

KWACHA—ANGOLA



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ENGLAND

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* EDITORIAL *
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SALAZARISM WITHOUT SALAZAR

All countries which have fought for, and achieved, their independence through an armed struggle illustrate that such a struggle must be a people's war: and that in order to be successful the people themselves must co-operate in their own political transformation. This means that any effective resistance must include political education of the people, and that this, and the military resistance, must be carried out from within the country itself. Outside propaganda - always obeying the maxim that the best propaganda is the truth - is then but the reflection of the real resistance within the country.

The realization of this revolutionary theory in practice can only be achieved when the leadership of the revolutionary party (both political and military) accept their full share of the daily risks and hardships borne by the people in their fight for the liberation of their country.

UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola), which held its first conference of political and military cadres - inside Angola - from 31st August to 5th September 1968, is convinced that the revolution in Angola cannot be led by telepathy, from the safety of neighbouring countries. Leaders cannot be only figure-heads: they must be tested and tempered by participating themselves in the day-to-day struggles of the people.

Three weeks after the conference of cadres in Angola came the news of Salazar's political end. From all over the Western world there followed messages of hope for his recovery, and of goodwill towards the new regime of Marcelo Caetano, the Prime Minister. These messages expressed gratitude, affection and admiration for Salazar: a man who, for forty two years, has been responsible for the oppression of the majority of his own people and those of the Portuguese colonial territories.

UNITA is not optimistic about the "liberalism" of the new regime in Portugal: already this new "liberal" regime has sent a further 7,000 troops to Guinea(Bissau) to continue the colonial war. Next year, some reliable sources say that Portugal is to spend 14,500,000 Pounds on its army and air force to be used against the guerrilla activities in the colonies.

From within Angola itself we have received the following declaration, made by the leaders of UNITA, expressing their attitude towards the new Portuguese regime:

" On 26th September 1968 the President of the Republic of Portugal, Admiral Americo Thomaz, announced the retirement of Dr. Salazar as Prime Minister of Portugal, owing to illness. At the same time he announced the appointment of Dr. Marcelo Caetano as the new Prime Minister.

On 27th September 1968, Dr. Marcelo Caetano made his political declaration to the National Assembly of Portugal on major issues of Portuguese policy. Our attention was drawn by the

Our attention was drawn by the following passage concerning Angola, Mozambique and Guinea(Bissau):

Dr. Caetano said: " No relaxation will be permitted in our struggle to defend our overseas provinces. Everything will be done to ensure the territorial integrity of our national heritage. Many and long are the memories which link me and our overseas provinces, whose populations I love and admire. The struggle against terrorism will be pursued by our armed forces in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), while in the meantime our policy must become more dynamic."

Dr. Caetano is a pupil of Salazar's, as he has confirmed in his speech. He was once a colonial Minister, and later, Minister of State, in Salazar's government. He has no political experience other than that he gained under Salazar. His cabinet includes many Ministers who also served under Salazar; and of the newcomers, many are former governors of Angola. The Minister of Defence, General Venancio Horacio de Sa Viana Rebelo, was Governor General of Angola on the eve of the nationalist uprising in 1961 in Angola. The new Minister of Health and Social Welfare, Dr. Lopez Cancela de Abreu, is similarly an ex-colonial.

In view of these facts, UNITA and its military wing FALA (Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola):

- 1... Call on Angolans at home and abroad to increase their vigilance against the possibilities of political manoeuvres by opportunists.
- 2... Call on the members of UNITA, at home and abroad, to continue in their fight for total independence for the oppressed peoples of Africa.
- 3... Call on the Angolans, at home and abroad, to unite with UNITA in this fight, which represents the hope of the suffering of all Africans from Cabinda to Cunene.

UNITA reaffirms:

- 1... its dedication to the war of liberation and the long-term objectives of freedom based on self-reliance;
- 2... its resolve to fight alongside other African resistance to colonialism and imperialism.
- 3... its unreserved support for all struggles of peoples of African descent for dignity and independence.

UNITA calls on African Independent States:

- 1... to be increasingly vigilant in recognizing and revealing the true nature of the so-called "liberalism" of the Portuguese regime after Salazar.
- 2... to increase their material and moral assistance to UNITA.

UNITA calls on the democratic forces within Portugal to persist in their long-term objectives, and not to pin their hopes on a new era emerging from the regime following Salazar.

