On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law by Hegel 1803
But it is the aspect of infinity which constitutes the principle of that apriorism which sets itself against the empirical, and we must now consider this in turn.
In the absolute concept of infinity, the drift of empirical opinion (with its mixing of the manifold with the simple) in relation to the concept is released from its vacillation, and the incomplete separation [of the two elements] is resolved. It is true that, at a lower level of abstraction, infinity is also emphasized (as the absoluteness of the subject) in the theory of happiness in general and especially in natural law, by those systems which are described as anti-socialistic and which posit the being of the individual as the primary and supreme value;[1] but it is not raised to the pure abstraction which it has attained in the idealism of Kant or Fichte.
It is not appropriate in the present context to give an account of the nature of infinity and its manifold transformations. For since it is the principle of movement and change, its essence is itself none other than to be the unmediated opposite of itself; or [to put it differently,] it is the negatively absolute, the abstraction of form. Inasmuch as this is pure identity, it is immediately pure non-identity or absolute opposition; inasmuch as it is pure ideality, it is equally immediately pure reality; inasmuch as it is the infinite, it is the absolutely finite; inasmuch as it is the indeterminate, it is absolute determinacy. That absolute transition to its own opposite which is its essence, and the disappearance of every reality in its opposite, cannot be halted except in an empirical manner, by fixing one of its aspects (namely reality, or the subsistence of the opposites) and abstracting from the opposite of this (namely the nullity of this subsistence). The real opposition consists, on the one hand, of manifold being or finitude, and on the other, of infinity as the negation of multiplicity (or, in a positive sense, as pure unity); and the absolute concept which is thereby constituted supplies, within this unity, what has been called ‘pure reason.’ But the relation of this pure unity to the manifold being [dem mannigfaltigen Seinenden] which is opposed to it is also itself a double relationship [Beziehung] – either the positive relationship of the subsistence of both, or the nullification of both. Both this subsistence and this nullification should, however, be understood as only partial; for if the subsistence of both were absolute, the two could have no relationship whatsoever, and if the complete nullification of both were posited, there could be no subsistence of either. This partial subsistence and partial negation of both – the opposition of a divisible ‘I” to a divisible not-'I’ within the ‘I’ (i.e. in a relationship which, for this very reason, is likewise partial) – is the absolute principle of this philosophy. In the former, positive relationship, the pure unity is called theoretical reason, and in the negative relationship, practical reason; and since, in the latter, the negation of the opposition is primary (so that unity is more subsistent), whereas in the former, the subsistence of the opposition is primary (so that multiplicity [Vielheit] is primary and more subsistent), practical reason appears here as real, whereas theoretical reason appears as ideal. – One can see, however, that this definition is wholly concerned with opposition and appearance. For that pure unity which is posited as reason is, of course, negative and ideal if what is opposed to it, namely the many (which is accordingly the irrational), is purely and simply subsistent – just as it will appear more subsistent and real if the many is posited as negated (or rather as what should be negated). But if nature is posited in opposition to reason as pure unity, this irrational many is irrational only because it is posited as the non-essential [wesenlose] abstraction of the many, whereas reason is posited as the non-essential abstraction of the one. Regarded in itself, however, this man is just as much absolute unity of the one and the many as unity is; and nature, or theoretical reason (which is the many), must, as the absolute unity of the o n and the many, be defined as ideal reason, because in the opposition, reality belongs with multiplicity, while identity belongs with unity.
Consequently, in what is known as practical reason, one can recognize only the formal Idea of the identity of the ideal and the real, and this Idea should be the absolute point of indifference in these [philosophical] systems.[2] But this Idea does not escape from difference [Differenz], and the ideal does not attain reality; for despite the fact that the ideal and the real are identical in this practical reason, the real remains purely and simply opposed [to the ideal]. This real is essentially posited [as] outside reason, and practical reason is [to be found] only in its difference [Differenz] from it. The essence of this practical reason is to be understood as a causal relation to the many – as an identity which his absolutely encumbered [affiziert] with a difference and does not emerge from [the realm of] appearance. This science of the ethical, which talks of the absolute identity of the ideal and the real, accordingly does not do what it claims to do: its ethical reason is, in truth and in its essence, a non-identity of the ideal and the real.
Ethical reason has already been defined as the absolute in the form of unity; consequently, since it is itself posited as a determinacy, it immediately seems, in this determination, to be posited just as essentially with an opposite. There is, however, a difference [Unterschied] here, in that true reality and its absolute are completely free from this opposition to nature, and are the absolute identity of the ideal and the real. The absolute, in accordance with its Idea, is recognized as this identity of different things, whose determinate character [Bestimmtheit] is to be unity and multiplicity respectively; and this determinate character is ideal, i.e. it resides only in infinity in accordance with the concept of infinity as indicated above: it is both superseded and posited. Each of the two, the unity and the multiplicity, whose identity is the absolute, is itself a unity of the one and the many. But that unity whose ideal determinacy is multiplicity is the subsistence of the opposites (i.e. positive reality), and it therefore itself necessitates and opposite and double relation. Since the real subsists within it, its identity is a relative one, and this relative identity of opposites is a necessity. Since it [i.e. this unity] thus resides [ist] in difference [Differenz], its relation itself or the identity of the relation must also be a difference [ein Differentes]; that is, both unity and multiplicity must be primary within it. The twofold relation determines the dual aspect of the necessity, or the appearance, of the absolute. Since this twofold relation refers to multiplicity, if we then describe as ‘indifference’ that unity of difference things which stands on the opposite side and in which the reality [of these things], or the many, is superseded, then the absolute is the unity of indifference and relation. And since this relation is a double one, the appearance of the absolute is determined [firstly,] as the unity of indifference and of that relation – or that relative identity – in which the many is primary and positive, and [secondly,] as the unity of indifference and of that relation in which the unity is primary and positive. The former is physical nature, and the latter is ethical nature.[3] And since indifference or unity is freedom, whereas relation or relative identity is necessity, each of these two appearances is the oneness and indifference of freedom and necessity. Substances is absolute and infinite; in this predicate of infinity, the necessary of the divine nature, or its appearance, is entailed, and this necessity is expressed as reality in none other than a double relation. Each of the two attributes itself expresses the substance, and is absolute and infinite, or the unity of indifference and relation. And in the relation, the distinction between them is posited in such a way that, in the relation of the ones, the many is the primary element which stands out from the others, and in the relation of the others, the one is the primary element which stands out from these. But since unity is primary in the relation of ethical nature itself, this nature is free even in this relative identity, i.e. in its necessity. Or, since the fact that unity is primary does not mean that this relative identity is superseded, this second freedom is so determined that, although the necessary is indeed [present] for ethical nature, it is posited negatively. Now if we were to isolate this aspect of the relative identity of ethical nature, and to acknowledge as the essence of ethical nature not the absolute unity of indifference and of this relative identity, but the aspect of relation or necessity, we would be at the same point at which the essence of practical reason is defined as possessing absolute causality, or as being free while necessity is only negative, but for that very reason nevertheless posited. Consequently, this very freedom does not escape from difference; relation or relative identity is made the essence, and the absolute is understood only as negatively absolute or infinite.
