Hegel's Philosophy of Right
p. 15 The work covers the same ground in a more detailed and systematic way than the Encyclopaedia (1817).
p. 16 The philosophic way of advancing from one matter to another is essentially different from every other.
p. 17 Free thought cannot be satisfied with what is given to it.
p. 18 The ethical world or the state, is in fact reason potently and permanently actualised in self-consciousness.
p. 19 There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of right.
p. 20 The spiritual universe is looked upon as abandoned by God.
p. 21 Mr. Fries, one of the leaders of this shallow-minded host of philosophers.
p. 22 It is no surprise that the view just criticised should appear in the form of piety.
p. 23 The actual world of right and ethical life are apprehended in thought, and this reasoned right finds expression in law.
p. 24 Philosophy should therefore be employed only in the service of the state.
p. 25 Philosophising has reduced all matter of thought to the same level, resembling the despotism of the Roman Empire.
p. 26 Philosophy is an inquisition into the rational, and therefore the apprehension of the real and present.
p. 27 What is rational is real and what is real is rational.
p. 28 To apprehend what is is the task of philosophy, because what is is reason.
p. 29 A half philosophy leads away from God, while a true philosophy leads to God.
p. 30 The owl of Minerva, takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.
§ 1 The philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right.
§ 2 The science of right is a part of philosophy.
§ 3 Right is positive in general.
§ 4 The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and its origin is the will.
§ 5 [a] The will contains the element of pure indeterminateness.
§ 6 [b] The I is also the transition from blank indefiniteness to the distinct content and object.
§ 7 [c] The will is the unity of these two elements.
§ 8 (a) The formal will as a self-consciousness which finds an outer world before it.
§ 9 (b) This content of the will is an end.
§ 10 Only when the will has itself as an object is it also for itself.
§ 11 The will is at first only implicitly free, the natural will ... impulses, appetites, inclinations.
§ 12 This content exists only as a multiplicity of impulses having many ways of satisfaction..
§ 13 The will of a definite individual is not yet the content and work of its freedom.
§ 14 The finite will stands above its different impulses and the ways they are satisfied.
§ 15 Freedom of the will is, in this view of it, caprice.
§ 16 What is resolved upon and chosen the will may again give up.
§ 17 Caprice is the dialectic of impulses and inclinations manifested in their mutual antagonism.
§ 18 Man is by nature good.
§ 19 Impulses must be freed from the form of direct subjection to nature.
§ 20 The propulsion by the universality of thought is the absolute worth of civilisation.
§ 21 Since the will has as its object, universality itself, it is the true idea.
§ 22 In the object the will has simply reverted into itself.
§ 23 The pure conception has the perception or intuition of itself as its end and reality.
§ 24 The will is universal, because in it all limitation and individuality are superseded.
§ 25 The subjective side of the will is its self-consciousness and individuality.
§ 26 The will becomes objective only by the execution of its ends.
§ 27 There is thus actualised as idea what the will is implicitly.
§ 28 Transcending the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity is the content of the idea.
§ 29 Right, therefore, is, in general, freedom as idea.
§ 30 Right is something holy, because it is the embodiment of self-conscious freedom.
§ 31 The true process is found in the logic, and here is presupposed.
§ 32 The sequence of the conceptions is at the same time a sequence of realisations.
§ 33 The stages in the development of the idea of the absolutely free will.
§ 34 The absolutely free will, when its concept is abstract, is an actuality contrasted with the real world.
§ 35 From this point of view the subject is a person.
§ 36 (1) 'Be a person and respect others as persons.'
§ 37 (2) The particularity of the will is present as desire, need, impulse and casual whim.
§ 38 To have a right is therefore to have only a permission.
§ 39 (3) Personality is that which struggles to lift itself above this restriction and to give itself reality.
§ 40 Property, Contract & Wrong.
§ 41 A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist as Idea.
§ 42 What is immediately different from free mind is a thing, something without rights.