NEWS FROM THE FRONT OF COMBAT
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The liberation war in Angola continues unabated. Reports coming from Lisbon through the Diario de Noticias and from London through the Financial Times, December 1968 have admitted that from July 1968 on the war in Angola has been intense.

The intensification of the war in Angola was due mainly to the presence of the UNITA's Central Committee inside Angola. The first Conference of political and military cadres held in Angola from August 31st to September 5th 1968 has discussed and reconsidered the overall strategy and tactics of present situation of the war in Angola, and a new period of reorganization and retraining of the UNITA forces has taken place.

The president of UNITA, Dr. Jonas Savimbi, speaking in a tape-recorded message from the heart of Angola to the Angolans abroad, to the sympathisers of UNITA, and to the friendly African countries has described the progress and the problems of the struggle conducted from within, has reaffirmed the UNITA's determination to continue the struggle inside Angola despite the present difficulties and contradictions, and finally he has appealed for help from and warmer relations with the African countries neighbouring Angola.

The tape-recording was accompanied by a war communique of FALA (Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola), UNITA's military wing, which reads:

June 27th 1968: UNITA forces launched a surprise attack at Administrative Centre of Luanda: 6 Portuguese soldiers were killed, 12 wounded and an USA automatic rifle G3, FMP 0 58147-11/66 was captured.

July 12th 1968: The Angolan patriots set up an ambush on the road between Samuhuzi and Kusinya: 9 Portuguese soldiers were killed, 15 wounded and a military vehicle was destroyed.

July 29th 1968: UNITA fighters on the road between Luanda and Dundo set up an ambush putting 15 Portuguese soldiers out of combat, 25 wounded and a great deal of ammunitions seized.

August 4th 1968: On the road between Kuemba and Luanda an ambush was set up; 12 Portuguese soldiers were put out of combat, 18 wounded and several hand grenades were captured.

August 25th 1968: A settler's farm was attacked by the UNITA patriots because of its Pide (Portuguese secret police) activities against the local African population in the area of Luanda. In the attack 3 Portuguese guards lost their lives, 9 wounded and 10 Mauser rifles were seized. The numbers of the rifles run as follows: D.2203; E 6682 ; C.9684; D.16702; E11977 ; E6661 ; 303C.9492 ; 303B.3525 ; 303U.32043; 303Y.1867

August 6th 1968: A column of Portuguese soldiers was ambushed by the UNITA patriots when going to attack one of the UNITA's camps. 6 Portuguese soldiers were killed and 16 wounded.

August 7th 1968: The UNITA patriots attacked a Portuguese military column on the road from Alto-Cuito to Munhango. 16 Portuguese soldiers died, 12 wounded and 2 military vehicles destroyed, and a great deal of ammunitions captured. On the same day the UNITA forces on the road from Munhango to Luso attacked the Portuguese convoy. 8 soldiers killed on the Portuguese side, 26 wounded, 2 guns captured, 4 hand grenades and 55 cartridges seized.

August 11th 1968: an ambush was laid down by the UNITA guerrillas on the road from Cangamba to Cassamba. The Portuguese side suffered 3 killed and several wounded.

12th August 1968: an attack made by the UNITA forces on the Saw Mill of Portuguese settlers near Umpulo, 2 Portuguese guards were killed and a Fiat tractor No. A.B.A 1491 was destroyed.

Septemb 27th 1968: The Armed Forces of UNITA have ambushed a column of Portuguese vehicles on the road from Mungai to Lungue-Bungu. 7 Portuguese soldiers were killed and a considerable amount of ammunition were captured

Septemb 29th 1968: A military Zone of UNITA was invaded by the Portuguese forces, and on a master counter-attack the UNITA patriots killed 4 soldiers and 6 were badly wounded.

October 12th 1968: UNITA forces operating from Cuamba area attacked a Portuguese military camp surprisingly. 5 Portuguese soldiers were killed and 10 wounded.

October 13th 1968: 15 Portuguese soldiers on a reconnaissance mission were attacked and put out of combat by the UNITA forces. One of them was the leader of the group, caporal No. 1020/67 P.B.T.R. 521

October 19th 1968: Portuguese soldiers invaded the UNITA camps at Lungue-Bungu detachment. On a counter-attack, 5 enemy soldiers were wiped out, 17 wounded, and the following weapons were captured: 1 FN56763/12/67; 1 mauser F12420; 1 mauser 58588; 1 mauser 1544; 1 mauser 2366; 1 mauser 31010; 1 mauser 4133; 1 mauser 15089; 300 rounds of ammunition; 12 hand grenades made in the U.S.A.

