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Central Books London; Imported Publications Chicago; Progress Books Toronto.

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Distributors of The African Communist

#### PRICE AND SUBSCRIPTION

**AFRICA** 

1 shilling (5p) per copy

4s. (20p) per year post free

Airmail £1.50 per year

**EUROPE** 

15p per copy

60p per year post free

N. AMERICA

50 cents per copy

\$ 2.00 per year post free Airmail \$ 5.50 per year

INKULULEKO PUBLICATIONS, 39 Goodge Street, London W.1

#### THE AFRICAN COMMUNIST

Published quarterly in the interests of African solidarity, and as a forum for Marxist-Leninist thought throughout our Continent, by the South African Communist Party

#### CONTENTS

#### 5 EDITORIAL NOTES

Southern Africa on the March: Strike Wave in South Africa; Atrocities in Mozambique; Border War in Rhodesia

#### 29 Alex la Guma

#### VIETNAM - A PEOPLE'S VICTORY

The author, who represented Africa on a World Peace Council delegation which visited North Vietnam from January 13 to 20, 1973, describes his impressions of the places and people that he saw.

#### 36 'WE PAY UNDYING TRIBUTE ...'

Letter from the National Chairman of the South African Communist Party to the Vietnam Workers' Party and the National Liberation Front

#### 38 AMILCAR CABRAL – OUTSTANDING LEADER OF AFRICAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT

A tribute by Dr Yusuf M. Dadoo, chairman, South African Communist Party

#### 44 'CABRAL'S MONUMENT WILL BE A FREE AFRICA'

Statement by the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party

#### 46 E. R. Braverman

#### AFRICAN WORKERS ADVANCE

A South African Trade Unionist describes the tremendous strides made by the African workers in industry, and shows how Black pressures are leading to changes in the labour structure and in the policies of both Black and White trade unionists. This article, written before the January 1973 strike wave, places the recent developments in their proper perspective.

#### 63 E. R. Mataio

#### WORLD TRADE UNION CONFERENCE AGAINST APARTHEID

A South African trade unionist discusses the issues which will be posed at the June conference on apartheid held under the auspices of the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations, and outlines the demands which should be placed before the conference by SACTU and other progressive forces.

#### 70 Joyce Malindi

#### UGANDA'S 'ASIAN PROBLEM' CREATED BY IMPERIALISTS

In this important study the writer analyses the historical causes of racial stratification in Uganda and other territories in East Africa, and shows how class and not race differences are at the root of the problem.

#### 84 J.A. Juma

#### DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSES IN INDEPENDENT KENYA

A student living in Nairobi discusses a sequence of events in Kenya during December 1972 and shows how they add up to a picture of warring classes inside Kenya, conflict between Kenya's bourgeoisie and the expatriates, and government subservience to foreign imperialism.

#### 91 J. Girodot

#### UN SHILLY-SHALLYING ON NAMIBIA

The author says the Waldheim and Escher missions to South Africa and Namibia have been meaningless diplomatic exercises which have fostered illusions about the role of the United Nations in bringing independence to Namibia.

#### 96 A. Langa

#### AFRICA: NOTES AND COMMENTS


Sudan: Trying to Make Friends. Zambia: The Next Battleground? Uganda: Is Amin Desperate? Rockefeller: Going Where the Bread Is.

#### 103 BOOK REVIEWS

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa by Walter Rodney. The South African Connection by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney. Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969 by Francis Wilson. The Roots of Segregation — Native Policy in Natal (1845-1910) by David Welsh. Outline History of the Communist International, Institute of Marxism Leninism. Speeches at Congresses of the Communist International by V.I. Lenin.

#### 122 LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Role of the Proletariat in Africa



# SOUTHERN AFRICA ON THE MARCH

'Only struggle educates the exploited class. Only struggle discloses to it the magnitude of its own power, widens its horizon, enhances its abilities, clarifies its mind, forges its will.'

V.I. Lenin

The Black peoples of Southern Africa are on the march, and events in the sub-continent are sweeping forward with such speed that the White racists have been rocked back on their heels, and in some sectors have suffered outright defeat.

From Tete in Mozambique, through Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia and Angola, the bastions of White power are being challenged as never before. The popular upsurge which is evident on all fronts reflects the growing determination of the oppressed peoples to put an end to the system which condemns them to a life of endless serfdom and poverty — a poverty which becomes more and more intense and unbearable as the White racists try to place the burdens of their political and economic crisis exclusively on the backs of the Black masses.

#### STRIKE WAVE IN SOUTH AFRICA

In the territories controlled by the Vorster regime, 1972 witnessed a gigantic upheaval of the African workers in many centres as they felt the pinch of spiralling inflation. The whole world knows that African trade unions are not recognised in South Africa and that it is a criminal offence for Africans to go on strike. Yet in one centre after another African workers downed tools, defied police intimidation, and went on strike demanding higher wages and better conditions.

The strike wave which started in Namibia in December 1971 and paralysed the economic life of the territory for several months, quickly spread to South Africa. In Durban and Cape Town, dock workers went on strike, in Pretoria and Johannesburg bus drivers, in Industria, Benoni, Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and other centres factory workers, in Kimberley diamond miners — towards the end of the year and early in 1973 sector after sector of the Black working class took action to advance their living standards.

At the height of the strike wave, it was estimated that in

the Durban area alone, over 100 factories had been compelled to shut down and not less than 50,000 Black workers were on strike, the majority of them African, though Indians and Coloureds were also involved. The total numbers on strike may well have been higher — the 'Financial Mail' estimated that there were 100,000 on strike in the Durban area. Many factories were shut down for a few days, sometimes even for only a few hours, to reopen again when the bosses quickly agreed to wage increases.

The strikes did not come like a flash of lightning out of a clear blue sky, but had been gathering momentum for months until the final outburst in January 1973. The spectacle of tens of thousands of Black workers demonstrating in a united and disciplined fashion in the streets chilled the hearts of the White racists. True to style, the Nationalist Government ranted and raved about 'agitation' and 'plots'. A few days before Parliament opened at the end of January, the Minister of Labour, Mr Marais Viljoen, issued a statement saying: 'The strikes in Natal follow a pattern from which it is clear that it is not merely a question of higher wages.' Viljoen said there was every indication of planned action and that 'the action and unwillingness of the workers concerned to negotiate shows undoubtedly that the agitation for trade unions is not the solution and is merely a smokescreen behind which other motives are hidden'.

#### THREATS

The Minister threatened action against those responsible for the 'incitement'. A few days later, during the no-confidence debate in Parliament, Viljoen said the strikes were caused by agitators who wanted to cause the downfall of the government. Linking the strikers with the National Union of South African Students, he alleged that the strikers 'see Black unrest as the only remaining way to bring the Government to a fall'. Money was not the aim. The agitators were merely out to cause chaos and disruption and were using the Black workers as a tool for their sinister political purposes.

The Cabinet's captive Englishman Senator Horwood, the Minister of Indian Affairs, echoed his masters by describing the strikers as 'mischief-makers' who thought they could hold the Government to ransom. It was wrong to say the Black workers had genuine grievances, claimed Horwood. There were nearly 9 million Africans economically employed and there was no unemployment worth talking about.

But the Government's hard line did not meet with universal approval from the Whites, nor even from the volk itself. When, under Government pressure, the police began to arrest, baton-charge and tear-gas the strikers, raid and arrest militant members of the Black People's Convention and turn their dogs loose on the crowds, many began to fear South Africa was on the point of witnessing 'another Sharpeville'. That the country was spared this disaster was in no small measure due to the strikers themselves, who gave the police little chance to indulge in the sort of brutality which is their speciality.

At the beginning of February the police chief on the spot, Brigadier Schroeder, had given the lie to Labour Minister Viljoen when he admitted: 'We have no definite proof of agitation' and added: 'It could have been spontaneous.' And he was not the only one who was forced to face the fact that the Black workers had been driven on to the picket lines because they were no longer prepared or able to exist on their starvation wages.

The Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce released figures in January, 1973, showing that an African family of five needs at least R85.15 a month to survive at the lowest level of existence. The Chamber said that rising prices had forced up the poverty line by 15.6 per cent in the last two years. The poverty datum line covers only the barest necessities of

life, allowing nothing for entertainment, furniture, crockery, utensils, sport or any other of the normal amenities of life which have to be paid for whether or not they are included in the bosses' budget for blacks. It is significant that what the economists call the 'minimum effective level' for an urban family is about 50 per cent higher than the poverty datum line. The chairman of Johannesburg's Non-European Affairs Committee, Mr Sam Moss, also in January, 1973, appealed to commerce and industry to pay a minimum wage of R100 a month to African household heads. He stressed that an African family of five in Soweto needed at least R150 a month to come out, but assumed there would be other wage earners in the family besides the main breadwinner to help bring total earnings to this figure.

The strike revealed that the overwhelming majority of the African proletariat live far below the poverty datum line. The Johannesburg Non-European Affairs Committee some while ago estimated that 70 per cent of Soweto families failed to reach the poverty line. The figures which came to light during the strike showed that in Durban the majority of workers were expected to come out on wages ranging between R3.5 and R10 a week. Yet in the midst of their squalor, the Black workers have been faced in many centres with huge increases in the cost of food, rent and transport – their basic necessities which swallow up the major part of their income. Meat prices had already soared to a level which put it out of reach of most African families. Increases in the Africans' staple foods - bread and mealie meal - were impending. Add to this the starvation endemic in the reserves, a bad harvest resulting from the drought, the mass unemployment following the deportation of tens of thousands of 'superfluous' Africans from the towns to the Bantustans, and the desperation of the Black masses can be imagined.

Uneasiness over the plight of the Blacks, coupled with fright at the possible consequences, even penetrated the ranks of the Nationalist Party, notwithstanding the tough official line taken by the Cabinet. The Nationalist newspaper 'Rapport' on January 14, 1973, made a forthright call for an all-round increase in African wages and suggested that 'certain limitations' on the use of Black labour had to be scrapped — presumably referring to job reservation. A Current Affairs broadcast by the South African Broadcasting Corporation during January 1973 also called for a better deal for the country's lowest paid workers who were being hit hardest by inflation. The 'Transvaler' on February 5, 1973, said there was no evidence that the strikes were caused by agitation — malnutrition and starvation wages were the main culprits, it said.

#### THE FRAME CASE

To some extent Nationalists were gloating that it was Durban, the English city, which was hardest hit by the strikes, thus demonstrating that the English, who were always blaming the Government for African poverty, were amongst the worst employers of Black labour. But Nationalist complacency quickly turned to embarrassment when the press examined the affairs of the Frame group of textile companies, one of the largest employers of Black labour in the country and the one most severely hit by strikes in Durban and East London. The head of the company, Mr Philip Frame, a keen Nationalist supporter, is a member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council and reputedly one of the richest men in South Africa. Yet he is paying his Black workers today a basic wage which is almost the same as the wage he was paying in 1964 — R8 a week.

Yet the cost of living had soared by 74 per cent between 1963 and 1972 — a fact reflected in the wages of the average White worker in manufacturing industry which were increased by 94.7 per cent between 1964 and the end of 1972.

The 'Financial Mail' quoted the case of one of Frame's workers, Annie Msomi, a 60-year-old woman who has to support a pensioner husband and five grand-children on R7.25 a week.

'Seven years ago when Annie Msomi started working for Phillip Frame her pay packet (believe it or not) was R3 per week, from which she also had somehow to finance her own bus transport from Hammarsdale 32 kilometres away and which now takes R2 per week out of her R7.25. That leaves a mere R5 for food, clothing, rent and so on against a poverty datum line nearly three times higher, that itself supports not much more than mere starvation.'

The 'Financial Mail' pointed out that while Mr Frame was paying his workers these 'deplorable' wages, last November he was able to tell the shareholders of one of his companies Natal Consolidated Industrial Investments that pre-tax profits had risen from R1.4 million in 1971 to R2.5 million in 1972, an increase of over 70 per cent.

'That yielded an after-tax return on shareholders' funds of over 8 per cent and an increased dividend. If that is not shameful exploitation of labour, then we don't know what the word means.'

And in a general comment on the Black workers' decision to come out on strike, the 'Financial Mail' said: Do you blame them? Wouldn't you agree that with living costs spiralling (even faster, we believe, for Blacks than for Whites) wages like these are shameful — a disgrace for the company paying them, for its board and management; a disgrace for manufacturing industry as a whole since they are by no means unrepresentative; and a disgrace for White South Africa.'

#### THE GOLD MINES

A week later the 'Financial Mail' added to the list of shameless exploiters of labour the firm T.W. Beckett, which was paying wages well below the poverty datum line while profits before tax soared from R250,000 in 1969 to R1.6 million in 1972. 'But', the journal added, 'T.W. Beckett and the Frame group are small fry. A bigger and better known culprit is the gold mining industry, where the average wage for Black underground daily-paid workers, although 22 per cent higher than a year ago, is still only 80 cents a shift, excluding benefits in kind like free food, accommodation and health services. That's less than R21 a month, barely the price of a good pair of shoes.

'The industry's total Black wage bill was R95 million last year; its profits before tax were R548 million, R212 million (or 63 per cent) more than in 1971. The increase in profits alone was more than the mines' total Black wage bill.'

The Nationalist afternoon paper 'Vaderland' came to light with the fact that the Progressive Party MP Mrs Helen Suzman was also an exploiter of Black labour, as she was a director of the Union Hotel in Pretoria where the highest unskilled wage was R32 a month 'and even skilled workers earn between R40 and R45 a month on average' - about half the poverty datum line of R85. It was sad to hear Mrs Suzman, while admitting the wages were inadequate in some cases, claiming 'these wages compare favourably with those at other hotels in Pretoria. The Vaderland is trying to compare them with those of striking workers in Natal, ignoring that Union Hotel workers get an additional 10 per cent on their wages, as well as tips.' When it comes to the crunch, Mrs Suzman, the socalled Black man's champion, speaks the same language as the President of the Chamber of Mines in trying to defend the indefensible.

#### A VICTORY

Ultimately, after five weeks of concentrated struggle, without strike funds and faced with brutal police intervention, the strikers were forced back to work. But through united action they had scored a mighty victory over the forces ranged against them.

Many of the strikers won huge increases in their wages — in some cases employers hurriedly granted increases even before their workers had gone on strike.

In Maritzburg the City Council staff committee recommended that rises of up to 50 per cent be granted to 3,500 Black municipal workers. The Durban Corporation managed to get its workers back on the job by offering them a wage increase of 15 per cent. The big Wilson-Rowntree factory in East London, employing more than 2,000 Black workers, pushed up the wages of the lowest-paid workers by 40 per cent. In Cape Town the City Council agreed to wage increases averaging about 12½ per cent for its 13,000 Coloured and African employees. The Johannesburg City Council decided to give its Black work force of 22,000 increases of between 21 and 27 per cent to take effect from July. Increases were also granted by many private employers.

However, the very size of the increases merely emphasises how much below the breadline the workers had been before they went on strike; and the fact remains that, with one or two exceptions, most of the firms involved are still paying wages far below the poverty datum line. Millions of African workers who did not go on strike have received no increases. On February 10 the 'Rand Daily Mail' reported: 'Basic wages for some unskilled Black municipal workers on the Reef are substantially lower than those now paid to labourers by the Durban Corporation.' The exploitation and the tensions that flow from it will continue; new outbursts on the part of the Black workers are inevitable.

Yet the strike cannot be seen as purely a bread-and-butter issue. The men and women who came out with such splendid discipline and solidarity were challenging the very nature of the apartheid state, and openly defying Vorster's repressive police apparatus. Just as in Namibia a year before, the very scale of the strike made it impossible for the authorities to contain it. For days the Black strikers held Durban at their mercy. Its economic life was paralysed, the police afraid to intervene lest they precipitate mass action on an even greater scale.

The workers were showing in the most effective way that they reject the apartheid state and all its works, and are prepared to fight and sacrifice for a better life. For years the Nationalist Government has been trying to control African workers by its Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act of 1953, outlawing strikes and establishing a complicated Government-controlled machinery for negotiations between employers and their African employees. Yet under this Act only 18 works committees had been set up by the end of 1971, in spite of the fact that there are more than 50,000 registered employers in South Africa; a further 200 bodies representing African workers had been set up outside the machinery of the Act.

By their strike, the African workers made plain their rejection of the Native Labour Act and their demand for the right to form free trade unions. By their actions they engaged in direct collective bargaining with their employers of the kind the Government has tried to deny them. By maintaining their unity from beginning to end, they showed they have the power to defeat the forces of the state.

The strike registered the advances in political consciousness which have been made by the South African working class since the war. Gone was the atmosphere of 1949, when in the so-called Durban riots Africans could be turned against Indians for the greater benefit of the White man boss. A statement issued by the recently formed Black People's Convention correctly pointed out that the strikes this year did not only involve Africans, but that Coloured and Indian workers were also taking part side by side with the Africans

in the fight to improve their conditions.

Signs of increasing Black militancy have been evident on all fronts — the revolt in the segregated Black universities and schools, the reiterated complaints of the Bantustan leaders over land allocations, the formation of the Black People's Convention, the Black Allied Workers' Union, the Black South African Students' Organisation and other bodies; but above all the struggle in the mines, workshops and factories where it has been the Black rank and file, often without formal leadership, who have set the pace.

Millions of Black South Africans have been given new confidence that they can effectively shape their own future.

This is the context in which the guerrilla strategy of the Communist Party and the African National Congress takes its logical place — and this in turn must be seen in relation to the guerrilla struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique. On all fronts — including the factory front — the Black armies are on the march. The strikes of January 1973, following the massive strike actions of 1972, have shown the road to the future South Africa which was described in the Freedom Charter — a road full of difficulty and danger, but whose end can no longer be in doubt.

#### ATROCITIES IN MOZAMBIQUE

There is no mystery about the anger of the Black peoples at the situation in which they find themselves. In the Portuguese territories the colonialists are resorting to the most bestial and depraved methods in their bid to smash the people's resistance. In January 1973 new statutes passed by the Portuguese Government came into force which Dr Caetano claimed would raise the status of the territories and pave the way for Black majority rule.

But as early as January 5, the Luanda correspondent of the Johannesburg 'Star' was able to report: 'The new administrative and political statute for Angola - and Mozambique that came into force on January 1 makes no significant change in the way this rich wedge of Portuguese Africa is to be governed. There is little enthusiasm for the statute which observers here see as reflecting the thinking of the right-wing Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr Silva e Cunha, who is unpopular in Angola. Even Angola's top body, the Legislative Council is not happy with it . . . And the influential Angola Economic Association circulated a manifesto in 1972 in which its regret over the statute was clear. The manifesto stated that there would be no changes in depth in the administration of Angola. Some observers here believe it actually strengthens the grip of the Minister on the African possessions.'

At the very moment that the statutes were starting to be implemented, there was staged in Lourenco Marques a trial which brought to the surface the real nature of Portuguese rule. Appearing before a military tribunal were two Roman Catholic priests charged with anti-Government activities. The charges against them were that they had told their parishioners of cases where Portuguese commandos had committed atrocities against Black people in Mozambique. The two priests had been in jail for a year before being brought to trial. Giving evidence for them, two other priests told the court they saw Black men and women jailed in beehive huts by troops and burnt to death. Five people had been killed in that way in one incident and three in a second. Similar evidence was given by other witnesses, who were at the time themselves in jail awaiting trial on similar charges.

One of them, a Spanish priest who had sought asylum in Rhodesia but been repatriated into the arms of the Portuguese police by Smith's Gestapo, said he had personally witnessed a massacre at Muculala in northern Mozambique on November 4, 1971, where Portuguese commandos had killed four women and 11 children with hand grenades. 'After the massacres and killings I have seen', the priest told the court, 'I cannot stay White.'

It is not the perpetrators of these atrocities who face trial, but those who unmask them. Not surprisingly the Bishop of the Beira diocese, Jose Augustus da Souza, asked the court: 'Who is the right authority to judge priests who speak the truth from the pulpit? Is it to be the bishops or the DGS (the Portuguese secret police)? What we have here is a scandalous society. What we should have is liberty for all.'

The Portuguese colonialists may boast as much as they like that they practise no colour bar. It is clear they are perpetrating in their territories the same ghastly atrocities as the Americans in Vietnam, including the herding of communities in concentration camps, defoliation and napalming. Meanwhile, Portuguese and other foreign businessmen ransack the enormous resources of these territories, which are far richer than metropolitan Portugal itself. It is to end this Portuguese murder and pillaging that FRELIMO has stepped up its offensive round Tete, the headquarters of the district where the Cabora Bassa dam is being built. Every Portuguese atrocity succeeds only in gaining new recruits for the FRELIMO forces, determined to have 'liberty for all'.

#### BORDER WAR IN RHODESIA

But as we go to press, it is the direct confrontation in Rhodesia which is bringing the whole situation in southern Africa to crisis point.


The intensified guerrilla campaign which came to public

notice in December 1972 rapidly produced results which confirm the long-term perspective and strategy of those, including our party, who have for years maintained that armed struggle has an essential role to play in the liberation of Southern Africa. Just how successful militarily the guerrilla campaign has been it is impossible to calculate from the communiques issued by the Smith regime. In fact, the first announcements of White civilian casualties in the Centenary area of Rhodesia made it clear that there had been intensive activity in the area since August 1972. Latterly there have been periodic announcements of the death of Rhodesian and South African 'policemen' as they attempted to round up the 'invaders', alleged to have come from Zambia. There have also been a number of civilian casualties.

The upsurge of guerrilla activity has been reinforced by two factors:

- (1) The intense politicisation of the Rhodesian masses as a result of the successful 'No' campaign conducted by the African National Council during the visit of the Pearce Commission.
- (2) The enactment by the Smith regime, as a punishment, a warning or in imitation of South Africa, of a succession of apartheid-type laws directed against the African people.

