides also commented on the positive role of the non-aligned movement in the struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism, against colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism, and in the attempt to establish international economic relations based on equality.

On September 22, Raul Castro, member of the Politbureau and Second Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba, First Deputy Chairman of the State Council and the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba, arrived in the Soviet Union on a friendly visit and was received in the Kremlin by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. During their talks they exchanged views on urgent questions concerning Soviet-Cuban relations and the international situation.

The fraternal alliance and friendship between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic have also been strengthened. Speaking at the 17th Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in 1976, Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, First Secretary of the CC MPRP and Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, emphasised that the further development of Mongolia urgently required that the process of economic, political, cultural and ideological rapprochement between the Mongolia and the fraternal socialist countries, and in particular the Soviet Union, be intensified.<sup>36</sup>

In October 1976, a party and government delegation from the Mongolia, headed by Yu. Tsendenbal, visited the Soviet Union. During their talks in Moscow, the two sides examined the further rapprochement and socialist integration of the two countries. Joint documents, signed at the end of the meetings between the Soviet and Mongolian leaders, provide for the consistent expansion of cooperation between the USSR and the MPR in every sphere. In the course of the visit an agreement was signed regarding the border between the two countries, which was demarcated and established in 1980. The joint communiqué reads: "The USSR and the MPR, the CPSU and the MPRP are fully resolved to continue their historic work of strengthening the fraternal relations between the two countries, improving the forms and methods of Soviet-Mongolian cooperation, increasing its effectiveness and using to the full all reserves and possibilities

<sup>36</sup> Yu. Tsendenbal, *The Report of the CC of the MPRP to the XVIIth Congress of the MPRP*, Ulan Bator, 1976, p. 81 (in Russian).

in this area."<sup>37</sup>

During a meeting in the Crimea on August 18, 1980 between Leonid Brezhnev and Yumjaagiyn Tsendenbal, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP and Chairman of the Presidium of the People's Great Hural, it was noted that relations between the Soviet and Mongolian peoples are constantly being enriched by new forms of cooperation. The CPSU and the MPRP are collaborating fruitfully in politics and ideology, in the training of cadres and in other fields. During their discussions on international affairs, L. Brezhnev and Yu. Tsendenbal were particularly concerned with analysing the situation in Asia and reviewing joint activity in support of the peoples of Asia in their struggle for peace, social progress and independence.

The second half of the 1970s was marked by truly historic changes in Indochina. With international support from the USSR and the other fraternal countries, the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea won major victories in their struggle against the forces of imperialism, Chinese hegemonism and reaction.

The heroic struggle of the people of Vietnam, together with diplomatic activity carried through jointly with the countries of the socialist community, resulted in total victory over American imperialism. "The solution of the Vietnamese problem was found in the joint efforts of the fraternal socialist countries aimed at removing the sources of military conflict and achieving a relaxation of international tension."<sup>38</sup>

On July 2, 1976, a session of the National Assembly, elected by the whole population of the country, adopted a resolution to establish the united Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The formation of the SRV considerably strengthened the position of socialism of Indochina. Speaking at the session about the foreign policy of Vietnam, the General Secretary of the CC of the Vietnam Workers' Party, Le Duan, declared that the SRV would march side by side with the socialist countries and with all the peoples of the world struggling for peace, national independence, democracy and socialism.<sup>39</sup>

The 4th Congress of the Vietnam Workers' Party took place in Hanoi on December 14-20, 1976, and was attended by a delegation from the CPSU, headed by Mikhail Suslov, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC CPSU. The congress played an important role in consolidating the policy of building a socialist society in the SRV and of cooperating with the USSR and other states. It laid down the

<sup>37</sup> *The Visit by the Party and Government Delegation of the MPR to the Soviet Union, November 18-24, 1976: Documents and Materials*, Moscow, 1976, p. 62 (in Russian).

<sup>38</sup> *The History of Diplomacy*, Moscow, 1979, Vol. V, Book 2, p. 67 (in Russian).

<sup>39</sup> *Pravda*, July 26, 1976.

major objectives of national development for the years 1976-1980 and renamed the Vietnam Workers' Party the Communist Party of Vietnam.

In 1977, there were a large number of Soviet-Vietnamese meetings at party and state level, including talks between Soviet leaders and the Prime Minister of Vietnam, Pham van Dong, and the Minister of Defence, Vo Nguyen Giap.

On November 4, 1977, there was a friendly meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Le Duan and other Vietnamese leaders, who had come to the Soviet Union to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Having exchanged views on the future development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation in various spheres, the two sides expressed their satisfaction at the consistent implementation of the provisions of the Soviet-Vietnamese declaration of 1975<sup>40</sup> and affirmed the determination of their parties and countries to do all in their power to uphold the principles of peaceful coexistence and cooperation on the basis of equality, and to oppose all attempts on the part of imperialism and its accomplices to block positive changes on the international scene.<sup>41</sup>

In February 1978, a Soviet delegation headed by G.V. Romanov, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU, visited Vietnam, and in November of the same year a party and government delegation from the SRV, headed by Le Duan and Pham van Dong, visited Moscow. Following negotiations between the USSR and the SRV, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed, together with a number of agreements on further developing and strengthening economic and technical cooperation between the two countries, according to which the USSR is to assist Vietnam in building a number of important national economic projects.

In addition to wide-ranging material aid, the USSR renders active political and diplomatic assistance to the peoples of Indochina. The Soviet Union also gives wholehearted support to Vietnam in its opposition to the expansionist ambitions of the Peking hegemonists.

At the beginning of 1979 the Peking leadership, with encouragement from the USA, had recourse to military action to achieve its aggressive ambitions concerning Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea. Peking started an undeclared war against these three countries of Indochina, a war waged on all fronts—political propaganda, economic and military war. During the months of February and March a Chinese army of 600 thousand men attacked socialist Vietnam. The defeat of Chinese aggression is not only a great victory for the heroic people of Vietnam in the defence of their national independence, territorial

<sup>40</sup> On the Soviet-Vietnamese Declaration of 1975 see p. 454 of the present volume.

<sup>41</sup> *Pravda*, November 5, 1977.

sovereignty and the gains of socialism in Indochina, but is also evidence of the effectiveness of the principles of socialist internationalism as expressed in the firm support given to the just struggle of the Vietnamese people by the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community.

A further meeting between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders at the highest party and state level took place in the Kremlin on July 3, 1980. The two sides paid particular attention to questions concerning the current and future development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation. They also expressed their conviction that Soviet-Vietnamese friendship would play an increasingly important role in the years to come.

The leaders of the SRV gave their full support to the conclusions and proposals contained in the declaration adopted at the conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in May 1980. Having reviewed the international situation, the two sides declared that they would continue to expand and strengthen cooperation between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Vietnam, between the USSR and the SRV in the interests of the Soviet and Vietnamese people, the cause of peace, freedom and national independence in Asia and throughout the world.<sup>42</sup>

During the visit by a party and government delegation of the SRV to Moscow, an inter-governmental agreement was signed on cooperation between the two countries and also on conducting geological surveys and extracting oil and gas from the continental shelf of southern Vietnam.

"The communist parties, governments and peoples of our countries," reads the greeting sent by the Vietnamese leaders on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Soviet-Vietnamese economic cooperation, "are constantly strengthening and developing a sincere friendship which has its source in the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The signing of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and the Soviet Union opened a new and exceptionally important stage in the development of relations between our countries. Militant solidarity and comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union provides the people of Vietnam with new and inexhaustible strength in the economic development and ensures a reliable protection of their native land in its rebuff of the hostile policy of the ruling circles in Peking and the forces of imperialism."<sup>43</sup>

The Soviet Union provides continual and comprehensive aid to the revolutionary forces in Laos in their struggle against imperialism and reaction. The Prime Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic

<sup>42</sup> *Pravda*, July 4, 1980.

<sup>43</sup> *Pravda*, July 18, 1980.



(LPDR), Kaysone Phomvihane, has pointed out more than once that the Soviet and Laotian peoples conducted a common struggle against the imperialists, and this strengthened their friendship and militant solidarity. A joint Soviet-Laotian declaration made during a visit by a party and government delegation from the LPDR to the Soviet Union from April 19 to May 4, 1976, stated that the Soviet Union had made an invaluable contribution to the victory of the Laotian revolution. The declaration expressed sincere and deep gratitude to the CPSU, the government of the USSR and the fraternal Soviet people for this support and assistance.<sup>44</sup>

Speaking at the October (1976) Plenum of the CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev stressed that "*the victory of the patriotic forces of Laos... is another important event... We have every ground to say that in Laos the family of socialist states has gained another new member.*"<sup>45</sup>

During the period from 1976 to 1980, party and government delegations from the LPDR conducted negotiations on comprehensive cooperation with the leaders of the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Mongolia, the GDR and a number of other countries. The victory of the revolution offered the people of Laos wide-ranging possibilities for socio-economic development and for establishing the conditions for the transition to the socialist transformation of the country.

On August 14, 1980, a friendly meeting took place in the Crimea between L. Brezhnev and K. Phomvihane, General Secretary of the CC of the People's Revolutionary Party of Laos and Prime Minister of the LPDR, during which the two sides noted that Soviet-Laotian cooperation was developing successfully in every sphere. Work on coordinating the state plans of the USSR and the LPDR for the years 1981-1985 was being completed and the economic links between the two countries were being constantly strengthened. Having examined a wide range of international issues, the Soviet and Laotian leaders expressed their conviction that the peace-loving states had sufficient strength and influence to overcome the imposition of international tension and to stabilise the international situation, particularly in Southeast Asia.

The USSR views the policy of Laos with sympathy and understanding and is assisting the people of Laos in every sphere of the nation's life and activity.

The victory of the revolutionary patriotic forces in Kampuchea, which put an end to the rule of the anti-popular, pro-Peking clique of Pol Pot and Ieng Sari, the formation of the People's Republic of

<sup>44</sup> *Pravda*, May 5, 1976.

<sup>45</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 25, 1976*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 35.

Kampuchea in January 1979, and the national-democratic revolution in Laos, whose people have started to lay the foundations of a socialist society, are achievements made possible thanks to the fraternal solidarity of the peoples of Indochina and the comprehensive aid given by the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries discharging their international duty.

From the moment of its establishment, the Soviet Union has given the young republic of Kampuchea considerable political and diplomatic support, including at the United Nations, in its struggle to win international recognition and to thwart attempts by Peking and the USA to doubt the irreversibility of political development in Kampuchea and to impede the consolidation of the popular revolutionary powers in the country.

A delegation from the United Front for National Salvation (UFNS) and the People's Revolutionary Council of Kampuchea (PRCK), led by the Chairman of the CC UFNS and Chairman of the PRCK, Heng Samrin, paid an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union on February 3-11, 1980. Following Soviet-Kampuchean negotiations conducted at the summit level and in an atmosphere of comradely sincerity and mutual understanding, important documents, including a joint Soviet-Kampuchean declaration and an agreement on the delivery of goods from the USSR to Kampuchea in 1980, were signed. The delegation from the People's Republic of Kampuchea, declares the joint declaration, expressed its sincere gratitude to the Soviet Union for the considerable and unselfish support and aid given to the people of Kampuchea to restore the country, normalise the life of the people and expose the anti-Kampuchean intrigues of international reaction.<sup>46</sup>

The communiqué published following the meetings between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Kampuchea, Laos and Vietnam in Phnompenh on January 5, 1980, emphasises: "The great and strategically important victory won by their peoples in 1979 spells a still greater militant solidarity. Thanks to the powerful bonds of friendship between them and with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries," the communiqué continues, "this solidarity has made it possible to defeat all the aggressors and has tipped the balance of forces in Southeast Asia in favour of national independence and social progress."<sup>47</sup>

The USSR gives its unswerving support to the idea of establishing a peace zone in Southeast Asia.

In the course of meetings that took place in the Crimea in July-August 1980 between Leonid Brezhnev and the leaders of the countries of the socialist community, it was noted that the efforts being

<sup>46</sup> *Pravda*, February 12, 1980.

<sup>47</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 4, 1980, p. 26.

made by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea to transform Southeast Asia into a zone of peace and stability met the interests of all the peoples living in the area, and could not but receive energetic support on the part of the fraternal socialist states. At the same time, however, it was pointed out that the hegemonic policy being pursued by Peking with the support of the USA was impeding the establishment of a zone of peace and stability and the normalisation of relations among all the countries of the region. The issue of establishing a peace zone in Southeast Asia is an important component of the struggle against the forces of imperialism and hegemonism.

The Soviet state is pursuing a consistent policy of strengthening relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. In January 1977, the Premier of the Administration Council of the PDRK Pak Sung Chul paid a friendly visit to the Soviet Union. Among the topics discussed was that of the expansion of economic and trade links between the two countries and a number of agreements were signed.<sup>48</sup> Pak Sung Chul expressed sincere gratitude to the CPSU, the Soviet Union for their support in the just struggle of the Korean people for national liberation and socialism, for their support and solidarity in the struggle for a united Korea.<sup>49</sup>

In 1979, a delegation from the Workers' Party of Korea, led by Kim Yong Nam, member of the Political Committee and Secretary of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea, visited Moscow.

In May 1980, having come to Belgrade on the occasion of the funeral of Josip Broz Tito, Kim Il Sung, General Secretary of the CC of the Workers' Party of Korea, had a friendly business meeting with Leonid Brezhnev.

In October 1980, a delegation from the CPSU, led by V. V. Grishin, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, took part in the work of the 6th Congress of the Workers' Party of Korea and the celebrations marking the 35th anniversary of the founding of the WPK. Speaking at a Korean-Soviet friendship meeting, V.V. Grishin declared that Soviet-Korean relations were continuing to develop on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on July 6, 1961.

The USSR and the PDRK are conducting a common struggle for peace and socialism and are engaged in fruitful economic, political and cultural cooperation as two equal states.

The Soviet Union has several times expressed its readiness to resume normal relations with Albania. Speaking on this subject, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "As to our relations with *Albania*, we, as it is known, are prepared to store them and consider that there are no

<sup>48</sup> See *Pravda*, January 27, 1977.

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, January 26, 1977.

objective factors dividing us from that country.”<sup>50</sup>

The Soviet Union considers the situation existing between Albania and the USSR as abnormal and counter to the genuine interests of the peoples of both countries and the cause of socialism.

### Soviet Cooperation within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

The 25th Congress of the CPSU paid great attention to economic cooperation with the socialist states and its further development on the basis of mutual benefit and socialist internationalism. The Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1976-1980 set the following objective: “*To consistently develop and deepen all-round cooperation with socialist countries and contribute towards the consolidation of the world system of socialism.*”<sup>51</sup>

In the second half of the 1970s, the task of further implementing the long-term Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration was successfully carried through. This programme of integration underlies the fundamental and continuing process of unifying and consolidating cooperation among the member countries of the CMEA. The Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th Congress of the CPSU emphasises that this programme “raises cooperation among socialist countries to a much higher level than ordinary promotion of trade. For example, it means joint development of natural resources for common benefit, joint construction of large industrial complexes to meet the needs of all the partners, and cooperation between our countries’ enterprises and whole industries planned for many years ahead”.<sup>52</sup>

Since the adoption of the programme in 1971, economic cooperation between the USSR and the member countries of the CMEA has been further consolidated and economic coordination has been expanded.

The Soviet Union has always taken a most active part in the work of the annual sessions of the CMEA, putting forward constructive proposals for further developing economic, scientific and technological cooperation with the members of the CMEA.

During meetings between party and state leaders from the Soviet Union and those of the member countries of the CMEA, questions relating to the coordination of economic development plans were

<sup>50</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on October 25, 1976*, p. 36.

<sup>51</sup> *25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Documents and Resolutions*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1976, p. 44.

<sup>52</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 15.

discussed, and joint measures for improving the effectiveness of economic links were elaborated. The implementation of coordinated economic plans for the period 1976-1980 served to strengthen the inter-relationship between cooperation in the fields of production, science and technology and economic planning.

The entry of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam into the CMEA in 1978 was an important international event. The Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are sympathetic to the interest shown by Lao People's Democratic Republic, the People's Republic of Angola and Socialist Ethiopia in expanding both bilateral and multilateral cooperation with the CMEA member countries.

The Soviet Union considers as extremely important the first agreed plan for multilateral projects over the 1976-1980 period, adopted at the Berlin session of the CMEA, and also the proposal to elaborate joint long-term (10 to 15 years) target-oriented programmes for cooperation in the major branches of production.

The elaboration and adoption of such programmes in the second half of the 1970s marked a qualitatively new stage in cooperation among the socialist community countries. Such long-term, target-oriented programmes for cooperation are not only of economic but also of great political importance. The necessity of developing such programmes was noted at the 25th Congress of the CPSU, and this idea was fully supported by the congresses of the other communist and workers' parties of the CMEA member countries. The Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration and the long-term target-oriented programmes, which complement and develop the former, outline an agreed strategy to be followed in solving major economic tasks over the period up to 1990, and even beyond that date in a number of branches of the economy.

In 1978 and 1979, the CMEA approved five long-term target-oriented programmes for cooperation in energy, fuel and raw materials, agriculture and the food industry, machine-building, consumer goods and transport.

The 1970s were marked by increased cooperation between the USSR and the other members of the CMEA in solving key problems of economic development. Over the period from 1971 to 1979, the volume of trade between the CMEA member states doubled, to reach 111,000 million roubles.<sup>53</sup>

Integration made it possible to meet most import requirements in raw materials and fuel on long-term, planned basis. In 1979, the CMEA member countries were able to satisfy through mutual deliveries almost 71 per cent of their requirements in iron ore, 93 per cent of their requirements in coal, 94 per cent in coke and 68 per cent in

<sup>53</sup> *Pravda*, June 23, 1980.

oil.<sup>54</sup> This high level of self-sufficiency is a major advantage enjoyed by the members of the CMEA.

During the 11th five-year plan, the trade turnover of the USSR will increase by almost 40 per cent, and the supply of Soviet oil, despite increasing difficulty in production, will remain at the high 1980 level. In its turn, the Soviet Union will receive from the other countries of the CMEA machinery for the value of over 60,000 million roubles and consumer goods for the value of over 40,000 million roubles during the next five-year period.<sup>55</sup>

The Soviet Union and the fraternal countries are now dealing with a problem of historic importance, namely turning the 1980s into a period of intensive cooperation in production, science and technology. This will involve carrying through the long-term target-oriented cooperation programmes, which contain about 340 different measures, including those in the field of science and technology, which will be implemented on the basis of multilateral and bilateral agreements.<sup>56</sup> With a view to the practical implementation of these measures, on May 1, 1980, the Soviet Union signed long-term programmes for the development of specialisation and cooperation in production with Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

The socialist form of the international division of labour is being formed and consolidated within the framework of the CMEA. In developing the Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration, the long-term target-oriented cooperation programmes determine the concrete plans of joint action by the fraternal countries to ensure the efficient expansion of interconnected production complexes, which play a decisive role in their all-round economic development. The measures provided for in the long-term target-oriented cooperation programmes are designed to satisfy the future requirements of the CMEA countries, primarily by means of the full exploitation of all the resources of each fraternal country and the community as a whole. Particular attention is being paid to equalising the level of economic development among the fraternal countries and assisting the rapid economic development of Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam.

At the 33rd session of the CMEA it was noted that, in carrying through the long-term target-oriented programmes, assisting the economically less developed countries of the community—Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam—to raise their economic level was a matter of principle, the international task of the community.<sup>57</sup> A modern industrial base is being formed in these countries with economic and

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> *Pravda*, June 18, 1980.

<sup>56</sup> *Pravda*, April 28, 1980.

<sup>57</sup> *Economic Cooperation among the CMEA Member Countries*, No. 4, 1979, pp. 71-72.

technical aid from the USSR and the other member states of CMEA. A number of important economic projects (including those to which the People's Republic of China treacherously ended its technical assistance) are being constructed in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. In his speech at the 33rd session of the CMEA, Pham van Dong declared: "At the new stage of the revolution in our country, efforts to strengthen the solidarity and the close all-round cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries are of exceptional importance. Our Party and State regard this as their principle policy."<sup>58</sup> Speaking at the 79th session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA in Cuba, Fidel Castro stressed that "relations between the Soviet Union and Cuba as regards political and military support, in trade and technical cooperation and in accelerating the development of the country will remain a page without parallel in the history of relations between large and small countries."<sup>59</sup>

The Soviet Union is the major partner of the fraternal countries in implementing the programme of socialist economic integration. Referring to this in his welcoming speech at the 33rd session of the CMEA, the Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, declared: "With due respect for the activities of every fraternal country within the CMEA, we should like to emphasise the Soviet Union's role as the natural core and prime mainspring of the integration processes."<sup>60</sup>

The development of large-scale production in the countries of the socialist community presupposes a production output that exceeds internal requirements, and therefore the powerful, multi-sectoral economic complex of the USSR with its vast internal market acquires yet greater significance. The USSR is the chief consumer of the industrial export produce of the fraternal countries. The planned and stable Soviet market and large-scale import and export links with the Soviet Union in production, science and technology actively promote the industrial export production in the countries of the socialist community. Commenting on the beneficent effect of this factor on the economic development of Hungary, Janos Kadar stressed in the Report of the CC to the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party: "It is vitally important to us that we can export to the USSR a large quantity of produce on the basis of long-term agreements. This ensures the reliability and profitability of our national economy."<sup>61</sup>

Speaking at the 12th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, A. P. Kirilenko, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of

<sup>58</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 2, 1980, p. 12.

<sup>59</sup> *Economic Cooperation among the CMEA Member Countries*, No. 1, 1977, p. 6.

<sup>60</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 2, 1980, p. 12.

<sup>61</sup> *Pravda*, March 25, 1980.

the CC CPSU, declared: "We have a tried and tested route, in following which the socialist countries are assured of reaching new heights and achieving development in every sphere. This route is socialist economic integration. We also have a viable instrument of collective cooperation that works in the interests of each fraternal country and the community as a whole. This instrument is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance."<sup>62</sup>

During the more than 30 years that the CMEA has existed, world economics has undergone a radical change, as have the position and role of the socialist countries in international economic relations. During these three decades the national income of the CMEA member countries has increased 9.5 times, and industrial production has increased 15-fold.<sup>63</sup>

The last ten years were particularly fruitful. During this period the CMEA member countries doubled their industrial potential and their mutual trade turnover more than tripled.<sup>64-65</sup> The joint plan of comprehensive measures of economic integration over the 1976-1980 period, which envisaged the carrying through of major economic projects valued at around 9,000 million roubles, was successfully completed. A number of these projects—the Soyuz gas pipeline, which started to operate at its planned power level in 1979, LEP-750 Vinnitsa (USSR)—Albertirsa (Hungary) electric power transmission line, the first sections of the Kiembai mining and concentrating asbestos combine and the Erdenet mining and concentrating copper-molybdenum combine (Mongolia)—are already in operation. Rapid progress was made in the construction of a nickel plant in Cuba and the Ust-Ilim cellulose plant in the USSR, and large new industrial installations for smelting iron-bearing raw materials and ferroalloys have been built in other CMEA countries. The collective experience gained indicates the way towards new forms of cooperation in production.

The organisation of an integrated power system, Mir, is one of the major achievements of wide-ranging cooperation among the CMEA member countries in the field of energy supply. The main component in satisfying the energy requirements of the CMEA countries is the development of a network of atomic power stations. Such stations are already operating in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the GDR, Hungary and the USSR.

In contrast to the capitalist system, the socialist economic system makes it possible to plan the rational use of raw materials and fuel on a national scale and also in the context of economic integration, to take measures to develop new sources at the appropriate time and to

<sup>62</sup> *Pravda*, March 25, 1980.

<sup>63</sup> *Pravda*, April 28, 1980.

<sup>64-65</sup> *Ibid.*



concentrate scientific and industrial resources on the creation of new energy sources.

A clear example of the successes achieved by the joint efforts of the CMEA countries in developing science and technology is provided by the Interkosmos programme, which has started a chronicle of space flights around the Earth by international space crews whose members come from various socialist states. Cosmonauts from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Cuba, the GDR, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Romania, Mongolia worked successfully alongside Soviet cosmonauts in orbit around the Earth.

The progress achieved by the CMEA member states and their experience in cooperation is assuming global significance insofar as they are exercising a growing influence on the restructuring of the system of international economic relations and on world politics. CMEA has established contacts with 60 international organisations. A number of states have concluded cooperation agreements with CMEA, as a result of which business links between CMEA and Finland, Iraq, Mexico, Angola, Afghanistan, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia and other countries have expanded over recent years. The CMEA countries are giving economic and technical assistance to 86 developing countries, thanks to which over 3 thousand projects have been built in these states and a further 1.5 thousand are either under construction or planned.

The countries of the socialist community are using their powerful economic potential to strengthen peace. Their determination to pursue a policy of peace and good neighbourliness was revealed in the initiative taken by the CMEA to conclude an agreement between the CMEA, on the one hand, and the EEC, on the other, to promote the development of trade and economic cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in the spirit of the Final Act of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

The presence of representatives of a number of non-member countries at sessions of the CMEA is evidence of its increasing international prestige and of the consistent implementation by the fraternal parties of a policy of broad equitable cooperation with all states on the basis of equality and in the name of peace and friendship between people.

### **The Struggle of the Soviet Union and the Entire Socialist Community for Peace and Disarmament and for International Detente**

Disarmament has become the burning international issue of the day. Having described it as the most important problem requiring immediate action, the 25th Congress of the CPSU put before Soviet

diplomacy the task of working "for the termination of the expanding arms race, which is endangering peace, and for transition to reducing the accumulated stockpiles of arms, to disarmament".<sup>66</sup> The directives issued by the party congress determined the basic objectives of Soviet diplomacy with regard to disarmament and stimulated new major Soviet initiatives in this field. Explaining the Soviet position, Leonid Brezhnev, speaking in Prague on May 31, 1978, declared: "There is no such armaments that the Soviet Union is not prepared to limit and to prohibit on the basis of reciprocal agreement with other states."<sup>67</sup>

As a result of the efforts made by the Soviet Union, the other socialist states, and all progressive and peace-loving forces, and despite the influence brought to bear by military circles in the West, a number of agreements limiting the arms race in specific areas were signed towards the end of the 1970s. Following the 25th CPSU Congress major documents were signed, including the Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (May 1976), the Soviet-French Accord on the Prevention of Accidental or Unsanctioned Use of Nuclear Weapons (July 1976), the Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Technique (May 1977), the Soviet-French Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (June 1977), the Soviet-British Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War (October 1977). The agreement reached in the summer of 1979 between the USSR and the USA on the prohibition of radiological weapons was viewed favourably throughout the world. A measure of progress was achieved in the autumn of 1979 during the United Nations conference on prohibiting or limiting the use of certain types of conventional arms which can be considered particularly destructive or have unforeseen effects, and also during the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Commenting on the important international significance of the Convention of the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Technique, based on a proposal put forward by the Soviet Union, A.A. Gromyko declared that a "new step had been taken towards strengthening peace and security and preserving the environment".<sup>68</sup>

Certain factors in the international situation and tendencies that have revealed themselves in the development of the imperialist countries in the second half of the 1970s, make the problem of disarmament yet more urgent and acute while also making it essential to

<sup>66</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee...*, p. 44.

<sup>67</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles, and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 353 (in Russian).

<sup>68</sup> *Pravda*, May 19, 1977.

increase efforts to find a solution. A wide-ranging programme of disarmament was advanced in a Soviet memorandum on halting the arms race and achieving disarmament, which was put before the Thirty-First Session of the UN General Assembly on September 28, 1976. This document stated: "The Soviet Union, guided by the foreign policy programme of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, once more appeals to all the member states of the United Nations and all states throughout the world to increase their efforts to find a solution to the most wide-ranging and important problem in modern international relations, the problem of halting the arms race and achieving disarmament."<sup>69</sup> The memorandum touched upon all the issues involved in disarmament: halting the nuclear arms race, limiting and then destroying nuclear weapons, prohibiting nuclear weapons tests, strengthening the statute of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, prohibiting and destroying chemical weapons, prohibiting the creation of new types and systems of mass destruction, reducing armed forces and conventional armaments, creating a peace zone in the Indian Ocean and other regions of the world, reducing military budgets. The memorandum also emphasised Soviet support for the convening of a world conference on disarmament and a special session of the UN General Assembly on this question.

On November 3, 1977, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR issued an appeal "To the Peoples, Parliaments and Governments of All the Countries of the World", which called upon them "to do everything possible to halt the arms race, to prohibit the creation of new means of mass destruction, to limit arms and armed forces and to move towards disarmament".<sup>70</sup>

In a speech delivered at a meeting to mark the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, Leonid Brezhnev addressed Western political leaders and proposed that they agree on a simultaneous halt to the production of nuclear arms and the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and that a moratorium be declared on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

In the second half of 1977, as a result of the creation of a new type of nuclear weapon—the neutron bomb, the problem of averting the danger of its production became most acute. The Soviet Union resolutely opposed US plans to produce a neutron bomb. "We propose," declared Leonid Brezhnev on December 24, 1977, in answer to questions put by a *Pravda* correspondent, "reaching agreement on the mutual renunciation of the production of the neutron

<sup>69</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament. A Collection of Documents*, Moscow, 1977, pp. 246-47 (in Russian).

<sup>70</sup> *Pravda*, November 4, 1977.

bomb so as to save the world from the advent of this new mass annihilation weapon".<sup>71</sup> Leonid Brezhnev warned imperialist circles that if the bomb were produced, the USSR would be obliged to respond in order to guarantee the security of the Soviet people, their allies and friends. On March 9, 1978, in an attempt to speed up the start of negotiations on a mutual refusal to produce neutron arms, the USSR and the other socialist countries put before the Geneva Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons, which then became the basis for negotiations on prohibiting this type of armament.

The firm position adopted by the Soviet Union and the campaign that started in many countries against the creation of neutron arms had a restraining effect upon the US administration. On April 8, 1978, President Carter announced his decision to postpone the production of neutron arms. However, in this as in many other issues, the Carter Administration proved inconsistent: the USA began production of the basic components of neutron arms.

One of the objectives set by the Peace Programme is the conclusion of an international agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. As is well known, as early as 1975 a Soviet draft treaty on this issue was laid before the UN. The Soviet-American Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, concluded on May 28, 1976, and the protocol to this treaty represented a step forward in this direction.<sup>72</sup> On May 18, 1978, the USSR signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco).<sup>73</sup> This was an important step taken by the Soviet Union in accord with its fundamental policy of reducing the threat of nuclear war.<sup>74</sup>

Another major objective of Soviet diplomacy is achieving firmer control over the spread of nuclear arms, a necessary step in view of the fact that a considerable number of UN member states have not yet signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968. By October 1, 1979, of the 152 member states of the UN, 45 states have not yet signed, including two nuclear powers and a number of "near nuclear" states.<sup>75</sup>

The Soviet proposal to prohibit the deployment of nuclear arms in the states having no such weapons on their territory, and to conclude an international convention further guaranteeing the security of

<sup>71</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, Novosti Press Agency, Moscow, 1978, p. 214.

<sup>72</sup> *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 159-83 (in Russian).

<sup>73</sup> From the name of the section of Mexico City where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is located.

<sup>74</sup> *Pravda*, May 19, 1978.

<sup>75</sup> *International Affairs*, No. 4, 1980, p. 81.

non-nuclear states was put before the 33rd General Assembly of the United Nations with a view to establishing firmer control over the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union has put a number of important proposals before the UN: in 1976, a proposal for a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and a Treaty not to Be the First to Use Nuclear Weapons; in 1978, a proposal to sign an Agreement on Averting the Danger of Nuclear War and adopt a Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Detente; in 1978, a proposal to reduce by equal amounts the military budgets of states with a large economic and military potential. The implementation of these proposals would be a major contribution to solving the problem of disarmament.

Soviet foreign policy in the field of arms race limitation and disarmament is being carried through in close cooperation with other socialist countries. The Soviet Union was actively involved in preparations for the UN Special Session on Disarmament (May 23-June 30, 1978), which was a landmark in the history of the struggle for disarmament. The speech made by Andrei Gromyko to the special session and the document "Practical Ways of Halting the Arms Race", presented on behalf of the Soviet delegation, contained Soviet proposals on the main aspects of disarmament. Soviet proposals contained in the Peace Programme were the focal point of discussions during the special session of the UN General Assembly and were included in the final document approved by the session. The results of the work of the special session once more revealed that the leaders of a number of prominent NATO members, and primarily the USA, did not wish to adopt a constructive approach to the problem of disarmament. Even as the UN Special Session on Disarmament was meeting in New York, the NATO Council was meeting in Washington where, under pressure from the Carter Administration, it adopted a long-term armaments programme. "In fact, therefore," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "the NATO countries conduct 'real politics' in Washington, and take part in the New York discussions merely for the sake of appearance, in order not to be subjected to justifiable criticism and condemnation."<sup>76</sup>

In agreement with the resolutions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the USSR considered as particularly important the rapid conclusion of preparatory negotiations with the USA on a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2)<sup>77</sup>.

The preparation of the SALT-2 Treaty was at the centre of talks from 1977 to 1979 between Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko

<sup>76</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 380 (in Russian).

<sup>77</sup> See L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee...*, pp. 34-35.

and high-ranking US representatives on limiting the deployment of the most dangerous and destructive types of weapons and then conducting further negotiations on the reduction of armaments. An exchange of views on this question took place during a visit to Moscow by the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (March 28-30, 1977). However, instead of adopting a constructive approach to the issues involved and taking into account the interests of both sides, the American side put forward proposals that represented a step backwards with regard to previous agreements, and attempted to revise the commitments undertaken by the USSR and USA at Vladivostok (November 1974). The Soviet side insisted on the consistent application in SALT-2 of the principle of equality and equal security. It rejected proposals put forward by Vance and designed to give an advantage to the USA to the detriment of the USSR.

SALT-2 negotiations were continued in Geneva (May 18-20, 1977) between Andrei Gromyko and Cyrus Vance, and then in Washington (September 22-23, 1977) between Andrei Gromyko on the one hand and President Carter and Cyrus Vance on the other. During these negotiations, the American side tried to alter to its advantage, and even call in question, the agreements previously reached and to link SALT-2 with other political problems in order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union. "The truth of the matter is," pointed out Leonid Brezhnev on April 7, 1978, "that the US administration is vacillating and inconsistent and has one eye on those circles who were opposed to the agreement from the beginning and who are doing everything in their power to wreck it and have a free hand for and uncontrolled nuclear arms race."<sup>78</sup>

The Soviet diplomacy had to exert considerable effort to re-direct the Soviet-American negotiations to the Vladivostok accords. During the negotiations it was decided to extend the Interim Agreement Between the USSR and the USA on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, which had been signed on May 26, 1972, and was due to expire on October 3, 1977.

As a result of negotiations between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, and President Carter, a Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms Limitation was signed by the two countries in Geneva on June 18, 1979. The basis of the treaty is a quantitative limitation of arms and an agreement to refrain from qualitative improvement. This document represents a sensible compromise that recognises the interests of both sides and was drawn up according to the principle of equality and equal security. Fulfilment of the terms accepted by both sides is subject to reliable checks. Explaining the

<sup>78</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 265 (in Russian).

international significance of the treaty, the *Pravda* newspaper wrote that, if it were ratified and put into effect, it "would open the way to SALT-3 and stimulate more rapid progress in negotiations on other questions relating to limiting competition in the military sphere..."<sup>79</sup>

SALT-2 received wide support throughout the world and was seen as a major contribution to detente and disarmament. Nonetheless, influential circles in the USA who favour a continuation of the arms race began attempts to block its ratification immediately after it had been signed. On January 4, 1980, under the influence of these circles, President Carter announced the "freezing" of the ratification of SALT-2, a move that provoked wide criticism throughout the world and a negative reaction from America's allies, who considered that the treaty served not only the interests of Soviet and US security but also reduced international tensions.

The Soviet Union is consistently and resolutely pursuing a policy aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament. Over the period from 1946 to 1977, the USSR has put forward over one hundred proposals on different aspects of disarmament.<sup>80</sup>

Between 1978 and 1980, the USSR continued negotiations with the USA on various issues involved in disarmament: on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons; on the prohibition of the creation of new types and systems of mass destruction (radiological weapons) and on the progress achieved by both sides in implementing the Soviet-American treaty of May 26, 1972, on limiting anti-ballistic missile systems; on the problem of limiting the international trade in conventional weapons. The Soviet and American delegations also discussed questions relating to the limitation of certain types of activity directed against targets in space and incompatible with peaceful relations between states. Negotiations involving the USSR, the USA and Britain were held with a view to drawing up a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Despite the deterioration of the international situation, negotiations on various aspects of disarmament are continuing. The Geneva Committee on Disarmament recommenced work in February 1980. The second international conference reviewing the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Arms took place in August 1980, in Geneva. However, due to the unconstructive position adopted by the West, no major progress has been made on the questions of disarmament.

Soviet-American negotiations on a gradual cessation of military activity in the Indian Ocean, broken off unilaterally by the Ameri-

<sup>79</sup> *Pravda*, June 20, 1979.

<sup>80</sup> *The History of Diplomacy*, Vol. 5, Book 2, p. 321 (in Russian).

cans, have not yet restarted. At the 34th session of the UN General Assembly, Andrei Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union is making every effort to renew these negotiations. "Such an agreement," he stated "would undoubtedly serve to give substance to the idea and would have a positive effect upon the international situation as a whole."<sup>81</sup>

Another major initiative in the field of disarmament was a letter from Andrei Gromyko handed to the UN Secretary-General, Kurt Waldheim, on April 11, 1980. This document contained a realistic programme of measures covering virtually all the aspects of the problem of ending the arms race and disarmament and indicated the main objectives requiring particular attention over the next few years. These measures, if implemented, "would give substance to the second decade of disarmament... would be of historic importance in the struggle for peace on Earth"<sup>82</sup>

In a declaration published in May 1980, the Warsaw Treaty PCC emphasised that in carrying through practical measures to limit armaments and halt the arms race, the immediate tasks were: the ratification of the SALT-2 Treaty; the successful conclusion of negotiations on a complete and general ban on nuclear weapon tests; the prohibition of radiological and chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons; an agreement not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not having such weapons on their territory, and not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of states where none are sited at present. The Warsaw Treaty member states called upon all state leaders, governments, parliaments and public organisations aware of their responsibility to their own people and the peoples of the world to concentrate their efforts on such major objectives as a universal agreement on the non-use of force, the halting of the production of nuclear weapons and the reduction of stocks of such weapons as far as their total elimination, the prohibition of the creation of new types and systems of mass destruction. These and other measures are meant to prevent a new world war. The countries of the socialist community also called for efforts to be made to reach agreement in the negotiations being conducted on the limitation and halting the arms race, to renew negotiations that have been suspended or broken off, and to re-examine the question of limiting and reducing military presence and activity in such regions as the Atlantic, the Indian and the Pacific oceans, the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.

The participants at the PCC meeting revealed their concern to ensure a peaceful future for the peoples of the world in a special statement which proposed that summit meetings be held between state leaders from all the regions of the world with a view to eliminat-

<sup>81</sup> *Pravda*, September 26, 1979.

<sup>82</sup> *Pravda*, April 13, 1980.



ing flash points and preventing war.<sup>83</sup>

The struggle being waged by the USSR to slow down the arms race and achieve genuine disarmament answers the vital interests not only of the Soviet people but of all the peoples of the world. "The most urgent and acute problem facing mankind today," commented Leonid Brezhnev, "is halting the arms race and preventing a nuclear world war."<sup>84</sup> The memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security", put before the 35th session of the UN General Assembly declares that the threat of war can be removed by taking radical measures for global disarmament, but it can also be considerably reduced by limiting and halting the arms race in specified areas. Moreover, the threat of war can and must be eliminated in certain regions of the world, and particularly in Europe.<sup>85</sup>

Achieving security and peaceful cooperation in Europe has always been one of the major objectives of Soviet foreign policy and the foreign policy of the socialist community.

In their relations with the states participating in the European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are particularly anxious to preserve and develop the progress achieved in European detente over the last ten years. They are resolutely striving to achieve the consistent implementation of all the principles and clauses of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, and particularly those principles which the states participating in the conference agreed to adhere to in their relations with each other. The socialist states are firmly resolved to work together with all peace-loving countries and groups to defend the policy of detente and transform it into a continuous and comprehensive process, universal in its dimensions. They are prepared to develop and consolidate their relations with all the countries of Europe.