*** During this period the UNITA side suffered 5 killed, including 4 civilians.

COMMUNIQUE issued from the Central Base of FALA (Armed Forces for Liberation of Angola) in Angola, October 21st 1968

Signed by the General Commander:

S.Katalahali C.

? AFTER SALAZAR, WHAT NEXT ?

During the last few weeks the international press has been reporting the death throes of the Portuguese dictator, Dr. Antonio d'Oliveira Salazar. This has naturally led to widespread speculations, and prescriptions, about the policies to be followed by his successor, Dr. Marcelo Caetano, the present Portuguese Prime Minister - not only in Portugal itself, but also in Angola and the other Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The death of Salazar seemed likely to have traumatic effects on the reactionary ruling circles of Portugal, and possibly on those same circles in other western countries. For Salazar represented to them the protection of their economic interests. To the people of Angola, and the majority of those in Portugal, however, he represented the forces of repression and reaction: a man dedicated to a system of exploitation of man by man.

But the fears of the former and the hopes of the latter are not likely to be fulfilled. For, with or without Salazar, the policies of Portugal in Africa seem certain to continue in their present oppressive course. The so-called "liberalism" of Marcelo Caetano will make no difference to the continued implementation of the archaic ideas of the New Constitution - "O Estado Novo". Marcelo Caetano, indeed, was one of the key architects of the Estado Novo and of Portuguese colonial philosophy. The ideology of the Estado Novo has its roots in Portuguese colonial history, in the pontifical Edicts of the Catholic Church, the Rerum Novarum of 1891 and the Quadragesimo Anno of 1931, and in Mussolini's fascism. It is therefore a Constitution formed by a complex amalgam of puritanism, authoritarianism, paternalism, feudalism and fascism. For over four decades the peoples of Portugal and Angola have been governed by this constitution.

But those who predict a long continued future for this constitution, insofar as Portugal's colonial policies are concerned, are surely mistaken. Portugal is the only remaining direct colonial power in Africa and it is not possible that people of these colonies will long submit to such oppression. In Angola the people are already fighting Portuguese colonialism UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola) and the Angolan people will not only continue, but will intensify, the fight until nothing less than total victory is achieved. No compromise will be accepted: neither an "Angolan Brazil", nor a UDI, will be accepted as solutions for the majority of the oppressed people in Angola. In the so-called "multi-racial" society of Brazil, the African communities, mainly located in the "favelas" (slums or ghettos), are "lower-class" communities in fact, their contribution to their society limited to such activities as football and dancing the Samba. In Zimbabwe, the majority of the people have not submitted to UDI, but have been encouraged by it to fight bitterly for their freedom and real independence.

Portugal, the most backward country in Western Europe, with a per capita income similar to some of the poorest and smallest newly-independent African countries, has the largest colonial empire in the world. The illiteracy rate is as high as 46%, the mortality rate the highest in Europe and per capita income the lowest in Europe. This is the country which has been faced with armed struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). This is the country which is affording to spend almost 50% of its national budget to the war in the colonies. Some figures comparing the military expenditure of Port

gal and South Africa are very revealing, indeed.:

	<u>PORTUGAL</u>	<u>SOUTH AFRICA</u>
Estimated GNP	\$4.4 billion	\$13.1 billion
Military Budget	\$302 million	\$354 million
Army : total strength	182,500	28,000
Total when fully mobilized	500,000	70,000
Per cent of Military expenditure	6.7%**	2.7%

** (largest in the whole of Europe excluding the Soviet Union whose expenditure includes space and atomic research)

NB.: figures taken from the Military Balance 1968-69 (Institute of Strategic Studies)