Commenting on these developments, the 'Rand Daily Mail' in an editorial on January 12, 1973, said: 'The Rhodesian Government has for some months been pursuing a policy of petty racialism. It was clear enough from the Pearce Commission's findings that there was widespread African animosity towards the Smith Government, and the new policy trend can hardly have improved matters. Rhodesia has introduced pass laws and an influx control system; more social apartheid and a curfew on African drinking in White areas. It has even taken to the South African habit of evicting people from their homes and resettling them. Hardly the way to win devotion and loyalty.'



In fact, the most striking feature of the whole campaign has been the extent of support the guerrillas have obtained from the local African population. The London 'Guardian' reported from Salisbury on January 18: 'Security forces are interrogating about 180 Rhodesian Africans who have been arrested on charges of aiding nationalist guerrillas. Sources here said many of the tribesmen had helped to carry large

quantities of arms and ammunition into Rhodesia from the Mukumbera district of Mozambique. Others had been charged with failing to report the presence of guerrillas to the security forces. Reports say the guerrillas are receiving a high degree of local assistance, and the infiltrators — estimated to number about 80 — are tying up hundreds of Rhodesian police, soldiers and airmen. More units of the Territorial Army are expected to be called up this week.'

Nor is it only Rhodesian troops that are involved. The Johannesburg 'Star' reported on January 10: 'It is not possible, for obvious reasons, to disclose the exact number of South African policemen involved in the fighting in Rhodesia. But the SAP are right at the forefront of the battle to guard Rhodesia – and South Africa – against incursions from the north.'

Smith's reaction was twofold: (1) to close the border with Zambia until the Zambian Government put a stop to the guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia; and (2) to provide for the imposition of collective punishments on tribal communities which aid 'terrorist infiltrators'.

It has long been priority No. 1 of the Southern African white racists to topple the regimes of Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere, which support the national liberation movements of the south and stand in the way of the implementation of South Africa's imperialist plans for economic and political domination of the continent. Attempts have been made by sabotage and subversion, letter bombs, encouragement of tribalism and other opposition forces, economic pressure etc. to smash the Kaunda and Nyerere regimes. When all these attempts failed, the white racists of the South proceeded to the next stage in their aggression against independent Africa. In closing the frontier, Smith hoped to create a state of economic chaos in Zambia as a result of which President Kaunda would be forced to abdicate. At the same time, he tried to protect the fragile Rhodesian economy by allowing

copper exports from Zambia — worth R1 million a month to the near-bankrupt Rhodesian railways — to continue.

#### KAUNDA'S STAND

Smith's actions met with a salutary rebuff. In a magnificent gesture of solidarity, President Kaunda identified himself with the guerrilla cause. Addressing the opening session of Zambia's second National Assembly on January 10, 1973, he said: 'Zambians must regard the liberation of Southern Africa as an unfinished task in the whole history of decolonisation. Rhodesia is an African country. No kind of oppression or terrorism will stop the tide of history destined to sweep the five million Zimbabweans to independence.

'Angola, Mozambique and Guine (Bissau) are African countries. We are against the current Portuguese war against African people.'

Regarding Namibia, he said the World Court had ruled that South Africa's jurisdiction over Namibia was illegal. Action must be taken to help the Namibian people to achieve independence, he said. In South Africa itself, facts showed that the apartheid policy was destined to fail.

President Kaunda declared: 'We, together with many peace and freedom-loving nations, will therefore continue to support the struggle of the oppressed masses. We will continue to work for the cause of freedom and justice.'

He stressed: 'We must be prepared as a nation to defend our borders against all acts of aggression by desperate men. The future of Zambia cannot be secure so long as conditions of conflict prevail around us. Our success in building a harmonious society cannot be guaranteed unless peace and justice are secured by the masses in Southern Africa. We therefore reaffirm our solidarity with those gallant people still struggling for freedom.' President Kaunda then launched his own counter-attack against the White racist south. All trade with Rhodesia including copper exports would cease forthwith, he declared. 'The position is now final and there is no turning back.' Trade between Zambia and Rhodesia would not be resumed, and Zambian imports and exports from other countries would not be allowed to pass through Rhodesia. President Kaunda said the border closure was a blessing in disguise, because it gave Zambia a 'golden opportunity' to find more permanent trade routes, especially via Tanzania. The President said he wanted to end the situation where Zambia was in any way dependent on the white dominated south.

#### SOUTH AFRICA'S ROLE

Much is now being made of the fact that in deciding to close the border Smith acted on his own, without consulting either Portugal or South Africa. This may or may not be true. There had been a meeting of South African and Rhodesian security chiefs as recently as October 1972, at which the situation on all sectors of the Southern Africa front had been discussed and contingency plans drawn up. The closing of the frontier must have been considered as a possibility. Smith himself admitted that he had previously warned Zambia of his intention to take action unless guerrilla incursions stopped, and South Africa must have known what he had in mind, even if they were not party to the actual decision.

Had Smith succeeded in his aim of crippling the Zambian economy and toppling the Kaunda regime, we need not doubt that South Africa and Portugal would have hastened to associate themselves with his action and showered him with congratulations. But it soon became clear that Smith had seriously miscalculated the mood of the peoples in Southern Africa today. He expected Kaunda to come crawling to him

begging for mercy, or else that a coup would take place bringing into power someone more amenable to dictation from the white racist south. What he evidently did not expect was that President Kaunda would have the determination not only to defend himself but also to hit back by banning all trade with Rhodesia. Once again the White racists had underestimated the will and determination of their enemies.

President Kaunda's strong stand immediately created a crisis, not only for Rhodesia, but for South Africa and Portugal as well, all of whom have profited in the past by the trade with Zambia and who faced the prospect of being totally isolated economically and politically from the rest of independent Africa once the Tanzam railway has been completed and other trade routes opened up for Zambia. Despite UDI and sanctions, Rhodesia's profit from trade with Zambia (mostly transport charges on goods to and from other countries) amounted to about R20 million a year, while South Africa's exports to Zambia amounted to more than R60 million a year. The Mozambique port of Beira, already suffering severely from the effects of sanctions, was threatened with total stagnation once Zambia's ban came into effect. And there was more at stake. With Zaire and Tanzania associating themselves with President Kaunda's stand, and the rest of Africa pledging support, South Africa's whole trade drive into Africa - the only sphere where she enjoys a favourable balance of payments - was likely to come to a sudden end almost before it had started.

Finally, on Zambia's initiative, the United Nations Security Council decided to send a mission to the Rhodesia-Zambia border to study the effects of the Rhodesian closure. Smith had suffered one intervention, by the Pearce Commission, which had turned out a disaster. Now he was faced with another, which could prove equally harmful to his interests. He began to twist and squirm.

Big business in South Africa took fright. Urging Vorster to

'cool it', Dr Gideon Jacobs, Witwatersrand chairman of the United Party, said that of South Africa's total exports of R1,561 million in 1971, about 20 per cent — R293 million — was earned in trade with other African countries. The R38 million spent by African buyers of South African chemical products represented 55 per cent of total chemical exports, he said. Machinery exports to African countries totalled R76 million — 80 per cent of total machinery exports in 1971.

'If we lose these markets it would be extremely difficult to find replacement outlets in other areas. The policy of dialogue was aimed at retaining and expanding African markets but if these markets are disturbed, then the major purpose of the dialogue policy is disturbed.'

The South African press, which had at first adopted a bellicose attitude, began to change its tune. On January 22, the Johannesburg 'Star' wrote in an editorial:

'Mr Smith has made two crashing blunders. One was to resort to sanctions on the Zambesi. The other and perhaps even cruder one has been to give provincial commissioners, and apparently tribal chiefs also, power to levy communal fines, without trial, conviction or appeal, on African communities suspected of aiding insurgents or succumbing to their threats . . . All the lessons of history and contemporary experience are to the effect that mass punishment, arbitrarily imposed, is the finest way of alienating loyalties. It is nazism. And it is always hateful.'

#### WHEN THIEVES FALL OUT

Once it was seen that the border closure was an expensive blunder, Smith was callously abandoned by his South African and Portuguese backers, without whom he cannot survive. On February 3 he was compelled to beat an ignominious retreat. Claiming without a shadow of evidence that he had received 'messages' (from whom?) indicating that his objectives had been achieved (how? — guerrilla action was still continuing), Smith announced that the border would be reopened the next day. But if he expected the situation would return to 'normal', he was in for another shock. President Kaunda announced firmly that he was not prepared to change his stand and would keep Zambia's border with Rhodesia closed. Urging the Zambian people to tighten their belts, he said he was determined to carry on until his country was entirely free from the pressures exerted by the white racists of southern Africa.

The present round of the border battle has resulted in a humiliating defeat for Smith, the repercussions of which may be felt for a long time to come. Far from toppling President Kaunda, it may be Smith who is toppled as a result of the failure of his brinkmanship. But this does not by any means signify that the threat of aggression on the part of the white racists has been ended.

The crisis on the Zambesi will continue, creating both an opportunity and a danger for the forces of liberation. The opportunity is to isolate the white-dominated South from the rest of Africa, to strengthen the economic and political base of the regimes in Zambia and Tanzania, and to open the way for further guerrilla advances against the racist enemy. The danger is of further aggression by the forces of the Unholy Alliance (Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa), aided and abetted by their imperialist partners.

There are already signs that the British Government regards the atmosphere generated by the crisis as propitious for the revival of the Home-Smith settlement plan. Ever since the crisis began, the British Government has taken refuge in what it is pleased to describe as a 'neutral' attitude. Far from supporting the guerrilla forces, who are doing what British troops should be doing to bring down the illegal Smith regime, the British Government is obviously now terrified

that the Smith regime may crack under the strain and that Black majority rule in Rhodesia will become an established fact. 'Unofficial' emissaries have been travelling backwards and forwards between Salisbury and London trying to get Smith and the ANC round the negotiating table again. In British Government circles it is obviously thought better to reach any sort of agreement which would maintain the Smith Government in power rather than see a guerrilla victory. How else explain Britain's total failure to come to the assistance of the Kaunda regime? If Zambia is in danger today, it is because Zambia has undertaken responsibilities flowing from UDI which Britain refused to shoulder. It is Zambia, not Britain, which is bearing the brunt of sanctions, Zambia, not Britain, which is allying itself with the African liberation struggle. Far from welcoming the evidence of Black rebellion against the illegal Smith regime, Britain acts with typical imperialist hypocrisy and deviousness to shore up the Smith regime while mouthing meaningless platitudes about majority rule. The peoples of Southern Africa must be on guard against any shameful compromise engineered by Home, the man of Munich, which will betray the fighting men of Rhodesia who are suffering and dying to open the way to true national liberation, just as 35 years ago Home was a party to the betrayal of Czechoslovakia which, far from producing peace, merely paved the way for the holocaust of the second world war.

#### AFRICAN MUNICH

The crisis over Rhodesia can, in fact, well be compared with the situation in Europe at the time of Munich. Failure to halt the racists in their track now is a guarantee of intensified conflict at a later stage. The Smith-Vorster-Caetano clique must, once the border closure has failed to achieve the desired results, logically proceed to the next stage - armed action against the regimes of Presidents Kaunda and Nyerere. This may not amount to a declaration of war or an outright invasion, which would compel United Nations intervention. What is far more likely to happen is an intensification of Israeli-style attacks mounted by the racists against their Black neighbours - lightning air strikes against alleged guerrilla camps, an intensification of border incidents and clashes, the mining of roads and bridges and commando-style attacks on targets in Zambia and Tanzania which are over before the diplomats can get round the table to start talking about them; the promotion of tribal discontent and opposition in Zambia and Tanzania aimed at toppling the leadership; round-the-clock subversion and espionage financed by the White south. There are already signs that the first steps have been taken to launch such actions. The failure of international opinion to halt this sort of aggression can only encourage the racists to extend it.

The world must understand the gravity of the situation on the Zambesi, for it is here that the shape of Africa tomorrow is being decided. Is Africa to be a collection of client states of the imperialist powers, policed by the forces of Israel and South Africa, her material and human resources looted for the benefit of foreign investors and their local counterparts and hangers-on? Or is Africa to be free and independent, master of her own house, willing and able to build a future of peace and prosperity for all her citizens?

The freedom fighters of all the territories of southern Africa are not waiting for others to present them with victory. Arms in hand, they are striking the first blows in what will be a protracted campaign to defeat the forces of apartheid and imperialism. In this fight there will be many fronts. One will be on the borders, another will be in the docks and on the factory floor, yet a third will be at the international conference table. Pressure can be exerted in a thousand ways to

influence the outcome of this struggle.

We call upon the democratic forces of the whole world to rally to the cause of the freedom fighters of Southern Africa, to defend the integrity of Zambia and Tanzania from their bloodthirsty neighbours, to help keep alive the spirit of resistance which is the guarantee of final victory. There is a place for everyone in this struggle, no matter where they may be. For every guerrilla in the front line, there must be tens of supporters keeping the supply lines open: the strikers for higher wages, the demonstrators against injustice, the signers of petitions and pledges, those who vote for resolutions of solidarity, or who carry a poster in a picket line — all have a vital contribution to make. In the name of the Southern African revolution, we call upon you to make that contribution now, and to dedicate yourselves unsparingly to active support of our cause until our lands are finally freed.


HANDS OFF ZAMBIA! HANDS OFF TANZANIA!
ALL SUPPORT TO THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE!


### VIETNAM A People's Victory

by ALEX LA GUMA

Who was the member representing Africa on a World Peace Council delegation which visited North Vietnam from January 13 to 20, 1973

Hanoi is a city of lakes. Once long ago the land had been under water and when the water subsided Hanoi was born. Today you can still walk down the wide Parisian avenues that are lined with trees, past the yellow French-colonial buildings, and stroll along the quiet bank of the Thugen Quan Lake, or visit the Lake of the Restored Sword. Cross the red Huc bridge that arches over the placid water and you find yourself at the Ngoc San pagoda which stands on an island in the lake, among lotus blossoms under a banyan tree. Or you can visit the temple dedicated to Le Roi who in 1407 led his people against the Ming invaders. Le Roi became king and founded the Le dynasty, you will be told. Then you can go to the one-pillar pagoda. It stands on a single column, the stem, and the building is shaped after the lotus flower. It is the city emblem of Hanoi. You can stroll down the shady avenue Dien Bien Phu, and along Hung Vuong towards the palace of the former French governorgeneral. Everything is peaceful.





Left: Hanoi workers start to repair the damage caused by the

American bombers.

Above: An anti-aircraft crew at action stations.

(Photographs by Alex la Guma)

#### SLAP IN THE FACE

But turn aside into the working-class areas, the populated districts where the Vietnamese women in their white blouses and black trousers, conical straw hats, trot along with baskets slung from a shouldered bamboo pole, and the streets teem with hundreds of cyclists, and there the aftermath of war strikes you like a slap in the face.

Kham Tien Street in the Dong Ba district is gone. Eighteen blocks of buildings, mostly residential, had been reduced to piles of rubble, the shells of others stood precariously among the mounds of debris. For the length of a kilometre and the width of 600 metres the storm of explosive from the US Air Force's giant B-52 bombers and F-111s had laid waste this oldest part of Hanoi. Ironically Kham Tien means 'Watching the Sky', because long ago an observatory had stood there. 30,000 souls had lived in the area and it had been transformed into hillocks of broken bricks and splintered beams. The market place had been destroyed, the welfare centres, cinema, the People's Bookshop, restaurants, stores, kindergartens. Fortunately the high degree of organisation of the Civil Defence and the system of air-raid shelters had managed to save more lives than had been lost.

This was the centre of Hanoi, and the other three districts of the four into which the 586 square kilometres is divided had likewise been systematically bombed again and again. Ahn Duong (Peaceful Scene) a residential area along the Red River was without most of its homes, the primary and secondary schools catering for 5000 children, the infirmary and the maternity centre.

Everything pointed to the fact that the United States aggressors had been determined to raze the city of Hanoi to the ground, to break the morale of her people, to force them to beg for mercy. It was not a matter of military targets but of political and military blackmail. But the giant bombers and millions of dollars of electronic equipment had foundered on the determination and courage of a people. Imperialism had banked on the racist theory that yellow-skinned people would never stand up to a blitzkrieg, but false hopes crashed down in piles of wreckage that dot the city and the countryside; heaps of aluminium and wire and scorched perspex, some still bearing the shattered insignia — iron gauntlet clutching lightning bolts (and an olive branch!) — of the US 'Strategic Air Command'. All over Hanoi placards proclaimed the

#### HERO CITIES

We had come to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in January, just before the ceasefire agreement was about to be signed, as a delegation of the World Peace Council to present the WPC's Lambrakis Medal to the hero cities of Hanoi and Haiphong for 'courage and sacrifice in the cause of national independence'.

These were the hero cities indeed. The outskirts of Haiphong looked like pictures of Hiroshima come to life. Here again the populated areas had been constantly and systematically blasted by planes and naval guns. The Czechoslovak-Vietnam Friendship hospital had suffered, the Polish ship 'Josef Conrad' listed at the wharf, her upperworks blasted, a great hole surrounded by peeled metal gaping at the sky; everywhere the port had been hit, everywhere people wore the white headbands of mourning.

But both Hanoi and Haiphong still stood, scarred, battered, burnt, but they still stood. This was Hiroshima and Nagasaki with a difference – the enemy had been defeated, made to run with tail between legs.

As one of our hosts from the Vietnamese Committee for World Peace put it, 'Imperialism could not afford a direct confrontation with the Socialist powers, particularly the Soviet Union, so it has chosen the front of national liberation. If imperialism could push back the forces of liberation in Vietnam it would be able to do so to the liberation movements in other parts of the world. But it is necessary for the imperialists to ponder over the advancement made by progressive forces in this period of world history.'

But Vietnam needs peace. It is the demand of the common people whom we spoke to on the streets as they cleared the wreckage, and of those who wear the white bands of mourning; it is demanded by the young men and girls who man the anti-aircraft defences, the soldiers standing by the looming black and green surface-to-air missiles; it is the demand of their leaders and their government. It is proclaimed in the shattered Bach Mai hospital, the bombed dykes and the destroyed villages, the children maimed by pellets and shrapnel from anti-personnel bombs.

In Hanoi the Commission on US War Crimes in Vietnam has reckoned the cost paid by the people in blood and property. So has the Medical Aid Committee for Vietnam, and the US Committee for Responsibility, and other agencies on both sides. Figures of casualties and destruction of homes and institutions are too numerous to mention. Seven million tons of bombs were dropped on Vietnam by US planes, 3½ times what was used in World War II.

#### A PEOPLE'S VICTORY

But peace in Vietnam does not mean the surrender of Vietnam; peace will not be paid for with the freedom and independence of the Vietnamese people. Today it is not Nixon who has 'peace with honour', it is the heroic people of Vietnam.

Everywhere it was stressed that as the war ends, the vigilance of the world community must not be relaxed, that the democratic forces, the peace-loving people everywhere must ensure that the peace is kept and the terms agreed on adhered to. The people of Vietnam would continue to be on guard, we were told. 'We will be on guard as long as the machinations of the imperialists continue. We are prepared to meet any situation, war or peace.'

Hoang Tung and Pham Hong of the Vietnam Peace Committee told the WPC delegation: 'We must continue to be vigilant even as the war ends. During the past years a wide and unprecedented world movement has arisen around developments in Vietnam. World opinion helped to stay the bloody hand of Nixon. Now the question is whether the United States and its puppets will carry out the agreement. We are ready to carry out our programme of national concord; we are ready to cooperate provided that there is willingness to build independence, democracy and world peace. We do not entertain a policy of war, and we will not permit the enemy to carry out a policy of war.'

The representatives of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam voiced the same sentiments. In addition, Nguyen Phu Soai, vice-president, and Nguyen Van Tien, member of the Paris conference, stressed the importance of the question of political prisoners held by the Thieu government. The US had tried to avoid this issue during negotiations, they said, but the US was equally responsible for these

prisoners. International pressure should be strengthened to ensure the safety of the political prisoners, their release and return to participation in all aspects of Vietnam's future.

#### THE LESSONS

Above all there were lessons to be learnt from Vietnam, especially for those engaged in the national liberation struggle in their own countries.

'We owe much to the assistance and support of the Socialist countries, to the Soviet Union, and to the world-wide solidarity of all progressive forces,' we were told. 'But most important for victory was the political unity of the Vietnamese people. Even our government and leaders were astonished by the determination, bravery and calmness of every citizen. In spite of tragedy, the loss of whole families, the people stood firm.'

In Vietnam we saw the results won by the conviction of a whole people in the justice of their cause and the necessity to fight together; by their organisation, political and defence, which extended from street to street, to residential quarter, to district, to city; by complete cooperation with their leaders on local, city and national level, with the Fatherland Front and the Vietnam Workers' Party; by the co-operation and solidarity between urban workers and the peasantry.

But perhaps everything was summed up by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong himself, when the delegation met him for an informal chat in Hanoi. He smiled as he replied to a comment from the Latin-American delegate, saying:

'THE PEOPLE PLUS MARXISM-LENINISM, THAT IS THE VICTORY'.

# 'We pay undying tribute...'

Letter from Dr Y.M. Dadoo, national Chairman of the South African Communist Party, to the Vietnam Workers' Party and the National Liberation Front

Dear Comrades,

26th January 1973

The epic fight of the Vietnamese people has been of immense worldhistorical significance to all who oppose imperialism and who long for national liberation, democracy, socialism and peace.

Especially to those like our own people suffering gross national oppression, colonialism and racialism in South Africa, your victory inspires us with fresh energy and unshakeable confidence that our just cause will triumph.

On behalf of all the oppressed and exploited people of our country we pay undying tribute to your Party, government and people. Your steadfastness and endurance, your high patriotism, and brilliant political, military, theoretical and practical leadership have enabled your people to sustain the most massive and prolonged onslaught of any nation in history, and to emerge with a victory for your people which is shared by the whole of freedom-loving mankind.

Please accept, dear comrades, our cordial congratulations, our ardent hope for the early realisation of the peaceful reunification of the nation of Vietnam, enjoying friendly relations with the free, fraternal peoples of Indo-China, advancing along the path illuminated by the immortal Ho Chi Minh.

