

DECEMBER 1990



SECHABA

official organ of the african
national congress south africa

A TWENTY-THREE YEAR CHAPTER CLOSES

1967-1990, Sechaba printed in the GDR



President O R Tambo cuts the ribbon on the occasion of the opening of the ANC Mission in the German Democratic Republic on November 20 1978. Behind him is Kurt Seibrer, the then President of the Solidarity Committee of the GDR.

DECEMBER 1990

SECHABA

ISSN:0037-0509

Volume 24 No 12

CONTENTS:

EDITORIAL	1
WAR RESISTERS RETURN HOME	
By Gavin Cawthra	2
THE BROADCAST SECTOR	
By Solomon Kotane	6
INTERVIEW	
Pallo Jordan speaks to Sechaba	10
PENSIONS IN A POST—APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA	
By Norman Levinrad	15
INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL	18
RESISTANCE CULTURE	
By Wally Serote	20
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY	
Summary of Draft ANC Policy Document	25
LETTERS FROM READERS	29
BOOK REVIEWS	31
OBITUARY: FRANCIS MELI	
By Ralph Mzamo	35

Graphic design by Hylton Alcock



EDITORIAL

A FRIEND TO SECHABA

This editorial is perhaps a belated comment on the loss the liberation movement has suffered with the disappearance of the German Democratic Republic as we knew it, and the emergence of a new Germany.

Sechaba should rightly comment on its long and fruitful relationship with the GDR. It is one of the most tangible and outstanding results of the unstinting services that the GDR people willingly and selflessly rendered to the South African people.

For 23 years, from January 1967 to October 1990, *Sechaba* was printed voluntarily by GDR workers every month. Its production became as much of a tradition to them as it became for its readers. The task of organising the GDR public to donate financially towards this effort was done by the Solidarity Committee of the GDR. This is a body that has always been a friend to all those who are waging just struggles in their countries.

We cannot say that there was any official decree by the new Germany for *Sechaba* no longer to be produced in Germany. What happened is that the new conditions under which our supporters have to operate do not allow direct assistance to parties or organisations such as we have been receiving all along, to be given.

On another level, capitalist competition, especially with the big plants in the former Federal Republic of Germany, has been unleashed in such a manner that, for a plant of the size that used to print *Sechaba* to continue to exist, it must give all its available time to this competition.

Now *Sechaba* will be printed in an ANC print-

shop for as long as it continues to exist. We say, "for as long as it exists," because new conditions have emerged in South Africa which might require a new approach to the whole information policy of the ANC. For instance, we had to produce *Sechaba* outside the country because conditions did not exist for its production inside the country. Otherwise, there was no reason for not producing it inside the country. At the same time, *Sechaba* had to address itself, initially, to the international community. Another journal, *Mayibuye*, directed its information campaign inside the country. Therefore, there may arise a need to collapse the two journals into one, or continue with both journals performing different functions.

In this endeavour to streamline our information and publicity struggle, we are embarking on a review of the existing journals of the ANC. We will inform our readers and subscribers about the final outcome, which will be reached in the ANC Consultative Conference in December.

We believe that our supporters, who, with their subscriptions have helped run *Sechaba*, are with us in thanking the people of the GDR, the Solidarity Committee and the "Erich Weinert" workers for a job well done over many years. The pledge by these German anti-apartheid forces to continue their support for our struggle and their determination to work with all other anti-apartheid forces in the new Germany is cause for us to struggle even more resolutely, to ensure that the cause they have supported for so many years bears fruit, sooner rather than later.

WAR RESISTERS RETURN HOME

THE APARTHEID WAR MACHINE MUST STILL BE CHALLENGED

By Gavin Cawthra



An advance party of exiled war resisters was due to return to South Africa at the end of November, declaring that they would continue to refuse to be conscripted until the armed forces were placed under democratic control. Although eligible for amnesty for previous refusals to fight for apartheid, many of the resisters could still be conscripted and face jail sentences if they refused.

The group joined over a thousand young white South Africans who have publicly refused to serve in the South African Defence Force (SADF). The government is continuing to prosecute some of them, though sentences have been reduced from six years' imprisonment to around two years.

The return was organised by the Committee on South African War Resistance (COSAWR), which for 11 years has organised exiled war resisters and published the journal *Resister*. COSAWR has decided that as resisters can now return, and its work can be carried out inside the

country by organisations like the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), it is closing down, and ceasing publication of its journal.

COSAWR explained that, "to contribute fully to shaping the new South Africa, we need to play our role in South Africa itself." The organisation was closing down "not because its tasks are completed, but because exile is no longer one of the necessary conditions of the South African struggle." It called for international solidarity with war resisters to be directed to the End Conscription Campaign.

In the final issue of *Resister*, published in

November, the organisation gave a brief history of COSAWR, which has been closely associated with the ANC. It pointed out that many challenges continue to face what has become known as the 'war resistance movement' — those organisations such as the ECC, the Conscientious Objector Support Groups and church organisations which have been campaigning against militarisation and the aggressive and repressive activities of the SADF and police.

Increasingly, these issues have become the concern of the mass democratic movement, as state violence is a growing threat to the process of negotiated change. At its meeting at the end of September, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of the ANC condemned "the violence that has been unleashed against the people ... by the combined forces of elements in the security forces and Inkatha vigilantes." The NEC stated that the ongoing violence posed "an immediate threat to the entire process of peaceful transition."

Since September, several steps have been taken by the democratic movement to address the question of violence. The NEC statement of October 19-20 discussed these, and "commended the work being carried out jointly by the ANC and COSATU in this regard." However, the government has failed to heed the ANC's call for a judicial commission of enquiry into the violence which swept through the Transvaal in August and September, leaving a thousand people dead.

Security control

The hidden hand of the 'security forces' in the spread of Inkatha violence to the Transvaal during August and September, the continuing existence of shadowy state murder squads, ongoing police attacks on ANC-organised demonstrations and meetings, and the obstructionist attitude publicly adopted by SADF generals, all point to the fact that the 'security forces' have not been tamed.

When De Klerk launched the regime on the road to negotiations, many observers speculated that the security establishment was being eclipsed.

The largely faceless securocrats responsible for implementing the State of Emergency, the military and police strategists who so keenly advocated a 'total strategy' to destroy the ANC, were seen to have been discredited. Their strategy had failed, and in the new search for political solutions, they would be sidelined.

This view was strengthened when De Klerk declared more than a year ago that the National Security Management System was being abolished. This was the network which gave the securocrats control over many aspects of the state, by which they co-ordinated what they saw as a counter-revolution.

But it has now become clear that the system has not been abolished. While it has been downgraded, and civilians have become relatively more important in it, the system of secret committees which blanket the country continues to exist. This is clearly contrary to the creation of an open political climate in which negotiations can take place. It remains to be seen to what extent the system is implicated in the disruptive and brutal violence which swept the country during the second half of 1990.

Conscription

The campaign against conscription into the apartheid armed forces continues. With the end of the war in Namibia and Angola, compulsory military service for young white men was halved. Conscription of whites only is unacceptable in a non-racial system, and the ANC has made it clear in a number of statements that it will be untenable to extend conscription to blacks. Agreement on the need to phase out conscription was reached at the conference in Lusaka in May 1990, where members of Umkhonto We Sizwe and senior officials of the ANC met with SADF strategists, members of the SADF citizen force, and retired senior officers (see *Sechaba*, August 1990, pp 6-10).

But SADF generals, who have followed Minister of Defence General Malan's bellicose stance, have made public statements that they intend continuing with conscription, or even extending it. One general even claimed that it

would be necessary until the year 2020 (*Paratus*, July 1990, p 22).

Rearmament

Many organisations, such as the World Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa, and COSAWR, have expressed concern about the continuing rearmament drive of the SADF. Cuts made during 1990 in the defence budget were hardly significant, given the end of the Angola/Namibia campaigns, and up to half the budget is earmarked for the secret Special Defence Account, most of which is spent on arms. Armscor, the armaments manufacturing parastatal, has apparently not cancelled its most expensive and long-term projects, notably the development of a nuclear-capable, intermediate-range, ballistic missile, and a new fighter aircraft. These projects almost certainly involve Israel.