The empirical and popular expression through which this notion, which envisages ethical nature solely in terms of its relative identity, has recommended itself so widely is [the claim] that the real, under such names as sensuousness, inclinations, the lower appetitive faculty, etc. (the moment of the multiplicity of the relation), and reason (the moment of the pure unity of the relation) do not coincide (the moment of the opposition of unity and multiplicity); and that reason consists in willing out of its own spontaneity and autonomy, and in limiting and dominating that sensuousness (the moment whereby the relation is determined in such a way that unity, or the negation of multiplicity, has primacy within it). The reality of this notion is based on the empirical consciousness, and on the universal experience of everyone in finding within the self both that division and that pure unity of practical reason (or the abstraction of the ‘I’) [referred to above]. Nor can there be any question of denying this point of view; on the contrary, it has already been defined as the aspect of relative identity, of the being of the infinite within the finite. But it must at least be stated that it is not the absolute point of view, in which it has been shown that the relation proves to be only a single aspect, whose isolation consequently proves to be a one-sided thing; and [it must also be stated] that, since morality [Sittlichkeit] is something absolute, the point of view referred to is not that of morality – on the contrary, there is no morality within it.[4] And as for the appeal to ordinary consciousness, morality [Sittlichkeit] itself must be present within this consciousness just as necessarily as that point of view which, since the relation, isolated for itself, is posited not as a moment, but as having being in itself, is the principle of immorality [Unsittlichkeit]. The empirical consciousness is empirical because within it, the moments of the absolute appear scattered, co-existent, consecutive, and fragmented; but it would not in itself be an ordinary consciousness if morality [Sittlichkeit] were not likewise present within it. That formal philosophy [referred to above] was able to choose among these manifold appearances of the moral and the immoral [des Sittlichen and des Unsittlichen] which are present in the empirical consciousness, and it is not the fault of ordinary consciousness, but of philosophy, that it chose the appearance of the immoral and imagined that it had [found] the genuine absolute in negative absoluteness or infinity.
The exposition of this practical philosophy is based on a presentation of what this negative absoluteness can accomplish, and we must review the chief moments in this mistaken attempt to discover a genuinely absolute [quality] in the negatively absolute.
It at once becomes clear that, since pure unity constitutes the essence of practical reason, a system of morality [Sittlichkeit] is so much out of the question that not even a plurality of laws is possible; for whatever goes beyond the pure concept, or – since this concept, in so far as it is posited as negating the many (i.e. as practical) is duty – whatever goes beyond the pure concept of duty and beyond the abstraction of a law, no longer pertains to this pure reason. Thus Kant, as the one who presented this abstraction of the concept in its absolute purity, fully recognizes that practical reason is completely lacking in any content of the [moral] law and that it can do no more than make the formal appropriateness [Form der Tauglichkeit] of the will’s maxim into a supreme law. The will’s maxim has a content and includes a determinacy; the pure will, on the other hand, is free from such determinacies. The absolute law of practical reason is to raise this determinacy to the form of pure unity, and the expression of this determinacy elevated to this form is the law. If the determinacy can be elevated to the form of the pure concept, and if it does not thereby cancel itself [sich aufheben], then it is justified and has itself become absolute, through its negative absoluteness, as law and right or duty. But the material [aspect] of the maxim remains what it is, a determinacy or individual quality [Einzelheit]; and the universality which its formal elevation confers on it is consequently a purely analytic unity, so that, when the unity conferred on it is expressed in a proposition purely for what it is, that proposition is an analytical one and a tautology. In truth, the sublime capacity of pure practical reason to legislate autonomously consists in the production of tautologies; and the pure identity of the understanding, expressed in theoretical terms as the principle of contradiction, remains exactly the same when applied to the practical form. If the question ‘What is truth?,’ when put to logic and answered by it, provides Kant with ‘the ridiculous spectacle of one man milking a billy-goat while another holds a sieve beneath it,’ then the question ‘What is right and duty?,’ put to and answered by pure practical reason, is of exactly the same kind. Kant recognizes that ‘a universal criterion of truth would be one which would apply to all knowledge [Erkenntnisse], irrespective of the objects of this knowledge, but it is clear that, since this involves abstracting from the whole content of knowledge (although truth is concerned with precisely this content), it is quite impossible and absurd to ask for a test of the truth of this content'[5] (because this test is supposed to have nothing to do with the content of knowledge). With these words, Kant in fact passes judgment on the principle of duty and right which is set up by practical reason. For the latter abstracts completely from all material [aspects] of the will; any content presupposes a heteronomy of the arbitrary will [Willkür]. But our interest here is precisely to establish what right and duty are; we inquire what the content of the moral law is, and our sole concern is with this content. But the essence of pure will and of pure practical reason is to abstract from all content, so that it is self-contradictory to look to this absolute practical reason for a moral legislation – which would have to have a content – because the essence of this reason consists in having no content at all.[6]
