
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THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

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THE DEVELOPING ARMED LIBERATION STRUGGLE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Report adopted at Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee, South African Communist Party.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY declares its unreserved support for and identification with the freedom fighters of the alliance of the A.N.C./Z.A.P.U. in their armed struggle.

They have opened a new phase in the long and bitter struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa.

For the first time south of the Zambesi River there exists a trained and dedicated army of African liberation, armed with modern weapons and a high level of political consciousness. Already in their first clashes with the oppressors our fighting youth have shown splendid qualities of courage, military skill and leadership in guerrilla war. They have inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Their daring deeds and their correct approach have ensured the confidence and support of the African masses and enabled them to establish self-sustaining mobile bases deep within Zimbabwe.

The first few months of guerrilla struggle, though restricted in scale, have already done more to shake the Smith regime than two years of United Nations 'sanctions' which have been flaunted with impunity by the Republic of South Africa and other imperialist powers, including Britain herself.

The lesson is plain. African and world support and solidarity is a valuable and essential element in the campaign against apartheid. But South African fascism can only be defeated and overthrown on South African soil by the oppressed people of our country, united in mass revolutionary action and armed struggle.

The first clashes in Zimbabwe have a significance far beyond their

immediate military results. They have exposed the Smith regime as a dependency, militarily as well as economically, of the Republic of South Africa which uses Zimbabwe as a buffer region. They foreshadow the history of the period ahead.

That is why the news of this fighting has awakened a wave of hope and revolutionary enthusiasm among the oppressed peoples in the Republic; and fear and foreboding among the ranks of the oppressors. These first shots herald the opening of the South African revolution. Guerrilla clashes will spread in Zimbabwe, together with increasing participation of the masses in their own liberation. They will spread south of the Limpopo, stimulating an ever-rising tide of mass revolution for the overthrow of the intolerable system of gross national oppression and merciless exploitation, rooted in slavery, and characterised in our Programme as 'colonialism of a special type.'

The destruction of this system, hated by the overwhelming majority of South Africans and condemned by the entire world, can only be accomplished in the course of determined and united action by the people, employing every form of struggle including guerrilla warfare and other forms of armed conflict.

No doubt this will involve prolonged and bitter disturbances, bloodshed and sacrifices. The responsibility for this position rests entirely on the ruling classes of South Africa and their imperialist backers at home and abroad.

Neither the Communist Party nor any other section of the national liberation movement has ever adopted any 'theory' of violent struggle or guerrilla war as the only possible road to national or social liberation in South Africa or in other countries, irrespective of conditions and circumstances.

In fact, as is well known, for very many years and particularly—during the fifties, the movement and the Party sustained a prolonged campaign of mass activities, embracing hundreds of thousands of people, making use of the widest possible range of militant but non-violent activities.

The policies and campaigns of that period were fully justified and correct. It was precisely during the defiance campaign, the mass general strikes and the other actions of the fifties that there emerged the historically-evolved and still developing united front of national liberation centred in the African National Congress and embracing all the most progressive sections of the population. The militant actions and persecutions of this decade purged the movement of opportunists and careerists and gave it its revolutionary character. The leaders and rank-and-file learnt in the course of struggle that the Communists were loyal and devoted colleagues and anti-Communism

the weapon of the enemy. It was during this period that unity of action found expression in unity of purpose and gave the people of South Africa an inspiring common programme—the Freedom Charter.

These struggles convinced the masses of the people and all their honest leaders and spokesmen that there is no other road towards the achievement of their aspirations as reflected in the Charter than that of revolution. The Nationalist government, backed by the United Party and the monopoly capitalists have been exposed as diehard racialists, who rule by naked terror and have left no possible opening towards the negotiation of an ordered transition to democracy. They have outlawed the people's organisations, imprisoned and murdered our leaders, suppressed freedom of speech, assembly, press and organisation and circumvented the courts.

The establishment of Umkhonto we Sizwe in 1961 by leaders of the A.N.C. and the S.A.C.P. was a recognition that henceforth the liberation movement would have to seek its goals not only by traditional political methods but also by means of armed struggle, and by answering violence with violence.

The reaction of the fascist government was yet more unbridled terror and abandonment of legality. A number of serious reverses and set-backs were suffered by the liberation movement in the course of which a great many outstanding leaders of the people were captured by the enemy. A prolonged and difficult period of reassessment, regrouping and training, under extremely unfavourable conditions, was necessary.

The new round of struggles in Zimbabwe show that the movement is once again on the offensive, advancing to challenge the fortress of imperialism and racialism in Africa.

PERSPECTIVES OF THE REVOLUTION

What is the nature of the developing South African revolution, its moving forces and strategic perspectives? What is the relationship of class forces, and specifically what is the role of our Party of the working class within the united front of national liberation?

Our Party programme points out that:

It is this combination of the worst features both of imperialism and colonialism within a single national frontier which determines the special nature of the South African system.

Arising from this analysis, the programme states:

As its immediate and foremost task, the s.a.c.p. works for a united front of national liberation. It strives to unite all sections and classes of oppressed and democratic people for a national democratic revolution to destroy white domination. The main content of this Revolution will be the national liberation of the African people.

This emphasis in our Programme on the immediate task of the Party to fight as part of the 'united front of national liberation' for the 'national democratic revolution' establishes our guide-lines, shows us the main driving forces and perspectives of the struggle and links the South African Revolution firmly with the great process of liberation sweeping through Africa, Asia and Latin America. Our struggle has much in common, important similarities and analogies, with those in the rest of Africa and elsewhere.

But those analogies and similarities cannot be pressed too far without incurring serious mistakes. We do have to contend with colonialism in South Africa, but as our Programme reminds us, it is colonialism 'of a special type.'

The national liberation struggle in South Africa takes place not in a backward but in a developed capitalist country.

The enemy is not a metropolitan imperialist power thousands of miles away. It is essentially (its close ties with Western imperialism notwithstanding) the South African monopoly capitalist class, based within the country itself, in control of a powerful state apparatus and backed by a modern industrial economy.

Compared with the position of external imperialist countries waging colonial wars, the S.A. imperialists are able rapidly to mobilise their resources and to move along relatively short lines of communication, well served by railways, good roads, etc.

Again the task and aim of the national movements in 'normal' colonial countries was to get the imperialists out of the country. It was not and could not have been the defeat and conquest of the imperial power itself. This position enabled compromises to be reached at varying stages of the struggle; the more or less gradual and piecemeal transference of political power to the hands of indigenous leaders (whether really representative or not); the withdrawal of the imperialists to their home territories. But the liberation of our country cannot be accomplished without the actual defeat and destruction of South African imperialism itself; the overthrow of the present state.

The unprecedented nature of this task should be borne in mind by those African and other leaders who see fit to criticise our liberation movement because it allegedly lags behind other parts of our continent.

It is precisely factors such as these which account for the exceptionally protracted and bitter struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa, and which sometimes lead to pessimistic assessments of the duration and even the outcome of the revolution.

Such assessments overlook the fact that every one of the apparent strengths' of South African imperialism contains within itself incurable sources of weakness and instability which are bound increasingly to assert themselves as the revolutionary struggle mounts in intensity.

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Unlike the West European and U.S. imperialists, the S.A. monopoly bourgeoisie has no stable and secure base outside the country from which to operate and to which to retreat. Its economy—industry, agriculture, transport, etc.—depend overwhelmingly on the non-white labour force without whose co-operation it cannot for long wage war or even survive.

The 3½ million whites are not sufficient even to man the supervisory jobs in the economy, administration and repressive organs of state even in 'normal' times, still less during a period of protracted guerrilla warfare and civil strife. Hiemstra has said that he could mobilise 100,000 men 'in a very short time.' That may be so—the question is whether white South Africa could maintain such a large force for any length of time without subjecting the economy and structure to intolerable stresses and strains. It must be borne in mind that at all times the abnormally large police apparatus is 'stretched' in applying and enforcing the innumerable laws intended to oppress and terrorise the people. The restraining of guerrilla struggles is bound to evoke a rising tide of turbulence and revolutionary unrest in town and country, imposing still further burdens on the police-military apparatus.

It is not intended, by drawing attention to these important factors, to suggest that the tasks facing the South African revolutionaries are simple, or capable of quick and easy accomplishment. On the contrary, the task is complicated and difficult, and the struggle will be bitter and may well be protracted over a long period. But what is certain is that the S.A. ruling class is by no means 'invincible.' It can and will be defeated by determined and resourceful action, employing all means of struggle, political, industrial and military, resting on organisation and unity, and able to mount a sustained and rising tempo of revolutionary action.

The question of armed struggle in South Africa cannot be approached purely as a military question. Particularly in its opening stages, the armed conflict cannot take the form of a head-on confrontation with the military and police forces of the S.A. state. The task of the armed units is basically a political one. Their operations must be designed to help organise and rally the masses, and arouse them to action around their practical problems and grievances.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT AND THE PARTY

At the same time, the propaganda and organisational work of the liberation movement—the A.N.C. and its sister Congresses, industrial

organisations of the working class, and the Communist Party—must be redoubled and intensified.

Certainly we look to the opening and sustaining of guerrilla activities as a powerful stimulus to a revival of political organisation and struggle of the masses. But this will not come of its own accord. The duty the political movement owes to the heroic freedom-fighters in the field is to support and to make use of their inspiring struggles by opening new fronts against the oppressor in every possible field of action.

The development of the struggle may well discover new and original forms of organisation and method. But these forms must develop from and be built upon the people's alliance which has been built up over the years at the cost of so much work and sacrifice—the Congress movement. It must be built on the basis of the revolutionary programme which has emerged from the people—the Freedom Charter, which reflects the developed character of the country and the strength of the working class and is one of the most far-reaching programmes of any liberation movement, containing fundamental elements of social as well as national liberation.

Each of the Congress organisations that were built up in the past has a necessary and indispensable role to play; they have thousands of followers and loyal supporters; it is for the leaders of each organisation to mobilise and reorganise their supporters, and to foster and strengthen the unity of the movement that is our most precious heritage.

At the same time we Communists will spare no efforts to build the Party as a dynamic and unifying force in alliance with the liberation movement, and yet retaining its own independent working-class ideology, programme and essential role. To rebuild our Party in all the main centres of South Africa, to consolidate all its forces, including those in exile, to revitalise its organisation and draw the membership fully into activity and policy-making, must be the special concern of the leadership of the s.a.c.p.

S.A. experience has fully proved that a strong Communist Party is vital to the strength and vigour of the movement as a whole. The Central Committee is vigorously opposed to any conceptions of counterposing the Party or 'the Communists' to the rest of the movement. We have never considered that the way to play a 'vanguard' role is by 'proclaiming' it or by contesting for positions. In the fight against white supremacy we have no aims separate from those of our non-communist comrades and colleagues in the liberation and working class movements. Leadership consists in each and every one of our members, in whatever field he may be working, and at whatever level, setting an example of firmness and devotion in the common patriotic

struggle against the common enemy. We maintain that our ideology of Marxism-Leninism enables our members to be better Congressites, better trade unionists, better fighters for the freedom of our country. We maintain that the movement as a whole can only gain by our Party playing its full role as a partner in the liberation alliance. It is in this sense that we believe that the strengthening of our Party is vital towards the accomplishment of our immediate goal, the winning of the national liberation war, as the key and condition for the future advance to socialism.

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Editorial Notes:

Against South African Imperialism

KAUNDA STANDS FIRM

As GUERRILLA STRUGGLE by the A.N.C.-Z.A.P.U. alliance spreads steadily southwards, ever more extreme and desperate measures are being taken by the fascist government of the Republic of South Africa to expand its aggressive military forces and to extend its anti-African activities—espionage, intrigue, economic penetration and threats of aggression—northwards, to the independent states of Africa. It has grown into as great a threat to peace as Nazi Germany in Europe of the thirties. Some African leaders of the calibre of Banda and Jonathan are intimidated exponents of the fatal policy of appeasement. Others stand firm for African dignity and resistance. Notable among them is Dr. K. Kaunda, President of Zambia.

The South African Government is going about the task of strengthening its position in relation to the rest of Africa with calculated thoroughness.

On the one hand it is spending 253 million rand* this year on its army, and a further 72.1 million on the police force, so as to be able to meet all possible 'defence' requirements. In the financial year 1960-61, the year of the Sharpeville shooting, the allocation for defence was only R44 million, and the following year still only R72 million. Then came the 'big leap' in defence spending revealed by the following figures:

Year			R million
1962-63		 	 129
1963-64		 	 157
1964-65		 	 210
1965-66		 	 229
1966-67		 	 255
1967-68		 	 253

This makes a total of 1,349 million rand allocated to defence in the last eight years—a staggering amount by any standards. In the same eight years, the allocation for the police force doubled—from R36 million in 1960-61 to R72 million this year.

By contrast, the Government's statutory allocation for African school education remains at R13 million a year—the figure first fixed when the Bantu Education Act came into force in 1953.

To its huge arsenal of weapons, including the latest in planes, ships and mechanised vehicles, helicopters, etc., the Government is adding to its own capacity to manufacture the weapons of war. The budgetary amount for what is described as 'the manufacture of munitions' jumped from R368,000 in 1960-61 to R44,900,000 in 1966-67, and South Africa now has the capacity to produce its own aircraft, rockets, napalm, armoured cars, weapons and all variety of bombs and shells. Portion of the components of these are still imported from abroad, but the Government hopes within a few years to be self-sufficient in munitions manufacture, and so largely immune, militarily speaking, from the effects of any proposed international sanctions.

Nationalist attitudes towards the rest of Africa range from supreme contempt to a barely-concealed fear. Speaking at the Cape Town conference held last May to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the Nationalists' accession to power, the Minister of Transport, Mr. Schoeman, boasted that South Africa was the strongest state in Africa

^{* 1} Rand (R1)=11/8d. Sterling or \$1.40.

and 'could make mincemeat of any of them before lunch'. In his speech later, the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, amended this to 'before breakfast'.

In more thoughtful moments, however, Cabinet Ministers, and indeed the Government as a whole, realise that the future of White South Africa is not very bright if it is to be based in perpetuity on race hatred and national antagonism.

In a speech at another Nationalist Party festival held at Paarl last May, the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. D. C. H. Uys, defending the Government's policy of giving economic aid to neighbouring countries, as well as spending money on its own African citizens, stressed that this was done out of necessity, not because the Government had succumbed to liberalism. The development of the non-whites and the raising of their living standards would cost money, he admitted, 'but every penny and every cent is also to our own advantage and continued existence in South Africa. They must have our co-operation and goodwill and we must have theirs. If there is a threat from outside, then it is much better to have peace inside the country'.

For the same reason, said Uys, it was essential that South Africa should live in the greatest possible friendship with Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and Malawi.

'This is not to play boetie-boetie† with them, but to create good relations; to stop terrorists making friends of these people and so coming nearer to our own borders.'

A publication issued by the chief information officer of the Nationalist Party, Dr. C. Mulder, M.P. for Randfontein, defends against rightwing attacks the Government's decision to allow an African diplomat from Malawi to take up residence in South Africa.

South Africa was the gainer from the exchange, argues Dr. Mulder. She now had a diplomatic representative in Central Africa who could look after her interests, combat subversive trends, promote goodwill and enhance South Africa's prestige. Relations with Malawi helped to expand South African trade with Africa, and proved that normal political and economic relations with African states were possible despite political differences.

To further this policy, the Government budgeted 5 million rand this year for aid to neighbouring states. This is admittedly a fleabite when compared with the amount set aside for defence, but the full scale of the Government's intentions was revealed with the publication in May of a Bill to provide the Department of Foreign Affairs with a 'multi-million-rand loan fund' from which it can channel South African aid to 'developing countries'. The Economic Co-operation Promotion

[†] i.e., play at being brothers.

Loan Fund, as it is called in the Bill, will use funds appropriated by Parliament, loan repayments and interest payments, interests received from investments and 'money accruing from any other source'. The R5 million allocated in the Budget was merely a first instalment, said Dr. Diederichs. The purpose of the fund would be to grant direct assistance to 'well-disposed' developing countries—particularly in Africa.

The first loan from the Fund was announced at the beginning of May when the Foreign Minister, Dr. Muller, disclosed that the Government had decided to grant Malawi a loan of R8 million towards the first phase of the building of its new capital at Lilongwe. Dr. Banda was delighted, and praised South Africa's generosity, which he returned abundantly shortly thereafter when a South African consortium was awarded a R11 million contract in connection with the Lilongwe project.

Other 'aid' so far proffered by South Africa to neighbouring states—apart from technical services and advice—has not so far been impressive. Fifty thousand rand has been loaned to Lesotho for improvements to the police force—but since the main purpose of the loan is (a) to combat opposition to the Jonathan regime and (b) to stop cattle rustling from South Africa, this 'aid' can also hardly be called disinterested.

In fact, an outline of the projects abroad—such as the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique, the Oxbow dam in Lesotho and the harnessing of the waters of the Kunene river running between South West Africa and Angola—makes it clear that the main purpose of South African 'aid' is to promote the interests of the Republic rather than of independent Africa, to provide the groundwork for the extension of South African investment in neighbouring territories and in this way to lay the basis for the development, step by step, of South African imperialism.

NEO-COLONIALISM

In his pamphlet already referred to, Dr. Mulder traces the history of Afrikaner contact with independent African rulers and says the present policy is a natural consequence of the policy followed from the 'earliest times'. Dr. Mulder calls this a policy of mutual friendship and recognition of sovereignty and rights together with inter-state contact based on absolute equality. No doubt African rulers like Dingane and Moshoeshoe would have described it differently. Certainly their descendants, both in South Africa and abroad, will recognise that the new 'aid' policy is indeed a continuation of the policy followed by the

Afrikaner (and the Briton) from the earliest times—a policy of conquest, tailored for the present day in the form of neo-colonialism.

Direct private South African investment in the Southern African bloc is estimated at between £350 and £400 million, and in all Africa an unknown additional number of millions. But what we are now about to witness is massive investment by the South African State, which is able to harness and direct funds on a much bigger scale than private enterprise, and also to take risks where private enterprise might hesitate. The net effect of both private and State investment in Africa will be the steady increase of South Africa's strength and power and the subversion of the freedom and independence of all recipients of South African aid.

The South African Government would prefer her penetration of Africa to be peaceful, for the use of force might produce reactions from the rest of the world which would be beyond her control. But since the opening of the guerrilla offensive by the freedom fighters of z.a.p.u. and the a.n.c. last August, the Vorster Government has been under increasing pressure from the right wing, clamouring for tougher action at home and abroad. The sending of so-called police units to help the Smith security forces has done nothing to still this clamour. On the contrary, the fact that South Africa was able, in effect, to invade British territory with impunity has merely strengthened the belief that she could do likewise in Zambia and Tanzania without the risk of intervention by any outside power. The Israeli victory over the Arab armies in the June war of 1967 was welcomed with the keenest appreciation in South Africa, not merely because it showed South Africa that she, too, had the capacity for military victory, but because Israel was allowed to get away with the loot.