The 25th Congress of the CPSU placed great importance on the implementation of the clauses of the Final Act. In the report to the Congress Leonid Brezhnev emphasised: "The main thing now is to translate all the principles and understandings reached in Helsinki into practical deeds."<sup>86</sup>

The first major step towards implementing the Final Act was the conference in Belgrade (October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978) of representatives of the states taking part in the European Conference, during which there was a broad exchange of opinion on putting the Final Act into practice and on the objectives formulated at the Helsinki Confer-

<sup>83</sup> *Pravda*, May 16, 1980.

<sup>84</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 623 (in Russian).

<sup>85</sup> *Pravda*, September 26, 1980.

<sup>86</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...* p. 32.

ence. Increasing security and developing cooperation in Europe were also discussed. Explaining the purpose for which the USSR had come to the meeting in Belgrade, Leonid Brezhnev declared in his speech made on March 21, 1977 "We, for our part, want a constructive and meaningful discussion... by sovereign partners.... We consider, therefore, that concern for peace and security in Europe, for developing cooperation between the nations of Europe, should be the main content of the Belgrade meeting."<sup>87</sup>

Another major diplomatic initiative on the part of the USSR and the other socialist states was the plan of action put before the Belgrade meeting with a view to strengthening military detente in Europe. This plan contained certain fundamental proposals, such as an agreement not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, an agreement not to extend the military-political alliances opposing each other in Europe by admitting new members, and increasing measures to develop mutual trust. The Soviet delegation stressed the importance of supplementing political detente with military detente, and proposed that all the questions involved in military detente be discussed in the near future at special consultative meetings to be attended by all the states participating in the European conference.

The Belgrade Conference was characterised by a stubborn diplomatic battle between the delegations from the USSR and the other socialist countries, on the one hand, and the delegations from the USA and certain other Western countries, on the other. Attempting to arrogate the "right" to impose its own laws and methods on other countries, and to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist states, the American delegation directed its activity to formenting a psychological battle by means of slanderous speechifying on the so-called human rights issue. The aim of this activity was a return to confrontation and the halting of the process of cooperation that began at Helsinki. The delegations from the USSR and the other socialist countries gave a decisive rebuff to these activities on the part of the US representatives. The majority of those participating in the Belgrade Conference adopted a constructive approach to the problem of further developing detente and cooperation in Europe.

The final document adopted at the conclusion of the Belgrade Conference indicated the course to be taken in strengthening detente, European security and cooperation. The representatives of the states taking part in the conference, declares the document, "have confirmed the determination of their respective governments to fulfil unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally all the provisions

<sup>87</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *The Trade Unions—an Influential Force of Soviet Society. Speech at the 16th Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR. March 21, 1977.* Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1977, p. 33.

of the Final Act”<sup>88</sup>

The wide-ranging measures adopted on specific issues agreed upon at the Belgrade Conference were a useful contribution to the development of cooperation in Europe. These included conferences of experts to elaborate a generally acceptable method of solving disputes peacefully, to prepare an all-European forum of scholars and to consider economic, scientific, technological and cultural cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The All-European Forum of Scholars, which was held in accord with agreements reached in Belgrade and which took place in Hamburg in February 1980, played a significant role in helping to expand scientific cooperation among the countries of Europe in the name of peace and progress.

Another important move towards implementing the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act was the Summit All-European Conference on Cooperation in Environmental Protection, which took place in Geneva on November 13-15, 1979 and was attended by representatives of the European countries, the USA and Canada. In his greetings to the conference participants, Leonid Brezhnev affirmed the willingness of the USSR to “further develop cooperation with other countries in the sphere of environmental protection. This includes cooperation within the framework of the UN Economic Commission for Europe, under whose auspices this conference is being held.”<sup>89</sup>

On November 13, 1979, the USSR and the other countries taking part in the conference signed a convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, which contains a number of practical measures designed to reduce the spread of polluted air across the frontiers of European states. According to a resolution adopted by the conference, the participating countries agreed to develop cooperation in this sphere prior to the convention coming into force. A third document—a conference declaration—contains recommendations on the development and application of pollution-free technology with a view to preserving the environment and putting natural resources to rational use.

Both the conference and the documents it adopted represent the practical implementation of the clauses of the Helsinki Final Act and serve to create a basis for fruitful international cooperation in the sphere of environmental conservation, which is vitally important both for the peoples of Europe and for mankind as a whole.

The Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, which met on December 5-6, 1979, affirmed in its communiqué the socialist countries’ determination to “conduct their relations with all the participants in the European Conference, and with all the countries of the world, according to the principles of international

<sup>88</sup> *Pravda*, March 11, 1978.

<sup>89</sup> *Pravda*, November 14, 1979.

relations proclaimed at the highest level in the Helsinki Final Act".<sup>90</sup>

Ensuring peace and security on the continent of Europe, a region of key strategic importance in which the most powerful armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries are concentrated, is one of the most important issues in international relations today. Leonid Brezhnev remarked: "Secure peace in Europe is, without any doubt, one of the decisive factors in preventing a new world war."<sup>91</sup> The Soviet government considers that the questions involved in increasing trust among the European countries and reducing the concentration of arms and armed forces are such that "they should be examined in all their diversity and complexity at a special forum—a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. The member states of the Warsaw Treaty have proposed that such a conference be convened in Warsaw."<sup>92</sup> The Soviet Union suggested that negotiations at this forum be conducted in stages, proceeding from simpler to more complex measures. In the first stage, the conference could concentrate on elaborating measures to increase mutual trust (notification of major military manoeuvres, air force and navy training, the movement of land forces, a reduction in the scale of military training, etc.), insofar as there already exists a certain degree of experience in this field and the positions of the two sides are very close, if not identical. In the next stage the conference could look at the questions of disarmament. The Soviet side also considers it essential that such a conference should discuss political, and contractual and legal questions, together with certain Soviet proposals relating to lessening the danger of war and to guaranteeing security in Europe. At the same time, the Soviet Union declared that it is always prepared to consider proposals by other countries concerning the organisation and subject matter of such a conference.<sup>93</sup>

This question was discussed during the Soviet-French negotiations that took place in Paris in April 1980 during a visit by Andrei Gromyko. The USSR and France agreed that the first stage should be a conference on measures to develop mutual trust, followed by a conference to discuss disarmament.

According to an agreement recorded in the final document of the Belgrade Conference, the next meeting of the states participating in the European Conference opened on November 11, 1980 in Madrid. The USSR and all the countries of the socialist community actively took part in the preparations for this meeting. On November 6, 1980, Nikolai Tikhonov, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, emphasised that

<sup>90</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1979.

<sup>91</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 352 (in Russian).

<sup>92</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1980, pp. 23-24.

<sup>93</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1980, pp. 23-24.

the Soviet Union was ready to "make a constructive contribution to the success of the Madrid meeting, which could prepare the way for a conference of military detente and disarmament in Europe".<sup>94</sup>

Together with the fraternal countries, the Soviet Union undertook active steps to obtain an agreement on concrete measures designed to reduce the level of military confrontation.

The Soviet Union is pursuing a policy whose objective is the spread of military detente to other regions of Europe, including the Mediterranean, a reduction in armed forces in those regions and the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear missiles, and an agreement not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of European and non-European Mediterranean non-nuclear states.

Pursuing its policy of support for the idea of the creation of non-nuclear zones and peace zones in different regions of the world, the USSR and the other socialist countries also support the establishment of such zones in Europe.

The successful conclusion of the negotiations started in Vienna in 1973 on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe is also of great importance in achieving military detente. In order to give a new impulse to these negotiations, the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia—all of them took part in the Vienna negotiations—put forward important proposals on June 8, 1978, which considerably reduced the number of disputed issues. "The socialist countries," declared Leonid Brezhnev on June 25, 1978, "are offering their partners a rational and realistic compromise. In making their proposal, they have gone more than half way... Now it depends on the political will of the West."<sup>95</sup>

On November 30, 1978, the USSR and its allies offered not to increase its arms and armed forces in Central Europe during the Vienna negotiations. The Western countries not only rejected this proposal but continued to speed up their military strength.

In order to achieve progress in the Vienna talks, on June 28, 1979, the USSR, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia put forward another compromise proposal elaborated on the basis of the positions of the Western countries and designed to stimulate a rapprochement. Nonetheless, the Western countries attempted to change the roughly equal balance of forces in Central Europe in their favour. They insisted on an "asymmetrical", i.e. unequal, reduction in the land forces of both sides, according to which the socialist countries were to reduce their armed forces in Central Europe by an amount three times greater than the corresponding reduction by the NATO countries. In an attempt to force this view on the socialist countries, the NATO states have

<sup>94</sup> *Pravda*, November 7, 1980.

<sup>95</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 382 (in Russian).

insisted over the last four years that the Warsaw Treaty countries have a considerably greater number of troops in Central Europe, despite the declaration made by President Carter (at the Vienna meeting in June 1979) and by US Secretary of Defence George Brown (in January 1980) that the armed forces on both sides are roughly equal, and despite official data according to which in 1976 NATO troops numbered 981.3 thousand and Warsaw Treaty troops numbered 987 thousand.<sup>96</sup>

Wishing to promote mutual trust between the opposing alliances in Central Europe, the Soviet Union, having reached an agreement with the leadership of the GDR and consulted with the other member states of the Warsaw Treaty, decided to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe, to withdraw over a twelve month period up to 20 thousand Soviet servicemen, one thousand tanks and certain other military equipment from the territory of the GDR. However, the USA and its NATO allies stepped up the arms race and further aggravated the international situation, making it still more difficult to reach agreement at the Vienna talks. The main reason for the failure of the Vienna talks is the obstructive position adopted by the NATO countries, who are continuing to pursue an unrealistic policy blocking the elaboration of an agreement acceptable to both sides. Their aim is to achieve unilateral military superiority, to alter the balance of forces in that region to their own advantage. The line being pursued by the NATO countries at the Vienna talks is the inevitable consequence of their general policy of stepping up military preparations.

The USSR and its allies, abiding strictly by the principle of reciprocity and not acting to the detriment of any country, are striving to achieve a reduction in the concentration of arms and armed forces in Central Europe which would not alter the balance of forces in that area but would ensure a more stable situation. The series of compromise proposals put forward by the socialist countries constitute a solid basis for agreement. These proposals provide for an initial reduction in the arms and armed forces of the USSR and the USA in Central Europe, leading to the second stage in which the direct participants in the negotiations would reduce their arms and armed forces in proportion to their military potential, this in turn finally leading to a reduction of the equal collective levels of the armed forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty in the region.

In July 1980, the socialist countries put before the Vienna talks proposals designed to ease and quicken the successful conclusion of the negotiations. It was suggested that in the first stage the number of US troops be reduced by 13 thousand and the number of Soviet troops be reduced by 20 thousand (in addition to the 20 thousand

<sup>96</sup> *Pravda*, June 3, 1980.

already withdrawn from the territory of the GDR by August 1, 1980). The socialist countries are willing to agree to a collective "freezing" of the number of troops deployed by the direct participants in the talks during the interval between the two stages of reduction, provided that, in order to preserve the collective level of the armed forces on both sides, the number of armed forces deployed by any one state does not exceed 50 per cent of the total collective level of 900 thousand for each of the two sides.<sup>97</sup> "We are ready at any time," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "to sign in Vienna an agreement to reduce the arms and armed forces of both sides in Central Europe by five, ten, twenty, even 50 per cent. However, let us act in good faith so as not to alter the existing balance of forces, nor give an advantage to one side to the detriment of the other."<sup>98</sup>

The NATO and Pentagon plan to site American medium-range nuclear missiles directed at the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries on the territory of Western Europe, a plan made public in the spring of 1979, threatens to seriously complicate the international situation. Leonid Brezhnev cautioned the Western powers when he declared that "these plans and those of the American military regarding neutron armaments, if put into action, could only serve to increase tension in Europe and to further accelerate the arms race".<sup>99</sup> At the same time, he called on the Western countries to agree not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons, to sign a pact on mutual non-aggression between the members of the European Conference and to develop measures designed to increase mutual trust.

Speaking in Berlin on October 6, 1979, Leonid Brezhnev further expanded on these proposals by announcing that the Soviet Union was prepared for its part to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear weapons deployed in the western regions of the USSR provided that no additional medium-range nuclear missiles are deployed in Western Europe. The Soviet Union also proposed that negotiations be held on this issue on the basis of the principle of equal security. Noting that the USSR was not aiming at military supremacy, Leonid Brezhnev warned that if the USA and NATO countries carried through the above-mentioned plans the socialist countries would not simply look on as passive observers but would take the necessary steps to increase their security.<sup>100</sup>

In January 1980, the Soviet side declared that such negotiations should be preceded by the annulment, or at least the official suspension, of NATO plans in this direction. However, the Soviet Union

<sup>97</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1980, p. 27.

<sup>98</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course: Speeches, Greetings, Articles and Reminiscences*, Vol. 7, p. 312 (in Russian).

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 626.

<sup>100</sup> *Pravda*, October 7, 1979.

was prepared to accept an alternative, namely that questions pertaining to medium-range nuclear missiles be discussed in the SALT-3 talks after the SALT-2 Treaty had come into force.<sup>101</sup> The Soviet Union solemnly repeated its determination not to use nuclear weapons against those states which agree not to manufacture or use such weapons and which have no such weapons deployed on their territory.

The Soviet proposals were fully supported by the socialist countries, by world public opinion and by the peoples of Europe. They fully exposed Western propaganda to the effect that the Soviet Union was increasing its military power in Europe to a degree exceeding defensive requirements. At the same time, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko emphasised that "militarist forces of the West must be aware that we are not prepared to accept an agreement undermining our security and the security of our allies, and that the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty will not allow anyone to upset the existing balance of forces".<sup>102</sup>

Revealing a genuine desire to preserve peace and detente and to consolidate European security, the Soviet government re-affirmed its previous position regarding appropriate measures to resolve the question of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe during negotiations with Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the FRG, who paid an official visit to Moscow on June 30-July 1, 1980. Continuing its initiative on the question of reducing arms and armed forces in Central Europe, the Soviet side suggested that the issue of medium-range nuclear missiles be discussed together and in connection with the issue of American forward-based nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Soviet leaders pointed out that agreement on these issues could only be implemented after the SALT-2 Treaty had come into force.

The Soviet Union regards the limitation of forces and armaments in Europe as an integral part of the overall effort of the USSR and other members of the socialist community to ensure security and peaceful cooperation in Europe.

In his answers to questions put by a *Pravda* correspondent in connection with the 5th anniversary of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation, Leonid Brezhnev gave a positive assessment to the results of the Helsinki Conference and stressed that the increasingly complex international situation only served to add to their importance.

The work done, largely by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, in an effort to strengthen European security has yielded positive results. Significant changes have taken place in the political climate of Europe, as is revealed in the altered political relations

<sup>101</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1980, p. 20.

<sup>102</sup> *Kommunist*, No. 11, 1980, p. 20.



among countries with different social structures, in regular contacts and consultations among the governments, in the exchange of visits, in the broadening of the area of peaceful cooperation and in the formation of more stable economic ties. "We are decisively in favour," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "of strengthening and increasing all the positive achievements built up in Europe over the years thanks to the efforts of states both large and small."<sup>103</sup>

Seeing that the international climate is worsening and the United States is pursuing a policy that can only be described as militaristic, the Soviet Union, at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly, considered it necessary to draw the attention of the member states of the UN and all the peoples of the world to the situation that had arisen in the most important areas of the struggle for universal peace, halting the arms race, achieving disarmament, and guaranteed international security, and to recall the proposals put forward by the USSR and the other socialist countries with a view to achieving success in this historic struggle.

The initiatives that have been consistently advanced over a number of years by the Soviet Union and all the countries of the socialist community are well known to the governments of the world. They include constructive proposals on halting the nuclear arms race and refraining from the use of force in international relations, limiting and reducing strategic armaments, preventing the accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, strengthening control over the non-proliferation of nuclear arms, prohibiting other means of mass destruction, reducing conventional arms and armed forces, ending the arms race and achieving disarmament at regional level, and reducing military expenditure.

The speech delivered by Andrei Gromyko at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly and the Soviet memorandum "For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security" provide a clear and substantiated account of the peaceful policy consistently pursued by the Soviet Union with regard to all major international problems and express the firm will of the USSR to enter immediately into negotiations with a view to finding a generally acceptable solution to those problems.<sup>104</sup> "The Soviet Union sees the only possible way to prevent a return to the cold war and to establish normal, stable relations among the states," declares the memorandum, "in consistent effort to promote detente,"<sup>105</sup> to which, in the world of today, there is no rational alternative. "There are no insurmountable objective barriers to durable, guaranteed peace," the memorandum continues. "The chief obstacle is the lack of political will on the part of

<sup>103</sup> *Pravda*, January 13, 1980.

<sup>104</sup> *Pravda*, September 24 and 26, 1980.

<sup>105</sup> *Pravda*, September 26, 1980.

certain states. This obstacle must be removed."<sup>106</sup>

The Soviet Union called upon all states to reject considerations of momentary advantage both in internal and external affairs, to refrain from attempts to gain military-strategic superiority, from hegemonic ambitions on a global or regional scale, and to recognise that it is in the vital interests of all peoples to remove the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and to ensure a peaceful future.<sup>107</sup>

The Soviet Union proposed that the item "On Some Urgent Measures to Reduce the Danger of War" be included on the agenda of the 35th session of the UN General Assembly as a matter of great importance and urgency.<sup>108</sup> The draft resolution of the UN General Assembly, introduced by the Soviet delegation, urges states members of military alliances to refrain from actions that would expand the existing military-political groupings by drawing in new members. At the same time, states which are not members of the existing military-political alliances should refrain from joining them. According to the draft resolution, all states will avoid any action that could lead to the formation of new military-political groupings or assign military functions to regional organisations not presently having such functions.

The Soviet Union also believes that an important step in reducing the danger of war would be taken if all states, and in particular the permanent members of the Security Council and the countries linked to them by military agreements would neither enlarge their armed forces nor build up their conventional armaments starting from January 1, 1981, as the first step towards subsequent reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union also considers it imperative to conclude as speedily as possible an international convention giving guarantees to non-nuclear states against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. As the first step towards such an agreement, the Soviet Union calls upon those states possessing nuclear weapons to make solemn declarations of analogous content on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states not having them on their territory.

The Soviet draft resolution of the UN General Assembly also contains an appeal to all nuclear states to display good will and assist in creating conditions more favourable to the successful elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by agreeing not to produce any nuclear explosions for the duration of one year starting from the date fixed by common consent and after having made relevant statements to this effect.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> *Pravda*, September 25, 1980.

Progressive men everywhere support the humane and noble mission of the USSR to avert the threat of a new world war, as was eloquently revealed by the collection of signatures to the Stockholm Appeal (1976), by the resolutions adopted by the World Conference to End the Arms Race, for Disarmament and Detente (Helsinki, September 1976), by the World Forum of Peace Forces (Moscow, January 1978), at the meeting of the communist and workers' parties of Europe for peace and disarmament (Paris, April 1980), and at tens and hundreds of other international and national forums of the supporters of peace.

Of particular importance among such gatherings was the meeting of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, which took place in Sofia at the end of September 1980. The Appeal to all politicians and statesmen, governments and peoples adopted at this meeting, and the Charter formulating the principal goals and objectives of those fighting for peace in the present complicated international situation reflect the attitudes and aspirations of millions of people, their desire for peace and detente and their opposition to preparations for war. 2, 260 representatives from 137 countries took part in this authoritative international forum.

In his speech in Sofia, Boris Ponomarev, head of the Soviet delegation, alternate member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Secretary of the CC CPSU, stressed that it was now more important than ever to unite the efforts of all those who opposed the arms race and the danger of war and supported detente and peace.<sup>109</sup>

The Charter of the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace reflects the deep concern felt around the world at the worsening international situation and the growing tendency on the part of the USA and its allies to resort to the threat of force, to blockades and to psychological warfare, thereby poisoning the international atmosphere. Expressing its extreme anxiety at the uncontrolled growth in arms throughout the world and at irresponsible policies designed to further accelerate this build-up, and also displaying its concern about the fact that spiralling military budgets are making it ever more difficult to solve the urgent social, economic and political problems facing mankind, the participants in the World Parliament of the People for Peace declared that to live in peace is the inalienable right of all peoples, mankind's common priceless possession, the main condition and prerequisite of progress. "Any encroachment of this sacred right—the planning, preparing and unleashing of war," states the Charter of Sofia, "is the gravest crime against humanity."<sup>110</sup>

The international forum in Sofia was resolutely in favour of the prohibition of nuclear arms and other means of mass destruction, and demanded:

<sup>109</sup> *Pravda*, September 25, 1980.

<sup>110</sup> *Pravda*, September 28, 1980.

- an early ratification and implementation of the SALT-2 Treaty and the continuation of strategic arms limitation talks;
- an immediate start of talks on medium-range nuclear weaponry, including forward-based systems;
- the dissolution of all military alliances, including the simultaneous disbandment of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, and the dismantling of all foreign military bases;
- the re-establishment of trust among states, as this served to considerably advance the cause of détente in the 1970s.<sup>111</sup>

In his message to the World Parliament of the Peoples for Peace, Leonid Brezhnev wrote: "We are convinced that it is possible to restrain those who, relying on force and aiming at world domination, are pushing mankind to the edge of the precipice, for today the fate of the world is not determined only by those who are accustomed to consider force and war as the normal means of solving international problems."<sup>112</sup>

### Soviet-China Relations

In its relations with the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union adhered strictly to the policy outlined in 1971 by the resolutions adopted at the 24th Congress of the CPSU. These resolutions stated: "In a situation in which the Chinese leaders came out with their own specific ideological-political platform, which is incompatible with Leninism, and which is aimed against the socialist countries, and at creating split of the international communist and the whole anti-imperialist movement, the CC CPSU had taken the only correct stand—a stand of a consistently defending the principles of Marxism-Leninism, utmost strengthening of the unity of the world communist movement, and protection of the interests of our socialist Motherland. The Congress resolutely rejects the slanderous inventions of Chinese propoganda concerning the policy of our Party and state. At the same time, our Party stands for normalisation of relations between the USSR and the PRC, and restoration of good-neighbourliness and friendship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would meet the vital long-term interests of both countries, the interests of world socialism, the interests of intensifying the struggle against imperialism."<sup>113</sup> However, the leaders of China continued to pursue a policy hostile to the Soviet Union and world socialism and, having broken with Marxism-Leninism, allied themselves with the most reactionary imperialist circles and strove by every means possible to defame the peaceful foreign policy of the

<sup>111</sup> *Pravda*, September 28, 1980.

<sup>112</sup> *Pravda*, September 25, 1980.

<sup>113</sup> *24th Congress of the CPSU*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1971, pp. 212-13.

USSR in an attempt to weaken the unity and international position of the socialist system.

The Soviet Union gave a resolute rebuff to the fictitious territorial claims of the Maoists and their demand that Soviet border guards be removed from a number of areas on Soviet territory to which they laid claim on the pretext that they were allegedly "disputed areas". "As for the Soviet Union," declared Leonid Brezhnev in a speech delivered in Ulan Bator on November 26, 1974, "we do not lay down any preliminary conditions for the normalisation of relations with China. We have for long offered the Chinese side to enter into businesslike and concrete negotiations. We do not lay claim to any alien territories, and for us there are no 'disputed areas'."<sup>114</sup>

On March 6, 1973, in an attempt to end the deadlock in the negotiations that had begun in 1969 and that had been brought about due to the position adopted by the Peking leadership, the Soviet side proposed that the Sino-Soviet border be re-examined, starting in the East. This initiative made it possible to restart negotiations. The Soviet side proposed that the re-examination begin with the eastern section of the border as nearly all this section of the border had been provisionally agreed upon by both sides at the level of working groups. According to the Soviet draft agreement of March 1973, the Sino-Soviet frontier in the region of the Amur, Ussuri and other rivers would lie along the main fairway or the middle of the river. The signing of an interstate agreement on the eastern section of the border would have made it possible to regulate all border issues along 4,300 km of the Soviet-Chinese frontier, and thus would have removed many of the causes of friction between the two states (river shipping, economic activity in border areas, etc.)

However, the Chinese delegation rejected the Soviet proposal, declaring that before the signing of an agreement on a status quo, as understood by the Chinese side (i.e. recognition by the Soviet side of the Chinese concept of "disputed areas" on Soviet territory), it was not prepared to re-examine the border and sign a new agreement on the Sino-Soviet frontier. The conditions stipulated by the Peking leaders for normalising Soviet-Chinese relations are in no way based upon the principles of equality and mutual respect for the interests of both sides, but rather on an unconditional agreement by the Soviet side to satisfy Chinese claims to a part of Soviet territory, unilaterally pronounced "disputed areas" by the Chinese side. The Soviet Union naturally refused to accept these preconditions.

Despite the Chinese rejection of the Soviet proposal of January 15, 1971 on the signing of a mutual non-aggression treaty and the increase in Chinese propaganda hostile to the USSR, the Soviet Union never

<sup>114</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course. Speeches and Articles (1972-1975)*, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 535.

abandoned the historical perspective in the questions relating to the restoration of friendship and cooperation with the Chinese people. The policy of the USSR remained constant: a resolute rejection of any actions against and encroachments upon the interests of the Soviet state, together with an earnest desire to normalise inter-state relations with the PRC and restore friendly relations with the Chinese people.

When official Chinese representatives started to announce that relations between the USSR and China should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union expressed its willingness to base relations on precisely these principles, and this was clearly stated in a speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the 15th congress of Soviet trade unions, held in March 1972. "The official Chinese representatives", declared Brezhnev, "tell us that relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China should be based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. Well, if in Peking it is not regarded as possible to go any further than that in relations with a socialist country, we are ready to build Soviet-Chinese relations on this basis today."<sup>115</sup>

On June 14, 1973, expressing this willingness in concrete and constructive terms, the Soviet Union officially proposed to the Chinese leadership that both sides conclude a mutual non-aggression pact. The text included a commitment by the parties not to attack each other with any weapons on land, at sea or in the air, and also not to threaten such an attack.<sup>116</sup> The signing of such a pact would have created a more favourable atmosphere for normalising relations between the two countries and also for reaching agreement in the negotiations being conducted in Peking on the border issue. It would also promote the renewal of friendly relations and good neighbourliness between the USSR and China. However, the Chinese authorities rejected this proposal too.

In February 1972, the Soviet Union proposed that the two sides sign long-term foreign trade contracts and that border trade between the USSR and the PRC be re-established. In March 1973, the Ministry of Public Health of the USSR offered to restore cooperation with the Chinese in the field of medicine and health services. Various Soviet organisations and official representatives repeatedly offered to renew contacts and cooperation between the respective Academies of Sciences and friendship societies, and suggested that each side send representatives from its central newspapers. In December 1977, the USSR offered to renew scientific and technical links with the PRC.

However, all these proposals were either rejected or received no

<sup>115</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, p. 33.

<sup>116</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.

response from the Chinese side. Peking declared that, before any question pertaining to Soviet-Chinese relations could be discussed, progress must be made in solving the "border problem", i.e. prior to any negotiations, the USSR must recognise Chinese territorial claims. Speaking at a session of the National People's Congress on January 13, 1975, the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Zhou Enlai, once more demanded the recognition of "disputed areas" on the territory of the USSR and the withdrawal from these regions of Soviet troops.<sup>117</sup>

Rejecting Soviet proposals, the Chinese authorities simultaneously created an atmosphere of war hysteria and anti-Sovietism, compelling its people to expend effort, resources and materials in the building of defensive trenches and underground shelters. The Chinese leaders increased their efforts to convince the Chinese people that the Soviet Union is "enemy No. 1".

In the Report of the CC CPSU to the 25th Congress of the Party, Leonid Brezhnev underlined that "in its relations with China, our Party firmly adheres to the course charted by the 24th Congress. This course has been proved correct by facts. We shall continue the struggle against Maoism—a principled and irreconcilable struggle".<sup>118</sup> In addition, the congress reaffirmed: "In our relations with China, as with other countries, we adhere firmly to the principles of equality, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and non-use of force. In short, we are prepared to normalise relations with China in accordance with the principles of peaceful coexistence. What is more, we can say with assurance that if Peking returns to a policy truly based on Marxism-Leninism, if it abandons its hostile policy towards the socialist countries and takes the road of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist world, this will be an appropriate response from our side and opportunities will open for developing good relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of China consonant with the principles of socialist internationalism. The matter rests with the Chinese side."<sup>119</sup>

In an attempt to assist the creation of a calm atmosphere and the search for ways to improve relations, the Soviet Union took a number of concrete measures. In September 1976, following the death of Mao, the publication of speeches and material criticising China was stopped. A message from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR sent to the Chinese leadership on the occasion of the 27th anniversary of the founding of the PRC stressed the desire of the Soviet Union to normalise relations between

<sup>117</sup> *Renmin-Ribao*, January 19, 1975.

<sup>118</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 14.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

the two countries on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.<sup>120</sup> At the October (1976) Plenum of the CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev declared that there existed no issues concerning Soviet-Chinese relations which could not be solved in the spirit of good-neighbourliness.<sup>121</sup> On November 28, 1976, L. F. Ilyichev, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and head of the Soviet delegation in the negotiations on border questions, arrived in Peking. In the course of the negotiations he repeated the numerous Soviet proposals designed to normalise relations: the signing of a treaty on the non-use of force and a non-aggression treaty; the re-establishment of contacts between ministries and departments and the renewal of cooperation in various fields. He emphasised Soviet willingness to accelerate negotiations to clarify the position of the border in certain areas and to sign a treaty that would settle this question and remove it from Soviet-Chinese relations.

Not long prior to this, a bitter struggle had taken place within the Chinese leadership: on October 6, 1976, the widow of Mao Tse-tung, Jiang Qing, and three members of the Political Bureau of the CC CPC who had come to power during the infamous "cultural revolution" unleashed by Mao, were arrested. In the course of the subsequent campaign to uncover the crimes committed by the "gang of four" it was admitted that during the period of the "cultural revolution" experienced party, state and military cadres had been compromised and destroyed, that the professionals had been subjected to violence, that the national economy had been undermined, that the scientific and technical development of China had suffered a severe setback and China's international economic and cultural ties had been blocked.

It was natural to expect that the removal from power of a group who had been condemned for the enormous harm they had inflicted on China and the direct or indirect admission of the many errors committed by the "great helmsman" would also lead to a modification of Chinese foreign policy, and in particular to a rejection of a policy hostile to the USSR and the socialist countries and directed towards an alliance with imperialism. However, such was not the case. The new Chinese leadership not only failed to respond to the Soviet initiatives but also made it clear that it intended to create new obstacles to the normalisation of relations between the two countries.

The organs of Chinese propaganda and official figures, including members of the leadership, continued to distort the foreign and domestic policy of the USSR. Any and every means were used to discredit the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, the fraternal relations between the countries of the socialist community, Soviet efforts to strengthen friendship and cooperation among the peoples of

<sup>120</sup> *Pravda*, October 1, 1976.

<sup>121</sup> *Pravda*, October 26, 1976.



the world and its struggle against the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression. On May 19, 1977, the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs handed in a note to the Chinese embassy in which the Soviet government protested against the hostile and slanderous campaign being conducted in China against the Soviet Union and warned that the Chinese leadership would bear the responsibility before its people for the consequences of continuing this campaign.<sup>122</sup>

The 11th Congress of the CPC, which took place in August 1977, left unchanged the Maoist adventurist and splitting policy being conducted by China in international affairs, a policy based on hostility towards the USSR. Hua Guofeng, Chairman of the CC CPC and Premier of the State Council, called upon the Chinese to "be ready to fight" as the Soviet Union had, allegedly, "not abandoned its intention to enslave our country".<sup>123</sup>

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union continued its effort to improve Soviet-Chinese relations. In July 1977, the Soviet side agreed to grant Chinese ships the right of passage along Soviet inland waters near Khabarovsk during low water in the border river of Kazakyevicev<sup>124</sup> linking the Amur and the Ussuri, and from September 1, 1977, Chinese ships started to pass near Khabarovsk. At the same time, the USSR suggested that the Kazakyevicev be deepened and broadened, and expressed its willingness to provide the necessary technical aid. However, the Chinese authorities rejected this offer.

On February 24, 1978, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR proposed to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress that an end be put to the present abnormal situation in the relations between the USSR and the PRC and to the danger of its further deterioration, which could have serious negative consequences for both countries and peoples, for peace in the Far East, Asia and throughout the world. In order to give concrete expression to the desire on both sides to base their relations on the principles of peaceful coexistence and to embody this in an international act of major significance, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suggested that both sides make a joint declaration of the principles of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. A joint declaration to the effect that both sides will conduct their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, strictly abiding by the principles of equality, mutual respect, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and the non-use of force could have served to promote the normalisation of Sino-Soviet relations. It was also suggested that if the idea of a joint declaration was acceptable to the Chinese side, a

<sup>122</sup> *Pravda*, May 27, 1977.

<sup>123</sup> *Renmin-Ribao*, August 23, 1977.

<sup>124</sup> *The History of International Relations in the Far East. 1917-1977*, Khabarovsk, 1978, p. 439 (in Russian).

high-level meeting between representatives of both sides could take place either in Moscow or Peking in order to decide as quickly as possible on the text of the declaration. Proposals made by the PRC with a view to normalising Sino-Soviet relations could also be considered during this meeting.<sup>125</sup>

In a note delivered on March 9, 1978,<sup>126</sup> the Chinese side curtly rejected the Soviet initiative and repeated as preconditions to improving inter-state relations questions relating to the defence of the USSR and the security of the People's Republic of Mongolia, preconditions unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

The session of the National People's Congress—the highest organ of state of the PRC—which took place in February-March, 1978, revealed that the Chinese leadership not only refused to discuss the real issues involved in normalising relations with the USSR, but also clearly demonstrated its intention to continue a policy hostile to the Soviet Union. The session confirmed the anti-Soviet policy of the Chinese leadership, formulated at the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of China. The struggle against the USSR and its allies became not only a party norm established in the Rules of the CPC, but also a constitutional norm of the PRC. The text of the constitution of the PRC was modified to correspond with the documents of the 11th Congress of the CPC, according to which the Soviet Union was counted as one of the main enemies of China. At the session of the National People's Congress, Hua Guofeng repeated the accusation that the Soviet Union was still harbouring plans to “enslave our country”, and on this “basis” he called for the economic and military development of the PRC to be speeded up. Thus anti-Sovietism was linked up to the “four modernisations”, the general line being pursued in Chinese domestic policy and itself closely bound up with the militarisation of the country.

The successors of Mao Tse-tung continued to fan tension in relations with the USSR in order to use the bogey of a “Soviet threat” to urge the Chinese people to work harder and continue to carry the burdens imposed on them by the ambitious, hegemonic plans of the Peking rulers. Requesting heavy loans from Japan, the USA and other Western powers, together with modern plant and machinery, military technology and arms, the Chinese rulers assured the imperialist countries that Peking could be relied upon in any struggle against the USSR and that China would not abandon its anti-Soviet policy.

The Chinese leadership took a negative view of the victory of the Vietnamese people over the American interventionists and the rapid unification of the country into the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which then pursued an independent foreign policy and consolidated

<sup>125</sup> *Renmin-Ribao*, February, 28, 1978.

<sup>126</sup> *Pravda*, March 21, 1978.

its unity with the socialist community. Peking was also displeased by the development of fraternal relations between Vietnam and Laos which had also chosen the socialist path. Having finally realised that socialist Vietnam did not wish to be an instrument of Chinese expansionist policy in Southeast Asia and that, on the contrary, it opposed such a policy, Peking started to increase its pressure on Vietnam and in February 1979 launched a military attack against the SRV.

The Soviet Union expressed its support for Vietnam which had become a victim of Chinese aggression. In a declaration dated February 18, 1979, the Soviet government stated that the Chinese attack on Vietnam only further revealed Peking's lack of responsibility, as regards the destiny of the world, and the criminal ease with which it resorted to armed force. The Soviet Union announced that it would fulfil the obligations it had assumed under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SRV, and demanded an end to the aggression and the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.<sup>127</sup> At the same time, the Soviet Union took measures to render additional support to Vietnam by delivery of all that was necessary to repel the aggressor. In a declaration made on March 2, 1979, the Soviet government warned Peking against any aggressive actions against the Lao People's Democratic Republic,<sup>128</sup> and the Soviet Union gave additional aid to the LPDR to strengthen its defence.

The logic of a slide into an alliance with imperialism on the part of the Peking rulers led to a declaration, on April 3, 1979, by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress that it was cancelling the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC, signed on February 14, 1950 for a period of 30 years and designed to be automatically extended upon its expiry. The Soviet government drew the appropriate conclusions from this hostile act, which was the result of a sharp turn to the right in the policies of the ruling clique in Peking, their adventurism and hegemonic ambitions. Just how adventurist had become the policies of the ruling circles in Peking, stated the declaration issued by the Soviet government, just how low they had fallen in betraying the interests of socialism had been revealed by their shameful attack upon the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.<sup>129</sup>

In its note of April 3, 1979, announcing its decision not to extend the Treaty of 1950, the government of the PRC also suggested to the Soviet government that negotiations be conducted to resolve the questions concerning relations between China and the Soviet Union and to improve those relations. The Soviet Union, which had con-

<sup>127</sup> *Pravda*, February 19, 1979.

<sup>128</sup> *Izvestia*, March 3, 1979.

<sup>129</sup> *Pravda*, April 5, 1979.

stantly supported the normalisation of relations with China by means of negotiations, agreed to this proposal and on April 17 suggested the subject matter of such negotiations: the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations and the elaboration of a document specifying the principles to underly these relations as the starting point for negotiations. Subsequently, in a memorandum dated June 4, 1979, the Soviet side suggested that the document include an agreement not to recognise any claims from any quarter to special rights or hegemony in Asia and in international affairs. Finally, in a memorandum dated June 23, 1979, the Soviet side agreed to include in the negotiations the question of trade, scientific and technical links and cultural exchange on the basis of equality and mutual advantage. Both sides agreed that negotiations should be conducted by government delegations headed by the Deputy Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the PRC, namely by L.F. Ilyichev and Wan Yupin respectively.

The government delegation from the PRC arrived in Moscow on September 23. Before leaving Peking and upon arriving in the capital of the USSR, the head of the Chinese delegation made announcements supporting an improvement in relations between the two countries. However, at the same time the Chinese press and official representatives of the Chinese authorities intensified their hostile attacks on the USSR.

On the suggestion of the Chinese delegation the two sides agreed that the negotiations should take place alternately in Moscow and Peking. (A similar decision was taken with regard to negotiations to settle border issues.)

At the first plenary session on October 17, 1979 the Soviet delegation handed the Chinese delegation a draft declaration of the principles of relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the People's Republic of China. Deciding upon the principles governing relations between the USSR and the PRC was particularly important as the cancellation of the 1950 Treaty had removed the political-legal basis of relations between the two countries.

The Soviet draft declaration had been drawn up in accord with the generally accepted principles of international law, the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, and the declarations made by both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on their willingness to normalise their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. It also took account of the results of the bilateral written exchanges that had preceded the Soviet-Chinese negotiations. The declaration proclaimed the desire of both sides to develop their relations according to the principles of full equity, respect of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, the non-use of force or threat to use of force and mutual advantage. The draft declaration includes commitments by both sides to refrain from the use of force or the threat

to use force, not to claim any special rights and hegemony, and to oppose any claims from any quarter to hegemony in international affairs. It also envisages measures designed to maintain mutual respect and trust in relations between the two sides, together with the appropriate mechanisms of joint consultations. The draft declaration also gives general expression to the willingness of both sides to broaden and strengthen trade, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other links between the two countries.

The acceptance by both sides of the principles considered in the draft declaration would have facilitated the solutions of issues that have accumulated between the USSR and the PRC and many of these would disappear of their own accord with the improvement of relations. The Chinese delegation, however, made the elaboration of the principles governing relations between the two sides dependent on regulating "unresolved questions" and "removing obstacles". They demanded that the Soviet Union accept the preconditions set by the Chinese side that were not acceptable to the Soviet side, and declared that if the Soviet Union did not accept them "there could be no question" of guarantees not to use force, of peaceful coexistence nor, therefore, of the normalisation of relations, thereby giving their demand the form of an ultimatum. Repeating the fictitious thesis of a "Soviet threat" to China from the north and the south, the Chinese delegation put forward "Proposals on Improving Relations Between the PRC and the USSR" which envisaged the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces in regions bordering on China, the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the People's Republic of Mongolia, the cessation of Soviet aid "of any kind" to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and the resolution of border issues on the basis of recognition of the "disputed areas" on the territory of the USSR bordering China, which would have meant the recognition of Chinese territorial claims on the Soviet Union.