§ 43 As the concept in its immediacy, a person is partly within himself and partly related to it as to an external world.
§ 44 The absolute right of appropriation which man has over all 'things'.
§ 45 As free will I am an object to myself in what I possess and thereby also an actual will.
§ 46 Common property that may be owned by separate persons is an inherently dissoluble partnership.
§ 47 I possess my life and my body, like other things, only in so far as my will is in them.
§ 48 From the point of view of others, I am in essence a free entity in my body.
§ 49 What and how much I possess is a matter of indifference so far as rights are concerned.
§ 50 A thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first in time to take it into his possession.
§ 51 My inward idea and will that something is to be mine is not enough to make it my property.
§ 52 Occupancy makes the matter of the thing my property, since matter in itself does not belong to itself.
§ 53 Taking possession, Use and Alienation.
§ 54 Grasping it physically, by forming it, and by merely marking it as ours.
§ 55 [a] Grasping a thing physically.
§ 56 [b] Imposing a form on a thing.
§ 57 It is only through the development of his own body and mind, that man takes possession of himself.
§ 58 [c] To mark the thing.
§ 59 The thing, as something negative in itself, exists only for my need.
§ 60 If I make repeated use of a product, then this transforms the grasp of the thing into a mark.
§ 61 If I have the full use of the thing I am its owner.
§ 62 Ownership therefore is in essence free and complete.
§ 63 As full owner of the thing, I am owner of its value as well as of its use.
§ 64 I gain or lose possession of property through prescription.
§ 65 The reason I can alienate my property is that it is mine only in so far as I put my will into it.
§ 66 Those substantive characteristics which constitute my own private personality are inalienable.
§ 67 I can alienate to someone else and I can give him the use of my abilities only for a restricted period
§ 68 A product of my mind may turn into something external which may then be produced by other people.
§ 69 The inventor of a thing remains the owner of the universal ways and means of multiplying such things.
§ 70 There is no unqualified right to sacrifice one's life.
§ 71 Existence as determinate being is in essence being for another.
§ 72 Contract is the contradiction that I am the owner only in so far as I cease to be an owner.
§ 73 The concept compels me to alienate property in order that my will may become objective to me.
§ 74 The two contracting parties are related to each other as immediate self-subsistent persons.
§ 75 Contract of exchange.
§ 76 Gift, Real contract and Exchange.
§ 77 Value is the universal in which the subjects of the contract participate.
§ 78 The distinction between property and possession is the distinction between a common will and its actualisation.
§ 79 In contract it is the will that the stipulation enshrines.
§ 80 A. Gift, B. Exchange, C Completion of a Contract.
§ 81 If the particular will is explicitly at variance with the universal, this is Wrong.
§ 82 In contract the principle of rightness is posited, while its inner universality is in the particular will of the parties.
§ 83 Non-malicious wrong, Fraud and Crime.
§ 84 Each may look upon the thing as his property on the particular ground on which he bases his title.
§ 85 The sphere of civil suits at law.
§ 86 The principle of rightness arises as something kept in view and demanded by the parties.
§ 87 We have Fraud when the universal is set aside by the particular will only showing in the situation.
§ 88 The contract is right enough so far as it is an exchange, but the aspect of implicit universality is lacking.
§ 89 The subjective arbitrary will, opposing itself to the right, should be superseded.
§ 90 My will may be coerced.
§ 91 The free will cannot be coerced at all.
§ 92 Force or coercion is in its very conception directly self-destructive.
§ 93 In the world of reality coercion is annulled by coercion.
§ 94 Abstract right is a right to coerce.
§ 95 The sphere of criminal law.
§ 96 It makes a difference to the objective aspect of crime whether the will is injured throughout its entire extent.
§ 97 Right actualised.
§ 98 Compensation.
§ 99 To penalise the criminal is to annul the crime and to restore the right.
§ 100 The criminal's action is the action of a rational being.