There are powerful forces behind Vorster advising him that he, also, can engage in military action in Africa without fear of retribution. The Administrator of Natal, Gerdener, has openly called for the deployment of South African forces in Mozambique. The Nationalist Government has so far contented itself with threats of unspecified action if Zambia and Tanzania continue to allow the training and stationing of freedom fighters on their territory.

ACTS OF AGGRESSION

These threats must be taken seriously. South Africa is inherently aggressive because of the nature of its internal contradictions which it is only able to control by force. The brutal oppression and suppression of the non-white peoples in South Africa is the source of the present armed confrontation in Rhodesia. South African forces are showing

in the most practical way that apartheid is a threat to the peace of Africa and the world.

The South African Minister of Defence, Mr. P. W. Botha, has repeatedly given expression to this latent aggression on the part of his Government. At a Nationalist meeting in Pretoria on April 1st, 1968, he said he believed, like the Prime Minister, that South Africa should carry its influence over its borders. The country was living in dangerous times in which stable leadership was necessary. 'South Africa must stand as a tower of strength in the free world and the nation had to live like a nation with a calling', he added.

Two days later Botha issued a warning that his Government regarded 'facilitating' terrorism as an act of provocation, and that any country that incited terrorism and guerrilla warfare must realise that 'provocation can lead to hard retaliation in the interests of self-respect and peace'. When he spoke of retaliation, Botha drew an analogy with Israel which was engaging in terror raids on Jordan. Similar calls for 'retaliatory' raids across the Zambian border have been voiced by Rhodesian Front leaders.

Most leaders of the independent African states appreciate to the full the danger which emanates from white dominated southern Africa, but few more so than Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, of Zambia and Tanzania respectively. Already these two states have been the victims, not only of verbal attacks by South African leaders, but also of various forms of unofficial aggression inspired and directed from the south.

Speaking at a national rally in Lusaka on April 30th, 1967, President Kaunda accused South Africa and Rhodesia of mounting a campaign of spying, propaganda and infiltration against Zambia in an attempt to destroy the country. Outside forces, which included the 'unholy alliance of Smith, Vorster and Salazar', had planted stooges everywhere in the country, not only in the army and the police, but even in the civil service, the university, the schools, commerce and industry. 'This chain of activity is very dangerous', he said.

President Kaunda announced that he had purged the army and the police force in order to ensure their loyalty to the state, but since then Zambia has been subjected to a spate of attacks, directed from inside and outside the country, which leave little room for doubt that subversive agencies are still powerfully entrenched and active.

From outside the country Zambia has been attacked by Portuguese forces from Angola and Mozambique, and by South African and Rhodesian troops stationed south of the Zambesi. Zambian villages have been bombed by Portuguese aircraft. Early in June 1968 the railway bridge across the Luangwa river, over which 92 per cent of

Zambia's fuel oil supplies are imported via Mozambique, was destroyed in an Israeli-type sabotage raid. Reporting from Lusaka on June 10th, the Guardian correspondent Patrick Keatley commented:

The significant detail behind the sabotage plan . . . is that a night watchman on the bridge died from a single bayonet thrust. Military experts at diplomatic missions here consider this a vital clue politically. . . . The bayoneting was silent and efficient—apparently the handiwork of trained military personnel as was the planting of the explosives a few minutes later.

Circumstantial evidence, therefore, points either to Rhodesian Army operation or a Portuguese one or both—with a further possibility that South Africans were involved since they are now serving on attachment with the security forces of both Rhodesia and Mozambique.

Calls for lightning raids on guerrilla bases in Zambia have openly been made in South Africa and attacks are likely to take place as the guerrilla war mounts in intensity. South African spy planes fly regularly over Zambian and Tanzanian territory.

Simultaneously, pressures have been applied to the Zambian regime from inside the country. Tribal clashes, inter-party violence, class and racial antagonisms have been fanned into what President Kaunda, speaking in August 1967, described as a 'raging bushfire against the UNIP central committee'. In an address to his party's national council, he said he had never known in Zambia 'such a spate of hate, based entirely on tribe, province, race, colour and religion'. A number of whites involved in subversion, including Rhodesians, were detained, but the situation became so bad early in 1968 that at one stage Kaunda, in great distress, contemplated resigning, and it was only with great difficulty that he was persuaded to carry on with his task.

Similar stresses have racked Tanzania. The former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oscar Kambona, fled the country in August 1967 after the uncovering of a plot to overthrow President Nyerere. In May 1968 the Tanzanian Government disclosed what was described as a 'king-size' plot by a group of people in the heart of the country's major cotton-growing region of Mwanza to ruin the national economy by burning down cotton ginneries, encouraging workers to go slow and strike, and by adulterating cotton to harm its reputation on world markets.

In both Tanzania and Zambia, the economic reforms announced by the governments, including nationalisation of some foreign firms, have led to further attempts by both the imperialists and sections of the aspirant bourgeoisie inside the country to topple the regime.

Foreign money and influence have also done a great deal to promote splits and disaffection in the ranks of the various national liberation movements operating in Tanzania and Zambia, the most recent example of which was the murderous attack launched by splitters on the FRELIMO offices in Dar es Salaam in May 1968. FRELIMO Vice-President Simango openly accused Portugal of creating an underground conspiracy to disrupt the organisation and murder the leadership.

It should not be forgotten, either, that South African Foreign Minister Dr. Muller has a fund at his disposal, voted annually by Parliament for 'special services', for which he never has to account. Officially the fund is said to be intended to promote 'good relations' with neighbouring African states. The amount voted in 1968 was R500,000, the same as the previous year.

The South African Parliament also voted in 1968 the sum of R1,012,000 for police 'secret services', R830,000 for 'military intelligence' and a further sum of R500 for secret services to the Bantu Administration Department. These funds are never accounted for, but it is fair surmise that a proportion at least is voted for the promotion of subversion in independent Africa.

Nor are Zambia and Tanzania the only two African countries affected by South African intrigue. South African intelligence operates in every African capital. When it was reported in January 1968 that South African planes were ferrying arms and supplies to the Biafran army, the Nationalist newspaper *Die Transvaler* was explaining that so long as there was division in Black Africa, there would be a chance for the white man to survive. It is in the long-term interest of the South African racists that independent Africa should remain poor and divided, and the Vorster Government's so-called 'outward' policy is designed to promote this.

KAUNDA'S OUTSPOKEN GABERONES SPEECH

Nobody is more aware of the predicament and danger facing his country than Zambia's President Kaunda. Unlike some of his colleagues, he has also shown himself a man of courage who refuses to be intimidated. On his state visit to Botswana in June 1968 he went one step further and attempted to rescue those of his colleagues who were showing signs of capitulating to the South African offensive.

In reply to a speech by President Seretse Khama defending Bots-wana's policy of 'peaceful co-existence' with South Africa, President Kaunda warned a mass meeting of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party in Gaberones stadium that no country in southern or central Africa would know peace and stability while Black Africans were discriminated against in the white-ruled states. 'Without justice there cannot be peace', he said. 'We cannot stand aloof'.

Botswana and Zambia occupied vital strategic positions in Southern Africa, he said. Africa looked to Botswana to set an example which South Africa and Rhodesia would be compelled to follow.

The instability of South Africa, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, Mozambique and Angola was bound to affect Botswana and Zambia, he said.

In all honesty, is it fair, is it Christian, is it civilised that three million whites in South Africa should subject fifteen million blacks to their own will? Is it fair that three million should continue to determine what fifteen million want, where they will live and even how they will live?

As long as the fifteen million remain without a voice, no amount of coercion, no amount of physical force will suppress the unquenchable thirst for freedom. The day will come when the people of South Africa will no longer be able to suppress the demand for freedom which has been realised in Botswana and Zambia.

There is no stability in South Africa. If the guns and the police dogs were removed, the majority would express their wishes. The people of South Africa will not need the agitation of Botswana or Zambia or the rest of Africa. They will do it on their own.

President Kaunda warned the whites of Rhodesia and South Africa that if they were interested in their countries and their future prosperity, they would be well advised to reject discrimination or they would lose everything.

In four days of incessant speech-making, followed by ever-growing and enthusiastic crowds, President Kaunda reiterated his call to the people of Botswana to look north, not south. Even South African press reporters admitted that the people had never heard language like this before and the country would never be the same again.

In South Africa, Foreign Minister Muller could only reply with further threats. President Kaunda was striking a false note in Africa and should stop trying to imitate President Nkrumah, he said in the House of Assembly. South Africa had warned its neighbours of the dangers of aiding terrorists and while its defence force was intended for defence only, it could retaliate vigorously if necessary.

In his address to the people of Botswana, President Kaunda promised to stand by them if they should follow the course he indicated to them. 'We are with you all the way. We will give you all the support we can'. If Botswana wanted to say it depended on South Africa as a market for its beef, he would reply that Zambia was ready to take all the beef Botswana could send her. Zambia would make a gift of grain to relieve the effects of drought. Thirty places would be made available

immediately at institutions of higher learning in Zambia so that eligible Botswana candidates would not need to subject themselves to Bantu education in South Africa.

President Kaunda's insight and action in relation to Botswana, and indeed the whole problem of Southern Africa, can only be praised. South Africa's grip on her neighbours must be prised loose. Independent Africa must stand firm to halt South African penetration and aggression.

But it is also time for Africa and the world to realise that President Kaunda's regime in Zambia, and that of President Nyerere behind him, are in deadly danger. All democratic-minded people throughout the world must rally to the defence of the independent African states which are opposing South African aggression. They are front-line fighters for peace and freedom in Africa, and must themselves receive the same order of support as they so generously offer to others.

FRANCE ON THE BRINK

For many years, almost since the second world war, the revolutionary upheavals of the colonial lands have been the centre of the attention of socialists and revolutionaries. Elsewhere, so it seemed, the imperialist countries of Europe and America rode serene, unmoving, almost immovable. While political theory of colonialism and liberation advanced with giant strides, new social myths grew up to replace political theory in the advanced capitalist world. Capitalism 'in the west,' it was said—and widely believed—had solved its contradictions; it was now free for ever of crisis, miraculously stabilised; class conflict and class struggle had been exorcised by 'the managerial revolution' and 'people's capitalism.' Marxism, it was said—and widely believed—was dead, irrelevant to our times, and fit only for interment alongside its founder in Highgate cemetery.

1968 has seen the smashing of these new myths—first in the desperate and still unresolved financial-economic crisis; and now in the dramatic upheavals of France. Suddenly, in the June events in France, the myth of stability and security was torn aside with explosive force, to reveal the reality which lies beneath the surface in the citadels of empire. To the Marxists, never content with surface appearances but seeking always the reality of conflict and contradiction beneath, the true face of French society in 1968 came as no surprise. But to others, the sudden revelations of the real nature of the 'Gaullist miracle' proved so confusing that they lost their bearings. Wild theories and wild proposals flew thick and fast, given wings by student demonstrations and barricades around the Sorbonne, and later accelerated by the vast general strike.

Among the wilder, were the many ultra-left groups—anarchists, Maoists, syndicalists and other factions, who swung from one skindeep view of the solidity and strength of the bourgeois state to another, equally shallow, view of its weakness. In the first barricades they saw a popular uprising, and in the first strikes proclaimed that the revolution had come. In so doing, they ran sharply into conflict with the older, more experienced organisations of the left—the Communist Party and the C.G.T. who saw the struggle as it really was—as a tremendous and inspiring beginning, in which at least the masses of France were coming into the reckoning against de Gaulle and the bourgeois state; but as a beginning which needs be nurtured, built upon and developed, steadily without hysteria, lest it erupt explosively before it has matured; and so destroy itself.

It is understandable that in the moment of crisis, with a vast struggle developing from day to day, these different views were not debated with the impassioned calm of a college debating union, but were dealt with summarily, quickly, and perhaps in language less than parliamentary. The ultra-left, severly criticised by the Communists, have resorted to vilification and a campaign of distortion of the Communist Party's role which requires the record on the June events to be put straight. It is not our intention—even were we able, from a distance, to do so—to attempt this in these notes.

For the moment, it is enough to say that while the anti-Communist tantrums of the ultra-left can be understood, it is more difficult to accept their holier-than-thou revolutionary criticism of the French Communist Party when they are echoed by the extreme right, such as the London *Times* and the B.B.C. These died-in-the-wool reactionary mouthpieces of the imperialist establishment solemnly concur with the ultra-left. Revolution erupted in Paris! But it was 'betrayed' by the French Communists who proved to be a conservative, establisment-upholding Marxist party of the working class! Thus the non-Marxist and the anti-Marxist wiseacres, stand on their heads, to try and turn France into a picture which fit their obsessive hatred of Communism.

This left revolutionary sloganising, which looked so convincing to many unthinking socialists in the heat of the passions of June, looks somewhat threadbare in the light of later events. De Gaulle, who seemed momentarily to be losing his grip on France, has seated himself even more certainly in the saddle with the aid of all the forces of French reaction, from the fascist o.a.s. colonels released from their Algerian war-criminal prisons, to the French petty bourgeoisie terrified by the prospects of 'disorder' and working-class power presaged by the June strikes. The election, with procedures carefully weighted in their own favour by the Gaullists, has returned a vast Gaullist majority, while the

left parties lost votes as the consequence of their failure to present a single, unified policy to the public as the alternative to Gaullism.

Thus once again, after the election, France settles into a semblance of serenity and stability. Once again the wiseacres proclaim the rout of the Communists, the triumph of capitalism and of the Gaullist miracle. But this time, there is no room for any illusions. The deep contradictions of French society have been laid bare, and can not again be papered over. None of those contradictions has been resolved by the election; none of them will be resolved while the bourgeoisie rule France. All the grinding poverty and toil, all the soaring cost of living and the declining standards of education, all the authoritarianism and dictatorship remain as running sores.

But this time the battle lines are sharply drawn. There is no room now for facile belief in the 'new capitalism,' in the 'managed society,' 'the classless capitalism.' The contending armies stand revealed, toe to toe, as Marxism discerned them long ago, locked in struggle which cannot be eliminated until capitalism is eliminated itself. Nor are we back to the status-quo of before the June days. For the French working class has felt for itself the earth-shaking power which lies in its unity in struggle; it has seen for itself how the seemingly formidable casing of the Gaullist dictatorship cracks and weakens in the face of united struggle. These things will not be lost on the working class, nor on the vast masses of the French peasantry, intelligentsia, professional people and petty bourgeoisie, for whose allegiance both the main contending camps must bid. We are not at the end of the French upheavals, but at their beginning.

There is much food for thought, for Communists and others, from the French events when all its events are fully explained, and all its meanings and lessons there to be pondered over and learnt. They go to the root of many of the problems of our time, including the problems of tactics of the Communist parties themselves, problems of broad people's unity, of the role and character of the students movements, and many others. Amongst those problems is one which has been left largely unstudied by Marxist thinkers and leaders. Because their eyes have been focused correctly on the colonial storm centres they have not dealt as deeply with the military, political problems which arose sharply in France and will surely arise again. It is the problem of combating a vast, bureaucratic state machine backed by a standing army of reactionary officers and men, armed with the latest weapons of mass destruction and prepared to use them against their own compatriots as they used them yesterday against their colonial subjects. This problem merits the same detailed study and attention which Marxists have given already to problems of military struggle and warfare in

colonial countries, under conditions of national struggle. In the continuing struggle facing the workers of France, it will doubtless now get it.

PROFESSOR Z. K. MATTHEWS

Professor Zachariah Keodirelang Matthews died in Washington, U.S.A., on May 12th, 1968, at the age of sixty-seven. He was the first representative of the Republic of Botswana at the United Nations, and Ambassador to the U.S.A.

Although his last years were spent in exile, first in Geneva as representative of the World Council of Churches, and later in the Botswana Diplomatic Service, the late Professor Matthews ('Z.K.', as he was affectionately known in Congress circles) spent his life as a distinguished academic, educator and leader of the liberation struggle, in his native South Africa—he was born in Kimberley in 1901.

Many pens have paid tribute to his distinguished academic career, and only those who know the innumerable difficulties and handicaps which beset the Africans of our country in their search for education can really appreciate what an enormous achievement it truly was for 'Z.K.' to reach the level of Acting Principal of Fort Hare University.

A devout Christian, and wont to express himself with the habitual measured and well-considered phrases of the academic world, 'Z.K.' was no 'firebrand', and was often presented as an example of the more 'moderate' and 'reasonable' of the senior generation of leaders of the African National Congress, of which he was a National Executive member since 1943 and Cape Provincial President in 1949.

Yet, and it is fitting that we should say it in these columns, the late Professor Matthews—who suffered, despite his academic stature, the humiliations and indignities heaped on a black man in our country, and could not enjoy even the vote and right to stand for Parliament extended automatically to an illiterate white hobo—never wavered from his patriotic stand. Indeed, he stood firm when many one-time 'firebrands' and demagogues had prudently vanished from the Congress ranks.

When—together with Chief Lutuli and over 150 other Congressites, including his own son Joe—'Z.K.' was arrested in the marathon treason trial, the utmost pressure was put on him and other well-known non-Communists, to disassociate themselves from 'Communism' which formed the gist of the original charges. 'Z.K.' stood unswervingly with his fellow-accused; his own evidence and contribution played a major part in the great courtroom victory that followed.

And when the Nationalist Government began to take over Fort Hare and introduce its pernicious policy of 'Bantu Education', he resigned his position as Vice-Principal, at no small sacrifice not only financially but also at the cost of abandoning his academic career and the pinnacle he had reached, which meant so much both to himself and his people.

As under the pressure of historic events Congress became more and more revolutionary, 'Z.K.', like our late beloved Chief Lutuli grew with Congress, worked with the Youth League militants and Communist Party stalwarts, and helped to maintain that broad unity of patriotic South Africans of all democratic political persuasions which our Congress Alliance has always been. The loss of two such outstanding senior leaders within a single year is a grievous one which our freedom movement can ill afford. It can only be made good by harder and better work by all of us who are left to carry on the struggle.

To his widow, formerly Miss Freda Bokwe, and all the members of his family; to our brothers of the African National Congress; to the Government and people of Botswana, we extend our respectful condolences. We lower our banner in remembrance of a great son of South Africa.

Hamba kahle, Z.K.

KARL MARX: THE MAN WHO CHANGED THE WORLD

Terence Africanus

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point however is to change it.

KARL MARX—Theses on Feuerbach

One Hundred and fifty years after his birth (on May 5th, 1818) the stature of Karl Marx is established more firmly than ever as the most influential personality of modern times. The ideas which he evolved together with his lifelong friend and co-worker Frederick Engels have made a profound impact on every field of human thought. Every modern philosopher, scientist, sociologist, historian or politician has directly or indirectly been influenced by Marxism; nor can any one of them who wishes to be taken seriously fail to reckon with and take his attitude towards Marxism and its upholders, the Communists.

Marx and Engels, though they unfailingly acknowledged their debt to the philosophers, economists, historians and others to whose works the evolution of their own ideas owed so much, were outstandingly original and creative thinkers. In every field which they explored they brought about a revolution in ideas.