As the ANC's discussion document on economic policy has argued, the billions of rand tied up in military expenditure should be redirected to meeting the pressing needs of South Africa's people — education, housing, health and economic development. The conversion of Armscor plants to civilian production was discussed at the Lusaka conference, and it is clear that this could be done with beneficial economic effects.

State murder squads

The NEC of the ANC has called for "the immediate and visible disbandment of the various state murder squads such as the CCB, the Askaris, Koevoet and other mercenary formations such as Battalion 32 ... (and) there should be full public disclosure of the future deployment of the personnel of these units, the distribution of assets and arms." (ANC press release, September 20, 1990)

The Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), a specialised hit squad with over 200 trained operatives and a budget of over R20 million, falls under the SADF Special Forces command, which also controls the Reconnaissance Com-

mandos (Recces). The Recces, working in conjunction with Military Intelligence, have trained and backed UNITA, Renamo and Namibian surrogate forces, and have also trained Inkatha elements. They function secretly and outside of the usual SADF command channels. These forces constitute a real potential threat in terms of building a 'third force' in South Africa along the lines of Renamo. As Nelson Mandela has rightly pointed out, "what is happening now is to extend the activities of Renamo to South Africa" (Mozambique Information Office News Review, September 24 1990).

The Askaris, an assassination unit exposed by Captain Dirk Coetzee and others, falls under the control of the Security Branch of the South African Police. Again, the Security Branch functions in total secrecy outside usual police command structures. The security police have been responsible for some of the worst police atrocities, especially the torture of ANC supporters. Although some of their most overt repressive actions have ended, there is no public indication that the nature of the branch has changed. In June, Brigadier Stadler declared: "There can be no question of cuts in the staff of the Security Branch" (*Star* June 16 1990).

Ultra-right

The ultra-right has a presence in many sectors of the security forces, and AWB leaders openly boast that they have the loyalty of much of the police force, army commandos and other structures. It was reported in the *Weekly Mail* of February 9 1990 that 75% of white police in the Transvaal are reliably estimated to align themselves with the Conservative Party or the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. SADF weapons have been found in the possession of right-wing terrorists, and it is clear that shadowy extremist groups are intent on sowing disruption by indiscriminate killings and assassinations.

The state has done little to stop right-wing paramilitary groups, allowing them to parade, train, patrol neighbourhoods and openly bear arms. Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok has refused to act against them, proposing instead

that they join the police reserve or the commandos. In its submission to the meeting with the government on October 10 1990, the ANC accused the government of "double standards," in that the security forces have clamped down on Umkhonto We Sizwe, while allowing ultra-right paramilitary groups freedom of action.

Police actions

In January 1990, De Klerk called together the 500 highest-ranking police officers and told them that he wanted the police out of the "political battlefield." The police, he said, would no longer play a "control function connected to a specific political policy," but should concentrate on "ordinary crime prevention" (*Star*, January 29th 1990).

The police appear to have taken little notice of this injunction, especially in smaller towns and rural areas. Throughout 1990, there have been countless attacks by the police on peaceful demonstrations and meetings throughout the country. The police have often acted apparently without the slightest regard for the doctrine of 'minimum force', opening fire with teargas, rubber bullets, shotguns, rifles, pistols and any weapon that comes to hand. Even the government Goldstone Commission, which investigated the killings at Sebokeng on March 26, concluded in its report that there was no justification for "the indiscriminate shooting by 30 policemen into (a) crowd at Sondela Gate in Sebokeng, which resulted in at least 161 people injured and five dead from gunshot wounds."

The result of this police violence has been an unending toll of dead and injured people. For example, according to monitoring carried out by the Human Rights Commission, between February 2 and August 31 at least 258 people were killed and 2 957 injured in police violence. These totally excluded Natal and the violence in the Transvaal involving Inkatha, because of the impossibility of separating out police violence from vigilante violence (HRC Area Repression Report, August 1990).

Instead of reducing the lethal force available to the police, in September the government an-

nounced Operation Iron Fist in the Transvaal, which further militarised the police and gave them greater powers. Amongst other things, police were authorised to mount light machine guns on their armoured vehicles.

The NEC of the ANC resolved at its meeting in September to conduct a national campaign to achieve greater public accountability on the part of the police and other security forces. The NEC called for:

- ★ An independent review body to investigate complaints against the police,
- ★ A publicly drawn up code of conduct for the police,
- ★ The demilitarisation of police units, and a limitation on police arms and weaponry.

Transforming the security forces

There are clearly urgent security matters which need to be attended to by the democratic movement as a whole. Some progress has already been made in the campaigns launched by the ANC. Agreements have also been reached with the government to open up channels of communication between the ANC and the police on a local level, and some local initiatives have been taken.

Over the years, COSAWR has played an important role within the liberation movement in helping to crack open the shell of secrecy surrounding the SADF in order to assess its strategies, organisational and operational principles and strengths and weaknesses. This work needs to be developed, and directed towards the transformation of the security forces to suit a democratic system.

A broad framework for this transformation, which must include the integration of MK and the SADF, was drawn up at the Lusaka conference in May. It was agreed that the new security forces should be non-racial, democratically accountable, fully professional, representative and under civilian control. COSAWR has for many years worked towards this objective, and though the role of the organisation as a structure in exile has come to an end, its supporters are returning to South Africa to assist in the process of democratic transformation.

RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATISATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING

By Solomon Kotane

The recent controversial appointment of the so-called Task Force by the South African Minister of Home Affairs, Gene Louw, ostensibly to investigate broadcasting and to look at options such as restructuring and privatisation, are indicative of the hidden agenda of the South African regime. Arguably, one may not be receiving the signals correctly. But, for a combination of reasons, there is a legitimate suspicion among the democratic groupings, who demand the disbanding of the Task Force as well as the appointment of an independent council to monitor the coverage of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) during the "negotiating period."

The prevailing climate of uncertainty and distrust emanates from a long history of media clamp-down and manipulation by the successive white governments. It is not simply a matter of excessively hyping wolf too soon and too often. Let us look at the turbulent scenario around the latest SABC machinations.

Of particular interest is the tinkering by the government with the pillars of broadcasting legislation. The Radio Act of 1952 and the Broadcasting Act of 1976, which put broadcasting under the control of the government, remain intact. The government has used the Radio Act to limit broadcasting licences, and has thus exercised control of the airwaves — granting licences to services in the homelands, and to big business.

The Broadcasting Act, meanwhile, established the SABC as a public corporation, defined its powers and activities, and provided for its financial support and the system of authority by which it is administered.

The composition of the secret task group is also a serious cause for concern. For all intents and purposes, the inclusion of the National Intelligence Service (NIS), the South African Defence Force (SADF), the Departments of Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs in the 'expert' team, reveals the service obligations and duties expected from any other government institution. Despite farcical

arguments by the spokesmen of the regime, that the exercise would result in an honest and unbiased appraisal of the broadcasting options, it is quite obvious that the hidden agenda of the regime contains a multiplicity of tactics aimed particularly at denying the African National Congress, the likely successor to the national power platform, any meaningful broadcasting facilities.

One may be accused once more of projecting speculation well into the future, but the fear appears real. The spirit of negotiation politics since February 2 demands that the ANC and other democratic organisations in the country be actively involved in the discussions that would lead to the eventual restructuring of key sectors of national institutions. The ANC has agreed to suspend armed actions and to contribute to the creation of a climate conducive to negotiations. But before such a matter of national interest can be resolved, the government unilaterally privatises and deregulates institutions of national and constitutional significance.

The ANC talks about a non-racial, democratic society, which needs to have a broadcasting system that is also non-racial and democratic, and assists in the development of a new society for all. If the government is serious in being a partner in the peace process, or is to meet the challenge of

being part of a new, non-racial and democratic society, it must participate in an open and public debate on the future of broadcasting — both in the transitional stages and in the post-apartheid South Africa. In my view, the government is not prepared at all to relinquish control over such a strategic institution as the SABC.