§ 101 The annulment of the crime is retribution.
§ 102 The annulling of crime in this sphere where right is immediate is principally revenge.
§ 103 The demand for a justice freed from subjective interest has emerged in the course of this movement itself.
§ 104 The Transition from Right to Morality.
§ 105 The standpoint of morality is the standpoint of the will which is infinite not merely in itself but for itself.
§ 106 Only in the will as subjective can freedom be actual.
§ 107 The moral standpoint therefore takes shape as the right of the subjective Will.
§ 108 The subjective will, directly aware of itself, is therefore abstract, restricted, and formal.
§ 109 The opposition of subjectivity and objectivity, and the activity related to this opposition.
§ 110 (a) My subjectivity is not merely my inner purpose, but has acquired outward existence.
§ 111 (b) The subjective will may not be adequate to the concept.
§ 112 (c) But the external subjectivity which is thus identical with me is the will of others.
§ 113 The externalisation of the subjective or moral will is action.
§ 114 Purpose, Intention & Good.
§ 115 The deed sets up an alteration in this state of affairs confronting the will.
§ 116 It is not my own doing if damage is caused to others by things I own.
§ 117 The deed can be imputed to me only if my will is responsible for it.
§ 118 Action has a multitude of consequences.
§ 119 Purpose comprises that universal side of the action, i.e. the intention.
§ 120 The right of intention is that the universal quality of the action shall be known by the agent.
§ 121 The subject's end is the soul of the action and determines its character.
§ 122 In contrast with this end the direct character of the action is reduced to a means.
§ 123 The satisfaction of needs, inclinations, passions, opinions, fancies, &c. is welfare or happiness.
§ 124 The view that objective and subjective ends are mutually exclusive, is an empty dogmatism.
§ 125 The welfare of many other unspecified particulars is thus also an essential end and right of subjectivity.
§ 126 An intention to secure my welfare or that of others cannot justify an action which is wrong.
§ 127 In extreme danger and in conflict with the rightful property of someone else, this life may claim a right of distress.
§ 128 Good & Conscience.
§ 129 The good is the Idea as the unity of the concept of the will with the particular will.
§ 130 Welfare without right is not a good.
§ 131 The subjective will has value and dignity only in so far as its insight and intention accord with the good.
§ 132 An action is right or wrong, good or evil according to its knowledge of the worth the action in objectivity.
§ 133 Duty.
§ 134 Do the right, and strive after welfare, one's own welfare, and the welfare of others.
§ 135 The sphere of duty.
§ 136 Conscience.
§ 137 The union of subjective knowing with objective principles and duties, is not present until the ethical life.
§ 138 This subjectivity remains the power to judge what is good in respect of any content.
§ 139 Once self-consciousness has reduced duties to the inwardness of the will, it has become potentially evil.
§ 140 To impose on others is hypocrisy; while to impose on oneself is a stage beyond hypocrisy.
§ 141 Transition from Morality to Ethical Life.
§ 142 Thus ethical life is the concept of freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness.
§ 143 The concept of the will and the particular will each is in its own eyes the totality of the Idea.
§ 144 [a] The objective ethical order is absolutely valid laws and institutions.
§ 145 That the ethical order is the system of specific determinations of the Idea constitutes its rationality.
§ 146 [b] This is an absolute authority and power infinitely more firmly established than the being of nature.
§ 147 On the other hand, they are not something alien to the subject.
§ 148 The individual is related to these laws and institutions as to the substance of his own being.
§ 149 In duty the individual acquires his substantive freedom.
§ 150 Virtue is the ethical order reflected in the individual character.
§ 151 Ethical life appears as custom, and the substance of mind thus exists now for the first time as mind.
§ 152 The individual knows that his particular ends are grounded in this same universal.
§ 153 In an ethical order individuals are actually in possession of their own inner universality.
§ 154 The right of individuals to their particular satisfaction is also contained in the ethical substantial order.