Their philosophical outlook of dialectical materialism developed and synthesised the most profound concepts of preceding thinkers into a rational and scientific explanation of the dynamics of growth, both in nature and human society. Prior to Marx, the materialists had assumed a static and mechanical universe. The dialectical idealists, ranging from

the Ancient Greeks to the great classical German school headed by Hegel, had applied dialectics (the concept of development through inner contradiction) solely in the field of ideas. But as Marx showed, ideas themselves could do no more than reflect the given social environment of the men whose brains conceived them. His materialist dialectic disclosed the basic laws of development of nature and the universe. Applying the same process to the development of human society (historical materialism) Marx provided both a key to the understanding of history and a means of shaping it. In his hands, philosophy itself, from being a process of detached enquiry and speculation, was changed into one of active participation in the transformation of society.

Marx showed that human history was not an accidental series of unrelated events, but a rational process of development from lower to higher stages of social organisation. At each stage the governing factors of social evolution are economic. To produce man's needs—food, clothing, shelter and others—is the primary function of society. How man produces his needs (the techniques of production); what is the relationship of different social classes to the means of production (land, cattle, tools, machinery etc.)—these are the basic elements of any society, determining its laws, institutions, customs and ideas.

In society as in nature, progress and development come about through internal contradiction, conflict and struggle—in history the struggle of contending classes. At each stage of social development an irreconcilable conflict arises between the masses of exploited people (whether slaves, feudal serfs or propertyless wage workers) and the minority (whether slaveowners, feudal lords or modern capitalists) who, through their ownership of the means of production, are able to oppress them and rob them of most of the fruits of their labour. This conflict can only be resolved through a social revolution advancing society to a higher level.

Such has been the history of human society ever since the early period of primitive communism, after which class-divided societies arose. But, Marx pointed out, with the appearance of modern bourgeois (capitalist) society, the time of the ultimate class struggle had arrived. Together with the tremendous growth in productive forces, capitalism created two new, mainly urban classes: the proletariat (working class) and the bourgeoisie (capitalists) who confronted one another contending for power. The aim of the working class could only be the abolition of private ownership of the means of production and the establishment of a classless, socialist (eventually communist) society.

The 'utopian' socialists had subjected capitalism to merciless criticism, and proposed socialist solutions. But their solutions were

impractical because they were not linked with the conquest of political (i.e., of state) power by the most advanced social class—the working class. Writing on this aspect in 1913, Lenin pointed out:

The chief thing in the doctrine of Marx is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of socialist society.

The Historical Destiny of the Doctrine of Karl Marx

In his great work Capital and other economic writings, Marx subjected the process of capitalist production to an exhaustive analysis. He demonstrated how the owners of capital were able to exploit the workers by paying them as wages only a part of the value they produced. The rest—'surplus value' is pocketed by the capitalists. Capitalist society itself was doomed. Inherently unstable it was moving into a permanent state of crisis. The only way out was revolution. The proletariat must organise as a class to take over state power, 'expropriate the expropriators', and build a classless, socialist society. Marx and Engels transformed socialism 'from utopia to science'.

Marx was not the first thinker to draw attention to the importance of class struggles in history. What was new in his approach, as he himself pointed out was:

- That the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical phases in the development of production;
- 2. That the class struggle necessarily leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat;
- That this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of classes and to a classless society.*

MAN OF ACTION

For Karl Marx, as we have seen, the point was not merely to 'interpret' but to 'change' the world. For him, theory had to be expressed in action. He lived the life of a practical revolutionary. Driven by reaction from his native Germany, he spent most of his life in exile (first in France and Belgium, then in Britain) and in poverty.

He and Engels founded the Communist League, whose programme— The Manifesto of the Communist Party—they wrote and published in 1848. During the revolutionary-democratic upsurge in Germany he edited the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, which under his guidance was not only a fighting people's newspaper but also an organising centre of revolutionary struggle. Later he became the outstanding leader of the International Workingmen's Association (the First International) which firmly established Marxism as the ideology of the organised working class throughout the world.

^{*} Karl Marx: Selected Works, Vol. II, p. 452.

Thus Marx's own life was a vivid exemplification of his belief that theory cannot be separated from practice. The enormous labours which he poured into the research, study and writing for his voluminous literary output (in an age before the advent of the dictaphone and shorthand typist) was paralleled by his tireless organisational work—in the early Communist League, in the First International and later in the exacting role of advisor and assistant to revolutionary parties in many countries.

'Workers of the world, unite!' was the stirring slogan with which he and Engels concluded the famous Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848). The true measure of the success of his endeavours is to be found, in the first place, in the extraordinary advance of the movement which he founded—the modern Communist movement whose Parties are established in every continent, in almost every country where the advance of industrialisation has brought into being a substantial working class. This movement is the legitimate successor to the First International founded in 1864.

I do not, in this article, propose to trace the historical development of the international Communist movement from those days to the present day† but rather to deal with some of the notable features of the movement today.

The first, and I should say the basic, feature is the fantastic overall progress of that movement from its recent (in a historical sense) beginnings.

Revolutionaries frequently tend to make over-optimistic predictions concerning the immediate future. Marx and Engels, born revolutionaries, frequently, especially in their personal correspondence, made such optimistic forecasts which didn't materialise. Citing numerous examples of such tendencies, Lenin wrote:

Yes, Marx and Engels made many and frequent mistakes in determining the proximity of revolution, in their hopes in the victory of revolution... But such errors—the errors of the giants of revolutionary thought, who sought to raise and did raise, the proletariat of the whole world above the level of petty, commonplace and trivial tasks—are a thousand times more noble and magnificent and historically more valuable and true than the trite wisdom of official liberalism . . .‡ [Italics in original.]

Never for a single instant did such disappointments of their immediate hopes and expectations cause Marx or Engels to waver from their basic confidence that the working class would accomplish its historic

[†] An outine of this theme is contained in 'The First International—100 Years After' (The African Communist, No. 18, 1964).

[‡] V. I. Lenin: Preface to the Russian translation of a collection of Marxist letters ('The Sorge Correspondence.') 1907.

mission—to end capitalism and exploitation and build a classless socialist society. (The same may be said of Lenin, who wrote the above passage ten years before the October revolution.) And life has amply vindicated Lenin's profound comment that such 'mistakes' are infinitely 'historically more valuable and true' than the 'trite wisdom' of the philistines who are for ever warning the masses (and consoling the oppressors) that 'revolution is not around the corner'.

When one considers the broad sweep of human history—primitive communalism and then slavery survived for countless thousands of years, feudalism for centuries—the modern socialist movement of the working people against capitalism has made such sweeping and tempestuous advances as to vindicate the most 'optimistic' of revolutionaries.

The first great break-through came in the closing years of the first world-wide war in which the working class, headed by Lenin and his Bolshevik comrades, ardent Marxists, overthrew the Tsarist empire, and embarked on the colossal task of building the new socialist society in this sprawling underdeveloped, largely peasant country, occupying a sixth of the earth's land surface.

The Bolshevik revolution, coming at a time when the workers, especially of Europe, had undergone the frightful and needless killings, hardships and destruction wrought in the course of the imperialists' war for the redivision of the world, evoked a mighty, enthusiastic and world-wide response. Abandoning the 'Social Democratic' Parties, steeped in opportunism, whose right-wing leaders had abandoned socialism and coalesced with imperialism, the revolutionary workers began to build new-style Communist Parties on the Leninist model, and to set up workers' councils ('Soviets') in many countries, aiming at power.

In the colonial countries enslaved by imperialism, a wave of national liberation movements arose, tending to merge with the workers' movement for socialism in the West. To the most optimistic (and most revolutionary) it seemed clear that the death-knell of capitalism had sounded. 'Before very long we shall see the victory of communism the whole world over, we shall see the founding of a World Federative Republic of Soviets,' Lenin concluded a speech in March 1919. And similar speeches were made by all the leaders of the Communist International.

Of course, Lenin himself—whose own brilliant theoretical writings, based on profound knowledge and understanding of Marxism, made an immeasurable contribution to the development and popularisation of scientific socialism—may be accused of the same sort of 'mistake' of overestimating the immediate prospects of world revolution. Yet exactly the same comments may be made about this as he had himself made about Marx and Engels. His estimates were 'a thousand times more

noble and magnificent and historically true' than those of the philistines who imagined that the temporary recession of the revolutionary tide after the middle twenties spelt a return to bourgeois 'normality'.

For who would deny that the aftermath of the second world war saw a new and splendid vindication and advance of Marx's vision, with a third of the world's population advancing to a better life under the banner of Marx and Lenin? Who would deny that millions of people in the remaining areas of the capitalist world—a world whose principal centres, the United States, France, Britain, West Germany are convulsed in crisis—see in the teachings of Karl Marx the only way to peace and progress and a livable future for the human race?

It is within this overall perspective, then, one of tempestuous—if inevitably rough and jagged—advance, that we must turn to review some of the present features of the international communist, workers' and national liberation movements.

THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES

By the middle of 1968, in addition to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (population 232 million) there are 13 countries in varying stages of the building of socialism, and ruled by the working class under the leadership of parties which openly proclaim their adherence to the principles of Marxism-Leninism. They are:

In Europe—The Polish People's Republic (population 32 million); the German Democratic Republic (17 million); the Hungarian People's Republic (10 million); the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (14 million); the Bulgarian People's Republic (8 million); the Yugoslav Federated People's Republic (20 million); the Albanian People's Republic (1,800,000); the Romanian People's Republic (19½ million).

In Asia—The People's Republic of China (700 million); the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (16 million); the Korean People's Republic (29 million); the People's Republic of Mongolia (1 million).

In America—The Republic of Cuba ($7\frac{1}{2}$ million).

Much is made of differences on policy and tactics as between the Communist and Workers' Parties which govern these fourteen countries, comprising the 'socialist third of the world'. Certainly there are differences, and I shall say something about them below. But before doing so it should be emphasised that each of these countries, in its own way, is striving towards the common goal of a classless, communist society. In these countries of workers' rule the exploitation of man by man has been outlawed, just as slavery was outlawed in the nineteenth century. The basic means of production have been transferred from private to public ownership. Equality of opportunity exists for all. There is no unemployment and there are no extremes of poverty

and wealth such as may be seen in every capitalist country. All the socialist countries are threatened by imperialism, and faced with blockades, cold-war propaganda and indirect and—especially in the case of Vietnam—direct aggression.

Over the long run these permanent and binding ties are bound to prevail; there is a fundamental trend towards unity among the socialist states (just as there is an equally fundamental and incurable trend towards disunity among the rival imperialist states) based not only on their common ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of the international fraternity of the working class, but also upon their common interests, economic, political and strategic. Historically speaking this community of outlook and interests transcends whatever temporary differences of policy or conflicts of interest that may arise from time to time.

This is of course not to deny that such temporary differences can and do arise; it is well known that they have reached a particularly acute stage in recent years, one which causes grave concern to all Communists everywhere.

At the end of 1960 at the world conference of Communist and Workers' Parties in Moscow all the Parties of the socialist countries were present, with the exception of Yugoslavia. A similar conference is to be held at the end of this year, but when a consultative meeting to arrange this conference was called in Budapest in February a number of Parties in the socialist countries were unwilling or unable, for various reasons, to send representatives. Two of these Parties, those of China and Albania, went so far as to denounce the meeting itself and all those participating in it. Another, that of Romania, withdrew its delegation on a complaint that its policy had been attacked.

IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

There are about 80 Communist and Workers' Parties in the capitalist countries, comprising practically every country in Europe, Asia and North and South America and a number of African countries as well. (I shall deal separately with the theme of Marxism in Africa below.) Some of these are great mass Parties with deep roots in the trade unions and in the lives of the people, and occupying strong positions in local government. Communist town and city councils and Communist mayors are commonplace in France and Italy; in a number of the State ('provincial') governments of India Communists hold Cabinet posts.

Many of the Parties, however, are illegal and hunted organisations, whose members are subjected to vicious persecution. The mass Communist Party of Indonesia suffered the most staggering and cruel losses in the right-wing imperialist-backed military takeover of 1965,

when a fanatical anti-Communist pogrom was unleashed and hundreds of thousands of Communists were massacred in cold blood. In several European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece and West Germany the Marxist-Leninist Parties have long been forced by illegalisation to work underground; the same applies in many Latin-American and Asian countries, and of course to our own South African Communist Party.

All these Parties, whether legal or illegal, though their tasks differ considerably according to the national and historical circumstances in which they operate, have clearly overriding common aims and interests in repelling the world-wide drive of imperialism towards war and counter-revolution, its aims of destroying national freedom and independence and the labour and Communist movement everywhere.

And again one must stress that this built-in drive towards unity born not only out of the principles but also the needs of the revolutionary working class movement, must eventually override and supersede whatever differences arise within the working class movement, inside each Communist Party, and between the Communist and Workers' Parties of various countries.

That such differences should arise is inevitable. Unity does not mean uniformity. It would be absurd and unscientific to imagine that a vast world-wide movement, counting its membership in tens of millions, could achieve identity of views at all times on all the innumerable problems of the application of theory to events, of strategy and tactics, which face each Party every day in the course of its work. Marxism-Leninism is not a closed book; a religious dogma whose precepts have been laid down for all time in a series of sacred texts whose devotees have merely to learn them by rote to qualify as 'leaders'. (Nor for that matter does Communist discipline mean that each Party member should become a sort of robot who abdicates his powers of independent analysis and reasoning to the dictates of some superauthority, claiming papal infallibility, who does his thinking for him.)

Communism is a living and ever-developing science. And like all sciences it stands in need of constant renovation and enrichment, as, upon the firm and proven theoretical foundation built by the genius of Marx, Engels and Lenin, it expands to comprehend the diversity and complexity of problems posed by a rapidly changing world. For the accomplishment of this essential task of renovation and development there is no other means than free and constant debate and discussion, the uninhibited flow and exchange of views and experiences between the Communists and the working masses, including the revolutionary youth and intellectuals, among the members of each Party, and between the various national Parties on a regional and international scale.

Debate, therefore, polemic, even sharp expressions of difference, are by no means a sign of distress, or something which Communists should regret or bemoan. Only the incorrigible philistines and 'peace-at-any-price' bureaucrats will deplore this polemising, this dialectic. This is the way that concepts are clarified, wits sharpened and minds matured. This is the healthiest sign of the evergreen rejuvenation and efflorescence or our great movement.

Quite a different matter, however, is the utterly sterile and destructive process that sets in when contending Parties or groups adopt a pattern of factionalism. Here there is no exchange, no dialogue. Ears are deaf and minds closed. Personalities are deified, stereotyped formulae and abusive labels become a substitute for rational discussion. The movement suffers and the imperialist enemy rejoices. This is not genuine polemic, but a grotesque substitute which bears the same relationship to healthy debate as a tumour to a living organism.

What, for example could be more ludicrous—and pathetic—than to observe the leaders of the Pan-Africanist Congress of South Africa, who have never been Marxists and mostly never will be, solemnly chanting litanies from the Thoughts of Chairman Mao and vilifying the seasoned Marxist-Leninists of our country, as well as the valiant non-Communist patriots, as 'revisionists'.

Such sterile 'polemics' have nothing in common with the serious and deep-reaching discussions which all Communists need to conduct in order to meet the problems of the present day. To conduct such discussions will no doubt need much time. But meanwhile the socialist countries, the working class movement and the national liberation movement are faced with immediate and pressing threats of imperialist aggression and war; with urgent tasks of initiating new advances for the workers and oppressed people.

These immediate problems and tasks cannot await upon a long and protracted period of debate. They require urgent consultation and the working out of a common approach now, to unite and rally all the anti-imperialist forces of the world.

The forthcoming November international conference of Communist and Workers' Parties has precisely this subject as its agenda. For this reason alone it is an enormously significant and important event for the workers and oppressed peoples of the world.

Looking further towards the future it also marks the beginning of a new phase in the process of collective discussion and consultation which will enable the Marxists of today to realise the slogan which Marx and Engels advanced at the dawn of our movement—Workers of the World, Unite!

MARX'S MESSAGE FOR AFRICA

Communists from a number of countries in Africa were present at the Budapest consultative and preparatory meetings and have indicated their intention of attending the Moscow Conference. They came from the Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Lesotho and South Africa. Marxist-Leninist parties in some other African countries support the aims of the conference but were unable to attend.

However, although there are individual Marxists in practically every African country, it must be observed that there are a great many in which independent Marxist-Leninist Parties have yet to be organised. One reason for this is that in many of our countries the working class, on which a Marxist party is based, is non-existent, or very small, or of recent origin. It is also true that in many parts of Africa, the imperialists backed by local reactionary forces have managed to keep Marxist ideas from the working masses, to censor its literature and present a false picture of Communism to the public. The spreading of such journals as The African Communism to the public. The spreading of such journals of distribution, but this is hampered by widespread illiteracy, poor channels of distribution, and even censorship and bans by some independent states who continue to follow the bad example set by the imperialists of preventing the free flow of advanced ideas.

Sometimes it is said that the establishment of independent workers' Marxist parties would distract African patriots from their central task of maintaining and extending independence, national liberation and African unity. It has also been maintained that Marxism is irrelevant to African problems since the process of polarisation and differentiation along class lines has not developed to any great extent in many of our territories.

To me it seems that both these contentions are gravely mistaken. Marxist science is of universal validity, applicable not only to advanced industrial societies but also to those in every stage of development. Of course it is not a set of rules, but a method, which must be creatively applied to a detailed study of the concrete realities of time and place. And this cannot be done by scholars in some remote academy but by practical revolutionaries working as part of a disciplined collective of Marxist-Leninists, and in close contact with the working masses.

The primary duty of a Communist who belongs to an oppressed nation or people is to join with all his might in the common patriotic struggle for freedom, independence and democracy. Experience has richly demonstrated that Communist Parties in countries subjected to colonialism or neo-colonialism, far from being a cause of weakness or division have been a source of tremendous strength and unity,

bringing to the analysis of modern problems which cannot be understood on the basis of old-fashioned nationalism, the perception of the most advanced social science, and to the working out of revolutionary strategy the collective experience of the entire international working class movement.

Even where no established Marxist groups or parties have existed it is apparent that every African patriotic leader of any stature has to a greater or lesser extent been influenced in his thinking by Marxism; that scientific socialist solutions are being impelled upon every sincere leader and government, not by virtue of a predetermined theory but by the very logic and imperative of history; that Marxist-Leninist theory is more and more being discovered by the rising generation of workers and intellectuals in our continent to be an absolutely indispensable weapon for solving the colossal problems of African development and progress.

More than that, every thinking African patriot recognises that the liberation of our continent from imperialism is intimately connected with the existence and growing strength of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, with the national liberation movements of Asia and the Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the revolutionary working class, headed by Marxist parties in the capitalist countries.

The work of Karl Marx and his followers has had its reverberations and repercussions throughout the world, and in every corner of Africa. It has made a powerful contribution to independence and will continue even more to do so in the future.

That is why we of Africa should be among the foremost in paying homage to Karl Marx, the mighty genius whose mission it was to change the world and who illuminated the way for revolutionaries everywhere to make it a better world for man to live in; a world free from exploitation, starvation, ignorance and war; based on equality, freedom and human brotherhood.