The Chairman of the SABC Board, Professor H C Viljoen, points out, in his reply to the memorandum recently submitted to him by the South African Association of Democratic Journalists, that the task force has to investigate technical and specialised aspects of broadcasting rather than political, constitutional or social issues. He also claims that the shared corporate values, supported by management and staff at the SABC, include the following:

- ★ sound, fair and ethical practices,
- ★ respect for the individual,
- ★ openness in all relationships,
- ★ pride in being a responsible broadcaster,
- ★ positive South Africanism, and
- ★ priority of corporate interests.

Elsewhere in his quasi-scientific response, Professor Viljoen curiously notes that, "any healthy, responsible organisation should continuously evaluate its environment of operation — technologically, economically and socio-politically — and adjust to the market forces if it wishes to maintain its strategic excellent position. This takes place against the background of a universal position..." By the way, Mr Viljoen is a professor in electronic engineering. He served as chairman of the previous Task Group, whose recommendations included increased or closer working relations between SABC and the state, in an attempt to flush out what the SABC notoriously called "terrorist onslaught."

Scanning through what Mr Viljoen describes as corporate SABC values leaves most of us, including laymen in broadcasting technology, in no doubt that there is no way that serious discussions or investigations in the medium can avoid dealing with the burning socio-political issues in South Africa. Unlike other engineers, the dubious SABC chairman refuses to comprehend that SABC operates not merely as a transmitter of messages, as a disseminator of a neutral web of news and information, but as a producer of highly

selective text and images designed to present a specific view of South African society and the struggles waged within it. He shows the defensiveness of all diehard Afrikaners and the institutions they have erected to sustain minority rule over the black majority.

The role now being played by Professor Viljoen resembles that of a dishonest marriage counsellor, who seeks to arbitrate in a dispute between a married couple, who are from time to time unfaithful to each other, but who have found it easier to carry on and live with the existing arrangements, because any alternative would be worse. Disruption is anyway difficult and awkward; it consumes time and energy. But there sometimes comes a moment when such a relationship seems false, or strikes observers as dishonest and mutually exploitative.

Is this actually the way the parties want to live? Perhaps it is, but they must say so openly. This is the moment when the marriage counsellor walks in, observing that all is not well. That is the part now being played by Professor Viljoen and his Task Group. This, then, is the time when we must all say what we think the relationship has been and should be — all of us, the SABC people, non-SABC people and the politicians.

It is not enough for the National Party to put upon the broadcasters, including broadcasting technocrats like Professor Viljoen, the burden of justifying existing arrangements; they, too, must put the case, whether for continuity or change. The issue here, we hope Professor Viljoen will take note, is not one of technology or economics only, but also of politics, of how as a society we wish to use our joint resources and collectively manage our affairs. All the technology and time-shifting in the world will not bring more than 24 hours in the day. The fact is that the SABC has, since its inception, served as an ideological state apparatus, and this most certainly continues to be its role — especially that of creating the illusion of social cohesion and political integration in the midst of difference and disintegration.

It is not simply a question of the SABC bowing to political pressure from the National Party; the SABC is itself a product and producer of political pressure. It is both subject to, and capable of exerting, political pressure. The

primary fault of the spirited defences of the SABC, conducted by confirmed and dedicated Afrikaner technocrats like Professor Viljoen, is that they fail to acknowledge that it was from the beginning bound up with a programme of prejudice and racism, both political and national. It was not merely susceptible to sporadic interference from specific political groupings, but was precisely a profoundly political organisation marked as much by its outcasts as its broadcasts.

The memorandum of the Campaign for Open Media (COM), which was virtually rejected by the SABC chairman, notes among other things that broadcasting is a powerful communication medium which can manipulate people's thoughts and feelings about the world. Again, that the history of broadcasting in South Africa is a history of how the white population was manipulated into believing in white racial supremacy, and how blacks were manipulated into accepting their subordination as something natural.

COM warns of a disastrous ending if this phenomenon is allowed to continue. They further argue that a 'free' society will need a broadcasting system that is both critical and independent. Neither the government nor the private sector should be allowed to dominate broadcasting in a future South Africa. This approach seems to be in consonance with the general sentiment among democratic trade unionists, who feel that trade unionism — which supports workers' popular causes — must not be subordinated to any party that will eventually rule South Africa. The practical achievement of this tantalising democratic principle still remains the subject of open and public debate.

When COS recently marched on the SABC in order to demonstrate their concern about developments in the public broadcasting sector, they correctly called upon the Minister of Home Affairs, Gene Louw, who appointed the secretive Task Force to disband it and halt any unilateral restructuring of broadcasting by the government and the SABC. Their demands and proposals seem to portray, across the spectrum, the general grievances of all democratic people and organisations throughout South Africa. I am convinced that to support these ideals would ensure a brighter and a democratic future for the people

of South Africa. They are as follows:

Demands and proposals

1. We demand that the restructuring of broadcasting takes place on a democratic basis and not over the heads of the people of South Africa.

1.1 We therefore call for the government-appointed task force to disband, and for a halt to any unilateral restructuring of broadcasting by the government and the SABC.

2. We call for the establishment of an independent board to ensure the impartiality of the SABC during the transitional period. The SABC should be an impartial broadcaster. However, the corporation's attempts at impartiality have not been satisfactory. Various organisations and individuals continue to be misrepresented. Because the government appoints the SABC board, the corporation's impartiality cannot be guaranteed. It is therefore critical that those who have been systematically excluded from broadcasting have some say over its control during the transitional process.

2.1 Section 10 of the Broadcasting Act of 1976 can be used to establish an independent advisory board to ensure the impartiality of the SABC during the transitional process.

2.2 The Minister is empowered by Section 10 to appoint advisory boards to advise the SABC board with regard to programmes broadcast by the corporation.

2.3 The method of appointment of an independent board and its composition should be negotiated.

2.4 An independent advisory board should be seen as an interim measure. Both the Radio Act 3 of 1952 and the Broadcasting Act 73 of 1976 need to be reviewed and amended as part of the constitutional negotiation process.

3. We call for the SABC to allow unions to organise freely within the corporation and to have access to SABC employees.

3.1 There is a common perception among SABC employees that the corporation's management does not tolerate freedom of association. SABC employees are often afraid of demonstrating their affiliation to political organisations.

Employees have expressed the view that they may lose their jobs if they join political or union structures. This is not democratic, and infringes international human rights principles.

3.2 We further call on the SABC to make a statement declaring that the corporation respects full freedom of association and will not harass or dismiss any employees on the grounds of their political or union affiliation.

4. We call for the SABC to lift its unofficial ban on films and videos produced by South Africans of different political persuasions.

4.1 The SABC has a history of censoring material on political grounds, and an ideological framework roughly congruent with apartheid has operated within the corporation. This has worked against film-makers who have tried to come to grips with the effects of apartheid on people's lives. A new society needs to be constructed on the principle of freedom of expression, and we therefore demand that the SABC take affirmative action and broadcast films and videos produced by South Africans who have different political views.

5. We demand that the SABC take affirmative action to redress the racial imbalance in skills and responsibilities regarding the production of programmes and the management of broadcasting.

5.1 White broadcasters and managers continue to occupy privileged positions within the SABC. This will prove to be a stumbling block in the process of transition towards a non-racial democratic South Africa, and must be addressed as soon as possible.

6. We call for open debate on the future of broadcasting in South Africa.

6.1 If the SABC is to meet the challenge of being part of a new, non-racial and democratic society, it must participate in an open and public debate on the future of broadcasting — both in transition and in a post-apartheid South Africa. Unrepresentative and dubious task forces with hidden agendas are not the way to do this.

Without doubt, the questions of impartiality and bias during the transition period occupy the centre stage among the campaigners for an independent Task Force. Naturally, these changing circumstances, in which the long-standing broadcasting monopoly by the Pretoria regime is under

challenge, offers a telling index of how senior administrators inside SABC conceive its new role — from sometime paternalistic dispenser of culture to professional honest broker holding the middle ground. This soul-searching phenomenon cannot occur overnight.