Thus, before this formalism can pronounce a law, it is necessary that some material [aspect], some determinacy, should be posited to supply its content; and the form which is conferred upon this determinacy is that of unity or universality. “That a maxim of your will must simultaneously count as a principle of universal legislation"[7] – this basic law of pure practical reason implies that some determinacy which constitutes the content of the maxim of the particular will should be posited as a concept, as a universal. But every determinacy is capable of being elevated to conceptual form and posited as a quality [Qualität], and there is nothing which could not be made into a moral law in this way.[8] But every determinacy is particular in itself, and is not a universal; it is confronted by an opposite determinacy, and it is determinate only in so far as it has such an opposite. Each of the two determinacies is equally capable of being thought; which of the two is to be elevated to unity (or to be thought), and which is to be abstracted from, is completely indeterminate and free. If one of them is fixed as subsisting in and for itself, the other cannot, of course, be posited; but this other than equally well be thought and (since the form of thought is [of] the essence) expressed as an absolute moral law. That ‘the commonest understanding, without any guidance,’ can perform this simple operation and distinguish what form of maxim is appropriate for universal legislation or not, Kant shows by the following example.[9] I ask whether the maxim that I should increase my wealth by all reliable means can count as a universal practical law if such a means should present itself to me in the shape of a deposit [with which I am entrusted].[10] The content of this maxim should thus be ‘that anyone may deny having received a deposit if no one can prove that he did so.’ This question supplies its own answer [according to Kant], because ‘such a principle, as a law, would destroy itself, since its effect would be that no deposits would be made.’ But what contradiction is there in no deposits beings made? The absence of deposits will contradict other necessary determinacies, just as the possibility of a deposit will be compatible with other necessary determinacies and consequently itself be necessary. But it is not other ends and material reasons which have to be invoked; on the contrary, the immediate form of the concept is to decide the correctness of the first or the second assumption. But the two opposing determinacies are equally indifference as far as the form is concerned; each can be conceived as a quality, and this conception can be expressed as a law. If the determinacy of property in general is posited, the following tautological proposition can be constructed: ‘Property is property and nothing else besides'; and this tautological production is the legislation of the practical reason already referred to: property, if there is property, must be property. But if the opposite determinacy, i.e. the negation of property, is posited, the legislation of the same practical reason results in the tautology: non-property is non-property. If there is no property, anything which claims to be property must be annulled [aufgehoben]. But the interest [at stake] is precisely to prove that there must be property; we are solely concerned with what lies outside the competence of this practical legislation of pure reason, namely with deciding which of the opposing determinacies must be posited. But pure reason requires that this should have been done in advance, and that one of the opposite determinacies should already have been posited; only then can it enact its now superfluous legislation.
The analytic unity and tautology of practical reason is not only superfluous, however, but – in its present application – false, and it must be recognized as the principle of immorality [Unsittlichkeit]. The mere elevation of a determinacy to the form of unity is supposed to change the nature of its being; and the determinacy, which by its nature is opposed by another determinacy so that each is the negation of the other and neither is absolute (and as far as the functioning of practical reason is concerned, it is a matter of indifference which of the two it has to deal with, for it supplies only the empty form), is itself supposed to become absolute, as law and duty, by means of this union with the form of pure unity. But whenever a determinacy or individual quality is raised to [the status of] something in itself [zu einem Ansich], irrationality and (in a moral context) immorality [Unsittlichkeit] are posited. – The illegitimacy of this transformation of the conditioned and unreal into something unconditioned and absolute is easily recognized, and its subterfuges are easily detected. When the determinacy is elevated toe the form of pure unity or formal identity and the determinate concept is expressed as a proposition, the result is the tautology of the formal proposition ‘determinacy A is determinacy A.’ But the form, as expressed in the proposition ‘the identity of the subject and predicate is an absolute,’ yields only a negative or formal [statement] which has nothing to do with determinacy A itself; this content is entirely hypothetical as far as the form is concerned. But the absoluteness which is present in the proposition by virtue of its form takes on a wholly different significance within practical reason; for it is also transferred to the content, which is by nature a conditioned being [ein Bedingtes], and contrary to its essence, this non-absolute, conditioned thing is raised to [the status of] an absolute as a result of this confusion. It is not in the interest of practice to produce a tautology, and practical reason would not make so much fuss just for the sake of this empty form (although this is the only power which it has); but through this confusion of the absolute form with the conditioned material, the absoluteness of the form is imposed by stealth on the unreal and conditioned character of the content, and this inversion and sleight of hand lies at the heart of the practical legislation of pure reason. The true meaning of the proposition ‘property is property’ is ‘the identity which this proposition expresses through its form is absolute;’ but instead, the meaning ‘the material [content] of this proposition, namely property, is absolute’ is falsely attributed to it, and any determinacy can at once be made into a duty. The arbitrary will can choose between opposing determinacies, and it would be sheer ineptitude if, for any [particular] action, some ground could not be found which not only possessed the form of probability – as with the Jesuits – but also no acquired the form of right and duty; and this moral formalism is no better than the moral artifice of the Jesuits or the principles of eudaemonism,[11] which are one and the same thing.