The Soviet delegation exposed the total groundlessness of the demands by China, declaring that the USSR was merely taking essential defensive measures in the Far East and that there was no basis for talking of a "concentration" of Soviet troops posing a threat to China. Pointing to the fact that there were more troops on the Chinese side of the border than on the Soviet side, the Soviet delegation repeatedly asked if China was prepared to reduce its armed forces on the border with the USSR. No answer was given to this question.

The Soviet side resolutely rejected attempts by China to interfere in relations between the USSR and the People's Republic of Mongolia and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, stressing that the cooperation between the Soviet Union and other sovereign states is of a peaceful nature, not directed against China or any other country, based on treaties and agreements between the countries involved and in accord with the United Nations Charter, and therefore cannot be a

subject of negotiation between the Soviet Union and China.

It was also pointed out that negotiations on border issues between the USSR and the PRC had so far failed to produce any results precisely because the Chinese side continues to make territorial claims on the Soviet Union under the guise of "disputed areas".

The Soviet-Chinese negotiations were accompanied by feverish foreign policy activity on the part of Peking. The Chinese leaders smoothed the way for joint action with the imperialist powers by calling on them to form an international front to struggle against the USSR.

The Moscow stage of the Soviet-Chinese negotiations continued from September 27 to November 30, 1979, when they were broken off by the Chinese. The delegations agreed that the date of the next round of negotiations would be decided through diplomatic channels.

On January 21, 1980, Chinese newspapers published a statement made by a representative of the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC. This statement read that a "second round of Soviet-Chinese negotiations is not appropriate at the present time". This step on the part of the Chinese authorities only served as further evidence of the fact that declarations by the leaders of the PRC on their willingness to normalise and improve relations with the Soviet Union were insincere. In its attempts to bring pressure to bear on the USSR and compel it to withhold aid from the Afghan people, the Chinese leadership has joined forces with the US Administration in a dangerous course escalating international tension.

A Resolution of the June (1980) Plenum of the CC CPSU declares that the rapprochement between aggressive circles in the West, and particularly in the USA, and the Chinese leadership is based on anti-Sovietism and is a threat to the cause of peace, that "the partnership of imperialism and Peking hegemonism is a new and dangerous phenomenon in world politics, dangerous for all of mankind, including the peoples of America and China".<sup>130</sup>

### **Relations Between the USSR and the Capitalist Countries**

In the years following the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries persistently and purposefully pursued a foreign policy directed at confirming the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different social systems. The most important feature of the relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries continues to be the struggle by the CPSU and the Soviet state to secure peace, an improvement in the international

<sup>130</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1980.

situation, a halt to the arms race, disarmament, and detente embodied in different forms of cooperation.

Speaking of the foreign policy of the USSR in the Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev emphasised: "In its foreign policy, the Soviet Union intends to search patiently and consistently for more new ways of expanding peaceful, mutually advantageous cooperation between states with different social systems, and more new ways leading to disarmament. We shall continuously augment our efforts in the struggle for lasting peace."<sup>131</sup>

In its efforts to strengthen peace and security, Soviet diplomacy lays great stress on developing bilateral relations with the capitalist countries.

The level of Soviet-American relations achieved in the first half of the 1970s created a solid basis for further development in this direction. However, the Soviet side could not but take note of increasingly negative tendencies in the foreign policy of the American Administration. "Behind all that," explained Brezhnev, "one feels the pressure exerted by the most aggressive forces of imperialism, the military and the military-industrial quarters and politicians bogged down in the mire of anti-Sovietism, the 'hawks'."<sup>132</sup>

During negotiations in Moscow between Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko and the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance (March 28-30, 1977), the USA tried to achieve a revision of agreements previously reached between the USSR and the USA. The Soviet side gave a resolute rebuff to these attempts, while at the same time declaring its willingness to develop Soviet-American relations. "The Soviet Union," declared Andrei Gromyko on March 31 at a press conference in Moscow, "would like these relations to be as good as possible and based on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It would be even better if relations could be friendly. This is our position, and we would like to see a similar approach on the part of the United States of America."<sup>133</sup>

At the beginning of 1978, a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, led by Boris Ponomarev, paid an official visit to the USA, in the course of which he had a meeting with President Carter. Talking of the foreign policy of the USSR, Boris Ponomarev emphasised: "The Soviet Union is firmly intent upon improving Soviet-American relations according to the letter and spirit of the agreements reached and the commitments undertaken. Despite the difficulties that have arisen over recent years through no fault of ours, this principle of Soviet foreign policy in the field of Soviet-American

<sup>131</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 30.

<sup>132</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Speech in the City of Tula on January 18, 1977*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, p. 21.

<sup>133</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *The Leninist Foreign Policy*, p. 498 (in Russian).

relations has not changed."<sup>134</sup>

The active steps taken by Soviet diplomacy to develop relations with the USA and the proposals it put forward encountered inertia, unwillingness and even open opposition from the representatives of the Carter Administration. Carter frankly expressed his foreign policy credo on June 10, 1977 in an interview given to American magazine publishers, when he said: "My own inclination ... is to aggressively challenge the Soviet Union and others for influence in areas of the world that we feel are crucial now or potentially crucial in 15 or 20 years from now."<sup>135</sup>

On November 2, analysing the international situation resulting from the actions undertaken by the Carter Administration, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out: "International relations are now at a crossroads ... leading either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war."<sup>136</sup>

Soviet diplomacy made every effort to overcome the difficulties that had arisen in relations with the USA. In the course of nine months (April-December 1978), six meetings took place between the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, and the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance.

A major event in Soviet-American relations was the meeting in Vienna between the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev and the President of the USA, James Carter, which took place on June 15-18, 1979 in connection with the Soviet-American Treaty on Offensive Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT-2). Bilateral Soviet-American relations were also discussed at the meeting and a joint communiqué was signed which publicly confirmed the principles of relations between the USSR and the USA as formulated at earlier summit Soviet-American meetings. The Vienna agreements laid the foundations for the further comprehensive development of Soviet-American relations. However, the implementation of these agreements met with stubborn resistance on the part of influential American circles who opposed détente and supported the achievement of military superiority over the USSR. Under the influence of these forces, the Carter Administration, in carrying through a foreign policy that combined cooperation with competition, swerved sharply towards the latter in the second half of 1979. "The tone of US foreign policy," remarked Andrei Gromyko on February 18, 1980, "is increasingly dictated by those forces who favour

<sup>134</sup> *Pravda*, January 27, 1978.

<sup>135</sup> *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXXVII, No. , 1985, July 11, 1977, p. 46.

<sup>136</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*. Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1978, p. 185.



militarism and expansionism."<sup>137</sup>

The increasing aggressiveness of Washington's foreign policy is shown, amongst other things, by the creation of a "rapid deployment corps"—a new cudgel to impose imperialist fiat, by the labelling of certain regions of the world, particularly those which possess oil, "spheres of vital interest" to the USA, by the provocative actions taken in relation to Iran, by the feverish search for locations for new military bases, and by President Carter's promulgation of Directive No. 59 on the "new nuclear strategy of the USA". This strategy, which is based on a preemptive nuclear strike against military targets in the peace-loving socialist countries, is intended (despite the agreement reached between Leonid Brezhnev and James Carter in Vienna, in June 1979) to give the USA military, and more importantly, nuclear supremacy. It presupposes the deployment of qualitatively new kinds and systems of strategic and other nuclear arms.

Referring to this strategy at the 35th session of the UN General Assembly, Andrei Gromyko noted that the "policy chosen by the USA and which cannot be called other than militaristic, is reflected in this so-called new nuclear strategy. Behind a smokescreen of totally unrealistic arguments on the possibility of 'limited' or 'partial' use of nuclear weapons, the creators of this strategy are attempting to implant into people's minds the concept of the possibility and acceptability of nuclear conflict. This irresponsible concept only increases the risk of a nuclear catastrophe, which can only cause alarm, and is causing alarm, throughout the world."<sup>138</sup>

The policy adopted by the American Administration and directed at aggravating the international situation and destroying détente is the result of the resentment felt in American ruling circles at American losses on the international scene, at a series of major foreign policy defeats (Iran, Nicaragua and others) and at the serious internal economic and social problems that the Administration is unable to solve. Another important factor was the forthcoming presidential campaign of 1980, and Carter's desire to be re-elected for a further four years in office.

At the beginning of January 1980, President Carter took hitherto unprecedented action regarding Soviet-American relations when he announced that "sanctions" would be imposed against the USSR in connection with the presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. In particular he announced that economic, scientific and technical links and cultural exchange, which had already been reduced as a result of unfriendly actions on the American side, would be further cut unilaterally, that contracts for the purchase of American grain by Soviet trade organisations would be annulled,

<sup>137</sup> *Pravda*, February 19, 1980.

<sup>138</sup> *Pravda*, September 24, 1980.

that the export of American goods (including those whose delivery had already been agreed) would be halted or reduced, and that America would boycott the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. In introducing these economic "sanctions", the Carter Administration openly declared that they were intended to damage the development of the economy of the USSR and lead to a worsening of the material well-being of the Soviet people. However, these calculations, based on a misconception of the economic potential of the USSR, were doomed to failure, since goods purchased from America constituted only an insignificant proportion of the economic budget of the USSR. During the first three years of the Tenth Five-year Plan, the USSR produced equipment to the value of 130,300 million roubles, while equipment purchased in the USA totalled only 1,200 million roubles; the grain harvest in the USSR amounted to 657 million tonnes, while grain imports from the USA amounted to only 32.5 million tonnes.<sup>139</sup>

Attempts by the American President to draw his European and Japanese allies into the implementation of discriminatory measures have met with defeat. Only the British Conservative government, the Peking leaders and a number of reactionary regimes gave Carter their full support.

In September 1980, the American Senate voted to lift the restrictions introduced by the Carter Administration on the delivery of grain to the Soviet Union. American senators were obliged to admit that the embargo on grain deliveries to the Soviet Union had not achieved the expected results, had not caused the damage its initiators had anticipated, but had cost American farmers hundreds of millions of dollars and had convinced world opinion that the USA was an unreliable trade partner.<sup>140</sup>

On September 26, 1980, during a visit to New York, Andrei Gromyko had a meeting with the US Secretary of State, Edmund Muskie, appointed to this post following the resignation of Cyrus Vance. In the course of a detailed discussion, Gromyko pointed out that the American side was departing from the fundamental principles previously agreed between the USSR and the USA and which are the only basis on which Soviet-American relations can be conducted if they are to be guided by the interests of preserving and strengthening peace and international security and the development of mutually advantageous businesslike cooperation.

Andrei Gromyko and Edmund Muskie exchanged views on the Soviet proposal to begin negotiations on the limitation of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and American forward-based nuclear arms in the same region.

In a speech delivered on November 6, 1980, the Chairman of the

<sup>139</sup> *Pravda*, February 29, 1980.

<sup>140</sup> *Pravda*, September 27, 1980.

Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai Tikhonov, declared: "The USSR put forward important and constructive proposals designed to prevent a dangerous turn of events. It was precisely this initiative that made it possible to start negotiations in Geneva recently on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe."<sup>141</sup>

In the message of congratulations sent to Ronald Reagan on his election to the post of President of the United States of America on November 6, 1980, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, expressed the hope that his presidency would serve to improve relations between the USSR and the USA in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples and the interests of peace.<sup>142</sup>

In the light of the objectives set by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Soviet diplomacy made every effort to further strengthen and extend Soviet-French relations. Cooperation between these two countries, both of whom are permanent members of the Security Council, is having an increasingly positive effect on the international situation and on the progress of the struggle for peace and detente. The withdrawal of France from the military organisation of NATO, which testified to an increasingly independent foreign policy and a growing role in the international scene, opened up new possibilities for the further development of Soviet-French relations.

The official visit paid by Andrei Gromyko to Paris on April 27-30, 1976, indicated a further improvement in Soviet-French relations. Andrei Gromyko and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean Victor Sauvagnargues exchanged views on questions relating to the development of Soviet-French cooperation and major international problems, including the implementation of the decisions of the Helsinki Conference, the situation in the Middle East and disarmament. In a joint announcement on the visit, the two ministers noted that "Soviet-French political consultations are of particular and growing significance and, in the opinion of both sides, should serve as an effective means of reaching agreement and exchanging opinions on urgent international problems and questions of bilateral relations".<sup>143</sup>

The signing of a number of new contractual agreements promoted the further development of relations. On September 16, 1976, a protocol was signed on the continuation of Soviet-French cooperation in the field of space exploration for peaceful purposes.<sup>144</sup>

A major event in the development of Soviet-French relations was the visit to France by Leonid Brezhnev (June 20-22, 1977), as a result

<sup>141</sup> *Pravda*, November 7, 1980.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> *Soviet-French Relations. 1965-1976: Documents*, Moscow, 1976, pp. 242-43 (in Russian).

<sup>144</sup> See *The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Disarmament*, pp. 185-87 (in Russian).

of which cooperation between the USSR and France was further consolidated and reached a higher level.

For the first time in relations between countries with different socio-political systems, a Joint Statement of the Soviet Union and France on Relaxation of International Tension was signed in the course of the meeting. In this document, which deals exclusively with questions relating to the strengthening of detente, both sides stressed the need to consistently implement the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (Helsinki, 1975), and expressed their concern that the policies of some Western countries revealed tendencies that ran counter to detente.

In the Soviet-French Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, both sides confirmed their joint determination to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The declaration, which summarised the results of the talks between the two sides, stated the jointly agreed position of both countries on the problem of disarmament, and called for the holding of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and the convocation of a World Disarmament Conference.

During the top-level Paris meeting the Foreign Ministers of the USSR and France, Andrei Gromyko and Louis de Guiringaud signed agreements on cooperation in the fields of transport and chemistry. A protocol to the Programme for the Expansion of Soviet-French Economic and Industrial Cooperation was also signed.

The mutual desire to extend Soviet-French relations was also demonstrated during the visit by Andrei Gromyko to France (October 25-28, 1978) and the visit by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gean François-Poncet to the USSR (February 11-13, 1979).

The talks between Leonid Brezhnev and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing which took place in Moscow on April 26-28, 1979, centred on the most urgent problems of the contemporary world which were discussed from the point of view of further measures to avert the threat of war, consolidate detente in Europe and throughout the world, halt the arms race and promote confidence among states. Leonid Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing signed a Programme for the Further Development of Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and France for Detente and Peace which, declared Brezhnev, "will become a major, even historic political landmark".<sup>145</sup> Leonid Brezhnev and the President of France also paid great attention to the question of developing Soviet-French economic cooperation on a stable and long-term basis. A long-term programme to extend economic, industrial and technical cooperation for the period 1980-1990 was signed, together with an agreement on economic cooperation for the period

<sup>145</sup> *The Visit by the President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, to the Soviet Union. April 26-28, 1979: Documents*, Moscow, 1979, p. 18 (in Russian).

1980-1985. The two sides also signed an agreement on measures to improve direct communication between the Kremlin and the Elysée Palace. Expressing his appraisal of the agreements signed during his visit to Moscow, Giscard d'Estaing declared: "Despite all the uncertainties of a troubled world, France and the Soviet Union are able to plan the development of their exchange over a ten-year period."<sup>146</sup>

At the end of the 1970s, when the international situation was becoming more complex, France did not support the NATO decision to site new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, although its policy on this point was insufficiently consistent. During the events in Afghanistan, the French government refused to join in American efforts to torpedo detente and apply economic sanctions against the USSR.

During a working visit to Paris by Andrei Gromyko on April 23-25, 1980 at the invitation of the French government, the two sides devoted their attention to current international relations, affirming their determination to preserve detente. At a press conference held on April 25, Andrei Gromyko remarked: "France now as before supports the relaxation of international tension and does not intend to depart from this line in her foreign affairs."<sup>147</sup> The Soviet side emphasised the need to act in accord with the Programme for the Further Development of Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and France for Detente and Peace, signed on April 28, 1979. The USSR and France noted that in the current circumstances their jointly agreed efforts to strengthen international and European security were of increasing significance. The discussions revealed that the USSR and France shared similar views on many issues relating to the causes of the deterioration of the international situation.

On May 19, 1980, Leonid Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing held talks in Warsaw which contributed greatly to improving the international situation. During these working discussions the two sides reviewed the international situation and initiatives directed at reducing international tension, together with questions concerning their bilateral relations. In a conversation with journalists, Giscard d'Estaing declared that the meeting in Warsaw had achieved its purpose. "The exchange of opinion that took place during the discussions," he pointed out, "was useful in preserving peace and detente." The talks confirmed that "the good will for cooperation exists as does the understanding that it is essential to continue the dialogue".<sup>148</sup> Giscard d'Estaing affirmed his intention to maintain Soviet-French contacts at the highest level.

The Carter Administration openly expressed its disapproval of the fact that the President of France had had a meeting with Leonid

<sup>146</sup> Ibid., p. 16.

<sup>147</sup> *Pravda*, April 26, 1980.

<sup>148</sup> *Pravda*, May 20, 1980.

Brezhnev. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gean François-Poncet gave a decided rebuff to Washington when he declared that his country conducted an independent foreign policy and held discussions with whom it considered necessary and when it considered necessary. It did not need to ask permission from anyone.<sup>149</sup>

Economic cooperation between the USSR and France is increasing every year on the basis of the agreements reached during top-level meetings. In the period 1975-1979 Soviet-French trade tripled in comparison with the previous five-year period and reached 9 billion roubles. Soviet-French contracts provide for a trade increase of 400 million roubles in 1980 as compared to 1979, bringing their total value for that year to 3 billion roubles.<sup>150</sup>

In accord with the principles of peaceful coexistence, the 25th Congress of the CPSU emphasised the necessity of consistently developing long-term, mutually advantageous cooperation in the fields of politics, economics, science and culture with the FRG. At the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev noted that relations with the FRG, based on the Moscow Treaty of 1970, had made great progress, and had proceeded smoothly as a result of the decision by the FRG not to call for any changes in the existing European frontiers. During meetings and discussions between statesmen from the USSR and the FRG, relations between the two countries had been improved and cooperation in the economic and other spheres had been increased. The FRG has become one of the Soviet Union's major partners in businesslike and mutually advantageous cooperation with the West.

However, in the second half of the 1970s Soviet-West German relations were marked with inconsistency and contradiction on the German side. The position taken by the government of the FRG on a number of questions concerning relations between the two countries impeded the conclusion of new Soviet-West German agreements. The government of the FRG attempted to invalidate the clear provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement declaring West Berlin to be independent of and separate from the Federal Republic of Germany.

On May 22, 1976, the government of the USSR published a statement affirming the willingness of the Soviet Union to continue the development of long-term cooperation with the FRG in the interests of the people of both countries and the cause of peace. The document also contained a warning to right-wing forces in the FRG who would like to forget the Moscow Treaty and return to a policy of confrontation with the USSR.

In its reply, published on July 3, 1976, the government of the FRG confirmed its intention to continue in its relations with the USSR a policy in accord with the Moscow Treaty and to develop

<sup>149</sup> *Pravda*, May 23, 1980.

<sup>150</sup> *Pravda*, February 14, March 9, 1980.

cooperation with the USSR in solving urgent international problems. At the same time, it continued to maintain an unrealistic position as regards the question of West Berlin and a number of other issues.

The official visit by Leonid Brezhnev to the FRG (May 4-7, 1978), created a favourable climate for the further development of Soviet-West German relations, the implementation of bilateral cooperation for strengthening detente. The joint declaration published at the end of the visit stated the position of the two sides on key contemporary problems. The USSR and the FRG expressed their common desire "to extend and consolidate detente and to give it a progressive and consistent character".<sup>151</sup> They emphasised that it was important that no one should achieve military supremacy and that the approximate equality and parity of the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation were sufficient to ensure defence. The joint declaration also contained a number of important proposals concerning bilateral Soviet-West German relations and other issues, in particular the development of long-term economic, industrial and technical cooperation in order to create "a solid material basis for these relations that would extend into the next century".<sup>152</sup> In accord with this declaration, an agreement was signed on May 6 on developing and deepening long-term cooperation between the USSR and the FRG in the economic and industrial fields.

The Politbureau of the CC CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR noted that the visit by Leonid Brezhnev to Bonn "was a major international event and a further significant contribution to the implementation of the foreign policy of the 25th Congress of the CPSU".<sup>153</sup>

A wide range of questions concerning Soviet-West German relations were discussed on June 25, 1979 in Moscow at a meeting between Soviet leaders Alexei Kosygin, Andrei Gromyko, and Nikolai Tikhonov and the Chancellor of the FRG, Helmut Schmidt, who was on his way to Tokyo. Having expressed their satisfaction at the development of mutually advantageous cooperation, the two sides pointed to the urgent necessity of pursuing a policy designed to strengthen peace and detente, and to carry through effective measures regarding disarmament.

On November 21-24, 1979, Andrei Gromyko paid an official visit to the FRG and held talks with Federal President Carstens, Chancellor Schmidt and the West German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. There was a detailed exchange of opinion on the further development of Soviet-West German relations on the basis of the documents agreed upon during the visit by Leonid Brezh-

<sup>151</sup> *The Visit by L. I. Brezhnev to the Federal Republic of Germany, May 4-7, 1978: Speeches and Documents*, Moscow, 1978, p. 59 (in Russian).

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 62.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 77.

nev to the FRG (May 1978). At the centre of discussions was the question of the American plan to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, a plan that Bonn looked upon favourably. "We did everything possible," declared Andrei Gromyko, referring to this question, "to show by means of argument that the deployment of this weapon was not the path to detente and to an improvement of the situation in Europe. On the contrary, it is the path to a deterioration in Europe, the path to an escalation of the arms race. It is the beginning of a new stage, a new twist in the spiral of the arms race."<sup>154</sup>

In the years following the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Soviet-West German economic cooperation has grown in scope and stability. From 1971 to 1979 trade between the USSR and the FRG increased 8 times, to reach 4, 2 billion roubles in 1979. The FRG is now the leading economic partner of the USSR in the West and the Soviet Union is one of the top ten trading partners of Bonn.

At the end of 1979-beginning of 1980, at a time when the international situation was becoming more acute, the Carter Administration exerted strong pressure on Bonn in order to gain its full support for American policy. As a result of this pressure, Bonn gave its consent to the deployment of American medium-range nuclear missiles on the territory of the FRG and significantly increased its military budget.

However, despite American pressure, the government of the FRG did not consider it possible to cut back its cooperation with the Soviet Union. Bonn manoeuvred to soften the negative consequences of American pressure. In an interview on West German television on February 2, 1980, Chancellor Schmidt stated: "I do not take back one word of the joint declaration signed on May 6, 1978 by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Chancellor of the FRG. The Federal Republic of Germany will abide by every sentence, every paragraph, every article of any treaty, any agreement that we have ever signed."<sup>155</sup> In a government declaration made on February 29, 1980, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt spoke of the inadmissibility of a split with the states of Eastern Europe and spoke in favour of continuing the dialogue with them.<sup>156</sup>

On June 30-July 1, 1980, Chancellor Schmidt and the Vice-Chancellor and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, paid a visit to Moscow on the invitation of the Soviet leadership, and discussed a wide range of international problems and questions relating to Soviet-West German relations. Leonid Brezhnev emphasised the willingness of the Soviet side to extend the already existing

<sup>154</sup> *Pravda*, November 25, 1979.

<sup>155</sup> *Pravda*, February 3, 1980.

<sup>156</sup> *Pravda*, March 1, 1980.



forms of agreement and cooperation and seek new forms of such agreement and cooperation with any country that so desired.<sup>157</sup>

Despite the worsening of the international situation and major differences of opinion on a number of issues, the two sides expressed the conviction that detente is essential, possible and useful, and voiced their determination to do everything possible to make detente a dominant factor in international relations.<sup>158</sup>

The Soviet delegation put the strengthening of international peace and security, the halting of the arms race and disarmament at the centre of the negotiations. Speaking for the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev made a number of proposals designed to promote agreement on these issues, including proposals relating to medium-range nuclear missiles. In his government declaration to the Bundestag on July 4, 1980, Chancellor Schmidt noted the constructive nature of the Soviet proposals.

The Soviet Union also put forward a number of concrete proposals relating to the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of arms and armed forces in Central Europe with a view to providing a basis for the elaboration of mutually acceptable decisions. In the course of the talks, both sides expressed their support for the implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and agreed that the convening of a special conference to examine the question of measures to promote confidence among states should be discussed at the forthcoming Madrid Meeting. Chancellor Schmidt supported the Soviet proposal on the holding of a European Congress on Energy Questions and called for the SALT-2 Treaty to be ratified as quickly as possible. Both sides confirmed that they would continue to base their policies upon treaties and agreements already signed, in particular the treaty of August 12, 1970, and this served to provide a clear basis for the development of constructive cooperation between the USSR and the FRG.

The long-term programme on the main forms of economic and industrial cooperation between the USSR and the FRG, which was signed in Moscow in the course of the negotiations, constitutes a new step in the strengthening of the material basis of their political relations.

In a joint communiqué on the visit, both sides supported the continuation of contacts between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, both at the highest and other levels, in accord with existing agreements and practice.

Summing up the visit by Chancellor Schmidt, the CC of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR noted that the negotiations had made "an

<sup>157</sup> *Pravda*, July 1, 1980.

<sup>158</sup> *Pravda*, July 2, 1980.

important contribution to the strengthening of peace and security, to improving the international climate and to furthering development of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the FRG".<sup>159</sup>

On August 12, 1980, on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the signing in Moscow of the Treaty between the FRG and the USSR, Chancellor Schmidt sent a telegram to the Soviet leaders in which he described the treaty as providing the basis for achieving important results in improving relations between the two countries. He expressed his satisfaction at the success of the negotiations held on June 30-July 1, 1980 with Soviet leaders at a time when the international situation had become more complex, and also his belief that relations between the FRG and the USSR would remain stable and long-term in accord with the objectives of the Moscow Treaty.<sup>160</sup>

Guided by the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Soviet diplomacy continued in the second half of the 1970s to actively work for the extension and strengthening of relations with Britain. A major contribution to the further development of these relations and the strengthening of mutually advantageous cooperation was the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Harold Wilson, which took place in February 1975.

An important landmark in the development of Soviet-British relations was the official visit to Britain by Andrei Gromyko (March 22-25, 1976), during which he had talks with the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, James Callaghan. During the visit, both sides affirmed the desire of their governments to strengthen and extend their bilateral relations. "The Soviet Union," declared Andrei Gromyko, "is in favour of the further development of good relations with Great Britain, as was clearly stated by the General Secretary of the CC CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev, at the highest forum of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the 25th Congress."<sup>161</sup> For his part, James Callaghan remarked that one of the most important aims of British foreign policy is the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>162</sup> During a discussion of international problems, both sides confirmed their intention to continue their efforts to strengthen peace and relax international tension, and to take active measures to halt the arms race. They also expressed their determination to fulfil all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

Given that the establishment of contacts and mutual understanding with the then ruling Labour Party would have a positive effect on the development of Soviet-British relations, the CC CPSU, on the

<sup>159</sup> *Pravda*, July 5, 1980.

<sup>160</sup> *Pravda*, August 13, 1980.

<sup>161</sup> *Pravda*, March 24, 1976.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*

invitation of the Executive Committee of the Labour Party, sent a delegation from the CPSU, headed by Boris Ponomarev, to London (October 28-November 2, 1976). During meetings with the leader of the Labour Party, Prime Minister James Callaghan (Prime Minister from April 1976), and other Labour Party leaders, the Soviet delegation emphasised the willingness of the Soviet Union to extend and strengthen relations with Britain. Both sides expressed their "joint intention to promote the further development of friendship and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields between the British and the Soviet peoples".<sup>163</sup>

A significant event in Soviet-British relations was the official visit to the USSR by the British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, David Owen (October 9-11, 1977). He was received by Leonid Brezhnev and conducted talks with Andrei Gromyko, during which there was an exchange of views on urgent international problems: security and cooperation in Europe, the strengthening and securing of detente, an end to the arms race, disarmament and preventing the danger of a nuclear war. Both sides confirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the necessity of tightening control over the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They also expressed their support for the convening of a special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament and a world conference on the same issue. On October 10, Andrei Gromyko and David Owen signed an Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.

In a joint communiqué on the visit, the two ministers expressed the desire of their governments to continue the development of political contacts and to promote the growth of trade and the development of scientific, technical and cultural exchange.

Economic links between the two countries increased together with political contacts. From 1974 to 1979 the trade turnover between the two countries increased from 890 million roubles to 1.9 billion roubles. Scientific, technical and cultural cooperation also developed. At the same time, the policies of the Labour government (particularly in the last years of its rule) showed increasing signs of unfriendliness to the Soviet Union on the pretext of "the defence of human rights".

The USSR made efforts to maintain normal relations with the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher, who came to power in May 1979. In a message to visitors to the Soviet exhibition in London, Leonid Brezhnev pointed out that the Soviet Union was prepared "to continue the extension and strengthening of cooperation with Great Britain, provided, of course, that the British side expressed a similar desire".<sup>164</sup> In June 1979, a meeting took place between

<sup>163</sup> *Pravda*, November 4, 1976.

<sup>164</sup> *Pravda*, May 24, 1979.

Alexei Kosygin and Mrs. Thatcher, and Andrei Gromyko met with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, in New York (September 1979) and in Vienna (May 1980).

However, the foreign policy of the Thatcher Government immediately took an anti-Soviet turn. It gave unconditional support to the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe and increased its military expenditure. The development of Soviet-British relations was halted by the hostile activities of the Thatcher Government, which started an unprecedented anti-Soviet campaign throughout the country on the pretext of the events in Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union developed its relations with Italy in accord with the provisions of the Peace Programme. Exchange visits by the Soviet and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs were of major significance in strengthening and extending cooperation between the USSR and Italy.

On January 10-14, 1977, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arnaldo Forlani paid an official visit to the USSR. He was received by Leonid Brezhnev and conducted talks with Andrei Gromyko, during which both sides remarked that Soviet-Italian relations had increased and had become more substantial. On January 11, 1977, referring to the prospects of their future development, Andrei Gromyko declared: "The Soviet Union resolutely supports the policy of strengthening wide-ranging cooperation with Italy and the co-ordination of the efforts to strengthen peace and detente. This policy was laid down by the decisions of the 25th Congress of the CPSU."<sup>165</sup>

On January 22-26, 1979, Andrei Gromyko paid an official visit to Italy, where he had talks with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arnaldo Forlani, and was received by the Italian President, Alessandro Pertini, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Giulio Andreotti. This visit contributed to the development of broad cooperation between the Soviet Union and Italy and revealed their closeness on a number of important international issues. It also showed that Soviet-Italian relations are becoming increasingly stable. During the visit a number of agreements were signed (a convention on legal aid in civil suits, a protocol on cooperation between the Hermitage and the Uffizi gallery and a memorandum on joint research in neutrino astrophysics), which extended the legal basis of Soviet-Italian relations.

The talks in June 1979, between the Italian Prime Minister, Giulio Andreotti and the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arnaldo Forlani, on their way to Tokyo, and Alexei Kosygin had a beneficial influence on Soviet-Italian relations. During the talks, Alexei Kosygin and Giulio Andreotti emphasised the prime importance of developing

<sup>165</sup> *Pravda*, January 12, 1977.

political cooperation, including regular bilateral consultations, and expressed their intention to combine their efforts in the cause of detente, disarmament and peace. Prime Minister Andreotti declared the Vienna talks and the SALT-2 Treaty to be of great importance. Both sides agreed to continue negotiations on new long-term Soviet-Italian agreement, and on October 27, 1979, an agreement was signed in Rome on economic cooperation between the USSR and Italy over the 1980-1985 period.

A delegation from the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, headed by Boris Ponomarev, which visited Italy from November 15-21, 1979, carried through useful work and had a noticeable effect on the further development of Soviet-Italian links. Soviet deputies met and exchanged views with the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Deputies.

However, towards the end of the 1970s, the Italian government made serious departures from its official declarations in its practical activity. To the detriment of its own fundamental national interests it voted in NATO for the deployment of new American nuclear missiles in Western Europe, including in Italy, and increased its military expenditure. Nonetheless, despite US pressure, Italy supports the preservation of detente<sup>166</sup> and the continuation of the development of Soviet-Italian relations, having refused to join in the measures taken by the Carter Administration. The leaders of Italy pointed out that the economic and political relations existing between Italy and the Soviet Union and also between Italy and other countries of Eastern Europe can serve as a model for relations between the East and the West and help the continuation of a dialogue that meets the interests of detente.<sup>167</sup>

Soviet-Italian cooperation in trade, economics, science and technology continues to develop successfully with every year. Between 1972 and 1978, Soviet-Italian trade increased fourfold.<sup>168</sup>

The Soviet Union is conducting a consistent policy of developing mutually advantageous and friendly relations with Canada, and considerable progress in this direction was achieved between 1976 and 1978. The Soviet and Canadian Foreign Ministers met during sessions of the UN General Assembly, discussed questions relating to their bilateral relations and exchanged opinions on ways of solving major international problems. In accordance with the protocol on consultation, signed on May 19, 1971, the two sides continued to maintain bilateral political contacts. Cooperation in trade, economics, science and technology also developed. Long-term agreements were signed on

<sup>166</sup> See *Pravda*, April 16, 1980.

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>168</sup> *Pravda*, February 22, 1980.

promoting economic, scientific, technical and industrial cooperation (1976), together with an agreement on fishing. The visits to Canada in 1976 by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Igor Novikov and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev contributed to the development of relations in this sphere.

The two-year programme of exchange and cooperation in the fields of science, education and culture, signed in 1978, laid the foundations for the further development of cultural relations between the USSR and Canada.

With the election of a Conservative government led by Charles Joseph Clark in May 1979, the foreign policy of Canada drew closer to that of the Carter Administration, becoming less friendly towards the Soviet Union. The Conservative government supported American plans to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe, and the NATO policy of increased militarisation. In connection with the events in Afghanistan, the Clark Government supported the American administration, adopted a decision to carry through a number of "measures" relating to Soviet-Canadian relations and backed out of a number of agreements reached earlier. However, these measures did not fundamentally affect mutually beneficial links between the two countries in the sphere of trade and economics. Although right-wing forces used the events in Afghanistan to stir up an atmosphere of anti-Sovietism in Canada, Soviet-Canadian relations continued to develop. During the Thirty-Fourth session of the UN General Assembly a meeting took place in New York between Andrei Gromyko and the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Flora MacDonald. Soviet-Canadian political consultations took place in Ottawa attended by the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Zemskov, at which were outlined ways of resolving certain practical objectives. Contacts and negotiations were continued at other levels, and some work was done on fulfilling previously concluded agreements.

In February 1980, the Canadian Conservative Party was defeated in the elections and the new government formed by the Liberal Party introduced a number of modifications into Canadian foreign policy to bring it in line with the traditional liberal policy of diversification of Canadian relations with other countries. Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau affirmed his intention to promote a relaxation of the existing tension in relations between the USA and the USSR and a strengthening of detente and peace.<sup>169</sup>

In its relations with Japan, the Soviet Union wishes to lay the foundations of good-neighbourly relations over a long period, thereby establishing a secure tradition of friendly Soviet-Japanese relations.

<sup>169</sup> *Pravda*, February 21, 1980.

At the 25th Congress of the CPSU, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "As we see it, good-neighbourliness and friendly cooperation should be the rule in Soviet-Japanese relations, and that is what we are working for."<sup>170</sup>

A positive contribution to the development of Soviet-Japanese relations was the official visit by Andrei Gromyko to Tokyo on January 9-13, 1976. Having noted that in the preceding years not a little had been done to extend and strengthen links between the USSR and Japan, Andrei Gromyko emphasised in the course of the negotiations that there was still much that could be done to extend them further. During the visit, both sides prolonged the exchange letters on cultural ties between the USSR and Japan, signed on January 27, 1972, and decided on the start of negotiations to prepare an agreement on cultural cooperation.

The generally auspicious atmosphere favouring the development of Soviet-Japanese relations was disturbed in the autumn of 1976 following a number of unfriendly actions on the part of the Japanese government. The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kiiochi Miyazawa went on a provocative sea-tour in the region of Soviet islands situated near Japan. The Japanese government took illegal measures regarding a Soviet military aircraft which landed on Japanese territory. A Soviet government statement underscored that the action taken in respect of the Soviet aircraft "cannot fail to have consequences for the present and future relations between the Soviet Union and Japan".<sup>171</sup> As a result, a joint meeting of Soviet and Japanese committees for business cooperation, and the signing of a long-term agreement on trade and payment for 1978-1980 were delayed. The planned visit by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ichiro Hatoyama, to the USSR did not take place, and the Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, Nikolai Patolichev, cancelled his visit to Japan.

The Japanese government, disturbed by the prospect of a deterioration in its relations with the USSR, took steps to smooth over the situation. In 1977, the General Secretary of the Cabinet of Ministers, Sunao Sonoda, and the Minister of Labour, Hirohide Ishida, came to Moscow in April and June respectively. On June 15, 1977, during a meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Hirohide Ishida, both sides expressed their "joint desire to promote the all-round development and strengthening of genuine good-neighbourliness and mutually advantageous cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan".<sup>172</sup>

On January 8-11, 1978, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sunao Sonoda, paid an official visit to the USSR. During the talks, Andrei Gromyko and Sunao Sonoda exchanged views on the devel-

<sup>170</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, pp. 36-37.

<sup>171</sup> *Pravda*, September 29, 1976.

<sup>172</sup> *Pravda*, June 16, 1977.

opment of bilateral relations and discussed urgent international problems of mutual interest.

The signing of a peace treaty between the two countries still remains an unresolved issue in Soviet-Japanese relations. The joint Soviet-Japanese declaration published on October 10, 1973 at the end of the visit by the Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, to the USSR, contained an agreement to continue negotiations on this matter. During its talks with Japanese leaders, the Soviet side repeatedly expressed its support for the signing of a peace treaty. "Given a sober approach on the part of the Japanese side to the realities that have taken shape as a result of the Second World War," commented Leonid Brezhnev, on June 6, 1977, "this could be done—and done quickly."<sup>173</sup> However, the insistence by the Japanese side that there exists an "unresolved territorial problem" in Soviet-Japanese relations reveals that ruling circles in Japan are not willing to conclude a peace treaty. In view of this, the Soviet government proposed to the Japanese government that the two sides exchange views and sign a treaty on good-neighbourliness and cooperation while continuing negotiations on the signing of a peace treaty. On June 6, 1977, answering questions put by the editor-in-chief of the *Asakhi Shimbun*, Leonid Brezhnev explained that the signing of a Soviet-Japanese treaty on good-neighbourliness and cooperation "would constitute a sharp turn towards overcoming the remaining distrust and promoting reliable and mutually beneficial cooperation in all spheres"<sup>174</sup> In the course of Soviet-Japanese negotiations in January 1978, Andrei Gromyko handed a draft treaty on good-neighbourliness and cooperation to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sunao Sonoda.<sup>175</sup> However, the Japanese government is still avoiding an examination of the Soviet proposal.

Just as US policies, the rapprochement between revanchist militarist circles in Japan and Peking hegemonists seeking to bring Japan under the influence of their anti-Soviet, anti-socialist policies is negatively affecting the development of Soviet-Japanese relations. On August 12, 1978, a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between Japan and China. The text of this treaty contains a clause on opposition to "hegemonism", included at the insistence of Peking and which, despite certain reservations made by the Japanese, is still clearly directed against the USSR.

The Soviet attitude to the Sino-Japanese treaty was set forth in the pages of *Pravda* as follows: "The content of the Sino-Japanese treaty signed in Peking goes beyond the limits of bilateral relations, and therefore the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent to what has occurred. In these circumstances it has the sovereign right to take

<sup>173</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, p. 91.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 92.