Perhaps it is precisely at this stage, where the African National Congress and its allies will have to intervene and set the record straight, specifically by including the Broadcasting Acts in the agenda for talks-about-talks. There is no government in the world, or any political contender for that matter, who ignores the crucial role played by the broadcasting sector.

The ANC demands the total overhaul of all apartheid laws, but with the growing politics of consensus. The agenda will not be satisfactory if Broadcasting Acts are left for the post-apartheid era. Restructuring and privatisation of an institution like the SABC are major constitutional activities.

Sources:

1. Memorandum on the Broadcast Sector in South Africa; the Association of Democratic Journalists/COS, August 25 1990.

2. Response to the ADJ/COS Memo by chairman of the SABC, August 29 1990.

3. InterMedia Journal, March-May 1990, published by the International Institute of Communication.

4. *Weekend Mail*, October 19-25 1990.

5. *South*, October 18-24 1990.

6. *New Nation*, October 19-25 1990.

7. *Weekly Mail*, October 19-25 1990.

8. *Vrye Weekblad*, October 19 1990.

9. *Putting 'Reality' Together*, Phillip Schlesiger, Methuen, 1987.

10. *Mass Communication and Society*, ed. James Curran et al, Hodder and Stoughton, 1977.

11. *Broadcasting and Politics in Europe*, ed. Raymond Kuhn, Frank Cass and Co, 1985.

12. *The BBC and Public Service Broadcasting*, ed. Colin McCabe et al, Manchester University Press, 1986.

13. *National and International Systems of Broadcasting, Their History, Operation and Control*, Walter B Emery, Michigan State University Press, 1969.

INTERVIEW WITH PALLO JORDAN

FROM THE FREEDOM CHARTER

TO A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

Thirty-five years ago, the ideals and aspirations of the South African people were expressed in the Freedom Charter. Now, in 1990, in the course of discussions on the future of South Africa, more aspirations are being articulated. Pallo Jordan, head of the ANC Department of Information and Publicity, spoke to a member of that department in Johannesburg, about the drive towards a post-apartheid constitution.

Is the ANC envisaging a People's Assembly, similar to the Kliptown Assembly?

There have been many forums at which opportunities have been afforded for the testing of opinion and the representation of public and mass opinion. I would not rule out even a referendum for that matter. At this point in time, the ANC has no plans for such a Kliptown-type assembly.

A process is under way to adopt sectoral charters — for example, the Women's Charter, the Workers' Charter. How will these fit into the negotiations process? How will they relate to the new constitution?

Any ANC package has to take account of the views and opinions of the sectoral structures. So that is how they will fit in. For example, it is said that various sectoral structures would like to field candidates for a constituent assembly election. I think that is an issue that can be examined as well.

The Freedom Charter was a product, not just of the Congress of the People at Kliptown, but also of a campaign being waged around programmatic issues, formulating a programme for a new South Africa. What specific campaigns, or campaign areas, can you pinpoint around the Constitutional Guidelines, and how do these relate, for instance, to the sectoral charters?

There hasn't been any big campaign around the Constitutional Guidelines. The Guidelines have been available, and people have discussed them at sectoral and other meetings. It has not been a concerted campaign along the lines of the Freedom Charter, but people have been afforded the opportunity to discuss them. Perhaps what is needed is that they should be more directly linked to specific campaigns. I would say the best suited campaign is that for a constituent assembly, which impinges directly on the issues that the Constitutional Guidelines wish to address.

Is the ANC going into constitutional negotiations as a single organisation, or does it seek to form

a broad front, and, if the latter, which forces do we want to unite behind the ANC? Which forces are we targeting, so to speak?

If one is talking about a negotiating process as being a process which involves talks between the democratic forces and the racist regime about specific issues other than the future of the country, I would say the ANC is interested in creating as broad a front of democratic forces as possible, what one might refer to as the sort of forces that participated in the Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF) at the end of last year; as broad as that.

If one is talking about the constituent assembly specifically, I would say again that the ANC would want to talk in terms of a very broad front as well; but I think one has to bear in mind, in respect to that, that within that very broad front people have very different and problematic proposals. The ANC and those usually referred to as the Charterists are the forces who participated in the CDF. So I would imagine that, for a constituent assembly, adherence to the Freedom Charter would constitute one particular front within the broad constituent assembly.

Is national consensus possible on the issue of a new constitution? To put the question another way, how do you see the prospects for consensus vis à vis the positions of business, Inkatha, PAC, Black Consciousness, AZAPO, the National Party and the extreme right wing?

Obviously, there are views that are irreconcilable in the spectrum you have mentioned. The extreme right wing is racist, fascist; its politics are completely incompatible with those of the ANC; there is no possibility of a meeting of minds there. Equally, I would have thought that the policies of the National Party are not reconcilable with those of the ANC. But I think there is a growing confidence around a decisive number of political currents in South Africa, and there is a possibility of resolving the problems of our country through a peaceful negotiating process.

I think that, to the extent the consensus grows, that becomes possible. The consensus doesn't

have to include all shades of opinion; there is no way in which you can be able to bridge the gulf between ourselves and the National Party in terms of how we see the future of our country; there's a huge gulf. But in so far as we can agree to resolve these problems by negotiation and peacefully, yes, I think that is important, and we should work to achieve it.

There are the people at the far right who are, first of all, uninterested in the peaceful process, let alone interested in a solution to the country's problems. They want to mire South Africa internally in the muck of apartheid and racialist regulations.

The objective that we strive towards is a consensus in which the overwhelming majority of South Africans recognises the new constitution as legitimate. But I think that, in the context of what we are trying to do, there are certain groups which we can write off as incorrigible. I don't think the far right cares one way or another how many people support a democratic constitution in South Africa.

Are you saying that, if you can't reach consensus, you proceed nonetheless, or you try to reach consensus with those people before you proceed?

As things are presently constituted, there is no way we are going to reach consensus with the far right about democracy. They are opposed to it. Their basic politics are in opposition to democracy.

Are you saying that you set your sights on seeking consensus among those groupings which broadly accept the concept of democracy?

Yes.

What, specifically, would be the areas around which you would seek consensus? You have indicated two so far: broad acceptance of the negotiations process, and acceptance of the constituent assembly. But what specific motivation, so to speak, would you give for the need for a new constitution?

Everyone, even the far right, recognises that the

country is in very deep crisis. The far right says that the cause of the crisis is that South Africa is moving away from apartheid towards democracy; we say the cause of the crisis is apartheid; but everyone recognises the country is in a crisis. That is the primary motivation for a new constitution.

I would say that another thing we need to have consensus about is that everyone will respect the outcome of the constituent assembly elections and will respect the constitution, once that constitution has been accepted and drawn up by the constituent assembly.

How would you relate that motivation for a new constitution to the basic clauses of the Freedom Charter and to the Guidelines?

If the ANC gains an overwhelming majority in the constituent assembly elections, let's say a 75% majority, obviously the constituent assembly will reflect that fact very strongly. In its deliberations, the constituent assembly will tend to reflect that ANC overwhelming predominance, and the outcome of its deliberations will be a constitution that very closely resembles the thinking of the ANC. It's in that sense that these things relate to each other. If the ANC loses, and you get the National Party, let's say, with a 75% majority in the constituent assembly elections, the results would be the direct opposite. If it is some sort of stalemate, then the constitution will reflect that as well.

The National Party — or at least De Klerk — seems to be saying that all other forms of struggle should give way to the negotiations process, should be collapsed into it. You have said that, whether we have a democratic constitution or not, the people still retain the right to struggle. If groupings on the far right are going to be engaged in their form of struggle, aimed at wrecking the consensus, at reversing the peace process, do you foresee a situation in which the broad democratic forces, the masses, will still be making their demands, campaigning and struggling on other fronts? What influence will that have on the question of reaching a consensus?

There is no oppressive government which does not prefer people not to struggle. The National Party would prefer us not to struggle. I think it has learned, after much trial and tribulation and at great cost to our country and ourselves, that there is no way it will persuade the people not to struggle, and it has come to accept that struggle as reality. But of course it keeps hoping against all hope that it can persuade people to struggle along lines that it finds comfortable and acceptable.