It should be clearly noted in this connection that the elevation of a determinacy to the concept must be understood as a [purely] formal operation, or as implying that the determinacy remains [as it was], so that matter and form contradict one another (inasmuch as the former is determinate and the latter infinite). But if the content were genuinely equated with the form, and determinacy with unity, no practical legislation would be possible: the determinacy would simply be annulled. Thus, property itself is directly opposed to universality;[12] but if it is equated with it, it is superseded. – This annulment of determinacy by elevating it to infinity or universality also causes problems for practical legislation. For if the determinacy is such that it itself expresses the superseding of a determinacy, then the elevation of this supersession [Aufheben] to universality or supersededness [Aufgehobensein] annuls both the determinacy which is to be superseded and the supersession itself; consequently, a maxim which refers to a determinacy of this kind, which is annulled when thought of in terms of universality, would be incapable of becoming the principle of a universal legislation, and would consequently be immoral. In other words, the maxim’s content, which is the supersession of a determinacy, contradicts itself if it is raised to the concept. For if the determinacy is thought of as superseded, its supersession no longer obtains; but if this determinacy is supposed to remain [in being], then the supersession which was posited in the maxim is in turn no longer posited – and whether the determinacy remains [in being] or not, it cannot in either case be superseded. But a maxim which is immoral [unmoralisch] in principle (because it is self-contradictory) is absolutely rational, and hence absolutely moral, inasmuch as it expresses the supersession of a determinacy; for the rational in its negative aspect is the indifference of determinacies, the supersededness of the conditioned. Thus, the determinate injunction [die Bestimmtheit] to help the poor expresses the supersession of the determinacy which is poverty; but if the maxim whose content is this determinacy is tested by raising it to a principle of universal legislation, it will prove to be false, because it annuls itself. If it is thought that the poor should be helped universally, then there are either no longer any poor, or there are only the poor (in which case no one remains to help them), so that in both cases, the help becomes irrelevant; thus, if the maxim is thought of as universal, it cancels itself [hebt sich selbst auf]. But if the determinacy which is the condition of the supersession – namely poverty – should remain [in being], the possibility of help also remains, but only as a possibility and not as the actuality implied by the maxim. If poverty is to remain in order that the duty of helping the poor can be fulfilled, this very retention of poverty runs directly against the fulfillment of the duty. Thus, the maxim that one should honorably defend one’s fatherland against its enemies, and an infinite number of other maxims, cancel themselves out [heben sich auf] whenever they are thought of as principles of universal legislation; for when, for example, the above maxim is extended in this way, the determinacy of a fatherland, like those of enemies and defense, cancels itself out.
Unity neither has the purely negative meaning of the mere supersession of determinacies, nor is it genuine unity of intuition or the positive indifference of such determinacies. Comparison with the latter [kind of] unity will clarify the distorted nature [Wesen] of the former from another angle. For the former unity of practical reason is essentially encumbered [affiziert] with a difference [Differenz], because it is posited either as the fixing of a determinacy, so that others are thereby immediately excluded (or negatively posited), or as an analytic proposition, in which case the identity of this proposition (i.e. its form) immediately contradicts its content. This can also be formulated as follows: given its content, this proposition contradicts the requirement that it should be a judgment. The proposition was supposed to say something, but an identical proposition says nothing, for it is not a judgment, because the relation of the subject to the predicate is merely formal, and no difference between them is posited. Or if the unity is understood as universality, then it refers entirely to an empirical multiplicity, and the present determinacy is opposed to an infinite mass of empirically different determinacies. The unity of intuition, on the other hand, is the indifference of the determinacies which constitute a whole; in this unity, they are not fixed as separate and opposed, but integrated and objectivised. And since this indifference and the different determinacies are completely united, this unity does not involve a division either between indifference as possibility and the determinacies as actualities, or between some of the determinacies as possible and others as actual; on the contrary, it is absolute presence. And in this power of intuition and presence lies the power of morality [Sittlichkeit] in general[13] – and, of course, of morality [Sittlichkeit] in particular, with which that legislative reason referred to above is primarily concerned, and from which that form of the concept, of formal unity and universality, must rather be kept completely separate. For the essence of morality is immediately annulled [aufgehoben] by this very form, in that it renders contingent what is morally necessary by making it appear in opposition to other things; but in morality [Sittlichkeit], the contingent – which is identical [eins] wit the empirically necessary – is immoral [unsittlich]. A pain which is [present] is raised by the power of intuition out of [the realm of] sensation, in which it is accidental and contingent, to unity, and [given] the shape of something objective and necessary which has being for itself; and through this immediate unity, which gives no thought to what possibilities formal unity offers on one side or the other, it is preserved in its absolute presentness. But as a result of the objectivity of intuition and the raising [of the sensation of pain] to this unity of being-for-itself, it is genuinely detached from the subject and rendered ideal in the fixed intuition of this unity.[14] If, on the other hand, the pain is compared with other determinacies by the unity of reflection, or thought of as universal and found not to be so, it is in both cases rendered contingent, and the subject thereby recognizes itself in its mere contingency and particularity; this cognition is the sensibility [Empfindsamkeit] and immorality [Unsittlichkeit] of impotence. Or if morality [das Sittliche] is concerned with relations between individuals, it is pure intuition and ideality (as in the entrusting of a deposit) which must be held on to and kept free from any interference on the part of formal unity and of the thought of other possible determinacies. The expression of this unity of intuition (’someone else’s property entrusted to me is someone else’s property entrusted to me and nothing else besides’) has a completely different meaning from the universally expressed tautology of practical legislation ('an alien property entrusted to me is an alien property entrusted to me’). For the latter proposition can equally well be confronted by another to the effect that ‘something entrusted to me which is not the property of another is not the property of the other'; that is, a determinacy raised to the concept thereby becomes ideal, and the opposite determinacy can equally well be posited. On the other hand, the expression of intuition contains a ‘this,’ a living relation and absolute presence whose possibility is inseparably connected [schlechthin verknüpft] with it, whereas any possibility distinct from it, or any [possibility of] otherness [Anderssein], is simply annulled, for in this possible otherness lies immorality [Unsittlichkeit].[15]
Now if the unity of practical reason were not this positive unity of intuition but had only the negative meaning of annulling the determinate, it would simply express the essence of negative reason or of infinity, of the absolute concept. But because infinity becomes fixed and divorced from the absolute, it shows itself in its essence as being its own opposite. It makes a mockery of reflection, which seeks to pin it down and grasp in it an absolute unity, and it does so by also giving rise to the complete opposite of such unity, namely a difference [Differenz] and multiplicity; thus, within this opposition (which reproduces itself infinitely), it permits only a relative identity, and even as infinity, it is consequently its own opposite, namely absolute finitude. And as it thus becomes isolated, it is itself only the powerless form, abandoned by the genuinely nullifying power of reason; it takes up and accommodates determinacies without annulling them, but rather perpetuating them.