<sup>175</sup> *Pravda*, February 24, 1978.



whatever measures it deems necessary to defend its interests."<sup>176</sup>

Between 1978 and 1980, relations between the USSR and Japan developed unevenly. Repeated statements by the Japanese government in favour of the development of relations with the USSR were not supported by any practical measures. A slanderous propaganda campaign on the "Soviet military threat" gathered momentum.

The USA and the PRC are pushing Japan into the dangerous course of militarisation and actions hostile to the Soviet Union. Military cooperation between Japan on the one hand and the USA and China on the other is increasing in scope and the dangerous concept of Japan as a "mighty military power" is being reborn. The visit to Tokyo by the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, Hua Guofeng (May 1980), represented a further attempt on the part of Peking to push the Japanese government into confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Demonstrating its "solidarity" with its American allies and the Peking hegemonists, the Japanese government restricted its contacts with the USSR in connection with the events in Afghanistan. The Japanese parliament adopted a decision to delay the visit to Japan by a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. However, the Japanese government also refrained from taking any measures that might have resulted in retaliatory measures by the USSR and led to a serious deterioration in Japanese-Soviet relations, a reduction in trade and economic cooperation and, more importantly, in cooperation in the field of fishing.

In the years between 1976 and 1980, Soviet-Japanese cooperation in trade, economics, science and technology developed rapidly on the basis of mutual advantage. Of great significance in this regard was the meeting on August 13, 1976 between Leonid Brezhnev and a delegation of Japanese businessmen. During the talks the two sides discussed the preparation of a long-term programme of economic cooperation over a period of 10-15 years based on the more intensive exploitation of the resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East, and also the conclusion of an agreement on the principles of economic cooperation, similar to those existing between the USSR and Britain, France and Canada. In 1977, as a result of joint decisions taken during this meeting, a long-term agreement on trade and payment was signed which provided for the volume of trade between the two countries to reach 10 billion roubles or increase by 1.6 times in comparison to 1971-1975. Inter-governmental documents were also signed on the provision of Japanese credit to the Soviet Union to the value of 300 million dollars, together with an agreement on cooperation in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

In 1977 and 1978, the USSR and Japan also signed a number

<sup>176</sup> *Pravda*, August 25, 1978.

of agreements on fishing in the coastal waters of the USSR and Japan and on cooperation in the fishing industry. In 1978 a programme of cultural and scientific exchange was signed for the period of 1978-1983, and this served as a stimulus to the development of Soviet-Japanese cultural cooperation.

Questions relating to the further development of Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation were discussed at a meeting on September 25, 1979 between Alexei Kosygin and representatives of the Japanese business circles. During these talks it was noted that there existed significant possibilities for developing cooperation in the interests of strengthening good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Japan, and great stress was laid on the need to take steps to secure peace in the Far East and other regions of the world.

Referring to Soviet-Japanese relations in his speech in Alma Ata (August 29, 1980), Leonid Brezhnev expressed the willingness of the USSR to continue to develop mutually advantageous economic and other ties with its neighbour, Japan, and pointed out that the development of these links depended on the extent to which the Japanese government was able to maintain an independent and realistic line in its policies and avoid influence from outside pushing Japan into militarisation and actions hostile to the Soviet Union.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the North European countries have, on the whole, been positive. The second half of the 1970s saw more active bilateral cooperation between the USSR and these countries in the fields of politics, trade, economics, science, technology, culture and in other spheres, and the legal-contractual basis of these relations was further developed by the conclusion of a number of bilateral inter-governmental agreements. Contacts via the Ministries for Foreign Affairs have become standard practice.

Cooperation between the USSR and the North European countries in international affairs has also broadened, the Soviet Union taking into account in this respect the basically realistic approach of the North European countries to the solution of major international problems and the positive tendencies in their foreign policy as regards detente, disarmament and the extension of European cooperation.

The development of relations between the USSR and Finland serves as a positive example of relations between states with different social systems on the principles of peaceful coexistence. These relations, noted Leonid Brezhnev, have become "a major element in international life".<sup>177</sup>

A major contribution to the development of Soviet-Finnish relations were the negotiations which took place during an official visit to the USSR by the President of Finland, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen (May 17-24, 1977). During the talks both sides paid particular atten-

<sup>177</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, p. 60.

tion to bilateral Soviet-Finnish relations and the prospects for their further development. "We, the Finns," declared Urho Kekkonen on May 17, 1977, "are convinced that the system of bilateral relations based on the 1948 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is not only essential for both sides but also represents the best possible variant given that there is no acceptable and practicable alternative."<sup>178</sup>

On May 18, Leonid Brezhnev and Urho Kekkonen signed a long-term Programme for the Development and Expansion of Soviet-Finnish Trade, Economic, Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation for the period ending 1990. This was the first time such a programme had been signed between states with different socio-economic systems. An agreement on cooperation in the construction of the Kostamuxsa mining and ore-concentrating combine in the Karelian ASSR was also signed.

The negotiations confirmed the coincidence of the views of the USSR and Finland on a wide range of urgent international issues. The two sides expressed their determination to work for the strengthening of detente and the implementation of all the principles and agreements contained in the Helsinki Final Act. They also agreed that finding a solution to the problem of disarmament was the most important issue of the day, supported the convocation of a World Conference on Disarmament and called for progress in the negotiations to limit arms and armed forces in Central Europe and the holding of European congresses or inter-state meetings on cooperation in the fields of environmental protection, transport, energy resources and other spheres.

The stability and solidity of Soviet-Finnish relations was strikingly revealed on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. On April 4, 1978, a Finnish government delegation headed by the Prime Minister, Kalevi Sorsa, arrived in Moscow and was received by Alexei Kosygin. In the course of their talks, the two sides confirmed the determination of the USSR and Finland to further develop and extend Soviet-Finnish relations. A Soviet government delegation headed by Andrei Gromyko attended the ceremonies in Finland to mark the anniversary of the signing of the treaty.

The meeting between Grigory Romanov, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and First Secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU, and the Prime Minister of Finland in connection with the completion of the Svetogorsk pulp and paper combine, reconstructed with the participation of Finnish firms, also assisted the development of Soviet-Finnish cooperation. Speaking on February 22, 1979, at a meeting to mark the opening of the second

<sup>178</sup> *Pravda*, May 18, 1977.

section of the combine, Grigory Romanov declared: "At joint Soviet-Finnish building projects, as in other spheres of cooperation, in everyday contacts and common labour, the feelings of friendship between our two peoples are strengthened. This in turn serves to cement Soviet-Finnish relations and expand the sphere of good-neighbourliness between our countries."<sup>179</sup>

The government of Finland responds positively to Soviet foreign policy initiatives. It expressed concern over the decision taken by the December session of the NATO Council to deploy new American missile systems in Western Europe and expressed its negative attitude to the freezing of the SALT-2 Treaty by President Carter.

At a time when the international situation was becoming more acute due to the provocative actions taken by the Carter Administration, Finnish foreign policy remained unchanged. In his 1980 New Year Address, Finnish President Urho Kekkonen declared that the policy of friendship and cooperation with the USSR had been fully justified. While remaining the basis for relations between the two countries, this policy was also directed at strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world.<sup>180</sup> On February 7, 1980, in a speech delivered at the opening of the spring session of the Finnish parliament, Urho Kekkonen stressed the need to avoid the collapse of detente and to increase efforts to limit arms in Europe.<sup>181</sup>

In September 1980, the President of the Republic of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, sent a telegram to the Soviet leaders on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet-Finnish agreement in which the Soviet Union renounced the right to use the territory of Porkkala as a naval base and withdrew Soviet armed forces. In the telegram it was noted that the restoration of the Porkkala territory and the simultaneous extension of the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was seen as an important stage in the development of relations of trust and good-neighbourliness between Finland and the Soviet Union. The 1948 Treaty serves as the foundation of friendly relations between the two countries, relations which are not affected by changes in international politics.

In the telegramme sent in reply, Leonid Brezhnev and Alexei Kosygin expressed their sincere thanks for the message of friendship and also their firm belief that relations between the two countries would continue to expand on the basis of the 1948 Treaty and in full accord with the provisions of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.<sup>182</sup> This policy underlying Soviet-Finnish relations was further

<sup>179</sup> G. V. Romanov, *Selected Speeches and Articles*, Moscow, 1980, p. 502 (in Russian.).

<sup>180</sup> See *Za rubezhom*, No. 9, 1980, p. 13.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>182</sup> *Pravda*, September 30, 1980.

confirmed during a visit by the President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen, to the USSR in the middle of November 1980.

Over recent years, Soviet-Finnish economic cooperation, which is wide-ranging in content, has become increasingly systematic and stable. The USSR and Finland have successfully cooperated in the building and reconstruction of major industrial and energy projects (the metallurgical combine in Raahe, the Saymen Canal, the Svetogorsk pulp and paper combine and two atomic power stations in the town of Lowieza). A mining and ore-concentrating combine is presently under construction in Kostamuksa.

Over the period 1976-1980 the volume of Soviet-Finnish trade amounted to more than 11 billion roubles. Finland is the third largest trading partner of the Soviet Union among the developed capitalist countries.<sup>183</sup>

The legal-contractual basis of Soviet-Finnish relations is being expanded every year. Describing relations between the USSR and Finland, Leonid Brezhnev noted: "As a result of persistent and purposeful joint efforts, a new political climate has come about in the relations between our two states. Friendship and trust, and a desire to understand each other's problems and to take into account each other's interests have come to the forefront."<sup>184</sup>

For his outstanding services in the struggle to preserve and strengthen peace, in 1980 the President of Finland, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, was awarded the international Lenin Prize For the Promotion of Peace among Nations.

Relations between the USSR and Sweden also developed favourably in the main. In 1976, the Prime Minister of Sweden, Olof Palme, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union. In 1978, King Carl XVI Gustav of Sweden also paid an official visit to the USSR, and had talks with Leonid Brezhnev.

Scientific, technical and industrial cooperation on the basis of long-term agreements is stable, despite attempts on the part of reactionary circles in Sweden to damage the generally auspicious development of Soviet-Swedish relations by means of an anti-Soviet campaign.

Relations between the USSR and Denmark are also marked by stability. In 1976, the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, paid an official visit to Denmark, in the course of which a Soviet-Danish protocol on consultations was signed. In 1978, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Knud Berge Andersen, visited the USSR.

Over the last five years the volume of trade between the Soviet Union and Denmark has more than doubled. In 1978, a long-term programme of economic and industrial cooperation was signed be-

<sup>183</sup> *Za rubezhom*, No. 9, 1980, p. 12.

<sup>184</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, p. 60.

tween the USSR and Denmark.

Relations between the USSR and Norway have developed in various spheres. However, the Soviet Union has several times pointed out to the Norwegian government the inadmissibility of military activity in the Spitsbergen region. The Soviet side made representations to Norway in connection with the use by American submarines, carrying Polaris missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, of radar navigation stations situated on Norwegian territory, and in connection with a statement made by representatives of the Norwegian government on its intention to decide on the creation of depots for war materiel and munitions in Norway for the armed forces of the NATO countries.

In 1978-1979, Soviet-Norwegian consultations took place at which the two sides exchanged views on unresolved issues.

A certain measure of progress has been made recently in the relations between the USSR and Iceland. For the first time in the history of Soviet-Icelandic relations, the Prime Minister of Iceland, Geir Hallgrímsson, paid an official visit to the USSR. The volume of Soviet-Icelandic trade has also increased in recent years, and the Soviet Union is now the fourth largest trading partner of Iceland after the USA, Britain and the FRG.

Both the USSR and the North European countries have a direct interest in the development of good-neighbourly relations and the expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation. However, this mutual interest has been negatively affected over the last few years by the increasing military activity of NATO in the north of Europe and the strengthening of Norwegian and Danish military cooperation with this bloc.

The principled approach of the Soviet Union to the problems relating to the situation in the north of Europe is reflected in the words spoken by Leonid Brezhnev, who declared: "We are convinced that the ways of really strengthening security in North of Europe should not be sought in the activation of the bloc policy here. The main thing is to find, through concerted efforts, solutions which are in accord with the objective interests of the peoples and which would promote peace."<sup>185</sup>

The Soviet Union is a consistent supporter of the development of good-neighbourly relations with neutral Austria. In December 1978, on the occasion of the official visit to the USSR by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, Andrei Gromyko stated: "We fully support Austria's adherence to the policy laid down in the Austrian State Treaty and the law on permanent neutrality. It is precisely this policy that sustains the mutual trust and willingness for broad cooperation that is a feature of Soviet-Austrian relations."<sup>186</sup>

<sup>185</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, p. 61.

<sup>186</sup> *Pravda*, December 20, 1978.

During a visit to the Soviet Union in February 1978 by the Austrian Federal Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, the Soviet leaders emphasised the principled, consistent and long-term nature of the policy of the USSR, directed towards friendship and comprehensive cooperation with Austria.<sup>187</sup> In a telegram sent in May 1980 to the Federal President of the Republic of Austria Dr. Rudolf Kirchschläger on the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty on the re-establishing an independent and democratic Austria, Leonid Brezhnev noted that the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Austria "had become an important element in European and international peaceful cooperation".<sup>188</sup>

The Soviet Union values the contribution made by the neutral countries, including Austria, to the restructuring of European relations on the basis of the recognition of and respect for the existing political and territorial realities, and also their contribution to the cause of developing European cooperation in accord with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

In the 1970s, political contacts developed between the USSR and Switzerland. There are now regular consultations and exchanges of opinion between representatives of the two Ministries for Foreign Affairs both on relations between the two countries and on major international problems, particularly the problem of European security. Parliamentary links between the two states have also been established.

The same period saw a noticeable development in relations between the USSR and Belgium. The visit by Andrei Gromyko to Brussels in October 1976 made it possible to strengthen positive aspects in Soviet-Belgian relations. Between 1976 and 1980 there was an exchange of parliamentary delegations, contacts at the level of ministries and departments were expanded and the legal-contractual basis of Soviet-Belgian relations was consolidated. In particular, agreements were signed on trade, shipping, on the development of economic, industrial, scientific and technical cooperation and on cultural exchange. In 1976, a protocol was signed on the exchange of consulates and in 1978 a General Consulate of the USSR was opened in Antwerp. Belgium has become an important foreign trade partner of the USSR, occupying seventh place among the countries of Western Europe.

In its relations with the Netherlands, the USSR has conducted a policy of developing mutually advantageous cooperation. In August 1976, a delegation from the States-General of Netherlands paid an official visit to the USSR, and in April 1978 a delegation from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR paid a return visit to the Netherlands.

<sup>187</sup> See A. N. Kosygin, *Towards a Noble Goal*, Vol. 2, p. 544 (in Russian).

<sup>188</sup> *Pravda*, May 15, 1980.

Of great importance in the development of Soviet-Dutch relations were contacts at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs during sessions of the UN General Assembly. During such a meeting in September 1978 both ministers positively evaluated the situation in Soviet-Dutch relations and confirmed the willingness of both sides to develop them further. In 1979, there was an exchange of messages between Leonid Brezhnev and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Andries van Agt, on questions relating to disarmament and the reduction of arms in Europe.

Soviet-Dutch trade relations, economic, scientific and technical cooperation and cultural exchange are basically stable.

Following the overthrow in July 1974 of the military dictatorship in Greece, positive changes took place in Soviet-Greek relations.

Questions concerning Soviet-Greek relations and the prospects for their future development, together with a wide range of international problems of common interest were the subject of negotiations between Andrei Gromyko and the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Rallis during a visit by the latter to the USSR in September 1978. These negotiations revealed identical or similar views on such vital issues as disarmament, detente, international tension and a political settlement in the Middle East. Both sides emphasised the urgent need to achieve a rapid solution to the Cyprus question on the basis of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, respect for its policy of non-alignment and the fulfilment of resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly and Security Council on the Cyprus question.

The official visit to the USSR by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis in October 1979, and his meeting with Leonid Brezhnev were instrumental in further developing good-neighbourly relations and cooperation between the two countries. During the visit joint Soviet-Greek documents were signed (a Soviet-Greek declaration and agreement on economic and technical cooperation between the USSR and Greece).

The Soviet Union is unequivocally in favour of good-neighbourly relations with Greece and of strengthening and extending mutual understanding in the sphere of international politics. In the introduction to his book, *Peace—the Priceless Treasure of the Peoples of the World*, published in Greek in Athens in 1978, Leonid Brezhnev emphasised: "There are no disputed issues between the USSR and Greece that could impede the development of friendly relations."<sup>189</sup>

The mid-1970s saw the development of Soviet-Portuguese relations.<sup>190</sup> Guided by the Peace Programme, the Soviet Union bases its policy towards Portugal on the principles of peaceful coexistence, the

<sup>189</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Vol. 7, p. 449 (in Russian).  
<sup>190</sup> See *Pravda*, June 7, 1976.



strengthening of European and international security and the promotion of mutually advantageous cooperation.

The collapse of the fascist regime in Spain created a favourable opportunity for re-establishing relations between the USSR and Spain, broken off in March 1939. Leonid Brezhnev referred to the re-establishment of relations between the two countries as a notable event in the political life of Europe. "Lately," he stated, "we have developed adequate cooperation with that country, mostly in economic matters. Now, it can be expected that our relations will be further developed."<sup>191</sup>

In its policy governing its relations with all the countries of Europe, the Soviet Union bases itself primarily on the need to strengthen peace and international security. The USSR and the other socialist countries are striving to turn European cooperation into a secure foundation for peace on the continent of Europe.

### **The Strengthening of Cooperation between the USSR and the Newly Independent Countries**

According to the policy laid down by the 25th Congress of the CPSU the Soviet Union in its relations with newly independent countries "fully supports the legitimate aspirations of the young states, their determination to put an end to all imperialist exploitation, and to take full charge of their own national wealth".<sup>192</sup>

At the basis of the ever-expanding cooperation between the USSR and the developing countries are common anti-imperialist objectives in questions relating to the national liberation struggle. As was noted by Nikolai Tikhonov, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, they have "a great deal in common in the struggle for peace and international security, for the elimination of exploitation and imperialist theft, in the building of a just society".<sup>193</sup> Supporting this struggle is an important part of the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples adopted at the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

The determining tendency in the development of relations between the USSR and the countries that have liberated themselves from colonial dependence is the further consolidation of the ties between them, enrichment of the political content of these ties and the exten-

<sup>191</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Speech at the 16th Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR, March 21, 1977*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, p. 32.

<sup>192</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 22.

<sup>193</sup> *Pravda*, November 7, 1980.

sion of wide-ranging cooperation. The number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America with whom the USSR has concluded agreements on economic and technical cooperation has grown from 40 in 1970 to 64 in 1978.

Relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent countries have become an important element in the structure of present-day international relations and international economic ties. The CPSU and the Soviet state are pursuing a consistent policy of internationalist solidarity with peoples who have defended their independence. "In the area of the liberation struggle, as everywhere, the Soviet Union supports the side of progress, democracy and national independence, and views the newly independent countries as its friends and comrades-in-arms."<sup>194</sup>

The Soviet Union has made a significant contribution to the strengthening of the national economy, to cultural development and to the defence of countries who have chosen the path of independent progressive development.

Among the developing countries are a large number of those who have proclaimed the building of a socialist society as their objective and who are carrying through far-reaching, progressive social changes. Over the last two decades, the number of such countries in Asia and Africa has increased considerably. In 1979, there were more than ten such countries in Africa, accounting for 30 per cent of the territory and almost 25 per cent of the population of the continent. They include Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Guinea, the Congo People's Republic, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Madagascar and Benin. Profound and positive changes are taking place in these states in the sphere of social relations. Revolutionary democracy, which has assumed the leading position in a number of these countries, adopts a clear anti-imperialist position in the international arena and supports cooperation with the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community.

However, the external forces of imperialism and the internal forces of feudal-compradore, tribal and clerical reaction persist in their attempts to impose their will on these countries and change the course of events in their own favour.

In the 1970s Africa became the scene of increased activity on the part of imperialist and Maoist forces. "Imperialism is doing everything it can," noted Leonid Brezhnev, "to prevent the peoples of the African countries from fully enjoying the fruit of a lasting peace and genuine independence."<sup>195</sup> This is why the imperialists are strengthening the last bastion of racism on the continent—the Republic of South Africa, attempting to knock together a military-political

<sup>194</sup> A. A. Gromyko, *The Leninist Foreign Policy*, p. 587.

<sup>195</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Our Course: Peace and Socialism*, pp. 131-32.

bloc in the region of the Red Sea, and why Israel and the Republic of South Africa are working together to develop nuclear weapons. This is why the imperialist states and the Peking hegemonists are working with the internal forces of reaction in the African countries to break up African unity, inflame internal conflicts and organise provocations against the patriotic forces and young progressive states of Africa. In the second half of the 1970s, mercenaries launched an attack on Benin, there was imperialist intervention in the internal affairs of Zaire, the aggressive actions on the part of South-African racists against Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana and the Republic of South Africa continued its aggressive incursions into Angola. Imperialist circles, supported by Peking, exploited the chauvinist-expansionist ambitions of the leadership of Somalia and provoked armed conflict in the Horn of Africa.

A Soviet government statement of June 23, 1978, exposed the essence of imperialist policy in Africa, and revealed the total falseness of the assertion that the assistance given by the USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries to certain African countries constituted a threat to peace and stability in Africa. The legitimacy of such assistance follows from the United Nations Charter, the norms of international law and the sovereignty of the countries involved. The Soviet government statement once more underlined the principles of Soviet policy in relation to Africa. In supporting the forces defending the cause of national independence, social progress and democracy in Africa, the USSR is not seeking any advantage for itself, is not attempting to establish political domination nor soliciting military bases. The Soviet Union is opposed to the preservation of any form of colonialism and racism in Africa, is opposed to neo-colonialism, and resolutely condemns military and political interference by imperialists and Peking hegemonists in the internal affairs of independent African states, violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Soviet Union is seeking to achieve the rapid elimination of sources of tension on the continent of Africa, supports the settlement of existing disagreements between individual African countries and opposes attempts by imperialists and the Peking leaders to set the African countries against each other and incite internecine strife and wars.

### **Relations between the USSR and the Countries of Africa**

Between 1960, when the Fifteenth Session of the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, introduced on the initiative of the USSR, and the beginning of 1980s, the struggle of the peoples of Africa against colonial slavery and racism had been crowned with new and historic victories.

In his message of congratulations to the states and peoples of Africa on African Liberation Day, May 25, 1980, Leonid Brezhnev expressed his conviction that the just cause of the liberation of Namibia would triumph and that the shameful system of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa would be brought to an end—the last two seats of colonialism and racism on the continent of Africa.<sup>196</sup>

In the 1970s, the national liberation struggle in Africa was marked by a historic success—the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. The selfless aid given by the USSR to the liberation movements in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Angola helped the peoples of these countries to win victory in the struggle against the Portuguese colonialists and brought the day of their national liberation closer. The assistance given by the USSR and the other socialist countries was of great importance to the patriots of the People's Republic of Angola in their struggle for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national unity in the face of encroachments by the forces of imperialism, racists from South Africa and internal reaction.

The People's Republic of Angola had only just gained its independence when, in January-March 1976, it fell victim to intervention by South African racists supported by pro-imperialist and pro-Maoist forces. In the course of a bitter hostile campaign against Angola on the part of bourgeois circles in the West, the Soviet Union, Cuba and other socialist countries gave Angola resolute support.

As a result of the timely and selfless aid given by the USSR, Cuba and other socialist countries, and also by progressive countries in Africa, South African troops and imperialist and Maoist mercenaries were driven from the territory of the young republic in March 1976. In May 1976, Soviet-Angolan talks were held in Moscow, and a Declaration on the Basic Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola was signed, together with a number of agreements relating to economics, trade and culture. On October 7-13 of the same year, a party and state delegation from the People's Republic of Angola, led by the President of the PRA, Antonio Agostinho Neto, visited the Soviet Union. Following summit meetings and talks, the two sides signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the People's Republic of Angola and an Agreement on Cooperation between the CPSU and the MPLA—Party of Labour.<sup>197</sup> "Soviet aid," declared Agostinho Neto, "has played an enormous role in our historical development, in our struggle to win independence and reconstruct our country. Nor could it be otherwise, insofar as the Soviet Union, rightly in the vanguard of the historical development of the peoples of

<sup>196</sup> *Pravda*, May 25, 1980.

<sup>197</sup> See *The Visit by a Party and State Delegation from the People's Republic of Angola to the Soviet Union, September 7-13, 1976*, Moscow, 1976 (in Russian).

the world, is building communism and has passed along a truly amazing revolutionary road leading from an exploiter society to socialism and the birth of proletarian internationalism."<sup>198</sup>

In September 1977, a delegation from the CPSU led by Andrei Kirilenko, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC CPSU, took part in the work of the 1st Congress of the MPLA—Party of Labour. There are regular exchanges of party and governmental delegations between the two countries and consultations on international questions. A Soviet-Angolan inter-governmental commission has been established to deal with economic, scientific and technical cooperation and trade.

On December 19-23, 1979, an Angolan party and governmental delegation headed by the Chairman of the MPLA—Party of Labour and the new President of the PRA, José Eduardo dos Santos, paid an official friendly visit to the Soviet Union. In the course of the talks, the two sides found themselves in complete agreement on major international issues. As regards the situation in Africa, the leaders of the Soviet Union and Angola re-affirmed their resolute support for the struggle of the peoples of Africa for freedom and independence and the total elimination of colonial and racist regimes. The Soviet-Angolan talks in Moscow revealed the further strengthening of the friendly relations existing between the two countries. In the course of the visit, a number of documents were signed which provide for the expansion of wide-ranging links on a party and state level.<sup>199</sup> Speaking of the victory of the Angolan people in their struggle for national liberation, dos Santos underscored "the decisive moral and material contribution"<sup>200</sup> made by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

A clear evidence of the internationalist position of the Soviet Union, Cuba and the other countries of the socialist community was the constant aid they rendered to revolutionary Ethiopia, including during the period when, as a result of Somalian aggression (1977-1978), supported by imperialist forces, Ethiopia was threatened with partition. The Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Council of Ministers of Socialist Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, expressed on behalf of the leadership and people of the country "deep gratitude to the Soviet people, the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Soviet government and Leonid Brezhnev personally for their firm support and internationalist aid to the Ethiopian revolutionary struggle".<sup>201</sup>

The development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations were further promoted by the visit paid to the USSR in May 1977 by a government delegation from Ethiopia, led by Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and the

<sup>198</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 13-14.

<sup>199</sup> *Pravda*, December 20-23, 1979.

<sup>200</sup> *Pravda*, December 22, 1979.

<sup>201</sup> *Pravda*, January 7, 1978.

signing of a Declaration on the Basic Principles of Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia, together with a number of other agreements. In 1978, Mengistu Haile-Mariam visited the Soviet Union twice (April, November), and had talks with Leonid Brezhnev which were of great political importance for the further development of friendly relations between the two countries. On November 20, 1978, following negotiations with Soviet leaders, a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia was signed for 20 years. That same year, a party and government delegation from the USSR, led by Vasily Kuznetsov, alternate member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, visited Ethiopia. During the visit the two sides signed an agreement on the establishment of an inter-governmental commission on economic, scientific and technical cooperation and trade. In September 1979, the head of the Soviet government paid an official visit to Ethiopia on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution.

The official friendly visit paid by the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the People's Organizing Provisional Office for the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile-Mariam, to the Soviet Union from October 27 to November 10, 1980, made an important new contribution to the development of friendship and comprehensive cooperation between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia. During the talks it was emphasised that Soviet-Ethiopian relations are deepening and expanding in every sphere on the basis of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, that they reflect the common interests of the peoples of both countries and their loyalty to the ideals of the struggle against imperialism, expansionism, colonialism, racism, apartheid and reaction, and promote the unity of all progressive, democratic and peaceloving forces in the struggle for peace and international security, for freedom, independence and social progress.

In the course of the talks, the two sides were unanimous in their support for the active struggle against the increasing danger of war, for the settlement of disputed issues by peaceful political means, and for the transformation of detente into a permanent feature of international life.

In a joint Soviet-Ethiopian declaration, the two sides called for summit meetings of state leaders from all regions of the world to discuss the problems related to the elimination of sources of international tension, expressed their concern over attempts by imperialist and reactionary forces to complicate the situation in Africa, including in the Horn of Africa, and noted that the creation of military bases in Somalia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf by the US administration constituted a direct threat to Ethiopia, and also to the peace and

security of countries in that region. The USSR and Socialist Ethiopia called for the Red Sea to be turned into a peace zone and expressed deep concern over the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran. They called for a rapid solution to this conflict by the peaceful means of negotiations, first and foremost between the two opposing sides in the conflict. They also supported the efforts of the United Nations and the non-aligned movement directed at finding a political solution to the conflict.

The joint Soviet-Ethiopian declaration expresses satisfaction at the victory of the people of Zimbabwe and full support for the national liberation movement in the south of Africa. It also demands an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia by the South African racist regime.

The Soviet Union and Socialist Ethiopia also condemned the racist regime in Pretoria for its continuing aggression against Angola and other independent African states.

The Soviet-Ethiopian talks were marked by a broad measure of agreement on all major international issues.<sup>202</sup>

An important event in Soviet relations with the countries of Africa was the signing, on March 31, 1977, of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Mozambique. The official friendly visit paid to the USSR in November 1980 by the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Chairman of the FRELIMO party, Samora Moisés Machel, and his talks with Soviet leaders were a clear sign of the expansion of Soviet-Mozambique political and economic cooperation.

"During the armed struggle of the people of Mozambique for national liberation," stressed Samora Machel during the talks, "firm ties of cooperation were established between ourselves and the Soviet Union." For his part, Leonid Brezhnev expressed his belief that Soviet-Mozambique relations held great promise for the future. The two countries are working together on the international scene like loyal comrades-in-arms in the struggle for peace, national liberation and social progress throughout the world.<sup>203</sup>

Relations between the USSR and the Congo People's Republic, Tanzania and Zambia have also strengthened over recent years.

Recent events in the Democratic Republic of Madagascar confirm the conclusion made by the 25th Congress of the CPSU that in the period of radical social changes following upon the strengthening and expanding of the influence of socialism on the development of world history, "the scale of the revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement is steadily growing".<sup>204</sup> The First Congress of the Democratic Committee of Support for the Malagasy Socialist Revolu-

<sup>202</sup> *Pravda*, November 12, 1980.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>204</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 46.

tionary Charter took place in August 1976. The congress adopted important resolutions directed at unifying the activities of all the anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and democratic forces of the country. The resolution on foreign policy emphasises the necessity of close alliance and the development of fraternal cooperation with the socialist countries and, in particular, with the Soviet Union.<sup>205</sup>

In 1978, on the invitation of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Soviet government, the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, visited the Soviet Union. His talks with Soviet leaders were yet further evidence of the strengthening and expansion of links between the two countries and the development of all-round cooperation, including joint efforts in the field of foreign policy in the name of peace and progress.

The Soviet government, which has always actively supported the patriotic forces in the south of Africa, was extremely pleased to greet in April 1980 the formation of a new independent African state, the fiftieth on the continent—the Republic of Zimbabwe. The message of congratulations sent by Soviet leaders to the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front declared: “The Soviet Union always gave its unswerving support to the people of Zimbabwe, displaying solidarity in word and deed with its long liberation struggle”.<sup>206</sup> The message expressed the hope that relations of friendship and cooperation would develop between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Zimbabwe.

At the Thirty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union demanded full implementation of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted twenty years ago on Soviet initiative. The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, expressed his conviction that the day would come when the people of Namibia would also win freedom and independence. At the session of the UN General Assembly, the Soviet delegation gave its resolute support to developing states’ striving to secure their economic independence and also supported their inalienable right to control their natural resources, and their legitimate demand that international economic relations be restructured on the basis of equality and the elimination of any form of discrimination.<sup>207</sup>

### Soviet Efforts to Obtain a Just Settlement to the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples, set

<sup>205</sup> P. I. Mancha, *Urgent Problems in Modern Africa*, Moscow, 1979, pp. 112-14 (in Russian).

<sup>206</sup> *Pravda*, April 18, 1980.

<sup>207</sup> *Pravda*, September 24, 1980.



the objective: to attain "a just and durable settlement in the Middle East".<sup>208</sup> The Soviet position on this issue was expressed in the Soviet government statement on the Middle East, issued on April 29, 1976, in the Soviet proposals made on October 2, 1976,<sup>209</sup> and also in the speech delivered by Leonid Brezhnev at the 16th Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR in March 1977.<sup>210</sup> This position can be summed up as follows: the final document (or documents) on peace in the Middle East should be based on the principle of the inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war, and on the right of all the states in that region to independent existence and security. Such a document should also guarantee the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs, including the right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state. The Soviet Union considers it self-evident that any document on peace in the Middle East must provide for the evacuation of Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied in 1967, a process that could be achieved in stages, but within a strictly determined time limit. The borders between Israel and its Arab neighbours involved in the conflict must be clearly and definitively defined and must be thereafter inviolable. From the moment when the evacuation of Israeli troops is completed, the state of war between Israel and the Arab states involved in the conflict will come to an end and peaceful relations will be established, with both sides accepting a reciprocal commitment to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability and political independence of the other side and to solve any international disputes between them by peaceful means. Demilitarised zones could be established on both sides of the borders, to be supervised either by special UN troops or UN observers for a clearly specified period of time. The final documents should also contain provisions on the passage of ships from all countries, including Israel (after the cessation of the state of war), through the Suez Canal, the Tirana Strait and the Gulf of Acaba. The fulfilment of the conditions for a peaceful settlement could be guaranteed by the UN Security Council, or even by individual states, such as the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain, who could have their own observers among the UN contingents in the appropriate zones.

Following an exchange of views between the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, and the US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, which took place in September, 1977, a joint Soviet-US Statement on the Middle East was published on October 2,

<sup>208</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 44.

<sup>209</sup> *Pravda*, April 29, October 2, 1976.

<sup>210</sup> Cf. L. I. Brezhnev, *Speech at the 16th Congress of the Trade Unions of the USSR, March 21, 1977*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977.

1977. In this statement both sides emphasised the necessity of achieving a rapid, just and generally acceptable settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would make it possible to solve all the concrete problems involved, including such key issues as the withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territory, the Palestine question, the ending of the state of war, and others. To this end the USSR and the USA affirmed their intention to do all in their power to ensure that the Geneva Peace Conference renew its work no later than December 1977.<sup>211</sup>

Under pressure from Israel, the Carter Administration treacherously violated the agreement recorded in the Soviet-American statement. Ruling circles in the US, together with the leaders of Israel and the Sadat regime succeeded in preventing the convocation of the Geneva conference and in replacing multilateral negotiations on a just and peaceful settlement in the Middle East with bilateral separate bargains which would benefit only the USA, Israel and Arab reaction, while running counter to the legitimate interests of the peoples of the Middle East.

The diplomatic steps leading to this separate bargain were the visit by Sadat to Israel in November 1977, and the subsequent negotiations between the political and military leaders of Egypt and Israel, first with the indirect and then the direct participation of the USA, which took place at the end of 1977 and in 1978. As a result of a meeting held in September 1978 at Camp David, the summer residence of the US President, and attended by President Carter, the Prime Minister of Israel, Menachem Begin, and the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, two documents were signed: "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and "A Framework for a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel". These documents constituted a separate Israeli-Egyptian bargain that ignored the fundamental issues involved in a Middle East settlement and the interests of other countries involved in the conflict. Israel was still not prepared to withdraw its troops from all the occupied territories, including Gaza, the West Bank of the Jordan River and the Golan Heights. The Palestinian people were refused the right to establish their own independent state, and the Palestine Liberation Organisation—the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians—was not recognised.

The separate meeting at Camp David did not solve any of the basic issues of the Middle East settlement. On the contrary, it only complicated the situation still further.

The Camp David agreements were decisively condemned by the Pan-Arab Front for Steadfastness and Confrontation in the Middle East, which was formed in December 1978, to oppose the Israeli-Egyptian bargain and which includes Algeria, Syria, Libya, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and also the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The agreement also failed to win the approval of such

<sup>211</sup> *Pravda*, October 2, 1977.

Arab states as Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Progressive world opinion recognises that the Camp David agreements and the signing in March 1979 of a separate peace treaty between Israel and Egypt only serve to distract those involved in the conflict from the search for a generally acceptable and just solution to the problem of the Middle East, which is the solution insisted upon by the Soviet Union, the fraternal socialist countries and all the forces for peace and progress throughout the world who wish to see eliminated a dangerous source of tension in the Middle East.

The principled position adopted by the leaders of the communist parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union on the Middle East question was reaffirmed in a joint statement published on November 25, 1978, which decisively condemned the policy of separate Egyptian-Israeli deal concluded under the auspices of the USA, which can only lead to new and dangerous complications in that region.

The Egyptian-Israeli deal provided the USA with further opportunities to strengthen its military presence in the region, oppose the Arab national liberation movement and conduct a policy of military pressure and interventionist threats. As a consequence of the Camp David agreements, Israel adopted a harsher position as regards the occupied Arab territories and the Palestine problem. This is revealed in the continuing colonisation of occupied territory, the claim to Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and increased military activity in the Lebanon. Such a policy has led to increasing tension in the region.

The Soviet Union does not recognise the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, considering it to be the result of a deal that is anti-Arab in nature and incapable of leading to secure and stable peace in the Middle East. The position of the USSR on this issue was demonstrated yet again during the visit by Andrei Gromyko to the Syrian Arab Republic in January 1980. During talks with the Syrian President, Hafez Assad, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdul Halim Khaddam, both sides categorically rejected the Camp David agreement and resolutely condemned the new concession made to Israel by the Egyptian leadership and the continuing negotiations on so-called autonomy for the Palestinians, under cover of which Israel is pursuing the colonisation of occupied lands.<sup>212</sup> At a press conference in Paris on April 25, 1980, Andrei Gromyko, evaluating the negotiations between the USA, Israel and Egypt "on autonomy for the Palestinians", commented that, in this instance "the real issue is the strengthening of the occupying regime".<sup>213</sup> The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs confirmed the position of the Soviet Union, which contains

<sup>212</sup> *Pravda*, January 30, 1980.

<sup>213</sup> *Pravda*, April 26, 1980.

the demand that all the Arab territories occupied by Israel be liberated and that the legitimate right of the Arab people of Palestine to establish an independent state be respected. He also emphasised that all the countries in the Middle East should have the right to a free and independent existence.<sup>214</sup>

The May (1980) declaration of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation provided a new stimulus to a just and generally acceptable settlement of the Middle East conflict.<sup>215</sup>

Expressing the policy of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "Is it not time to put an end to the trouble caused by the anti-Arab policy of separate deals? Is it not high time to put the settlement of the Middle East problem back onto the only proper footing—that of the collective efforts of all the interested parties, including, of course, the Palestine Liberation Organisation?"<sup>216</sup>

#### Relations between the USSR and the Arab Countries

The Soviet Union and the progressive Arab countries are united by common positions as regards foreign policy and a common approach to the major international problems of our time: the struggle for peace and international security, for freedom and national independence, for liberation from foreign occupation and racial oppression. The USSR and the progressive Arab countries are also of one mind as regards the strengthening of European security, which is indissolubly linked with the security of the Mediterranean area. They are one in their high estimation of the non-aligned movement and in their support for restructuring international economic relations on the basis of justice and equality, and in calling for an increase in the effectiveness of the United Nations in strengthening peace and international security.

In the second half of the 1970s, the revolutionary process in the Arab East continued to develop. In a number of Arab countries, including Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Libya and Syria, anti-imperialist national forces grew in strength, and cooperation between the USSR and the Arab countries broadened in scope and content. An important element in this cooperation are top-level meetings, in the course of which a common policy is elaborated concerning a number of international issues and the more pressing questions of bilateral cooperation are dealt with.

One of the most important meetings of this kind in the second

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> *Pravda*, May 16, 1980.

<sup>216</sup> *Pravda*, May 28, 1980.

half of the 1970s was the visit by the Chairman of the Revolution Command Council of the Libyan Arab Republic, Colonel Muammar al-Caddafi, to the USSR on 6-9 December, 1976. Soviet-Libyan talks at the highest level revealed the unity of views of both sides as regards the settling of the Middle East conflict and also on a number of other international issues. In the course of the visit, a number of agreements were signed on expanding bilateral relations in the field of economic and technical cooperation.