I think we can ignore that, for that is wishful thinking. We will struggle as we have always struggled, as we see fit. Their wishes and qualms about what we are to do are completely irrelevant to what we see as necessary. We cannot have the enemy prescribe for us what methods we should use to overthrow him.

The ANC has a Constitutional Committee which produced the first draft of the Constitutional Guidelines. How is it currently composed? What is its current position? What are its functions?

Its task is first of all to undertake work relating to constitutional matters for the organisation. It drew up the Constitutional Guidelines and piloted these through the organisation. Now it is engaged in looking at various options for the shaping of the South African constitution. It is also engaged in examining a number of options for the restructuring and reform of the South African judicial system. Legislation, administration, executive, judiciary, tax base — it's looking at all those issues.

This involves a certain amount of research, some amount of consultation, and so on. In the Constitutional Committee, there are quite a number of people who are trained in the law and who have got specialist knowledge, and also a number of non-specialists, people who have always had an interest in these issues, and who can contribute to the work of the Committee.

What is the specific brief of the Centre for Development Studies?

The Centre for Development Studies is a

research and training capacity which has been developed by the democratic forces of this country. It was initiated by the ANC, and its purpose is to co-ordinate developmental research, policy research, to map out the future of a democratic South Africa.

There are quite a number of policy research institutions and centres for policy studies in South Africa. How does the policy research of the ANC differ from and compare with the research being done by the other institutions?

The policy research of the ANC is informed by the Freedom Charter and the struggle of the people, and is viewed as being answerable and accountable to the people of South Africa engaged in struggle. I can't speak for other research institutions. I would say the one big difference is the extent of endowment. Other policy research institutes are very, very well endowed in terms of monies made available to them by various funding agencies, foundations and so on. The ANC is much less fortunate in that respect, and that is because the sort of constituency that the ANC represents is in the main propertyless, poor people, whereas many of these other policy research outfits might be linked to constituencies that are very, very well endowed with funds.

You said once that one of the considerations in drawing up the Freedom Charter was, as you described it, architectural, to try to shape the future. What may be described as an architectural approach has sometimes been found to smack of rather managerial, technicist elements. What steps and processes does the ANC use in its policy research work to obviate that tendency?

The only thing to obviate it is the sort of political culture you have within the ANC. People in the ANC and the sorts of researchers that work within the context of ANC policy research are people who consider themselves answerable to the people of South Africa, and are reared in a specific political culture which always places a great deal of stress on accountability, and also loyalty to a certain political perspective. I would say that that, in itself, serves to obviate a very

technicist, managerial approach. One needs to develop in one's style, and in policy research and its methodology, mechanisms whereby there is a continual dynamic feedback from the mass of the people, so that you don't move away, or in directions that run counter to their interests.

You also said once that some of the rights and goals that we aspire to, like the right to health, requires that there be in existence an infrastructure in which they can be realised. Is the ANC thinking of developing an infrastructure, a base, which would provide backup to the whole process of policy development, the whole process of getting feedback on the Constitutional Guidelines, piloting the Constitutional Guidelines, looking at the specific issues that are raised, and so forth? Is the ANC applying its mind to these questions?

Well, I can't say that creating the opportunities for feedback have proceeded as far as one might want. In terms of feedback received on the Constitutional Guidelines, I'd say the sorts of centres that have paid the closest attention to them are very limited in number. It's not as if the document has reached every conceivable constituency in our country. One hopes that with the establishment of ANC regional structures throughout the country the process will be speeded up. Till now, the ANC has relied on organised centres and formations outside itself to afford their particular constituencies a chance to discuss the Guidelines and assess them. It has not been able to supervise and lead the sort of process itself. With the creation of legal ANC structures, I think we will have to ensure that those sorts of opportunities are increasingly taken advantage of, and, if not taken advantage of, created.

You said that the Constitutional Committee and the Centre for Development Studies are distinct, and the CDS does not function under the Constitutional Committee. How does the policy connect with, or relate to, the whole constitutional process? Or, specifically, what policy are we looking at? Are we looking at organisational policy or policy matters which may also have a

bearing on a developing democratic constitution?

I would say myself that CDS policy research is aimed at equipping a democratic South Africa with a whole series, a whole range, of options, so that it is interconnected with what the Constitutional Committee of the ANC is intending to do: that is, to arrive at a democratic South Africa.

To sum up: what general comments would you like to make on the theme of: From the Freedom Charter to a democratic constitution?

The Freedom Charter was part of the struggle, and was conceived as an instrument of struggle. It was drawn up as a result of a political educational campaign; educational in the sense that we had hundreds of volunteers going out into the rural areas, into villages, into people's homes, into factories, into other work places, and communicating with the grassroots of our people at a very intimate level.

During that process, the people participated in the Freedom Charter campaign, became better acquainted with realities of oppression in South Africa, what it meant for all the people in our country. At the same time, they were able to bring the message of the ANC to our people at those various levels. In the process of doing that, you are not only educating yourself, you are educating the people. You are not only going to know what the people's demands are, but you are also, in the process, teaching the people that there are expectations which they have never even dreamed of, which are expectations they should rightfully have.

Having then achieved what we had set out to do at the Congress of the People, that is, create a very representative gathering of the people of South Africa, to draw up the Freedom Charter, we used the Freedom Charter as an instrument of enlightenment, placing before the world, and our people in particular, a vision of the new South Africa towards which we strive. And, as such then, the Freedom Charter became an instrument of the struggle.

I would say the most important lesson in relation to that is that, just as the Freedom Charter

was an instrument of struggle, the democratic constitution towards which it was striving is the result and the product of struggle. It's not something that is going to come about because of an agreement, a gentleman's agreement, in a smoke-filled room, between one set of politicians and another. It's not going to be the result of wheeling and dealing, at some conference table, between one set of politicians and another. It's going to be the outcome of hard-fought struggles by the majority of our people. At this time, especially, we need to maintain our vigilance, must maintain and expand our struggle around all fronts, because it is only through that struggle that we are going to be able to move from the Freedom Charter to a democratic constitution.

As you said, the Congress of the People was a congress of the people of South Africa. The Constitutional Guidelines have often been referred to as the Constitutional Guidelines of the ANC. I suppose this is partly because they were specifically the initiative of the ANC, but in another sense one gains the impression that they are perceived as just belonging to the ANC. How does the ANC intend the Guidelines to be received? Are they just meant for ANC constituencies, like the ANC membership, its allies in the mass democratic movement, just for a layer of activists? How does the ANC intend the Guidelines to be seen?

The ANC has, I think, made clear that the Guidelines are called the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines because they come from the ANC. The Freedom Charter came from the Congress of the People, which was a completely different process. But we have always said that the character of the Constitutional Guidelines is that they are a draft, subject to amendment, amplification, even rejection for that matter. So we don't expect them to be received by, and to be the property of, only ANC members and activists, or the ANC and its allies. We expect them to be the property of the people of South Africa, to discuss them, to amplify them, to accept them, to reject them, to amend them, as they see fit.

PENSIONS IN A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

By Norman Levinrad

The ANC-COSATU Harare Conference, entitled "Recommendations on a Post-Apartheid Economic Policy" addresses the issue of pensions in a brief manner. It states that the ultimate responsibility for the provision of pensions and welfare will lie with the democratic, non-racial state, and that existing benefit funds be deployed in support of national development objectives. It states that state policy would facilitate such redeployment by providing legislative regulation.

The paper attempts, in order to stimulate a debate on the issue of pensions, to suggest some specific changes to the system of pensions and social security that exist in South Africa currently.

- a) The system can provide an old age pension for every citizen who reaches a specific age, regardless of means or income;
- b) It can provide the pension only for those people whose assets or income fall below some specified limit;
- c) It can require all employers to provide a minimum pension to offset the pension provided by the state;
- d) It can provide a minimum level of protection for all citizens through a state pension scheme, with employer pensions supplementing the state pension for higher-earning individuals.

In the ideal situation, with unlimited funds available to the state, recognising that every citizen has the right to an old age pension, the state would provide all pensions. However, given the intense competition for state funds that will exist, it will be necessary to shift the burden for the provision of pensions on to employers, leaving only those citizens not in regular waged employment to be covered by a state pension

scheme. It would not be in contradiction to the statement of the Harare Conference if this occurs, as long as the state regulates such employer pension plans in a way that ensures coverage, non-discrimination, and sufficiency.