We pledge to you that our people and our Party, as part of the world's forces against imperialism, will stand ever vigilant at your side to safeguard the peace against treachery and sabotage.

Yours fraternally,

Y.M. Dadoo: Chairman South African Communist Party

# Amilcar Cabral · Outstanding Leader of African Liberation Movement

A Tribute by YUSUF M. DADOO, Chairman, South African Communist Party

'How is it that we, a people deprived of everything, living in dire straits, manage to wage our struggle and win successes? Our answer is: this is because Lenin existed, because he fulfilled his duty as a man, a revolutionary and a patriot. Lenin was and continues to be, the greatest champion of the national liberation of the peoples.'

These were the words addressed to the delegates attending the seminar on 'Lenin and National Liberation' held at Alma Ata, capital of Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan in 1970 by Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the PAIGC, who met his death on 20th January 1973 at Conakry, Guinea at the hands of a traitor Innocenta Canida, an agent of the Portuguese colonialists who had infiltrated into the ranks of the movement three years ago.

These words reflect the revolutionary thinking and life-work of this utterly dedicated patriot, outstanding African revolutionary of our time and the father of the new independent sovereign state of Guine in the process of birth. It was the cognition of the scientific theory of



revolution, of Marxism-Leninism, to which he was introduced by his contacts with the Portuguese Communist Party during his student days in Lisbon which made to combine within him, in the words of the statement of the Central Committee of the South African Communist Party, 'a deep understanding of the processes of the African Revolution with an untiring devotion to practical struggle'.

#### IDEOLOGICAL BASE

Whilst eschewing dogma, he continually stressed the need for a firm political and ideological base for a revolutionary: 'If it is true that a revolution can fail even though it is based on perfectly conceived theories — nobody has yet made a successful revolution without a revolutionary theory.'

Cabral was above all a man of action. Born on September 12, 1924, at Bafata in what was then the Portuguese West African colony of Guine, he spent part of his youth in Bissau, the capital. He was able because of his family's relatively comfortable position to go to secondary school and then to the University of Lisbon, where he qualified as an agricultural engineer in 1951. Returning to his country he served for two years in the Colonial Administration as an agronomist which provided him with ample opportunity to learn at first hand of the dire poverty and intense suffering of his people, especially in the country-side. His experiences made him more determined than ever to find ways and means of working for the freedom of his country and delivering his people from the yoke of colonial bondage. This inevitably led him into bitter conflicts with the governor of the colony and he transferred himself to Angola.

There in 1956 he helped to form what is now the most important national organisation of Angola, the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola). In the same year he also became one of the founders of the African Party of Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands and was its permanent leader until the time of his assassination.

Under his leadership the PAIGC mobilised the country's patriots to struggle for the freedom of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, created the people's army and led the national-liberation war against the Portuguese colonialists. Cabral knew and understood his enemy well, and every phase of the struggle was carefully planned and action meticulously organised. The cadres of the PAIGC were given political education as well as military training and he stressed always 'that we are armed militants and not militarists'.

#### THE RACE QUESTION

Cabral saw the task of the national liberation movements as not merely to usher in Black rule replacing white faces with black ones; it was not only to raise a different flag and sing a new anthem but to remove all forms of exploitation from the country. 'Bearing in mind the essential characteristics of the present world economy, as well as experience already gained in the field of anti-imperialist struggle, the principal aspect of national liberation struggle is the struggle against neo-colonialism.' Cabral was careful to distinguish the colour of men's skins from exploitation and repeatedly emphasised that the struggle was against Portuguese colonialism and not against the Portuguese people. He made it clear that:

'We are fighting so that insults may no longer rule our countries, martyred and scorned for centuries, so that our peoples may never more be exploited by imperialists — not only by people with white skin, because we do not confuse exploitation or exploiters with the colour of men's skins; we do not want any exploitation in our countries, not even by black people.'

Though the focus of Cabral's activity was always the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, he was an internationalist and saw his people's struggle as merely one front of a common international struggle against imperialism which 'is trying simultaneously to dominate the working class in all advanced countries and smother the national liberation movements in all the under developed countries'.

#### SOCIALIST ALLIES

The historic role which the socialist community, as an integral and powerful part of the world anti-imperialist front, is playing for peace, independence and socialism was clearly understood and recognised by Cabral. At a conference held in Dar-es-Salaam in 1965, Cabral had said:

'It is our duty to state here, loud and clear, that we have firm allies in the socialist countries . . . Since the socialist revolution and the events of the second world war, the face of the world has definitely changed. A socialist camp has arisen in the world. This has radically changed the balance of power, and this socialist camp is today showing itself fully conscious of its duties, international and historic, but not moral, since the peoples of the socialist countries have never exploited the colonised peoples.'

He had very close association with the Soviet Union which he visited on many occasions and made a major contribution to the promotion and strengthening of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of Guinea-Bissau and the Soviet Union, between the PAIGC and the CPSU. Speaking as the head of the PAIGC delegation at the Joint Meeting in the Kremlin dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the USSR, Cabral said:

'Availing ourselves of this opportunity we want to express on behalf of our people fraternal gratitude to the Soviet people, the CPSU, its Central Committee for the versatile assistance you render us in our bitter struggle against the Portuguese colonialists, against the war and genocide, for independence, peace and progress of our African Motherland.'

The assassin's bullets struck down this great African leader just as preparations were going ahead for the convening of the National Assembly in the early part of this year for the adoption of the Constitution and the official declaration of the new independent sovereign State of Guine. This foul deed was engineered by the Portuguese colonialists with the nefarious aim of sowing confusion and disruption among the ranks of the PAIGC and of causing disunity among the national liberation movements of southern Africa.

It shows that the evil triumvirate of Caetano, Smith and Vorster will stop at nothing to stem the irresistible advances of the courageous and steeled guerrillas and brave freedom fighters of Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa in their noble struggle to free the whole of southern Africa from national, racial and social oppression.

In our own country, South Africa, Vorster faces the ever growing

tide of indignation and resistance of the Black masses against apartheid tyranny and especially of the bulk of the Black working people against the whole of the inhuman cheap-labour system and starvation wages.

In spite of the use of the deadly modern weapons of war, terror and devious manoeuvres, the colonialist and racialist regimes are doomed. The new State of Guine shall be a reality; the whole of southern Africa shall be freed.

However, the struggles ahead call for, on our part, ever stronger unity and organisation of the masses, ever greater vigilance against the manoeuvres and machinations of the enemy, ever more determination and will to sacrifice in our efforts to exterminate the forces of oppression and win final victory.

By the death of Amilcar Cabral, Africa has lost one of her great revolutionary leaders. We, the fighting black people and all the revolutionaries of South Africa salute this indomitable fighter. We shall see to it that the cause — which is also our cause — to which Amilcar Cabral devoted all his energies and ultimately gave his life, will triumph.

AMANDLA! RONA-KE MAATLA! MAYIBUYE AFRIKA!

# 'Cabral's Monument will be a Free Africa'

### STATEMENT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The Central Committee of the South African Communist Party expresses its profound shock and outrage at the foul murder of comrade Amilcar Cabral by agents of Portuguese colonialism.

Comrade Cabral exemplified the new generation of African revolutionaries. He combined within him a deep understanding of the processes of the African revolution with an untiring devotion to practical struggle.

The liberation of Guinea Bissau under his inspiring leadership had made giant strides forward at the time of his murder. By this act of desperation Portuguese fascism hopes to reverse the victories of the liberation forces. We have no doubt that the people's forces which comrade Cabral helped to unleash will answer the enemy's colonial terror with a renewed vigour.

The gains of the peoples of Guinea Bissau are the gains of all in Africa and especially those in Southern Africa who are carrying on a relentless struggle against a combination of Portuguese colonialism and Vorster-Smith white racialism. As in Guinea Bissau, so in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe, let the murder of comrade Cabral be a signal for even greater determination to hit the enemy until he is utterly destroyed.

Africa has lost one of her greatest sons. His monument will be a Continent truly free of domination and exploitation; an aim which, by the inspiration of his ideas and revolutionary actions, comrade Cabral has brought nearer to achievement.

# African Workers Advance

#### by R. E. BRAVERMAN

This article, written before the January 1973 wave of strikes, explains the background to the workers' upsurge

#### MYTH AND REALITY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Two major themes dominate the ongoing debate about South Africa's future. One is government-inspired and concerns the prospects for Bantustans. The other is being dictated by African workers who raise the issue of their role and rights in commerce and industry.

Note the contrast. The government and its agencies focus on the constitutions of the eight 'tribal' authorities. A large-scale propaganda campaign is conducted to create a false consciousness and to maintain the fiction of separate 'Bantu nations' within the country's border.

The African working class ignores the propaganda. It is irrelevant to their needs and problems. Their urgencies are related to starvation wages, excessive exploitation, exclusion from skilled employment, the denial of trade union rights and their insecurity under the migratory labour system. This is their reality and they are making it a central point of the debate by means of strikes, organisation and growing pressure for recognition of their claims in the capitalist economy.

For these reasons and because of cumulative changes in the economic structure, the African's position in the society is being discussed more widely and more seriously than at any time since the Nationalist Party took office in 1948. I propose to discuss the changes and the African's response to class and colour exploitation.

#### THE WORKING CLASS

We have a population of 21½ million people, consisting, according to the 1970 census, of 15 million Africans, more than 3¾ million Whites, 2 million Coloured and 600,000 Indians. Today, more than 8 million are 'economically active', in the sense of making a direct contribution to the national income. The most recent analysis of the economically active group shows that, as at the end of 1971, there were in this category 1,554,000 Whites, 732,000 Coloureds, 188,000 Asians and 5,856,000 Africans — a total of 8,330,000.1

White propagandists never tire of congratulating themselves and informing the world at large of our country's natural wealth, as though it were created for their special benefit by a divine providence. South Africa produces three-quarters of the capitalist world's gold output and two-thirds of its output of diamonds; it is a major producer of platinum and uranium; has large deposits of coal, iron ore, manganese, copper, asbestos and chrome; and it is the most highly industrialised country in Africa. There is an abundance of fish, fruit, maize and other agricultural produce and a well developed animal husbandry. The country exports minerals, metals, wool, maize and a wide range of manufactured goods, including furniture, clothing, electrical appliances, machinery and canned foodstuffs.

The Whites pride themselves on having the highest standard of living in the world apart from the Whites in the United States. Government propagandists are discreetly silent, however, about the human source of this wealth and the starvation wages paid to the great mass of African, Coloured and Indian workers.

South Africa is not the only multi-racial country, nor is it the only one in which people suffer discrimination and hardship because their

<sup>1</sup> House of Assembly Debates, 25.5.72.

skin colour is dark. In no other country, however, is skin-colour the primary and major determinant of a person's life's chances. Only in South Africa does skin colour determine where a person is to live, how he is to live, the kind of job he does, his associations, political rights and disabilities. Nowhere else does racial status, as specified in a reference book or identity card, take precedence over all other factors that shape the lives and fortunes of individuals.

The racial divisions have a far-reaching effect on the class system and the structure of the labour movement. Of particular importance is the composition of the industrial working force. Factories employed 1,410,600 workers in 1970. The racial proportions were:— Africans, 743,760 (52.7%); Whites, 339,800 (24.1%); Coloured, 242,000 (17.1%); and Indian, 85,000 (6.0%).<sup>2</sup>

For every White worker, in different fields of employment, there are: 9.8 Africans, Coloured and Indians in mining; 6 in construction; and 4 in manufacturing. The labour force increased by 366,500 between the end of 1967 and October 1970. The increase was made up of 264,300 Africans, 68,170 Coloured and Indians, and 34,000 Whites, who accounted for less than 10% of the increase.<sup>3</sup>

White workers formed 30% of the labour force in manufacturing industries in 1961. Their proportion has declined since then to 23%.

#### EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS

To understand the significance of these changes in the racial composition of the labour force, we should relate them, on the one hand, to the government's declared aim of restricting the employment of Africans in the big industrial centres and, on the other hand, to the kind of jobs in which they are employed.

Africans have always been the major source of 'unskilled' labour. Now they are increasingly being recruited for semi-skilled and skilled occupations. To illustrate this point, I quote from recent statements by industrialists, trade union leaders and politicians.

<sup>2</sup> Annual Report of the Department of Labour for year ending 31.12.71. R.P. 1972 Pretoria.

<sup>3</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 4.11.72.

Harry Oppenheimer, head of the big Anglo-American complex, told a group of shareholders in the Highlands Steel and Vanadium Corporation in September 1972 that the shortage of skilled workers could be overcome by employing Africans. Further delays in the effective selection and training of Africans, he warned, would lead to 'continued disproportionate increases in the rates of pay of the existing skilled and semi-skilled labour force'. He had in mind the 'disproportionate' increases in White workers' wages.

Mr Rudolf, head of Volkswagen AG, said: 'Blacks were to be trained for better jobs at the company's Uitenhage assembly plant. There are not enough Whites and we want to build more cars here. Volkswagen will not go beyond what is agreed with the White trade unions — the company has adopted a definite policy of training Blacks for every job where they can be used.'5

Dr Albert Wessels, Chairman of Toyota, said: 'the motor industry needs 4,000 new apprentices each year, at present, 2,000 apprentices are being recruited . . . the Union is blocking things. Sooner or later there will have to be a confrontation.' He referred to the Motor Industry Employees' Union (White), which has sent a threatening letter to motor mechanics who train Coloured or Indian apprentices, that their membership will be cancelled forthwith. The Union actually sacked four of its members for training Coloured apprentices. Mr D.W. de Klerk, Transvaal divisional chairman of the Motor Industry Employees' Union, said: 'The day that R100 a week is the basic rate for mechanics, I will be prepared to ask my members if they will consider opening the door a little to Coloureds.'

One fact which has been overlooked, is that the White union exercises control over who should be apprenticed through the Apprenticeship Committee on which the Motor Industry Combined Workers' Union (Coloured and Indians) is not represented. Dr Gideon Jacobs, MP, the United Party's economist, said: 'About 50,000 African workers would have to be allowed into skilled work every year if the target of the PM's Economic Advisory Council — a growth rate of

<sup>4</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 20.9.72.

<sup>5</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 3.11.72.

<sup>6 &#</sup>x27;Garment Worker', 27.10.72

<sup>7 &#</sup>x27;Steadfast' - Labour Party Newsletter, October-November, 1972.

5.75% over the next five years - was to be achieved.'8

Harry Schwartz, UP leader in the Transvaal, said: 'a major development among African workers is their growing awareness that they are capable of doing skilled and semi-skilled work, but because of legislation and other restrictions they are prevented from doing it. Pay gaps had to be narrowed.'9

Trade union leaders, following the employers and politicians, have also expressed the need to integrate more African workers into semiskilled jobs. Tom Murray, general secretary of the Boilermakers' Society and TUCSA's vice-president, told the Annual Conference that:— 'The steel industry alone needed 24,000 new workers of all races every year to maintain a 5% growth rate. This number could not be met from the White work force alone. Refrigerators and washing machines were produced in South Africa "untouched by White hands", yet the lowly-paid Black workers who built them were called, "not skilled". The work force in the steel and engineering industry was now 90% African and 10% White compared with 30% African and 70% White, 30 years ago.' 10

L.C. Scheepers, president of TUCSA and of the Radio and Television Workers' Union, on returning from a study tour in Europe, said that 'the productivity of South Africa's Black workers was at least as high as that of more highly paid White workers in Europe... The highly skilled technicians in South Africa's television industry would be White, but the mass of semi-skilled workers would be recruited from the Black population'. <sup>11</sup>

How far are Africans really being allowed to enter skilled and semiskilled jobs? There is much greater readiness on the part of employers to give skilled employment to Coloureds and Indians than to Africans. Even when Africans do the work, they have neither the status nor the wages of skilled workers. Racial attitudes persist in the practice of downgrading a job to the 'Black' level as soon as it is undertaken by an African.

<sup>8</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 5.12.72.

<sup>9</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 3.11.72.

<sup>10</sup> Cape Times, 24.8.72.

<sup>11</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 3.11.72.

#### LABOUR HIERARCHY

Employers and White trade unionists alike, we gather from these statements, welcome the absorption of Africans in semi-skilled occupations and are complacent about the entry of Coloureds and Indians into skilled jobs. Before commenting on the conditions under which Africans are employed in the more skilled types of work, I have something to say about the structural background.

In periods of large-scale employment, as during the depression years of the 1930s, the government's 'White labour policy' led to the dismissal of thousands of Africans, Coloured and Indians from the railways, docks, municipal, provincial and central government agencies. Their places were taken by unskilled Whites, largely coming from rural areas, who streamed to the towns in search of work. Africans, in contrast, were expelled from the towns and forced into the reserves to starve.

For most of the century, no job has been considered too menial for a 'poor White', while no African was admitted to an occupation which required a modicum of technical training and education.

Economic growth during and after the second world war facilitated the movement of Whites from less to more skilled occupations. The consequent changes in the racial composition of the 'labouring' force in non-mining industrial occupations appear in the following table.

## Proportion per cent of workers, according to race, classified as 'labourers' in industrial occupations other than mining

	1936	1960	1970
	%	%	%
Africans	89.5	84.0	68.2
Coloured	54.6	49.4	44.2
Indian	43.6	23.0	15.3
Whites	21.8	4.2	3.3

Unskilled Whites previously found sheltered employment at subsidised wages in the railway administration and government services. They had the vote and so, a powerful trade union. Their strong bargaining position enabled them to obtain preferential treatment in fields of employment under the government's control. This position has not changed, but the supply of unskilled Whites is drying up. The railway and harbour administration employs more than 224,000 wage earners. Half this number are Africans, Coloureds and Indians, and a growing proportion are being absorbed into jobs formerly reserved for Whites.

The measures taken were considered at great length by the administration and the White railway unions, each side being represented by five members of a commission appointed to draw up a scheme of 'controlled' employment. The outcome was described by Ben Schoeman, the veteran Minister of Transport, during the third reading of the railway budget in March 1972. 'Each skilled White artisan on the railways', he told the House, 'will in future be assisted by two non-Whites who will be trained as semi-skilled labourers . . . If it is a success as far as bricklayers and joiners are concerned, then perhaps it can be extended to other divisions as well.'

'It was a fundamental principle of the National party', he added, 'that White workers should be protected against cheap non-White labour', but the government would allow 'controlled employment' of Africans, Coloureds and Indians in work hitherto monopolised by Whites, also in private enterprise. 12

The railway administration now employs Africans as booking clerks and barrier attendants to serve African passengers only; as train marshallers in goods' yards only, the same work being done in passenger shunting yards by White 'shunters'; as truck drivers in Johannesburg; in the catering division to serve Africans only; and as machine minders, carriage and wagon examiners. The White railway unions agreed, on condition that Africans were paid less than Whites for the same class of work. For instance, the 'casting dresser', who cleans up rough casting in railway workshops, used to be a semi-skilled White worker receiving 80 cents an hour. The job was then reclassified as 'unskilled' and given to Africans, who were paid only 25 cents. <sup>13</sup>

Such manipulations, involving an abandonment of the sacred principle of 'the rate for the job', might not be feasible in the private sector, where employers as well as workers compete. Given a scarcity of white semi-skilled workers, who are in a position to bargain for wages well

<sup>12</sup> Daily Dispatch 11.3.72, Diamond Fields Advertiser 17.2.72, Rand Daily Mail 21.3.72.

<sup>13</sup> Rand Daily Mail 15.11.72 and Financial Mail 19.9.69.

above the statutory minimum rate, employers might wish to hire Africans, but are obliged to pay them the rate for the job. This position arose recently in the engineering trades under an agreement arrived at by the employers with the ten registered unions concerned.

The agreement states that the 10,000 D grade jobs now held by Whites, Coloureds and Indians may be opened gradually to Africans under stringent conditions. Firstly, an employer may not replace a White, Coloured or Indian worker in a D grade job unless the latter has been promoted to a superior job at a higher rate of pay, or leaves of his own free will, or is sacked for misconduct. Secondly, the employer may not hire an African for the vacant position without consulting the trade union and obtaining permission from the industrial council. Thirdly, no African may supervise or give instructions to workers of another race employed in D grade jobs. If and when the African has overcome all obstacles, he will receive the minimum rate of 98 cents an hour laid down for this type of work. <sup>14</sup>

#### **EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK**

TUCSA and other White trade union leaders, not satisfied with this planned, controlled change and job reservation, are pressing for the rate for the job — 'equal pay for equal work' — as a protection for White workers. 'Equal pay for equal work' is a socialist slogan — but in South Africa where African workers are denied elementary democratic rights and equal opportunities with White workers, the slogan is to serve reaction. There are 100 colleges for training Whites but only 13 colleges and trade schools, which are no comparison to the technical colleges for Whites, where Blacks can be trained. There is not a single African boilermaker or ironmoulder — the mining colleges are the sole preserve of Whites.

Mr Gert Beetge (Verkrampte), secretary of the White Building Workers' Union said: 'There is no job reservation left in the building industry and in these circumstances I support the rate for the job as the second best way of protecting our White artisans.' 'In view of the present Minister of Labour, Mr M. Viljoen's unwillingness to enforce job reservation, I will support the rate for the job.'

Evidence of the government's inability to check the use of low paid Africans in skilled jobs has been provided at Newcastle where Bester Homes Limited, using sub-contractors, is engaged in a huge scheme for Iscor. 15

The phenomenal increase of Black workers in industry has created insecurity in the Whites who are therefore pressing for unionising of Black workers in their unions and for wage increases. A growing power-lessness of the White workers is expressed in their speeches. Previously White workers depended on their skin colour and their political power. The Nationalist Party depended mainly on the White workers' vote. The Nationalist Party today embraces the Afrikaner capitalist and thus they are representing the interests of capitalism — a change in the class character of the Nationalist Party.