§ 155 In this identity of the universal will with the particular will, right and duty coalesce.
§ 156 The ethical substance is the actual mind of a family and a nation.
§ 157 Family, Civil Society & the State.
§ 158 The family, as the immediate substantiality of mind, is specifically characterised by love.
§ 159 The right which the individual enjoys takes on the form of right only when the family begins to dissolve.
§ 160 Marriage, Family Property & Children and the Dissolution of the Family.
§ 161 Marriage is the immediate type of ethical relationship.
§ 162 The objective source of Marriage lies in the free consent of the persons.
§ 163 The ethical aspect of marriage consists in the parties' consciousness of this unity as their substantive aim.
§ 164 The knot is tied and made ethical only after this ceremony.
§ 165 The difference in the physical characteristics of the two sexes has a rational basis.
§ 166 One sex is mind in its self-diremption; the other is mind in unity as knowledge and volition.
§ 167 Marriage is monogamy because it is personality which enters into this tie.
§ 168 Marriage ought not to be entered by two people identical in stock who are already acquainted.
§ 169 The family, as person, has its real external existence in property.
§ 170 A family requires, not merely property, but possessions specifically determined as permanent and secure.
§ 171 The family as a legal entity in relation to others must be represented by the husband as its head.
§ 172 A marriage brings into being a new family, independent of the clans from which it has been drawn.
§ 173 It is only in the children that the unity of the family exists externally.
§ 174 Children have the right to maintenance and education at the expense of the family's capital.
§ 175 Children are potentially free and their life embodies nothing save potential freedom.
§ 176 Marriage is but the ethical Idea in its immediacy.
§ 177 Once the children have come of age, they become recognised as persons.
§ 178 The dissolution of the family by the death of the father, has inheritance as its consequence.
§ 179 A man may at will squander his capital altogether.
§ 180 The members of the family grow up to be self-subsistent.
§ 181 Transition of the Family into Civil Society.
§ 182 The concrete person finds satisfaction by means of others, and at the same time by means of universality.
§ 183 The livelihood, happiness, and rights of one is interwoven with the livelihood, happiness, and rights of all.
§ 184 The system of the ethical order constitutes the Idea's abstract moment, its moment of reality.
§ 185 Particularity destroys itself and its substantive concept in this process of gratification.
§ 186 Particularity passes over into universality, and attains its truth not as freedom but as necessity.
§ 187 Private ends are mediated through the universal which thus appears as a means.
§ 188 The System of Needs, the Administration of Justice and the Public Authority & the Corporation.
§ 189 Need is satisfied in the product of others, and labour, the middle term between subjective & objective.
§ 190 The multiplication of needs and means of satisfying them.
§ 191 The means to particularised needs and the ways of satisfying these are divided and multiplied.
§ 192 Universality makes concrete, i.e. social, the isolated and abstract needs and their ways of satisfaction.
§ 193 The need for equality and for emulation becomes a fruitful source of the multiplication of needs.
§ 194 The strict natural necessity of need is obscured.
§ 195 Luxury.
§ 196 Labour confers value on means and gives them their utility.
§ 197 Theoretical education develops, and practical education is acquired through working.
§ 198 Division of labour makes men dependent on one another, labour more & more mechanical, until machines take their place.
§ 199 Subjective self-seeking turns into a contribution to the satisfaction of the needs of everyone else.
§ 200 Differences in wealth are conspicuous and their inevitable consequence is disparities of resources & ability.
§ 201 The entire complex is built up into particular systems of needs, means, and types of work, into class-divisions.
§ 202 [a] The substantial or immediate class, [b] the reflecting or formal class; & [c] the universal class.
§ 203 [a] The Agricultural Class.
§ 204 [b] The Business Class.
§ 205 [c] The Universal Class [the civil service].
§ 206 The class to which an individual is to belong depends on natural capacity, birth, and other circumstances.