It is on the opposition described above, on its fixation as a reality and its incomplete connection [Verknüpfung] as a relative identity, that the recent definition of the concept of natural law and of its position within the whole science of ethics [des Sittlichen] depends.[16 ]We must now consider from this more specific angle what has hitherto been examined in general terms, [and so discovery] how that separation, insuperable as soon as it was posited, appears in its own distinctive way in the science of natural law.
The absolute concept, which is both the principle of opposition and opposition itself, presents itself – since it is fixed – within this separation in such a way that, as pure unity, it is opposed to itself as multiplicity. As a result, it can remain the absolute concept both in the form of pure unity and in that of pure multiplicity; and in the form of multiplicity, it is not a varied range [Mannigfaltigkeit] of differently determined concepts, but is subsumed under unity as well as under multiplicity. The concept itself is subsumed in many determinate concepts, and is [nevertheless] not many but on. The absolute concept, being itself a multiplicity, is a mass of subjects, and in the form of pure unity – as absolute quantity – it is opposed to these as its own qualitative and posited being [Gesetztsein]. Thus, both [aspects] are posited – an inner oneness of the opposites, which is the essence of both (i.e. the absolute concept), and a division of the concept under the form of unity (in which it is right and duty) and under the form of multiplicity (in which it is the thinking and willing subject). The first of these aspects, whereby the essence of right and duty and the essence of the thinking and willing subject are totally one, is the main aspect of the philosophy of Kant and Fichte (as is, generally speaking, the higher abstraction of infinity). But this philosophy has not remained true to this oneness; instead, although it does acknowledge this oneness as the essence and absolute, it posits the separation into the one and the many just as absolutely, according equal dignity to both. Consequently, it is not the positive absolute which constitutes the essence of both and in which the two are one, but the negative absolute or the absolute concept; furthermore, this necessary oneness becomes formal, and the two opposite determinacies, posited as absolute, accordingly belong int their subsistence to ideality, which is in this respect the mere possibility of both. It is possible for right and duty to have reality independently, as a particular [realm] separate from the subjects and from which the subjects are separate; but it is also possible for the two to be linked.[17] And it is absolutely necessary for these two possibilities to be kept apart and distinguished from one another, so that each may form the basis of a separate science – one concerned with the oneness of the pure concept and the subjects (or the morality [Moralität] of actions), the other with their non-oneness [Neichteinssein] (or legality), but in such a way that if, in this division of the ethical realm [des Sittlichen] into morality [Moralität] and legality, these two becomes mere possibilities, they are both for that very reason equally positive. Admittedly, the one is negative for the other – but both are equally so. It is not that one is the absolutely positive, and the other the absolutely negative; on the contrary, each is both [positive and negative] within their mutual relation, and since each of the two is as positive as the other, both are absolutely necessary, and the possibility that the pure concept and the subject of duty and right are not one must be posited unalterably and without qualification.
The basic concepts of the system of legality flow directly from the above, in the following manner. The pure self-consciousness, the ‘I,’ is the true essence and the absolute, but it is nevertheless conditioned. The condition to which it is subject is that it should progress to real consciousness. In this relation of mutual conditionedness, the two forms [of consciousness] remain totally opposed to one another. The former pure self-consciousness, pure unity, or the empty law of ethics [Sittengestez] – the universal freedom of all – is opposed to the real consciousness, i.e. to the subject, the rational being, and individual freedom – which Fichte, in a more popular manner, expresses as the presupposition that ‘loyalty and faith are lost.'[18] On this presupposition, a system is established which aims to unite bot the concept and the subject of ethical life, despite their separation (although because of the latter, their union is only formal and external); the resultant relation is called coercion.[19] Since this externality of oneness is thereby totally fixed and posited as something absolute which has being in itself, the inner dimension [Innerlichkeit], the reconstruction of the lost loyalty and faith, the oneness of universal and individual freedom, and ethical life [in general] are rendered impossible.
We shall refer here to Fichte’s exposition as the mos consistent and least formal account, which actually attempts to create a consistent system with no need of an ethics [Sittlichkeit] and religion that are alien to it. In a system of such externality (as in any system which proceeds from the conditioned to the unconditioned), it is either impossible to discover anything unconditioned, or if something of this kind is posited, it is [merely] a formal indifference which has the conditioned and the different outside it; it is essence without form, power without wisdom, quantity without inner quality or infinity, rest without movement.