AFRICA

Notes and Comments

J. J. JABULANI

Egypt Fights Counter-Revolution

THE POPULAR STRUGGLES of June 9th-10th last year, and of the days from February 20th this year were launched in order to safeguard and protect the gains of the Egyptian revolution.

In the June war the imperialists had hoped that they would succeed in overthrowing the progressive government of Egypt through the agency of Zionist aggression.

When that plan was brought to nought, not unnaturally, their hopes transferred to the counter-revolutionary elements that had deeply entrenched themselves in the Egyptian army and government as well as in the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union (A.S.U.), Egypt's sole political party, and in the managements of the state enterprises.

The role of these elements has been well told in evidence given at the trial of Badran and 53 others which opened before the Revolutionary Tribunal on January 22nd this year. Shams el-Din Badran was War Minister during the June War.

Among those accused are also Abbas Radwan, former Assistant Secretary of the A.S.U., and Salah Nasr, former Chief of General Intelligence.

Badran and his co-conspirators had, according to the indictment, planned a coup to take place August 27th last year. For this purpose they had formed a secret military organisation.

It was planned to seize the commands of various army divisions which would then march on Cairo, arresting Nasser and other progressive leaders including Ali Sabri, present Secretary-General of the A.S.U., Shaarawi Gomaa, Minister of the Interior, Amin Howeidi, Minister of State, and Mohammed Fayeh, Minister of National Guidance. Field Marshall Amer, former Vice-President, who subsequently committed suicide, would then be proclaimed President.

As early as June 11th, a group of officers had visited Nasser to protest against the change of military command undertaken immediately after the June War. They had also demanded the reinstatement of Amer. On the same day they had seized arms and troop carriers from Khilmia base and marched on the army headquarters. Acting in expression of the popular struggles of June 9th and 10th, Nasser placed these officers under house arrest.

Other officers involved in the plot hid both themselves and large quantities of weapons in Amer's house. Among those meant to be hiding at Amer's house was former Air Force Commander, Marshall Sidki Mahmud. Before he arrived at Amer's house however, he was arrested and was among the four Air Force officers sentenced by the Supreme Military Tribunal on February 20th for 'dereliction of duty during the war with Israel'. (It was the leniency of the sentences on these four officers, two acquittals and two sentences of 10 years and 15 years each, that sparked off the February struggles.)

The trials have not only shown that there exists a counter-revolutionary faction within the armed forces. Evidence has also been given by the accused showing that officers were misappropriating public funds and joining in illegal currency and contraband transactions. Further, this faction was opposed to the transfer of political power to the popular masses. It subscribed to the view that it must maintain an élitist and privileged officer-corps with a permanent right to govern the country. The faction was also in favour of 'a new government more acceptable to the United States . . .', according to Badran.

The faction has been described in Egypt variously as 'the military bourgeoisie' and a 'parallel centre of power.' It was part of the Free Officers' Movement which overthrew Farouk in 1952.

Within the military government since then, and led by Amer, it maintained the reactionary attributes of the social classes from which it was drawn, those of large landowners and the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie that were not grouped together with those sections that were part of and acted in collusion with the aristocratic dynasty.

Thus it was that even in 1962, as Badran testified, it opposed the nationalisation laws enabling the takeover of the basic means of

production, the credit and banking system and transporting and providing for the regulation of foreign trade.

The faction was also opposed to the 1962 Charter for National Action which proclaimed that Egypt chose the socialist road. Further, it ensured that, despite attempts to the contrary, Amer retained the exclusive right of determining policy in relation to army cadres.

It has therefore become clear that the revolution can only be safeguarded, and the reverses suffered through the Zionist war of aggression corrected, through the determined vigilance and struggles of an alliance of workers, peasants, intellectuals and a patriotic army.

To meet this prerequisite, Nasser announced on March 30th, that a programme for the reorganisation of the Arab Socialist Union would be drawn up. This would be submitted to a national referendum on May 2nd. On approval of the programme, the A.S.U. will in effect become the country's ruling body. It will decide state policy and its Central Committee will outline policies to be pursued in the various spheres of government.

The elective principle for all organs of the A.S.U., including its Central Committee will be introduced. Its National Congress, meeting once in three months to decide important questions of state, will be its highest organ.

Work is to continue in order to activate its membership, thus ensuring maximum popular participation in the reconstruction. Further, people who through incompetence, or through holding reactionary political views are hindering the progress of the revolution, are to be weeded out of the state apparatus.

The first session of the reconstructed A.S.U. is to be held on July 23rd, the 16th anniversary of the revolution.

Meanwhile War Minister Fawzi has ordered the retrial of the Air Force officers, and some of the Intelligence officers, including Salah Nasr, are still appearing in the courts.

By the time that their attempts to hand over the Egyptian people to U.S. imperialism have earned them their true punishment, the historic significance of the struggles launched in February by the workers at the Helwan military factory will be clearly evident.

Their historic contribution, increasing as it does, the democratic content in the revolution, can only be maintained by further struggle until reaction in Egypt is totally destroyed, power transferred to the popular masses and all traces of the Israeli aggression removed.

The future of the Egyptian revolution is of crucial importance not only to Africa and the Middle East in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and for genuine national independence, socialism and peace, but also to the whole world.

Zambia: A Blow Against Foreign Control

In his speech on April 19th at the National Council of the United National Independence Party (U.N.I.P.), held at Mulungushi, President Kaunda of Zambia did more than announce a series of economic reforms. He dealt as well, and at some length, with agricultural development issues, co-operatives and the need for self-reliance.

Of great importance to Zambia's progress towards complete national independence, he also enunciated the philosophy which guided U.N.I.P. and the government when considering what steps Zambia should take to secure economic independence.

In this regard, President Kaunda stated that:

... time is now that we must take urgent and vigorous steps to put Zambian business firmly in the hands of the people themselves just as political power is in their hands.

We cannot in this Note deal with the complex issues raised by the speech. We shall however detail the measures announced by the President.

In terms of the passage quoted above, the economic measures announced visualise:

- (a) increasing the measure of public control over various companies that operate as monopolies or cartels in the supply of various commodities
- (b) increasing the number of businesses that are wholly, or in the main, owned by individual Zambian businessmen.

(During his speech, President Kaunda repeatedly stressed that by Zambian he meant people '... with a Zambian passport or green national registration card.' He however also made it clear that the intention was to bridge the gap that exists between locally-owned business and resident expatriate business.)

President Kaunda announced that the state would take a 51 per cent holding in 24 companies in order to break their monopoly position, reduce prices and rationalise the various industries affected.

Of these companies, three manufacture door and window frames; seven supply building materials; three operate quarries in the Lusaka area; two are breweries; two are road transport companies carrying both freight and passengers; five are retailers and wholesalers; one supplies timber to the mines and the last one is a sawmill.

Compensation will be paid to all the companies so affected.

Further, all foreign companies, including those owning the copper mines, will only be allowed to export 50 per cent of their profits. (These expatriated profits may not exceed 30 per cent of the equity capital of the company involved.)

In future, expatriate firms will be prevented from raising capital in Zambia except under exchange control regulations which require that the firms must bring in a proportionate amount of capital from abroad. All firms will, according to this formula, be asked to pay back outstanding loans.

As far as local Zambian businessmen are concerned, various measures to help them were announced.

One of these envisages an increase in the amounts of money lent to them by the banks, insurance companies, building societies etc. This will be done by restricting loans to companies that are wholly, or in the main, Zambian-owned.

Further, retail expatriate firms will only be allowed to trade in 'the centres of the big towns only'. This covers ten towns, including Lusaka, Kitwe, Ndola and Livingstone. Thus the Zambian businessman will be sheltered from expatriate competition.

The government's Public Works Department will award all contracts worth less than K100,000 (about £53,000) to Zambians only. President Kaunda also urged other large concerns to follow this example.

A Stock Exchange will be established. It is visualised that as individually-owned Zambian companies grow to a certain size, they will then become public companies, offering their shares on the Stock Exchange. If they then grow even bigger, they will be nationalised.

With these measures Zambia strikes a heavy blow against foreign control of her economy. It may be feared that they will also stimulate the growth of an exploiting local capitalist class. But President Kaunda added:

'We do not propose to make of Zambians business barons now or in future. Everybody's contribution must ultimately be for the benefit of MAN through the State . . . I do not want to create capitalism here.'

Algeria: The Cure for Instability

Algerian university students, supported by teaching staff and students in other institutes, stayed out on strike for twenty-three days in February.

On March 14th, they staged a half-day warning strike to obtain the release of six student leaders arrested during the February strike. The police were called out and patrolled in their cars.

In a speech reported on February 26th, from Aures, one of Algeria's poorest provinces, President Boumedienne denounced the students

saying they were 'connected to foreign movements and antagonistic to the socialist system.'

The student strike however, had not been based on anti-socialist demands. It was based on democratic demands.

The new Secretary General of the F.L.N., Kaid Ahmed (appointed in December 1967) has issued a circular addressed to the students and entitled 'The Process of Normalising the Activities of the National Union of Algerian Students' (U.N.E.A.).

In the circular the F.L.N. called for the students to elect a new leadership by February 29th. It threatened sanctions, including the withdrawal of scholarships, against those students who refused to vote. Voting would not be by secret ballot. The circular explained that the F.L.N. reserved for itself the right to veto the election of anyone considered to be 'in collusion with underground forces.' The students refused to accept the normalising process, thus maintaining a tradition that has built up since the ousting and arrest of Ben Bella, that of the students frequently acting as the catalyst in the struggle for democratic rights in Algeria.

On December 15th, last year, Colonel Tahar Zbiri, who was dismissed as Army Chief of Staff on November 1st, 1967, led an attempted military takeover. This was quashed and most of the instigators arrested.

At the time, Boumedienne said that Zbiri had been used by the imperialists who intended to destroy Algeria's revolutionary gains.

A less demagogic note was however struck by the paper Revolution et Travail, journal of the General Union of Algerian Workers (U.G.T.A.). Referring to the non-implementation of the agrarian reform, the almost complete elimination of workers' self-management (autogestion) in the commercial and industrial sector, the lack of workers' participation in economic management generally and the erosion of the liberties of the Trade Unions, the paper said that the country would not return to normal until 'the political machine is made really democratic.' (The U.G.T.A's leader has since been removed from the board of the paper.)

Boumedienne's troubles also stem from what he described as the 'immobility and torpor' of Algeria's sole legal political organisation, the F.L.N. On that occasion, the December 1967 Congress of the F.L.N., he also complained of the Party's general lack of direction and progress.

On January 5th this year, Boumedienne announced a purge of all 'incapable persons' from the F.L.N. Some of these, he said, had appropriated state farms for themselves, while they still called themselves party militants.

Speaking at a meeting of over 3,000 activists on March 12th (1968), Kaid Ahmed announced that the F.L.N. would soon be given a 'doctrinal charter'. Its ideology was, he said, Islam, which the militants must adapt to the demands 'of our century and our revolution.' He further announced the creation of a specialised corps of hand-picked officials who would watch over the behaviour and failures of the members of the F.L.N. These changes come on top of an order issued earlier that every member must re-apply for admission into the F.L.N.

In all this, the so-called 'Oudja Group' which includes Boumedienne Kaid Ahmed, Bouteflika (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Medeghri (Interior), Cherif Belkacem (Finance and Planning), is trying to strengthen itself.

By promising a 'doctrinal charter' this year, it seeks to reverse the gains recorded in the 1964 Algiers Charter, which proclaimed that the government and the party would be guided by the principles of scientific socialism.

Thus it seeks to recruit to the F.L.N. the more backward elements and the slavish followers of the Oudja Group, and then extend its control over popular progressive organisations as in the attempted takeover of the leadership of U.N.E.A. (The F.L.N. has announced that it will progressively take over the 'professional corporations' including the unions of writers, artists, journalists and 'other liberal professions'.)

In thus attacking the democratic rights of the popular organisations and the most progressive sections of the population, the Oudja Group hopes to establish the conditions for the speeding up of the retrograde processes whose beginning was marked by the still unexplained detention of Ben Bella but which have been resisted by the popular forces.

Charles Hargrove of the London *Times* (15.3.68) wrote eloquently about Boumedienne's Minister of Industry, Abdersselam, under whose direction the Algerian economy

... is taking a distinct turn towards more orthodox forms of state control, as opposed to the more picturesque versions that flourished in the euphoria of liberation, when the leaders claimed they were working out their own specific version of socialism . . .

The attempted assassination of Boumedienne late in April was evidence of the permanent instability of which Revolution et Travail had written.

Stability can only be found on a return to legality, the re-establishment of democratic rights, including the lifting of the ban on the Communist Party, the release of Ben Bella and the continuance of the popular programme enunciated in the Algiers Charter of 1964.

Dahomey and the 'Young Officers'

The announcement early in May by Colonel Allais, head of state in Dahomey, that he could not declare any of the Presidential candidates as elected, brought to attention the continuing political crisis in that country. (Five candidates stood, but Dr. Moumouni who polled the highest number of votes, still could not get a quarter of the total. Maga and Apithy have called for an election boycott which has had some response.)

Army rule in Dahomey was initially firmly entrenched when a coup d'état took place in December 1965 and General Soglo was installed as head of state. This was after a crisis had been provoked by the competition between Maga, Ahomadegbe and Apithy for political leadership and the deterioration of the living conditions of the workers and peasants in view of the ineptitude of the various governments in dealing with economic and social issues.

On December 17th last year, the younger army officers (Jeunes Cadres de l'Armée) ousted General Soglo and installed Colonel Allais as head of state.

The move was inspired by the strike action engaged in by the organised Dahomey workers the same month against a 25 per cent wage cut imposed by the Soglo military government. (In 1963, the Maga government was overthrown following popular actions led by the workers.)

The young officers charged that:

- (i) Soglo had failed to take action to restore the economy.
- (ii) New sacrifices were required of people whose purchasing power had been greatly reduced, resulting in a general lack of business in the markets and shops.
- (iii) The peasant masses, who were constantly asked to make a greater effort, were wearing themselves out with work without seeing their lot improved.
- (iv) Public funds had been misappropriated.
- (v) Major decisions involving the future of the country and serious military responsibilities were made 'within the family circle'.
- (vi) The 'military committees of vigilance' were muzzled and paralysed. Their role was confined to that of a roving controller, 'one who meddles in everything and does nothing' and their discoveries were kept secret.
- (vii) These policies were resulting in divisions among the army itself.

Promising to return power to civilians within six months, Col. Allais set up a Constitutional Committee of eighteen elected and fifteen appointed members to draw up a new constitution.

Conscious of the demand by the working people for a bigger share in determining the affairs of the country, the military government set up an ad-hoc commission composed of government and trade union representatives to study the workers claims. The government also asked the Trade Unions to submit recommendations on the questions of family allowances and the refund of the 25 per cent deduction from salaries. It also invited the workers to voice their views on proposed budgetary measures.

At the beginning of March 1968, the Constitutional Committee, which had been presided over by Ignacio Pinto, President of the Supreme Court, handed in its recommendations to Col. Allais and the Revolutionary Military Committee (M.R.C.).

Among the recommendations that it made were the following:

- (a) members of the parliament should only be paid during sessions while the number and duration of sessions should be 'reduced to a minimum.'
- (b) the position of President of the Supreme Court should be a nonpolitical one to guard against 'past experiences of arbitrary arrests and detentions . . .'
- (c) for a period of 5 years there should be one political party—the National United Party—which would have its functions laid down by law, to ensure 'unity, harmony and stability.' According to Allais, it should be 'conceived... with a completely democratic structure...'

In a tour of the country undertaken during the referendum on the constitution he called on the people to vote in liberty for 'a return to legality, peace and union'. He also explained that a period of economic austerity was in the offing. (In the budget published at the end of December 1967, the 25 per cent wage-cut was maintained.)

Now, deadlock has emerged in the first attempt to terminate military rule. (On March 14th, the M.R.C. forbade Maga, Ahomadegbe and Apithy from participating in the presidential elections.)

On the basis of trust confided in them by the working people and the peasants, the Allais government has been able to carry through the measures detailed above. It is exactly because of this trust and genuine attempts by the military government to take into account popular interests, that the French government, mindful of Dahomey's advance towards genuine independence, has begun to show its disapproval.

At the end of November 1967, before Soglo was overthrown, the French government had agreed to give aid to Dahomey.

Soglo was carrying out his austerity programme supported by foreign aid from France in particular. In 1967 the budget was expected to show a deficit of 400 million c.f.a. francs. (588 francs to the post-devaluation pound sterling). France had promised to give more than half this amount—and had promised more for 1968. She had further promised to make up the debts accounted for by the public sector. It had also been estimated that in the first six months of 1968, private French capital totalling 1,500 million c.f.a. francs would enter Dahomey.

In mid-March, Allais made a statement that: 'France had failed to honour certain financial promises on which we were relying for the completion of the 1967 budgetary programme and for the execution of the 1968 budgetary programme.'

Earlier in the month, Dahomey had failed to obtain a loan from the 'francophone' countries organised in the Council of the West African Monetary Union. On that occasion Togo Minister of Finance, Roukari Djobo, had advised that, to cure her budgetary deficit, Dahomey should try 'to rectify her situation with France' so that this country would come to her aid.

In rejecting this advice, Allais said that in future Dahomey must rely entirely on itself.

Starting from a position where they were compelled into action by their own antagonism towards the top officer-corps, the Jeunes Cadres de l'Armée have now come face to face with the machinations of French imperialism. The latter are actively working for the return of their old neo-colonialist representatives. The sole condition under which their schemes can be thwarted is the institution of a genuinely popular regime, supported by the workers and the peasants.

Union of Central African States (U.E.A.C.)

In February, three states in Central Africa, Congo Kinshasa, Chad and the Central African Republic (C.A.R.) formed themselves into a Union. The full Charter was signed on April 2nd, at Fort-Lamy in Chad.

At the same time, the latter two withdrew from another regional grouping, U.D.E.A.C. (the Central African Customs and Economic Union) to which they belonged together with Cameroon, Gabon and Congo Brazzaville.

The declared aim of the Union is:

to create an economic common market in Central Africa, on the basis that all the countries involved are 'serious partners' and taking into account the geographic position and actual difficulties of each country.

The Union is open to any country in Central Africa that wants to join. (Burundi has already applied.) Restrictions on movement of people will be lifted. Investment policies will be designed to favour the two land-locked countries, Chad and the C.A.R.

There will be co-ordination of economic development programmes as well as rail, river, sea and air transport. For the latter a joint company has been set up—Air Afrique Centrale.

Further, the agreement provides for exchange of information on security matters and co-operation in 'countering subversion on the territory of one member state, or the whole of the Union.'

The formation of the U.E.A.C. follows a period in which both Chad and the C.A.R. have increasingly found that membership of U.D.E.A.C. was not benefiting them economically. This was in terms of both the differential tariff structure which did not work and the fact that capital was attracted to the coastal areas, especially Cameroon, thus ensuring the continued impoverishment of the two hinterland countries.

Undoubtedly the Congo is the dominant partner in the Union. It is clear that Mobutu has used the grievances against U.D.E.A.C. to persuade Chad and C.A.R. to join the Union. Mobutu will be the Union's first president.