Mr M.G. Swart (Personnel Manager, Sanlam) told the symposium of the Afrikaanse Studente Vereniging, Stellenbosch, that 'there was nothing wrong with wealth. The Afrikaner's personal means were increasing. In 1959, 24% of all share-holders on the Stock Exchange were Afrikaans-speaking, while the percentage in 1969 rose to 39%. In 1966, 59,600 Afrikaans-speakers bought shares, but within 3 years the figure rose to 91,260. In 1969, 46% of all investors in mutual shares were Afrikaans-speaking. <sup>16</sup>

This does not mean that the Nationalist Party is abandoning the White workers. As long as the Whites have the monopoly of votes, political parties will compete for their votes and promise the voters concessions at the expense of the voteless, just as Hitler did in Nazi Germany at the expense of the Jews, Poles, Russians, French, Czechoslovaks and other people that he enslaved. Dr C.P. Mulder (Minister of Information) told the Nationalist Party conference: 'The essence of the matter as far as South Africa's future was concerned, was who stepped through the swing doors of parliament. They would be Whites.' Mr M.C. Botha, Minister of Bantu Administration, told the same conference: 'The Nationalist Party would not allow the White worker to be endangered, it would not allow the non-white to be an

<sup>15</sup> Rand Daily Mail 23.11.72.

<sup>16</sup> Hoofstad 21.7.72.

arbiter in White politics'.17

Employers and white workers might offer concessions and modifications to suit their interests, but decisive changes in the social system will result only from action by the disfranchised, alienated masses of African workers and their allies. We must look to them for signs that the momentum of economic growth is creating effective resistance to the racial rigidities of the labour market.

#### STRIKE WAVE

Government propagandists take time and trouble to persuade the public that the strict enforcement of colour bars and the ban on African strikes have succeeded beyond expectations in maintaining 'peace in industry'. 'The real truth is', said Helen Suzman in the Assembly last April, 'that little publicity is given to strikers and work stoppages involving black workers. Instead of the Press appearing on the scene, the police do.' In spite of repressive action by police and employers, who sack African strikers rather than negotiate, an annual average of 70 strikes and stoppages of Africans occurred between 1959 and 1969. The incidence of strikes in 1971 was 86, according to the Annual Report of the Department of Labour for Year ending 1971. In 1972 the number of strikes appreciably increased.

I have not enough space for a detailed account of African strikes in the recent period, and I shall do no more than draw attention to the main events. One of the most important was the general strike that broke out in Namibia in December 1971. It was remarkable both for the large numbers of workers involved, and for the nature of their demands. Miners, factory hands, farm labourers, municipal and transport workers called for an end to the contract labour system, and for the right of workers to settle with their families in the labour centres. This was the first major rejection of the migratory labour system in Southern Africa.

South Africans have mounted smaller, less concerted movements in a variety of industries and occupations. The residents of Hammarsdale an industrial (border) region between Durban and Pietermaritzburg, boycotted the local bus service in January 1972, and compelled the owners to cancel an increase in bus fares from R1.70 to R2.00 for a five day ticket. In June, in Johannesburg, bus drivers and not passengers took action in support of a wage claim. More than 300 drivers were arrested and jailed, while 80,000 African workers could not get to their work. Officials of PUTCO (Public Utility Company) and government negotiated with the strikers in prison. Thousands of Africans outside the prison demanded the release of the strikers. The men were released, charges brought against them under the Bantu Labour Settlement of Disputes Act were withdrawn, and the men won a 33% increase in wages and other improvements in conditions of work.

The Putco busmen demonstrated that workers in a key position could with impunity defy the law, police and employers; that legal sanctions need not be the decisive factors; and that Africans can muster effective bargaining power. PUTCO workers have formed themselves into a trade union against the strong disapproval of employers, who have not succeeded in isolating the leaders.

Durban dockers, who have a long and honourable record of struggle, went into action in September 1971 and obtained a 30% increase pending a Wage Board investigation. About 100 dockers — 60 Africans and 40 Coloureds, and spokesmen for 2,000 dockers in Durban — testified before the Wage Board in Cape Town in July, 1972 on a long list of complaints: starvation wages, increased rents and prices, the insecurity of casual dock workers. The spokesmen demanded an increase in the basic weekly wages to the estimated 'poverty datum line' of R18, danger money, a holiday bonus, skilled rates for men operating loading winches, a shorter working day and sick leave on full pay.

The Wage Board had not yet issued its report when the dockers struck work in October and brought the harbour works in Durban to a standstill. Faced with an ultimatum from the employers, most of the strikers went back to work. Stevedores in Cape Town made their own protest a few days later by refusing to work overtime — the docks were described as 'quiet as a graveyard', a full fleet of forklift trucks stood idle. Their 'stop five p.m.', gave great support to the Durban dockers' demands for speedy and effective relief. The Wage Board worked fast, published its recommendations on the 17th November, allowed for an increase from R2.30 to R3.50 a day in Cape Town docks and from

R2.07 to R3.20 in Durban. With a new minimum rate of R16.00 for Cape Town and for Durban R9.50 for a five day week plus R1.00 for every day worked — an almost unprecedented rise of more than 50% in the basic wages.

The most successful sortie against wage discrimination was undoubtedly that undertaken by African medical doctors in Johannesburg. They went on strike in November 1972, and within a few days extracted a major concession from the City Council. It agreed to pay all its practitioners the same basic rate of R5700 rising by annual increments of R300 to R8100 a year, as compared with pre-strike scales of R3450-R5400 for Africans and R4050 for Coloured and Asian doctors. This was a sensational breach of the rule that salaried Africans should be paid about 60% and Coloured about 70% of the amount paid to their white colleagues with the same qualifications.

Some strikes have been abortive. Municipal workers in Paarl, for instance, were dismissed and sent back to the Transkei in October after holding out for an increase in their weekly wage of R9. Twenty miners employed in the Sover diamond mine near Windsorton were jailed for 80 days during a strike of 142 men, and were ordered to return to Mozambique after serving their sentence. But the spirit of defiance is abroad and takes many forms. It was expressed by the Soweto School Board, which refused to dismiss two teachers — Abram Tiro and Kubayi — who had been expelled from the University of Turfloop and whom the Education Department banned from teaching.

The spirit of defiance moved 6000 Indian and African commuters who threatened to strike 'with their feet' in protest against the refusal of the authorities to renew the licences of 130 buses owned by Indians in Chatsworth near Durban.

It is widely recognised that African discontent centres mainly on the wage issue. There have been increases in wages — but these seldom outstrip the rise in prices. The gap between the average African and white wages continues to expand. White workers in industry received an average of R300 a month in 1970, this figure representing an annual average increase of 3.7% since 1960. African industrial workers averaged only R58 a month in 1970, the average annual rate of increase being only 2.7%. African wage incomes exceed the 'poverty datum' estimate of R85 a month for a family of five in only two of the thirteen sectors of the economy.

#### COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Some White trade union leaders and employers' representatives have come round to the view that a primary reason for the low wage rates is the exclusion of Africans from the system of collective bargaining. 'The existence of the wage gap', said J.H. Liebenberg, president of the railway artisans' union, 'is due to the fact that Africans have no negotiating rights . . . The Bantu Labour Settlement of Disputes Act, introduced 20 years ago . . . has failed completely'. His proposed changes were unions based in the Homelands!

This is the opinion also of building trade employers, who recently called for a limited recognition of African Unions, but with retention of racial segregation and the ban on strikes. W.D. Wilson, chairman of the Anglo American Corporation, similarly urged industry in its own interests to press for changes in 'the whole area of negotiation, consultations, grievance procedure, and communications in general — all of which are at a low level'.

Leading Natal employers in conference in November, 1972 at Durban voted overwhelmingly to give African workers' trade union rights. They rejected the idea of Homeland-based trade unions as suggested by Liebenberg and also by Professor van der Merwe at TUCSA's 18th Annual Conference — August, 1972. George Palmer — chairman of the meeting and editor of the Financial Mail said: 'We are playing with fire if we don't introduce machinery now to deal with the situation!' He urged that trade unions and employers work out the highest common factor of agreement on the African representation issue.

White trade unionists are divided on this issue. One section, insisting on the rigid application of colour bars in employment and the trade union movement, refuse to concede the right of organisation to Africans. More progressively minded persons, Mr Ray Altman and others, argue that Africans should be allowed to form trade unions freely as a matter of equity and to protect the interests of registered white, Coloured and Indian trade unionists. A supporting opinion is that whites in managerial and supervisory work — many with a trade union background — have identified with the managerial class and encourage the employment of Africans in jobs previously reserved to whites.

In the highly favourable market, skilled whites receive up to 50% more than the negotiated wage rate, and tend to drop out of active trade unionism. For this reason, and because of the decline in the proportion of whites in the labour force, the trade unions have lost much of their bargaining power, particularly in the manufacturing industries, in which TUCSA unions are most strongly represented. To retain some influence, said the leaders, they needed a large African membership. This explains the resolution adopted at the 18th Annual Conference of TUCSA which called on all affiliated unions to obtain from their members an unambiguous and clear mandate to press the government to permit the organising of African workers into registered trade unions in their respective industries and occupations for which they cater!

The appeal has been supported by 36 affiliated trade unions, representing more than 156,000 out of the 69 unions representing 194,000 members. Among those supporting the principle of organising African workers into registered unions were the boilermakers, typographical and garment unions.

I have tried to explain this change of heart on the part of these workers, and now add a note on the position taken up by some of the craft unions. Cliff Crompton, general-secretary of the Iron Moulders' Society, told TUCSA's annual conference in August 1972 that Coloureds virtually outnumbered whites in his section of industry. Employers were paying the basic rate of R1.15 an hour, as against the premium rate of R1.50 paid to whites, and the rate would decline further if the industry were flooded with Africans who were being paid less than 27 cents an hour. The union was steadily becoming less representative of the working force, and could not tolerate the continued employment of unorganised Africans. They must either be kept out of the industry — and this was impossible — or they must be admitted as trade union members.

Not only Crompton — but the other craft unions belonging to the Confederation of Metal & Building Unions (CMBU), affiliated to the International Metal Workers' Federation, also resolved to 'heed a call by the IMF' which after a visit to South Africa, invited by CMBU, concluded after its investigation that 'viable African trade unions were possible and that CMBU unions should encourage their establishment'. CMBU resolved 'to make every endeavour to bring about the admission

of Africans to trade unions'.

The government has refused to budge on this issue. 'The Organisation of African workers', said Marais Viljoen, the Minister of Labour, 'is neither in the interests of South Africa, nor of improving their wage position, nor of promoting race relations'. 'The recognition of African Unions', he added, 'would endanger "labour peace" and threaten the country's security.'

#### BLACK UNIONS AND SACTU

This attitude is consistent with Nationalist party policies of the last 40 years, and receives a surprising measure of support from some African trade union leaders.

Mr Drake Koka, the secretary of the Sales and Allied Workers' Association, argues that their priority is not statutory recognition and registration, but the formation of a comprehensive African trades union, covering workers in all sectors of the economy and based on individual affiliation. Mr Koka appears to contemplate a revival of the ICU of the 1920s — the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union which, under Clements Kadalie, became a legend of mass organisation.

Koka objects to TUCSA's notion of non-racial unions. 'Africans are tired of "Kaffir-boetie" unions . . . we cannot allow White trade unions to make use of African workers in order that they can be acceptable to the overseas countries and to the ILO.'

Africans, says Koka, can speak for themselves and negotiate on their own behalf. They do not want to exist 'like black pimples on the White unions' face'.

The Black Allied Workers' Union was launched in November, 1972 at Katlehong, with Mr Etienne T. Phoofolo as the national president and Mr R. Davids as the national organiser. It appears to be the brainchild of Mr Koka, but the organisation has adopted a policy far more moderate than the programme he originally outlined. 'The basis of our operation', we are told by the president and organiser, 'is to win the respect of the employers, the public, and the government; to create a climate of opinion in which the laws about Bantu trade unions and discriminatory industrial and labour laws could be reformed for the sake of the country's rickety economy.' It is not their intention to

organise illegal strikes, or to make unreasonable demands for political reasons. On the contrary, the BAWU intends to raise productivity and create a climate favourable to reform, by sponsoring training centres and courses for African youth.

This kind of pious platitude and wishful thinking was common in the early stages of African trade unionism, when leaders thought they could appease and placate employers and government by promises of industrial peace. The strikers of Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, Paarl, Prieska and Sover diamond miners are closer to reality and have a right to expect more maturity from persons who call themselves trade unionists than the BAWU displays.

The leaders of BAWU, or Black Workers' Council as some refer to them, approached SACTU leaders and suggested that SACTU disbands and joins with them. Their approach to SACTU is the height of arrogance on the part of these confused persons.

SACTU was established in 1955 as the only trade union centre organising and leading the exploited workers of South Africa. Fifteen years ago it organised the campaign for a living wage — R2.00 a day. The government and employers feared SACTU organisers. SACTU leaders were banned, banished, imprisoned, but SACTU's leadership, principles and spirit prevail.

When H.J. Oosthuizen tells the Vaal Industries Association annual meeting at Vereeninging, that 'steps have been taken to prevent agitators being included among the Africans recruited in the Homelands, that a record is being kept of any difficulties encountered by employers with the object of keeping agitators out', it is SACTU members that his organisation is fearing.

SACTU is recognised by and enjoys high prestige with the international labour movement and the ILO. SACTU has from its very inception played a significant role in focussing world attention on the plight of the exploited and oppressed Black workers of South Africa.

SACTU has trained many leaders — leaders who are capable of organising their fellow-workers, capable of negotiating agreements, whether in prison or at the factory gates. They are able to organise strikes in support of the workers' demands and are able to tell the public what their demands are.

The South African workers led by SACTU will learn to combine illegal and legal forms of struggle. They will learn to identify their friends and enemies — enemies who are out to nobble the African workers' organisations for the 'country's economy', 'country's security' or for their desire just for 'controlled change' as put forward by TUCSA.

The African workers are on the march for advance and SACTU is there to lead this march. All help to the South African workers and SACTU, which is leading the struggle to secure higher wages, better conditions of work and human dignity, justice and democratic rights.

# World Trade Union Conference against Apartheid

by E. R. MATAJO

The Governing Body of the ILO on November 14-17, 1972, resolved to set aside one or two days of the 58th Session of the International Labour Conference in Geneva, June 1973, for a World Trade Union Conference Against Apartheid.

The World Conference Against Apartheid will be an occasion for mobilising the three major international labour organisations — the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the World Confederation of Labour — on a common platform.

The United Nations declared 1971 an International Year Against Racism and Racial Discrimination. In keeping with the spirit of the UN resolution, the International Labour Conference at its 56th Session in June, 1971, directed the ILO Governing Body to take action. Ways and means should be explored of intensifying the struggle against apartheid in the world of labour and for the achievement of fundamental human and trade union rights in South Africa. <sup>1</sup>

The proposal to call the conference arose from these actions, and from a UN resolution adopted in 1970. The special committee on Apartheid was then requested to co-operate with the ILO, the OAU

1 Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 14/72, June, 1972.

and the trade union internationals, with the aim of convening a worldwide conference against Apartheid. 2

All these bodies have agreed to sponsor the conference. It has the support of the UN, the ILO, the WFTU, ICFTU, WCL, AATUF and the OAU.

This might well prove to be the widest gathering of trade unions that has yet been achieved. It will be an historic occasion, commented the General Council of the WFTU at its 22nd Session in Bucharest in November 1972. 'It will be the first time since 1945 that the trade unions of the world, without exception, will have co-operated on a given subject the topicality and importance of which need not be emphasised.'

#### GREAT APPREHENSION

Before commenting on the importance of the proposed conference, I want to draw attention to two related factors, the attitude of the South African Government, the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA) and the work of the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

The South African Government and the white trade unions have shown great apprehension at their increasing isolation in the international labour movement. As Arthur Grobbelaar, the General Secretary of TUCSA, stated in 1972:

'The Government's policy of apartheid had been consistently attacked at previous conferences. The condemnation would be general, but particularly bitter attacks on the government's race policies would come from the Afro-Asian and communist delegates. In addition, I expect to be confronted by the agents of the South African Congress of Trade Unions — the professional exiles — as has happened at past congresses.'

Mr Grobbelaar made this statement, before leaving for Geneva where he lobbied delegates on behalf of South Africa's re-admission to the ILO. On his return to South Africa, he warned TUCSA against the strength of the anti-apartheid movement.

- 2 Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 32/71, July, 1971.
- 3 Rand Daily Mail, 12.5.72.

'The anti-South African Government lobby at the ILO, as in other places, continues to grow in strength and influence. Prominent in Labour circles are the agents of SACTU. An indication as to how SACTU has succeeded in gaining in prestige and influence, is shown by the fact that the General-Secretary's normal interview with the Director General of the ILO was on this occasion marked by the SACTU representatives also being present.'

In urging the government to work for South Africa's eventual admission as a member of the ILO he said:

'It is recognised that any efforts to return to the ILO will mean treading a long hard road, and that some concessions will also have to be made in Government policy, before this final objective be achieved. However, the changes that are required in Government policy are perhaps not as serious as many would believe. The Government must also accept that, if it believes that apartheid is an honest, equitable, and ethical system, it is necessary to enter into the world arena to defend it. Staying outside is not going to convince any of the neutrals, and neither does it assist those Nations who are not ill-disposed towards us.'4

Two important conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, the campaign against South African racists has bitten deep through their habitual arrogance. Marginal groups, such as some white trade unionists are thinking of minor concessions. These would leave white power structures intact, but give capitalist countries a pretext for conferring legitimacy on apartheid policies.

#### SACTU'S ACHIEVEMENT

Secondly, Grobbelaar's reference to SACTU is a tribute to the patient, dogged work of its representatives since its formation in 1955. One of its major tasks was to expose the evil of the government's apartheid system and the treachery of the white trade unions in South Africa, their betrayal of working class solidarity, and the persistent support given to the system of white domination.

4 TUCSA, Supplementary Report of NEC to the 18th Annual Conference, Cape Town, August 21-25, 1972, pages 22-24. SACTU has done all it can to enlighten the world labour movement about the true nature of Apartheid. A prominent feature of the campaign has been the exposure of claims by the South African government and white trade unions to represent the whole body of six million wage earners in South Africa. SACTU has constantly denied the right of white racists to speak for the five million African, Coloured and Indian workers.

SACTU sent representatives to International Labour Conferences in 1970, 1971 and 1972. They made contact with representatives of African trade unions in Geneva and with trade unionists from other countries. This patient and systematic explanation of our cause has undoubtedly been an important factor in the decision to convene the conference.

Their efforts at the last 57th Session of the ILO Conference in June, 1972, were particularly successful. Mark Williams Shope and Ray Simons who represented SACTU had meetings with the workers' delegates of 31 African States, and with representatives of the WCL, ICFTU, WFTU, and AATUF. They interviewed the ILO's Director-General, Mr Wilfred Jenks, Mr A. Tevodjre the Assistant-General Secretary and other ILO departmental heads. Mark Shope, the General Secretary of SACTU, spoke to the Workers' group on the 21st of June when he delivered an impressive hard-hitting speech about conditions in South Africa and about South Africa's collaborators. He appealed to his audience to get together in an international conference and to work out an effective programme of action against apartheid.

'We', he said, 'know that the main burden of liberating ourselves from this fascist terror and violence which has gripped the Black people of South Africa, is the historic responsibility of the Black workers and the people of South Africa . . . but, it is also a common responsibility and a positive concern of the entire labour movement of the world. We need your unqualified support . . . let this assembly come out with a unanimous decision to call an international conference of trade unionists at which a programme of action against the inhuman system of apartheid can be worked out and acted upon.'

The Workers' Group thereupon resolved that an International Conference of Trade Unions be held during the ILO Conference in 1973, so as to allow maximum participation by trade union organisations from all countries. It was agreed that the Secretary General of the

United Nations be invited to open the Conference and that the UN and ILO should give technical and all other necessary assistance to ensure its success.

Ambassador Abdulrahim Abby Farah of Somalia, the Chairman of UN Special Committee on Apartheid, thanked the Congress of the ICFTU in London during July, 1972, for agreeing to support the conference against apartheid. He said:

'While apartheid is basically a system where a rich minority owns all the wealth of the country, and the majority live in grinding poverty in the midst of wealth, apartheid . . . also means the most dehumanising form of racism in the world today . . . it is a crime against humanity. It is on two counts, therefore that we ask for your increased support — as workers in protest against the flagrant violation of the principle of workers' rights, and as human beings confronted with a large-scale attack on humanity.'

He emphasised the importance of the unions. 'We should very much like to see unions refusing to take part in manufacturing and exporting arms for South Africa, which provide the power by which the racist regime is able to maintain its grip over the population. Workers involved in the production of these arms to SA cannot escape responsibility for this sad state of affairs. We should also like to see unions refuse to handle imports from South Africa.'5

Abdulrahim Farah's comment on the significance of the conference deserves wide circulation. On another occasion he said:

'It can confidently be hoped that a forceful new element will be added to the international campaign. The issues in the South African situation challenge every premise of the trade union movement. No national trade union worthy of its name should do less than give its most active support to any action that is called for by the whole movement.'6

White reaction in South Africa has been hostile, as one might expect. Grobbelaar reported that TUCSA's officers are seriously worried at Farah's speech and the ILO's governing body decision.

He warned: 'If the whole of the Workers' Movement is gathering for the express purpose of deciding what sort of action should be taken by

<sup>5</sup> Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 17/72, September, 1972.

<sup>6</sup> Unit on Apartheid Notes and Documents No. 20/72, October, 1972.

the trade unions against South Africa, then the Republic is in for a very serious time.' 7

'The thinking of TUCSA leaders is that the South African Government should return to the International trade union fold, and this approach is shared by the pro-government South African Confederation of Labour. Whereas it formerly put pressure on the government to pull out of the ILO, it now proposes 'to make a diplomatic approach to the government to see if there is any chance of the Republic regaining membership of the ILO.'8

#### SABOTAGE BID

The South African government, its friends at home and abroad will do all they can to sabotage this conference. They will sow confusion through the capitalist controlled press, announcing 'big changes in South Africa', 'narrowing the wage gap between Black and White workers', 'new deal ahead for African labour', 'easing up on pass laws', etc. All these headlines will bear no relation to the actual position at home. The stark reality is: the pass laws, the migrant labour system, both responsible for the break-up of African homes, the landlessness, the starvation wages, the fraudulent Bantustans and the denial of elementary democratic rights — all these together with the host of discriminatory laws and practices remain intact. I am confident that the international labour movement, UN and the ILO which have for many years acquired a knowledge of South Africa's race discrimination practices in labour matters will not be confused.