§ 207 In this class system, the ethical frame of mind therefore is rectitude and esprit de corps.
§ 208 Right has attained its recognised actuality as the protection of property through the administration of justice.
§ 209 Education makes abstract right something universally recognised and having an objective validity.
§ 210 The objective actuality of the right consists in its being known & in its possessing the power of the actual.
§ 211 The principle of rightness becomes the law when thinking makes it known as what is right and valid.
§ 212 There may be a discrepancy between the content of the law and the principle of rightness.
§ 213 The endlessly growing complexity and subdivision of social ties and the different species of property and contract.
§ 214 In the interest of getting something done, there is a place within that limit for contingent and arbitrary decisions.
§ 215 If laws are to have a binding force, then they must be made universally known.
§ 216 Simple laws are required, but the nature of the material leads to the further determining of laws ad infinitum.
§ 217 My individual right now becomes embodied in the existent will and knowledge of everyone.
§ 218 The fact that society has become strong and sure of itself leads to a mitigation of its punishment.
§ 219 Law is something on its own account, and something universal, the business of a public authority.
§ 220 No act of revenge is justified.
§ 221 A member of civil society must acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court and accept its decision as final.
§ 222 In court the specific character which rightness acquires is that it must be demonstrable.
§ 223 The long course of formalities is a right of the parties at law.
§ 224 The publicity of judicial proceedings.
§ 225 Whether a trespass has been committed and if so by whom, and the restoration of right.
§ 226 The judge.
§ 227 Judgment on the facts lies in the last resort with subjective conviction and conscience.
§ 228 The confidence which the parties feel in the judge is based on the similarity between their social position.
§ 229 The actualisation of the unity of the implicit universal with the subjective particular.
§ 230 The safety of person and property and every person's livelihood and welfare must be actualised as a right.
§ 231 The universal authority by which security is ensured is an external organisation.
§ 232 Private actions may escape the agent's control and may injure others and wrong them.
§ 233 The actions of individuals may be wrongful, and this is the ultimate reason for police & penal justice.
§ 234 There is no inherent line of distinction between what is and what is not injurious.
§ 235 Activities and organisations of general utility call for the oversight of the public authority.
§ 236 The differing interests of producers and consumers may come into collision and requires control.
§ 237 While the possibility of sharing in the general wealth is open to individuals it is subject to contingencies.
§ 238 Civil society tears the individual from his family ties.
§ 239 Civil society has the right and duty of superintending and influencing education.
§ 240 Society has the duty of acting as trustee to those whose extravagance destroys their subsistence or their families'.
§ 241 The public authority takes the place of the family where the poor are concerned.
§ 242 Society struggles to make charity less necessary, by discovering the causes of penury and means of its relief.
§ 243 The amassing of wealth and the dependence and distress of the class tied to work.
§ 244 When the standard of living falls below a subsistence level, the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers.
§ 245 Wealth & Poverty.
§ 246 The inner dialectic of civil society drives it to push beyond its own limits and seek markets in other lands.
§ 247 Trade by sea is the most potent instrument of culture.
§ 248 This far-flung connecting link affords the means for the colonising activity.
§ 249 Ethical principles circle back and. appear in civil society and constitute the specific character of the Corporation.
§ 250 The business class is concentrated on the particular, and hence the Corporations are specially appropriate.
§ 251 A member of civil society is in virtue of his own particular skill a member of a Corporation,.
§ 252 The Corporation comes on to the scene like a second family.
§ 253 The Corporation member commands the respect due to one in his social position.
§ 254 The right of exercising one's skill is made rational in the Corporation..
§ 255 As the family was the first, so the Corporation is the second ethical root of the state.
§ 256 The Public Authority and the Corporation find their truth in the absolutely universal end and its absolute actuality.
§ 257 The state is the actuality of the ethical Idea.
§ 258 The state is absolutely rational once the particular has been raised to consciousness of its universality.
§ 259 Constitutional Law, International Law & World-History.