The Chad Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Jacques Baroum, stated at the end of March that the Union was not inspired by any foreign pressures.

The Union however is not without relevance to the contending interests of primarily U.S., Belgian and French imperialism in the area.

The U.S. is giving open support to Mobutu. By attaching Chad and the C.A.R. to the Congo, thus detaching them from the 'francophone'. U.D.E.A.C., they have increased their 'sphere of influence'.

An initial step has been taken by the U.S. company Diamond Distributors Inc. The company has set up a subsidiary in the C.A.R.—Diamond Distributors Centrafrique SA, with the stated objective of amalgamating the different diamond companies in the country.

In 1967, individual and small diamond prospectors produced 515,000 carats while companies produced 45,000. Amalgamation of companies in this case will undoubtedly result in a reversal of these figures and the increasing proletarianisation of the people of the C.A.R. and their recruitment into U.S.-owned mines.

Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone was thrown into confusion during the General Elections which took place on March 17th, 1967. When the Governor-General, Sir Henry Lightfoot-Boston, called former mineworkers' leader, Siaka

Stevens, leader of the All People's Congress (A.P.C.) to form the government as the A.P.C. had won, primarily over the Sierra Leone People's Party (S.L.P.P.), led by Sir Albert Margai, a coup d'état took place and the army, under Brigadier Lansana, seized power.

A day later Lansana was himself removed by other army officers who formed the 'National Reformation Council' (N.R.C.) led by Lieutenant-Colonel Juxon-Smith, himself trained at Sandhurst, England and originating from 'a much respected' Freetown Creole family.

A Commission was set up under Justice Dowe-Ewin on April 11th, 1967. It reported at the beginning of December. It found that:

The whole of the government arrangements for the 1967 elections was rigged and corrupt . . . they were determined to use all means fair and foul to win and remain in office and if all failed to get Brigadier Lansana to take over.

The Commission found that the s.L.P.P. had won twenty-two of the contested seats and six of its candidates had been elected unopposed. The A.P.C. had won thirty-two. Independents had won six seats and the Paramount Chiefs eleven.

In trying to maintain the hold of the 'Margai dynasty' against popular wishes, the s.l.p.p. entered into all sorts of tricks and ruses. It increased the deposits for candidates and increased the cost of election petitions. The Prime Minister told members of the Civil Service, acting as returning officers, that they must ensure that the government was returned. Presiding officers in each constituency were selected by s.l.p.p. candidates. In certain cases s.l.p.p. candidates were declared elected unopposed despite the fact that the A.p.c. had put up candidates. In such cases it was declared that A.p.c. nomination papers were invalid.

After the Commission Report had been published, a Civilian Rule Committee (c.r.c.) was set up to advise on the necessity of having a new General Election and any other action which the c.r.c. might consider necessary to effect a peaceful handover.

While unpopular itself, the military junta carried out some measures which met with popular response. On February 27th this year, it confiscated Sir Albert Margai's property and ordered him to repay Le771,037.14 within thirty days on the grounds that his assets had been unlawfully acquired. (Le2=£1 sterling). Prior to this on January 18th, the junta had ordered that all the former ministers in Margai's government should pay back a sum totalling Le207,000.

These measures could not however increase the popularity of the military junta. It held power for thirteen months. Then on April 17th, the soldiers overthrew the whole officer corps of both army and police

and arrested them. The soldiers invited the warrant officers to lead them. They called back Colonels Bangura and Genda from diplomatic posts abroad and within ten days civilian rule, with Siaka Stevens as Prime Minister, was restored. The present government is composed of a majority of A.P.C. ministers, but also includes members of Margai's party, some chiefs and some independents.

The Stevens government takes over a country which is heavily in debt to foreign groupings. These are made up of loans from the U.S. dominated International Monetary Fund, the World Bank (I.B.R.D.), the U.S., the U.K. and West Germany. Some further charges arise out of money owed to contractors—what is called 'contractor-finance'.

One figure to indicate the extent of the financial crisis is that in the financial year 1967/8 servicing of debts will cost the government Le9 million, which amounts to 22 per cent of recurrent revenue. This sum will increase in the years to come.

Meanwhile however the junta had already laid the basis for imposing sacrifices on the working people and on the peasants.

It increased taxation and cut down on government expenditure. It appears that Stevens is to continue this programme by inducing the chiefdom councils to collect further taxes at the local level.

Correspondingly other economic measures have been introduced which will increase the strength of the local moneyed groups.

The military junta decided to shut down the country's publiclyowned railway system on the grounds that it was uneconomic. Over the last three years the railways have received a government subsidy amounting to Le5 million. Engineering surveyors have begun work which will end with the creation of an extensive road system which will be dominated by private interests.

Similarly, on March 14th this year, the junta established a National Development Bank with a share capital of Le1 million. 51 per cent of this has been offered to local companies, businessmen and private individuals. The balance will be held by foreign investors and foreign banks, and the foreign-owned mining and insurance companies in Sierra Leone.

Stevens has got into power on the basis of support given by the poor peasants and the working people, especially in the capital city of Freetown. On the basis of this support, conditions exist for the A.P.C. government to work for the improvement of the conditions of the poor sections of the population.

In the time that Stevens has been in power however there has been no indication that he proposes to break with the elements that created the 1967 Sierra Leone crisis.

Libya

A trial of 106 people opened in Tripoli on January 17th this year. They were charged with plotting to overthrow the government.

Charges included the possession of explosives, commando training in other Arab countries, using trade unions and students 'for subversive activities', and possessing and distributing socialist books.

The accused are also charged with instigating strikes despite the state of emergency declared during the June 1967 Middle East crisis.

Eleven of the accused are being tried in their absence. They include Hani el Hindi, a former Syrian government Minister, Muhsin Ibrahim, editor of the Beirut paper Al Hurrya and people from various other Arab countries.

It is alleged that the accused belong to the Arab Internationalist Movement which operates in Libya and is dedicated to bringing about social and political revolutions in the Arab countries on the basis of Marxist principles.

Last year, among other sections of the population, the students in Libya came out on strike in defence of the autonomy of the students' union. They also demanded the introduction of democratic rights in Libya.

King Idris' government responded by arresting the student leaders, closing the university and withdrawing scholarships of Libyan students abroad who had sent deputations and had sat-in in Libyan embassies in solidarity with their comrades inside the country.

In the face of the sharp reaction by the government, the strike had to be called off.

Organisation of Senegal River States (O.E.R.S.)

About the same time as the formation of the U.E.A.C., Mali, Guinea, Senegal and Mauretania agreed to the formation of the O.E.R.S. The summit conference held in Labe, Guinea, at which this was agreed, ended on March 24th.

The Organisation aims at promoting joint social, economic and cultural development. In the economic sphere, this co-operation will extend over industrial and agricultural development, power and mines, transport and telecommunications and trade.

It also envisages co-operation in encouraging tourism and in the training of technical and professional personnel.

The Organisation is viewed as the first step towards forming a single cultural and economic entity.

The o.E.R.s., which should facilitate economic development in the

countries of the Senegal river basin, is now the sixth of the groupings to which ex-French African countries belong. The other five are U.D.E.A.C. and U.E.A.C. (above), the Entente Council to which the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger and Togo belong, One other, much larger and more openly a creation of French imperialism, is O.C.A.M. (the Afro-Malagasy Common Organisation). This excludes the countries of the Maghreb; Guinea, Mali and Mauretania elected not to belong.

The sixth one is the West African Monetary Union. (See item on Dahomey above.)

THE COLOURED PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA

Willem Abram Malgas

This year further government attacks on the Coloured community in South Africa resulted in legislation for the final removal of Coloured representation in Parliament, and the expansion of the Coloured Representation Council to serve as a centre of Coloured 'representation' within the framework of apartheid.

Thus, Acts of Parliament were passed to (a) abolish the present representation of Coloured voters by four white M.P.s. (These will serve until 1971 after which date the vacancies will not be filled.) (b) enlarge the present C.R.C. and give it some control over Coloured group affairs, the administration of funds, education, pensions etc.

In order to give this arbitrary and cynical arrangement an aura of democracy the legislation allows for the compulsory registration of voters, both men and women, and makes the Council predominantly elective. Needless to say, the Council will remain at the beck and call of the Central Government through the relevant Minister, that of Coloured Affairs.

To turn the screws a little tighter, another law has been enacted simultaneously, to prohibit (a) the participation in political parties of one racial group by members of another group; (b) multiracial membership of political parties; (c) the acceptance by South African political parties of funds from abroad.

It would be wishful thinking to say that this latest attack on the Coloured community is the ultimate one on their political life, for who knows what might develop even within the C.R.C. and its elections, and what other 'preventative' measures the Nationalist government might have up its collective sleeve? Thus the continued preparedness of the

people and militant leadership, particularly of the Coloured People's Congress, is essential.

The white supremacists have a long record of attempting to relegate this minority community to the status of virtual 'non-people' in the same way it has the Africans. But the insatiable altars of the apartheid Moloch and Baal have history to reckon with, and the determination of people to survive and win.

It would be appropriate and important at this stage to give some further consideration to the complex question of the origin, nature and aspirations of the Coloured people, and their role in the national liberation struggle for the overthrow of apartheid and white minority domination. It is hoped that the following thoughts on this subject may stimulate some debate and discussion in the columns of this journal and elsewhere.

HISTORICAL ORIGINS

As a community and part of the South African population, these people generally and officially known as 'Coloured' have a history which cannot be separated from that of the other sections inhabiting the sub-continent.

Latest figures show that this community now totals 1,859,000 persons, the majority of whom are concentrated in the south-western part of the Cape Province. Various statutory definitions have tried to identify the 'Cape Coloured' or 'Coloured' (for while the majority live in the Cape Province, the community is scattered throughout the Republic) but these vague and negative definitions become more inexplicable in the light of any examination of the history of this people.

The main ingredients of the Coloured people of today are (a) slaves brought from abroad; (b) local aborigines (the Khoin people); (c) white colonists; (d) indigenous Africans to a lesser extent.

The slaves seem to have outnumbered the local Khoin inhabitants,¹ commonly referred to as Hottentots and Bushmen. These latter were decimated by the incoming white colonists and those not taken as slaves were driven from the area. With the demand for labour increasing as the outpost at Cape Town developed, slaves were brought in by the Dutch East India Company.

There were two main sources of slaves: the East Indies and East Africa including Madagascar. Slaves from the latter were apparently in the majority, and were brought to perform agricultural work mainly

¹ The census of 1805 gives the number of slaves as 29,545, and Hottentot and Bushmen, 20,000. In 1821 there were 35,698 slaves.

in the colony, the pastoral, easy-going Khoin having been found unsuitable. These slaves were 'Negroid by race, with an infiltration of Indonesian blood and an Indonesian language (Malagasy) with remnants of a few Bantu words'.2

The Asian slaves, though fewer in number, were the 'aristocracy' of the slave population. They came mainly from the Malay Archipelago. Some were convicts who, having served their time, became 'Free Blacks' and chose to settle in the Cape Colony and later formed the nucleus of a small artisan group. Others were political exiles with their attendants. Many of these were Moslems and the term 'Cape Malay' (now considered a derogatory term) denotes a religious rather than an ethnic group.

Many of these were skilled craftsmen, builders, masons, carpenters etc. The white colonists were farmers, artisans, soldiers, clerks and there were of course uncounted sailors who passed through. The cultural gap between the lower strata of the colonists and the slaves was probably not very great.

In the original contact-situation, the most important mixtures were those between slave men and aboriginal women, and European men and slave and aboriginal women. In both the slave and European communities, men far outnumbered women for a long period, and the relatively few European women were not likely to risk their higher social status for the sake of casual, much less permanent, intercourse with slaves or the despised Hottentots. Even today it is usually the white man and the non-white woman who seek association outside their group.

Thus three-quarters of the children born to slave mothers at the Cape by 1671 were found to be half-breeds. Many of these and later half-breeds, quarter-breeds etc, may also be the ancestors of the present white population. The inter-marriage between historical figures like Van Meerhof, Van der Kemp, James Read and others, and non-white women are well known, but it is obvious that it was not only a few potentates who took non-white women.

On the whole the original intercourse between white and non-white took place mainly between the colonists and slaves, the Hottentots being generally considered with contempt—a 'stinckene natie' (stinking people) as Van Riebeeck described them.

Nevertheless as the colonists trekked further away from the civilised Cape their way of life forced them to shed many of the little niceties of European culture, for they became as nomadic as the despised Hotten-

² G. B. Lestrade, University of Cape Town.

³ Prof. I. D. Macrone.

tot while at the same time the chronic shortage of women compelled many informal, sometimes permanent, unions with the womenfolk of these people.

By the beginning of the 19th century the pure aboriginal had practically ceased to exist in the Colony and the second, third and fourth generations of mixed breeds were breeding among themselves and increasing their numbers.

In spite of the fact that by this time colour-prejudice had hardened, the white contribution to the mixed-breed community seems not to have diminished greatly, and with migration a further mixed-blood community was added—by white and African 'miscegenation', particularly in the Eastern Cape, and in Natal and Transvaal.⁴

In short, the Coloured people are the products of an early series of mixed unions between Europeans and slaves, slaves and Europeans, slaves and aborigines, and Europeans and aborigines, and on a smaller scale between Europeans and Africans and Coloured and Africans.

The slaves having been transported from their homelands naturally adapted themselves to their new environment. Being at the beck and call of their master they had to learn his language, pander to his customs and follow generally the course laid out for him. The white slave owners and the colonists, consciously or unconsciously rationalising their superior status saw to it that the slave recognised the value of the masters' 'civilising' influence. The growing community of mixed-bloods gradually accepted the languages, the customs and culture of the whites.⁵

The missionary societies brought Christianity and the beginnings of formal European-based education, and it might be added that today (except for the small Moslem community) the churches of European

⁴ The present Coloured population in the Eastern Cape and Natal is estimated at ½ million, approximately 8,000 living in the Transkei (not taking into consideration removals under the Group Areas Act, etc.), while another 25,000 live in the Orange Free State.

⁵ According to the Bureau of Census and Statistics in 1946, languages spoken by the Coloured people in the Cape Province were: English 7.3 per cent; Afrikaans 91.5 per cent; Other 1.2 per cent. In Cape Town only, the percentages were English 21.07 per cent; Afrikaans 77.26 per cent; Other 1.67 per cent.

The Cape Library Services state that in 1964 in one month (June) 10,446 Coloureds, including juveniles, read Afrikaans books, as against 2,179 whites.

⁶ The first school for young slaves of the Dutch East India Company was established in 1658. The purpose of the school was to teach the slaves Dutch and to give religious instruction. In 1663 the first mixed school was established with 18 Europeans, 4 slaves and 1 Hottentot. To this girl-slaves were admitted in 1665. By 1823 it was estimated that 1,551 slaves were attending school in Cape Town.

origin include membership of 90 per cent of the Coloured people. The Dutch Reformed Church has the largest percentage (almost 40 per cent) of Coloured Christians, the rest being divided among the other churches.

COLOUR—THE BASIS OF DISCRIMINATION

No trace is left among the Coloured people of the culture of their slave ancestors, apart from some words and cuisine of Indonesian origin. Names, languages, clothes, customs, art, literature are all shared with white South Africans. '... the Coloured do not appear to differ from us today in anything except their poverty. ... A Coloured does not exist in any realistic interpretation of the term' states Prof. J. S. Marais.

Discrimination against the Coloured people has been based on colour rather than on culture, for while the pigmentation and physical characteristics of the community might range from Caucasian to Negroid no real cultural or language difference between them and the whites can be pinpointed. Indeed, in spite of the attempted definitions of 'Coloureds' for purposes of various laws, the authorities dare not go too far back into the ancestry of either white or Coloured peoples fo 1 fear of being confronted with startling revelations.

Although slavery was abolished in the British Empire in 1833, it proved difficult to eradicate from the mentality of most white South Africans the conception that the main function of the non-white is to provide cheap labour for the European. The slave-owning mentality was built up long before the African became a source of labour for the white. The distinction between work that was proper for a white person and what subsequently came to be known as 'Kaffir work' was thereby drawn for centuries to come.

The idea that skin colour and not skill should be the determining factor in the economic hierarchy thus became an intergral part of white attitudes and support for the colour-bar, segregation or apartheid.

From the earliest times labour restrictions were practised and the statutes of the first parliament of the Cape of Good Hope (1854-1858) contain 'An Act for encouraging the Importation of European Labourers into this Colony' and others restricting African movement, while earlier, in 1809, labour laws provided for passes for Hottentots.

An examination of the activities of the earliest organisations of the Coloured people show that these generally centred on demands of a political and economic nature, rather than cultural. Already sharing a common language and cultural background with the whites, the Coloured community's struggle reflects essentially a desire to return to the fold from which they have been ejected. Politically they had enjoyed

political rights in the Cape and Natal equal with the whites since the Charter of 1856. When there were indications that these rights were in danger, as an anonymous Coloured historian put it in the APO newspaper in 1909, 'it would be necessary to safeguard their interests', i.e. their equal political rights with the whites.

Coloured political leaders continued to show a growing ire against being excluded from the fold. In 1938 Dr. Abdurhahman complained:

As far as I know, no leader or spokesman of the Afrikaner community during the present [Voortrekker centenary] celebrations has uttered one word of appreciation of the loyalty, kindness and heroism displayed by the Coloured people and other Non-Europeans who stood by the side of the Voortrekker...9

Later campaigns reflected this demand for a return to equality with whites. For example (a) the protests against the introduction of residential segregation in 1939; (b) segregation on the trains; (c) removal of the Coloured voter from the common roll; (d) the Anti-C.A.D. movement which saw the government treating the Coloured people as separate and inferior.

IS IT A 'NATIONAL' STRUGGLE?

There is no basis, and there never has been, for the 'national' struggle of the Coloured people (as we loosely term it) to include the right 'to speak a single language, with all obstacles to the development of that language and its consolidation in literature eliminated'. The history of the community shows that it is part of the English- and Afrikaansspeaking communities by virtue of language and culture, sharing with them the common territory of South Africa. By means of their colour they are discriminated against in the interest of the white bourgeoisie, and this discrimination gave rise to a community self-consciousness and demands which cannot be considered 'national' in the strict sense of the word.

Apart from a few minor businessmen and property owners, a Coloured economic bourgoisie is absent. On the whole the community provides the labour force in the areas which they occupy. In the Cape Peninsula alone, the Coloured population of over 500,000 provide 80 per cent of the manpower required to keep the area's secondary industries going,

⁷ In the Cape and Natal there was no constitutional discrimination between white and Coloured persons. There was however a hardening of attitudes towards non-whites even before Union. e.g. Laws in 1865 and 1896 excluded Africans and Indians from political rights.

⁸ Lionel Forman's Notebooks.

⁹ Cape Argus, 17.12.38.

¹⁰ Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination.

with the rest occupied in other work and in the professions. In the Western Cape countryside they form the bulk of the rural working population. The Coloured people, workers essentially and discriminated against on colour-lines, demand 'as a matter of principle, that there should be no privileges, however slight', and consequently what they demand is that they be given the same rights as their white counterparts.