Yet, we dare not underestimate South Africa's friends in all these organisations. Many delegates at this World Trade Union Conference Against Apartheid will understand the reasons for the support to the racist regime in Pretoria by the capitalists and their government in the USA, West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom – their aim is to maintain White supremacy in Southern Africa, to guard their investments and maintain the exploitation of Southern Africa's human and natural resources.

<sup>7</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 17th November, 1972.

<sup>8</sup> Rand Daily Mail, 25th November, 1972.

We, who know the cruelties committed every day to human dignity and decency, we who have before us the faces of those who have sacrificed their lives — we dare not tire from explaining again and again the real meaning of life under Apartheid.

We must at this Conference emphasise that indifference to the Apartheid system equals support for the Vorster regime and remind delegates that apathy and indifference in the 1930's led to the Nazi gas chambers.

Therefore Conference must resolve to strike new blows against Apartheid in Southern Africa. The trade union movement in all capitalist countries must:

- (a) Bring pressure on their governments and companies to halt the sale of arms to South Africa. Workers must refuse to manufacture and handle arms for South Africa.
- (b) Refuse to handle goods for and from South Africa. The International Longshoreman's Association (AFL/CIO), who have boycotted all goods from Rhodesia and were investigating ways to detect importation of such goods, in order to overcome the difficulty of falsified documents, have shown the possibilities of developing such action.
  - (c) Withdraw all investments from South Africa.
- (d) Stop technicians or any skilled manpower from going to South Africa.
  - (e) Refuse to play sport with apartheid South Africa.

ISOLATE RACIST SOUTH AFRICA. Let the men of apartheid know in a way that will really hurt them that the International Labour-Movement is determined to assist the oppressed and exploited people in South Africa in their struggle to win fundamental and trade union rights in South Africa!

Let this Conference be a meaningful blow for freedom in our country!

## Uganda's 'Asian Problem' created by Imperialists

#### by JOYCE MALINDI


'The party holds the view that the Indians are a foreign and outlandish element which is unassimilable. They can never become part of the country and must therefore be treated as an immigrant community.'

Nationalist Party Manifesto 1948

'I am absolutely certain that if we distinguish between the Indians who are exploiters and those who are exploited, and if we resolve to treat the exploited in the same way as other workers, they will help us to implement our policies of socialism and self-reliance.'

President Nyerere 9.12.1968

The reactions to the expulsion of non-citizen Asians from Uganda has been revealing. In South Africa, the rulers have pounced gleefully to exploit the situation and divide the Black people. Now it is not the apparently intrinsically unassimilable Asians who were to blame, but the Africans who were given political power which they are incapable of wielding. Fortunately most of the Black people have not swallowed this proffered example of the inevitable consequences of African rule.



The Western world led by Britain has been quick to discern Black racialism and not unexpectedly has been blind to the culpability of British colonial rule and to the British racialism that refused to admit its Asian citizens for so long.

In India and some of the more progressive third world countries the

tendency has been to blame the Asians for not 'identifying' and to condemn Amin as a racialist.

Thus with few exceptions the responses have been generalised and have seen the situation as purely one of inter-acting racial groups. This approach has characterised much of the writing on the Asians in East and South Africa and led to depressing conclusions as to their future. They have been described as 'powerless minorities at the mercy in South Africa of a tyrannical albinocracy, and in East Africa, of equally hostile black majorities'. Behaviour patterns have been sought and found as resulting from racial factors. Yet in reality racialism is not the basic element in the situation. Social and economic factors are the determinants, racial differences the gilding fostered, encouraged and aggravated by the colonial power.

Such apparent racial conflict as has existed in East Africa has not been between Asian exploiters and African exploited, but between an Asian bourgeoisie creaming some of the benefits and an African bourgeoisie anxious for the lion's share of the spoils.

One of the triumphs of British colonialism in East Africa has been the skill with which it has succeeded in deflecting the odium attached to the exploiter on to the Asians, while presenting the British as protectors and helpers of African advance. It was British policy not to educate and train Africans but instead to recruit civil servants and administrators from India. Later, as a policy of deliberate discrimination, Africans were confined to the lowest grades and Asians to the middle grades with Europeans in the senior grades. Yet now it is the Asians who are blamed for holding the positions they did and for retarding African progress.

Discriminatory legislation kept the Asians from the rural areas and from agricultural occupations, thus confining them to urban areas and giving rise to a concentration in the commercial sector. At the same time the restrictive credit, marketing and other legislation prevented the growth of an African commercial class. Yet once again it is the Asians who are held solely to blame for dominating the commercial sector.

As a result even today independent African governments often recruit British and other western expatriates at enormous salaries, whilst

<sup>1</sup> Van den Berghe, Pierre L. Portrait of a Minority (London 1970), page 152.

the skills of local Asians are under-utilised. And events such as the Uganda expulsions are used to divide and create hostility and to further imperialist designs.

This is not to suggest that Asian behaviour in the colonial period and after in East Africa has been exemplary, but rather to stress that the greatest culpability rests with the imperial rulers of Uganda. The Asians though less privileged than the Europeans, were still a privileged class and as a group acted in their class interest. Those few amongst them who were more aware and wished to change attitudes found difficulties in doing so, as they did not have political power — and in Uganda at least the alternative claimants to political power were tribal and other vested interests.

#### HISTORY OF OCCUPATION

The Asian presence in Uganda or elsewhere in East Africa did not originate with or result from the importation of indentured labour to build the Kenya Uganda railway, as is popularly believed. As early as the second century AD Indians were known to be active along the east coast of Africa. Even after the advance of the imperialist powers into the Indian ocean, the Indian traders continued their activity, but for a long period they confined their presence to the coastal region of the mainland and Zanzibar. Having annexed the Indian Empire, Britain used the fact that many Indian traders were British subjects as an effective lever in the disputes over the division of the imperial spoils in Africa.

By the 1890s when the railway from the coast to Uganda was to be built the system of indentured labour was well established as the successor to slavery. Of the 31,983 indentured labourers brought from India, over 20% (6,454) were invalided home before the railway was completed, nearly 8% (2,493) died on the job, and 50% (16,312) were repatriated at the end of their contracts. Thus only 6,724 remained in East Africa.<sup>2</sup>

From this time onwards there was immigration from India. Some were unofficially recruited to work the railways, others as craftsmen, artisans and clerks. Still others came as traders or to take up employment. The British also recruited their lower grade administrators from

<sup>2</sup> Final report of Uganda Railway Committee Cd. 2164 (1904).

India, thus avoiding the need to provide education and to train and use Africans as administrators. There was a further spurt in immigration after 1948 attracted by the post war boom and development.<sup>3</sup>

It is thus from these groups, attracted by a laissez faire system and anxious 'to make good', that the Indians of East Africa originated. Their origins and the opportunities available in East Africa led them into becoming a basically middle class community. By contrast in South Africa nearly 80% of the Indians are descended from indentured labourers. Restrictions on freedom of movement and employment opportunities have meant that the majority of Indian South Africans are today a part of the South African working class.

In much of Uganda the traditional feudal type system adapted and retained some control of production and land, and excluded white settler immigration. The first Asians who ventured into the interior did not themselves engage in production. They concentrated on collecting and financing crops produced by African growers. By 1903 when cotton was introduced Asians were buying the entire crop.

The Baganda elite felt at home in the highly material and competitive 'pioneer' society. Soon there were conflicts with African farmers who resented the Asian monopoly of marketing and ginning. Thus in the 1920s when European settlers and Asians in Kenya were in conflict, Europeans were able to use anti-Asian statements by Uganda Africans to strengthen their hand vis a vis the Colonial Office and presented themselves as the protectors of the African against the exploiting machinations of the Asians.

From this early period competing economic interests led to apparent racial conflicts in East Africa. In Kenya African land and wealth had been usurped and the early competition/conflict was between the Asians and the settlers.

The economic entrenchment of the Asians came in World War II and after. Scarcities and shipping difficulties led to greater self-sufficiency resulting in some early industrialisation. The often enormous profits made required new avenues of investment. New food manufacturing industries were set up and more investment poured into sugar, flour, oil, and coffee processing. Textiles, soap and other manufacturing

<sup>3</sup> The 1948 Census for Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika gave the number of Asians in East Africa as 183,000. The estimate in 1963 was 352,300.

industries were established by local Asian interests.

The Asians had established their own schools and with greater affluence Asian Youth were able to acquire professional and technical qualifications. African education lagged pitifully behind, with little government expenditure. In Kenya for instance, whilst £80.10sh was spent on each European child, only £3 was spent on an African child, £21 on an Indian or Goan child and £21.10sh on an Arab child. Even in the period just before independence when 'Africanisation' was allegedly being speeded up the figures reveal similar discrimination in higher education as the following tables for government bursaries and loans show: 4

	Bursaries			Loans for overseas education		
	1960	1960-61	1961-62	1960	1961	1962
Europeans	53	56	54	29	33	35
Asians	62	75	80	63	77	72
Africans	28	34	40	32	35	46

Whilst the situation in Uganda was slightly better, the discriminatory policies prevented the emergence of skilled African manpower. The results are evident in the Uganda Government High Level Manpower Survey of 1967, though the true imbalance is concealed as the Ugandan figures include Asians who are citizens.

	Ugandans	Non-Uganda Asians	Europeans & Others
Senior Management	638	154	244
Senior Farm Management	2	12	4
Junior Management	2284	429	187
Chemists	16	35	19
Architects	5	12	15
Civil Engineers	26	25	44
Electrical Engineers	13	20	22
Mechanical Engineers	4	21	25
Chemical Engineers	2	2	-
Industrial Engineers	-	2	-
Doctors	181	201	162
Accountants	77	89	52
Lawyers	85	76	13
School teachers (with degrees	s) 195	415	881

<sup>4</sup> Rattansi P.M., Abdulla M. Portrait of a Minority (London 1970), page 139.

The position of the Africans at the bottom of the pile was not accidental. British policy was to categorise and segregate the population into distinct groups. Economic, political and social discrimination was based on the compartmentalisation of the population into three main groups. There were separate schools, hospitals, residential areas. There was no job reservation legislation as exists in South Africa, but the civil service was rigidly divided. Jobs were graded by race and discriminatory salary scales and benefits applied. European and Asian civil servants received 'home' leave in the UK and India, thus further distinguishing them. The three tier system with Europeans at the top, Asians in the middle and Africans at the bottom was followed in the economy as a whole.

The aim of colonial policy was to preserve and sustain cultural, linguistic and religious differences. People were encouraged to think in group terms and the groups were divided from each other. The development of a concept of a common national identity was thus retarded.

Each of the groups was encouraged to be ethnocentric. By tradition Asian social organisation was closed to outsiders; the policy of compartmentalisation merely encouraged further isolation. The system designed to emphasise and strengthen white superiority also led to a significant number of Asians accepting the corrolary of African inferiority. Stereotypes were built and the absence of contact encouraged prejudice.

The division extended to the political sphere with separate electoral rolls. In the case of the Asians the divisions created in India were imported into East Africa and communalism was a potent political factor.

#### POLITICAL ACTION

The early political record of the Asians is highly creditable. In Kenya, at a time when there was little overt African activity, the Asians resisted settler claims of Kenya being a white man's country. Their protests, petitions, deputations and boycotts, supported by India, played no small part in preventing Kenya becoming another South Africa or Southern Rhodesia.

In 1930 the East African Indian National Congress welcomed the British White paper enunciating the principle of African paramountcy and asked for the removal of all racial discrimination in legislation and specifically for restriction on African land and labour.

The Congress and Asian members of the Legislative Council repeatedly urged direct representation for Africans, the abolition of the kipande (pass) system, the removal of restrictions on the growing of crops and for payments for crops to be equal to those made to Europeans.

However the Asians ceased to feel the necessity to voice African grievances with the appointment of Africans to the legislative Councils and the development of African political organisations.

Whilst even in the early 1950s the Asians worked closely with African political organisations,<sup>5</sup> there seems to have been a decline in support for such progressive policies as African nationalism gained momentum. Asian politics were narrow and more often communal. In contrast with 1930 the Asians were by now a more affluent group, though there were still some members living in relative poverty. As the Africans moved out of the subsistence sector into the money economy, the Asians moved up the scale. With the development and growth of the economy and the relaxation of some of the earlier restrictive legislation their interests expanded rapidly. They began to view with misgivings the possibility of African rule.

In Uganda a further dimension was added by tribal conflict. Following the deportation of the Kabaka by the British in 1953 there was a boycott of non-African goods in Buganda. Because of their position the Asian commercial group was most affected. Similarly, in 1959, the Baganda in an attempt to preserve their privileged position launched a boycott of non-African goods and services in protest at proposed equal representation in the Legislative Council for all the regions. Again the Asian was affected, the large importer as well as the small Dukawala (shopkeeper).

There was a complete lack of leadership and in the circumstances the Asians viewed the prospect of independence with alarm. Their political organisations began to consider special electoral safeguards for their future including a communal roll and racially reserved seats. Younger radical members of the community were able to prevent these

<sup>5</sup> There were joint meetings of Kau and Indian Congress in 1951 to protest against separate electoral representations for Muslims and asking for common franchise.

demands being formally presented, but they never formulated a positive alternative policy that went beyond generalisations.

It was not surprising therefore that when the British made an alternative citizenship available on the eve of independence many Asians chose not to become Uganda citizens. In so doing they did not help their position vis a vis African governments. India had urged them to identify and had actively supported the African independence struggle. However, the propaganda and brainwashing of imperialist rule had its effect—racial attitudes had been entrenched and the myth of European superiority and African inferiority had taken hold. At the same time the stereotype projected by the settlers of the Asian as an exploiter of the African led to racialist statements by African politicians and obstructionist policies by the new bureaucracy—thus further aggravating Asian fears.

With African politicians in Uganda and Kenya themselves divided, it was difficult for those Asians anxious to identify with African nationalism to do so. The political parties had for long refused to accept non-African members and there was no avenue of active political participation, a necessary prerequisite for membership of a common society.

The dilemma of the Asian was expressed in the Presidential Address<sup>6</sup> to the Kenya Indian Congress in 1956:

'India has declared herself inexorably against colonialism presuming that it exists in Kenya in its worst form, and that we, the local Indians, are associating ourselves with the British "colonialists" in maintaining it and in keeping down . . . the African nationalists striving for the just aspirations of the sons of the soil. As against that the local European community reproaches us for putting into the heads of the African people ideas of colour bar, common roll, and reserved highlands with motives not honourable towards their settlement here. If there is any truth in either of these imputations, it is in the latter but neither of them is conducive to our popularity in either quarter . . . there is no influence so potent as self-interest; and our self-interest ordains that we should be in favour of the perpetuation of the British connection with this country.'

The British offer of citizenship was designed in the settlers' interests and was a natural follow-up on the policy which had earlier deliberately refrained from encouraging the emergence of a national identity. The

<sup>6</sup> Kenya Indian Congress-26th session 4-6 August, 1956.

only identity projected was that of graded children of the Empire, whose protection was in the paternal hands of the Imperial power. The Asians thus sought the protection they believed existed in UK citizenship.

The compartmentalisation of the races, and the differentials that existed between them, portended conflict. On the eve of independence some of the potential points of hostility between the Africans and Europeans were removed by Britain. European civil servants were given very generous golden handshakes, thus allowing them to leave and their jobs to be transferred to Africans. Farmers and landowners similarly were bought out and their lands made available for Africans. The generosity was, however, paid for by East Africans; the newly independent governments were obliged to pay the golden handshakes and buy out the farmers with assistance from British loans.

Though Asian civil servants had also been recruited from outside by the British and brought to East Africa, they were not included in the handouts, and no scheme was prepared to enable the governments to buy out the Asian economic interests.

The auguries were thus present at Independence. But the source of potential conflict was not the racial differences, as indeed developments in other East African countries have shown, but rather in the economic situation of the majority of the people and the extent to which they were to share in the fruits of independence.

One commentator in 1961 described the racial situation as the barometer of progress, which would be set fair whilst satisfactory steps in solving the economic problems of the country were taken. 'For though historical developments, prejudices, and the instinctive desire to maintain one's identity all play their part, the problem is in reality a manifestation of the struggle between the haves and the have nots. As long as there is an inequitable distribution of wealth; as long as the racial and economic divisions are identical; so long will remain the seeds of racial discord.'

#### SCAPEGOATS

In the absence of socialist policies, the growing African middle class has seen the Asian as his main competitor and sought to eliminate him, using race and non-African character as an excuse. Governments whose economic policies did not benefit the man in the street also used the Asian as an ever-ready scapegoat. In 1968 Oginga Odinga, commenting on the situation in Kenya, said that in order to accelerate the creation of an African middle class the Asians were being sacrificed: 'Government economic policies have logically led to a situation where someone has to be sacrificed to relieve pressure on the government.'

The Asians had neither the foresight nor the means to follow the example of the larger European economic interests, who took individual influential Africans on to their Boards of Directors and sought government partnership or participation as a way of safeguarding their investments and profits. The Europeans have thus been able to *increase* their share of the economy after independence. They have seen the Asians as competitors and potential sources of obstruction to their expansion, and have therefore further aggravated racial hostility.

The pattern of Africanisation has been to restrict licences in particular areas or commodities and to require all non-African foreigners to have work permits which are granted so long as there are no local personnel with adequate skills. In theory it should thus have been possible gradually to phase out all foreigners without friction.

But the usefulness of the Asians to British interests had now ended and, subjected to internal pressures, the British government abandoned their responsibility and refused them free access to Britain. Many of the Asians who were small scale businessmen or artisans and semi-skilled or white-collar workers were amongst the first to be affected by the process of Africanisation. With little or no capital (the British controls originally exempted those who were able to show capital resources in the UK) they were hit by the British immigration controls. Forced to remain, they created a bottleneck, giving rise to greater African resentments and pressure.

The Kenya government, in exchange for financial support, was prepared to accommodate Britain and an agreement was worked out matching the phasing out of Asians in Kenya with British entry regulations. But the British arrogance in legislating in a manner which presumed to dictate the rate at which African countries should bring their economies into the hands of citizens was resented in both Uganda and Tanzania. President Obote on various occasions stressed that the prob-

lem in his country was not one of Asians but of British citizens who were being refused entry into their own country.

President Obote had already emerged as an outspoken supporter of the liberation movements in southern Africa. In 1969 he had announced widespread nationalisation measures. These were to include complete control of the import/export sector and 60% holdings in over 80 enterprises.

Not surprisingly, all the vested interests who had felt threatened by the Obote policies welcomed the coup by Amin. The haste of the British recognition of the new regime had more to do with the projected sale of arms to South Africa opposed by Obote than with questions of de facto control over Uganda.

Among the first acts of the Amin regime was to support dialogue with South Africa, and to overturn the nationalisations. The number of companies to be affected was cut from 82 to 18 and government shareholding was to be reduced to 49%. Those companies with whom agreements had already been negotiated for a larger government participation were allowed to re-negotiate and retain control. *The Times* commented aptly: 'Generally speaking, private business in Uganda claims to be very happy with the new government's policies . . .'

It is against this background that Amin's claims of economic war and desire to place the economy in African hands must be seen. There has been some takeover of British firms, but no real consideration of the interests of the mass of Ugandans in the formulation of this or any other policy. Instead, adventurist decisions have been taken on an ad hoc basis to gain popular support. Already however, the watering down of these takeovers indicates the strength of the foreign vested interests.

Amin's opportunistic policies have not only generally encouraged local and foreign capitalists, but tribal as well as racial rivalries have been brought to the forefront and thousands of Ugandans have been massacred. The basic structure of the economy has not been altered and exploitation remains. The takeovers do not amount to nationalisation. Businesses have merely been transferred to African capitalists, who are already taking advantage of shortages at the expense of the customer. There are reports of African shopkeepers who are selling imported sugar in Kampala's suburbs with a mark up of over 60%.

#### THE PEOPLE SUFFER

The main casualties during two years of Amin's rule have been the African people. Tragic in its personal consequences as was the decision to expel the Asians, it clearly is not the final factor in any assessment of Uganda.

Events in Uganda do point a lesson for societies with multi-racial populations, but not the one of the inevitability of mutual hostility projected by South Africa. Tanzania with a roughly analogous colonial heritage to Uganda's has been able to show a different path.

Though popular prejudices exist among all racial groups in Tanzania, and occasionally individuals have exploited them, nonetheless there is a deliberate Government attempt to play down differences. Most important, the Tanzania leadership has been trying to educate the masses to differentiate between racial differences and conflicts arising from different economic interests.

The economy of the country has been placed more and more under central control and Asian economic interests as well as those of other expatriates have been adversely affected. After the Arusha Declaration of 1967 the economic rather than the racial motivation has been apparent. With the property nationalisations in 1970, when Africanowned buildings were included in the takeover, it became evident that the interests of all capitalists, local or foreign, African or non-African, would be affected adversely.

Thus whilst many Asians have left Tanzania they have done so voluntarily, preferring not to live within a growing socialistic economy. With similar motivations some Africans are seeking jobs within the East African Community or international organisations. Correspondingly it has become possible for the Asian workers to identify with TANU's policies, and Asian bank employees were publicly praised by the President for their work in ensuring the success of the Bank nationalisations. In 1968 it was found that approximately 10% of TANU cell leaders in Dar es Salaam were Asians, and in elections Asians have been known to defeat Africans in largely African constituencies. Class, not race, became the criterion.