§ 260 The state is the actuality of concrete freedom.
§ 261 The strength of the state is lies in the unity of its universal end with the particular interest of individual.
§ 262 The function assigned to any individual is mediated by circumstances, caprice and personal choice of station in life.
§ 263 In particularity and individuality, mind glimmers in them as the power of reason in necessity.
§ 264 Mind is the nature of human beings en masse.
§ 265 Social institutions and the Corporations are the pillars of public freedom.
§ 266 Necessity appears to itself in the shape of freedom.
§ 267 This necessity in ideality is the strictly political state and its constitution.
§ 268 The political sentiment is simply a product of the institutions subsisting in the state.
§ 269 The patriotic sentiment acquires its specifically determined content from members of the organism of the state.
§ 270 (1) Conservation of particular interests (2) The Powers of the State & (3) its universality.
§ 271 The Internal Constitution & Foreign Relations of a State.
§ 272 The constitution is rational in so far as the state acts in accordance with the nature of the concept.
§ 273 The Legislature, the Executive & the Crown.
§ 274 The constitution of any given nation depends in general on the character and development of its self-consciousness.
§ 275 (1) The universality of the constitution and laws, counsel, and the moment of ultimate decision.
§ 276 [a] The particular powers and their activities are dissolved and yet retained.
§ 277 [b] The functions and powers of the state cannot be private property.
§ 278 [c] Sovereignty requires that the powers of the state have their roots in the unity of the state as their single self.
§ 279 (2) The truth of subjectivity is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality only in a person.
§ 280 (3) The monarch is raised to the dignity of monarchy in an immediate, natural, fashion through his birth.
§ 281 Something against which caprice is powerless, the 'majesty' of the monarch.
§ 282 The right to pardon criminals arises from the sovereignty of the monarch.
§ 283 The choice and dismissal of the supreme council rest with the monarch and his unrestricted caprice.
§ 284 The monarch is above all answerability for acts of government.
§ 285 Universality subsists subjectively in the conscience of the monarch and objectively in the constitution and laws.
§ 286 In the rational organism of the state, each member, by maintaining itself in its own position.
§ 287 The task of subsuming the particular under the universal lies in the executive power, the judiciary and the police.
§ 288 Corporations, &c., will be appointed by a mixture of popular election and ratification by higher authority.
§ 289 (a) the executive civil servants, and (b) the higher advisory officials.
§ 290 Division of labour in the business of the executive.
§ 291 The objective factor in the appointment of officials is knowledge and proof of ability.
§ 292 Since the qualification for the civil service is not genius, there is an indefinite plurality of eligible candidates.
§ 293 While the actions of the officials are their duty, their office is also a right exempt from contingency.
§ 294 Once an individual has been appointed by the sovereign's act, his tenure is conditional on his fulfilling its duties.
§ 295 Security against misuse of power by officials lies in their hierarchical accountability, & the authority of the Corporations.
§ 296 Officials gain the habit of adopting universal interests, points of view, and activities.
§ 297 The sovereign works on the middle class at the top, and Corporations work on it at the bottom.
§ 298 The legislature is itself a part of the constitution but the constitution develops with the further elaboration of laws.
§ 299 [a] provision by the state for their well-being and happiness, and [b] the exaction of services from them.
§ 300 The last moment in the legislature is the Estates.
§ 301 The Estates have the function of bringing public affairs into existence not only implicitly, but also actually.
§ 302 The Estates stand between the government on one hand and the nation broken up into particulars on the other.
§ 303 The class of civil servants must have the universal as the end of its essential activity.
§ 304 The Estates still retain the class distinctions already present in the lower spheres of civil life.
§ 305 Members of the agricultural class attain their position by birth, just as the monarch does.
§ 306 The agricultural class is particularly fitted for political position.
§ 307 The right of this section of the agricultural class is based on the natural principle of the family.