In regulating employer pension funds, the state should not attempt to specify the exact nature of benefits that every fund should provide, but should rather regulate minimum levels of eligibility, benefits, contributions, disclosure requirements, leaving the exact nature of benefits to be negotiated between employers and employees.

These regulations should take as their starting point the principle that every worker has the right to a pension after a lifetime of work. The worker who works for ten different companies over a career has the same right to security in old age as the worker who has only worked for one company. Similarly the worker who works for a small enterprise has the same right to security as the worker who works for a large factory. The regulations promulgated by the state must ensure these rights.

The actual specifics of the regulations will of course be the product of negotiations between the state, employers and workers; however, the

following are suggested:

1. There should be a maximum period of eligibility (one year perhaps) so as not to exclude short service workers, while at the same time recognising that it would be extremely burdensome to employers to have to cover each and every employee regardless of the length of service.

2. Part-time workers who have satisfied the period of eligibility should be required to be covered, with the law specifying the minimum hours of service necessary for inclusion (for example 20 hours per week).

3. All workers of a company who satisfy the above requirement, whether South African citizens or not, should be required to be covered.

4. The law should specify minimum vesting requirements, so as to ensure that workers who leave after short periods of service (for example under five years) are not precluded from receiving employer benefits.

5. The law should require that the ultimate pension is "accrued" during the career of the employee, and should specify minimum rates of accrual. In the design of funds, South African employers have structured benefits in such a way as to protect only those individuals who stay in employment for many years. Funds have historically provided pension funds only to those employees reaching early or normal retirement, while just providing a return of an employee's own contributions (at a below market rate of return) to those who leave employment prior to retirement age. This has had the clear effect of denying pension rights to black workers who historically, due to circumstances imposed by apartheid, do not stay in the employment of one company as long as white workers do. There appears to be a current trend under which funds are providing an accrual of the employer portion of the benefit during the working lifetime; however such accrual usually does not begin until the employee has been in service for five years. Unless regulations specify minimum accrual rates many workers will continue to be excluded from ever earning a portion of the benefits funded by the employer.

6. The regulations should specify the minimum pension benefit or minimum contribution (depend-

ding on the nature of the fund), with these minimums designed to ensure that the ultimate retirement benefit will indeed be sufficient for individuals to live on without becoming a burden on the state.

7. The law should specify that the rate of return paid on the employee's own contributions upon termination of employment should at a minimum equal the rate the employee could have received had the funds been deposited in a bank.

8. All employers who have been in business for a minimum period (six months or one year perhaps) should be required to establish pension or provident funds, or to contract these funds through an insurance company.

9. All other employers who have been in business for the minimum period but who employ less than the minimum number of workers should be required to establish retirement annuities for their workers, jointly funded through a combination of employee and employer deposits. Self-employed workers should be required to establish retirement annuities.

10. All companies must be required to provide their workers with simply written explanations of the funds in the language spoken by the workers, and must be required to provide workers with annual statements of benefits.

11. The retirement age should match the actual age at which employees retire in that particular industry, so as to avoid situations where few black workers ever reach the age of retirement, or having reached that age will not live more than a short time.

12. The law should prevent funds from discriminating either by design or in practice against any group of employees, either on the basis of age, sex or race.

13. The law should require that workers must be equally represented on the boards of pension funds. This will ensure that the design of funds will serve the interests of both parties, and will ensure that workers are satisfied with where "their" money is invested.

14. The state should appoint an ombudsman to oversee the implementation of the regulations and to arbitrate in pension disputes.

15. The law should specify that a certain percent-

tage (perhaps as little as 5%) of the assets of all pension and provident funds be invested in "socially responsible" investments, through specific financial instruments created explicitly for this purpose (for example housing or education bonds).

16. Employees should be able to have access to retirement funds for the purpose of purchasing a home without having to leave employment, through the form of a loan against benefits accrued.

17. It is not enough to specify minimums. The law must ensure that these pension benefits are protected, so that when the worker actually reaches retirement age the money is there. The South African government attempted to tackle this extremely difficult issue in 1981 with the proposed Preservation of Pension Interests Bill, which would have eliminated the right of employees to receive benefits prior to retirement. Black workers expressed their opposition to this bill by striking and demanding back their pension contributions. Trade unions were not consulted as to the contents of the bill.

The preservation of pensions is an issue which few countries have been able to solve effectively. No acceptable solution will be reached unless all parties are involved in these deliberations. It will not serve the interests of the state if, after regulating pensions to ensure that workers receive benefits, the state is in the position of having to provide for the security of a retiree if the pension benefits previously earned by that employee have been wasted. Clearly black workers expect to get back their own contributions with interest on termination of employment. However, incentives could be developed to encourage terminating employees to retain all or part of their benefits or contributions in the fund, for example by providing a higher return if money is left in the fund.

It will not be as difficult to protect the employer portion of benefits, either by requiring the employer to purchase a deferred annuity from an insurance company for the terminated employee; to retain the benefit in the plan until the employee reaches retirement age at which time it is paid as a pension; or to require that the benefits accrued be transferred to the fund

of the worker's new employer.

18. The state should subsidise the funding of these pensions through the provision of tax deductions for the employer portion of the contribution.

Those individuals not in regular wage employment will need to be covered by a state scheme. The details of a state scheme and the method in which such a scheme is funded will need to be the subject of detailed proposals which should be undertaken immediately. However it can be obviously stated that such a scheme must avoid the inequities of the current state scheme. Benefits must be tied at a minimum to subsistence levels and preferably higher. All differences in benefits on the basis of race must be eliminated. There should be no bias in favour of urban dwellers. The administration of the state system must be completely revamped to avoid the dehumanising and humiliating manner in which pensioners are treated. Since the state scheme will only cover those workers not covered by an employer plan, it would be expected that such a system would be funded from general revenues.

The success of a private pension system will depend on factors other than just the specific pension regulations. Pension benefits cannot be preserved until retirement unless there are unemployment benefits for those workers who become unemployed. The success of a state system will depend primarily on the number of unemployed or underemployed people not covered by employer plans, who have to be covered by the state.

By nature, pension funds are tools for the future. The impact of regulations will not be felt for many years to come. Despite the outside factors that can affect the ultimate success of a regulated, mandatory private pension system, and despite the political pressures that may encourage short-term solutions, it is essential to put in place a set of regulations that will ensure the retirement security of both today's and tomorrow's generation of workers.

It is hoped that this paper will elicit responses from all parties involved in pensions in South Africa. It is not meant as a blueprint for the future, but merely as an tool for discussion.

CONTINUING INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL

This is a report on the delegation of South Africans that visited various European countries under the auspices of Association of Western European Parliamentarians Against Apartheid (AWEPA) and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, October 11-22 1990.



The membership of the delegation was drawn from the following organisations: the South African Council of Churches, the Southern African Catholic Bishops Conference, the Black Sash, the Human Rights Commission, the Institute for Contextual Theology, the United Democratic Front, the African National Congress, the Azanian People's Organisation and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania.

The delegation regarded the purpose of its visit as being:

- ★ to inform members of the European Community on present developments in South Africa;
- ★ to urge continuing pressure for profound and irreversible change; and to define what they would consider as "irreversible";
- ★ to emphasise the need for a clear understanding of the obstacles which still lie in the path towards negotiations;
- ★ to seek material support to enable recently unbanned political movements to strengthen their organisational structures, and, therefore, their ability to contribute to the peaceful transforma-

tion of South African society.

It acknowledged that certain changes have taken place: for example, the lifting of the State of Emergency in all areas except in Natal; the unbanning of organisations; and the release of key leaders of those organisations from prison. In addition, the Separate Amenities Act has been repealed, and the repeal of the Group Areas Act and other legislation is to be considered.

However, the delegation stated, before we begin to regard the South African government for these "reforms" we need to be aware of what has **not** changed. The Population Registration Act racially classifies every South African from birth. It then determines through a series of subsidiary laws whether and how a person may own land and housing, and receive state services such as education, health and social welfare.