However, the rise of the African liberation movement enforced upon Coloured political thinkers the consideration of the common basis of African and Coloured struggle, against the barriers of race and colour oppression.

Efforts for Coloured-African unity are not recent ones. The APO, dealing with the question of the Act of Union, stated: 'We the Coloured and Native peoples of South Africa, have a tremendous fight before us. We have the war of wars to wage...' And again, by the APO Johannesburg correspondent:

The fight must begin somewhere and it seems to us that the Pass Regulations is a good battleground for the first struggle. When once it has begun, consolidation of native forces will be the result. Success must not be looked for immediately, but the Coloured people must remember that the fight for freedom, national, social, political or economic, though baffled oft is ever won.¹²

The struggle for freedom in South Africa is inclusive of similar calls and practical efforts for unity of struggle. But the development of the struggle, under the leadership of the militant African liberation movement, has given rise to advanced conceptions of the goal of the struggle. The ultimate of a united South African nation arising from the equal participation of all groups has been something minority groups, especially, have had to chew upon.

The white racists of course reject this conception. The more conservative thinkers in the Coloured community hesitate, but the pressure of the African people was felt, and thus the Coloured Convention of 1961 'proclaimed a new dynamic for the South African nation . . . a dynamic that will bring every single person who comprises the South African nation, peace, justice, honour, happiness, security and prosperity'. Other politicians of the Coloured Left adopted a similar standpoint. 'The South African nation is thus made up of people of various "racial" and cultural origins who have undergone an irretrievable process of assimilation . . . "14 [Our emphases]

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² The Working Class is Born (New Age pamphlet).

The South African 'Coloured' National Convention. Preliminary Report.
 Towards a Modern South African Patriotism. A Citizen Pamphlet.

Both these groups jump the gun, for they already speak of 'the South African nation' as if this already exists, as if the evolutionary process has already taken place. Of course the principle of a common South African nation is accepted by far-thinking people, but hasty proclamations of its existence do not bring it about.

For the generally unorganised Coloured community with its cultural and historical base in the white groups, the conception of real unity with the Africans have always been a difficult one to bring to practicality. While unity with the African people has been theoretically accepted as an essential for the overthrow of economic and political barriers, there exists the subconscious fear that this unity would result in a total alienation from the base. This fear has also resulted in failure to maintain sustained political organisation on a community basis, other factors aside—organisation which might involve antagonising those who are in fact 'blood-brothers' of the Coloured people. Organisation of the Coloured people on the basis of the community, while essential in the light of colour discrimination, will continue to be hampered by this blockage, and principled enunciations about the 'South African nation', present or future, will not help to remove it.

While the ultimate goal of all the South African peoples is a single unified South Africa, the first consideration of the Coloured people is a return to their base to become integrated with their English and Afrikaans counterparts. While those who hope to see Coloured participation in the struggle against the white supermacists do not take this into consideration difficulties will continue to be met.

CLASS FACTOR IS THE KEY

But the blockage can be by-passed only by the correct orientation of the progressive leadership within the Coloured community. The difficulties experienced in creating sustained organisation, in creating political unity with the African people, can be overcome by a greater consideration of the Coloured people's class position and the relationship of that position to its community position. We have pointed out that the Coloured community is essentially a working-class community. Since the period of slavery the Coloured people have been a labour force, and today they form a proletariat reduced to a source of cheap labour by virture of their colour. On the class basis their demand is 'that there should be no privileges (for whites only) however slight'. Coloured workers are found in every branch of commerce and industry, particularly in the Cape, as has been pointed out. Coloured tradeunion membership in that Province is extensive to the extent that they can cause considerable consternation for the ruling class. This has been shown during such periods when protest strikes were waged. They

are the pioneers of the garment workers' union formed in the thirties, one of the biggest in the Cape. On this class basis they are far better organised than on the 'Coloured' and experience has shown that it has been on this basis that they have reacted during periods of militant struggle against community oppression.

It is in the field of class struggle where what we claim is a psychological blockage, the fear of alienation as a community, has been overcome.

Scant attention has been paid by the *political* movement of the Coloured people to this aspect of the community's organised life, and far greater effort should have been made to overcome the deficiency. It is hoped that in spite of the violent repression existing in the country that the task can still be undertaken.

By this alliance of the class interests with the community interest can the Coloured people win the equality they desire and take their place within a common community of white and Coloured, and contribute towards the creation of the eventual South African nation.

The Freedom Charter of the Congress Movement provides a realistic programme for the ultimate united South Africa. It recognises the diversity of the peoples of South Africa and provides for the fulfilment of their immediate aspirations. 'All people shall have equal right to use their own languages, and to develop their own folk culture and customs; all national groups shall be protected by laws against insults to their race and national pride.'

The Coloured People's Congress, in adopting the Freedom Charter, and allying itself with the Congress Movement, showed its willingness to organise the Coloured community on the basis of a realistic programme. But what is basically required of the C.P.C. is a detailed and scientific examination of the community's past, its present aspirations, and its destiny. This is essential for future organisation and co-operation in the struggle for a new South Africa.

WHITE LABOUR AND APARTHEID

J. Villiers

At its Annual Conference in April 1968, the Trade Union Council of South Africa (T.U.C.S.A.) voted by a large majority (fifty-six unions representing 123,566 workers to eighteen unions representing 32,871 workers) in favour of allowing African unions to affiliate to T.U.C.S.A., thus reversing a contrary decision at its special conference last December.

The American-dominated I.C.F.T.U., which was represented officially at the conference by its agent in Rhodesia, Mr. H. G. Lawrence, who had busily lobbied at the conference to achieve this result, hailed this step as a progressive one. But the I.C.F.T.U. is not famous for progressive policies, nor for having a clear understanding of where workers' interests lie.

For example, at the recent International Human Rights Conference in Teheran, the I.C.F.T.U. circulated a document condemning apartheid but ludicrously trying to link this with an attack on workers' conditions in the Soviet Union. Closer examination shows that the T.U.C.S.A. decision is the latest in a long series of manoeuvres by organised white workers to maintain their position as an aristocracy of labour against the interests of the oppressed African majority.

T.U.C.S.A.'s record is a bad one, and the latest decision is in line with a policy whose tactics have varied over the years but whose basic strategy has been to preserve the privileges of the white section of the working class. T.U.C.S.A. was formed in 1954 by those white trade unionists who had been foremost in opposing progressive and non-racial policies in the old, multi-racial South African Trades & Labour Council (s.A.T.L.C.). From its inception it sacrificed the solidarity and unity of the working class on the altar of race prejudice and white supremacy. Its original policy statement paid lip-service to the unity of the working-class, and promptly gave the lie to its intentions by debarring non-registered

(i.e. African) unions. It persistently cold-shouldered those who were genuinely trying to unite the working class in a single non-racial industrial organisation, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (S.A.C.T.U.). And it persistently claimed a right to represent all organised workers in South Africa which it manifestly was not entitled to. Alarmed by the growing success of S.A.C.T.U.'s militant stand and dedicated organisers, T.U.C.S.A. sought to divide the workers still further by setting up an African rival to S.A.C.T.U., the so-called Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa (F.O.F.A.T.U.S.A.). Despite some support from the I.C.F.T.U. the Pan-Africanist Congress and members of the Liberal Party, F.O.F.A.T.U.S.A. never put down roots and by 1962 it had collapsed.

In the context of the growing mass militancy of the Congress Alliance (in which s.a.c.t.u. is the industrial partner), the Nationalist Government took upon itself the task which T.U.C.S.A. had attempted by subversion and underhand techniques. It banned, deported or imprisoned most of the leading personnel in s.a.c.t.u., and by sheer weight of persecution and intimidation started whittling away its effectiveness as the spokesman of the exploited. But not before T.U.C.S.A., in a belated attempt to replace its failed African ally F.O.F.A.T.U.S.A., had in 1962 opened its ranks to African and multi-racial unions, even though the former could not be registered like the white unions under the Industrial Conciliation Act. Despite the vicious Government attack on s.a.c.t.u., the new tactic of t.u.c.s.a., to woo the African worker and encourage him to join tame unions controlled financially and administratively by T.U.C.S.A. officials, did not meet much success. African workers did not flock to the paternalistic banner of T.U.C.S.A., and by the end of last year T.U.C.S.A. could only claim some twelve African unions with some 6,000 members, as compared with s.a.c.t.u.'s more than fifty unions in 1962 with over 53,000 members of all races (over two thirds of them African workers).

FRICTION WITH THE GOVERNMENT

Even this small showing, however, was enough to earn T.U.C.S.A. the displeasure of the rigid apartheid-minded policy-makers in the Nationalist Government. In its ruthless pursuit of policies entailing the decentralisation of industry, 'repatriation' of African workers to the industries on the borders of their rural 'homelands', and the intensification of measures designed to uproot Africans from the cities and the heart of South African industry, the Government was increasingly insensitive to world-wide repudiation of its labour policies, and indifferent to the possibility—actively campaigned for by T.U.C.S.A. in its overseas propaganda—of South Africa's readmission to the I.L.O.

The result was increased tension between T.U.C.S.A. and the Government. The difference between them was one of method. Could white workers' privileged position best be preserved by accepting the African worker as a necessary and numerically growing corollary of the industrial expansion of the country, by controlling his agitation for better conditions, and by fostering stooge trade unions which would strengthen T.U.C.S.A.'s bargaining position in relation to the employers? Or could the same result be achieved by forcing industry to accept job reservation, pushing new industries into undeveloped areas where African labour would be cheaper than in the cities, and by preventing the organisation of African workers at all costs?

The latter, Government view was also one shared by a minority of T.U.C.S.A.'s affiliates, and by the extreme right-wing S.A. Confederation of Labour (confined to whites only). In December 1967, under Government pressure, the minority view in T.U.C.S.A. became the majority view and at a special conference it was decided to expel the African splinter unions whose existence had been nurtured during the previous five years. In April 1968, the Annual Conference took into account the spate of international criticism which had followed the December decision, and the tactic of admitting African unions was once again adopted. The Government growled off-stage, but, as in the past, took no steps to impose its will—a striking contrast with the raids, arrests and victimisations which were used against S.A.C.T.U. when the future of a genuine multi-racial industrial movement was at stake!

The whole debate between T.U.C.S.A. and the Government, because is does not concern the basic question of the rights and needs of the country's four million African, Coloured and Indian workers, would be a storm in a tea-cup were it not for the fact that it arises from the mounting conflict between the forces of production and the relations of production, and reflects acute contradictions in the economy which Government policy is aggravating rather than alleviating. The forces at work are deep-seated, and affect not only the character of the economy but the lives of numberless people, and it is therefore important to examine them.

EXPANSION AND INFLATION

The economy has been expanding rapidly since the post-Sharpeville recession of the early 1960's. The growth rate of Gross Domestic Product was 5.9 per cent in 1966, and 6.9 per cent in 1967, one of the fastest growth rates in the capitalist world. The Government has had to wrestle with a potentially serious inflation problem, stemming in part from the continued accumulation of more capital than the economy—organised as it is now—can absorb. Capital formation has been

running at the unusually high rate of 24 per cent of G.D.P. The 'outward-looking' policy of Vorster which angers the so-called 'verkramptes' has been forced on the Government by the need to export capital throughout Southern Africa, notably to Malawi, Botswana, Rhodesia, Mozambique, and even as far afield as Kenya.

Yet this economic growth, useful though it may be to the South African government in its propaganda to attract trade and tourism, has been achieved at a cost which is little short of tragic and for which the country as a whole will suffer in the long run. The cost is inflation and the relative pauperisation of the non-white people, and in particular of the African community, with all the suffering that poverty, hunger, malnutrition and insecurity bring in their wake.

On the mines for example, it has recently been estimated by a Cape Town economist that in real (i.e. buying power) terms, African cash wages are no higher today than in 1911. Today the average African miner gets a mere 58 cents (minimum) a day in wages, plus accommodation, and food that costs the employers 17 cents a day. This explains why the mines have had to intensify their recruiting efforts outside South Africa, and why the number of black South Africans employed in the mines has fallen from 166,000 (or 66 per cent of the total) in 1936 to 131,000 (or 48 per cent of the total) in 1966, even though the overall number of Africans employed has risen from 297,000 to 370,000 in the same period. Meanwhile the wages of white miners have been rocketing, and their average monthly earnings are now about R264 or eleven times the African minimum.

The gulf between white and non-white earnings and standards of living is notoriously wide in mining, but in no section of the economy is it very different. In the tobacco industry, for example, which in December 1967 was the industry paying the fifth highest salaries to both white and African exmployees, the average monthly salary for whites was R285, and for Africans R60 or less than a quarter of the white salaries. The same story or worse can be repeated in every sphere of life under apartheid, but what is changing is that the gap between white and non-white earnings and living standards is growing.

Although non-white earnings are increasing, they are declining in relation both to white income and to the rapidly spiralling cost-of-living. Recent studies by T.U.C.S.A., by the Bantu Wage and Productivity Association, and by the Johannesburg Municipal Non-European Affairs Department all paint a similar picture—and it is a grim one. Even in Soweto, the drab network of African townships near Johannesburg where half a million Africans live within reach of the booming industrial and commercial centre of the Rand, 68 per cent of African families earn less than the minimum of R53.32 a month

they need for bare subsistence. The shortfall is estimated at R12.57 a month. In the rural slums designated 'Bantu homelands' by the Government, poverty is still more acute. The United Party leader, De Villiers Graaff, recently calculated that in the 15 years since Verwoerd's much-vaunted Tomlinson Commission first drew up the great apartheid blue-print, the average wage of Africans in the Reserves had only increased from R48 to R53—which in real terms must mean an actual decline in income.

Thus while the economy expands rapidly and capital accumulation generates inexorable inflationary and expansionist tendencies, the impoverishment of the people grows worse. In the midst of plenty the masses suffer. Such is the mad irrationality of white supremacy. But it is not the only or even the most important contradiction.

AFRICANS IN INDUSTRY

Irrationality abounds in the labour market. Africans are being drawn into wage labour at ever-increasing rates by the expansion of industry. In almost every sector of employment, Africans are being absorbed at a faster rate than whites, with the result that white workers are a declining section of the working class. This trend is particularly marked in the faster growing sections of the economy, and especially in manufacturing industry. A recent T.U.C.S.A. survey showed that whereas whites comprised 30 per cent of the labour force in manufacturing industry in 1961, they have been declining at the rate of 1 per cent a year to 25 per cent in March 1967, and by 1971 can be expected to form only 20 per cent of the labour force.

This trend is having several side-effects. Firstly the colour-bar in employment is under severe pressure. For example, in March this year the General Manager of the Railways said that 16,000 non-whites have been given jobs on the railways that were formerly reserved for whites. In the building industry, where the Government is not directly involved as employer and the adjustment of laws to economic necessity proceeds more slowly, it is estimated that half the Africans in the industry are working illegally. Secondly, the shortage of skilled workers is growing more acute. Apartheid demands that Africans shall not acquire skills and the permanency of employment that goes with them (in contrast with unskilled labour)—except in their own areas. Thus in 1966, the building trade recruited only 28 per cent of the apprentices it needed, largely because Africans are excluded from artisanship. Similarly on the railways, where the S.A.R. & H. is experiencing a 13 per cent shortage in some semi-skilled grades, and a 20 per cent shortage of artisans.

To satisfy the crazy logic of the system, and the long-fostered racial

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exclusiveness of its supporters, the Government is even trying to extend the colour bar wherever possible. For example, in terms of a Government Notice issued early this year, African drivers of heavy vehicles in certain areas of the Transvaal and Orange Free State are to be replaced by whites. In the building industry, instead of opening the doors to Africans, the Government is pushing up the hourly rates and fringe benefits for white apprentices, and has cut the period of training from 5 to 4 years in an attempt to attract more apprentices—white, of course.

The third result of this trend is the declining power of the white trade unions. Their membership, although it has grown slightly since 1960, still is less than 300,000, and the relative decline of whites in employment inevitably undermines their bargaining power in relation to employers. In this situation the employers, with a characteristically capitalist lack of concern for either the welfare or the colour of their labour units, are becoming freer than in the past to employ black workers at low wage rates that whites reject as beneath them. The long-term result of this would be the erosion of the privileges which satisfy the aristocracy of labour. The fear of this has been a powerful motive behind T.U.C.S.A.'s recent wrigglings. For those white unionists who have argued the need to encourage the affiliation of African unions, the case has been explicitly based on self-interest. The Report of the N.E.C. of T.U.C.S.A. to its 12th Annual Conference in Durban in May 1966 put the case thus:

If these (white) unions should eventually be regarded as unrepresentative, they will lose their bargaining position under the Industrial Conciliation Act. This is already happening in certain sectors of industry and job reservation cannot stop it. (p. 7)

The report went on to argue that the continued integration of Africans into the labour force must continue if expansion was to be maintained. Unfortunately, but typically, the conclusion it drew showed no concern for the working class as a whole:

Unless these African workers, through properly-led (i.e. T.U.C.S.A.-controlled) trade union organisations, are assured of reasonable wage standards and working conditions, they will push out those workers who cannot accept the low wages which the Africans will gladly work for.

Unfortunately an influential section of the White Trade Union Movement either will not, or cannot, see this danger and steadily opposes the organi-

either will not, or cannot, see this danger and steadily opposes the organisation of African unions. These White workers are apparently blind to a great and growing danger and they will be responsible . . . for the ultimate destruction of the organised (i.e. white) labour movement in South Africa. (p. 8)

If the present racial structure of industrial organisation is destroyed—as it must be, along with the capitalist economic system and racist

political system of which it is a part, for exploitation to be ended—and if many of its defenders die in the futile attempt to save it, it will not be for lack of warning or alternatives. For years the Communist Party has urged upon white workers the self-destructive danger of seeking security in policies which divide the working class on racial lines. For years the progressive forces in the South African Trades and Labour Council, and afterwards the progressive policies of s.a.c.t.u., offered a genuine non-racial alternative. They were spurned, and those who spurned them cannot now complain if the inexorable forces of economic expansion and the growing political and military strength of the armed vanguard of the national liberation struggle converge to destroy the whole apartheid system.

There is a fourth and no less sinister side to this process. It has been brought to light recently by the publication of the proposed terms of an agreement covering the whole iron and steel industry with its 230,000 workers, of whom only 66,000 are whites. The agreement was negotiated between eight registered trade unions and the Steel and Engineering Industries Federation. African workers were excluded from the negotiations, which lasted nearly a year. The wage rates 'agreed' for African workers have been widely condemned. The minimum wage for unskilled workers will be 19 cents an hour, well below the Poverty Datum Line calculated by the Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Department (which, in such matters, is not known for its compassion for the welfare of its unwilling subjects). Under the agreement, not only will these sub- and near-starvation wage rates remain in force for at least two years, but the victims will have to work alongside whites with starting salaries 500 per cent greater.

In these circumstances it might seem churlish of the white workers to criticise the agreement. Yet they have done so, because job fragmentation has been built into it in such a way that jobs that were formerly skilled have been broken down into semi- and unskilled components, and Africans will in future be doing aspects of a journey-man's job at much lower wages than those received by white skilled workers.