Giving his evaluation of Soviet-Arab relations, Muammar al-Caddafi commented that he "views Soviet-Arab friendship not as a tactical but as a strategic stage", and that "the Arab nation will never forget the assistance given to it by the USSR in its struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction".<sup>217</sup>

Among the most important top-level meetings were those between leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the President of the Algerian People's Democratic Republic and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Algeria, Houari Boumedienne that took place in Moscow in January and in October-November 1978. During their talks the two sides discussed a wide range of questions concerning relations between the USSR and Algeria, strongly condemned the policy of separate deals and the capitulatory policy of the Egyptian leadership, and stressed the importance of rallying all progressive Arab forces with a view to achieving a genuine, generally acceptable, just and permanent settlement in the Middle East.<sup>218</sup> Of great political importance was the visit to the USSR, in October 1979 and October 1980, of the Secretary General of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafez Assad and also in October 1979 and May 1980, of the leaders of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

Talks conducted between the Soviet leaders and Hafez Assad and the General Secretary of the Yemeni Socialist Party and Prime Minister of the PDRY, Ali Nasser Muhammad, confirmed the common approach of the USSR and the Arab countries to the main issue, that of a settlement in the Middle East. The joint Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-South Yemeni communiqués<sup>219</sup> resolutely condemned the Camp David agreements and the separate Egyptian-Israeli treaty as actions directed against the rights and national interests of all the Arab nations and peoples, as an appeasement of the Israeli aggressors leading to the further aggravation of the situation in the Middle East and throughout the world.

The talks demonstrated the high level of relations between the USSR, the SAR and the PDRY. All three stated that they would continue to give priority to the further strengthening of political

<sup>217</sup> *Izvestia*, December 7, 1976.

<sup>218</sup> *Pravda*, January 13, October 20, November 15, 1978.

<sup>219</sup> *Pravda*, October 19, 27, 1979; May 29, October 11, 1980.

relations, inter-party links and mutually advantageous economic cooperation. The practical result of these talks was the signing of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the SAR and the USSR and the PDRY, together with a number of documents on expanding cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria and the Soviet Union and Democratic Yemen.<sup>220</sup>

The leaders of the Soviet Union, Syria and the PDRY, having noted the importance of the further all-round development of friendship and cooperation between the Arab states and the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, declared that they would rebuff any attempts to undermine Soviet-Arab friendship.

Relations between the USSR and the Palestine Liberation Organisation have also strengthened. The leader of the PLO, Yasser Arafat, who visited Moscow in March 1977, and April 1978, was received by Leonid Brezhnev.

A further convincing demonstration of increasing Soviet-Arab friendship was a visit by a PLO delegation, led by Yasser Arafat, to the USSR on November 12-14, 1979.<sup>221</sup> In the course of the discussions, that took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, the two sides exchanged views on a wide range of questions. The Soviet side placed a high value on the principled position taken by the PLO on a settlement in the Middle East and on its contribution to strengthening united action by the Arab states in their struggle against capitulation and separate deals.

The 4th conference of the heads of the member states of the Pan-Arab Front of Steadfastness and Confrontation took place in Tripoli on April 12-15, 1980. The participants—the heads of state of Algeria, Libya, the PDRY and Syria, and also the Chairman of the Executive Committee of the PLO—expressed their high appreciation of the position of the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community, who are supporting the just struggle of the Arab peoples, and called for an expansion of bilateral relations. Cooperation between the USSR and the newly free countries of the Arab East is a factor of permanent historical significance in the stability, security and progress of this region of the world.

### **The Soviet Union and the Situation in the Middle East**

On April 27, 1978, following revolutionary action led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the national-democratic revolution triumphed in Afghanistan.

<sup>220</sup> *Pravda*, October 19, 26, 1979; May 29, October 9, 1980.

<sup>221</sup> *Pravda*, November 14, 15, 1979.

The Soviet Union was one of the first to recognise the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, proclaimed on April 30, 1978, by the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan. The USSR viewed with complete understanding the policy statement made on May 9 by the General Secretary of the CC PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the DRA, Nur Muhammad Taraki. In particular, the statement read that the principle task facing the government of the DRA was the defence of its territorial integrity, national sovereignty and independence, and of the gains of the April revolution, and the genuine unification of all national progressive and patriotic forces. The revolutionary government elaborated a broad programme of economic change and social development. The first decrees issued by the new government revealed that they were directed at the elimination of the remnants of the monarchical system and feudal exploitation and at the establishment in Afghanistan of a modern society founded on the principles of social justice. The policy statement of May 9, 1978, Main Directions for the Revolutionary Tasks of the DRA Government, also defined the foreign policy of the new Afghan government.<sup>222</sup>

Revolutionary Afghanistan is conducting a peaceful, national and independent foreign policy based on the principles of non-alignment. It opposes imperialism, colonialism, Zionism, racism and apartheid, and supports peace and detente. The leadership of Afghanistan underscores the necessity of further strengthening the united action of the countries of the socialist community, the non-aligned states and the national liberation movements, and declares its intention to develop and strengthen solidarity among these natural allies in the struggle for peace and international security, freedom and national independence. Afghanistan places great importance on establishing friendly relations with neighbouring states, and in particular with the USSR.

For its part, the Soviet Union is firmly committed to expanding cooperation with Afghanistan. The April revolution promoted the further consolidation of ancient traditions of friendship and cooperation between the two neighbouring states.

In December 1978, Nur Muhammad Taraki paid an official visit to the USSR. "The genuinely popular revolution has radically altered the centuries-old history of Afghanistan," declared Leonid Brezhnev on receiving this honoured guest in the Kremlin. "It is therefore not surprising that under such circumstances the traditionally good relations between our two countries should assume what I could describe as a qualitatively new character."<sup>223</sup> During the visit, on December 5, documents of the utmost importance for Soviet-Afghan

<sup>222</sup> See *International Affairs*, 1979, No. 3, pp. 51-52.

<sup>223</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Vol. 7, p. 548 (in Russian).

relations were signed, namely a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA, an agreement on the establishment of a permanent inter-governmental Soviet-Afghan commission on economic cooperation and a joint Soviet-Afghan communiqué.<sup>224</sup>

The treaty expressed the firm determination of the USSR and the DRA to strengthen the ties of friendship between the two countries on the basis of comradely relations and revolutionary solidarity, full equality, respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Article 4 of the treaty contains a clause which states that the USSR and the DRA "will consult together and, with the agreement of both sides, will take appropriate steps to guarantee the security, independence and territorial integrity of both countries".<sup>225</sup> The two sides also agreed to consult with each other "on all important international issues affecting the interests of both countries" (Article 10). The USSR and the DRA, declares Article 9, "will cooperate with each other and with other peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of nations for freedom, independence, sovereignty and social progress."<sup>226</sup> The two sides particularly stressed the fact that the Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation is designed to serve not only the further development of Soviet-Afghan relations but also the strengthening of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

Having expressed their satisfaction at the level of Soviet-Afghan economic, scientific and technical cooperation, the two sides noted in their joint communiqué that this cooperation was new in content and was acquiring a more stable and long-term nature.

The USSR and DRA concluded several agreements according to which the Soviet Union was to participate in carrying through a number of new projects on Afghan territory. The Soviet Union has always assisted Afghanistan in overcoming economic and cultural backwardness. About 120 industrial, agricultural and other projects have been carried through or are under way in Afghanistan with assistance from the USSR, and around 70 of these are already in operation to the benefit of the Afghan people. The USSR has helped to build around 70 per cent of the hard surface roads in Afghanistan, large enterprises in the metal-working, chemical, building and food industries, educational centres and a polytechnic.

The new democratic state system in Afghanistan was met with unconcealed hostility from the USA and also neighbouring countries such as Pakistan and China. These countries organised large-scale subversive activity aimed first at stifling the Afghan revolution and secondly at establishing on the borders with the Soviet Union, which

<sup>224</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 8, 1978.

<sup>225</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1978.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibid.*



stretch over two thousand kilometres, a new anti-Soviet bridgehead to replace the US bases lost in Iran. After the April revolution in 1978, gangs several thousand strong and armed with American, Pakistani and Chinese weapons were sent across the border into Afghanistan, where they launched an active armed struggle against the democratic power of the country. By the end of 1979, the existence of Afghanistan as an independent state was under serious threat.

In September 1979, Hafizullah Amin, having come to power by means of internal intrigues and plots, began an open betrayal of the cause of the Afghan revolution. He carried through a coup d'état, removed Nur Muhammad Taraki from all his posts and then physically eliminated him, and repressed a large number of party cadres and people dedicated to the revolution. Amin tried to conceal his counter-revolutionary intrigues with ultra-revolutionary speeches, but his authorised representatives were meanwhile in secret contact with representatives of Washington and Peking. At the same time, external reactionary forces intensified their overt intervention in Afghan affairs. Sabotage groups were sent in from Pakistan and China in increasing numbers, and an attack on Kabul was planned. Amin deliberately led the country to disaster. In these circumstances the party, supported by the military loyal to the revolution, overthrew the treacherous Amin régime on December 27, 1979, and Babrak Karmal became the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, and was also elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

The new party and state leadership of the DRA issued a policy statement that gave realistic expression to the aims of the national-democratic revolution. Given the ever-increasing threat to the security of the country from the counter-revolutionary gangs sent in from Pakistan and China, the Afghan government repeated its earlier calls for military aid to remove the external threat, basing itself on the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of 1978 and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. In December 1979, having taken into account all the circumstances, the Soviet government decided to send a limited military contingent into Afghanistan. "Continuing armed intervention and the by now far advanced intrigues of external reactionary forces," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "threatened to deprive Afghanistan of its independence and convert it into an imperialist military bridgehead on the southern border of our country. In other words, the moment had come when we could no longer fail to respond to the appeal of the friendly government of Afghanistan. To have acted otherwise would have been to hand Afghanistan over to division by imperialism, to allow aggressive forces to repeat here what they succeeded in doing in, for example, Chile, where the freedom of the people was drowned in blood. To have acted otherwise would have been to look on passively

as a potentially serious threat to the security of the Soviet state arose on our southern frontier."<sup>227</sup>

The USA and its allies in NATO used the events in Afghanistan to distort the essence of the fraternal aid given to this country by the Soviet Union, in full accord with international law, and to cast doubt on the right of the DRA, under the United Nations Charter, to individual or collective defence. Ignoring the facts and the clear statements made by the governments of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, President Carter, on January 4, 1980, made a speech permeated with the phraseology of the cold war. A TASS statement made on January 7 describes the speech made by President Carter as an attempt by the US administration to use the events in Afghanistan to step up its escalation of international tension and its direct interference in the affairs of the DRA.<sup>228</sup> The Soviet government clearly stated that it is prepared to withdraw its troops when all forms of external interference directed against the government and people of Afghanistan are halted.<sup>229</sup>

The Soviet Union positively assesses the efforts of Afghanistan to establish peaceful and friendly relations with its neighbours, Iran and Pakistan.<sup>230</sup> The USSR actively supports the initiatives of the government of the DRA undertaken with a view to achieving a political settlement of the issues involved, and in particular its proposal of May 14, 1980, to the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the government of Pakistan that they conduct bilateral negotiations without any prior conditions on the renewal and development of friendly relations and comprehensive, mutually advantageous cooperation. In making this proposal, the government of the DRA is proceeding from the assumption that, in addition to the bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Iran, a political settlement should include appropriate political guarantees by states acceptable to both Afghanistan and the other parties to the bilateral agreements. These states, in the opinion of the DRA, should include the Soviet Union and the United States. "As for the guarantees on the part of the USA," reads the statement made by the government of the DRA, "these should include a clearly expressed commitment not to conduct any kind of subversive activity against Afghanistan, including subversive activity conducted from the territory of a third country." The government of the DRA declared that the question of the withdrawal of the limited contingent of Soviet troops from the territory of Afghanistan would be solved within the context of a political settlement.<sup>231</sup> In making these proposals for a political

<sup>227</sup> *Pravda*, January 13, 1980.

<sup>228</sup> *Pravda*, January 7, 1980.

<sup>229</sup> See *Kommunist*, 1980, No. 5, p. 78.

<sup>230</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>231</sup> *Pravda*, May 15, 1980.

settlement, the government of the DRA again made it quite clear that issues affecting the interests of Afghanistan could not be discussed, and even less solved, without its participation.

The Soviet Union welcomes the policy of non-alignment being pursued by the DRA and its desire to achieve a political settlement of its relations with neighbouring states, its determination to defend its independence and, at the same time, to remove the tension and discord that has arisen in the region by peaceful means, by negotiations.

Despite the noisy anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan campaign launched by Washington and Peking, and despite the direct external aggression against the DRA, life in Afghanistan is gradually returning to normal. Large gangs of counter-revolutionaries have been destroyed and the interventionists have suffered major defeats.<sup>232</sup> Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union, with the agreement of the Afghan government, decided to withdraw some of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The June (1980) Plenum of the CC CPSU fully approved of the policy of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government as regards the Afghan question and called for a political solution to the situation that had arisen around Afghanistan. However, this requires a complete halt to subversive activity against this country and reliable guarantees concerning subversive activity from abroad. The Soviet Union, declared the Plenum of the CC CPSU, would continue to help Afghanistan to build a new life and preserve the gains of the April revolution.<sup>233</sup>

In October 1980, the General Secretary of the CC PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, paid an official friendly visit to the USSR. In the statement made by the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan summing up the results of the Soviet-Afghan talks and published in *Pravda* on October 20, 1980, both sides expressed their deep satisfaction at the relations developing between the two countries on the basis of fraternal friendship, revolutionary solidarity and the principles of internationalism. The Afghan side also expressed its gratitude to the Soviet people for their comprehensive aid and support in the struggle of the Afghan people against counter-revolutionary intervention from without and against imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. The talks confirmed the total unity of both sides as regards guaranteeing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Afghanistan and defending the revolutionary gains of its people. The two sides again called for a political settlement to the Afghan problem, which would have a positive influence on the situation in that region of the world

<sup>232</sup> *Pravda*, June 24, 1980.

<sup>233</sup> *Ibid.*

and help to improve the international political climate. They also emphasised that the question of the timing of the withdrawal of Soviet troops could only be considered within the context of a political settlement, and not before the complete cessation of aggression against the DRA and the provision of guarantees that subversive activity against the people and government of the DRA from outside Afghanistan would not be renewed. The talks also revealed complete agreement between the USSR and the DRA on major international issues and on ways of ensuring peace and security.

The last few years have seen dramatic changes in the region of the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East, where until recently Iran, ruled by the Shah, functioned as the obedient "younger partner" of the USA. In 1978, a powerful popular movement against the Shah and against imperialism swept the country. American imperialism, fearing to lose its military-political bridgehead in Iran, which it used to stifle the national liberation movement in that part of the world and to threaten the southern borders of the USSR, started to prepare plans for direct military intervention in the internal affairs of Iran threatening the country's sovereignty. Under these circumstances, Leonid Brezhnev gave a decisive warning to the USA and other Western countries regarding interference in the internal affairs of this country. "Let it be perfectly clear," he declared in reply to a question put by a *Pravda* correspondent, "that any, and in particular any military interference in the internal affairs of Iran—a country that borders directly on the Soviet Union—will be viewed by the USSR as affecting its own security."<sup>234</sup>

At the beginning of February 1979, the Iranian revolution overthrew the Shah. On February 13, the Soviet Union, loyal to the Leninist policy of peace and friendship among peoples, announced its recognition of the provisional government of Iran and expressed its willingness to maintain and develop relations between the two states on the principles of equality, good-neighbourliness, recognition of national sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.<sup>235</sup>

From the end of October 1979, American-Iranian relations deteriorated sharply as a result of the overt protection given by the American administration to the Shah, who was guilty of massive repressions against Iranian patriots and of the theft and illegal transfer abroad of enormous sums of money and national treasures belonging to the Iranian people. In Teheran, thousands participated in anti-American demonstrations of protest, and students occupied the American embassy, demanding that the American administration extradite the Shah for trial before a revolutionary court. In response to the deten-

<sup>234</sup> *Pravda*, November 19, 1978.

<sup>235</sup> *Pravda*, February 13, 1979.

tion of about 60 American diplomats, the US government began to expel Iranian nationals from the USA and subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. President Carter ordered the freezing of all Iranian assets held in American banks in the USA and their branches abroad and hastily dispatched additional naval forces to the Persian Gulf. The US government declared an economic and trade embargo against Iran, bringing extreme diplomatic pressure to bear on the countries of Western Europe and Japan in order to compel them to join in this anti-Iranian activity.

Commenting on the events in Iran, Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC CPSU, wrote: "Certain official figures in Washington seriously assumed that by sending, for example, an aircraft carrier to the shores of Iran, they would be able to frighten the people and avert the victory of the revolution. However, what can an aircraft carrier or even an entire division of marines do when millions of people come out onto the streets every day, risking their lives and demanding the overthrow of the despotic and corrupt pro-American regime of the Shah? Revolution in Iran had ripened and the explosion which had to happen happened."<sup>236</sup>

The Soviet Union disrupted American diplomatic plans to "legalise" their punitive measures against Iran by using its veto in the UN Security Council to block the draft resolution. Speaking at a meeting to mark the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, Konstantin Rusakov, Secretary of the CC CPSU, declared in connection with the actions being taken by the USA in relation to Iran: "The Soviet Union, and this has been stated more than once, supports respect for diplomatic immunity. However, it is perfectly obvious that the sudden deterioration in the region of the Persian Gulf is the result of the actions of American imperialism directed against the liberation revolution in Iran. While demanding adherence to the norms of international law by others, ruling circles in the USA themselves unceremoniously flout these norms and take no account of the inalienable right of the Iranian people to determine their own fate."<sup>237</sup> The Soviet Union condemned the military sabotage operation undertaken by the USA to "save" the American embassy staff held hostage in Iran and which the American military, on the instructions of President Carter, attempted to put into action in April 1980, and also the US, Israeli and Egyptian efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran by means of various intrigues.

American imperialism, the military regime in Pakistan and internal counter-revolutionary forces in Iran are trying to use events in Afghanistan to divert the Iranian revolution from its anti-imperialist course.

<sup>236</sup> *Kommunist*, 1980, No. 1, p. 22.

<sup>237</sup> *Pravda*, May 22, 1980.

The external and internal enemies of the Iranian revolution are attempting, by means of disinformation and slander, to present these events as if the activities of the counter-revolutionary gangs in Afghanistan—financed, organised and armed by American imperialism and its Chinese and Pakistani accomplices to oppose the Afghan people's government—are one with the Islamic movement in Iran. The First Secretary of the CC of the People's Party of Iran (Tudeh Party), Nureddin Kiyanuri, stated that the enemies of Iran "tried, by using these events, to change the direction of the foreign policy of the Iranian revolution, directed against its implacable enemy—American imperialism—and to foster in the Iranian people hostility towards the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, who supported the Iranian revolution and are the most reliable defenders of the fighting revolutionary peoples of Iran."<sup>238</sup> However, progressive forces throughout the world recognise that the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution in Afghanistan, as the liberation, anti-monarchical revolution in Iran, enjoy the full support of the Soviet Union and all the socialist countries. Both these revolutions have dealt a heavy blow to imperialism and reaction, and to their partner, Peking hegemonism. Therefore any attempts to weaken the revolutionary basis of Afghanistan is also a direct blow against the Iranian revolution.

The Soviet Union, genuinely desirous to see the establishment of friendly relations and cooperation between the countries of the Near and Middle East and, convinced that war should not and cannot be a means of solving disputes between states, expressed serious concern over the military conflict that began in September 1980 between Iran and Iraq, two countries which have friendly relations with the Soviet Union, and called on them to settle any disputed questions around the negotiating table. "It would seem," commented Leonid Brezhnev during Soviet-Indian negotiations on December 9, 1980, "that there are those who are attempting to aggravate the conflict. They wish to weaken the parties involved in order to re-establish the positions of those external forces who have lost their influence following the collapse of the Shah's regime in Iran."<sup>239</sup> Imperialist circles hope to increase their military presence in the Near and Middle East, shatter the unity of the Arab world, weaken the anti-imperialist course of both Iranian and Iraqi policy and establish control over Near and Middle Eastern oil. The only possible beneficiary of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict is a third party alien to the interests of the peoples of that region.

In the second half of the 1970s, relations between the USSR and Turkey continued to develop. A Soviet-Turkish communiqué, published in December 1975 in connection with the visit by a Soviet

<sup>238</sup> *Kommunist*, 1980, No. 5, p. 88.

<sup>239</sup> *Pravda*, December 10, 1980.

governmental delegation led by Alexei Kosygin to Turkey, noted that the main objectives of the 1972 Declaration, according to which the two sides based their relations on peace, friendship and good-neighbourliness, corresponded to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and that the good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and Turkey constituted a positive contribution to the relaxation of international tension.<sup>240</sup> In the report of the CC CPSU to the 25th Congress of the CPSU it was noted that cooperation between the Soviet Union and Turkey "is gradually spreading from the sphere of chiefly economic to political questions".<sup>241</sup>

In March 1977, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ihsan Sabri Caglayanil visited the USSR. In the course of the visit an agreement on long-term economic, scientific and technical cooperation was signed. The official visit to the Soviet Union in June 1978 by the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, was evidence of the further strengthening and expansion of Soviet-Turkish relations and of their increasingly political content.<sup>242</sup>

During the talks, the sides signed a Political Document on the Principles of Good-Neighbourly and Friendly Cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of Turkey and agreed to strictly adhere to the principles of refraining from the use or threat of force and also of refusing to allow their territory to be used for aggression or subversive activities against any other state. The document provides for cooperation between both sides in international organisations and conferences, for a broader exchange of opinions, for cooperation in strengthening detente and extending it to all regions of the world, and also for cooperation in questions relating to disarmament, the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racial discrimination. A Soviet-Turkish Agreement on the Delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea was also signed, and agreement was reached on a considerable expansion of trade and economic cooperation.

The development of the positive tendencies in Soviet-Turkish relations depends on consistent fulfilment by Turkey of the commitments contained in the political document signed in Moscow. In this connection, the Turko-American agreement on cooperation in the spheres of defence and economy, signed on March 29, 1980, cannot but cause understandable concern. With this agreement, the USA secured the legal right to the continued use of 26 military bases. The agreement was signed for five years and contains provision for its automatic extension.

By drawing Turkey into military preparations in the Near and

<sup>240</sup> *Pravda*, December 30, 1975.

<sup>241</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 26.

<sup>242</sup> *Pravda*, June 26, 1978.

Middle East, the USA is involving this country in a course that is dangerous to peace and likely to complicate the situation for Turkey and further aggravate the situation in that region of the world.

The Soviet Union, basing itself on experience that has revealed the fruitfulness and mutual advantage of cooperation between the USSR and Turkey, takes due cognizance of the fact that, although Turkey is a member of the NATO bloc, one of the elements of its foreign policy over recent years has been a desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union, which would meet the vital interests of both neighbouring peoples. When a new government came to power in Turkey in September 1980, Alexei Kosygin sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Bülent Ulus, in which he expressed the hope that relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey, relations whose foundations were laid by Lenin and Kemal Atatürk, would successfully develop to the benefit of both countries and in the interests of strengthening universal peace. In his telegram of reply, the Prime Minister of Turkey reciprocated the hopes and wishes of the Soviet government.<sup>243</sup>

#### **Relations between the USSR and the Countries of South and Southeast Asia**

One of the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy is the development of relations of friendship and comprehensive cooperation with India. Despite the difference in their socio-economic systems, the two countries are united by a common loyalty to the cause of peace and detente and the ideals of developing relations between the two states on a just and democratic basis. "Against a background of flash-points and conflict situations in different parts of Asia," declared Andrei Gromyko, "one factor for stability and peace deserves to be singled out, namely the relations between the Soviet Union and the great Asian country of India. There is every justification for saying that there are good prospects for the further development, on the basis of the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, of joint action by the two countries in the interests of strengthening peace in Asia and throughout the world. This is cooperation in the interests of peace, and no one, not one country pursuing peaceful aims, needs to fear it."<sup>244</sup>

The strengthening and deepening of Soviet-Indian friendship and cooperation over the period 1976-1980 has shown the world that Soviet-Indian relations are not based on immediate tactical considerations but on the long-term and vital interests of the peoples of

<sup>243</sup> *Pravda*, October 2, 1980.

<sup>244</sup> *Pravda*, February 19, 1980.



both countries. They are an example of the practical implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation between countries with different social systems.

The USSR and India cooperate effectively on the international scene, including in the United Nations and other international organisations. Both countries consistently support the strengthening of détente in international relations and its extension to all regions of the world, universal and complete disarmament under effective international control, the elimination of war from human existence and the affirmation in international relations of such principles as the right of each people to choose its own political system, the refusal to use force or the threat of force, respect for sovereignty and the inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and cooperation in economic and other spheres on the basis of full equality and mutual advantage.

During Soviet-Indian top-level meetings in 1979, Leonid Brezhnev stressed that "the Soviet Union wishes to see friendly India a mighty and prosperous state that would play an important role on the Asian as well as world scene".<sup>245</sup>

The effectiveness of Soviet-Indian economic cooperation is revealed by the following facts: enterprises built with Soviet assistance account for 80 per cent of all Indian metalware production, 60 per cent of all its heavy electrical equipment, 70 per cent of its oil production and one-third of its production of refined oil, 35 per cent of its total steel production and one-fifth of its energy production.<sup>246</sup> The further development of Soviet-Indian economic cooperation was provided for by the long-term Programme of Economic, Trade, Scientific and Technical Cooperation for a period of 10-15 years, signed in Delhi in March 14, 1979, during the visit by Alexei Kosygin to India. Under the terms of this programme, the USSR will, amongst other things, help in the expansion and modernisation of metallurgical works in Bhilai and Bokaro to bring their overall production up to 10.5 million tons; in the construction of another—the third—iron-and-steel works in Vishakhapatnam and of an alumina factory, to be built on a product-pay back basis; and in broadening the production range of already existing enterprises.

At the beginning of 1980, the Indian National Congress Party (I), led by Indira Gandhi, won a major victory in the Indian special parliamentary elections. Shortly after the nomination of Indira Gandhi to the post of Prime Minister of India, the Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrei Gromyko, paid a visit to India. His meetings with Mrs. Gandhi and other Indian leaders served to stimulate the further development of Soviet-Indian political relations in the

<sup>245</sup> *International Affairs*, 1980, No. 3, p. 19.

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

name of peace in Asia and beyond.

On the invitation of the government of the USSR, the Indian Minister of External Affairs, Narasimha Rao, paid an official visit to the Soviet Union on June 3-7, 1980. During his visit, Narasimha Rao conveyed to Leonid Brezhnev greetings from the President and Prime Minister of India and had talks with Andrei Gromyko. The two sides discussed the development of bilateral relations and also a wide range of international issues of common interest. They were pleased to note that relations between the USSR and India serve the interests of peace and stability in Asia and throughout the world. They also examined questions related to the fulfilment of long-term agreements in the main spheres of Soviet-Indian cooperation. Having exchanged views on the major international issues, the two sides remarked on the closeness of the positions of the USSR and India regarding the issues under discussion. The Soviet Union and India expressed their conviction that the process of detente should be extended to all regions of the world and also their firm intent to continue their support for an end to the arms race and for the struggle against imperialism, racism and all forms of domination. The results of the visit by Narasimha Rao to the Soviet Union constituted a new and positive contribution to the development of mutual understanding and friendship between the USSR and India.<sup>247</sup>

Another major step in the further expansion and consolidation of friendly Soviet-Indian relations was the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Indira Gandhi in Belgrade on May 8, 1980, which took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding. In the course of the meeting, the two sides exchanged views on a number of questions pertaining to Soviet-Indian cooperation in various spheres, and agreed that expanding the sphere of mutually advantageous cooperation met the interests of the peoples of the Soviet Union and India. During discussions on major international problems, the two sides noted that the positions adopted by the Soviet Union and India on the main questions concerning the strengthening of detente and peace were identical, and that cooperation between them helped to promote stability and good-neighbourliness in Asia and throughout the world.

The President of the Republic of India, Neelam Sanjeva Reddy, visited the USSR between September 29 and October 7, 1980. During his talks with Leonid Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders, there was an exchange of views on the main questions concerning Soviet-Indian relations, based on the firm foundation of the 1971 Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Republic of India. In their discussions on urgent international problems, the two sides paid particular attention to the strengthening of peace and international security, to the struggle against imperialism, colonial-

<sup>247</sup> *Pravda*, June 8, 1980.

ism and racism. The Soviet Union, declared Leonid Brezhnev, is making consistent and resolute efforts to preserve and stimulate detente, to secure a concrete shift from armament to disarmament, and to achieve a just political settlement of conflict situations, including those in such a "sensitive" region as the Near and Middle East. The two sides made a detailed analysis of the situation in Asia, where the intensification of activity by aggressive forces has escalated tension. The President of India described the traditional friendship between India and the USSR as an example of fruitful and mutually beneficial cooperation answering the fundamental interests of both the Indian and Soviet peoples and also the interests of universal peace.<sup>248</sup>

During top-level meetings in Moscow on July 3, 1980, Soviet and Vietnamese leaders exchanged views on the situation in Southeast Asia. Both sides noted that the present leadership of the People's Republic of China, supported by the US administration, is attempting to destabilise the situation in Indochina. To this end it is organising military demonstrations on the Sino-Vietnamese border, encouraging provocative attacks by remnants of the Pol Pot gangs against the People's Republic of Kampuchea and exerting overt pressure on the member countries of ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia). The two sides emphasised that the growing tension on the Thai-Kampuchean border is directly linked to the hegemonic policy of Peking and the imperialist activity of the USA.<sup>249</sup>

The Soviet Union supports the proposal put forward by Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea for a settlement of the situation in Southeast Asia. The constructive proposals made by these three states of Indochina provide a carefully thought-out and well-argued basis for the start of negotiations to eliminate tension in that region and for discussions on the whole complex of problems in Southeast Asia. Of particular interest was the proposal by the socialist states of Indochina on the establishment of a demilitarised zone and an international conference on guaranteeing any agreements elaborated by Thailand and Kampuchea either by direct negotiations or via third parties. The Soviet leaders expressed their understanding and approval of the actions and initiatives of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea, and also of other states in Southeast Asia, directed at consolidating peace and stability in this region of the world.

The Soviet Union continued to develop its relations with other countries in South and Southeast Asia—with Nepal, Sri-Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. The peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union meet with understanding on the part of the governments and the public of these countries. The important and urgent proposal put before the Thirty-Fourth Session

<sup>248</sup> *Pravda*, October 1, 1980.

<sup>249</sup> *Pravda*, July 4, 1980.

of the UN General Assembly by the Soviet Union on the inadmissibility of a policy of hegemonism in international relations brought a favourable response from the countries of Asia. Representatives of the Asian countries stressed that the issue had been raised at an appropriate moment, pointing out that a hegemonic policy was a direct threat to international peace and security, and that this question bore on the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and also the principles and aims of the non-aligned movement.

During the Thirty-Fourth Session of the UN General Assembly, the delegations from the South and Southeast Asian countries actively supported the adoption of concrete measures designed to promote the implementation of the declaration on the Indian Ocean as a peace zone, a declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly as far back as 1971. The Asian countries also responded positively to Soviet indications at the session of willingness to join the Special Committee on the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet memorandum For Peace and Disarmament, for Guarantees of International Security put before the Thirty-Fifth Session of the UN General Assembly reaffirms the Soviet desire to renew the negotiations on restricting and subsequently reducing military activity in the Indian Ocean, broken off by the USA. In this connection, the Soviet Union noted that the increased US military presence in the Indian Ocean, the establishment of military bases, in particular on the island of Diego Garcia, ran counter to the will of the peoples of that region, escalated tension and created the threat of dangerous military conflicts. The memorandum also expressed Soviet support for the UN resolution to hold an international conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981.

On December 10, 1980, the Soviet Union and India issued a joint declaration in which they called for the elimination of all foreign military and naval bases in the region of the Indian Ocean, and for the prohibition of the establishment of new bases. They also strongly condemned any attempts to increase the foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean for whatever reason, and expressed their support for the just demand of Mauritius that the Chagos Archipelago, including the island of Diego Garcia, be returned to it.<sup>250</sup> "The Soviet Union is a staunch champion of the idea that the Indian Ocean be turned into a zone of peace," declared Leonid Brezhnev. "We believe that the Indian Ocean has been and remains the sphere of vital interests of the states located on its shores, but not of any other states."<sup>251</sup>

<sup>250</sup> *Pravda*, December 12, 1980.

<sup>251</sup> *Pravda* December 11, 1980.

## Relations between the USSR and the Countries of Latin America

The development of political, trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and the majority of the countries of Latin America during the 1970s is a sign of the positive changes that have taken place in the foreign policy of a number of these countries, and has become an important factor in increasing their role in international affairs and in the solution of the problems facing mankind.

The continuing disintegration of the colonial system in the Western hemisphere has led to the birth of new independent states in Central America and the region of the Caribbean basin with whom the Soviet Union is developing numerous contacts, and to their emergence onto the international arena.

In the second half of the 1970s, the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Peréz, the President of Mexico, José López Portillo, the Prime Minister of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, the Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Norman Manley, and the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of a number of Latin American countries paid official visits to the Soviet Union. Relations between the USSR and Latin America have developed to include parliamentary links and increased trade and cultural exchange. Mutual political understanding has also deepened, and a unity of views has emerged on basic international problems. "The Soviet Union and Venezuela," declares a joint Soviet-Venezuelan communiqué, "will actively promote the strengthening and expansion of detente so that it become a permanent feature of international relations. In this connection, the two sides expressed their interest in the achievement of concrete agreements on disarmament and the conclusion of a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations."<sup>252</sup>

Expressing his high estimation of the consistent policy of peace pursued by the USSR in international affairs, the President of Mexico, José López Portillo, declared that the political objectives of his visit to Moscow, the further strengthening of friendship between the Mexico and the Soviet Union, had been fully achieved.<sup>253</sup> The joint Soviet-Mexican communiqué noted that both sides consider the halting of the arms race, the reduction of armed forces and nuclear and conventional arms, and general and complete disarmament under effective international control to be a most important and urgent task. They also expressed their resolute support for effective measures to avert the danger of nuclear war.<sup>254</sup>

The period 1979-1980 saw the success of the national liberation revolution in Nicaragua, which became a milestone in the general

<sup>252</sup> *Pravda*, November 29, 1976.

<sup>253</sup> *Pravda*, May 20, 1978.

<sup>254</sup> *Pravda*, May 26, 1978.

anti-imperialist struggle of the peoples of Latin America. "Are not the objective sources self-evident?" wrote Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Secretary of the CC CPSU. "For many years the people of Nicaragua struggled against a fascist dictatorship. However, for a long time their forces were inadequate; the patriotic vanguard was insufficiently united and organised. When all the conditions necessary for the success of the uprising had ripened, nothing could restrain popular anger, no guard of Somoza armed with American weapons could maintain in power the doomed despotic clique."<sup>255</sup>

From the 17 to the 22 March, 1980, on the invitation of the CC CPSU and the Soviet government, a government-party delegation from the Republic of Nicaragua, led by Moisés Kassin, member of the Directing Council of National Regeneration Government, paid a visit to the Soviet Union. Voicing his satisfaction at the warm and friendly atmosphere in which the Soviet-Nicaraguan talks had taken place, Andrei Kirilenko, member of the Politbureau and Secretary of the CC CPSU, stated that the visit to the USSR by the Nicaraguan delegation "would serve to develop friendship and cooperation between the peoples of both countries and to strengthen peace and international security."<sup>256</sup>

The 25th Congress of the CPSU welcomed the growing role of the Latin American countries in international life, and particularly the growing role of such large states as Argentina and Brazil.

The Soviet Union is in favour of broadening its relations with Argentina and took note of the declaration made by the new President of Argentina, Jorge Rafael Videla who came to power in March 1976, that his government would seek to strengthen its relations with all the countries of the world on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

One indication of the more independent course being followed by Argentina, particularly in the sphere of foreign trade policy, was the ratification in August 1977 of the agreement on the development of trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation with the USSR, signed in February 1974. This provided a considerable impetus to the expansion of economic links between the two countries.

The 1970s also renewed and improved relations between the Soviet Union and the Federative Republic of Brazil, a situation which was to no small degree helped by radical changes on the international scene, the emergence of new factors in the relations between Brazil and the USA and a move in Brazilian foreign policy to broaden in every way possible its international links in the political, and most importantly, in the economic spheres. An exchange of information

<sup>255</sup> *Kommunist*, 1980, No. 1, pp. 21-22.

<sup>256</sup> *Pravda*, March 20, 1980.

and consultations on international issues of common interest now takes place between the USSR and Brazil.

Trade and economic cooperation between the USSR and Brazil has also developed to a considerable degree. In August 1979, an agreement was signed on cooperation between the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Federation of Chambers of Commerce of Brazil, which provides for a further increase in trade between the two countries. The Soviet Union is participating in the development of Brazilian power resources, and in particular in the construction of hydro-electric power stations.

By 1980, the number of capitalist countries in Latin America with whom the USSR maintains active diplomatic relations had increased from 5 (1967) to 14.

### **The Soviet Union and the Non-Aligned Movement**

The vast majority of the developing countries are members of the non-aligned movement. The essence of this movement lies not only in a refusal to join blocs, but also in an active struggle against imperialism, colonialism, and racism, in a policy of political solidarity with peoples struggling for their national sovereignty and to strengthen their political and economic independence.

From its very inception the non-aligned movement has enjoyed broad support from the USSR and the other countries of the socialist community. As was noted by the 25th Congress of the CPSU, the non-aligned movement rests on common aspirations, "a deep common allegiance to peace and freedom, and aversion to all forms of aggression and domination, and to exploitation of one country by another".<sup>257</sup> The Soviet Union also bases its attitude upon the fact that the democratic content of the non-aligned movement is enriched by the struggle of the developing countries against exploiter relations, both feudal and capitalist.

The non-aligned movement is not homogeneous. Its members include countries with different socio-economic systems and different degrees of dependence on imperialist states. Some of its members are attempting to place the non-aligned states in opposition to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and are conducting a policy of "equal distance" from imperialist and socialist countries, trying to ignore the objective fact that the world socialist community and the non-aligned movement are both engaged in the struggle for peace, detente and disarmament, in the struggle against colonialism

<sup>257</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks...*, p. 27.

and neo-colonialism. However, the anti-imperialist and anti-colonial position of the non-aligned movement is its central feature. The 1976 Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties noted: The movement of non-aligned countries, which includes the majority of developing countries, is now one of the most important factors in world politics. It renders an active contribution to the fight for peace, security, detente and equal cooperation, for the establishment of a just system of international political and economic relations, and to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and all forms of domination and exploitation".<sup>258</sup> This appraisal of the non-aligned movement was convincingly vindicated in the resolutions adopted at the Sixth Non-Aligned Nations' Summit Conference, which took place in Havana on September 3-9, 1979. This was the first time a top-level forum of the non-aligned movement had taken place in Latin America, in socialist Cuba. At the Havana meeting, Bolivia, Grenada, Iran, Nicaragua, Surinam and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front became full members of the non-aligned movement. Membership has increased from 25 in 1961 to 95 in 1979.<sup>259</sup>

The conference elected the Cuban representative to the post of Chairman of the non-aligned movement.

In a message to the Chairman of the Sixth Conference of the Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Countries Fidel Castro, Leonid Brezhnev expressed the firm determination of the Soviet Union to give every support to the non-aligned movement, which is closely bound up with the struggle for detente and the securing of universal peace. In particular the message declared: "The Soviet Union is against the division of the world into opposing military-political blocs and, as is well known, has repeatedly, together with the other member states of the Warsaw Treaty, affirmed its readiness to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organisation simultaneously with the disbandment of the North Atlantic Treaty alliance as a first step in the elimination of military organisations, starting with a reciprocal reduction in military activity.

"The developing countries have our support in their struggle for restructuring international economic relations on the basis of equality and justice, excluding any kind of discrimination."<sup>260</sup>

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"The implementation of the Peace Programme proposed by the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU," declared Leonid Brezhnev,

<sup>258</sup> *For Peace, Security, Cooperation and Social Progress in Europe*, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1976, p. 35.

<sup>259</sup> *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, 1980, No. 2, p. 92 (in Russian).

<sup>260</sup> *Pravda*, September 3, 1979.