The delegation summarised the state of repression as follows:

★ No repressive legislation has, in fact, been removed or even been modified. Only the implementation of certain measures has been suspended. The Public Safety Act is fully intact and, in terms of its powers, a state of emergency still exists in Natal, and 19 "unrest areas" have been declared in the Transvaal.

★ The Internal Security Act remains on the statute book in spite of the government's undertaking to review it. Detention without trial under this Act continues on a daily basis: During September 253 people were detained in South Africa (including the self-governing "homelands").

★ Only 156 political prisoners have been released out of between 2 000 and 3 000. Political trials have not been halted, and continue to create more political prisoners. Over 400 such trials have been completed this year and another 300 are in progress.

★ Capital punishment has not been abolished. There are over 300 people on death row, 55 of them for politically related offences. Their position remains precarious, as their lives depend on the retrial of their individual cases.

★ A so-called "consolidated list" contains the names of over 300 persons who may not be quoted.

★ There is a blanket ban on all outdoor gather-

ings unless special permission has been granted.

★ Formal repression as described above, is accompanied by its ever-present and more sinister accomplice — informal repression, the extension of repression into the realms of the semi-legal and non-legal. This manifests itself in the following way: vigilantes and hit-squads who played a dominant role in the recent township violence. Vigilante actions caused the deaths of more than 800 people over the last three months, while hit squads played the role of agents provocateurs. It is in this area of informal repression that there are strong suspicions of the old securocratic elements within the government taking a hand in order to sabotage the negotiation initiatives.

The delegation appreciated that in all meetings so far it had been received with courteous attention and had been assured of an on-going commitment to maintaining the present position on sanctions. However, it was aware that there are moves in some quarters in the European Community to ease the situation in order to "encourage" or "reward" the moves towards the negotiation process. It urged that no changes in the present policy be made unless clear direction is given from within South Africa that such encouragement is appropriate.

It stressed the necessity of listening to the voices of the disenfranchised majority when attempting to define the irreversibility of the change process. It stated that the dismantling of apartheid will be irreversible only when:

a) a constituent assembly, elected on the basis of universal suffrage, has been constituted;

b) sovereign power has been removed from existing apartheid legislative structures and invested either in the constituent assembly or another agreed interim structure; and

c) when a white minority cannot legally reverse or veto the process through the present unrepresentative legislative structures.

It concluded that the continuing support and encouragement of the international community has been and will be essential to the efforts to ensure that apartheid is irrevocably set aside in South Africa and replaced with a system of government which is truly peaceful and just because it is based on democratic processes and enjoys the support of the majority of the people.

RESISTANCE CULTURE, TRANSFORMATION AND THE EXPRESSION OF FREEDOM

This paper was delivered in Glasgow at the Sechaba Festival in 1990 by Mongane Wally Serote



Siphiso "Hotstix" Mabuse at Zabalaza Festival in July this year

As in some other parts of the world, there exist two cultures in South Africa. One culture is that which, while recognising the historical differences of national groups, seeks to build a nation which will bestow on people such knowledge and understanding — a civilisation of co-existence — as will result in the eradication of all forms of deprivation and discrimination on whatever basis. The other culture is that which finally reached bloom in 1948 in our country, based on discrimination, oppression, exploitation and divide and rule, by exploiting the differences of national groups in the country and building a nation dominated by whites.

The latter culture has its roots here in Europe, a continent which, while it historically built and became the guardian of civilisation has, through word and deed, participated in building an exclusive western civilisation which eventually

practised colonialism, racism, oppression and exploitation of millions of peoples in the world. The preservation of so-called "civilised western" standards has resulted in the creation of a "master race" in the world, which is seen as white. There therefore exist in the world, today, in varying degrees and different shades, as in South Africa, black and white cultures.

The basic relationship between these two cultures, throughout the world, and in history, is that of hostility which at times has resulted in war which, in turn, has threatened the eventual existence of human life. This vicious cycle, which hangs like an evil moment of destruction over the world, exists today and is threatening to grow into a process which, as the contractions of the womb before a child is born, can increase the process for a birth to take place, either for a total annihilation of human life or to bestow



Wally Serote back to his roots in Alexandra Township,
Johannesburg

peace and progress on the human race. This moment has as its basis and emergence the development of societies in the life span of humankind. In South Africa this moment is being dramatised through the life and death struggles currently raging there.

It was not through a magic wand, an act of God, or mysterious circumstances that humankind developed from slavery and feudalism to capitalism, and attempted to leap into socialist and later communist societies. The process of this development unfolded for concrete and understandable reasons and circumstances. The processes which contributed to this development, and to life itself, have consistently confirmed one single truth that for life to continue, change must be its constant. It is not possible for backward societies to remain backward, if on discovering

mineral resources, acquiring knowledge to cultivate land, organising communications — through trains, ships, planes, vehicles, phones, faxes, computers — they obey this constant of life. Yet, while it is true that societies have not only developed and defined one of the most honest elements of life — science — societies in general have remained backward in human relations.

Why is it so?

Why is it that throughout the world — Europe or the United States, the Middle East or even on the continents which are inhabited by peoples who are not white — those who are white not only dominate, oppress and exploit, but these backward political, economic and social systems are defended and protected by the West?

The progress of the development of any societies has not only depended on material life, but also, informed by gains it has made and by the rules it defines for relations among individuals within society, has depended on the improvement of the quality of life for all peoples. This is my understanding of the processes which have defined the manner in which history unfolds. It also defines another important aspect of life — culture.

The root of any society is its economic power. The society's ability to utilise its economy to sustain life and to make it worth living depends on how that society engages individual members to participate in the discovery and utilisation of its economy. It is that engagement and participation which contributes to the consciousness of those individuals, an element which puts humankind as superior to all other beings and things in the world. The relationships of individuals, societies and nations in so far as their economic power is concerned, define not only the politics of single societies, but of the world as a whole; it is the politics of both the society and the world which eventually defines the history of those societies and of humankind. It is the basic laws governing the lives of individuals — the administrative structures and organisations enabling individuals to participate in society, the right to vote and its exercise and the organisation and administration — which eventually define their freedoms. It is this organisation of society, coupled with its

economy, which defines its politics.

For over three centuries and a half, the processes to discover and utilise the economic potential of South Africa excluded the majority of the people, who happened to be black. When they were involved in the process it was as inferior beings because of their skin colour, while the minority whites were defined as superior beings, because they happened to be white. This process of discrimination was eloquently articulated through legislation which bestowed the right for whites to appropriate land and all its material fruit. There was also the legislation which defined where each race would live, how it would live and how it would relate with others. Apartheid, an economic system which bestows on white people all natural rights and privileges as it denies these rights to blacks, was enacted within the same national boundaries and sustained through merciless oppression of the blacks, with cultural reflexes to unsheath violence in defence of the rights and privileges of whites. A ghastly crime had been committed in the broad daylight of a century which had experienced a devastating world war.

The Second World War, born out of discrimination, gave birth to a civilisation which gave itself the task of reorganising and establishing a centre for a world community, the United Nations. It had at its disposal the most modern means to save humankind. But humankind as a definition — and history absolves my view — did not include people who were not white. While it did not, the blacks of the world, dispossessed through colonialism, were powerless to remind their white brothers and sisters of their plight.

How else can I interpret the deafness of the various British governments with whom the ANC raised the issue of the plight of the majority of people in South Africa for decades without any result? How else do I interpret the inability of the UN, no matter what the ANC said in that august body to make any significant moves which could have shortened the lifespan of the apartheid system in South Africa? How else do I understand the way the United States, United Kingdom and other European countries exercised their veto power, paralysing the UN from tak-

ing any action which could have contributed to the development of humankind's culture in South Africa? How do I interpret the fact that during the ANC's fifty years of non-violent practice for achieving political rights for the blacks in South Africa, to which the minority regimes of the day responded with bloody violence, we saw no action from the Western powers to stop these regimes?