The supreme task in an arrangement which works with mechanical necessity so that the activity of each individual is coerced by the general will is one which presupposes an opposition between the individual will and the general will (given that this general will must necessarily be real in those subjects [Subjekte] who are its organs and administrators). Oneness with the general will consequently cannot be understood and posited as inner absolute majesty, but as something to be produced by an external relation, or by coercion. But in reality, in the process of coercion and supervision which must in this case be posited, one cannot continue in infinite series and make a leap from the real to the ideal; there must be a supreme positive point from which coercion in accordance with the concept of universal freedom originates. But this point, like all other points, must itself be coerced into coercing [others] in accordance with the concept of universal freedom; for any point within this universal system of coercion which were not itself coerced would depart from the principle [of the whole] and become transcendent. The question is therefore how this supreme will, by coercion and supervision, can likewise be made to conform to the concept of the general will so that the system remains wholly immanent and transcendental. The only way in which this could happen would be for the power of the whole to be divided between the two opposing sides so that the governed are coerced by the government and the government by the governed. If we assume that the power – and hence the possible coercion – exercised by the two sides is of unequal strength, then only one part, rather than its opposite, is subject to coercion, inasmuch as the one has more power than the other or the power of both is excessive; and this ought not to happen. But in point of fact, only the possessor of excess power is genuinely powerful, for before something can impose limits on something else, it must be equal to it.[20] The weaker [of the two] cannot therefore limit the other; both must consequently coerce and be coerced by one another with equal power. But if in this way action and reaction, stance and resistance, are equally strong, the power on both sides is reduced to equilibrium; thus all functions, actions, and expressions of will are annulled [aufgehoben]. This reduction may be thought of in positive or negative terms; that is, action and reaction may be posted as existing [seiend] and working, or posited negatively, so that the equilibrium arises because neither action nor reaction is present. Nor is it a true solution to try to remedy this stagnation[101] by opening out the direct confrontation [of the two sides] into a circle of effects, so that the central point of contact at which the reduction of the opposites takes place may be annulled [aufgehoben] by deceptively leaving the center empty. In opposition to the hierarchy of coercion which descends from the supreme authority [Gewalt] through all its ramification down to every individual unit [allen Einzelheiten], a corresponding pyramid is in turn supposed to ascend from the latter to an uppermost point of counter-pressure acting against the downward pressure.[20] The whole is thus supposed to turn round in a circle in which the immediacy of contact would vanish; the forces – in so far as they constitute a mass – would be kept apart, and intermediate elements would create an artificial difference [Differenz] so that no single element [Glied] would react directly upon the one which moved it (so reducing the two to equilibrium), but always on another element, so that the first would move the last and the last would in turn move the first. But instead of moving, such a perpetuum mobile whose parts are all supposed to move one another round in a circle will at once achieve perfect equilibrium and become a perfect perpetuum quietum; for pressure and counter-pressure, coercion and exposure to coercion are precisely equivalent, and they are just as directly opposed to one another, and produce the same reduction of forces, as in the original model [Vorstellung]. Pure quantity cannot be subverted by such mediation, which brings no difference, true infinity, or form whatsoever into it; on the contrary, it remains, as before, a completely undivided, pure, and shapeless power. It is impossible to compel such a power to conform in this way to the concept of universal freedom, for no authority can be found outside it, and no division can be established within it.
For this reason, the expedient of a purely formal distinction is in turn adopted. Actual power is admittedly posited as one, and as united in the government; but it is contrasted with possible power, and this possibility is supposed as such to be capable of coercing the actuality in question. This second, powerless existence of the general will is supposed to be in a position to judge whether the power has deserted the first [existence of the general will] with which it is associated, and whether or not this power still accords with the concept of universal freedom.[22] Indeed, the general will is supposed to supervise the supreme power in general, and, if a private will takes the place of the general will within it, to wrest the power from this private will; the manner in which this is supposedly accomplished is by a public declaration, possessing absolute force, of the complete nullity of all actions of the supreme political authority from that moment onwards. What should and may not happen is for the power to detach itself on its own independent judgment, as this would amount to insurrection; for this pure power consists solely of private wills, which are consequently unable to constitute themselves as a collective [gemeinsame] will. But it is the second collective will [referred to above] which declares that this mass [of private wills] is united as a community, or that the pure power is also united with the general will, since the general will is no longer present in the former powerholders. Whatever determinate element [Bestimmtheit] is posited as a means of enforcing anything against the supreme power must be invested not just with the possibility of power, but with real power. But since this power is in the hands of other representatives of the collective will, it is able to thwart [the efforts of] and such determinate element [Bestimmtheit], and to nullify whatever operations are entrusted to the ephorate – such as supervision, the public declaration of the interdict, and whatever formalities it may devise.[23] And it does so with the same right as those who were made responsible for the business of the [proposed] determinate element [Bestimmtheit]; for such ephors are likewise just as much private wills as the others, and whether the private will of the ephors has detached itself from the general will can just as readily be judged by the government as the latter can be judged by the ephorate – and the government can enforce its judgment absolutely [schlechthin]. It is well known that, when a government in recent time set about dissolving a rival legislative power which was paralyzing its activity, a man who was himself involved rightly judged – when it was suggested that the establishment of a supervisory council would have been treated just as violently if it had attempted to oppose the government.[24 ] – But finally, even if those in supreme authority voluntarily agreed to permit these secondary representatives of the general will to summon the community to choose between the government and the supervisors, what could one do with such a mob, which also interferes in all private affairs, which is itself remote from public life, and whose education has not equipped it to be conscious of the collective will or to act in the spirit of the whole, but to do precisely the opposite?[25]
What this has shown is that, if ethical life [das Sittliche] is posited solely in terms of relations, or if externality and coercion are thought of as a totality, they cancel themselves out [sich selbst aufhebt]. This certainly proves that coercion is not something real and that it is nothing in itself; but this will become even clearer if we demonstrate it in terms of coercion itself, in accordance with its concept and with the determinate character [Bestimmtheit] which the relation of this association [Beziehung] assumes; for the fact that relation is absolutely nothing in itself is something which must in part be proved by dialectics, and which has in part already been briefly outlined above.
As to those concepts in general which have to do with coercion and which express this same relation, it has in part already been shown that they are insubstantial abstractions, products of thought or figments of the imagination without reality. In the first place, there is the hollow abstraction of the concept of the universal freedom of all, supposedly distinct from the freedom of individuals; then on the other hand, there is the latter freedom of the individual, equally isolated. Each, posited on its own [für sich], is an abstraction without reality; but both, as absolutely identical and then posited merely in terms of this first basic identity, are a very different things from those concepts whose significance lies solely in their non-identity.[26] Then natural or original freedom is supposed to be limited by the concept of universal freedom; but the former freedom, which can be posited as subject to limitation, is for that very reason not something absolute. And then it is self-contradictory to construct an idea to the effect that the freedom of the individual, because of the externality of coercion, conforms with absolute necessity to the concept of universal freedom – which simply amounts to imagining that the individual, by virtue of something which is not absolute, is nevertheless absolutely equal to the universal. In the concept of coercion itself, something external to freedom is directly posited. But a freedom for which something is genuinely external and alien is not freedom at all; its essence and formal definition is precisely that nothing is absolutely external [to it].