Before the World War II Portugal was supported mainly by Britain, Germany and Italy, in terms of investments. Since the War, the military and financial machinery of NATO has supplied Portugal with massive financial and military assistance. The USA, in return, has acquired the military base in the Azores; the Permanent American Military Mission (MAAG) based in Portugal was able to give military advice and direct aid to the Portuguese colonial army; recently, the American CIA has been openly supporting Portugal's colonial war in Angola through private enterprises. West Germany is today the biggest supplier of machinery and goods to Portugal. In return, she received the Military Base NO.11 in Beja (in South of Portugal). German technicians have been drawing up plans for the largest Jet engine test facilities in Europe, destined for Lockheed F-104 Jet Star Fighters. In 1966, West Germany delivered 40 FIAT GIA jet planes to Portugal, to be used in the colonial war in Africa. France got a missile tracking station in the Azores, and in return she gives warships to be used in Africa against the "bandits". Since the Windsor Treaty of 1386, Britain has been a strong Ally of Portugal. At the moment, British investments exceed 300 million pounds - in mining, trade, transport etc. Large British Companies such as ICI and Unilever, have large factories in Portugal. In July 1967, Lazard Bros. gave a loan of 50 million pounds to the Portuguese iron and steel industry.

From this it will be clear that the "valiant Portuguese resistance" to terrorism" in its African colonies has nothing to do with the Portuguese "Latin temperament", the "great Lusitanian passive courage" of the Portuguese or the "historical Lusitanian values."

International protest at the United Nations, and other international gatherings, has not succeeded in conving Portugal to change her colonial policies. (And as long as such military and financial aid is forthcoming from the Western countries she is not likely to be encouraged to.) UNITA does not share any illusions that protests (unsupported by actions) will succeed in doing so. Only a resistance by the Angolan people directed correctly from within, can succeed in altering Portugal's policies in Angola.

As Portugal is forced to call upon more and more outside help to maintain her irrational rule over Angola, UNITA inside Angola will continue and intensify the struggle for total independence. With the increasing participation of South Africa and Rhodesian forces in the Portuguese military side, the struggle in Angola will inevitably spread to affect the whole of Southern Africa. It will be a grim and bitter struggle, but one which must, in the end, succeed in achieving freedom and independence for the peoples of these countries.

At this very moment, when Africans in Angola are accepting greater sacrifices in order to achieve their freedom, UNITA appeals to all those Portuguese, inside and outside the country, who are fighting against Portuguese oppression, to co-ordinate their efforts with those of the liberation movement in Angola. Only through such co-operation can the struggle be shortened, and can conditions be created for future co-operation and understanding between Portugal and independent Angola.

STATEMENT ADDRESSED TO THE AFRICAN LIBERATION COMMITTEE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY.

Your Excellency, the Executive Secretary
Honourable Delegates,
Dear Brothers,

POLITICAL SITUATION

UNITA (National Union for Total Independence of Angola), one of the three political parties fighting in Angola today, was formed in March 1966.

Since the commencement of hostilities in the Angolan liberation war in 1961, there has been no real organization of the people behind the guerrilla units, and for this reason progress has been slow. UNITA was formed with the intention of applying correct revolutionary techniques to the situation: to organize the people politically and militarily inside the country, and to raise their morale: factors on which victory will depend.

The people of Angola have been repressed for 500 years by the Portuguese colonial regime in the most brutal and humiliating way. They have been denied the most elementary human and political rights, including that of free assembly. They have never been able to participate in the political life of their own country; have never had the experience of political action in such basic ways as belonging to a trade union, a students union or even women's association.

It was the fact that the people had no political experience, and were continuing to have none, that brought UNITA into being, to remedy this, by organizing the people through political education into a cohesive force against Portuguese oppression.

A liberation war must be a people's war - fought by the people, and for the people. Small disorganized freedom fighter groups will never defeat the armies of oppression alone. UNITA realises this, and has already embarked on the long and difficult work of mobilising the people by example and political education.

The work of organizing the people cannot be done outside the country; it cannot be done by a monotonous and improbable list of victories against small detachments of enemy troops, broadcast from outside the country; it cannot be done by propagandist incursions from neighbouring territories, retreating whence they came when the opposition gets too strong.

The leaders must be inside the country; they must share the dangers of the people; they must lead and be seen to lead - only then will the people follow. This is UNITA's belief, and

this is what UNITA is doing. The people are tired of hearing over the years bombastic and monotonous communiques which signify nothing. It does not improve the people's morale when they learn that their country, apparently awaiting the outcome of the struggle, at which point they stroll over the dead bodies of their brothers to the rich pickings they imagine are to be had.

If we are right to ask our brothers to risk their lives, then they have the right to ask the same of us.

We ask the African Liberation Committee to note that credibility of the nationalist propaganda efforts has fallen very low because of exaggeration and distortion. We believe that the best propaganda in the struggle is always the truth.