"has made it possible to achieve a great deal. Taking a broad view, the most important achievement has been the breaking of the vicious circle: world war—a brief peaceful interlude—world war. This historic success is something of which we Soviet people are rightly proud, as are our friends, the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries, and all those who have struggled and who are struggling for peace, for detente, for peaceful coexistence among states with different social system."<sup>261</sup>

On the international scene, the years following the 25th Congress have been marked by considerable dynamism, variety and eventfulness, a relentless struggle to control the forces of reaction and aggression, and to uphold the ideals of peace and the stability of international security. These same years have seen a considerable advance in the world liberation process and major shifts to the advantage of socialism and democracy.

The increasing strength of world socialism and the international Communist and workers' movement, the successes of the anti-imperialist revolutions in a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the progress achieved by peace-loving, democratic forces in the capitalist countries themselves have all provoked furious opposition on the part of imperialist circles against the further development of detente. These circles had already opposed the relaxation of international tension, and positive changes in international relations occurred against their will and intent.

Towards the end of 1970s, the most reactionary and aggressive forces of American imperialism began overt attempts to return the world to the times of the cold war. Detente as the main trend in the development of international relations in the contemporary period became the object of savage attacks from military-industrial circles in the USA and the countries of NATO. Opposition by the forces of reaction and militarism to world socialism, to the peaceful initiatives of the Soviet Union and the positive foreign policy of the socialist countries, directed at strengthening detente, became an integral part of the global policy of imperialism and its allies, the Peking hegemonists. In May 1978, the Washington session of NATO adopted a decision to automatically increase the military budget of its member countries every year up to the end of the century. In the USA it is the forces of militarism and expansion who are setting the tone. At the end of the 1970s these forces intensified their efforts to take Washington back to a policy of cold war.

Commenting on such attempts, Andrei Gromyko, member of the Politbureau of the CC CPSU and Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared that "detente has become too firmly woven into the fabric of international relations and has too many supporters throughout the

<sup>261</sup> *Pravda*, January 13, 1980.

world for one country to decide its fate unilaterally. Despite the difficulties that it faces, detente continues to live and breathe regardless of present attempts by the American administration to sound its death knell."<sup>262</sup>

For its part, the Soviet Union is ready to respond positively to any constructive steps taken by the new US administration as regards Soviet-American relations and urgent international problems.

On November 26, 1980, when receiving the US Senator Charles Percy, Leonid Brezhnev once more pointed out the futility of trying to achieve military superiority over the USSR. He stressed that the Soviet Union was still in favour of strengthening and developing long-term relations with the United States of America on the basis of equitability and equal security.<sup>263</sup>

The consistent policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, directed at improving the international climate, was clearly expressed during meetings between the party and state leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, which took place in Moscow on December 5, 1980. The leaders of the socialist countries affirmed their common desire to continue their contribution to the strengthening of peace, to continue the policy of detente, to develop international cooperation and to solve all conflicts by means of negotiation. They underlined their support for cooperation with all progressive, democratic and anti-imperialist forces.

The party and state leaders of the Warsaw Treaty states expressed their determination to further consolidate the unity of the socialist countries on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and internationalist solidarity, equality and mutually advantageous cooperation, and to rebuff any attempts by imperialist circles to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries.<sup>264</sup>

The Soviet Union is unswerving in its loyalty to the Leninist policy of strengthening solidarity with the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America. A convincing affirmation of this policy was the visit by Leonid Brezhnev to India on December 8-11, 1980, which promoted the further development of the traditionally friendly relations between the USSR and India. The joint Soviet-Indian Declaration, the agreement on economic and technical cooperation, the trade agreement for 1981-1985 and other documents signed in the course of the visit are evidence of the high level of all-round cooperation between the two countries, which is developing on a planned and long-term basis, and open up new possibilities for expanding Soviet-Indian relations for the benefit of the peoples of both countries.

The leaders of the Soviet Union and India affirmed that the two countries are adopting a common or similar approach to the most

<sup>262</sup> *Pravda*, February 19, 1980.

<sup>263</sup> *Pravda*, November 27, 1980.

<sup>264</sup> *Pravda*, December 6, 1980.

important international problems. They underscored the necessity of rebuffing attempts by the opponents of peace to undermine detente, impose on mankind a new round in the arms race, alter the existing military balance in their own favour and create new seats of international tension.

The Soviet Union and India expressed their firm conviction that the strengthening of peace and the prevention of a new world war is the most important task facing mankind. Commenting on the deterioration in the international situation and the emergence of new flashpoints, they called for the preservation and strengthening of detente, declaring that this process should become irreversible and universal.

The new, peaceful and constructive Soviet proposals for ensuring peace in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, put forward by Leonid Brezhnev in his speech to the Indian parliament, met with approval in India and other countries of the world. These proposals provide for agreement among all the interested states, including the USA and other Western countries, China and Japan, to assume a reciprocal commitment not to create foreign military bases in the region of the Persian Gulf and nearby islands, not to deploy nuclear or any other weapons of mass destruction in the area, not to use or threaten to use force against any country in the region of the Persian Gulf, not to interfere in their internal affairs and to respect the statute of non-alignment to which these countries adhere, not to draw them into military groupings with states possessing nuclear arms, to respect the sovereign right of the states of that region to their own natural resources, and not to create any obstacles or threat to normal trade and the use of shipping routes linking these states to the other countries of the world.<sup>265</sup>

Having moved into the 1980s, the Soviet Union is successfully pursuing the Leninist foreign policy proclaimed in the decisions of the 24th and 25th congresses of the CPSU and recorded in the Constitution of the USSR. The Soviet Union resolutely supports the strengthening of peace and the improvement of the international climate. "Such a policy," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "takes account of the realities of the modern world. It is a policy comprehensible to the peoples of the world and is in accord with their aspirations. It is the policy of the future."<sup>266</sup>

<sup>265</sup> See *Pravda*, December 9, 10, 11, 12, 1980.

<sup>266</sup> *Pravda*, October 1, 1980.

## CONCLUSION

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union has travelled a long and complex, but successful and noble path.

The first steps along this path were taken amidst extremely difficult circumstances. The Great October Socialist Revolution occurred in a country weakened by the imperialist war, suffering from hunger, poverty and dislocation. The international position of the Soviet Union was exceptionally difficult and threatened the very existence of Soviet power. Immediately after the victory of the October Revolution, the young Soviet state found itself surrounded by a hostile capitalist world.

Today, the Soviet Union has become a mighty socialist power which has completed the building of socialism and is now successfully building a communist society. It is a member of a large community of socialist states, occupies second place in the world in terms of volume of industrial production, and is one of the greatest powers in the world, without which no question of world politics can be resolved. All the peoples struggling against imperialism, all the supporters of peace and socialism, look with trust and hope towards the USSR.

The Soviet people achieved this notable rise to its present position under the leadership of the Communist Party, which has unswervingly followed the teaching of Lenin. It is precisely the leadership of the Leninist party that has secured the tremendous successes achieved by the Soviet people in economics, politics, science and culture both in peaceful labour and on the battlefield.

Foreign policy is no exception. A study of its history over the more than sixty years that have passed since the October Revolution reveals that it has always been based on the principles elaborated by Lenin and has made no small contribution to the achievements of the Soviet people. History makes it possible to pick out the more significant foreign policy successes that have had a noticeable effect on the fate of the Soviet Union.

The foreign policy of the Soviet state, under the direct leadership of Lenin, brought Soviet Russia safely through the extremely dangerous situation in which it found itself immediately after the October Revolution. The young Soviet state had virtually no army, but

was at war with German imperialism, and the former allies of Russia—Britain, the USA and France—were already preparing armed intervention.

However, the international situation in which the Soviet Union found itself had one advantage: the two hostile imperialist groupings were at war with each other. It was precisely this factor that was used by the Leninist diplomacy to obtain the necessary breathing space for the Soviet Republic by means of the Treaty of Brest. Subsequently, the Leninist foreign policy was also instrumental in helping victory to be won in the civil war against counter-revolution and imperialist intervention.

The peace achieved by Soviet power in 1921 created the necessary foreign policy conditions for the reconstruction of the national economy, which had been devastated by wars and foreign military intervention. It also made it possible to carry through the socialist industrialisation of the country, the collectivisation of agriculture and the completion, in the main, of the construction of a socialist society—the first in the history of mankind. These historic achievements were possible because the peace won after the defeat of the interventionists and White Guards was successfully maintained for two decades.

Alongside the growing Soviet economic and military potential and the unity of Soviet society, the Soviet foreign policy was another factor contributing to securing world peace. In the 1920s, it achieved the establishment of friendly relations with Germany, defeated in the First World War, and with our Asian neighbours, giving them active help to liberate themselves from colonial and semi-colonial bondage. Thereby it also successfully prevented the formation of an anti-Soviet coalition by the imperialists and a renewal of attempts to overthrow the socialist system by means of armed force.

A sharp aggravation of imperialist contradictions and the escalating crisis of capitalism led, at the beginning of the 1930s, to the emergence of dangerous potential sources of war in Africa and Asia, as was revealed by the military activity of Italy against Abyssinia and Japanese imperialist aggression against China, and then in the heart of Europe itself with the rise of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany.

Soviet diplomacy, the instrument of the Leninist foreign policy of the Soviet government, made every effort to restrain the aggressors and to give active assistance to China, Spain and other countries who had become their victims. It strove to counter the aggressors with a system of collective security or, at least, the signing of a treaty of mutual aid with Britain and France, in order to jointly repel the most dangerous aggressor—Nazi Germany. These efforts failed when the reactionary ruling circles of the Western countries refused to enter into an alliance with a socialist state and then, in Munich, entered into an agreement with the aggressor. In doing this they had

the support of US imperialism. The policy of an agreement with Nazi Germany, of which the Munich deal was the culmination, was designed to direct Nazi aggression to the East, against the Soviet Union.

Taking this into consideration, and in view of the threat it represented, the Soviet Union concluded a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany. In so doing, Soviet diplomacy delayed the Nazi aggression against the Soviet Union by almost two years. This delay allowed the defence capacity of the USSR to be strengthened and prevented the unification of the imperialist world against the country of socialism, as was planned by the "Munchenites". War initially broke out between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Britain and France on the other.

Exploiting the Munich policy of the Western powers, who even after the initial outbreak of war did not take any effective measures to deal with the aggressor, Nazi Germany overran more than ten capitalist countries and had at its disposal the resources of the entire European continent. Only then did it decide to attack the Soviet Union, a move that proved fatal for Nazism and the military bloc that it controlled. The Nazi army, which till then had marched victoriously through Central and Western Europe, was totally crushed by the armed forces of the Soviet Union.

During the Great Patriotic War waged by the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders, Soviet foreign policy ensured the necessary conditions for victory by creating a broad anti-Hitler coalition.

The decisive role played by the Soviet Union in the defeat of Nazi Germany revealed to the world the might of the first socialist state, which had been previously underestimated by the international bourgeoisie. The basis upon which rests Soviet foreign policy was strengthened. The history of the Soviet Union, including the history of its foreign policy, had entered a new period. "It (victory—*Ed.*) largely determined the future course of world history," declared Leonid Brezhnev, "creating new and favourable prospects for the rapid growth of revolutionary forces."<sup>1</sup>

The Second World War led to the total defeat of German, Italian and Japanese imperialism and to a sharp decline in British and French imperialism. Only American monopoly capital gained from the Second World War, even more than from the First, and succeeded in subordinating, to some degree or other, the policy of almost all the countries of the capitalist system. It attempted to restore capitalism in countries that had broken away from it and had adopted the socialist path, and to suppress the national liberation struggle.

In its attempts to establish world domination and halt the world

<sup>1</sup> L. I. Brezhnev, *Following Lenin's Course*, Moscow, 1972, Vol. 3, p. 6 (in Russian).

revolutionary process, American imperialism came up against opposition from the mighty socialist state and revolutionary forces in various countries.

Even prior to the Second World War, the USSR had become the bulwark of international peace and the support of peoples struggling against imperialism for their freedom and independence. After victory in the Second World War, the international role of the Soviet Union grew dramatically. The capitalist encirclement that had faced the USSR from 1917 onwards was removed, and the world socialist system emerged. There was a major shift in the balance of forces in favour of socialism, further assisted by the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism and the emergence of a large number of independent states in Asia and Africa, most of which adopted an anti-imperialist position.

All these events helped Soviet foreign policy in its struggle against imperialist aggression.

The Soviet people have had to heal the wounds caused by war, reconstruct the national economy and eliminate the consequences of the unparalleled devastation caused by the Nazi aggressors. The Soviet people sacrificed over 20 million lives in the struggle to free the USSR and all mankind from the fascist threat. In contrast, American imperialism grew rich from the war and the disasters that befell the peoples of Europe and Asia. It had the atom bomb, not yet possessed by the Soviet Union. As early as the 1940s, American imperialism was able to subjugate a large number of the capitalist states, creating NATO and other anti-Soviet blocs.

Under these circumstances, Soviet foreign policy had to possess a high degree of determination, flexibility, caution and consummate skill. Soviet policy set itself the aim of protecting as far as possible those countries that had adopted socialism from the encroachments of American imperialism and its allies and vassals. It was directed at assisting peoples who had won independence or who were struggling for independence. Soviet foreign policy had to effectively repulse imperialist aggression while simultaneously ensuring peace and preventing imperialists from unleashing a third world war. The successful solution of this highly complex task represents a great service performed by the Soviet Union for mankind. The preservation of peace has permitted the Soviet people, filled with the enthusiasm of creative labour, to rapidly reconstruct the national economy, achieve major economic, scientific and technical progress and move to the building of communism. At the same time, the Soviet Union has succeeded in defending the new socialist countries of Europe and Asia,—and later, Cuba in the Western hemisphere—and in foiling attempts by American imperialism and its allies to re-establish the old order in those countries. Within the community of socialist nations new inter-state relations have developed, based on the principles of socialist international-

ism, fraternal mutual assistance and close cooperation. The socialist system has become a determining force in world development.

The consolidation of the socialist community and, in particular, the increasing authority and might of the USSR, in turn accelerated the liberation of the peoples of Asia and then of Africa from the yoke of colonialism. In their struggle against imperialism they relied upon, and continue to rely upon, the socialist countries, and in particular on the Soviet Union. The role of the Soviet Union in the fight against imperialist aggression and as the bulwark of peace and freedom, is of growing importance, and all the more so as economic, scientific and technical progress has permitted the USSR to create an impregnable modern defence power, arm itself with nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons produced by the heroic efforts of the Soviet people in the difficult post-war years, and develop rocket technology. Its success in the latter was demonstrated with the launching of the first artificial satellite. All this had reduced the former invulnerability of the territory of the United States to nought. The time has gone when American armed forces could strike at the Soviet Union from its bases on foreign territory in Europe and Asia while the Soviet army could strike effectively only the allies of the USA, while the territory of the USA itself remained almost beyond reach.

As a result of radical changes in the strategic situation, American imperialism has been compelled to drop its policy of "repelling communism" by means of a nuclear blow. The inexorable shift in the balance of power in the favour of socialism has obliged ruling circles in the USA to revise their foreign policy and military concepts, although they continue to be directed against the socialist countries. In his foreign policy message to Congress on February 18, 1970, President Nixon admitted that "a revolution in the technology of war has altered the nature of the military balance of power... Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the ability to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first".

The consistent, peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries led in the 1970s to a transition from cold war to a relaxation of international tension. In the Peace Programme adopted by the 24th Congress of the CPSU and approved by progressive men everywhere, the policy of detente was given a new stimulus. The correctness and success of the Programme have been proved by subsequent events.

The joint foreign policy efforts of the USSR and the other fraternal socialist countries have made it possible to achieve an improvement of the international situation. Over this period a number of important international agreements have been reached and a number of international treaties which recognised the political and territorial realities of Europe and the inviolability of the western frontiers of the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia have been signed with Western



powers. American aggression in Vietnam has ceased and Israeli aggression against the Arab states has been universally condemned. Many attempts at armed intervention by imperialist powers in the affairs of a number of countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America have come to nought. Chinese aggressors opposing the free development of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea have been repelled.

One of the most important results of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community has been the conclusion of the first agreements on limiting the arms race.

In the course of the Peace Programme, numerous bilateral and multi-lateral meetings took place between Soviet leaders and leaders from the USA, the FRG, France, Britain, Italy, Japan and other states. Thanks to the efforts of the USSR and all the countries of the socialist community, together with realistically-minded people in the Western countries, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was successfully carried through in Helsinki in 1975. This conference established the principles of peaceful coexistence as a universally recognised international norm. The recognition of the inviolability of the European frontiers resulting from the Second World War and of the democratic principles of international relations by the 33 European states, the USA and Canada, who took part in the European conference, created a firm basis for cooperation between the socialist and capitalist sections of the continent.

The appraisal of international problems in the documents of the 24th, 25th and 26th congresses of the CPSU and their adoption of socialist, integrated foreign policy programmes for the contemporary period constituted a major contribution to Marxist-Leninist theory. Thanks to its profoundly scientific character, the Peace Programme reflects the continuity and consistency of the foreign policy being pursued by the CPSU on the basis laid down by Lenin. It confirms the indissoluble unity of the struggle for peace and the struggle for social progress and corresponds to the aspirations of the working people of the socialist countries, the international working class and the forces of the national liberation movement, and to the interests of all mankind.

The major positive changes that took place in the international situation in the course of the 1970s were the result of the continuing shift in the balance of forces on the international scene in favour of socialism. World socialism, the national liberation struggle and the entire revolutionary and anti-imperialist movement have become the decisive and invincible force of the modern age.

Nonetheless, as was noted in a resolution of the CC CPSU in honour of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, "the present stage of world development is characterised by an

intensification of the class struggle in the international arena. Aggressive imperialist forces are escalating the arms race ... and are doing everything possible to impede the relaxation of tension. Reactionary circles are organising ideological sabotage against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, together with slanderous anti-Soviet, anti-communist campaigns, and are attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of socialist and other countries."<sup>2</sup>

At the end of the 1970s, the peoples of the world faced a furious counter-attack by imperialism, which does not wish to accept irreversible historical changes or reconcile itself to the new balance of forces. At present, a bitter political battle is being waged between the forces supporting peace, respect for national rights and detente, and the forces of oppression, militarism and aggression. Influential circles in certain countries would clearly like to cast aside the solid capital of detente accumulated during the 1970s.

The main threat in this regard comes from American imperialism and certain of its allies, from their irresponsible policies and their main weapon—the aggressive NATO bloc. In recent years, the American administration has operated as the head of the reactionary forces of militant imperialism, compelling its allies in NATO to increase armaments over many years to come. It is opposed to disarmament and is expanding its activity in Asia and creating dangerous flashpoints in the Near and Middle East. The doctrine of a "limited nuclear war" announced by the American administration in 1979 is evidence of the fact that ruling circles in the United States have returned to the old policy of "brinkmanship" pursued in the middle of the 1950s. Attempts to back the claims to the position of undisputed leader of the world community with military superiority, and to create the material basis for a policy of hegemonism and diktat have become a typical feature of the Carter Administration's policy.

The USA and aggressive circles in certain other NATO countries are attempting to upset the approximate balance of military forces and to acquire supremacy over the socialist community. Hence the pursuit by the USA and NATO of the chimera of military supremacy, the policy of an intensification of the arms race and the creation of dangerous centres of tension in different regions of the world under the pretext of a fictional "Soviet threat".

The international situation is aggravated by the military-political rapprochement between China and the USA, which is based on a common hostility to the Soviet Union, to the entire socialist community and the national liberation movement, and on their common desire to end detente, escalate the arms race and bring the world to the brink of thermonuclear war. The apostasy of the Peking

<sup>2</sup> *Resolutions and Decisions of the CC CPSU Congresses, Conferences and Plenums, Moscow, 1978, Vol. 12, p. 438 (in Russian).*

leaders and their entire foreign policy represent direct complicity with imperialism.

Attacks on detente affect the vital interests of the newly independent peoples. The "anti-detente" policy and the neo-colonialist counter-attack are closely interrelated.

Speaking of the deep-seated causes of the deterioration of the international situation at the end of the 1970s, Leonid Brezhnev declared: "The more the possibilities of imperialist domination over other countries are reduced, the more furious are the reactions of its most aggressive and short-sighted representatives. This aggressiveness can only be restrained by power, by a sensible policy on the part of peace-loving states, and by a determination on the part of the peoples of the world to thwart the dangerous plans of those aiming at world domination."<sup>3</sup>

Against the "doctrine" of war hysteria and a feverish race to arm, the Soviet Union offers a foreign policy strategy based on a consistent struggle for peace and the security of nations. It calls for a political solution to international problems through negotiations conducted on the basis of equitability and equal security, on the condition that all the participants in the negotiations make sincere efforts to reach mutually acceptable agreements.

The congresses of the CPSU are always events of major international importance: they are like beacons lighting up the path already traversed and the path lying ahead. The guiding will of the Party inspired the Soviet people in the years of the first five-year plans, during the bloody struggle with fascism, and during the economic reconstruction following the defeat of the enemy. Each congress marked an important stage in the heroic history of the Soviet state and determined its domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet Union remains loyal to the Peace Programme proposed by the 24th Congress and developed by the 25th and the 26th congresses of the CPSU.

The 26th Congress of the CPSU summed up the qualitative changes that have clearly manifested themselves in the economic, social and political life of a developed socialist society, determined the programme for the building of communism in the next stage, added new pages in revolutionary theory and practice, in the struggle for peace, and constituted the next major step en route to the achievement of the ideal of socialism—the total elimination of war from the life of men.

<sup>3</sup> *Pravda*, February 23, 1980.

## CHRONOLOGY

1945

*September 11-October 2:* First session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, France, and China, London.

*September 25:* The USSR and Hungary restore diplomatic relations.

*November 10:* The USSR and Albania establish diplomatic relations.

*December 16-26:* Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, and Britain.

1946

*February 27:* The Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic sign a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance and an Agreement on Economic and Cultural Cooperation.

*March 18:* The USSR and Switzerland restore diplomatic relations.

*April 25-May 15, June 15-July 12:* Second session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Paris.

*June 6:* The USSR and Argentina establish diplomatic relations.

*July 17:* The USSR, Britain, the USA, and France sign an agreement on control of Austria.

*July 29-October 15:* Paris Conference on the drafting of peace treaties with Italy, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Finland.

*November 4-December 11:* Third session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, New York.

*December 31:* The Soviet Union and Thailand restore diplomatic relations.

1947

*February 10:* Peace treaties with Italy, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland are signed in Paris.

*March 10-April 24:* Fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Moscow.

*April 14:* The USSR and India establish diplomatic relations.

*June 27-July 2:* Paris Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, France, and Britain on the Marshall Plan.

*July 15:* The Soviet Union and Hungary sign a Treaty of Trade and Shipping and an Agreement on Trade and Payments, Moscow.

*November 6-22:* Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France on the German question, London.

*November 25-December 15:* Fifth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, London.

1948

*February 4:* The Soviet Union and the Romanian People's Republic sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

*February 11:* Soviet government statement on the former Italian colonies.

*February 13-16-March 6:* Notes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the London separate conference of the Western powers on the German question.

*February 18:* The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Republic sign a

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

*February 18:* The USSR and Burma establish diplomatic relations.

*March 18:* The USSR and the People's Republic of Bulgaria sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

*April 4:* TASS statement on the Iranian-US military agreement of October 6, 1947.

*April 6:* The Soviet Union and Finland sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

*May 1:* The Soviet Union and Pakistan establish diplomatic relations.

*May 7:* The Soviet government replies to the appeal of the joint conference of representatives of North and South Korea to the governments of the USSR and the USA on a simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

*May 9:* Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister on the causes for the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-US relations.

*May 15:* The Soviet government recognises the State of Israel and its provisional government.

*May 26:* The USSR and the Indonesian Republic establish consular relations.

*June 3 and 7:* Statements by the Soviet government to the governments of Finland, Romania, and Hungary on a 50-per cent reduction of the remaining reparations due from these countries.

*June 9:* Notes of the Soviet government to the governments of the USA and the Netherlands on their violation of the UN General Assembly resolution on measures against war propaganda.

*June 19:* The USSR and Finland sign a Frontier Convention.

*June 23-24:* The Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania, and Hungary confer in Warsaw on the German question.

*July 8:* The Soviet Union and the Polish Republic sign a Treaty of the Regime of the Soviet-Polish State Frontier and a Frontier Convention.

*July 14:* The Soviet government replies to the notes of the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the situation in Berlin.

*July 30-August 18:* Danube Conference in Belgrade. A Convention on the Regime of Shipping on the Danube is signed.

*August-September:* The governments of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France hold talks on the situation in Berlin.

*September 13-15:* Representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France confer in Paris on the question of the former Italian colonies.

*September 20:* The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs releases a statement that Soviet troops would have been evacuated from Korea by January 1, 1949.

*October 12:* The USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea establish diplomatic relations.

1949

*January 25:* A communiqué is released on the formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance with the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, as its members (it was joined by Albania in February 1949 and by the GDR in September 1950).

*January 27:* The Soviet Union proposes a Peace Pact among the five great powers.

*January 29:* Statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the North Atlantic pact.

*March 31:* Soviet government memorandum on the North Atlantic pact.

*April 4:* The aggressive North Atlantic pact is signed in Washington.

*April 5:* Notes of the Soviet government to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on unlawful changes of Germany's western frontiers.

*May 6:* Communiqué of the governments of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France on the

German question. The Berlin crisis ends.

*May 23-June 20:* Sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris.

*July 20:* Soviet government note on Italy's joining to the North Atlantic Treaty.

*August 25-27:* Session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, Sofia.

*September 23:* Soviet delegation at the 4th UN General Assembly proposes a Peace Pact among the five great powers.

*September 25:* TASS report on the testing of an atomic bomb in the USSR.

*October 1:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the German question.

*October 2:* Soviet government statement on the termination of its diplomatic relations with the Chiang Kai-shek government. Diplomatic relations are established between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

*October 10:* The Soviet government transfers the administrative functions of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany to the government of the GDR.

*October 15:* The Soviet government recognises the German Democratic Republic and establishes diplomatic relations with it.

## 1950

*January 25:* The Soviet Union recognises the United States of Indonesia and establishes diplomatic relations with it.

*January 30:* The Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam establish diplomatic relations.

*February 14:* The USSR and the People's Republic of China sign a Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance and agreements on the Chinese Changchun Railway, Port Arthur, and Dalny, and on the granting of a long-term credit to the PRC.

*April 20-June 16:* Soviet gov-

ernment notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the question of the Free Territory of Trieste.

*May 15:* The Soviet government cuts the remaining reparations due from Germany by 50 per cent.

*June 7:* Soviet memorandum on the regime of the Antarctic.

*June 27-29:* Exchange of notes between the government of the USA and the government of the USSR on the armed conflict in Korea.

*July 8:* Soviet government note to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the question of Trieste.

*October 20-21:* Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the GDR confer in Prague on the German question.

*November 3-December 22:* Soviet government notes to the governments of France, the USA, and Britain suggesting the convocation of the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the question of demilitarisation of Germany.

*December 15:* Soviet notes to the governments of France and Britain declaring that their policy relative to West Germany is incompatible with the Potsdam Agreement and with Franco-Soviet and Anglo-Soviet treaties.

## 1951

*February 5:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the USA and Britain on convening the Council of Foreign Ministers to consider the question of demilitarisation of Germany.

*March 5-June 22:* Preliminary conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers of the USSR, France, the USA, and Britain in Paris to work out the agenda for a session of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

*March 10:* Soviet note to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France containing the Soviet draft principles of a peace treaty with Germany.

*March 12:* The USSR Supreme Soviet passes a law on the defence of peace.

*June 23:* The Soviet representative on the UN Security Council speaks over the US radio making a proposal to begin talks on an armistice in Korea.

*August 6:* US President Harry S. Truman and the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Nikolai Shvernik exchange messages on ending international tension.

*September 11:* Soviet government note to the French government on the remilitarisation of Germany.

*October 15:* Soviet government statement to the government of the USA on the situation in Korea and on Soviet-US relations.

*November 3:* Soviet government note to the government of Turkey on her joining the North Atlantic bloc.

*November 8:* Soviet delegation at the 6th UN General Assembly proposes measures against the threat of another world war, and for strengthening peace and friendship among nations.

*November 17:* Soviet government notes to the governments of Britain, France, and the USA on the question of Trieste.

*November 21:* Soviet note protesting against an act of hostility by the USA in relation to the Soviet Union—the authorisation of \$100 million for subversion and sabotage against the USSR and other socialist countries.

*November 24:* Soviet government note to the US government on its plans to set up a Middle East Command.

## 1952

*March 10:* Soviet note to the Western powers on the drafting of a peace treaty with Germany (with the Soviet draft principles of a peace treaty with Germany attached to the note).

*June 18:* In the Security Council the Soviet Union moves a proposal for a resolution that all countries should ratify the Geneva Protocol

banning the use of bacteriological weapons.

*August 13-September 27:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the State Treaty with Austria.

## 1953

*May 30:* Statement by the Soviet government to the government of Turkey proposing normalising Soviet-Turkish relations.

*August 4:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on convening a Foreign Ministers Conference to consider the German question and ways and means of easing international tension.

*August 20:* The Soviet government publishes a communication on the testing of a hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union.

*August 22:* A Soviet-German (GDR) communiqué and a protocol on the termination of German reparations are signed in Moscow.

*September 21:* The Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly proposes measures to remove the threat of another world war and reduce tension in international relations.

*November 26:* Soviet government notes to the governments of France, Britain, and the USA on convening a Foreign Ministers Conference of the four powers to secure the earliest settlement of outstanding international problems.

## 1954

*January 25-February 18:* A conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain, the USA, and France is held in Berlin on ways and means to ease international tension.

*March 26:* The Soviet government publishes a statement declaring that the German Democratic Republic now enjoys complete sovereignty in its domestic and foreign affairs.

*April 26-July 21:* Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain, the People's Republic of China, the USA, France, and other interested nations confer

in Geneva on the questions of Korea and Indochina.

*July 24:* Soviet government notes to the governments of France, Britain, and the USA on collective security in Europe.

*August 15:* Statement by the Soviet Foreign Minister on the formation of SEATO.

*November 13:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the European countries and the USA proposing a European conference on the creation of a system of collective security in Europe.

*November 29-December 2:* Eight European nations confer in Moscow on ensuring peace and security in Europe.

#### 1955

*January 25:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet passes a decree ending the state of war between the USSR and Germany.

*February 9:* Declaration of the USSR Supreme Soviet on exchanges of parliamentary delegations between countries.

*April 16:* Statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on security in the Middle East.

*April 18-24:* Conference of Asian and African countries in Bandung.

*May 11-14:* Warsaw conference of eight European nations on peace and security in Europe.

*May 14:* The USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw (Warsaw Treaty).

*May 15:* Representatives of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France sign the State Treaty with Austria in Vienna.

*June 2:* A joint Soviet-Yugoslav Declaration is signed.

*July 18-23:* Conference of heads of government of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France in Geneva.

*September 14:* The USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany sign an agreement on the establishment of diplomatic relations between them.

*September 19:* The USSR and Finland sign a Protocol prolonging the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of April 6, 1948 for 20 years and an agreement under which the Soviet Union renounces all rights to the use of Porkkala Udd.

*September 20:* A Treaty of Relations between the USSR and the GDR is signed.

*September 25:* A communiqué is released on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Libya.

*October 27-November 16:* Geneva conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, Britain, the USA, and France on European security, disarmament, and the German question.

*October 31:* The 1928 Soviet-Yemeni Treaty of Friendship is renewed.

#### 1956

*February 14-25:* 20th Congress of the CPSU.

*May 14:* Soviet government statement on disarmament and on a reduction of the USSR Armed Forces by 1,200,000 effectives.

*July 16:* Message of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the parliaments of all countries on the question of disarmament.

*July 20:* The USSR and Nepal establish diplomatic relations.

*August 9:* The Soviet government releases a statement on the Suez Canal.

*August 16-23:* London conference on the Suez Canal.

*October 19:* The Soviet Union and Japan sign a Declaration on the Termination of the State of War and the Resumption of Diplomatic and Consular Relations and a Protocol on the Promotion of Trade, Moscow.

*October 30:* Soviet government declaration on the principles underlying the development and further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

*October 31:* Soviet government statement on the armed Anglo-



French-Israeli aggression against Egypt.

*November 17:* Soviet government statement on disarmament and on easing international tension.

1957

*March 16:* Statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Western powers in connection with the plans to form Euratom and the Common Market.

*May 3:* The Soviet Union publishes proposals for disarmament.

*May 10:* The USSR Supreme Soviet sends a proposal to the US Congress and the British Parliament on ending atomic and hydrogen bomb tests and banning these weapons.

*October 4:* The Soviet Union launches the first-ever artificial Earth satellite. The space age is inaugurated.

*October 19:* TASS statement on the situation in the Middle East and on US provocations against Syria.

*December 6:* The first postwar Soviet-Japanese Trade Treaty is signed in Tokyo.

1958

*January 7:* TASS report on a further reduction of the USSR Armed Forces by 300,000 effectives.

*January 10:* Soviet government proposals on easing international tension are published.

*January 15:* The Soviet Union and Ghana establish diplomatic relations.

*January 29:* The Soviet-Egyptian Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation is signed in Moscow.

*February 20:* Soviet government statement proposing the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe.

*March 5:* Soviet government memorandum proposing the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe is published.

*March 16:* The Soviet government proposes banning the use of outer space for military purposes, dismantling military bases on foreign territory, and establishing internation-

al cooperation in the exploration of outer space.

*March 31:* The USSR Supreme Soviet decrees the Soviet Union's unilateral cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests and calls upon the parliaments of all countries to join in this initiative.

*May 24:* Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Moscow.

*June 25:* TASS issues a statement on the Western powers' preparations for armed intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon.

*July 16:* Soviet government statement on the events in the Middle East.

*July 16:* The Soviet Union recognises the Iraqi Republic.

*July 18:* Soviet government statement on the US and British aggression in the Middle East.

*August 6:* Publication of the exchange of messages between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, the President of the USA, and the Prime Minister of Britain on the US and British intervention in the Middle East.

*October 31:* Talks begin in Geneva between representatives of the USSR, the USA, and Britain on ending nuclear tests.

*December 8:* Soviet government declaration on measures to prevent sudden attack is published.

*December 27:* The Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic sign an agreement in Cairo on assistance in the building of the Aswan High Dam.

1959

*January 1:* The people's revolution in Cuba triumphs.

*January 10:* The Soviet Union recognises the provisional government of the Republic of Cuba.

*January 10:* The Soviet government sends a note to the nations that had participated in the war against Nazi Germany proposing the draft of a peace treaty with Germany and the convocation of a peace conference.

*January 23:* Soviet government

statement in connection with the three-power talks on ending atomic and hydrogen bomb tests.

*March 17:* The Soviet Union and Australia resume normal diplomatic relations.

*April 21:* Soviet government note to the USA condemning the steps to give nuclear weapons to the FRG and other NATO countries.

*April 23:* Message of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers to the heads of government of the USA and Britain on ending nuclear tests.

*April 27-28:* Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries and the People's Republic of China, Warsaw.

*April 28:* Soviet government note to the government of Italy protesting against the building of NATO military bases in Italy.

*May 4:* Soviet government note to the government of Japan protesting against the provision of atomic and hydrogen weapons to Japanese armed forces and the installation of nuclear weapons at US military bases in Japan.

*May 11-June 20, July 13-August 5:* Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers of the USSR, the USA, Britain, and France, with the participation of representatives of the GDR and the FRG, on the German question.

*May 15:* At the Geneva Foreign Ministers Conference the Soviet Union submits the draft peace treaty with Germany.

*June 25:* Soviet government proposal for the creation of nuclear-free zone in the Balkans and the Adriatic.

*August 18:* Statement by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the situation in Laos.

*August 29:* Soviet government statement on the decision not to resume atomic and hydrogen weapons tests in the Soviet Union if such tests are not resumed by the Western powers.

*September 18:* Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament at the UN General Assembly.

*October 24:* TASS statement

declaring the need for a four-power summit.

*October 31:* Message of the USSR Supreme Soviet to the parliaments of all countries calling for every effort to achieve general and complete disarmament.

1960

*January 3:* Talks on ending nuclear tests begin in Geneva between the USSR, the USA, and Britain.

*January 27:* Soviet government memorandum to the government of Japan in connection with the signing of a US-Japanese military treaty.

*April 8:* The Soviet delegation in the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits the Basic Principles of General and Complete Disarmament.

*May 3:* At the three-power conference in Geneva the Soviet delegation proposes a 4-5-year moratorium on underground nuclear tests.

*May 8:* Statement by the governments of the USSR and Cuba on the resumption of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

*May 10:* Soviet note to the government of the USA protesting against the incursion of Soviet air space by a United States U-2 spy plane.

*June 30:* Soviet government statement on the ratification of the US-Japanese military treaty.

*June 30:* Soviet government notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the use of West Berlin for the FRG's military preparations.

*July 7:* The Soviet Union and the Republic of the Congo (Leopoldville) establish diplomatic relations.

*July 13:* Soviet government statement condemning the imperialist intervention against the Republic of the Congo.

*July 16:* TASS statement on the untenability of the USA's claims to the right to intervene in the affairs of Latin American states on the basis of the Monroe Doctrine.

*July 19:* Soviet government statement to the government of the USA protesting against the landing of a

US military force in Leopoldville (Republic of the Congo).

*July 25:* Soviet note to the US government on disarmament.

*August 1, 6, 21:* Statements by the Soviet government on the situation in the Republic of the Congo.

*August 31:* Soviet representatives on the UN make a representation to the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on the need for the immediate withdrawal of Belgian troops from the Congo.

*September 10:* Soviet government statement on the situation in the Republic of the Congo.

*September 14-16:* The UN Security Council, convened on the demand of the USSR, considers the situation in the Republic of the Congo.

*September 22:* The Soviet government issues a statement on the intervention of the USA and its SEATO allies in the internal affairs of Laos.

*September 30:* The Soviet Union and the Somali Republic establish diplomatic relations.

*October 7:* The Soviet Union establishes diplomatic relations with the government of Laos headed by Prince Souvanna Phouma.

*October 11:* Joint statement of the governments of the USSR, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, and Poland exposing militarist and revanchist activities in West Germany.

*November 18:* Communication is published on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Cyprus.

*December 7:* The Soviet government issues a statement on the situation in the Congo in connection with the arrest and torture of the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and other Congolese leaders.

*December 12:* TASS statement on the Anglo-US military agreement.

*December 14:* Soviet note protesting against the US interference in the internal affairs of Laos.

*December 15:* Communication is published on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Central African Republic.

*December 22:* Soviet note to the British government proposing a con-

ference of the participants in the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina to consider the situation in Laos.

*December 27:* Soviet government statement on the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

## 1961

*January 12:* A Soviet government statement is published on the need to end Belgian trusteeship over Ruanda-Urundi and on the situation in the Congo.

*February 14:* Soviet government statement on the murder of the Prime Minister of the Congo Patrice Lumumba.

*April 18:* Message of the head of the Soviet government to US President John F. Kennedy and a Soviet government statement on the invasion of Cuba by counter-revolutionaries.

*May 16:* International conference on the settlement of the Laos problem opens in Geneva.

*May 27:* Soviet government statement on the situation in Angola.

*July 6:* A Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea is signed in Moscow.

*August 3-5:* Soviet-Tunisian talks on Soviet assistance to Tunisia in connection with French aggression in Bizerta.

*August 9:* Soviet government note to the US government on the question of ending nuclear tests.

*August 18:* Soviet notes to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France (in reply to their notes of August 17) in connection with the effective control established by the GDR on its frontier with West Berlin.

*September 2:* Soviet notes to the US, British, and French embassies in Moscow protesting against FRG provocations in West Berlin.

*September 9:* Soviet note to the British government on the dangerous developments in South Vietnam.

*September 20:* Soviet-US statement on agreed principles for disarmament negotiations is signed in New York.

*September 25:* The Soviet government publishes a communication on bilateral Soviet-US disarmament talks.

*September 29:* The Soviet government releases a memorandum on nuclear tests.

*September 30:* Soviet government memorandum is published on progress in carrying out the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

*October 1:* Soviet government memorandum is published on measures to ease international tension, build up confidence among states, and help achieve general and complete disarmament.

*October 17-31:* 22nd Congress of the CPSU.

*November 23:* The USSR and Brazil restore diplomatic relations.