That view of freedom which regards it as a choice between opposite determinacies (so that if +A and -A are given, freedom consists in determining oneself either as +A or as -A, and is completely tied to this either-or) must be utterly rejected. Anything resembling this possibility of choice is purely and simply an empirical freedom, which is the same thing as ordinary empirical necessity and is completely inseparable from it. Freedom is rather the negation or ideality of the opposites, of +A as well as -A, the abstraction of the possibility that neither of the two exists; something external would exist for it only if freedom were determined solely as +A or solely as -A. But freedom is the direct opposite of this: nothing is external to it, so that no coercion is possible for it.
Every determinacy is in essence either +A or -A, and the -A is indissolubly joined to the +A, just as the +A is to the -A. Thus, whenever an individual has adopted determinacy +A, he is also tied to -A, and -A is for him an external [element] over which he has no control. In fact, because of the absolute link between +A and -A, he would be brought, by the determinacy +A, directly under the alien power of -A, and the freedom which supposedly resides in determining itself either as +A or -A would never escape from necessity. If it determines itself as +A< it has not nullified -A; on the contrary, -A subsists absolutely necessarily for it as an external [element], and the converse applies if it determines itself as -A. Freedom is freedom only in so far as, either positively or negatively, it unites -A with +A and thereby ceases to occupy the determinacy +A. In the union of the two determinacies, both are nullified: +A – A = 0. If this nought is thought of only in relation to +A and -Am and the indifferent A itself is thought of as a determinacy and as a plus or minus in opposition to another minus or plus, absolute freedom stands above this opposition, and above any opposition or externality; it is utterly incapable of any coercion, and coercion has no reality whatsoever.
But this idea of freedom seems itself to ab an abstraction; and if it were a question of concrete freedom and the freedom of the individual, for example, the existence [Sein] of a determinacy – and with it a purely empirical freedom as the possibility of choice – would be posited, and hence also empirical necessity and the possibility of coercion, and in general the opposition of universality and singularity [Einzelheit]. For the individual is a single entity [Einzelheit], and freedom is the nullification of singularity. By virtue of singularity, the individual is [placed] directly among determinacies, so that something external is present for him, and coercion is accordingly possible. But it is one thing to impose determinacies on the individual under the form of infinity, and another to impose them absolutely. Determinacy under the form of infinity is thereby superseded, and the individual exists [ist] only as a free being; that in, inasmuch as determinacies are posited within him, he is the absolute indifference of these determinacies, and it is in this that his ethical nature formally consists. And in so far as individuals in general are different [different] – whether in relation to themselves or to something else – and have a relationship [Beziehung] to something external, this externality it itself indifferent and a living relationship; and it is in this that organization and (since totality is [to be found] only in an organization) the positive [aspect] of ethical life consists. – But the indifference of the individual as a single entity is a negative one in relation to the being of the determinacies; when his being is actually posited as individuality, however (i.e. as a negation which he cannot positively overcome and a determinacy by which the external as such is maintained), all that he is left with is completely negative absoluteness or infinity – the absolute negation of both -A and +A, or the absolute elevation of this individual being to the concept. Since -A is an external element in relation to the subject’s determinacy +A, the subject is under alien control as a result of this relation; but since the subject can equally well posit its +A negatively as a determinacy and supersede and dispose of it, it remains completely free in face of the possibility and actuality of alien power. If it negates +A as well as -A, it is constrained [bezwungen] but not coerced [gezwungen]; it wuold have to suffer coercion only if +A were absolutely fixed within it, because this would allow an infinite chain of further determinacies to be attached to this same subject as a determinacy itself. This possibility of abstracting from determinacies is unlimited; or [to put it differently,] there is no determinacy which is absolute, for this would be a direct self-contradiction. But though freedom itself – or infinity – is the negative, it is also the absolute, and the individual being of the subject is absolute singularity elevated to the concept, negatively absolute infinity, or pure freedom. This negatively absolute [element], this pure freedom, makes its appearance as death, and through his ability to die, the subject proves that he is free and utterly above all coercion. Death is the absolute constraint [Bezwingung]; and because this constraint is absolute, or become individuality becomes completely pure individuality within this constraint, and not a positing of +A to be exclusion of -A (an exclusion which would not be a true negation, but merely the posited of -A as something external and at the same time of +A as a determinacy), but the cancellation [Aufhebung] of both the plus and the minus, this individuality is its own concept, and consequently infinite. It is the opposite of itself, or absolute liberation, and the pure individuality which is in death is its own opposite, namely universality. Within this constraint, there is accordingly freedom, because it is directly purely towards the cancellation [Aufhebung] of a determinacy. In cancels not just one side of this determinacy, but cancels it both in so far as it is posited positively and in so far as it is posited negatively, subjectively as well as objectively; consequently this freedom, considered in itself, remains purely negative in character. Or, since the cancellation [Aufhebung] itself can also be understood and expressed in positive terms by reflection, the cancellation of both sides of the determinacy will then appear as the wholly equal positing of both sides of whatever is determined.
If this is applied to punishment, for example, it follows that its only rational aspect is retribution; for it is by retribution that crime is subjected to constraint [bezwungen]. A determinacy +A, which was posited by the crime, is complemented by the positing of -A, so that both are nullified; or viewed in positive terms, the determinacy +A is coupled for the criminal with determinacy -A and both are posited equally, whereas the crime posited only one of them. Thus, the punishment is the restoration of freedom; and not only has the criminal remained (or rather been made) free, but the administrator of the punishment has acted rationally or freely. In this, its [proper] determination, the punishment is accordingly something in itself, genuinely infinite and absolute, which therefore carries its own respect and fear within it; it derives from freedom, and even as a constraint [als bezwingend], it remains in freedom. But conversely, if punishment is understood [vorgestellt] as coercion, it is posited merely as a determinacy and as something wholly finite which embodies no rationality. It falls entirely under the common concept of one specific thing as against another, or of a piece of merchandise with which another commodity, namely the crime, can be bought. The state, as a judicial authority, runs a market in determinacies known as crimes, which it can buy in exchange for other determinacies [known as punishments], an the legal code is the list of current prices.