Thus the Uganda experience should not be regarded as the inevitable pattern for the whole of Africa. The South African policy of separate development bears a marked resemblance to the British policy in East

Africa in its results. The challenge for the Liberation Movement is to ensure that apartheid does not succeed in isolating our peoples from one another. It is our task to understand and expose the true nature of the oppression in South Africa, and to unite all sections of the oppressed people in the struggle for liberation.

# Development of Classes in Independent Kenya

by J. A. JUMA

Kenya has been going through rapid social change in the last ten years. On attaining political independence in 1963, there was not a properly constituted local bourgeois class capable of ruling the country and formulating clear policies. By the end of 1972, however, this class had been formed and, in collaboration with the western bourgeoisie, is now rapidly taking root — making policy and executing it. Reliance on the western bourgeoisie, the cornerstone of the ruling class existence, runs like a red thread throughout our analysis. We shall use the events, reported by bourgeois newspapers, during the month of December 1972, a 'quiet' month, to help us in our efforts to show class groupings and activities, as an assessment of the present situation in Kenya.

Statements by various members of the government during the month of December, 1972, include the following points:

(1) The encouragement of foreign private investment. The President himself, during the Jamburi (Republic) celebrations, restated, for the umpteenth time, that his government welcomes foreign private investors. He said his government's policy was one of 'live and let live' towards foreign investors. The finance minister made special tax agreements with capitalists from Norway and Denmark, to be followed later by similar agreements with other countries.

- (2) Tourism is to be encouraged and a great deal of money spent on hotels etc. The area for tourist parks is to be increased, said Mr Shako, Minister for Tourism and Wildlife. In this sector of the economy, foreign private investors are welcomed and reassured that their hotels will not be nationalised.
- (3) The local bourgeoisie are to be encouraged to work in collaboration with foreign capitalists. In some areas of the economy, the local bourgeoisie will have exclusive rights, for example, certain sections of the tourist trade (Jam Mohammed Assistant Minister for Tourism and Wildlife). They will also have priority in getting some government contracts. In many fields, e.g. insurance, banking and the management of foreign firms, the government is pressing for more local participation.
- (4) Local capitalist big farmers are to be encouraged by and supported with government loans and various credits. A 'co-operative' bank is to get financial help from the government, primarily of course to help agricultural 'firms'.
- (5) For the petty-bourgeoisie small farmers, petty-traders and others the government's policy is to encourage rural based, small production in an effort to slow down the rush to the towns. The government sees this policy as the only way out of serious unemployment as the 'wage-sector' of the economy has grown by only 3% since 1964! In particular, 'self-employment' is offered to school leavers (Nyagah Minister of Agriculture).

#### SOCIAL POLICIES

What are the policies of the Kenya government in the social sphere?

- (a) A 'determined' fight against racism and tribalism (the local 'racism' with which sections of the bourgeois fight each other).
- (b) Encouragement of religion, especially Christianity (Vice-President Moi).
- (c) Selling the 'British example' of behaviour, for example to civil servants (Mwendwa Minister of Labour).
- (d) Capitalist propaganda against traditional values. This propaganda is carried out all the time by every member of the government especially the Attorney-General. In particular they encourage family planning, using the crudest and most racist arguments.

What are the avowed political policies of the Kenya government?

Inside the country it wants 'Continuity and Stability' (President Jomo Kenyatta). In practice this means relying on the armed forces and police (with their western advisers) and the suppression of all democratic freedoms of the people, for example, the banning of the Students' Union at the University of Nairobi and of daylight dances for young people ('boogies').

In KANU (Kenya African National Union — the only legal political party in the country), endless 'reorganisation' committees have been set up. Much ink and talk have been spent on its elections, supposed to have been held in 1971! The bourgeoisie relies on favours from the loyal clique who surround the President. The loyal clique is favoured in the fight for positions. For example, Mr Gichuru (Minister of Defence) has been made head of Kiambu KANU group. Kiambu is a very important political district in Central Kenya.

For the masses, the government devises various schemes to keep their interest diverted. After political independence in 1963 they encouraged self-help schools, but 500 of these the government has been unable to help at all, thus deflating mass support for self-help schemes. Now, the talk is of one-million pound 'self-help' institutes of technology. For these, also, there is no government planning whatsoever.

On East Africa, the policy initially was: against Tanzania Socialism and for the Uganda military regime. In showing support for the latter, delegations were sent to General Amin and the Government helped with the reorganisation of his police force. Later, relations cooled after Amin started to attack Kenya and Kenyans working in Uganda. Against the Tanzanians the Kenya government have carried out propaganda on Chinese aid and on Zanzibar's laws on clove smuggling (there have been allegations of senior Kenya government ministers and civil servants being involved in this smuggling).

In Africa, the Kenya government sees itself as the 'best'. The government claims the credit each time an international conference or company decides to come to Nairobi (e.g. The Airlines Conference, Tetrapack headquarters for Africa, etc.) and above all the UN Environmental Body — which is to be given KANU headquarters for its offices!

The foreign policy of Kenya is described as 'pragmatic non-alignment' (Mungai Njoroge - Foreign Minister). The policy is against 'Chauvinism,

racism and dogmatic ideologies'! In practice this means that the Kenya government is anti-socialist, in keeping with its dependence on the imperialist west.

#### CLASS STRUCTURE

What social classes do the government's activities serve? What classes are emerging from the monolithic 'people' of the anti-colonialist struggle? How are these classes organised?

First: the foreign bourgeoisie, represented here by diplomats, 'aid' groups, businessmen and intellectuals. These work directly with the local ruling class, the big bourgeoisie, businessmen, politicians belonging to the ruling clique, senior managers of foreign owned firms and senior civil servants — permanent secretaries, provincial commissioners etc. These two groups, the foreign and local big bourgeoisie, actually exercise state power in Kenya. They are organised in government departments and in business. A portrait of one member, Mr Matiba, featured in the press for some weeks this month. Mr Matiba is the Managing Director of Kenya Breweries Ltd., and has interests in insurance, hotels, airlines and horticulture. Previously Mr Matiba was a permanent secretary in the government. When the government calls for the 'Africanisation' of business it means the further enrichment of the ruling class, of the Matibas.

The middle class is, unlike the European middle classes, without much property. It is the professional class sprung from the educational efforts of the last twenty years, the intellectuals, doctors, teachers, back-bench politicians etc. This class sees itself being neglected in the acquisition of wealth, and is bitter against the foreign firms which it sees as the source of racial discrimination. It is starting to organise itself into professional bodies. The 'Kenya Management Staff Association' was started in this month. This class is a nationalist and often 'tribalist' (i.e. ethnic parochialist) class. Mr Mwithaga (MP for Nahuru) attacked 'Luos and Black Europeans' (!) for not attending national celebrations.

The petty-bourgeoisie is a large class numerically. It is characterised by small scale productive enterprises (farming, shops, etc.). In Kenya it is the most conservative of all the social classes and is weighed down by religion, ethnic prejudices, ignorance and capitalist greed. The government's capitalist propaganda is well received by this class. Because of its conservation and capitalist individualism, there are few organisations representing this class. It is organised by the government in various commercial bodies. During this month the small dairy farmers complained that the Kenya Creameries Co-operatives (KCC) (a government organised monopoly) had not been receiving all their milk.

The peasantry in the rural areas is a varied group of poor people. Its mentality is petty-bourgeois, riddled with capitalist greed, religious prejudices and ignorance. The peasantry in Kenya is under great pressure from the middle classes to sell its land and animals. For those of the peasantry who sell their land the option is to join the ranks of the rural workers or the lumpen-proletariat on the outskirts of the towns. The peasantry is disorganised and the government is worried lest the unemployed increase too greatly if they continue to sell their land. A warning to the peasantry not to sell land was voiced by the Provincial Commissioner for Central Province, which is the most capitalistically developed province where the impoverishment of the peasant is deepest. It is important to remember that the nationalist peasantry that fought British colonialism in the 1950s has been largely neglected by the Kenya government. Lacking financial backing to start capitalist production the peasantry is very rapidly being proletarianised.

#### THE WORKERS

The workers are divided into two categories, urban and rural. This is a very small class. All the wage earners in Kenya number just over a million in a population of nearly twelve million. The workers proper, those who have nothing but their labour power to sell, possibly number half a million. Because of their small numbers they are greatly influenced by petty-bourgeois ideas.

The best organised workers are the urban proletariat. In December 1972 alone they carried out three strikes and one picketing of a local council, won two industrial court cases and threatened to strike in two different towns. In spite of all this activity it is important to remember that their trade unions are controlled by the government through the Central Organisation of Trade Unions (COTU). The workers are already restive about this control and a call for the resignation of a union leader

(also an MP) was made during the month by the Kenya Civil Service Union. The least organised of the urban workers are the domestic servants due to the personal influence of their employers.

Among the rural workers, the plantation workers are the best organised. They have held protests against the employment of casual labourers without proper safeguards. The least organised of the rural proletariat are the workers who labour for individual capitalists. They are scattered and greatly under the influence of their employers.

At the bottom of all these classes are the unemployed, semiemployed and casual workers. This is a very large class that genuinely frightens the government. Out of 187,500 candidates (1972) for the end of primary school examination, only 48,000 could expect to find places for further studies. Thus, seventy five percent of the candidates would have to go to swell the already large army of the lumpenproletariat. This is a very unreliable class which lives on the margin of the towns and Nairobi City, is disorganised and thrives on crime and prostitution. It is prone to violence, and in Nairobi alone, there were over three hundred criminal incidents per week during December 1972. It is the existence of this class in such large numbers that shows the bankruptcy of the government's policies. By relying on western capital to solve the unemployment problem, the government has miserably failed the people.

#### THE RULING CLASS

A dependent, underdeveloped, capitalist country has emerged after nine years of political independence. The rulers are the foreign western bourgeoisie and their local 'managers' in government and industry. The emergence of this 'managerial' class from the 'people' of the anti-colonialist struggle has precipitated more or less a clear class stratification. On the one hand stand these managers with the middle class and some of the petty-bourgeois. On the other — a few of the middle class, some intellectuals and professionals, and most of all the working masses (workers, peasants and some of the petty-bourgeoisie).

Are the rulers united? The local bourgeoisie is bitter against its western collaborators for their racism and refusal to share power in industry. They talk of 'Africanisation' of industry. There are also complaints of over-invoicing of goods from the west and the corruption of the western representatives. The western bourgeoisie accuse the local ones of corruption and inefficiency. Without western help, the local bourgeoisie would be extremely weak. Despite their divisions, the long term aims of these two groups are the same: the more thorough exploitation of Kenyans. We must not make the mistake of trusting the local bourgeoisie.

The middle classes are extremely important. When the crunch comes, they are on the side of the big bourgeoisie. However, among them, particularly among the intellectuals, there are trends, nationalist-democratic and even socialist, to be encouraged. Because of their greater education, ability to travel and mix in all circles, we can expect some trends towards the adoption of socialist policies (as well as other radical movements) from these classes. Due to the present disorganisation of many workers' organisations and the domination of the bourgeois classes, every manifestation of dissent in the middle classes is very important.

The duty of every Kenyan Socialist is to go amongst the workers, pick out the most intelligent, the most energetic, teach them, organise them and raise their class-consciousness. They are, in spite of everything, the best organised of the 'lower' classes and only under their leadership will the working masses overcome foreign and local bourgeois domination. A hard struggle is necessary in COTU (Trade Unions) and in all other workers' organisations.

Kenyan socialists therefore must organise the workers, raise their consciousness and take advantage of divisions in the ranks of the bourgeoisie.

### U.N. Shilly-Shallying on Nambia

#### by GIRODOT

United Nations debate and resolutions on Southern Africa have served to expose the character of apartheid and its record of exploitation in its illegal 'colony' of Namibia. But UN resolutions and debates and legal proceedings before the World Court have also been used by imperialism to try to defuse the explosive content of the issues in the Southern African confrontation. The tactic has been to play for time, to debate and resolve rather than act, to devise strategies that place emphasis not on mass action and popular armed struggle but on international diplomacy.

World Court legal decisions were sought, it was claimed, to lay the groundwork for western-backed United Nations interventions against South Africa's illegal occupation of the territory. But when in June 1971 – after the abortive court case of 1966 – the Court held without equivocation that South Africa's presence in the territory was illegal and that member-states were duty bound to do nothing to recognise that illegality, even then the gulf between verbal statement and implementation yawned wide as ever. The Court had provided a legal basis for action but the western powers, prominent among them Britain, France and the United States, promptly sought fresh lines of retreat.

South Africa, it was argued in the lobbies and corridors of the Addis Ababa Security Council session, would surely be more susceptible to reason than to confrontation tactics; why not try talking to her at least once more? The African states decided not to obstruct the move and so the United Nations Secretary-General was instructed in Resolution 309 to conduct talks with the parties to the dispute. The Waldheim visit to the territory and talks with Prime Minister Vorster were followed by the Escher mission pursuing this resolution of the UN.

Both the Waldheim and the Escher reports on their missions have been made public. The Escher report has been described by one commentator as a mini-Pearce Commission finding. The secretarygeneral's representative met 74 delegations in the territory and concluded on the strength of their representations, often backed by mass demonstrations, that the majority of the non-white population of Namibia support the establishment of a united, independent Namibia. (Vorster, of course, refused to concede this; his rejection of the finding was duly minuted.)

For the rest the talks were as inconclusive. Dr Escher pressed the South African prime minister on three issues: (1) complete and unequivocal clarification of South Africa's policy of self-determination and independence for Namibia; (2) discontinuance of the application of the Bantustan policy and (3) abolition of discrimination and equality for all Namibians. Vorster's response has been to hedge on all these issues, to argue that experience in self-government is an essential element for self-determination, and 'bearing in mind the circumstances', that this could best be achieved on a regional basis. Bantustans again, in other words.

#### IMPOSSIBLE TASK

Eager though the UN representatives have been to keep the talks going and to bridge the gulf with South Africa, the task has proved impossible. The record of the Waldheim-Escher missions serves only to confirm once again how far removed the South African regime is from the principles and practice of self-government. The UN officials are bound by UN resolutions for self-determination and independence for Namibia; Vorster can talk only of Bantu homelands and Bantustans and there is

absolutely nothing in common between the two approaches.

After the later round of negotiations with the Escher mission Vorster tried a grand confidence trick but it came disastrously adrift. He summoned a press conference in Pretoria and announced that he had just presided over the funeral of one man one vote in Namibia. There was jubilation in white Windhoek and white Pretoria. But it soon transpired from a close reading of the documents that despite Vorster's claims no agreement had been reached; the talks had been exploratory only and nothing binding on the UN had been signed.

The General Assembly resolution of last November which considered the Escher mission report gave the South African claims short shrift. The Assembly resolution confirmed once again that any solution must enable the people of the territory to achieve self-determination and independence as a single territorial and political entity. It condemned the South African government once again for its continued refusal to terminate its illegal occupation and called upon it to withdraw forthwith.

#### WHERE TO NOW?

At this stage it is rather unclear where the United Nations goes next on the issue of Namibia. The Secretary-General has been instructed to report to the next, twenty-eighth, session on the implementation of the Addis Ababa resolution; the membership of the Council of Namibia has been enlarged; and a full-time UN Commissioner for Namibia is due to be appointed some time in the near future. But the Council for Namibia has been stillborn from the outset because the western powers, which have a formidable vested interest in the status quo in Namibia, are determined to do no more than play a delaying tactic, and the UN is consequently hamstrung.

Once again the conclusion for Namibia, and for the whole of Southern Africa for that matter, is inescapable. The role of the United Nations is secondary, not primary; its action is strictly auxiliary to the struggle of the oppressed peoples whether at the receiving end of apartheid or of Portuguese colonialism. The UN response at worst will lean heavily on western prevarication; at best it will be firmed by the progress of the battle — witness the international diplomatic initiative

under way demanding UN recognition of the independent status of liberated Guine-Bissau. International support is important but it remains essentially support for a struggle whose issues will and must be determined down on the ground in Southern Africa.

All the more dangerous therefore are the repeated attempts by western powers to use the world body not to recognise and support the armed struggle but to pre-empt it and redirect it into 'safer' channels. It is of pointed significance that the UN approaches to the South African government were made even as the magnificent Namibian strike of 1971-2 reached its climax. Even as the masses grasped the initiative and threw the South African regime on to the defensive, their prolonged strike thus augmenting the 1966 decision to embark upon armed struggle with forms of mass political action which complement and reinforce such armed struggle, the world body placed negotiation with the apartheid regime on the agenda. Since then the energies of the liberation movement have in part been spent - successfully so far - in preventing what might have been a disastrous back-sliding of UN policy. It has been a wasteful exercise and one calculated to foster the kinds of constitutional and judicial illusions which have inevitably evaporated as new means of struggle have been firmly grasped.

#### SWAPO'S ATTITUDE

Swapo's representative to the December meeting of the Security Council said his organisation wanted an immediate end to South Africa's illegal occupation. He also called for the termination of the talks being conducted under resolution 309. The Waldheim and Escher missions were supposed to get satisfactory answers from the South African regime on fundamental questions: a precise definition of the concept of self-determination and independence; the withdrawal of South Africa's administration; her acknowledgement of the unity of Namibia; elections on the basis of universal suffrage; the release of the political prisoners and the return of the exiles; termination of Bantustan schemes and the abolition of all apartheid legislation. None of these questions is being confronted. SWAPO, said the movement's representative, was not against talks per se, but it could not support meaningless diplomatic exercises.

Meaningless the Waldheim and Escher missions have been. The issue for Namibia is full and total independence, nothing less. The task remains of assisting the struggle of the people to reach new heights within the territory; and of mustering international action designed not to obscure but to expose and undermine the support which apartheid gets from her imperialist allies.

(In February 1973, Vorster displayed his contempt for world opinion by introducing in Parliament the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Amendment Bill, proposing the establishment of Transkei-type Bantustans for the various peoples of South West Africa. A White Paper explaining the Bill said the Government was 'firmly and irrevocably' committed to promoting 'regional self-government' - a direct repudiation of the UN demand that independence be granted to Namibia as a whole. Vorster also told the House of Assembly, in reply to a question, that he was taking steps to establish a multi-racial advisory body for South West Africa as envisaged in his so-called 'agreement' with Dr Escher. Commenting on these developments, the London representative of the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) said in a statement: 'Vorster's interpretation of the UN Charter and the intentions of the world body is his own. Now he tries to justify new illegal actions by referring to a misinterpretation of the Charter. In other words, he is trying to establish a facade behind which he can continue to strengthen South Africa's illegal presence in Namibia. When our organisation rejected any further talks between South Africa and the UN during the recent debate in the Security Council, we foresaw these developments. The present Bill is but another attempt to confuse the issues. It is about time that the Western nations within the UN realise to the full extent the South African intentions to keep Namibia at all costs in defiance of the entire world community.' -Ed.)

# AFRICA: Notes and Comments


by A. Langa

SUDAN: Trying to Make Friends

In the attempt to shore up the precarious peace in the South of the country, President Nimeiri's regime has been falling over itself with promises of 'development' for this backward region, while at the same time picking quarrels with Arab allies to the north, and dismissing 'pan-Arabist' elements from the Government. Some of these developments, of course, are part of much deeper and very important develop-

ments in the whole North-Eastern region, which deserve detailed attention. But the changes in policy and, more importantly, the public relations fanfare which accompanies them, are also signs of Nimeiri's anxiety to patch together a political machine which had collapsed under him in the wake of his persecution of the Communists and progressives in 1971.

The key elements of the policy are quite simple to unravel. In the first place, in order to pacify the South and to



impress black Africa (as well as to avoid being very much the junior partner), Nimeiri has turned his back on the Arab north, quarrelled with Sadat and Gaddafi of Libya, and cultivated the friendship of Tanzania. Of course things can get a bit difficult, as when Sudan refused to allow Libya overflying rights for planes carrying troops to bail out Amin in his fight with guerrillas last year — the decision was applauded in Tanzania, but it has done no good for Nimeiri's southern border with Uganda.

Secondly, much play is made of 'Tanzania-style' development plans for the southern Sudan. Visiting journalists, shown round the south by the Information Minister himself, are told of the coming Socialist villages, along ujamaa lines, which are to be set up.

And thirdly and possibly most importantly, policy with regard to capitalism and especially foreign investment has been utterly reversed: foreign investors, under a law passed last year, are once more obsequiously welcomed, given elaborate rights to repatriate profits, the possibility of total tax holidays for five years and more, guarantees against nationalisation, exemption from tariffs, protection against competition, etc., etc., etc., etc.

It is to be doubted, however, whether the newcomer foreign businessman is going to find even these miserably spineless concessions sufficient - simply because the law was really enacted for one company which, in the delicate words of one of its executives, enjoys an 'exceptionally favourable' influence in the Sudan: Lonrho, the imperialist concern par excellence. For anyone who knows anything of the activities of this multinational conglomerate, involved in robbery of Africa quite literally from Cape to Cairo, and with dangerous influence over African news media and communications in several countries, there is no need to say more. The fact that Lonrho is the chief purchasing agent for the Khartoum government, that it is now entering an agreement with Nimeiri under which the Government will put up half the capital for a £25 million sugar scheme, but Lonrho will have sole and exclusive control of its management - these facts tell all that needs to be told of Nimeiri and his henchmen. Add to this that - surprise surprise - the Americans are now willing to lend Sudan up to \$30 million, the World Bank \$10 million, and so on, and one need be left in no doubt that all those promised socialist villages in the south are going to find their economic environment hostile, to say the least.

#### ZAMBIA: The Next Battleground?

With the success of the blows being dealt the Smith regime by armed freedom fighters in recent months, Zambia has moved to the front of the African stage once again as the crucial frontline in the battle for liberation. The Smith regime's hysteria in closing the border, and its humiliation on finding, when it meekly opened it again, that the Zambians rejected the move with contempt, were victories for Africa and for the forces of freedom.

But the fact is that Zambia remains extremely vulnerable to racist and imperialist attacks. The Tan-Zam railway, the Freedom Line, is not complete and will not be until 1975. The Benguela railway, at present the major means of exporting Zambian copper, must come under increasing pressure as the Portuguese grow more desperate in the Angolan war, and with the continuing vulnerability of Mobutu, through whose Zaire the line also runs, to pressure from his American masters.