*November 28:* The Soviet government releases a statement in connection with the resumption of talks on ending nuclear tests and the draft agreement on ceasing tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

*December 2:* The Soviet and British ambassadors hand a joint message on a peaceful settlement in Laos to representatives of the three political groups in Laos.

*December 4:* The Soviet government publishes a statement in connection with the talks on ending nuclear tests.

*December 7:* The Soviet representatives on the UN release a statement on the violation of the Security Council's resolution on Katanga by the colonial powers.

## 1962

*January 1:* The Soviet Union recognises the independence of Western Samoa.

*February 9:* Soviet government statement on Indonesia's sovereignty over West Irian.

*February 19:* Soviet statement on US preparations for further provocations against Cuba.

*March 16:* Publication of the Soviet Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control.

*March 18:* Statement by the USSR Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on US policy in South Vietnam.

*March 19:* The Soviet Union extends de jure recognition to the provisional government of the Algerian Republic.

*April 5:* In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva the Soviet delegation submits the draft declaration banning war propaganda.

*April 20:* The Soviet government releases a statement in connection with the joint memorandum of eight neutral nations on ending nuclear tests, submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

*June 4:* Soviet statement on US high-altitude nuclear tests.

*June 5:* Communication is published on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Dahomey.

*June 6-7:* Conference of Heads of Government and First Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties of the CMEA Countries in Moscow.

*June 15:* The USSR and the Republic of Senegal establish diplomatic relations.

*June 29:* Soviet government note to the Japanese government on the question of banning nuclear tests.

*July 1:* The Republic of Rwanda and the Kingdom of Burundi proclaim their independence.

*July 9-14:* World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace, Moscow.

*July 13:* TASS statement on the escalation of the arms race and on the exchange of views between the USSR and the Western powers on a German peace settlement.

*July 22:* Soviet government statement on the resumption of nuclear tests in response to the US tests of nuclear weapons.

*July 23:* In Geneva the Soviet Union and other countries sign the

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos unanimously adopted by the 14 nations participating in the conference on the peaceful settlement of the Laos question.

*September 3:* Publication of a Soviet-Cuban communiqué on supplies of armaments to Cuba and also economic and technical assistance.

*September 12:* TASS statement on US provocations against Cuba.

*September 15:* The governments of the USSR and Iran exchange notes on Iran denying the use of its territory for missile bases and for aggression against the USSR.

*September 21:* At the UN General Assembly the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko submits the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament Under Strict International Control.

*October 27-28:* The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the US President exchange messages on the Cuba question.

1963

*February 6:* Soviet government statement to the Japanese government in connection with its permission for the use of Japanese ports by US submarines.

*February 11:* The Soviet government recognises the new government of Iraq.

*March 11:* The USSR and Kuwait agree to establish diplomatic relations and exchange diplomatic representatives at embassy level.

*April 22:* The UN International Conference on Consular Relations in Vienna adopts the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.

*May 17:* A Soviet government note in reply to a note from the government of the FRG regarding the treaty of Franco-West German cooperation.

*July 24-26:* Conference of First Secretaries of the Central Committees of Communist and Workers' Parties and Heads of Government of the CMEA Countries, Moscow.

*August 5:* In Moscow the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the US Secretary of State Dean

Rusk, and the British Foreign Secretary Lord Home sign a Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

*August 21:* Soviet government statement on China's stand on the question of banning nuclear tests.

*September 25:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.

*October 10:* The governments of the USSR, Britain, and the USA deposit their instruments of ratification of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. The treaty comes into force.

*October 21:* TASS statement on the plans to form NATO multilateral nuclear forces.

*December 14:* The Soviet Union and Kenya agree to establish diplomatic relations and exchange diplomatic representatives at embassy level.

*December 22:* The Soviet Foreign Ministry publishes a statement on the question of enlarging the composition of the UN Security Council and the UN Economic and Social Council.

1964

*January 30:* TASS statement on Soviet support for the lawful aspiration of the Cypriot people to ensure their independence and on the condemnation by the Soviet Union of attempts at foreign interference in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cyprus.

*February 4:* Soviet government representation to the FRG government in connection with the organisation of the manufacture of missiles in West Germany.

*February 5:* The Czechoslovak, Polish, and Soviet delegations submit a joint document to the Preparatory Committee of the UN Conference on Trade and Development stressing the need for an international trade organisation that "would be open and acceptable to all nations regardless of their social system and

level of economic development”.

*March 8:* TASS statement concerning the report on the FRG government's activities in 1963.

*March 11:* Soviet government note to the government of the USA strongly protesting against the provocative flights of US military aircraft in the GDR air space.

*March 25:* A joint Soviet-Yemeni communiqué is published.

*May 4:* Soviet government statement on USSR participation in the Second Conference of Asian and African Countries.

*May 6:* At the UN Conference on Trade and Development the Soviet Union and Bulgaria submit, on behalf of socialist countries, a draft resolution “On Some Measures to Remove Manifestations of Colonialism in the Economy and Foreign Trade of Developing Countries in Order to Speed Up Their Economic Growth”.

*June 12:* The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic sign a Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation.

*July 6:* The Soviet permanent representative on the UN hands the UN Secretary-General U Thant a statement on the situation in the Congo.

*July 7:* The Soviet permanent representative on the UN hands the US ambassador to the UN a Soviet government memorandum on some measures to enhance the UN's effectiveness in safeguarding international peace and security.

*July 19:* Soviet government statement in reply to a statement by the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the signing of the USSR-GDR Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation of June 12, 1964.

*August 9:* The Soviet representative on the UN forwards to the Security Council Chairman a Soviet government statement on the anti-Cuban resolutions passed on July 25 at an OAS Foreign Ministers Conference.

*August 16:* Soviet government statement in connection with the appeal by the President of Cyprus Archbishop Makarios for military

assistance to defend the sovereignty and independence of the Republic of Cyprus.

*August 25:* TASS statement on the armed intervention by the USA and Belgium in the internal affairs of the Congo.

*September 21:* TASS statement in connection with the US provocation in the Gulf of Tonkin.

*November 15:* TASS statement on the accelerated activity in Western countries to form NATO multilateral nuclear forces.

*December 24:* Soviet government statement on the FRG government's decision to cease court proceedings against nazi war criminals as of May 1965.

## 1965

*January 1:* The Soviet Union abolishes customs dues on goods imported from developing Asian, African, and Latin American states.

*January 17:* Soviet government note to the government of the FRG protesting against preparatory moves to amnesty nazi war criminals.

*January 19:* Soviet government note to the governments of the USA and the FRG protesting against the West German government's plans to create an “atomic mine belt” along the FRG's frontiers with the GDR and Czechoslovakia.

*February 17:* Soviet-Cuban long-term trade-and-payments agreements for 1965-1970 and a protocol on trade for 1965 are signed in Moscow.

*March 4:* Soviet government statement to the government of the USA in connection with the expanding US interference in the internal affairs of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

*March 28:* Soviet government note to the governments of the USA, Britain, and France on the FRG's intention to hold a sitting of the Bundestag in West Berlin.

*April 8:* The USSR and Poland sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw.

*May 2:* The Soviet permanent representative on the UN demands an immediate convocation of the

Security Council to consider the US armed intervention in the internal affairs of the Dominican Republic.

*May 9:* The Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Council of Ministers publish an address "To the Governments, Parliaments, and Peoples of All Countries" on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the victory over nazi Germany.

*May 9:* TASS statement on the Indo-Pakistani border conflict in the vicinity of Rann of Kutch.

*May 21:* TASS statement about a speech by the US President Lyndon B. Johnson in connection with the 20th anniversary of World War II.

*July 3:* TASS statement in connection with the agreement signed in Tokyo on the "normalisation" of relations between Japan and South Korea.

*August 6:* The Soviet Union and Afghanistan sign a protocol prolonging the operation of the Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression of June 24, 1931.

*September 8:* TASS statement on the Indo-Pakistani armed conflict.

*September 13:* Another TASS statement on the armed conflict between India and Pakistan.

*September 17:* In Moscow the USSR and Czechoslovakia sign a protocol on the procedure for the non-visa travel of citizens of both countries going to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia on private business or on visits to relatives, friends, and acquaintances.

*September 24:* At the UN General Assembly the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko submits the draft Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and on the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, and also the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

*September 28:* The UN General Assembly approves the recommendation of the General Committee to include the questions of the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of states and of the non-

proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted by the Soviet Union, in the agenda of the 20th General Assembly.

*October 13:* In Sofia the Soviet Union and Bulgaria sign a long-term trade agreement for 1966-1970 and a protocol on trade for 1966.

*October 14:* TASS statement on the signing of a Japanese-South Korean agreement.

*October 15:* The Soviet Union and Australia sign a long-term trade agreement in Moscow.

*October 26:* TASS statement protesting against the intention of the white minority in Southern Rhodesia to proclaim the "independence" of that country.

*November 3:* A committee to help conduct the First Solidarity Conference of Asian, African, and Latin American Peoples is set up in the Soviet Union.

*November 4-8:* Soviet-Singapore negotiations. Agreement is reached on opening a Soviet trade mission and a TASS branch in Singapore.

*November 15:* Soviet government statement in connection with the situation in Southern Rhodesia.

*November 18:* In Moscow the Soviet Union and Poland sign a long-term trade-and-payments agreement for 1966-1970 and a protocol on reciprocal sales of goods for 1966.

*December 2:* The Soviet Union and Britain sign a consular convention in Moscow.

*December 3:* The Soviet Union and the GDR sign a long-term trade agreement for 1966-1970 in Berlin.

## 1966

*February 16:* Soviet government memorandum to the US government on flights by US aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over the territories of foreign countries and over the high seas.

*February 17:* Soviet government memorandum to the Japanese government on the use by the USA of Japanese territory, industry, and manpower in the aggression against Vietnam.

*March 4:* In Bucharest the Soviet Union and Romania sign a convention abolishing visas for travel by their citizens on business and on visits to relatives and acquaintances, and also abolishing transit visas.

*March 7:* The permanent Soviet representative on the UN sends the Security Council Chairman a letter in support of the application of the German Democratic Republic for membership of the United Nations.

*March 7:* The Soviet Union signs the International Convention on the Abolition of All Forms of Racial Discrimination passed by the 20th UN General Assembly.

*March 29-April 8:* 23rd Congress of the CPSU.

*April 2:* The Soviet Union and Singapore sign a trade agreement.

*May 17:* The Soviet government replies to a note of the FRG government of March 25, 1966.

*May 28:* TASS statement on the Middle East policy of the imperialists.

*May 28:* TASS statement on the conference of Foreign Ministers of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, South Korea, the Saigon regime, and the Chiang Kai-shek clique scheduled for June 14 in Seoul, South Korea.

*May 30:* TASS statement on US military provocations against the Republic of Cuba.

*May 30:* The Soviet Union proposes that the 21st UN General Assembly consider the question of an international agreement on the legal principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.

*June 30:* In Moscow the Soviet Union and France sign a Declaration, an Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Conquest of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, and an Agreement on Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation.

*July 1:* Soviet government statement in connection with the US bombing of the areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.

*July 5:* Soviet government statement on provocative actions by

the USA and its allies against neutral Cambodia.

*August 20:* The USSR Foreign Ministry hands the British chargé d'affaires in the USSR the Soviet draft statement by the Co-Chairmen of the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina in connection with the US armed encroachments on the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia.

*August 22:* Soviet government note to the FRG government in connection with the Statute of Limitation passed by the West German Bundestag on June 23, 1966.

*August 24:* TASS statement on the Soviet stand relative to the developments in Nigeria.

*October 3:* Agreements are signed in Moscow on further gratuitous assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on additional credits, and on trade in 1967, and also other documents.

*December 8:* The Soviet Union and France sign a Consular Convention.

*December 15:* Soviet government statement condemning the barbarous US bombing of Hanoi.

## 1967

*January 27:* In Moscow, Washington, and London the depository nations (the USSR, the USA, and Britain) sign the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (it was then opened for signature by other nations).

*January 29:* Soviet government statement on the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany—on the activities of neofascist and militarist elements.

*February 4:* Soviet government statement strongly protesting against the anti-Soviet campaign in China.

*February 9:* Soviet government note to the FRG government in connection with the resurgence of nazism and militarism in the FRG and the FRG government's claims "to speak on behalf of the entire German people".

*April 24-26:* Karlovy Vary Confer-



ence of European Communist and Workers' Parties on Security in Europe. The Conference adopted a statement headed "For Peace and Security in Europe" and some other documents.

*May 12:* The USSR and Bulgaria sign a 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and a Soviet-Bulgarian communiqué.

*May 18:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies signed on January 27, 1967.

*June 6:* Soviet government statement in connection with the Israeli armed aggression against the United Arab Republic.

*June 7:* The UN Security Council adopts the Soviet-sponsored resolution demanding that Israel cease fire and all hostilities at 20 hours Greenwich time on June 7, 1967.

*June 7:* The Soviet government sends the government of Israel a statement in connection with Israel's non-fulfilment of the Security Council resolution requiring an immediate cessation of fire and all hostilities.

*June 9:* Leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia meet to consider the Middle East situation. The central committees of the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of these countries adopt a statement.

*June 10:* The USSR breaks off diplomatic relations with Israel.

*July 8:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Soviet-Bulgarian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on May 12, 1967 in Sofia.

*July 11-12:* Budapest conference of leaders of Communist and Workers' parties and heads of government of socialist countries on the situation in the Middle East.

*July 26:* The USSR and Malta establish diplomatic relations.

*August 24:* The Soviet delegation

in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament submits the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

*August 24:* TASS statement on the further criminal actions by the US imperialists against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

*September 7:* The USSR and Hungary sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance.

*November 3-4:* Joint sitting of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to mark the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

*December 19-21:* Warsaw Conference of Foreign Ministers of European Socialist Countries on the situation in the Middle East.

## 1968

*January 5:* In London the USSR and Britain sign an agreement on the settlement of mutual financial and property claims.

*January 18:* The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumes its work in Geneva. The Soviet delegation submits the draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which included a provision on international control of observance of the treaty. An analogous draft is submitted by the United States delegation.

*January 19:* Soviet government statement on US provocations against Cambodia.

*January 29:* Soviet government statement to the government of Japan on the expansion of Japanese-US military and political collaboration in the Vietnam question.

*February 21:* The Soviet Foreign Ministry lodges a strong protest with the US government in connection with a criminal action against the USSR Embassy in Washington. A bomb was thrown into the embassy.

*February 24:* The USSR Foreign Ministry holds a press conference on the continued growth of neo-nazi and militarist forces in the FRG.

*March 3:* TASS statement on the

plans to form a new military bloc in the Persian Gulf under the aegis of the USA and Britain.

*March 4:* The Soviet Ambassador in the GDR makes a statement to the press regarding the unlawful holding of a "Bundestag Week" and sitting of the FRG government in West Berlin.

*March 7:* The USSR, the USA, and Britain submit to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva an agreed draft resolution of the UN Security Council on guarantees of security and draft statements of these three nuclear powers on this question.

*April 22:* An Agreement on the Rescue of Cosmonauts (Astronauts), the Return of Cosmonauts (Astronauts) and the Return of Vehicles Launched Into Outer Space is signed in Moscow, Washington, and London.

*May 31:* The USSR and the USA, Co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Committee, submit to the UN General Assembly a specified and enlarged draft Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons taking into account the proposals and recommendations made at the discussion of the draft in the Political Committee of the UN General Assembly.

*June 1:* The USSR and Singapore establish diplomatic relations.

*June 19:* The UN Security Council passes a resolution, proposed by the Soviet Union, the USA, and Britain, on guarantees of security to non-nuclear nations signing the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

*June 20:* At the United Nations the Soviet Union submits a proposal for banning the use of the ocean floor and sea-bed for military purposes.

*July 1:* The Soviet government circulates a memorandum on some urgent measures to halt the arms race and promote disarmament.

*July 2:* Communication is published that the USSR and the USA had reached an understanding to begin talks in the immediate future on a comprehensive limitation and cutback of offensive strategic nuclear

arms delivery vehicles and of anti-ballistic defence systems.

*July 11-13:* Soviet documents about an exchange of views between the USSR and the FRG on the non-use of force are published.

*July 26:* The Soviet delegation to the UN sends the UN Secretary-General a letter strongly censuring the efforts by Britain, the USA, and France to depict the FRG as the sole existing German state.

*July 29:* A general agreement is signed in Tokyo on Japanese sales of equipment, machinery, materials, and other items for the development of the timber resources of the Soviet Far East and on Soviet sales of timber to Japan.

*August 13:* In the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva the Soviet representative proposes a discussion of ways and means of ensuring fulfilment by all nations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

*August 21:* TASS statement on the entry into Czechoslovakia, at the request of Czechoslovak party leaders and statesmen, of Soviet military units and of units of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, GDR, and Polish armies to help the working people of that country safeguard their revolutionary achievements against encroachments by internal and external enemies of socialism.

*August 23:* The governments of Bulgaria, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR publish an Address to the citizens of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

*September 25:* A statement on the situation in the Middle East is read out at a press conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

*October 16-17:* In Prague the governments of the USSR and Czechoslovakia sign a Treaty on the Terms for the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia.

*October 18:* The Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on the Terms for the Temporary Stationing of Soviet Troops in Czechoslovakia comes into force.

*October 23:* The 15th UNESCO

General Conference passes a resolution on official UNESCO participation in marking the centenary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

*October 23:* In Moscow representatives of the Soviet Union, the GDR, and Poland sign a Declaration on the Baltic Continental Shelf.

*October 29-30:* Conference of Defence Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty Countries on Strengthening the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

*November 3:* Soviet government statement in connection with the cessation of US bombing of the DRV territory.

*November 6:* TASS statement on a new aggravation of the Middle East situation resulting from Israeli dangerous armed provocations against Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon.

*November 11-13:* The Presidium of the World Peace Council holds a sitting in Lahti, Finland. It adopts an Appeal to the peoples of the world in support of Vietnam and a statement on Vietnam. It considers European security and other international problems. It resolves to take an active part in marking the centenary of the birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

*November 16:* TASS refutes Western press reports that a Soviet naval base is under construction at Mers-el-Kebira and that a network of Soviet missile installations is being set up in Algeria.

*November 25:* In Moscow the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam sign agreements on Soviet gratuitous economic and military assistance, on new long-term Soviet credits, and on trade between the two countries in 1969, and also documents on some other questions concerning Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation.

*November 26:* By a majority vote the UN General Assembly approves the text of a Convention on the Inapplicability of the Statute of Limitation to War Crimes and to Crimes Against Humanity.

*December 3:* In Moscow, Washington, and London the Soviet Union, the USA, and Britain deposit the instruments of ratification of the Agreement on the Rescue of Cos-

monauts (Astronauts), the Return of Cosmonauts (Astronauts) and Return of Vehicles Launched Into Outer Space. The Agreement thereby comes into force officially.

*December 6:* TASS statement on the talks held in October-November by the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and also by the British Minister George Thomson with the head of the racist regime in South Rhodesia Ian Smith.

1969

*January 8:* In Havana the Soviet Union and Cuba sign three agreements on the expansion of their cooperation.

*January 21:* The Soviet government backs a French proposal for a meeting between the representatives of the USSR, France, the USA, and Britain on the UN Security Council to consider, in contact with the UN Secretary-General, ways and means of helping to establish a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

*January 21:* In Moscow the governments of the Soviet Union and Jordan sign an Agreement on Economic and Technical Cooperation and a Trade Agreement.

*January 28:* The Soviet press publishes a statement by Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, as Co-Chairman of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos in connection with the intensifying US interference in the internal affairs of Laos.

*February 1:* The USSR and Peru establish diplomatic relations at embassy level.

*February 26:* The Soviet delegation to the UN submits to the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression a draft resolution containing a clearly-worded definition that armed aggression is a crime against humanity.

*February 26:* The Soviet government sends the government of the GDR a note requesting it to consider the possibility of taking steps to curb the unlawful militarist activity of the authorities and citizens of the FRG and West Berlin that were

affecting the security of the socialist states and European peace.

*February 28:* TASS statement on new acts of aggression by the Israeli military against Arab countries.

*March 2:* Soviet government note of protest to the government of the PRC in connection with armed provocations by the Chinese authorities on the Ussuri River.

*March 11:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Convention on the Inapplicability of the Statute of Limitation to War Crimes and to Crimes Against Humanity, signed on behalf of the Soviet Union on January 6, 1969.

*March 15:* The Soviet government lodges a strong protest with the government of the PRC in connection with the Chinese military provocations on the Soviet frontier on March 14 and 15.

*March 18:* The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament resumes its work in Geneva. The Soviet Union submits a draft Treaty Banning the Use of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof for Military Purposes.

*March 29:* Soviet government statement in connection with armed border incidents provoked by the Chinese side on the Ussuri River in the vicinity of Damansky Island.

*April 11:* Note by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Foreign Ministry of the PRC proposing a resumption of the autumn 1964 Soviet-Chinese consultations in Moscow on April 15 or at any other immediate date convenient for the Chinese side.

*April 23-26:* The Special 23rd Session of the CMEA with the participation of leaders of Communist and Workers' parties and heads of government of the CMEA countries is held in Moscow.

*May 26:* In Moscow the USSR and France sign an Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation for 1970-1974.

*June 3:* In Moscow the Soviet Union and Britain sign a long-term Trade Agreement for 1969-1975.

*June 13:* Soviet government statement of March 29 is forwarded

to the government of the PRC through the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.

*June 13:* The Soviet Union recognises the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam.

*June 5-17:* An international conference of 75 communist and workers' parties is held in Moscow.

*September 19:* The Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko sends the UN Secretary-General a letter requesting the inclusion of the question "On Strengthening International Security" as an important and urgent item on the agenda of the 24th UN General Assembly. The draft "Appeal to All the Countries of the World", submitted to the 24th General Assembly by the Soviet government, is appended to the letter.

*September 19:* At the 24th UN General Assembly the delegations of Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukraine, and the USSR send the UN Secretary-General a letter requesting the inclusion of the question of signing a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction in the agenda of the session. The draft of this convention is appended to the letter.

*October 20:* Talks on questions of interest to the two sides begin in Peking between government delegations of the USSR and the PRC in accordance with the understanding reached earlier between the two governments.

*October 25:* TASS issues a statement concerning a statement circulated by the US Embassy in Lebanon, which, on the pretext of concern for the "independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon", in effect proclaimed the USA's claim to interference in the internal affairs of the Lebanese Republic.

*October 26:* A communication is published to the effect that reaffirming their earlier understanding to enter into negotiations on curbing the strategic arms race the govern-

ments of the USSR and the USA have agreed that their special representatives would meet in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, for a preliminary examination of the questions involved.

*October 30-31:* Prague conference of Foreign Ministers of the socialist states that signed the Budapest Address—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union—considers some issues relating to preparations for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

*October 31:* A statement on the situation in the Middle East is read at a press conference held at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

*November 3:* The Soviet Foreign Minister and Co-Chairman of the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos Andrei Gromyko publishes a statement expressing serious concern over the alarming situation in Laos as a result of the further escalation of US interference in the internal affairs of that country.

*November 12:* In Santiago, Chile, the ambassadors of the USSR and Ecuador to Chile reach an understanding on formalising diplomatic relations, established between the Soviet Union and Ecuador in 1945, at embassy level.

*November 24:* The Soviet Union and the USA ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

*November 27:* A statement on the situation in the Middle East is published by the central committees of the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union.

*December 22:* The preliminary talks on halting the strategic arms race, begun on November 17 between Soviet and US delegations, are completed in Helsinki. The communiqué states that an understanding has been reached on resuming these talks in Vienna on April 16, 1970, and then moving them back to Helsinki.

*December 22:* The Warsaw Treaty Committee of Defence Ministers

meets in Moscow to consider the security of frontiers and the state of the armies of the Warsaw Treaty nations.

1970

*January 30-February 18, March 3-21:* A Soviet delegation led by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and an FRG delegation led by the West German Minister for Special Assignments (State Secretary) Egon Bahr exchange views in Moscow on questions relating to the intention of the two countries to conclude an agreement on the non-use of force between the FRG and the USSR.

*March 5:* The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons comes into force. In Moscow, Washington, and London the depository nations—the Soviet Union and the USA deposit the instruments of ratification. The instrument of ratification of Britain, which is likewise a depository nation, was deposited with the government of the USSR on November 29, 1968. The treaty's provision that it enters into force after it is ratified and the instruments of ratification are deposited by the three depository nations and also by 40 other nations is thus fulfilled. The Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin speaks at the depositing ceremony in Moscow.

*April 16:* The Soviet Union and Venezuela restore diplomatic relations, which were severed in 1950.

*April 22:* Centenary of the birth (1870) of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.

*April 25:* TASS statement on the massacres of persons of Vietnamese nationality residing in Cambodia by the military authorities of that country.

*April 30:* TASS statement on the unceasing Israeli military provocations against Lebanon.

*May 4:* At a press conference in Moscow the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin reads a Soviet government statement in connection with the US armed invasion of Cambodia.

*May 8:* The Soviet people, the peoples of other socialist community states, and progressives throughout the world mark the 25th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany.

*May 14:* The heads of government of the eight socialist member states of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance consider the situation generated in Indochina by the spread of the war to Cambodia and the escalation of the US aggression in that region.

*June 1:* On the recommendation of the USSR Council of Ministers the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed by the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in Prague on May 6, 1970. This same day the Treaty is ratified in Prague by the President of Czechoslovakia Ludvík Svoboda.

*June 11:* Agreements on additional Soviet economic and military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1970 is signed in Moscow.

*June 16:* The Committee on Disarmament resumes its work in Geneva. Its agenda includes examination of a draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and of a Convention on a Total Ban on Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons.

*June 21-22:* The Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries confer in Budapest and adopt a memorandum on accelerating the preparations for a European Conference on Security and for the drawing up of its programme.

*July 15:* The first session of the eighth USSR Supreme Soviet adopts a statement in connection with the escalated US imperialist aggression in Indochina and a statement on the situation in the Middle East.

*August 12:* The USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany sign a treaty in Moscow.

*August 14:* Soviet-US talks on limiting strategic arms, begun on April 16, are completed in Vienna.

The released communiqué notes that the sides have agreed to resume the talks on November 2 in Helsinki.

*September 30:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Soviet-Romanian Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance signed on June 7, 1970.

*October 27:* Soviet government statement to the governments of the USA and Turkey in connection with an incursion into Soviet airspace by a US military aircraft on October 21.

*November 3:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the Protocol prolonging the operation of the Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of April 6, 1948.

*November 24:* Soviet government statement in connection with Portuguese armed aggression against Guinea.

*November 24:* TASS statement on the US bombing of DRV territory on November 21.

*December 3:* A Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee adopts the following documents: a statement on strengthening security and promoting peaceful cooperation in Europe, a statement in connection with the aggravated situation in Indochina, a statement calling for the establishment of lasting peace and security in the Middle East, and a statement demanding an end to imperialist provocations against independent American states.

*December 17:* The governments of the USSR and Guyana agree to establish diplomatic relations.

*December 18:* The strategic arms limitation talks begun by delegations of the USSR and the USA on November 2 end in Helsinki. The released communiqué states that it has been agreed to resume the talks in Vienna on March 15, 1971.

*December 19:* A communiqué is published on the strategic arms limitation talks between delegations of the USSR and the USA.

*December 22-24:* Andrei Gromyko has talks in Moscow with the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mah-

moud Riad.

*December 27:* A joint communiqué is published on a visit to the USSR by an Egyptian party and government delegation led by the Vice-President of the UAR Ali Sabri.

1971

*January 15:* The Soviet government offers the government of the People's Republic of China to sign a Treaty on the Non-Use of Force.

*February 11:* The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and on the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof is signed in Moscow, London, and Washington by its three depository nations—the USSR, Britain, and the USA.

*February 18-19:* The Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty nations confer in Bucharest on the preparations for the European Conference.

*February 26:* Soviet government statement in connection with an extension of US aggressive actions against Laos.

*February 28:* Soviet government statement in connection with Israel's refusal to pull its troops out of the occupied Arab lands.

*March 30-April 9:* 24th Congress of the CPSU. The congress adopts an address "Freedom and Peace for the Peoples of Indochina" and a statement "For a Just and Durable Peace in the Middle East".

*May 27:* The USSR and Egypt sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Cairo.

*June 23:* Soviet government statement on the question of convening a conference of the nuclear powers.

*June 25-27:* The 25th CMEA session adopts a Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Economic Integration.

*August 2:* Leaders of Communist and Workers' parties of socialist countries meet in the Crimea.

*August 9:* The USSR and India sign a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in Delhi.

*August 19:* A communication is published on the signing in Moscow of an agreement on additional Soviet gratuitous assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to strengthen the country's defence capability.

*September 3:* In West Berlin the USSR, France, the USA, and Britain sign a quadripartite agreement on questions concerning that city.

*September 6:* Publication of a letter from the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the UN Secretary-General U Thant requesting the inclusion of the item "On a World Disarmament Conference" in the agenda of the General Assembly.

*September 30:* An Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Accidental Nuclear War Between the USSR and the USA and on Improving Direct Communication Between the USSR and the USA is signed in Washington.

*October 30:* A Soviet-French Declaration and the Principles of Cooperation Between the USSR and France are signed in Paris as a result of the visit to France by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev.

*November 22-23:* A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee hears a report from the CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev "On the International Work of the CPSU Central Committee After the 24th Party Congress" and passes a resolution on this question.

*November 30-December 1:* A Conference of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty countries on preparations for the European Conference is held in Warsaw.

*December 6:* TASS statement in connection with the armed clashes on the Indo-Pakistani frontier.

*December 16:* 26th UN General Assembly passes a resolution approving the Soviet proposal for a World Disarmament Conference.

*December 31:* Communication is released on the signing in Moscow of an agreement to provide additional Soviet gratuitous assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam

for the further strengthening of the country's defence capability.

1972

*January 7:* TASS reports the withdrawal of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia from the preparatory committee for an international UN conference on the environment in connection with the resolution forced upon the General Assembly by the imperialist powers.

*January 24:* The Soviet Union recognises the People's Republic of Bangladesh and declares its readiness to establish diplomatic relations with it and exchange diplomatic representatives.

*January 25-26:* A Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee conference in Prague adopts a communiqué, a Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in Europe, and a statement in connection with the continued US aggression in Vietnam.

*January 29:* The USSR and the United Arab Emirates agree to exchange diplomatic representatives at embassy level.

*February 9-10:* Defence Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty holds a regular meeting.

*February 12:* The Soviet government strongly censures the US aggression in Vietnam.

*February 16:* Soviet government statement to the governments of Greece and the USA in connection with the intention of setting up bases for the US 8th Fleet on Greek territory.

*February 17:* Soviet-Niger communiqué on an exchange of diplomatic representatives at embassy level.

*March 3:* The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Bangladesh sign a Joint Declaration in Moscow.

*March 28:* At the Committee on Disarmament the USSR and other socialist countries submit a draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

*April 9:* The Soviet Union and Iraq sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in Baghdad.

*April 10:* A Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on Their Destruction is signed in Moscow, London, and Washington.

*April 11:* In Moscow the USSR and the USA sign an agreement on exchanges and cooperation in science, technology, education, culture, and other fields for 1972-1973.

*April 18:* A Declaration of Principles of Goodneighbourly Relations Between the USSR and Turkey is published.

*May 4-17:* Representatives of the USSR and the USA hold talks in Washington on the prevention of incidents on the sea and in air space.

*May 11:* Soviet government statement in connection with the further escalation of the US aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

*May 19:* The General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev delivers a report "On the International Situation" at a plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.

*May 23:* In Moscow the USSR and the USA sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection and an Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Medical Science and Public Health.

*May 24:* In Moscow the USSR and the USA sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes and an Agreement on Cooperation in the Fields of Science and Technology.

*May 25:* In Moscow the USSR and the USA sign an Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the Sea.

*May 26:* In Moscow the USSR and the USA sign a Treaty of the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.



*May 29:* The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations Between the USSR and the USA are signed in Moscow.

*June 2:* Statement of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR "On the Results of Soviet-US Talks".

*July 31:* Leaders of communist and workers' parties of socialist countries meet in the Crimea.

*August 6:* The Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee passes a resolution on the results of the meeting of leaders of communist and workers' parties of socialist countries in the Crimea on July 31.

*October 14:* A Soviet-US agreement on shipping is signed in Washington.

*October 20:* Soviet-US agreements on trade, lend-lease settlements, and reciprocal credits are signed in Washington.

*October 26:* In Moscow the Soviet Union and Italy sign a Protocol on Consultations and a Treaty on Merchant Shipping.

*November 10:* Statement by the governments of the USSR, Britain, the USA, and France on quadrilateral rights and responsibilities in connection with the forthcoming admission of the GDR and the FRG to UN membership.

*November 22, 1972-June 8, 1973:* Thirty-two European nations, the USA, and Canada, hold multilateral consultations in Helsinki on the preparations for the European Conference.

*November 29:* The 27th UN General Assembly passes a Soviet-sponsored resolution "On the Non-Use of Force in International Relations and Perpetual Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons".

*December 9:* In Moscow agreements are signed on Soviet gratuitous assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on trade between the USSR and the DRV for 1973, and on the formation of a Standing Intergovernmental Soviet-Vietnamese Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Coop-

eration.

*December 20:* TASS statement in connection with a new escalation of US military actions against the DRV.

*December 22:* Signing of the Geneva Memorandum on an agreement to set up a Permanent Consultative Commission in accordance with Article 13 of the Soviet-US Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems.

*December 24:* Publication of the Address of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the CPSU Central Committee "To the Peoples of the World".

## 1973

*January 15-16:* Conference in Moscow of the Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR.

*January 18:* Soviet government note to the governments of several Western countries on the preparatory consultations for negotiations on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

*January 23:* Communication of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee on the meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and the President of France Georges Pompidou.

*January 27:* The Soviet government informs the Western countries of Soviet participation in the preparatory consultations on holding talks on a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe.

*January 27:* The Agreement on the Termination of the War and the Restoration of Peace in Vietnam is signed in Paris.

*February 26-March 2:* International Conference on Vietnam.

*April 24:* Convention on the Legal Capacity, Privileges and Immunities of the Headquarters and Other Administrative Bodies of the United Forces of the Warsaw Treaty is signed in Moscow.

*April 26-27:* A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee

hears a report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev "On the International Activities of the CPSU Central Committee to Fulfill the Decisions of the 24th Party Congress" and passes a resolution on this question.

*May 19:* In Bonn the USSR and the FRG sign agreements on the development of economic, industrial and technical cooperation, and on cultural cooperation, and an Additional Protocol to the Agreement on an Air Service of November 11, 1971.

*May 22:* In Washington the USSR and the USA sign a Protocol to the Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the Sea signed in Moscow on May 25, 1972.

*June 14:* The CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet Government send the Chinese leadership a proposal for a Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

*June 19:* In Washington the USSR and the USA sign agreements on cooperation in agriculture, transport, and the study of the ocean, and a General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation.

*June 20:* In Washington the USSR and the USA sign a Tax Convention.

*June 21:* In Washington the USSR and the USA sign the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and an Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

*June 22:* A Protocol is signed in Washington on the opening, on October 21, 1973, of a Soviet trade mission in Washington and a US commercial bureau in Moscow, and also a Protocol on the formation of a US-Soviet Chamber of Commerce.

*June 22:* The USSR-USA Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War is signed in Washington.

*June 30:* Communication is published of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Pre-

sidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of a visit to the USA by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev.

*July 3-7:* First phase of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

*August 7:* In Moscow the USSR and Iran sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Prevention of the Hijacking of Civilian Aircraft and an Additional Protocol to the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of May 7, 1957, on the regime of the frontier between the two countries and on the procedure for settling frontier conflicts and incidents.

*September 14:* A statement by the CPSU Central Committee on the military coup in Chile.

*September 18:* The Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet ratifies the international accords on economic, social and cultural rights and on civil and political rights signed on behalf of the USSR in New York on March 18, 1968.

*September 18-December 18:* 28th UN General Assembly in New York.

*September 22:* Soviet government statement concerning the reign of terror and outrages instituted by the military junta that overthrew the lawful government of Chile.

*September 23:* The USSR breaks off diplomatic relations with the military junta that seized power in Chile.

*September 25:* Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko addresses the 28th UN General Assembly.

*September 25:* The Soviet-US strategic arms limitation talks resume in Geneva.

*September 29:* In New York the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Irish Republic Garret FitzGerald sign a communiqué on an exchange of diplomatic representatives between the USSR and Ireland.

*October 8:* Soviet government statement in connection with the renewal of hostilities in the Middle East.

*October 16:* The USSR and Ga-

bon establish diplomatic relations.

*October 24:* Soviet government statement in connection with Israel's violation of the Security Council resolution of October 22, 1973, calling for a cease-fire and an end to all hostilities in the Middle East.

*October 25-31:* World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow.

*October 28:* TASS statement in connection with the Middle East developments and the attempts to justify the alert of US armed forces in some regions, including Europe.

*November 29:* In Delhi the USSR and India sign a Declaration, an Agreement on the Further Development of Economic and Trade Cooperation, an Agreement on Cooperation Between the USSR State Planning Committee and the Planning Commission of India, and a Consular Convention.

*December 7:* The UN General Assembly passes a resolution approving the Soviet proposal "On the Reduction of the Military Budgets of States Permanent Members of the Security Council by 10 Per Cent and Utilisation of Part of the Funds Thus Saved to Provide Assistance to Developing Countries".

*December 10-11:* A plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee hears a report by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev on the work of the Political Bureau in carrying out the domestic and foreign policy decisions of the 24th Party Congress.

*December 20:* An agreement on Soviet economic assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam is signed in Moscow.

*December 21-22:* Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East.

1974

*January 15:* The working organs of the second phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resume their sittings in Geneva. The talks in Geneva were continued, with brief intervals, throughout the whole of 1974.

*January 22:* A Soviet Foreign Ministry note to the Embassy of the

PRC is published in the Soviet press.

*January 30:* The Soviet Union and Fiji establish diplomatic relations at embassy level.

*April 1:* TASS statement on Soviet support for the concrete proposals of the provisional revolutionary government of the Republic of South Vietnam aimed at ensuring a durable and just peace and achieving national concord.

*April 17-18:* Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw adopts statements under the headings: "For a Just and Lasting Peace in the Middle East", "For Durable Peace in Vietnam, for Ensuring the Just National Interests of the Vietnamese People", and "End the Lawlessness and the Persecution of Democrats in Chile".

*April 22:* Sittings of the second phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe resume in Vienna.

*May 10:* Talks on a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe resume in Vienna.

*June 6:* The USSR and Trinidad and Tabago establish diplomatic relations.

*June 9:* The USSR and Portugal establish diplomatic relations.

*June 23:* TASS statement in connection with the continued fueling of tension in the Middle East by the Israeli military.

*July 3:* The USSR and the USA sign a Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, a Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests, a Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Tests, a Joint Statement, and a Joint Communiqué.

*July 6:* Communication is published of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of the third Soviet-US summit.

*July 11:* The USSR and the Somali Democratic Republic sign a Treaty of Friendship and Coopera-

tion.

*July 16:* TASS statement in connection with the anti-government rising of the national guards on Cyprus.

*July 21, 29, August 23:* Soviet government statements in connection with the continued tense situation on Cyprus.

*November 24:* A Joint Soviet-US Communiqué and a Joint Soviet-US Statement are signed in Vladivostok.

*November 29:* Communiqué of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of a working meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and the US President Gerald R. Ford.

*December 10:* Communication of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the results of a working meeting between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and the President of France Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

*December 18:* TASS statement and a letter from the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Henry Kissinger on trade and economic relations between the USSR and the USA.

1975

*February 10:* In Moscow Soviet and US delegations resume talks on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

*February 17:* The Soviet Union and Britain sign a Statement, a Protocol on Consultations, a Joint Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and a number of agreements.

*February 10-17:* A Week of Solidarity with the Arab people of Palestine is held in the Soviet Union, as in many other countries.

*March 2:* The Soviet Union and France sign an Agreement on Cooperation in the Protection of the En-

vironment and an Agreement on Cooperation.

*March 12:* The USSR and Jamaica establish diplomatic relations at embassy level.

*May 9:* 30th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

*May 10:* The Soviet press publishes the Address of the CPSU Central Committee, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the peoples, parliaments, and the governments on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War.

*May 12:* An agreement is signed in Moscow on Soviet economic assistance to the population of South Vietnam in 1975.