WHAT OF THE FUTURE?

Once again, the division of the working class on racial lines plays right into the hands of the bosses, and the lower paid non-white workers are subjected to even more ruthless exploitation than before. This pattern can be expected to spread to other industries, with the bosses' task made easier by the introduction of automation and technological innovation, and the additional pretexts and opportunities for job-splitting which they provide. Viewed in isolation, the economic future for the country's

non-whites is gloomy. But the broader reality embraces other factors, and these change the long-term perspective.

The fight for trade union rights and the fight against exploitation in South Africa are part and parcel of the broader struggle for democratic rights in a free non-racial society. That this struggle is now being waged by the guerrilla forces of the national liberation movement should be a source of inspiration to workers all over the world, for it brings the day of freedom nearer. The South African Communist Party has called upon the international working class to show its solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa in this decisive phase of their revolutionary struggle. In our land of wealth and promise, the abundant rewards of men's labours shall be shared by all. This is our goal, and the struggle our historic task.

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SOCIALISM AND RURAL RURAL REVOLUTION

A. Langa

THE KEY TO Africa's development, it has often been said, lies in the countryside, in the agricultural production upon which all African countries are overwhelmingly dependent, and from which the vast majority of our people draw their livelihood. Agriculture must continue to support the people, must give them the chance and the reality of a better life, and must in large part produce the surplus to finance industrialisation and the building of strong, independent, modern economies.

But African agriculture, characteristically, is technologically backward, slow to respond to market changes, low in productivity, and dependent on price-fixing cartels which largely control the world prices of tropical agricultural commodities. Coffee, sugar, cotton, cocoa, sisal, pyrethrum—they are all a boon and a burden to the African peasant. He wants to grow these export crops, to liberate him from mere subsistence farming, to give him cash to pay his taxes and his children's school fees, to buy a few tiny 'luxuries' such as cloth, a handcart, perhaps a bicycle. But one year he gets quite a good price, the next he is ruined, and he has no capital to cushion him in the many bad years.

How can production be improved? Certainly not by 'increased productivity' (a favourite slogan among overseas 'experts') on the part of individual small peasants. How can a man who slaves, from dawn to dusk, with his entire family, on a miserable little piece of infertile ground which he may not even own, be expected to be more productive? He does not know how to increase his yield, but even if he did, he has neither the strength nor the means to do so.

It is obvious, therefore, that African farming must be increasingly organised along large-scale, mechanised lines, so that modern methods, modern machinery and sophisticated organisational techniques can produce what thousands of illiterate peasants on tiny holdings cannot. But it is not, of course, simply a question of correct organisation and investment. In essence, the entire question of agrarian reform, in Africa as elsewhere, is political: the crucial issues are those which involve the class structure of the countryside and the composition and ideology of the national élite.

This is the message of Abdel Ghoneim of the United Arab Republic, in a paper to the historic Cairo Seminar of African progressive and revolutionary parties, held just over a year ago. (His paper, and a wide selection of others read at the seminar, are collected in Africa: National and Social Revolution, Peace and Socialism Publishers, Prague*.) As Ghoneim points out, agrarian conditions, rural class structure, levels of political consciousness and ruling ideologies differ widely from country to country, and there are consequently many differing solutions to the agrarian problem. But at the heart of it is the liberation of the peasantry from feudalist and capitalist exploitation, and the liberation of production from semi-feudal and semi-capitalist relationships.

As Ghoneim shows so clearly, the legacy of colonialism, in the rural areas as in the towns, has been the introduction of capitalist modes of production and the nuclei of capitalist classes, involving private tenure of land that was once communally or feudally owned, and the formation of capitalist marketing and distributing structures to deal with the new commercial agriculture. Thus, in West Africa the characteristic rural situation is one of uneasy coexistence of tribal communism, feudal landlordism and capitalist freehold tenure, with the former two losing out to the latter. As the rural bourgeoisie buys up land, the small peasants are forced out, and the feudal rentiers expropriate land for their own use. The class structure is correspondingly complicated; the largest class, however (some 60 per cent of the rural population), consists of middle-level landowners, who either own or rent their land, do not own any capital, and are too small to employ labour. The rich peasantry, capitalist farmers and feudalists do not constitute more than 10 per cent of the population, while at the bottom of the social hierarchy are the agricultural labourers and the poor peasantry, who cultivate very small plots for subsistence, supplementing their income by seasonal labour.

Quite plainly, Ghoneim is right when he says that it is this large

^{*} Available from Central Books, London. 3/6, (plus 1/- postage).

middle-level peasantry, with small holdings and no capital, which is at the root of agricultural backwardness. What is the solution?

FREEHOLD—THE CAPITALIST SOLUTION

A favourite policy advocated by imperialist experts and by indigenous African capitalists is the complete 'marketisation' of land tenure. In other words, they seek to destroy existing feudal and communal systems of land ownership, and substitute freehold ownership of farming land. The prime example of this, of course, is Kenya's land consolidation and registration programme, set in train by the imperialists as a weapon against the Kikuyu liberation fighters, and enthusiastically carried on by Kenya's present government. What does this policy mean, in essence? In the first place, it gives many opportunities for enrichment to the capitalist class, who have the capital (and often State power to back them up) to enlarge their farms and squeeze out the poorer peasants.

Its object—and this is something the British made quite explicit in Kenya†—is to facilitate the development of a class of large capitalist landowners, underpinned by a numerically strong body of small landowners who own and work their own land, with a class of landless peasants to form the labour force to minister to the needs of the rural capitalists. There are two threads of reasoning here: firstly, since it is evident that peasants will have little incentive to undertake improvements in technique or to grow long-maturing crops if their ownership is insecure, freehold title will provide them with the missing incentive. Secondly, the capitalist class, who are to reap the main benefits of the establishment of individual tenure, will be buttressed from political attack by this new class of conservative peasants, who will be unwilling to jeopardise their new-found security through radical action, thus leaving the large landowners in peace to reap the major benefits.

The political rationale for this policy—the containment of social change, the defeat of socialism, and the introduction of capitalist exploitation on a wide scale in the rural areas—makes it obvious why freehold tenure should be resisted by democratic and socialist forces in African countries where non-capitalist relations of production still

[†] This 'three-tier' class system was set out in the so-called Swynnerton Plan for African Agriculture, and implemented in the consolidation programme. Its aim, according to D. J. Penwill, the responsible official in the colonial Dept. of Agriculture, was 'to accomplish a social revolution . . . to standards of life and social behaviour set by the immigrant European community', and the Special Commissioner for Kenya's Central Province noted in 1957 that the object of land reform was to create upper and middle strata of farmers 'too busy on their land to worry about political agitation'. For a full and revealing treatment of land consolidation in Kenya, see M. P. K. Sorrenson—Land Reform in Kikuyu Country, Oxford University Press, 1967.

exist on a wide scale. But even if we ignore the most important aspect of individual ownership—its political character—we are still left with the fact that capitalist policies in regard to rural land in Africa just do not work.

The most important reason for this is the notorious weakness of the indigenous bourgeoisie: its specific character, and in particular its weakness vis-à-vis imperialist interests, makes it impossible for the bourgeoisie to make a substantial positive contribution to increased rural production. The capitalist farmers in the rural areas of most African countries can be divided into three groups: the administrative and political élite, former petty traders and merchants, and former tribal or feudal authorities, who have 'converted themselves' into capitalists, rather than remain as mere rentiers,

PARASITISM

It is a striking characteristic of many newly-independent African states that the new African administrative class, and the Members of Parliament, government ministers and party hangers-on, divert a large part of their new-found wealth into the purchase of land as an 'insurance policy'. In some cases, as in Kenya, these purchases are the result of private and often corrupt relationships between African politicians and colonial settlers. In others, the land is bought from poor peasants or 'acquired' in the wake of government 'redevelopment programmes'. But what can they contribute? Their prime interest is not in developing their land—they are absentees, living it up in the capital, indulging in the game of power. Their interest in their land is mainly concentrated, while they remain in power, on ensuring that it is utilised to the full for tax purposes, for renting to poor peasants or landless people in small plots (which are hence relatively unproductive), and for speculation. Thus the tenants' meagre resources are wasted in providing rent to the absentees for him to squander in high living and political horse-trading in the capital, and providing bribes for the 'farm manager' in order to be allowed to grub a miserable existence out of his plot. The administrative-political bourgeoisie, therefore, are almost textbook examples of parasitism—their productive contribution is minimal, and they are particularly prone to non-productive spending as well as to chronic insecurity, which, paradoxically, does not lead them to invest in productive ventures, as we have shown.

There are serious weaknesses, too, in the position of the other components of the rural bourgeoisie. Those who owe their comparative wealth to their former positions as traders, petty middlemen and merchants under colonialism are, it may be said, more interested in raising agricultural production. But they have two faults: firstly, as Ghoneim

shows in the case of West Africa, they are characteristically inclined to indulge their petty-bourgeois commercial instincts in speculative trading and marketing; and secondly, their capital is small, which makes them particularly prone to the frequent fluctuations in market prices. In sum, they tend to over-extend themselves by hiring labour and buying sophisticated agricultural equipment on credit, and by attempting to retain their former status as commercial entrepreneurs in the country-side. Their strength, such as it is, lies in their enthusiasm for innovation—their weakness, in essence, in their greed.

The tribal and/or feudal authorities who have become large private landowners have some problems in common, but some which are peculiar to them. The major weaknesses worthy of mention are in fact political in character: they are the uneasiest partners in the bourgeois coalition, and their imperialist past ensures the hatred of the mass of rural poor. These are the former chiefs and headmen, the 'indirect rulers' and tax collectors so beloved of colonial district commissioners and so loathed by their fellow-countrymen—including, and this is the nub of their problem, the new bourgeoisie many of whom after all, played a prominent part in the anti-imperialist struggle. While they are in alliance with the new capitalists where the suppression of rural revolt and the desire for individual wealth is concerned, there are always present, just beneath the surface, the eternal tensions between new and old, each grasping the other by the hand, but in reality wanting to grasp him by the throat.

As Ghoneim shows in regard to Egypt and West Africa, and as experience elsewhere in Africa amply demonstrates, the large landowners do not, in fact, provide a productive nucleus for the solution, even on the most brutal and unjust level, of the problem of agrarian production. And the bulk of the rural population, labouring under the familiar burdens of the inefficient scale of farming, lack of capital and oppressive marketing conditions, offer little hope. It is true that in a number of countries the productivity of this class has risen substantially, due in the main to more widespread introduction of cash crops in colonialism's declining years. But the burdens remain, and to them must be added the crucial factor which will contribute, and in some cases is already contributing, to the impoverishment of the middle peasantry, reducing most of them to the level of the poor peasants, and enabling only a very few to escape upwards into the capitalist class: the steady decline in world prices for unprocessed agricultural commodities.

It should be emphasised that in this process, the role of the pricefixing imperialist cartels is slowly becoming less important, although for some crops—coffee and cocoa are examples—it is still crucial. More

and more, however, the decline is due to overproduction, and where it is relative, to the higher prices of processed and manufactured goods. There is thus a prospect of *steady impoverishment* of primary producing countries, against which the efforts of the Third World at international trade and development conferences and the like, laudable and necessary though they are, are merely a palliative. Obviously, the long-term solution involves industrialisation, both to counteract the adverse terms of trade, and to process home-produced raw materials and thus break the manufacturing monopoly of the imperialist world system, whereby for example, rope is sold by Britain to sisal-producing Tanzania, chocolate to cocoa-farming Ghana, and insecticide to pyrethrum-producing Kenya. But for the foreseeable future, development must involve substantial expansion, both quantitively and in terms of crop diversification, in the rural sector.

RURAL SOCIALISM 'BY DECREE'

The hammering out of a viable socialist alternative to the agrarian problem is fraught with difficulty, and Ghoneim's analysis of the Egyptian experience illustrates this, as do the proposals he puts forward as a tentative model for rural socialism.

In general, he says—and this is very much in line with Egyptian developments of the last few years—the agrarian revolution is in two stages—democratic and socialist. The first stage involves returning the land to those who till it—that is, expropriating the foreigners, feudal chiefs, rentiers and the like—while the second, to be achieved by persuasion and not by compulsion, consists of the gradual establishment of socialism by setting up rural co-operatives, initially concerned with collective marketing, but later taking the form of authentic socialist ownership of land and equipment—in other words, evolving towards the collective farm. Ghoneim adds that, in countries where relatively advanced feudalist and capitalist classes do not exist in the countryside, the first stage of the agrarian revolution may be bypassed, and socialism put into operation from the start.

But we are entitled to enquire: just where and under what conditions can this revolution be carried out in the way that Ghoneim suggests? Certainly the U.A.R., which has had a better thought-out agrarian policy than most African countries, a determined government (at least at the very top), and a peasantry which, while oppressed and downtrodden, was considerably more class-conscious and developed than most in Africa, had had the most severe problems, as yet unresolved, in applying the type of policy which Ghoneim advocates. He tells us, for example, how the Egyptian rural ruling class subverted land 'ceilings' by installing their relatives in land surrounding their depleted holdings;

how the bourgeoisie, with allies within the bureaucracy, evaded the 1961 law reserving four-fifths of co-operative board seats for poor peasants by the simple expedient of intimidating the peasants into placing picked candidates on the boards, where they faithfully served the interests of their capitalist and feudalist masters . . . and so on. The feudalists and capitalists even penetrated Arab Socialist Union branches in the countryside, so that the peasants were deprived of an important organisational weapon. The ultimate expression of bourgeois-feudalist subversion, of course, was the abortive Muslim Brotherhood conspiracy.

WHO HOLDS POWER?

The Egyptian lesson is clear: administrative and legal reforms, however well-intentioned, are not the ultimate solution. In the rural areas as in the nation in general, reality does not lie in constitutions, statutes, organisational arrangements, and administrative tinkerings, but in the actual distribution of power. For the peasantry, the crucial questions must be: who controls the state machine? who owns the land, the capital, the marketing organisations? who controls the media of communication—press and radio, popular meetings and village conferences?

If the rural bourgeoisie, aided by the 'bureaucrat-capitalists' and feudalists, holds these crucial weapons, no marketing co-operative, no democratic village council, no peasant credit society can do more than alleviate immediate burdens, leaving the basic problems unresolved. In essence, the peasantry must be able, under the guidance and with the help of the socialist party (or, if they are very lucky, the progressive government), to wrest control of the levers of power from their rural oppressors. And to retain that control, they need the help of the urban workers and other progressive elements; otherwise the bourgeoisie will regroup, seek allies in the cities, and strike back.

If this approach seems excessively 'revolutionist', it is perhaps because African progressives, inspired by the great and glorious liberation of our continent in the last two decades, have been over-optimistic about the abilities of progressive regimes to introduce socialism without social revolution. The possibility cannot, of course, be ruled out; suffice it to say that we have witnessed over the years a depressing succession of coups overthrowing democratic governments, and sell-outs to imperialism and reaction by self-seekers who once persuaded us of their patriotism. Even in those countries where governments have had the courage to stick to their principles, the struggle is by no means won. Aside from the ever-present threat of imperialist intervention, Tanzania, Egypt, Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and others are only now learning the grim realities of class warfare. We are all learning how co-operatives

can become tools for the advancement of capitalism, how democratic land redistribution can create new strata of reactionaries, how party branches are transformed into feudalist cabals, how misinformation and ignorance can weaken progress and turn large groups of peasants into counter-revolutionaries, how feudalism and capitalism advance everywhere in new guises and subtleties. What we have yet to developand the work of Ghoneim and other theoretical and practical writers help us in this—is a comprehensive and penetrating analysis of the nature of African agricultural problems and their relationship to the major political issues of national independence, democracy and socialism. Without such knowledge and theory as weapons, the struggle for socialism in a continent where over 90 per cent of the people get their livelihood from the land is doomed to suffer repeated setbacks and failures. As Frantz Fanon wrote, 'down there at the bottom is an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time'. The mass waits only to be shown the way, and they will march.

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NKRUMAH, GHANA AND THE CONGO

Reap the Whirlwind. An account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966, by Geoffrey Bing (MacGibbon and Kee, 6s.).

Dark Days in Ghana, by Kwame Nkrumah (Lawrence and Wishart, 12s. 6d.).

Challenge of the Congo, by Kwame Nkrumah. A Case study of Foreign Pressures in an independent state (Nelson, 42s.).

Colonialism, says Geoffrey Bing, has never consisted merely in rule by an alien power. 'It brings in its train a series of commercial, financial, military and social relationships which do not disappear at the ending of imperial rule and have often, from long usage, come to be regarded as the natural order of things.' Thus, he argues, the old colonial system cannot be set aside by some broad sweep of policy. 'The bonds which bind down a poor country come to independence are not of solid weave. They are composed of a thousand separate strands often not even intertwined.'

The statement is incontestable; the evidence has not before been argued so lucidly, from rich 'inside' experience of the attempts of one country to free itself from entanglement with these thousand separate strands. Geoffrey Bing writes a personal account of his sixteen years in Ghana, first as a practising barrister of the Bar of the old colonial Gold Coast, then as constitutional adviser to Nkrumah when he first became Prime Minister, then as Attorney-General, a post he held for four years until he was locked up in the coup d'état of 1966. He gives a fascinating and absorbing insight into the great families who had provided an African ruling class in the past and who felt that, with the coming of independence, the country's ruination was caused by the

'unfortunate' adoption of universal suffrage; they wanted a legislative assembly of the British type, but the House of Commons before 1867 was their model. The 1954 Constitution that was devised did not go back that far into history but it deliberately turned the principles of parliamentary government upside down. Those who 'prepared' African colonies for independence had no finality of purpose, and, indeed, this so-called 'preparation for independence' is shown to be a myth. The Colonial Office blocked attempts by Ghanaian political leaders to prepare themselves and their country: in the period between full selfgovernment and independence the C.P.P. was actually prevented from training and assembling its own civil service machine. As for the outgoing civil service, the Colonial Office men thought the main battle of the constitution was to find the right form of words to safeguard the 519 colonial civil servants, and pages of the constitution were filled with the methods to be used to calculate the exact sums (£8,000 down payment plus a pension) due to these officials. The drain of these officials could not have been all that unwelcome, but the transition period was not used to build a new machine to cope. Suddenly a newly independent country with gigantic economic and development problems, with a mono-crop economy at the mercy of the prices of the world market, found itself having to find from scratch enough trained individuals to man the whole apparatus of state. This book describes in rich and lively anecdote several of the institutional and other legacies of colonialism: an army that insisted on its right to military (like academic) freedom, believing that an army, like a university, should be a sovereign entity distinct from the party and the political system state; an education system and a university that considered itself far above giving the training needed to man an economy, that could supply graduates learned in ancient history and the classics, but few who could deal with problems of international trade and planning.