§ 308 The section of the Estates comprises the fluctuating element & can enter politics only through its deputies.
§ 309 Deputies are elected to deliberate on public affair on the strength of confidence felt in them.
§ 310 The deputy acquires and develops a managerial and political sense, tested by his experience.
§ 311 Since civil society is the electorate, the deputies should be conversant with its particular interests.
§ 312 Each class in the Estates contributes something peculiarly its own to the work of deliberation.
§ 313 The upper and lower houses.
§ 314 The distinctive purpose of the Estates is in their pooled political knowledge.
§ 315 Public opinion reaches thoughts that are true and attains insight into the concept of the state and its affairs.
§ 316 Public opinion is a standing self-contradiction, the essential is just as directly present as the inessential.
§ 317 Public opinion has common sense, but is infected by accidents of opinion, ignorance and perversity.
§ 318 To be independent of public opinion is the first formal condition of achieving anything great or rational.
§ 319 Free speech is assured by the innocuous character which it acquires as a result of the stability of government.
§ 320 Subjectivity is manifested in the substantial will of the state, the subjectivity of the crown.
§ 321 The state has individuality, and in the sovereign an actual, immediate individual.
§ 322 Individuality manifests itself in the state as a relation to other states.
§ 323 The relation of one state to another is that moment in the state which is most supremely its own.
§ 324 The individual's duty is to maintain the sovereignty of the state, at the risk and sacrifice of property and life.
§ 325 Sacrifice on behalf of the state is the substantial tie between the state and all its members.
§ 326 If the state as such is in jeopardy, all its citizens are in duty bound to answer the summons to its defence.
§ 327 The courageous man's motive may be some particular reason or other, and even the result not intended.
§ 328 The work of courage is to actualise this final end, the sovereignty of the state.
§ 329 It directly devolves on the monarch to command the armed forces and to conduct foreign affairs.
§ 330 International law springs from the relations between autonomous states.
§ 331 The nation state is mind in its substantive rationality and immediate actuality — the absolute power on earth.
§ 332 The subject-matter of these contracts between states is infinitely less varied than it is in civil society.
§ 333 The fundamental proposition of international law is that treaties ought to be kept.
§ 334 It follows that if states disagree, the matter can only be settled by war.
§ 335 Danger threatening from another state is a cause of strife.
§ 336 Welfare is the highest law governing the relation of one state to another.
§ 337 Government is a matter of particular wisdom, not of universal Providence.
§ 338 War should be not waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life.
§ 339 Relations between states depend principally upon the customs of nations.
§ 340 The mind of the world, exercises its right in the 'history of the world which is the world's court of judgment'.
§ 341 World history is a court of judgment.
§ 342 World history is not the verdict of mere might, but actualisation of the universal mind.
§ 343 The history of mind is its own act.
§ 344 States, nations, and individuals are all the time the unconscious tools of the world mind at work within them.
§ 345 Each stage of world-history is a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind.
§ 346 History is mind clothing itself with the form of events.
§ 347 The nation ascribed a moment of the Idea is entrusted with giving complete effect to it.
§ 348 World-historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects — living instruments of the world mind.
§ 349 The transition from a family, a horde, &c., to political conditions is the realisation of the Idea as that nation.
§ 350 The right of heroes to found states.
§ 351 Civilised nations are justified in regarding as barbarians those who lag behind them in institutions.
§ 352 Four world-historical realms.
§ 353 The substantial mind, ethical individuality as beauty, mind-forsaken & actual laws.
§ 354 (1) The Oriental, (2) Greek, (3) Roman, and (4) Germanic principle.
§ 355 (1) The Oriental realm.
§ 356 (2) The Greek realm.
§ 357 (3) The Roman realm.
§ 358 (4) The Germanic realm.
§ 359 The power of mind over the mundane heart, acts against the latter as a compulsive and frightful force.
§ 360 The realm of mind lowers itself to an earthly here and now and the mundane realm builds up into thought.
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