1. In some sense, Hegel means to use the idea of the becoming of the individual to get beyond ‘the being of the individual,’ whether that individual is conceptualized in terms of happiness (Glückseligkeitslehre) or Kant’s more high-minded conception of Moralität. Obviously, in this paragraph, Hegel means to associate the natural self with being and the spiritual self with becoming.
2. The reference to an ‘absolute point of indifference’ needs to be read in terms of Schiller’s and Schelling’s earlier discussions of this matter. On this theme, see Dickey (1987; pp. 246-8).
3. The last few sentences seek to say that multiplicity is primary to physical nature and unity primary to ethical nature. This allows Hegel to oppose the two aspects of nature to each other in the same way he as he would later oppose atomism to Sittlichkeit and civil society to the state.
4. Later in the essay, Hegel will advance his famous distinction between Moralität an Sittlichkeit. This paragraph needs to be read in anticipation of that distinction. It is also important to realize that in this paragraph, Hegel does not use the term Moralität, but he does identify a certain kind of Sittlichkeit as Unsittlichkeit. Translating Unsittlichkeit as ‘immorality’ captures very well what Hegel means when he later substitutes Moralität for what is here identified as Unsittlichkeit.
5. See Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 97-8 (A 58-9). (Our translation differs slightly from the Norman Kemp Smith translation.)
6. In writings from the years 1830-1, Hegel will use this line of argument to explain why France had been prone to political revolutions since 1789.
7. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, p. 30 (Book I, Chapter I, section 7). (Our translation differs slightly from Lewis White Beck’s translation.)
8. What results for Hegel from this privileging of the private is what Friedrich Schlegel (1991: p. 81) called a ‘polemical totality’ in which everyone talks but no one listens.
9. See Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 26-7 (Book I, Chapter I, section 4 and Remark).
10. Hyppolite (1996: p. 47) discusses the Kantian background of the ‘deposit’ argument. Kant puts forward the argument in the material cited in note 9 above.
11. ‘Eudaemonism’ translates the German Glückseligkeitslehre, i.e. that system of ethics which makes happiness the criterion of rectitude. It is not insignificant that in 1758, J. H. G. von Justi suggested that the machine state would maximize the happiness of citizens. See Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, entry on ‘Staat,’ p. 21, for particular details. Parry (1963) also discusses this theme.
12. Accordingly, as Hegel will later argue in the Philosophy of Right, the law of property serves the particular interests of civil society rather than the universal interest of the state. As such, law and property work together to preserve and sanction an ‘empirical multiplicity’ – an aggregation – that cannot transform itself into unity.
13. Again, Hegel derives the principle of Sittlichkeit from the disposition towards unity in intuition.
14. In this sentence, we see Hegel discussing subjectivity in terms of self-regarding and other-regarding tendencies.
15. One of the most important statements in the Philosophy of Right is that in which Hegel refuses to allow political participation to be ‘optional’ (Hegel 1991a: p. 276). This sentence in On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law goes far to explain both why he said this and why he is not a political pluralist.
16. In other words, Hegel wishes to separate the disposition towards rights-based individualism from the science of ethics and, by so doing, to make Sittlichkeit the measure of natural law.
17. Here, Hegel re-affirms the link between Moralität and subjectivity that he had discussed in such detail in Faith and Knowledge.
18. The reference is to the opening sentence of section 14 of Fichte’s Science of Rights, p. 192. Fichte develops the idea of a machine state in this section. H. B. Acton (1975: pp. 28-35) provides a good discussion of Hegel’s view of Fichte as it emerges in On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law.
19. There are hints in some of Hegel’s early political writings that he is trying to explain the violence of the French Revolution by means of the argument on ‘coercion’ which he is developing here. In the next two paragraphs, in which e discusses Fichte, he runs together the arguments concerning ‘coercion’ and ‘mechanical’ systems of government, just as he had in The German Constitution. He has Fichte in mind – specifically the latter’s so-called ‘law of compulsion.’
101. Translator’s note: Literally, ‘this death.’
20. Implicit in what follows is a critique of mixed government. Compare this with the positive things Hegel has said in The German Constitution about the Gothic polity as a mixed form of government.
21. A formula similar to this can be found in Schiller (1967: p. 19).
22. In The German Constitution, Hegel represents the general will as a power in need of representation rather than as a power with absolute authority.
23. The reference is to Fichte’s discussion of the ephorate in the Science of Rights, section 16, pp. 205-85 esp. pp. 259ff. Also compare Hegel’s last sentence with two statements of Friedrihc Schlegel around 1800 (1996: pp. 166-7): (1) ‘Without opinion publique, no volonté générale; and no opinion publique without the ephorate of intellectuals and propaganda of reason'; and (2) ‘There is no republic without an ephorate and only the spiritual class can execute this.’ That Fichte’s ephorate may be an agent of public opinion has been noted by scholars. For a nuanced discussion of Fichte and the ephorate, see A. La Vopa (1989), especially p. 158.
24. Hegel’s critique of Fichte here is parallel to his critique of the French Revolution.
25. With the phrase ‘remote from public life,’ Hegel may be thinking of the Greek definition of the demagogue. For what the Greeks said about the latter, Hegel says about public opinion as an ‘irresponsible’ political power.
26. The last two sentences disprove the charge (e.g. in Barker 1957: p. xvii) that Hegel’s political philosophy aims to engulf individuals.