*May 14:* The 20th anniversary of the signing of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance is marked in the Soviet Union.

*June 25:* The USSR and Mozambique establish diplomatic relations.

*June 24-26:* The 29th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is held in Budapest at the level of heads of government.

*July 3:* In Moscow Soviet and US delegations resume talks on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

*July 4:* An Agreement on Cooperation is signed between a CMEA delegation and a delegation from the Republic of Iraq.

*July 5:* The USSR and the Republic of Cape Verde Islands establish diplomatic relations.

*July 12:* The USSR and the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe establish diplomatic relations.

*July 30:* Talks on cooperation between the CMEA and Mexico are completed in Moscow.

*July 30-August 1:* Concluding phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe is held in Helsinki. The Final Act is signed.

*August 21:* In Moscow the USSR and Czechoslovakia sign a Protocol

on the results of coordinating economic development plans for 1976-1980.

*September 1:* 7th Special UN General Assembly on Development and International Economic Cooperation opens in New York.

*September 11:* The UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim is handed a letter from the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko requesting the inclusion in the agenda of the 30th General Assembly as important and urgent the item "On Concluding a Treaty of a Complete and General Ban on Nuclear Weapon Tests".

*October 3:* A Soviet-Portuguese Declaration is signed.

*October 7:* The USSR and the GDR sign a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

*November 20:* The Soviet Union and Italy sign a Joint Declaration.

*December 11:* The Soviet Union and Afghanistan sign a Protocol prolonging the operation of the 1931 Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression.

*December 15-16:* A Conference of Foreign Ministers of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the USSR is held in Moscow.

## 1976

*January 6:* The USSR and the Comoro Islands establish diplomatic relations.

*January 9:* TASS statement concerning the inventions about Soviet warships "cruising off the shore of Angola".

*January 10:* Soviet government statement concerning an all-embracing political settlement in the Middle East.

*January 26:* A regular meeting of CC secretaries of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Communist Party of Cuba, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party, the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the Polish United Workers' Party, the Romanian Communist Party, and the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union on international and ideological questions is held in Warsaw.

*February 7:* TASS statement refuting rumours spread in the West about armed clashes on the Soviet-Chinese frontier.

*February 24-March 5:* 25th Congress of the CPSU. The congress adopts a statement under the heading "Release the Prisoners of Imperialism and Reaction".

*March 16:* TASS statement on the breaking off by the Egyptian side of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the ARE signed in 1971.

*April 14:* The Soviet-Cuban agreement on economic and technical cooperation for the period 1976-1980 is signed in Moscow.

*April 29:* Soviet government statement on the situation in the Middle East and the necessity of an immediate settlement of the Middle East conflict.

*May 5:* The first-ever party and government delegation from the Lao People's Democratic Republic visits the USSR. The two countries sign a Trade Treaty and an Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation.

*May 19:* The USSR and Papua New Guinea establish diplomatic relations.

*May 22:* Soviet government statement on the situation in Europe and the relations between the USSR and the FRG.

*May 28:* The USSR and the USA sign a Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

*June 2:* The USSR and the Republic of the Philippines establish diplomatic relations.

*June 10:* TASS statement in connection with the sudden deterioration of the situation in and around Lebanon.

*June 11:* A declaration on the further development of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and India is signed in Moscow.

*June 22:* TASS statement on the settlement of the Cyprus crisis.

*June 29-30:* The Conference of

the European Communist and Workers' Parties in Berlin.

*June 30:* The USSR and the Republic of the Seychelles Islands establish diplomatic relations.

*July 2:* The USSR and Western Samoa establish diplomatic relations.

*July 7-9:* 30th session of the CMEA is held in Berlin at the level of heads of government.

*July 13:* The Governments of Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union sign in Moscow an Agreement on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes.

*July 16:* The USSR and France formalise by an exchange of letters an Agreement on the Prevention of Accidental or Unsanctioned Use of Nuclear Weapons.

*September 1:* The consular regulations of the USSR come into force.

*September 30:* The publication of a Soviet memorandum on arms limitation and disarmament.

*October 6:* In Copenhagen a Soviet-Danish protocol on consultations is signed.

*November 25-26:* The Bucharest Meeting of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee.

*November 27:* The publication of the declaration "For New Frontiers in International Detente, for the Strengthening of Security and Promotion of Cooperation in Europe" adopted by the Warsaw Treaty member states.

## 1977

*January 14-16:* The World Forum of Peace Forces in Moscow.

*January 31:* The resolution of the CC CPSU on the 60th Anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

*February 9:* The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Spain.

*March 31:* The signing in Maputu (Mozambique) of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the PRM, of a joint Soviet-Mozambique declaration, and a consular convention between the

USSR and the PRM.

*April 6:* The signing in Moscow of a consular convention between the USSR and Tunisia, of a trade agreement and a protocol on the establishment of Soviet trade representation in Tunisia.

*May 6:* The signing in Moscow of a declaration on the principles governing friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia, of a protocol on economic and technical cooperation, of an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, and of a consular convention.

*May 18:* The signing in Geneva of an agreement between the USSR and the USA on cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

*May 18:* The signing in Geneva of an international convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

*May 25-26:* A meeting in Moscow of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

*June 21-23:* The 31st session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, held in Warsaw.

*June 22:* The signing in Rambouillet, near Paris, of a France-Soviet declaration, of a joint statement on the relaxation of international tension, a declaration on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an agreement on cooperation in the field of transport and the field of chemistry, and of a protocol to the programme for the expansion of Soviet-French economic and industrial cooperation for a ten-year period.

*July 8:* The signing in Washington of an agreement on the extension for another five years of the Soviet-American agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology, dated 24 May, 1972.

*July 22:* The signing in Moscow of a trade agreement between the USSR and Ethiopia and of an agreement on the establishment of Soviet trade representation in Addis Ababa.

*August 9:* TASS declaration on the production of nuclear weapons in the Republic of South Africa.

*September 25:* The publication of a joint Soviet-American declaration on the limitation of strategic arms.

*October 2:* The publication of a joint Soviet-American declaration on the Middle East.

*October 4, 1977-March 9, 1978:* A meeting in Belgrade of representatives of the member states of the European Conference on the implementation of the Final Act.

*October 7:* The Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopts the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

*October 10:* The signing in Moscow of an Agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on the Prevention of Accidental Nuclear War.

*October 15:* The publication of a Soviet declaration on the total elimination of the vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid.

*November 4:* The publication of the message of peace and good will from the CC CPSU, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the peoples, parliaments and governments of all the countries of the world.

1978

*February 8:* The signing in Nicosia of a consular convention between the USSR and Cyprus.

*March 11:* TASS declaration in connection with US plans to produce a new weapon of mass destruction—the neutron bomb.

*March 21:* TASS publishes "On Sino-Soviet Relations".

*April 5:* The official announcement of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Republic of Dzibouti.

*April 24-25:* Meeting in Sofia of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

*May 6:* The signing in Bonn of an agreement on developing and deepening long-term cooperation between

the USSR and the FRG in the economic and industrial field.

*May 18:* The signing in Moscow of a consular convention between the USSR and Mexico.

*June 23:* The following documents are signed in Moscow: a political document on the principles of good-neighbourly and friendly cooperation between the Soviet Union and Turkey; an agreement between the governments of the USSR and Turkey on the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Black Sea.

*June 27-29:* The 32nd session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance takes place in Bucharest.

*September 6:* The signing in Moscow of a consular convention between the USSR and Greece.

*November 3:* The signing in Moscow of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

*November 20:* The signing in Moscow of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia.

*November 22-23:* Meeting in Moscow of the Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

*November 25:* Declaration by the leaders of the Communist and Workers' parties and governments of the PRB, the HPR, the GDR, the PPR, the USSR and the CSSR on the situation in the Middle East.

*December 5:* The signing in Moscow of a Treaty of Friendship, Good-Neighbourliness and Cooperation between the USSR and Afghanistan.

*December 17-18:* Meeting in Stockholm of the Communist parties of Northern Europe.

1979

*January 19-21:* A session of the International Committee for European Security and Cooperation takes place in Brussels.

*January 23-February 16:* Soviet-American negotiations on anti-sa-

tellite systems are held in Berne (Switzerland).

*March 3:* A Soviet government declaration on Chinese aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the concentration of Chinese troops on the border with Laos.

*March 6-8:* An International Emergency Conference in support of Vietnam is held in Helsinki.

*March 26:* The signing in Washington of the Egyptian-Israeli Separate Peace Treaty.

*April 4:* Soviet government declaration on the refusal of the government of the PRC to extend the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC, signed in 1950.

*May 14-15:* A meeting in Budapest of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

*June 15-18:* A meeting in Vienna between Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CC CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and US President Carter.

*June 18:* The signing in Vienna of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-2).

*June 26-28:* The 33rd session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance takes place in Moscow.

*July 10:* In Geneva the USSR and the USA put before the Committee on Disarmament a joint proposal for the prohibition of new, radiological, weapons of mass destruction.

*August 27-31:* A Consultative Conference of Representatives of the Foreign Ministries of socialist countries is held in Ulan Bator.

*September 7:* The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Grenada.

*September 29-November 30:* Negotiations between government delegations from the USSR and the PRC take place in Moscow.

*October 18:* The normalisation of relations between the USSR and Nicaragua at the level of embassies, and an exchange of ambassadors.

*October 25:* The signing in Moscow of a Treaty of Friendship

and Cooperation between the USSR and the PDRY.

*November 13-15:* The European Conference on Cooperation in the Field of Environmental Protection takes place in Geneva, attended also by representatives of the USA and Canada.

*December 5-6:* A meeting in Berlin of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states.

*December 18-20:* An extraordinary session of the Bureau of the Presidium of the World Peace Council is held in Helsinki.

## 1980

*January 22-23:* Diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Central African Republic are broken off.

*February 1:* The establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Kingdom of Lesotho.

*February 4-5:* Franco-Soviet consultations via the Ministries for Foreign Affairs take place in Moscow.

*March 23-25:* An International Conference for Peace and Security in Asia is held in Delhi.

*March 28-31:* An International Conference Against Imperialist Bases, for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean takes place in Valletta (Malta).

*April 11:* The permanent representative of the USSR at the United Nations hands a letter from Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Foreign Minister, on the objectives of the second decade of disarmament to the UN General Secretary, Kurt Waldheim.

*April 18:* The independence of Zimbabwe is proclaimed in Salisbury.

*April 28-29:* A Meeting of European Communist and Workers' Parties which adopts the Appeal of the Communists to the Peoples of the European Countries for Peace and Disarmament takes place in Paris.

*May 12-14:* A meeting of the ruling organs of NATO is held in Evere (near Brussels).

*May 14:* The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan puts forward a proposal on



the normalisation of its relations with Iran and Pakistan.

*May 14-15:* A Conference of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states takes place in Warsaw.

*May 23-25:* An International Conference of Solidarity with the Struggle of the Peoples of Asia and Africa for Independence, Security and Socio-Economic Progress is held in Colombo.

*June 3-4:* A session of the NATO group for nuclear planning takes place in Bud (Norway).

*June 6:* The signing in Peking of an agreement on trade and payments for 1980 between the USSR and the PRC.

*June 16-19:* A meeting of the representatives of the parliaments of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation is held in Minsk.

*June 17-19:* The 34th session of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance is held in Prague.

*June 23:* A plenum of the CC CPSU is held in Moscow to listen to the report by Andrei Gromyko, "On the International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union".

*June 25-26:* A session of the Council of NATO at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is held in Ankara.

*July 3:* The signing in Moscow of an agreement between the USSR and the SRV on cooperation in geologi-

cal prospecting and drilling for oil and gas on the continental shelf to the south of the SRV.

*July 17-18:* A conference of the Foreign Ministers of Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea takes place in Vientiane.

*August 1:* The Soviet Union completes the total withdrawal from the GDR into the USSR of a contingent of 20 thousand Soviet troops, one thousand tanks and a certain quantity of other military technology. The withdrawal began on December 5, 1979.

*August 11-September 7:* The II Conference on the Implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons takes place in Geneva.

*September 9:* The opening in Madrid of the preparatory session prior to the meeting in November of representatives of the member states of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation.

*September 23-27:* The World Parliament of Peoples for Peace meets in Sofia.

*October 19-20:* Meeting in Warsaw of the Committee of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation.

*November 11:* The meeting of representatives of the member states of the European Conference on the implementation of the Final Act opens in Madrid.

## ESTABLISHMENT OR RESTORATION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

**AFGHANISTAN** (Democratic Republic of Afghanistan)

July 17, 1973-April 30, 1978—Republic of Afghanistan

May 27, 1919—establishment of diplomatic relations with the RSFSR; July 23, 1923—with the USSR, embassies.

**ALBANIA** (People's Socialist Republic of Albania)

Prior to December 28, 1976—People's Republic of Albania.

July 4-September 4, 1924—exchange of letters on establishment of diplomatic relations. Diplomatic missions were not opened, and diplomatic representatives were not accredited. From September 17, 1934 onwards diplomatic relations were maintained by the USSR through the Soviet mission in Greece. On April 7, 1939 diplomatic relations were ruptured with the occupation of Albania by Italy. On November 10, 1945 diplomatic relations restored—missions. On August 4, 1953 the missions were reconstituted into embassies. In December 1961 the Soviet government recalled the embassy staff from Tirana following hostile actions by the Albanian authorities against Soviet representatives. The Albanian embassy left the USSR.

**ALGERIA** (Algerian People's Democratic Republic)

March 19-23, 1962—establishment of diplomatic relations, embassies.

**ANGOLA** (People's Republic of Angola)

November 12, 1975, embassies.

**ARGENTINA** (Republic of Argentina)

June 5, 1946, embassies.

**AUSTRALIA** (Commonwealth of Australia)

October 10, 1942, missions. July 15, 1947-February 5, 1948. (Here and elsewhere the two dates indicate the exchange of notes or letters). The missions were reconstituted into embassies. On April 23, 1954 the Soviet government recalled the ambassador and personnel of the Soviet embassy after actions by the Australian government made it impossible for the embassy to function normally. Correspondently, the Australian embassy left Moscow. On March 16, 1959 agreement was reached on the return of the diplomatic representatives of the two countries to Moscow and Canberra.

**AUSTRIA** (Republic of Austria)

February 25-29, 1924, missions. In March 1938 diplomatic relations ceased with Austria's seizure by Germany. On October 20-24, 1945 diplomatic relations were resumed, and political missions were opened. On June 9-12, 1953 the political missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**BANGLADESH** (People's Republic of Bangladesh)

January 25, 1972—diplomatic relations established at embassy level.

**BELGIUM** (Kingdom of Belgium)

July 12, 1935, missions. Closure of all foreign diplomatic missions accredited in Brussels was announced on July 15, 1940 following Belgium's occupation by Germany. On August 7, 1941 agreement was reached with the Belgian government in exile in London on an exchange of diplomatic missions. December 26, 1942-Ja-

nuary 21, 1943 missions reconstituted into embassies.

#### **BENIN**

(People's Republic of Benin)

Prior to November 30, 1975—Republic of Dahomey. June 4, 1962, embassies. From August 10, 1963 to May 4, 1966 diplomatic relations were maintained by the USSR through the Soviet embassy in Togo. May 1966—exchange of ambassadors.

#### **BOLIVIA (Republic of Bolivia)**

April 18, 1945. Diplomatic relations were established on November 16, 1969, embassies.

#### **BOTSWANA (Republic of Botswana)**

March 6, 1970, establishment of diplomatic relations. Embassy of Botswana in the USSR has not been opened. From September 16, 1970 diplomatic relations were maintained by the USSR through the Soviet embassy in Zambia.

#### **BRAZIL (Federative Republic of Brazil)**

April 2, 1945, embassies. On October 20, 1947 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Brazil. November 23, 1961—diplomatic relations restored, embassies.

#### **BULGARIA (People's Republic of Bulgaria)**

July 11-23, 1934, missions (diplomatic relations, established under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918, were in fact not implemented). On September 5, 1944 diplomatic relations broken off by the Soviet Union in view of continued Bulgarian assistance to nazi Germany. On August 14-16, 1945—diplomatic relations restored, missions. January 6, 1948 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

#### **BURMA (Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma)**

Prior to January 4, 1974—Union of Burma.

February 18, 1948, embassies.

#### **BURUNDI (Republic of Burundi)**

October 1, 1962, embassies. From March 8, 1963 to June 19, 1964 diplomatic relations were conducted by

the USSR through the Soviet embassy in Zaire. July 1964—exchange of ambassadors.

#### **CAMEROUN (United Republic of Cameroun)**

February 18-22, 1964, embassies.

#### **CANADA**

June 12, 1942, missions. November 13-17, 1943, missions reconstituted into embassies.

#### **CAPE VERDE ISLANDS (Republic of Cape Verde Islands)**

September 25, 1975—establishment of diplomatic relations. No diplomatic missions have been opened. Diplomatic relations were maintained by the USSR through the Soviet embassy in Guinea-Bissau.

#### **CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC**

From December 4, 1976 to September 22, 1979—Central African Empire.

December 7, 1960, embassies. January 22-23, 1980 diplomatic relations broken off.

#### **CHAD (Republic of Chad)**

November 24, 1964, embassies.

#### **CHILE (Republic of Chile)**

December 11, 1944, embassies. On October 27, 1947 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Chile. On November 24, 1964 diplomatic relations restored, embassies. On September 22, 1973, following coup by the military junta, the Soviet government broke off diplomatic relations.

#### **CHINA (People's Republic of China)**

May 31, 1924—diplomatic relations established with China. On June 13-July 14, 1924 agreement was reached on an exchange of embassies. On July 17, 1929 diplomatic relations were broken off by the Soviet government in view of the conflict created by the Chinese authorities on the East China Railway. On December 12, 1932 diplomatic relations were resumed. On October 2, 1949 the USSR ceased diplomatic relations with the Canton government in view of the proclamation of the People's Republic of China and the formation of the Central People's Government of China. On Octo-

ber 1-2, 1949—diplomatic relations established between the USSR and the PRC, embassies.

**COLOMBIA (Republic of Colombia)**

June 25, 1935. In effect no diplomatic missions were opened. On February 3-4, 1943 it was agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives at mission level. On May 3, 1948 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Colombia. On January 19, 1968 diplomatic relations were restored, embassies.

**COMORO ISLANDS (Federal and Islamic Republic of Comoro Islands)**

January 6, 1976, embassies. No diplomatic offices have been opened. Diplomatic relations were maintained by the USSR through the Soviet embassy in the Seychelles Islands.

**CONGO (People's Republic of the Congo)**

March 16, 1964, embassies.

**COSTA RICA (Republic of Costa Rica)**

May 8, 1944, missions. No Costa Rican embassy has been opened in the USSR. The Costa Rican Ambassador accredited in Moscow pluralises from residence in Paris. The USSR maintained diplomatic relations through the Soviet embassy in Mexico. July 15, 1971—exchange of diplomatic representatives, embassies.

**CUBA (Republic of Cuba)**

October 5-14, 1942, missions. From September 17, 1942 to April 25, 1946 diplomatic relations were maintained through the Soviet embassy in the USA. April 1946—exchange of diplomatic representatives. On April 3, 1952 diplomatic relations were broken off after the Cuban government denied the Soviet mission normal communication with the government of the USSR. On January 10, 1959 the Soviet government recognised the revolutionary government of Cuba. An exchange of diplomatic representatives at embassy level was agreed on April 13-23, 1960.

**CYPRUS (Republic of Cyprus)**

August 16-18, 1960, embassies.

**CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Czechoslovak**

**Socialist Republic)**

June 9, 1934, missions. On March 16, 1939 diplomatic relations ceased with Czechoslovakia's seizure by Germany. On July 18, 1941 an agreement was reached with the Czechoslovak government in exile in London on an exchange of diplomatic missions. On September 28, 1942 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**DENMARK (Kingdom of Denmark)**

June 18, 1924, missions. On June 22, 1941 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Denmark. On April 18-23, 1944 diplomatic relations were established between the USSR and the Danish Freedom Council. On May 10-16, 1945 diplomatic relations were restored at mission level. On August 6-18, 1955 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**DJIBOUTI (Republic of Djibouti)**

April 5, 1978, establishment of diplomatic relations. No diplomatic offices have been opened in Moscow.

**DOMINICAN REPUBLIC**

March 7-8, 1945, missions. Diplomatic missions have not been opened, diplomatic representatives have not been accredited. (The envoy of the Dominican Republic left the USSR on December 18, 1945.)

**ECUADOR (Republic of Ecuador)**

June 12-16, 1945—establishment of diplomatic relations. November 12, 1969—agreement on reconstituting missions into embassies and on exchanging ambassadors.

**EGYPT (Arab Republic of Egypt)**

From July 18, 1953 to February 1, 1958—Republic of Egypt. From February 1, 1958 to September 11, 1971—United Arab Republic; from September 11, 1971—Arab Republic of Egypt.

July 6-26, 1943—establishment of diplomatic relations, missions. February 15-March 11, 1954 missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Republic of Equatorial Guinea)**

December 12, 1968—establishment of diplomatic relations, embas-

sies. The Soviet embassy has been opened in Malabo. The embassy of Equatorial Guinea has not been opened in Moscow.

**ETHIOPIA** (Socialist Ethiopia from September 1975)

April 21, 1943, missions. On May 18, 1956 missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**

September 13-24, 1955, embassies.

**FIJI**

January 31, 1947, embassies. No Fijian embassy has been opened in the USSR. Diplomatic relations are maintained through the USSR Ambassador in Australia.

**FINLAND** (Finnish Republic)

December 31, 1920—diplomatic relations established with the RSFSR under the peace treaty of October, 14, 1920, missions. July 23, 1923—with the USSR. On November 29, 1939 diplomatic relations were severed. On March 12, 1940 diplomatic relations were restored, missions. On June 22, 1941 diplomatic relations were broken off. On August 6, 1945 diplomatic relations were restored at mission level. On July 18, 1954 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**FRANCE** (French Republic)

October 28, 1924, embassies. On June 30, 1941 the Vichy government severed diplomatic relations with the USSR. On June 16-August 26, 1943 diplomatic relations were established with the French Committee for National Liberation, plenipotentiary missions. On October 23, 1944 diplomatic relations were established with the government of France at embassy level.

**GABON** (Gabon Republic)

October 15, 1973—establishment of diplomatic relations, embassies.

**GAMBIA** (Republic of Gambia)

July 17, 1965—establishment of diplomatic relations. Gambia has not opened an embassy in the USSR. Diplomatic relations are conducted

through the USSR ambassador in Senegal since September 27, 1965.

**GERMANY**

April 16, 1922—diplomatic relations established with the RSFSR; July 23, 1923—with the USSR, embassies (diplomatic relations established under the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of March 3, 1918 were broken off by Germany on November 5, 1918). On June 22, 1941 diplomatic relations ceased with nazi Germany's invasion of the USSR.

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC**

October 16, 1949, missions. On August 23, 1953 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**GHANA** (Republic of Ghana)

September 3-October 2, 1957, embassies.

**GREECE** (Greek Republic)

March 8, 1924, missions. Diplomatic relations ceased on June 3, 1941, following Greece's occupation by Italy and Germany. An understanding on restoring diplomatic relations was reached with the Greek government in exile in London on July 30, 1941. On April 14, 1943 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**GUATEMALA** (Republic of Guatemala)

April 19, 1945, missions. (The Guatemalan envoy left the USSR on July 27, 1946.) Diplomatic missions were not opened, and diplomatic representatives were not accredited.

**GUINEA** (Popular and Revolutionary Republic of Guinea)

Prior to November 21, 1978—Republic of Guinea.

October 3-4, 1958, embassies.

**GUINEA-BISSAU** (Republic of Guinea-Bissau)

September 30-October 6, 1973, embassies. February 7-September 11, 1975—exchange of ambassadors.

**GUYANA** (Cooperative Republic of Guyana)

December 17, 1970—diplomatic relations established, embassies.

From December, 24 1970 to March 14, 1973 the USSR maintained diplomatic relations through its embassy in Great Britain. On March 14, 1973 it was agreed to open embassies.

#### **HUNGARY (Hungarian People's Republic)**

February 4, 1934, missions (the treaty on the establishment of diplomatic relations of September 5, 1924 was not ratified by Hungary and did not come into force). On June 23, 1941 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Hungary, which aligned itself with Nazi Germany. On September 25, 1945 diplomatic relations were restored. On March 2, 1948 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

#### **ICELAND (Republic of Iceland)**

June 22-24, 1926, diplomatic relations were maintained through Denmark. June 27-September 21-October 4, 1943—direct diplomatic relations were established, missions. On November 24-26, 1955 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

#### **INDIA (Republic of India)**

April 2-7, 1947—diplomatic relations were established. On April 13, 1947 it was agreed to exchange embassies.

#### **INDONESIA (Republic of Indonesia)**

January 26-February 3, 1950—diplomatic relations were established. On November 30-December 17, 1953 it was agreed to exchange embassies.

#### **IRAN (the Islamic Republic of Iran from April 1, 1979)**

Prior to March 22, 1935—Persia. May 20, 1920—diplomatic relations established with the RSFSR; July 23, 1923—with the USSR, plenipotentiary missions. From December 8-16, 1925—embassies.

#### **IRAQ (Iraqi Republic)**

May 16, 1941—establishment of diplomatic relations; diplomatic offices were not opened; diplomatic representatives were not accredited. August 25-September 9, 1944, missions. January 3-8, 1955 diplomatic

relations were broken off by the Iraqi government. July 18-19, 1958 diplomatic relations were restored at embassy level.

#### **IRELAND**

September 29, 1973, embassies.

#### **ISRAEL (State of Israel)**

May 15-18, 1948—establishment of diplomatic relations, missions. On February 11, 1953 diplomatic relations were broken off by the Soviet government in view of the absence in Israel of elementary conditions for the normal work of Soviet representatives. On July 6-15, 1953 diplomatic relations were restored. On April 29-May 13, 1954 the missions were reconstituted into embassies. On July 9, 1967 the Soviet government broke off diplomatic relations in connection with the Israeli aggression against Arab states.

#### **ITALY (Italian Republic)**

February 7-11, 1924, embassies. On June 22, 1941 diplomatic relations ceased with Italy's declaration of war on the Soviet Union. March 7-11, 1944—establishment of direct relations and exchange of government representatives. October 25, 1944—diplomatic relations restored, embassies.

#### **IVORY COAST (Republic of Ivory Coast)**

January 23, 1967, embassies. On May 30, 1969—diplomatic relations broken off.

#### **JAMAICA**

March 12, 1975, embassies.

#### **JAPAN**

February 25, 1925—diplomatic relations established under a convention of January 20, 1925, embassies. On August 9, 1945 diplomatic relations ceased with the outbreak of hostilities between the USSR and Japan. On October 19, 1956—diplomatic relations restored, embassies.

#### **JORDAN (Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan)**

August 20, 1963, embassies.

#### **KAMPUCHEA (People's Republic of Kampuchea)**

Perior to January 5, 1976—Kingdom of Cambodia. From January 5, 1976—Democratic Kampuchea, from January 11, 1979—People's Republic of Kampuchea.

April 23-May 13, 1956, embassies. No diplomatic offices of the People's Republic of Kampuchea have been opened in Moscow.

**KENYA** (Republic of Kenya)

December 14, 1963, embassies.

**PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

October 8-12, 1948, embassies.

**KUWAIT** (State of Kuwait)

March 11, 1963, embassies.

**LAOS** (Lao People's Democratic Republic)

Prior to December 2, 1975—Kingdom of Laos.

October 7, 1960, embassies. From October 8, 1960 to August 31, 1962 the USSR maintained diplomatic relations through its embassy in Cambodia (Kampuchea). Since March 31, 1962—exchange of ambassadors.

**LEBANON** (Lebanese Republic)

July 31-August 3, 1944, missions. On June 29, 1956 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**LESOTHO** (Kingdom of Lesotho)

February 1, 1980—diplomatic relations established.

**LIBERIA** (Republic of Liberia)

January 11, 1956, embassies. Embassies have not been opened, diplomatic representatives have not been accredited till September 1972. From September 7, 1972—exchange of ambassadors.

**LIBYA** (Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

Prior to February 1977—Libyan Arab Republic.

August 31-September 4, 1955, embassies.

**LUXEMBOURG** (Grand Duchy of Luxembourg)

August 26, 1935, missions (plurality with the Soviet mission in Belgium). After Luxembourg's occupation Germany announced the

dissolution of all foreign diplomatic missions on July 15, 1940. October 13, 1942—diplomatic relations restored, missions. Until 1956 relations were conducted through the Soviet ambassador in Belgium. November 17-December 1, 1960—the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**MADAGASCAR** (Democratic Republic of Madagascar)

Prior to December 21, 1975—Malagasy Republic.

September 29, 1972, embassies. The Ambassador of the Madagascar Republic accredited to Moscow is based in Paris. Diplomatic relations were maintained through the Soviet embassy in France. March 15-June 19, 1974—exchange of ambassadors.

**MALAYSIA** (Federation of Malaysia)

April 3, 1967—diplomatic relations established. On November 24, 1967 it was agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives at embassy level.

**MALDIVES** (Republic of Maldives)

September 21, 1966—diplomatic relations established. No diplomatic offices have been opened. Diplomatic relations maintained through the Soviet ambassador in Sri Lanka.

**MALI** (Republic of Mali)

October 8-14, 1960, embassies.

**MALTA** (Republic of Malta)

September 20-October 31, 1964. Until 1967 there were no diplomatic offices, and diplomatic representatives were not accredited. In October 1967 the Soviet Ambassador in the United Kingdom was appointed to act as the Ambassador of the USSR in Malta. The Maltese Ambassador to the USSR, based in London, presented his credentials.

**MAURITANIA** (Islamic Republic of Mauritania)

July 12, 1964, embassies.

**MAURITIUS** (State of Mauritius)

March 17, 1968, embassies. Embassy in Moscow has not been opened.

**MEXICO** (United States of Mexico)

August 4, 1924, missions. On January 26, 1930 the government

of Mexico recalled the personnel of its mission in the USSR. On November 10-12, 1942 diplomatic relations were restored, and on June 7-14, 1943 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**MONGOLIA** (Mongolian People's Republic)

November 5, 1921—diplomatic relations established with the RSFSR; July 23, 1923—with the USSR, missions. On April 4, 1950 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**MOROCCO** (Kingdom of Morocco)  
August 29-September 4, 1958, embassies.

**MOZAMBIQUE** (People's Republic of Mozambique)

June 28, 1975—diplomatic relations established. Mozambiquan diplomatic offices in Moscow have not been opened.

**NEPAL** (Kingdom of Nepal)

June 5-July 9, 1956. Prior to 1959 diplomatic relations were maintained through the Soviet Ambassador in India. On April 24, 1959 embassies were opened in both countries.

**NETHERLANDS** (Kingdom of the Netherlands)

July 10, 1942 agreement was reached with the Dutch government in exile in London on an exchange of diplomatic missions. On October 22-November 4, 1942 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**NEW ZEALAND**

April 13, 1944, missions. On June 13, 1950 the government of New Zealand closed its mission in the USSR, transferring the protection of its interests to the United Kingdom embassy in the USSR. On April 19, 1973 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**NICARAGUA** (Republic of Nicaragua)

December 10-12, 1944, missions. Diplomatic missions have not been opened, and diplomatic representatives have not been accredited.

**NIGER** (Republic of Niger)

February 17, 1972, embassies.

**NIGERIA** (Federation of Nigeria)

October 1, 1960-January 1, 1961, embassies.

**NORWAY** (Kingdom of Norway)

February 15-March 10, 1924, missions. On July 15, 1940, after occupying Norway, Germany announced the closure of all foreign diplomatic missions. On August 5, 1941 an agreement was reached with the Norwegian government in exile in London on an exchange of diplomatic representatives. On August 1, 1942 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**PAKISTAN** (Islamic Republic of Pakistan)

April 27-May 1, 1948, embassies.

**PAPUA NEW GUINEA**

May 19, 1976, embassies. Diplomatic offices have not been opened.

**PERU** (Republic of Peru)

February 1, 1969, embassies.

**PHILIPPINES** (Republic of the Philippines)

June 2, 1976, embassies.

**POLAND** (Polish People's Republic)

April 27, 1921—establishment of diplomatic relations with the RSFSR; July 28, 1923—with the USSR, missions. February 16, 1934 the missions were reconstituted into embassies. On September 17, 1939 diplomatic relations were severed following Poland's invasion by Nazi Germany. On July 30, 1941 diplomatic relations were restored with the Polish government in exile in London. On April 25, 1943 diplomatic relations were broken off due to the anti-Soviet campaign started by the Polish émigré government in London. July 25-August 1, 1944 diplomatic relations were established with the Polish Committee for National Liberation. January 2-5, 1945 diplomatic relations were established with the government of the Polish Republic, embassies.

**PORTUGAL** (Portuguese Republic)

June 9, 1974, embassies.



**ROMANIA** (Socialist Republic of Romania)

June 9, 1934, missions. On June 22, 1941 Romania broke off diplomatic relations, siding with Nazi Germany in the war against the USSR. On August 6, 1945 diplomatic relations were restored. On August 20-24, 1945 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**RWANDA** (Republic of Rwanda)  
October 17, 1963, embassies.

**SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE ISLANDS** (Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe)

August 9, 1975—diplomatic relations established. Diplomatic offices in Moscow have not been opened.

**SAUDI ARABIA** (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)

February 16-19, 1926. Diplomatic offices have not been opened; diplomatic representatives have not been accredited.

**SENEGAL** (Republic of Senegal)  
June 14, 1962, embassies.

**SEYCHELLES ISLANDS** (Republic of the Seychelles Islands)

June 30, 1976, embassies. The Seychelles Islands' Ambassador accredited to Moscow is based in Paris.

**SIERRA-LEONE** (Republic of Sierra Leone)

April 26, 1961-January 18, 1962, embassies.

**SINGAPORE** (Republic of Singapore)

June 1, 1968—diplomatic relations established, embassies.

**SOMALI** (Somali Democratic Republic)

July 1-September 11, 1960, embassies.

**SPAIN**

July 28, 1933, embassies. In March 1939 diplomatic relations were broken off following the seizure of power by Franco. Diplomatic relations were restored on February 9, 1977, embassies.

**SRI LANKA** (Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka)

Prior to May 22, 1972—Ceylon.

Up to October 4, 1977—Republic of Sri Lanka. December 3-6, 1956, embassies.

**SUDAN** (Democratic Republic of the Sudan)

January 3-7, 1956—diplomatic relations were established, embassies.

**SWEDEN** (Kingdom of Sweden)

March 15-18, 1924, missions. August 26-September 1, 1947 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**SWITZERLAND** (Swiss Confederation)

March 18, 1946, missions. On December 31, 1955 the Soviet mission in Switzerland was reconstituted into an embassy. On March 27, 1957 the Swiss mission in the USSR was reconstituted into an embassy.

**SYRIA** (Syrian Arab Republic)

July 21-29, 1944, missions. On November 17-19, 1955 the missions were reconstituted into embassies. On February 22, 1958, with the formation of the United Arab Republic, the embassies were dissolved and a Consulate-General of the USSR opened in Damascus. September 30-October 7, 1961—establishment of diplomatic relations, embassies.

**TANZANIA** (United Republic of Tanzania)

December 10-11, 1961, embassies (date of establishment of diplomatic relations with Tanganyika. On April 26, 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar combined to form Tanzania).

**THAILAND** (Kingdom of Thailand)

March 12, 1941. Diplomatic offices were not opened; diplomatic representatives were not accredited. December 28-31, 1946, missions. The missions were reconstituted into embassies on June 1, 1956.

**TOGO** (Togolese Republic)

May 1, 1960, embassies. The Togolese embassy in the USSR has been opened in January 1977.

**TONGA** (Kingdom of Tonga)

October 14, 1975. The embassy of Tonga in the USSR has not been opened. The Soviet Union maintains diplomatic relations through its em-

bassy in New Zealand.

**TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO** (Republic of Trinidad and Tobago from January 1974)

June 6, 1974, embassies. The embassy of Trinidad and Tobago in the USSR has not been opened. Diplomatic relations are maintained through the Soviet Ambassador in Venezuela.

**TUNISIA** (Republic of Tunisia)

June 11-July 11, 1956, embassies.

**TURKEY** (Turkish Republic)

June 2-November 29, 1920—establishment of diplomatic relations with the RSFSR; July 23, 1923—with the USSR, embassies.

**UGANDA** (Republic of Uganda)

October 11-12, 1962, embassies. November 11-17, 1975 diplomatic relations were temporarily severed. November 17, 1975—diplomatic relations restored.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

December 8-23, 1971, embassies. Embassies have not been opened; diplomatic representatives have not been accredited.

**UNITED KINGDOM** (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

February 2-8, 1924, embassies. On May 26, 1927 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of the United Kingdom. July 17-23, 1929—diplomatic relations restored, embassies.

**UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

November 16, 1933, embassies.

**UPPER VOLTA** (Republic of Upper Volta)

February 18, 1967, embassies.

**URUGUAY** (Oriental Republic of Uruguay)

August 21-22, 1926—establishment of diplomatic relations. On August 11-13, 1933 agreement was reached on exchanges of diplomatic representatives, missions. On December 27, 1935 diplomatic relations were broken off by the government of Uruguay. On January 27, 1943

diplomatic relations were restored at mission level. On November 30, 1964 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**VENEZUELA** (Republic of Venezuela)

March 14, 1945, embassies. On June 13, 1952 diplomatic relations were broken off by the Soviet government when the government of Venezuela violated the norms of international law by creating abnormal conditions for the work of the Soviet embassy. April 16, 1970—diplomatic relations restored, embassies.

**VIETNAM** (Socialist Republic of Vietnam)

In June 1976 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam united with the Republic of South Vietnam; from July 2, 1976—Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

January 14-30, 1950, embassies.

**VIETNAM** (Republic of South Vietnam)

On June 13, 1969 the USSR recognised the Republic of South Vietnam; on July 8, 1969 the embassy of South Vietnam was opened in Moscow. The Soviet Ambassador accredited to the RSV pluralised from Burma.

**YEMEN** (Yemen Arab Republic)

November 1, 1928. In effect no diplomatic offices were opened. October 31, 1955—full diplomatic relations were established. June 23, 1956 an agreement was reached on an exchange of diplomatic representatives, missions. The mission of the Yemen Republic in the USSR was opened in February 1961. The USSR maintained diplomatic relations through its Ambassador in the UAR until its mission was opened in the Yemen Republic on June 9, 1962. On November 24, 1962 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**YEMEN** (People's Democratic Republic of Yemen)

December 1-3, 1967, embassies.

**YUGOSLAVIA** (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)

June 24, 1940, missions. The

Soviet government announced that in connection with the departure of the Yugoslav government from Yugoslavia its mission had ceased to function on May 8, 1941. On July 20, 1942 the missions were reopened. On September 14, 1942 the missions were reconstituted into embassies.

**ZAIRE (Republic of Zaire)**

Prior to December 1971—Democratic Republic of the Congo with the capital in Stanleyville, then in Kinshasa.

June 29-July 7, 1960, embassies. September 14-18, 1960—diplo-

matic relations were broken off by the Congolese government. On July 6, 1961 the Soviet mission in Stanleyville resumed its functions, and in September 1961 it moved to Leopoldville. Diplomatic relations were broken off on November 21-23, 1963. On November 30, 1967 diplomatic relations were restored at embassy level.

**ZAMBIA (Republic of Zambia)**

October 29-30, 1964, embassies.

**WESTERN SAMOA**

July 2, 1977—establishment of diplomatic relations. Diplomatic offices were not opened.

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The second volume of the two-volumed *Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1980* is devoted to the activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet Government on the international scene following the Second World War. The victory of the peace-loving nations over Hitler Germany and Japanese militarism radically changed the course of world affairs.

The book shows that in the new historical setting, the Soviet Union projected Lenin's foreign policy principles to fight actively for disarmament, for the elimination of war flashpoints in different parts of the world, and to protect the interests of the socialist community and of peoples that had flung off the colonial yoke and embarked on independent development against international imperialism.

True love of peace and firm action against imperialism's aggressive ambitions are compounded in the foreign policy of the CPSU and the Soviet Government, which are fulfilling their internationalist duty to the world communist and working-class movement and to the peoples of the whole world.