Internally, the health of the Zambian political system and the policies of the government are naturally of critical importance; if imperialist and pro-racist elements are permitted to operate freely (and there are, alas, plenty of them in Zambia), the Zambian people will find themselves stabbed in the back when the crunch comes, as come it surely will.

With the birth of the 'Second Republic', as the new one-party state is called, there has emerged a clearer conception of the nature of Zambia's position and of the measures necessary to safeguard the country. President Kaunda has announced curbs on political leaders, in particular, with respect to commercial activity and landlordism. The report of the commission on the one-party state, on which the President's edicts were based, laid particular emphasis on the necessities laid on Zambia by its 'geographical position and security situation' — necessities which particularly included an honest and committed party and government leadership as well as strengthened administrative institutions and an augmented police force.

African revolutionaries have a duty to give maximum support to the Kaunda government in its resolute fight against the imperialist threat. Under unimaginable pressures, President Kaunda has refused to give in, has refused to stop assisting the forces of liberation, has maintained his commitment to African freedom. It must also be said, however, that

Zambia has some way to go before it emerges as a truly revolutionary state: the contradictions, the forces of appearement, persist. It is only by unrelenting solidarity with the progressive and anti-racist forces in Zambia, and unrelenting exposure of the reactionaries who still operate there, that that brave country will remain out of the hands of Vorster, Heath, Caetano and Nixon.

#### UGANDA: Is Amin Desperate?


For some time, after General Amin successfully weathered the storm created by the expulsion of the non-citizen Asians from Uganda and sundry jailings, expulsions and the like, observers seemed to think that things were taking a distinct turn for the better. With internal opposition crushed, the guerrilla incursion from Tanzania repulsed, Amin seemed secure indeed. He had even acquired a certain radical air as the result of his fulminations about imperialism and the well-argued speeches he made in announcing the takeover of British businesses in November and the subsequent departure of most British personnel.

And the objectively progressive character of many of the regime's measures must not be underestimated: the Asian domination of the petty urban economy, after all, was an economic and political fact of some importance, with strong overtones of the colonial period. Likewise the summary discomfiture of British business interest was a blow against British imperialism and, in its very unpredictability, an unsettling occurrence for the imperialist powers in general. If it were possible, General Amin seemed determined that Uganda would no longer be a creature of British imperialism, that the Ugandan economy would 'belong wholly to Ugandans', as he was fond of saying.

The reality, however, is rather different. Amin has failed, utterly and miserably, to achieve either of the prime requirements of his regime: he has failed to build any kind of durable or secure political base for his rule, and he has failed to set the economy in motion again.

Instead, the basically insecure and terroristic nature of the regime becomes painfully apparent each time the slightest pressure is exerted on it — and to cope with such pressure, Amin has turned increasingly to non-Ugandans (so much for his 'nationalism'!) to maintain him in power. Despite the theorising of 'radical' apologists, there is no real sign that Amin is succeeding in creating an indigenous capitalist class 'by decree' to replace the departed Asians and British. For one thing, for all the talk about anti-imperialism, the key financial institutions — banks (notably Barclays), insurance and investment companies — remain in imperialist hands. Indeed, one of the first acts of the regime on usurping power from Obote in 1971 was to hand these concerns — nationalised by Obote — back to their former owners! For another, no-one in his right mind supposes that the bunch of hucksters, crooks, optimists and small-time traders who have been vying for the businesses of the

expelled Asians are going to be able to reopen the three-quarters of Kampala's businesses which have shut down. This in itself would perhaps be no bad thing, if it implied that economic resources were being devoted to better uses than drapery stores and tape recorder merchants: but everyone knows they are not. There is no money in the Ugandan treasury, there are no real prospects of substantial sums flowing in, and if they did they would promptly be stolen by the General and his henchmen.



And to the economic crisis and the prospect of a drastic downturn in living standards for large numbers of Ugandans must be added a political crisis, compounded of determined opposition to the regime from both inside and outside the country, and Amin's own inability to move beyond barrack-room threats and blustering to the cultivation of political support. Increasingly, therefore, he has resorted to a policy of political survival based on three elements:

- The exploitation of ethnic and religious differences
- Terror and repression directed at real or imagined opposition
- Increasing dependence on outside intervention and support.

It is now no secret that Amin has been desperately cultivating Gaddafi

and Feisal, pleading 'Muslim solidarity' to get money, arms, even soldiers from the Libyan and Saudi leaders. It is likewise clear what opposition to Amin means: for the Chief Justice of Uganda, for the Governor of the Central Bank, for the Vice Chancellor of Makerere University, it meant murder at the hands of 'persons unknown' (this was later changed to 'Obote guerrillas'.) For 12 unfortunate 'guerrillas' in February this year, it meant a barbaric public execution by firing squad.

And, in his desperate attempts to remain in control of the situation, Amin has now begun in earnest to whip up ethnic hatreds. The Langi people, from whom Obote comes, are now accused of being — collectively — responsible for all opposition to Amin's rule. And the concern of Kenyan trade unionists for the safety of Kenyans working on the railways in Uganda calls forth hysterical attacks from Amin on the Luo of Kenya, who, he says, have been conspiring with his enemies.

Uganda has not been free of dangerous ethnic tensions in the past. It is clear that the Amin regime is prepared to risk vicious inter-communal conflict to stay in power, if not in control. When Amin is finally over-thrown, let us hope that the successor regime has more to build on than a pile of corpses — there are too many of these in Uganda already.

#### ROCKEFELLER: Going where the bread is

Students of US Imperialism will be interested to know of developments in the activities of the Rockefeller Foundation, repository of the ill-gotten Rockefeller millions, imperialist 'educational and cultural' institution, and key CIA network. Feeling that it has Kenya sown up, with a tame bunch of indigenous stooges to back up the efforts of the resident US business, diplomatic and academic community, the Foundation's operation in East Africa is 'winding down'. Chief Rockefeller money bags and hatchet-man for Africa James S. Coleman (a 'deeply respected' political scientist from California) has left his Nairobi offices (in the plush International Life House) to a junior minion and taken up residence in Kinshasa.

The word is that the big 'growth areas' for Rockefeller, now that the hard-core CIA has done the initial softening-up, are — Zaire, Indonesia, and Brazil. It is, of course, no accident that Rockefeller, in keeping

with the 'hardnosed' line in American foreign policy, has dropped the pretence of liberalism, and is concentrating on three of the richest and most populous nations in the Third World — three which also happen, by great good fortune, to be military dictatorships as well.

Note to MPLA: You can expect a substantial increase in interest in Angolan liberation movements — in the form of scholarships, offers of 'educational assistance', visits from 'sympathetic American scholars', and the like — now that Coleman is on your doorstep.



#### HOW AFRICA WAS COLONISED . . . AND THE ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE

How Europe Underdeveloped Africa by Walter Rodney, published by Tanzania Publishing House, P.O. Box 2138, Dar es Salaam, and also by Bogle L'Ouverure Publications, 141 Coldershaw Road, London W13. Price in UK: 65p plus postage.

Development — and under-development — must be the most overworked words of our age. So overworked, in fact, that one scarcely pauses to question what they mean. Nowhere are the terms more commonplace than in discussion of Africa. Here 'under-development' has become the inevitable phrase which describes its present and recent past; and 'development' the phrase of its hoped-for future. Every school-child knows that Africa is 'under-developed' — meaning that its industries, transport and power sources are vastly less than the 'developed' areas of Western Europe, its agriculture less mechanised with lower levels of productivity.

There have been a multitude of studies which purport to show how Africa can overcome this backwardness, and move into the ranks — not clearly defined — of the 'developed'. It has been the weakness of the overwhelming majority of these studies that they take a static approach to the whole matter. Asking why Africa is 'under-developed', they seek the answers in simple, dissociated causes: 'Because the climate and the tsetse fly drain initiative.' 'Because the slave trade creamed off the active and dynamic.' And so on, and so forth. From specific 'causes' of under-development follows the attempt to find specific 'remedies' — more foreign aid, or more opportunity for foreign investment; more education or more urbanisation. In the years since African independence began to become a reality, the recipes have been many and varied. Most of them have been tried out in one area or another, generally with considerable faith in their effectiveness, often with high vigour. But now the evidence is at hand — and this too has been well publicised in recent years — to show that the remedies in which so much confidence was pinned, have failed to meet the problem.

If Africa was 'underdeveloped' before — and this is not a statement of its actual development, but only of its level compared to other countries — then it is more 'under-developed' now. True its industrial base has been developed, its agriculture modernised, its transport systems mechanised, its educational services improved and so on. But when, after all this, the comparison between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' is made anew, the facts show that the gap has grown wider than ever. The static search for simple, disparate remedies has proved to be a failure. There can be little reason now to doubt that the search for simple, disparate 'causes' of underdevelopment is equally fallacious.

Marxism broke with the whole way of historical study in which a cause was seen to have produced an effect; and that effect remained, static and inviolate, until another 'cause' — breaking into the scene as an intruder from without — brought forth another 'effect' — another static stage of history. In the place of this approach, which sees history as the record of a series of chance personalities, chance ideas, chance events, Marxism seeks to understand processes rather than 'causes'; and to discover within these processes of change the stresses and conflicts which provide their impetus. In the main, Marxist studies have been turned to the history of Europe, where the record is well documented, and where historical research — as one of the spin-offs of 'development' — is itself widespread. Not so much has been done by Marxist scholars to uncover the historical process of African development, and little of

what has been done has been translated from the original French and Russian in which it was written.

Walter Rodney's book, 'How Europe Underdeveloped Africa' is thus something of a breakthrough. Its purpose, he says with some modesty in the preface, '. . . has been to try and reach Africans who wish to explore further the nature of their exploitation, rather than to satisfy the "standards" set by our oppressors and their spokesmen in the academic world.' That purpose, I have little doubt, has been surpassed, and Rodney, a scholar from Guyana presently teaching at Tanzania's University College, has produced a work of great importance. The academic will find in it little newly researched statistical material or historical data. But the lay reader will discover the revelation of the real processes of African change, brilliantly illuminated by the light of Marxist analysis; and from this revelation, a new understanding of where the path forward is to be found, and a new confidence in the ability to follow it.

#### UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

Rodney bases his work solidly on the notions of class and class struggles, class consciousness and revolutionary change, which are the small change of Marxist analyses of Europe. But in Africa for the main part of its history . . . 'the existing classes have been incompletely crystallized and the changes have been gradual rather than revolutionary.' The key to understanding African history, then, is not — as for Europe — to be sought in a succession of revolutions, but rather in discovering why African development differed from European.

There have been times when development in parts of Africa outran Europe. Egypt, for example, produced not only abundant food, but also mastered a considerable technology and science at a time when much of Europe was still hunting with bow and arrow for survival. Or again, early European explorers, venturing from Portugal to the West coast of Africa, found feudal-style kingdoms more advanced than those they had left behind them in Europe. Development, then, has always been uneven, and so too have rates of development. Some countries have advanced suddenly, overtaking and surpassing those formerly ahead; others have fallen back.

It is impossible in the scope of this article to explain why this is so. In short, 'part of the answer' according to Rodney, 'lies in the environment in which human groups evolved . . . and part of it in the "superstructure" of society. That is to say . . . forms of social relations, forms of government, patterns of behaviour and systems of belief.' Man's stage of social development is determined, in the main, by the way he provides for his needs by mastering his environment; but the rate of change in society is affected by peculiarities of the 'super-structure'. Every society can be regarded as transient, and will sooner or later give way to another. In this sense, 'development' is a universal law of society, its level uneven, and 'under-development' means little more than that one society has not advanced as far, produced as much or become as wealthy, as another. But 'development' and 'under-development' arise in the course of contact and inter-relations between societies at different social, political and economic levels. Any study of the subject, then, needs to study and lay bare the relationships produced by those contacts. When this is done, it becomes clear that 'under-development' is not a simple statistical comparison, but is the reflection of a relationship of exploiter and exploited.

'All the countries named as "under-developed" in the world are exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now pre-occupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist and colonialist exploitation. African and Asian societies were developing independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers. When that happened, exploitation increased and the export of surplus ensued, depriving the societies of the benefit of their natural resources and labour. That is an integral part of underdevelopment in the contemporary sense.'

Under-development is not a product of natural poverty of resources. For paradoxically, many of the under-developed countries are better endowed than their 'developed' contemporaries.

'The fact of the matter is that the most profound reasons for economic backwardness of a given African nation are not to be found inside that nation. All that we can find inside are the symptoms of underdevelopment and the secondary factors that make for poverty... The true explanation lies in seeking out the relationship between Africa and certain developed countries and in recognising that it is a relationship of exploitation.

'Man has always exploited his natural environment in order to make a

living. At a certain point in time there also arose the exploitation of man by man... Then a stage was reached by which people in one community called a nation exploited the natural resources and labour of another nation and its people. Since underdevelopment deals with the comparative economics of nations, it is the last kind of exploitation that is of greatest interest here — the exploitation of nation by nation.'

This is the basis of Rodney's work. It is not narrowly restricted to economics. He ranges over the social and cultural features which have assisted the process of underdevelopment and grown from it, and deals at length with the historical processes in different parts of the continent.

#### THE SWEEP OF HISTORY

To uncover the nature of the impact which exploitation by outside nations had upon the nations of Africa, it is necessary to understand the nature of African society, and the trends of its development before the coming of the Europeans, that is roughly the year 1500, and thereafter. The patterns of European development cannot be simply translated into African environments. The European sequence of modes of production, from communal to capitalist, were not reproduced in Africa. African communal society did not give way to an epoch of slavery arising out of internal revolution. Nor was there a mode of production which was the replica of European feudalism. 'The assumption that will underlie this study', says Rodney, 'is that most African societies before 1500 were in a transitional stage between the practice of agriculture (plus fishing and herding) in family communities, and the practice of the same activities within states and societies comparable to feudalism.'

In Africa only a few societies reached the feudal stage; in much of the continent, while the feudal state was in the making, communal elements and feudal elements existed side by side, with some peculiarities arising from African conditions. Antagonistic classes, and the concept of class as a motive force in social change, had not yet developed on the classic European model when European contact became important. Thus, the sources of social change in African society must be sought not in class struggle or revolutions, but in the mode of production, and above all the tools and instruments. The dominant

activity everywhere was agricultural; the development of iron making, and the introduction of iron tools to agriculture produced modes of production well suited to the ecology of the country. In Europe, scarcity of land provided a need for rapid scientific advance in agricultural science; and private ownership allowed the land-owning minority to concentrate on improving land and productivity. In Africa, where communalism ensured each man land for his own needs by virtue of being a member of the family, and where land was relatively abundant, there were few social pressures to increase productivity or to seek technical changes. Nevertheless, most African societies fulfilled their own needs; production of ironware, cotton goods and leatherware compared favourably in quality - but not in quantity or in scale - with the manufactures of Europe. In Europe, such production in the age of capitalism, gave rise to rapid advance in both technique and volume of output. In Africa, productive modes made their influences felt only slowly, held back by the conservative influences of family production, communal land ownership, and a culture of deferment to age. Nevertheless, classes were beginning to arise; distribution of wealth was becoming more uneven, and family differences more pronounced, as social influence and prominence followed private wealth. It was a period of social transformation, however slow, with the emergence in embryo of feudaltype states.

But to talk of Africa in this respect as though it had reached a single, uniform situation, is to obscure the real process of growth which was taking place. There were different rates of advance, different specific patterns. From them, Rodney has selected those he considers the most illuminative and the most advanced. 'Each was also a leading force on the continent in the sense of carrying its neighbours along the same path . . .' Those specific areas are Egypt, Ethiopia, Nubia, the Maghreb, the Western Sudan, the Inter-lacustrine zone (i.e. the area of the Great Lakes) and Zimbabwe. In these almost sketchy chapters, a penetrating light is shed over the course of our continent's history. But this is almost by the way — a side-show to the main thesis with which the book is concerned.

Europe's explorers, traders and merchants made their way to Africa, driven by commercial desires. In the pre-colonial stage, when European technology was not always superior, European traders made extensive use of African and Asian manufactures, such as cloth, leather goods, etc. But Europe advanced technologically from its external trade monopoly, while Africa either benefitted not at all, or actually lost. By the 16th century, African and Asian cloth production had been destroyed . . . 'It was concentrating almost entirely on the export of raw cotton and the import of manufactured cloth. This remarkable reversal is tied to technological advance in Europe and to stagnation of technology in Africa owing to the very trade with Europe.'

Development implies that the society is registering advances which provide the springboard for further progress. But what the precolonial era did for Africa was to break through the social process of self-sustaining growth; not only did the craft of weaving decline, but with it its technology and artistry. In the same way, manufactured iron goods from Europe destroyed the basis of iron smelting in Africa. And so European trade finally destroyed the basis of Africa's development. Africa, in this pattern of trade, had little reason to take over for itself the advanced technology of Europe. It was driven in other directions by the demands of new economic forces.

'The lines of economic activity attached to foreign trade were either destructive, as slavery was, or at best purely extractive, like ivory hunting and cutting camwood trees. Therefore, there was no reason for wanting to call upon European skills. The African economies would have had little room for such skills unless negative types of exports were completely stopped.'

But trade with Europe was an export trade in 'negative type' of goods – ivory, camphor, gold and finally slaves.

Thus, in the precolonial era, the growth of trade with Africa laid the basis for the rapid development of Western Europe. But like an inseparable shadow of that process it destroyed much of the developing economic life of Africa, and laid the basis for African underdevelopment.

The slave trade was the most vicious and most obvious part of the process in many parts of Africa. But its impact, though felt throughout the continent, did not fall with equal force everywhere. Rodney does not content himself with a single synoptic 'African' picture, but develops in some depth the actual historical processes which underlay the changing societies of different peoples of Africa – Yoruba, Dahomey, the inter-lacustrine states, Rwanda and Zulu – up to the late 19th

century. He is at pains to present a balanced picture, which has often been grossly distorted by other partisan writers. It is necessary he says, to reconcile a '...recognition of African development up to 1885 with an awareness of the losses simultaneously incurred ... due to the nature of the contact with capitalist Europe ... Nor does it represent reàlity to suggest that the slave trade swept Africa like a bush fire, leaving nothing standing. The truth is that a developing Africa went into slave trading and European commercial relations as into a gale force wind, which shipwrecked a few societies, set many others off course, and generally slowed down the rate of advance. However (pursuing the metaphor further) it must be noted that African captains were still taking decisions before 1885, though forces were already at work which caused European capitalists to insist on, and succeed in taking over command.'

Precolonial relations paved the way for colonialism, and early capitalist commercial contacts for imperialism. The economic and technological gap which had opened up between Africa and Europe — a gap of little dimension when the first Portuguese sailed to the continent in 1444, but vast by 1885 — provided for Europe not only the need but the power with which to impose its domination on Africa. 'Racism... confirmed that decision that the form of control should be direct colonial rule.'

# CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION

In this article, there is no possibility of developing this thesis as Rodney does. It is clear that to understand just how colonialism came to Africa, one has to understand how the trade contracts between Africa and Europe influenced each continent, '... so that what was called "precolonial" trade proved to be a preparatory stage for the era of colonial rule.' To this understanding, Rodney has devoted the major part of his book. But to complete the study, there are two final chapters, containing a wealth of statistical information on the nature of African exploitation in the age of colonialism — a real survey of the impoverishment of the continent by imperialism. The two chapters divide — significantly — into one on how Africa's exploitation has strengthened all the economic, technological and military aspects of western capitalism. And the

other on how colonialism has driven Africa further and further behind in the tables of development. Thus, the final two chapters of the book furnish the record of how Europe's development has under-developed Africa.

But history is not a simple process of straight-line developments. The purposes and achievements of the colonisers, as Rodney sums up in his tailpiece, are constantly in conflict with the aims and purposes of the African people. Marxism's great contribution to the study of history has been made through disclosing contradictions between classes. The contradictions between the mighty imperialists and the colonial masses was an intrinsic part of the African process. In the end, that contradiction contributed to the ending of colonialism, and the beginning of African independence. Rodney touches on this at the end of his book. 'The only positive development in colonialism', he says, 'was when it ended.' One could perhaps argue with the emphasis he places on education as a prime mover in bringing the contradiction between the people and their masters to a head. But this is not in any sense a major or heavy-weight part of the book. It is put in, almost tentatively, to round the book off where we stand today; and in order to make the point which is the central point of the whole work, and its raison d'etre that history is made by the conscious activity of the people, grappling with the social conditions which history has bequeathed to them. Understanding of their material social conditions, of the social relations of society and of the laws of social development are real weapons in the struggle for Africa's future and its final liberation from its past.

To this final liberation, Rodney's book comes as a real source of strength. Used properly — as it is meant to be used — as a work for study by political activists and fighters for liberation, its influence will be felt. And the interest which every chapter generates will serve to send many readers, I have no doubt, to the books mentioned in the author's 'Brief Guide to Reading' which follows each chapter.

'The significance of Dr Rodney's book', writes A.M. Babu, the former Tanzanian Minister of Economic Development, in a short post-script, 'is that it is addressed, quite appropriately, to the masses and not to the leaders and one hopes that it will be instrumental in arousing mass action by the people.' There can be little doubt that this hope will be vindicated.

TOUSSAINT

## WORLD CAPITALISM BACKS APARTHEID

The South African Connection by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele and Christabel Gurney. Published by Temple Smith, London, £3.50.

This will become the indispensable reference book for everyone interested in its subject, which is the South African economy and its relationship with international capitalism. Every statistic which one could want is there: imports and exports; capital flows; foreign investment in South Africa analysed by origin, by type and by sectors of the economy; white and black wage levels now and in the past, and many more. The analysis is not confined to facts concerning the economy as a whole, but includes a wealth of information about the activities of important companies — both South African companies and foreign companies carrying on business in South Africa. Twelve companies receive detailed treatment, and there is a list of about five hundred British companies with subsidiary or associate companies in South Africa.