When he was arrested during the army and police coup of 1966 and found himself pacing the prison yard, Bing asked himself whether it was inevitable that the Nkrumah system be destroyed overnight, in circumstances he had never anticipated. Was what happened, in fact, inevitable? Could Nkrumah in practice have followed another policy and if he had, would it have been any more successful. Had the new state of Ghana been born with such congenital defects that it could never have long survived, or was the collapse of the Nkrumah system due to a series of subsequent miscalculations, mistakes and crimes which, with ordinary prudence and honesty, could have been avoided? Bing makes it plain throughout that Ghana's economic and other problems must be seen in the framework of the struggles of the countries of the Third World to build economies at the mercy of

falling export prices and manipulations of the world market. His finding is that Ghana failed 'because the western world determines that it should not succeed.' The falling price of cocoa had a disastrous effect on Ghana's economy. What about foreign intrigue and intervention? If the United States had intervened through its secret services so effectively in so many countries, why not in Ghana? But, weighing the evidence to date, 'it is impossible to say more than there is a prima facie case that the C.I.A. may have had a hand in the plot'.

Many questions go unanswered, many crucial contributory causes for the collapse of the C.P.P. government unprobed, unexplored, even unexpressed. It is true that the drop in the cocoa price was disastrous but at the same time agriculture was showing no signs of development, there was a marked decline in the output of other major cash crops, and while capital for development was accumulated very impressively indeed, it was not matched by a mobilisation of human resources, and of political and administrative leadership. All of which, in turn, were drains on the economy. Of course the institutional and other legacies of colonialism were a deadweight on the new state; how and why did the state fail, not so much to train the planners, the experts and the technicians, but to evolve new instruments for social transformation, above all else a party able to achieve popular mobilisation and a democratic party structure?

This is all, perhaps, beyond the stated purview of Bing's book, but by not stating these factors, and by providing explanations about the coup that deflect the causes to outside (western economic pressure and possible still-to-be-discovered c.i.a. or West German intrigues), Reap the Whirlwind underplays the factors that revolutionaries in Africa need most desperately to analyse from the Ghanaian experience.

Clearly, the social forces that had won independence could not transform the state. The objective was a mass, mobilising party. The product was an apparatus run by incompetent and high-handed party and government officials who built not from the village up but by subordinating trade unions, farmers' groups, women, youth and other organisations, to the administrative control of the c.p.p. The c.p.p. itself was an interclass party; committed verbally to the building of socialism, opposed by forces outside of it that stood for unalloyed free enterprise in alliance with international capital, but also enveloping within itself groups and sub-groups of the c.p.p. leadership that had similar purposes, some who used politics as a power game and the cult of the personality to insinuate themselves into favour, and got away with it because it was a bureaucratic and not a revolutionary party, and its revolutionary strategy was not based on a close analysis of social forces.

What kind of party instead? What strategy? One turns if not for the answers, ready-made and packaged, at least for a discussion of the problem, to Kwame Nkrumah's own new book, Dark Days in Ghana. He sets out to describe in detail the event of the coup. This makes a lurid picture but one which in a number of places suggests that his informants, for some reasons of their own, felt that exaggeration took first place above accuracy. Nkrumah's own approach is disappointingly facile. This is not the critical re-interpretation from a socialist standpoint of the C.P.P. period of government and planning. There is repeated denunciation of the traitors and rebels who seized power and are today turning Ghana into a colony of the West, especially the United States and West Germany; there is material on Ghana's economic achievements and plans, nothing new, mostly re-presentation of official data; there is some historical material on the rise to power of the C.P.P., also not new; there are long messages of support, some printed twice, and irritating because they continue in the old tradition of obsequious tribute to the Head of State; and there is a strong piece about the C.I.A. and all its intrigues in Africa, including the charge that the U.S. Ambassador offered the traitors 13 million dollars to carry out a coup d'état (which would build more than Bing's prima facie case, surely, if this can be substantiated. But can it?). It is always a safe and a necessary assumption that the C.I.A. is intent to bring down an African government that comes anywhere near the aims and goals and actions of the C.P.P.; it is another thing to use the general assumption as a substitute for evaluating how extenral and internal factors interlocked in counter-revolution. How devise alternate policies, and remedies, if a view of the causes of political events is so woolly, generalised and imprecise?

There are one or two places in the book where Nkrumah approaches the real problem. '... the old organisation (the C.P.P.) was defective and the old leadership which was in many cases inherited from the struggle against British imperialism was inadequate for its task and when put to the test of crisis failed . . . ' 'the coup d'état made it plain that the C.P.P. can no longer follow the path of the old line. It must develop a new and reformed revolutionary leadership which must come from the broad mass of the Party . . . ' But no more than three paragraphs of this in a book of 163 pages, and at the end of chapter six, a sentence that is in accord with recent calls to armed insurrection carried in Africa and the World: 'The only effective solution lies in revolutionary action in the form of a counter-coup, that is to say, a decisive reversal of the original coup.' Which calls for a closer look at whether a counter-coup could be this 'revolutionary' action, and what about all those other questions of policy and strategy without whose answers one can't

analyse the immediate past, let alone equip the present, and the immediate future.

Challenge of the Congo is largely a collection of documents of Nkrumah's correspondence with Lumumba, and with African and other governments, also confidential despatches from his diplomatic representatives during the 1960 Congo crisis and onwards, and during the tragic murder of Lumumba. These contemporary diplomatic records make an invaluable source for evaluating the foreign pressures on the Congo, also Ghana's conduct of her own foreign policy. In places there is lavish advice to Lumumba, and sets of detailed steps are enumerated for him to follow. 'Do not force Kasavubu out now' 'Do not make an issue of Tshombe's treachery' (this for tactical action reasons at the time not in general) and, after a blueprint for a Cabinet system 'If you fail you have only yourself to blame.' There is the agreement concluded between Nkrumah and Lumumba to pool their states in a Union of African States, this in August 1960, precarious days for the young Congo state. There is a wealth of material, too, on tussles inside the United Nations and with General Alexander, then in command of Ghana's army in the Congo, about the role of the Ghanaian forces there.

A MOST PREDICTABLE RESPONSE

A Very Strange Society, by Allen Drury (Michael Joseph, 50s.).

Subtitled A Journey to the Heart of South Africa, the book's main interest lies in its guide to the thinking of a man who expresses all too clearly certain realities underlying U.S. policy in relation to South Africa.

Mr. Drury has interviewed many South Africans, has recorded many Government spokesmen's recitations of what they are doing for 'the Bantu', as Mr. Drury calls the African people—when he doesn't refer to them as Natives. He has spoken to non-Nats too—though it's a curious thing that these usually seem to be slightly drunk, or embittered or inspired by 'the sentimental myths of a pseudo and phoney liberalism'. Mr. Drury seems clear about one thing; he states that those who oppose the Government actively are communists, for the overthrow of 'any stable government' and that 'like any government' the South African regime has a right to defend itself against them. He never explores on what basis South Africa's rulers are elected as a government when considering this—just as he never investigates

more deeply when South African spokesmen deny torture of political prisoners.

Mr. Drury's interviews are interspersed with items quoted from newspapers (which, unfortunately, are undated, making the book useless as a work of reference). From these cuttings, a picture cannot but emerge of oppression, of suffering, and of barbarous behaviour on the part of the Whites. This is all the more interesting in that Mr. Drury is above all concerned that U.S. policy should not be one of 'appeasing Black African states who are one inch from savagery . . . and who don't even have the saving graces of intelligence, industry and common ordinary good sense and stability to excuse them'.

The quality which is glaringly absent from Mr. Drury's book is natural indignation; indeed he found an interview with an American diplomat who hated apartheid so unsatisfactory that he felt the offender should be posted straight back home. Mr. Drury has no such temptations to passion. He is calmly able to record: 'I like John Vorster'.

Mr. Drury's concern for 'stability' has already been noted. He was able to announce, of revolution, that 'I neither saw nor heard anything to convince me of its imminence or even of its possibility'. Perhaps in view of recent developments, he is now having second thoughts. If so, they will be unwelcome ones. For in his opinion 'something irreparable will be lost if South Africa is lost. And lost she will be, in one way or another, unless the responsible elements of the West understand her and give her genuine help'.

Mr. Drury could hardly speak more plainly than that.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Dear Comrades:

I have just completed the reading of your issue No. 33. I congratulate you particularly on the article entitled 'Africa in America—Our People in the U.S.A.' It is a contribution to the struggle against imperialism in the United States, the strongest link in and at once the rotting core of world imperialism.

Our hands clasp. We are indissolubly linked together by the historical development of society as Africans, Afro-Americans and most of all as human beings. We have as Karl Marx declared only our chains to lose.

The main key to the irons that hold us in subjugation is in the hand of the monstrously brutal imperialists of this country. For those of us of African descent who live here—this is a profound challenge. Our late Comrade Dr. W. E. B. DuBois recognised its magnitude. He also as you have noted had boundless faith in our ability to meet it.

Almost all of Black America was touched by the resolution of the African States gathered in 1963 in Addis Ababa when in their Summit Conference that imperialist bedevilled group paused to express the: '... deep concern aroused in all African peoples and governments by the measures of racial discrimination against communities of African origin living outside the continent and particularly in the United States.'

We are a new people, an amalgam of Africa, Europe, east and west, of Asia, of the Indians native to this soil. These are peoples who have perforce and voluntarily been wedded to the African in the U.S.A. We are a new people. But we are a strong link with progressive Africa. Capitalist America made of colour a bond that cannot be severed. Yet our strongest ties are political and not as some militants here conclude biological.

We share with you the great DuBois. He lived with us. He died with you. And if you venerate his name as 'the father of African unity' we hold that name banner high for he was also the greatest American of the 20th Century; a man whose deep appreciation of reality brought him inevitably to Communism. In his relentless pursuit of objective

truth DuBois revealed to us the many facets and political virtues of our ties with Africa with you and with mankind.

We are attached to you by the realities of life. But the dialectics of historical development coming from the unparalleled impact of the socialist revolution in the empire of the Tsars, that prison house of nations and the rise and decay of American imperialism have strengthened that bond and helped clarify our vision. Our freedom is bound up with yours. This we recognise.

I write because among the enemies of U.S. imperialism are some militants out of whose emotionalism comes new and false ideological concepts of how best to give practical, meaningful political value to our relationship. They would give up their birthright, the heritage that is theirs as that segment of American nationals who together with white workers have made the U.S.A. what it is in terms of industrial power. They espouse a separatist movement which if carried into life would remove us from the fray and cause us to surrender to imperialism what of right is ours. They do not see that to aid in the liberation of Africa and ourselves we must relentlessly fight imperialism here and on every front.

The fight to end the war in Vietnam is not only in the interests of that heroic people. It is an aid to all liberation struggles in Africa, Asia, Latin America. It can mark a far-reaching defeat of imperialism that can have great repercussions. That too you must say to the peoples of the U.S.A. Your voice can be of great assistance.

We are fighting for the unity of Afro-Americans in struggle regardless of creed or political affiliation. But we cannot counterpose that to the fight to align black and white in the battle against the common foe. Imperialism strives desperately to thwart the realisation of that unity. We believe that in the momentous battle ahead: 'Emotional responses alone are inadequate' as Claude Lightfoot says in his Ghetto Rebellion to Black Liberation.

'Up from Slavery' through heroic struggles the children of African ancestry spiritually and physically lead the fight for human freedom in the U.S.A. They are capable of playing a leading role in developing a massive peoples' conflict against the dehumanising course mapped by imperialism domestically and in its foreign policy. How profoundly this would aid the liberation struggles of the African peoples. This step is also in our interest and consistent with our responsibilities to you our brothers and mankind. We will go forward to victory destroying the myths of white superiority.

Incidentally Adam Clayton Powell was not the only black Congressman. There are six Afro-Americans in the House of Representatives and Senate. We constitute 11 per cent of the total population. Maybe more! How often are blacks not counted when a census is taken. But we are not a recorded majority in any given state.

Unfortunately we have black 'leaders,' who embrace the anti-Communist position of their imperialist overlords, among whom are the top leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People and the Urban League. Their influence wanes, however.

Men like Henry Winston, Claude Lightfoot and James Jackson are constantly calling the attention of the Afro-American to the murderous role of U.S. imperialism on the African continent. They are among the foremost leaders of the Communist Party U.S.A. Added to their voices are those of Rev. Ralph Abernathy now leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Council, the heads of SNICK of CORE and many militant leaders.

We salute you.

WILLIAM L. PATTERSON National Committee, C.P.U.S.A.

I READ WITH much appreciation the very generous review by A. Langa, of my book *Introduction to Neo-Colonialism*, in the issue Number 33 of The African Communist.

As an author I am naturally reluctant to comment on a review of one of my own books, nor would I presume to take issue with A. Langa's views and estimates. There is, however, one point which I feel may misrepresent what I actually said in the book itself. At the end of his review Mr. Langa says 'the only solution, Mr. Woddis emphasises, is for the people of the Third World to do battle against the internal agents of imperialism, if necessary with arms in hand'. It is quite correct that this question of the struggle against the internal agents of imperialism is made clear in the final section of the book, but I did not say that this is 'the only solution'. In the first case I state 'In a number of cases, this will involve armed conflict' and further it will be found that I also emphasise that

'Neo-colonialism is a world-wide phenomenon; it cannot be defeated by the people of each country acting in isolation. It requires the united effort of all anti-imperialist forces—the socialist countries, the national liberation movements, and the working class and democratic movement in the imperialist countries.'

In other words, I have tried to indicate that the struggle against neo-colonialism is part of the twentieth century revolution and is not something which is the concern solely of the people in the Third World itself.

I hope that Mr. Langa will appreciate the reasons for my making these comments.

JACK WODDIS.

A. Langa comments:

I welcome Comrade Woddis's comment on my review of his book, and apologise for the unintentional oversimplification of his views. I did not wish to suggest, of course, that the struggle against neo-colonialism was only a matter for the people of the Third World: indeed, as he rightly points out, it requires the united effort of all democratic and revolutionary forces. I wished to emphasise, however, the urgency of the struggle against neo-colonialism by the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and to point out that in the present era of intensified imperialist aggression throughout the world, the Cuban revolutionary slogan 'Patria o muerte!'—Fatherland or death!—has taken on a new significance.



BROTHER PARTIES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

On the Meeting of Representatives of the South African Communist Party and the Communist Party of Lesotho.

RECENTLY REPRESENTATIVES OF the South African Communist Party and the Communist Party of Lesotho met and had friendly discussions. The delegation from Lesotho conveyed fraternal greetings to the brother Party from the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Lesotho, Comrade J. M. Kena, from the Central Committee and all Basotho Communists.

The C.P.L. delegation informed the South African comrades about the general political situation in Lesotho, the neo-colonial character of the present Leabua Jonathan regime and particularly the sinister plans of the fascist Republic of South Africa to turn Lesotho into its exclusive neo-colony, a Bantustan of a new type. Vigorous efforts were being made by the Basotho Communists to build the C.P.L. into a mass party, capable of playing a vanguard role in the struggle against neo-colonialism, for true independence and National Democracy.

The South African representatives in their turn informed the Lesotho delegation of the Party's attitude towards the new stage in the struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa from the fascist and colonial regimes of Vorster, Smith and Salazar. The South African Communist Party warmly welcomed the fighting alliance of the African National Congress and the Zimbabwe African People's Union. It would partici-

pate with all its strength in the South African Revolution to overthrow fascism and white domination on South African soil, and win the just demands of the people's Freedom Charter.

Both Parties recalled the long tradition of revolutionary co-operation and solidarity between the brother peoples of Lesotho and South Africa, which had originated in the seventeenth century wars of resistance against colonial-settler expansion in Southern Africa, had developed in the course of the national liberation movement, and would continue in the common struggle against the common enemy—South African imperialism—and for a common destiny—national freedom, self-determination and socialism.

Both delegations reaffirmed the fact that the relations between the South African Communist Party and the Communist Party of Lesotho have always been normal relations between fraternal Marxist-Leninist Parties, relations of independence and sovereignty of each Party, of mutual and fraternal co-operation and cohesion on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Both Parties expressed their determination to maintain and further develop and strengthen their brotherly relationship, in the cause of national independence, national democracy and socialism.

Both delegations noted with satisfaction that there existed a similarity of positions between the South African Communist Party and the Communist Party of Lesotho on the present international situation and the International Working-Class and Communist Movement. Stressing the need for world anti-imperialist unity, and paying tribute to the inspiring resistance of the heroic people of Vietnam against U.S. aggression, the participants in the joint meeting expressed the resolute determination of their respective Parties to promote the success of the forthcoming International Conference of Communist and Workers' Parties to begin in Moscow on November 25th, 1968.

Representatives of both the brother Parties consider their meeting to have been a great success and an important step in the way of strengthening the fraternal relations between the Communist Party of Lesotho and the South African Communist Party in the interests of the oppressed and working people of both countries.

Meeting between Representatives of the South African Communist Party and Communist Party of Great Britain

The Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa

SUPPORT FOR THE freedom fighters in Southern Africa was the keynote of recent joint talks between representatives of the British and South African Communist Parties.

South African spokesmen gave a brief review of the present stage of the struggle against apartheid, and the heavy blows inflicted against the illegal Smith regime in Rhodesia by the freedom fighters of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (z.a.p.u.) and the African National Congress (a.n.c.) of South Africa.

British Communist spokesmen reviewed the solidarity activity in Britain. It was recognised that the scope and intensity of the campaign in Britain needs to be increased so as to compel a change in Government policy and to win the whole Labour movement for more effective solidarity action.

Both sides agreed that victory for the liberation struggle in South Africa would bring far greater radical changes than elsewhere in Africa because the main political force was an experienced working class. British Communists paid tribute to the revolutionary impetus given to this struggle by South African Communists.

Both sides praised the heroism and courage of the guerrilla fighters, and the African masses engaged in all other forms of resistance to apartheid and white minority rule.

The South African Communists expressed their warm appreciation of the consistent solidarity of British Communists over many years, and both sides pledged to maintain close relations in their continued support for the united fight of all Africans against the common enemy of imperialism, apartheid, and white minority rule.

Dark Days in Ghana

KWAME NKRUMAH

In this book the founder of independent Ghana and the most articulate champion of African unity and socialism describes in detail background and circumstances of the 1966 coup and the violence and repression which accompanied it. Dealing frankly with the difficulties which the government under his own Presidency faced, he refutes charges of 'dictatorship' and mismanagement and shows convincingly how Ghana was progressing both economically and politically—a progress that has now been interruped. The so-called Liberation Council' of army officers and policemen is destroying Ghana's freedom and independence and selling out to the imperialists. This book is not only Dr. Nkrumah's reply to the military conspirators, but also his message to the peoples of Africa.

paperback 12s. 6d.

Introduction to Neo-Colonialism

JACK WODDIS

'This book provides in a short space and easily read form the most comprehensive and up-to-date factual survey of all the many features and varied practices of neo-colonialism in the present era. As such it is an indispensable guide for the understanding of the problems of modern world politics.' R. Palme Dutt, Labour Monthly.

'Almost an encyclopaedia of neo-colonialism. With amazing concentration Jack Woddis has packed into its pages a mountain range of facts as well as political analysis . . . a *must* for all who wish to keep abreast with what is happening in the world.' Fenner Brockway, *Tribune*.

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