For example, the land from which this memorandum was written was claimed to have been liberated by another Angolan organization long ago - yet this was certainly not the case when we started work here. This situation must be brought to an end; otherwise the whole credibility of the nationalist movement in Southern Africa will suffer. In short, there is a credibility gap.

The presence of UNITA is unquestionable in six provinces: those of Moxico, Cuando-Cubango, Lunda, Bie, Malanje and Huambo. Large areas in these provinces are under UNITA's control, and have been since 1966. Thousands of Angolans are today enjoying the fruits of freedom in these liberated areas. Approximately 50% of the population living in these areas pay no taxes whatsoever to the colonial regime. In the disputed areas the colonial authorities have lowered the individual tax from 250 escudos (4 pounds) to 50 escudos, in a desperate bid to buy off the people from supporting UNITA. In some areas the colonial regime has gone so far as to tolerate the refusal of our people to pay taxes, in an attempt to stop the mass exodus of the population to the liberated areas.

In the liberated areas themselves UNITA has expanded and organized the local committees to fit them for their new responsibilities:

- Education: an extensive literacy campaign is under way, and primary schools are being established;
- Health : rudimentary clinics are being set up to meet the needs of the people;
- Production: all production is controlled and undertaken by local co-operatives.

All this has been done without outside assistance, and as yet we are far from reaching our objectives. How much more could we have done had we received outside help?

We think that the African Liberation Committee should send a commission of enquiry to find out who is doing what inside Angola. By doing this the Committee would be in a better position to assess the achievement and the needs of the Angolan struggle. UNITA would extend a hearty welcome to the commission and would give all possible assistance and co-operation.

MILITARY SITUATION:

The military organization set up by UNITA is called FALA (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola). It is organized as, and developed along the lines of, a popular militia.

Today UNITA has under its command in FALA over 3,000 soldiers, who are well trained, but - as so often reported in the international press - "badly equipped." Because of the popular base of their organization, these men have scored a number of successes against the numerically superior and better equipped troops of the Salazar regime. The military activities of FALA range from such small - scale guerrilla activities as the sabotage of bridges, roads and railways, "hit and run" raids and ambushes, up to large scale engagements of battalion strength.

Another of FALA's activities is that of being party organisers in those areas under Portuguese control.

The military activities of UNITA have been reported several times in the Portuguese press and radio; and while we could give a lengthy resume of our military activities from January 1968 to the present time, we are aware of the detrimental effect of the monotonous listing of engagements that have been flooding into various African capitals from nationalist quarters. We do, however, respectfully propose that the African Liberation Committee should send a military commission to Angola to establish the truth for themselves.

UNITY WITH OTHER ANGOLAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS:

We have all along affirmed our willingness to unite with the two other Angolan liberation movements. Out of this desire for unity we met the representative of the Mpla in July 1966. The talks then held did not produce any concrete results. In September of the same year we met Mr. Holden Roberto, president of Upa and leader of the former government in exile. Again, unfortunately, nothing came of this meeting. Both meetings took place in Lusaka under the auspices of the Zambian government.

UNITA believes that unity through the struggle and for the same struggle is an essential factor in armed resistance against the enemy: united we stand, divided we fall.

There should be no preconditions for unity talks, the only credentials required of those parties taking part being that they should have forces engaged in the armed struggle in Angola.

UNITA has its representatives abroad who are fully instructed to participate in any unity talks initiated by the OAU, or by any African independent State, provided that the security of our delegate is assured. If need be, we are prepared to send a delegate from inside Angola to join in unity talks, in order to avoid any problem that may arise concerning the authority for finalising agreements reached.

THE PERSPECTIVES OF THE STRUGGLE:

The road ahead of us in Angola is arduous in the extreme. Our main task consists of developing our struggle on three main fronts: 1) the political mobilization of the entire nation; 2) the prosecution of the armed struggle to an ever-increasing intensity; 3) national reconstruction in the liberated areas, to establish a political, economic and social system which will both respect our traditions and at the same time make our country strong and progressive.

To achieve these objectives we need the sympathy and assistance of the independent African states, who, we believe, as fellow Africans are in a position to help us in our struggle, in spite of their own internal problems. We believe that we are on the side of right and that we must win, but it will be a long fight and a slow, and will require all the courage we can muster.

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