As a collection for reference purposes of basic factual material, the book is an unqualified success. It also succeeds in a subsidiary objective, namely, the demolition of the liberal theory that foreign investors can play and are playing a progressive role in South Africa.

There are two further things for which the reader might hope, but in these respects he will be disappointed. The first is a thoroughgoing Marxist analysis of the South African economy. This is something which the authors have not really attempted, and it would be too much to expect of a work by three authors of somewhat differing political complexions. The definitive Marxist analysis of South Africa in the seventies remains to be produced, but whoever produces it will owe a good deal to the research of these writers.

The other disappointment will be suffered by those who may expect a triumphant proof of the correctness of the solidarity movement's line on 'disinvestment'. The call for foreign companies to 'withdraw their investments' from South Africa makes an excellent slogan. It can be used as the basis for a campaign of attacking, discouraging, demoralising and dividing the foreign bloodsuckers who grow fat on the profits of apartheid. The closer one looks at the facts, however, the less does disinvestment emerge as a policy which might one day be actually implemented. The situation is infinitely complex. The Japanese do not invest money in South Africa, but Japanese and South African capitalism have devised other methods of collaboration which seem equally satisfactory to both sides. The only steps in the direction of disinvestment which have been taken in practice have been taken at the behest of the South African government, which has ordered some firms and encouraged others to sell off part of their holdings to local capitalists.

The basic point, however, which emerges clearly from this book, is that investment in South Africa is not some accidental aberration on the part of the foreigners. South African and overseas capitalism are one and the same thing. We can no more expect international capitalism to impose economic sanctions on South Africa than we can expect a man's bloodstream to stop nourishing one of his limbs.

It follows that too much must not be expected from the solidarity struggle. That struggle can weaken the enemy in a variety of ways, but the day will never come when the South African revolution will be helped on its way by a complete abandonment of South African capitalism by its foreign friends. The squalid system which this book so vividly depicts will come to an end only when the South African people remove our country from the international capitalist orbit.

P.M.

#### SLAVE LABOUR IN THE GOLD MINES

Labour in the South African Gold Mines 1911-1969, by Francis Wilson. Cambridge University Press 1972. Price £4.60.

Both the African National Congress — spearhead of the National Liberation struggle — and the South African Communist Party are committed to the total destruction of the apartheid system. The nationalisation of the mining industry is fundamental to this objective. The colour bar is inextricably interwoven with the gross exploitation

and dehumanisation of the African people in the main and all black people in general. Thus the modification or humanisation of the present system is a practical impossibility which Francis Wilson in 'Labour in the South African Gold Mines' does not seem to have come to terms with, though the facts which he presents inevitably lead to this conclusion. To be fair, the author, who is honest in his presentation of the facts, admits that his study is limited to describing and interpreting the world: clearly he wishes for changes in a humane direction — but that, he says, is a matter for the politicians. He does not seem to grasp that exploited man can and will change his world — in South African terms this means the total elimination of the policy of white supremacy.

The brutality and inhuman system of the South African regime is well known and condemned in every corner of the world — readers of our journal need no convincing of the viciousness of apartheid. Why then should Francis Wilson's academic study of the South African gold mining industry have such a peculiar fascination, even though he introduces his book with the statement that he intends not to propagate any cause but merely to present facts?

The stark facts which have obviously been painstakingly researched expose in a blunt way the raw viciousness of the 'super civilised men' in the board rooms of South Africa's primary industry. Dr Wilson's study is not a book about petty apartheid and the painful humiliation of bus and train and toilet facilities. It is about the colour bar in the mining industry and its effect on black people in general, and specifically those in the gold mining industry.

Here are some of the startling facts unearthed by Wilson's research: The gap between earnings of black and white mine workers has been consistently increasing since 1936 and had reached the situation where

in 1969 white mineworkers earned on average 20 times as much as Africans. In 1968 Anglo-American's (Oppenheimer Group) total income was R60 million of which R25 million came from gold mining.

The list of directors (1965) shows the Anglo-American Corporation's interconnection with the other three main mining houses which join together to determine the policy of the Chamber of Mines.

The Chamber of Mines controls the recruiting agencies through which all African labour on the mines is organised, and in this way prevents competition between the mines to entice labour.

In spite of the vast profits of the mining houses the Government

subsidises the so called 'marginal mines' with the result that their turnover has become amongst the most profitable of all the mines.

In 1968 the average Zambian mineworker earned R1,300 as against the R189 per annum earned by the African miner in South Africa.

Already in 1951 (the pre-Bantustan period) if the Reserves had been fully developed agriculturally they could have provided a living for only 43% of the population – the other 57% would have had to move off. (The population has since expanded without any real increase in land availability.)

The cheap labour system is achieved through Government legislation and the corresponding 'Native Recruiting System' both under heavy control by the Chamber of Mines.

And so the facts flow on, until one is staggered by the misery of this, South Africa's biggest industry, which is significantly also the pacesetter for other branches of industry.

The whole system, Dr Wilson argues, is based on the colour bar in mining which is jealously guarded by the white Mineworkers' Union to protect and retain their position as a labour aristocracy. Though this is convincingly demonstrated, not sufficient emphasis is placed on the fact that this reactionary stratum of the working class arose to a large extent as a protective device against the Chamber of Mines' early attempts to replace white miners with black miners at a lower rate of pay, so threatening both the earnings and jobs of the white miners. The owners' motive has never been one of fair play between black and white worker but rather the further growth of profit. From a Marxist viewpoint this is the book's main weakness and is inevitable since Dr Wilson starts from the assumption that 'supply and demand' determines both economic processes and social-political institutions. The exploitative foundation of capitalist economics is underplayed.

The facts glaringly lead to obvious political conclusions. Early on the mine owners, first through the formation of the mining houses and thereafter their unification through the Chamber of Mines, created an embryonic monopoly structure. It is not 'collusion' between the mining houses that is at the root of the dire misery of the black mineworkers but rather the monopolistic nature of the industry and its power which is reflected in the super profits it earns and the power it wields in the legislature.

'Collusion' also exists between the white Mineworkers' Union and

the monopolists and this is reflected in the narrow-minded shortsightedness of the white workers who refuse to recognise that their black fellow workers are super exploited. Selfishly the white miners protect their interests and have become one of the main instruments for maintaining apartheid. The elite white mineworkers are in collusion with the monopolist financiers in South Africa and abroad. This blurring of the distinction between 'monopoly' and 'collusion' is perhaps the chief weakness in what is otherwise a very useful book.

A. BAKAYA

#### THE BRITISH VERSION OF APARTHEID

The Roots of Segregation - Native Policy in Natal (1845-1910) by David Welsh. OUP 1971. Price £6.25.

This book attempts to describe and to analyse the first sixty years of the conquest, occupation and subjugation of Natal by British Imperialism and the white colonists. It is a thoroughly researched and well documented study which sheds a great deal of light on the policies and attitudes of the white colonists and principally of Theophilus Shepstone, the father of the policy of segregation.

What emerges clearly are the racist attitudes which underlined the 'native' policies of the British Imperialists and the white colonists, and how this influenced subsequent white minority governments after Union. There are also interesting chapters on how traditional African customs were changed both by the socio-economic forces and by the policies pursued by the Natal Colonial Government; and on the Langalibalele affair.

The Langalibalele affair occurred in October 1873 when some 200 Hlubi's were killed by a force of regular and irregular troops. Langalibalele, the chief of the Hlubi tribe, was found guilty of fomenting a revolt and, as was to befall future generations of revolutionaries, was sentenced for life to Robben Island. The colonists of course sought retribution. Women and children were placed in servitude, the tribe was broken up, its land harried, property confiscated and approximately

£60,000 of the tribe's money was paid into the Colonial Exchequer (page 136).

However the study has some fundamental weaknesses. Obviously it is not possible to pinpoint all of them except the main ones. These are:

- (1) The failure of the author to examine in depth the crucial relationship between declining land ownership and the increasing proletarianisation of the African people. Welsh investigates the land issue mainly from the point of view of the colonists. Thus we do not get an analytical account of the effects of the earlier phases of migratory labour both on an incipient capitalist society and on the African people.
- (2) Welsh has a one-dimensional approach in his appraisal of the development of 'native policy' in Natal, in that he fails to see the connection between the interests of an expanding voracious developing capitalist society (tied to British Imperialism) and the need for a stable, docile, super-exploited labour force. Nor does he fully appreciate the role and contribution of the African working class in building the industrial and commercial life of Natal.
- (3) In the chapter on 'The African Response' the author should have devoted some space to the actions taken by the Africans in the urban areas to improve their miserable conditions. There is on the other hand too much emphasis on, without a critical analysis of, the differences between the educated Africans (Kholwa's) and the traditionalists. Admittedly this chapter contains a few statements by Africans articulating the people's deeply felt anger and resentment at their treatment. A quote from 'Ilanga lase Natal' of 4 December, 1903, deserves to be quoted in full as it could be used to describe conditions seventy years later. White political leaders, the newspaper said:

'openly maintain that the black man is destined to be led, but not to lead; to be thought for by others, but not to think for himself. This applies with very marked emphasis upon the natives of Natal and Zululand, who are saddled at every turn with restrictions that stifle all aspirations which lurk within their breasts — restrictions in education — restrictions in religion — restrictions in bettering their condition in the matter of migrating from colony to colony in order to offer their services to the highest market — restrictions in obtaining the franchise — restrictions even in the insignificant matter of walking upon the foot-paths . . . '

Finally, it needs to be re-iterated that we do not yet have a comprehensive account of the development of racial attitudes in South Africa. This of course can only be accomplished most comprehensively within the framework of Marxian historical and dialectical materialism.

A. T.

#### LIGHT ON THE COMINTERN

Outline History of the Communist International. Institute of Marxism-Leninism; Central Committee of the CPSU. Progress Publishers, Moscow.

Speeches at Congresses of the Communist International by V.I. Lenin. Progress Publishers. (50p from Central Books, London.)

A vital part in the making of world history was played from 1919 to 1943 by the Communist International. Established on the initiative of the Bolshevik Party, the Comintern was a close-knit, centralised organisation of the Communist Parties of many different countries. Most of these Parties had sprung up under the dynamic influence of the October Revolution.

This is because it was the inheritor of the best traditions of the First International led by Marx and Engels and of the Second International which collapsed ingloriously in 1914 as a result of the treachery, class collaboration and opportunism of its leaders, Right-wing heads of the European Labour and Social-Democratic Parties, when the first world war broke out.

From its outset the new International fought relentlessly against this opportunism – the curse and the tragedy of the labour movement in the developed capitalist countries. It was uncompromisingly based on the revolutionary principles of working class internationalism, of Marxism creatively developed and enriched in the present epoch by V.I. Lenin.

Determined to avoid 'diplomatic' compromises and papering over of differences which characterised the Second International, the Communist International set out to lay the basis of, and to realise, the ideological, political and organisational unity of the Communist Parties which constituted it — each of which regarded itself as a section of what was in effect a worldwide Party. Many incorrect, unMarxist views and actions manifested themselves in the young Communist Parties — right-wing opportunism and revisionist tendencies, hangovers from the old Social-Democratic Parties; nationalist deviations; ultra-left petty bourgeois syndicalist or anarchist leanings. Each of these was analysed, identified and vigorously opposed by the Comintern. Under Lenin's guidance, the international hammered out, on the anvil of practice, the theory, policy and tactics of Marxist Parties.

The experience of the Comintern covers a vast panorama, ranging from the building of socialism in the USSR to the critical struggles of the workers in Western Europe and the liberation fights of China, India and other victims of colonialism. Looked at against the constantly-changing background of world events, the story of the Comintern is one of a body of men and women who decisively changed history and moulded the international communist movement of today, the most powerful and important instrument of revolutionary change the world has ever known.

Yet the absorbing narrative of the Comintern has never adequately been told or analysed by the Communists themselves. For the most part it has been the falsified and hostile accounts of the enemy which have been spread abroad. An important contribution to filling this gap has now made its appearance in the Outline History of the Communist International. Prepared by a group of eight authors, headed by A.I. Sobolev, it is issued by the CPSU's Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

The book covers the formation of the Comintern; its fight in the early twenties to win the masses for workers' unity and to strengthen the Soviet republic; the 1924-1928 period of the post-revolutionary partial stabilisation of capitalism; the years (1929-1933) of capitalist economic crisis and the laying of the foundations of socialism in the USSR; the fight (1934-1939) for unity against fascism and war; the war years; and finally the present-day international Communist movement.

The authors have done an admirable job. By and large, this is not

only a highly-instructive but also an inspiring book for any Communist to read. Certainly, during the course of its quarter century of work, the Comintern leadership committed a number of mistakes and misjudgments. Some of these were very serious indeed in their magnitude and consequences. This book does not gloss over such errors and short-comings. It goes into them thoroughly. But it also shows how, on each occasion, the Communists were able to recognise their own mistakes in time, to correct them and emerge with deeper understanding and greater effectiveness. It does this with a commendably historic and balanced approach and assessment of the part of various individuals and groups involved. This invests the volume with great authority.

In their work the authors have drawn considerably on materials in the Central Party Archives of their Institute. The result is that the chronicle is enlivened by a wealth of detailed information which is new (at least to the present reviewer) and sometimes surprising.

This is a hefty volume of 562 pages. In some respects one could have wished it even bigger. Of course it is an 'outline' and that implies a certain amount of selection and omission. Still, I feel it focuses too narrowly on the problems and the Parties of only some countries, particularly of Europe. Of Asian countries, only China receives anything like detailed discussion and treatment. Regarding Africa, the reader learns only that the Communist Party was founded in South Africa, among several others in various parts of the world, in the year 1921. The debate on South Africa at the sixth Congress, so vital for our Party, is not mentioned.

I also find it culpable that a book of this character lacks an index.

Such lesser criticisms apart, however, I would emphasise that this is an invaluable book, rich in lessons and in wisdom.

#### LENIN'S SPEECHES

An essential companion to it is a newly-issued collection of all Lenin's speeches at the four Congresses of the Comintern that took place during his lifetime. It contains fourteen speeches in all. Each is a gem.

Of particular interest, perhaps, to readers of this journal will be Lenin's report, at the second Congress in 1920 on the national and colonial questions. It is in the course of this report that he refuted the concept that economically-backward nations would inevitably have to go through the capitalist stage of development. 'With the aid of the proletariat of the advanced countries, backward countries can go over to the Soviet system and, through certain stages of development, to communism, without having to pass through the capitalist stage.'

Lucidity, as always with Lenin, sparkling liveliness, deadly logic in debate: these are the hall-marks of the speeches. I would appeal to every one of our colleagues who write on economic questions to read again the report on the international question at the second Congress. Here is a masterly example of how to deal with complex problems of international economy without either muddling your audience up or putting them to sleep.

Reading these speeches invests with flesh and blood, breathes life into our studies of the formative years of the Comintern. Whether he was delivering major reports, or engaged in the cut and thrust of detailed debate, they summon to mind an irresistible picture of the impact upon his comrades made by their incomparable leader, Lenin.

TERENCE AFRICANUS

# Letters to the Editor

## THE ROLE OF THE PROLETARIAT IN AFRICA

A. Lerumo's review of my recent book, New Theories of Revolution (see African Communist, No. 51, Fourth Quarter, 1972), raises a number of questions which I think would benefit from further discussion.

Most of these deal specifically with Frantz Fanon and his views on the African revolution, but before commenting on these I would first like to make some observations on one or two other aspects of the book.

Firstly, as regards Marcuse. In his review, Comrade Lerumo refers to Marcuse having provided 'a powerful indictment of advanced Western monopoly capitalism'. As I have tried to show in my book, one of the outstanding features about the writings of Marcuse, and especially demonstrated in his best known work, One Dimensional Man, is precisely his very failure to indict monopoly capitalism. Neither the term nor the concept are included in his examination of modern society in the West. In fact, as I explain in my book, by his concentration on what he terms the 'consumer society', Marcuse draws attention to a secondary characteristic of capitalism and so diverts people's thoughts away from the main contradiction in capitalist

society, which is not distribution but the private ownership of the means of production. It is this, in its advanced form, which is the main feature of monopoly capital. Yet this receives no attention whatsoever from Marcuse.

Secondly, Comrade Lerumo refers to my 'relying on the traditional British appeal to practice rather than sweeping ideological assertion'. It has always been a basic Marxist tenet that theory is based on practice, that Marxist analyses are made on the basis of concrete, objective facts. If one wants proof of this they need only look through the three volumes of Marx's Capital, or Lenin's Imperialism. It is not as a 'British pragmatist' that I have attempted to examine Fanon, Debray and Marcuse, but as a Communist, using the well-established methods of Marxism. If I have made extensive use of factual evidence to back up my arguments this, I would hold, is traditional Marxist method and not a peculiarly 'British' characteristic.

Thirdly, it seems to me that Comrade Lerumo misses the whole point of the book when he argues that the three subjects of my study — Fanon, Debray and Marcuse — have nothing in common apart from 'their departure from accepted Marxist analysis', and that by concentrating on this I have given an 'unbalanced emphasis' to my treatment of their views.

One of the main causes of confusion in the revolutionary movements in the world today is the spread of ideas attacking the concept of the working class as the decisive revolutionary force in the world transition to socialism. The capitalists, of course, make full use of such confusion, anxious as they are to divide the working class from its potential allies and also to hinder the working class from fulfilling its historic role as the leading class in the socialist revolution. This is why the bourgeois press provides ample space to theories alleging that the working class no longer performs such a role.

It was to refute these dangerous views, and, by fact and argument, disprove them, that I wrote New Theories of Revolution. As a basis for such a book I chose Fanon, Debray and Marcuse. This was not because these three writers, each of whom concentrated on a particular continent or continents (Africa, Latin America, United States and Europe) simply share, to use Comrade Lerumo's term, a common 'departure from accepted Marxist analysis', it was because what all three share in common is their rejection of the working class as the

decisive revolutionary class in this epoch, and their attempts to present some other class or strata – peasants, students, intellectuals, lumpenproletariats – as the main or leading revolutionary force.

This is in no sense a marginal aspect of Marxist theory, but its very core. As Lenin put it:

'The main thing in the teaching of Marx (italics added) is that it brings out the historic role of the proletariat as the builder of socialist society.'

Yet Comrade Lerumo, dealing in particular with Fanon and Africa, argues that Fanon's attempts to denigrate the role of the African working class and to present it as a non-revolutionary force is not 'the main thing that has to be said' about Fanon.

But can one put aside so readily what Lenin regarded 'as the main thing in the teaching of Marx'? Can it really be claimed, as Comrade Lerumo does, that Fanon, who made such a concentrated and consistent attack on the African working class, made 'a positive contribution . . . to a comprehension of the "third world"? Does not such argument need at least one qualification?

There are some positive ideas in Fanon's writings (I deal with these in my book, and shall say more about them later), but one cannot really comprehend the 'third world' if one accepts Fanon's false theory regarding the role played by different classes in the African revolution.

Africa stands at a decisive stage of her struggle. Most of the independent African states are still dominated by imperialism. As I explain in my book, these African states 'have to break the grip of imperialism, defeat the manoeuvres of neo-colonialism and endeavour to put their countries on a path that will take them away from capitalism and towards socialism. There is a concerted effort by imperialism and its supporters, including sections of the new capitalist forces in the independent states, to drive a rift between the workers and the peasants in order to make it easier to maintain political power in the hands of the collaborators with imperialism. Part of this political and ideological offensive is to deny the role played by the workers in the national liberation struggle as a justification for excluding them from positions of power in the building up of the new system in their countries after independence. Any unthinking acceptance of Fanon's ideas on the African working class assists those who want to keep the working

class in a subordinate position in order that they can push their countries along a capitalist path in submission to neo-colonialism and in bondage to imperialism. Despite his militant language, his passionate denunciation of colonialism, and his plea for radical change, Fanon rejects the main revolutionary class in modern society, and provides ideological cover for an alliance of the elite, the petty-bourgeoisie, the lumpenproletariat and the peasants against the workers'.

These criticisms of Fanon's central thesis regarding social classes in the revolution in no way detract from the value of much of what he wrote. In fact, despite Comrade Lerumo's apparent feeling that I ignore Fanon's positive achievement, in the final passages of the section of my book that deals with Fanon I write:

'He (Fanon) was, above all else, dedicated to the struggle against colonialism and racialism. He died a comparatively young man. He was cut off in the midst of his development; and his honesty of purpose, if he had lived, might have helped to carry him forward to a clearer appreciation of the revolutionary process . . . and when the theoretical confusions and political inadequacies of his writings have been forgotten, the noble struggle against colonialism to which he devoted his short life will still be remembered.'

This still remains my overall judgement, but in no sense should it stand in the way of a necessary critique of ideas which, whatever the motivation, have the objective result of damaging the cause of revolution.

Lastly, Comrade Lerumo writes that Fanon's writings present a 'sharp challenge . . . to the complacency of "the West". I am sure that on reflection, Comrade Lerumo would want to modify the observation. Whether in solidarity with Vietnam, or to save the victims of Nimeiri, or to assist the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, or on many other questions, progressive forces in Britain, despite the critical nature of their own domestic struggle, have never hesitated to stand by their brothers in the 'third world'. This is true above all of the Communist Parties in 'the West' who surely need no Fanon to shake their alleged 'complacency'.

Intermittent discussions on Fanon and Africa have taken place over a number of years. Perhaps it would be timely to discuss these matters more systematically. It seems to me that a journal with such a deservedly fine reputation as African Communist could be an excellent medium for initiating such a discussion.

Yours fraternally, Jack Woddis.

(A. Lerumo comments: While regretting that my brief notice of New Theories of Revolution was apparently somewhat misconstrued by the author, I remain satisfied that on the whole it gave a fair description — and a highly favourable estimation — of the book.)

# LABOUR MONTHLY

Founded 1921

Editor: R. Palme Dutt

A Marxist commentary on political events in the cause of national liberation and socialism.

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Printed by Interdruck Leipzig