The answer of the South African people to this impunity and violence of the minority regimes was to pick up arms and fight, through the creation of Umkhonto We Sizwe, as also, it was to create ANC external missions to promote and engage the world community in our struggle.

Today, 78 years after the formation of the ANC, thirty years after waging an armed struggle based on defending the principles of non-racialism, democracy and the creation of a united South Africa, my education and understanding of the world does not equip me to understand and interpret the ability of the United States to impose sanctions as it has on Iraq, when it took the ANC decades to convince that world power and its allies to take this action against regimes which practised apartheid in South Africa, against a political and social system which had been declared a crime against humanity.

Why was it so difficult for the West to take swift action as it has done with Iraq? And this is in no way to justify Iraq's actions against Kuwait! Also, I try to understand why it is that Zionism cannot be defined as a system which must bestow on the Jewish people the right to land, political rights, justice and peace without justifying the creation of conditions of discrimination, landlessness and bloodshed for the Palestinian people. Why has it been possible for certain western countries to support, for example, UNITA and the MNR against sovereign states, the result of which is the rampant massacre of millions of people and the destruction of property on an unimaginable scale? Is it mere coincidence that, in the examples I have given, the peoples of those countries are not white?

I say this tully aware that apartheid, racism and discrimination are also political, social and cultural systems which arise from and seek to perpetuate exploitative economic systems. Still,

as a black man, living in the twentieth century I pose that question: Is it mere coincidence that in the examples I have given above, the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Palestine are not white?

For the record, and also for understanding the current, most complex unfolding scenarios in my country, I wish to state a fact. From its inception, throughout its political record of 78 years and the thirty years of armed struggle which has been guided by its politics, the ANC has been able to shed backwardness and to surge forward in progress in defence of peace.

It was the strategy and tactics of the ANC which in the eighties enabled it to make decisive interventions in the cultural sphere in our country. The ANC has had direct participation and has interacted with various cultural workers in the creation of cultural structures at local, community, regional and national levels. This participation and interaction, while taking place under difficult conditions of illegality, harassment, detention and at times death, sought always to defend and promote democracy and the recognition of the fact that, as culture is the product of people, it is the people of South Africa, regardless of their political affiliation or race, who will and must produce South African culture.

I can therefore say today that a cultural forum exists in my country, which seeks ways and means of effectively destroying, once and for all, the apartheid culture. Various cultural formations exist. At the helm is the National Interim Cultural Co-ordinating Committee, whose principles of non-racialism, non-sexism and democracy forge a working basis between itself and the structures of the ANC. There are other cultural formations in that country which, while not in agreement with all these positions, are nevertheless anti-apartheid. Also, there exist others, which have directly or indirectly emerged from the apartheid system, in the bantustans or within white communities.

It is not to contradict the principle of democracy to suggest that, since the majority of people in South Africa stand for non-racialism, non-sexism, democracy and the creation of a united South Africa, all structures must find ways

and means of engaging this principle fully. Besides, the record of the apartheid system is illuminated by several decades of practice as not only backward, but cruel, evil and bloody. By its nature, the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, while having to practise democracy, in expressing freedom, will become more and more outraged by apartheid.

Somewhere above here, I have indicated that the survival of the apartheid system depends on how minutely the black people there are divided. The separation of races has gone to the extent where shades of white or black sealed the future of families, where some members of families were classified white, and others black, and those who were made black were doomed to the lowest rung of the social ladder in that country. The bantustan policy, one of the pillars of the apartheid system, not only encourages and promotes tribalism — and this policy has numerous collaborators who are not white — but has in fact created economic structures, geographic spaces, and has imposed a tribal future on black people. These exist side by side with the white, Indian and coloured social and political structures which are all kept apart through economic, political, social affirmative action with criteria of either texture of hair, shade of white or black skin colour.

Another objective, at the end of the day, is to exploit mercilessly the African labour force, for skyrocketing profits. These conditions have existed for several decades in South Africa, creating the base for political and economic power among white South Africans. It is these structures which in the late eighties the ANC called on our people to dismantle and render ungovernable. The ANC called on our people to replace these structures with organs of popular power based on non-racialism and democracy, and it is in this period that the apartheid regime unsheathed its sword, which now glitters red with the blood of hundreds of democratic activists, both black and white.

There are two opposing positions, which complement each other, which seek skilful handling, which on the whole will bring the expression of freedom in South Africa. They arise out of two contradictions: the first is that there exist in our

country divisions on race which are artificially created and deliberately encourage hostile national, social, economic and cultural groups; the other contradiction is that there exists a significant stratum which is poised for non-racialism and democracy, having earned these principles through a bitter life and death struggle. Between and within these positions are various options. It is how the best options are sorted and chosen, are put into practice and defended, which will bring about the transformation of that society, and its expression of freedom. In the process of doing so, our society will produce dynamic people, since each one of us will sense freedom and will be experiencing it for the first time in centuries. Opportunists will mask their fears of losing privileges, and will seek to protect narrow interests, as they find out that freedom for all places responsibility not only on society but also on individuals. And also, viewed in this respect, freedom can be a burden. This implies that democracy is not supple or brittle but is firm and uncompromising in its expression of freedom.

F.W. de Klerk departed from a long-standing apartheid policy of "total onslaught" and opted for dialogue in putting change on the agenda of our country. The ANC, using its experience and understanding that there is no record which shows that any of the apartheid regimes has been able to abide by agreements, laid, as a condition of dialogue, the Harare Declaration, which sought to commit the apartheid regime to put in motion a process which is "irreversible", which can involve all our people to destroy apartheid for ever, and to create a climate for the participation of every South African in deciding on how to build a liveable South Africa for all its people. This in itself is both an expression of contradiction and of freedom. The apartheid regime must be given a chance to choose to move away from apartheid, but the ANC has no choice; it must proceed in a straight line to set freedom in motion. That is the expression of democracy and it is also the expression of freedom. Outside of this exists conflict.

The events I have cited above do have a direct bearing on a culture of people. If culture cannot exist without people, without an economic, political, social and historic base, it is therefore in-

separable from these human activities, and does not only reflect their state, but actually influences human activity.

It is my view that the existence of the ANC in South Africa, and all similar organisations in other parts of the world where national liberation struggles are being waged, together with the various institutions, movements and organisations, like the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Europe, are, at the end of the day, cultural movements which seek to create the basis for co-existence, tolerance, progress and peace in the world. It is when the peoples who participate in these struggles at national and international levels produce culture, that transformation will take place. While historical events indicate that the expression of freedom does not necessarily mean it will be peaceful and progressive, the guarantee does exist that if fascism, racism, sexism and others of those backward elements raise their heads as they do and have done during intense and extensive moments of transformation and expression of freedom, means and ways can be devised by democratic movements throughout the world to isolate and destroy them without creating conditions for their going underground. In an era of disarmament, and co-operation among the superpowers, in a world which is being shrunk by means of co-operation and self-knowledge of peoples, this is a possibility — and the Sechaba Festival is a clarion call to that.

It is when the peoples of the world, black and white, poor or rich, can evolve a culture which is colour-blind, which reflects and influences each one of us to hate poverty, to be tolerant of those who are different from us, and to come to terms with the fact that it is no longer just a saying to speak of "a small world", but a reality, that the space for fascism, racism, sexism will be reduced, and a civilisation of co-existence can find root in the world. However, our history as humankind, and our experience in organisation and mobilisation work, does inform us that while life cannot be life without constantly changing, implied in this truth is that struggle is the constant of life. Finally, may I say: let there be many Sechaba Festivals and let them forever increase in size and scope, and the period between them must forever become shorter.

POVERTY AND INEQUALITY

ECONOMIC REALITY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION

In October, the ANC released its draft economic blueprint for debate within the organisation. It does not represent an agreed policy, but is seen as a contribution to the democratic process of formulating its economic policy. Proposals put forward for discussion in the document flow out of two workshops held in Harare between April and May and then in September. Below is a summary of the policy document. It first appeared in the *New Nation*, an alternative democratic newspaper published in South Africa.

Given the levels of poverty, inequality and economic stagnation, the ANC argues for the "fundamental restructuring" of the economy. It points out that the vast bulk of productive resources are concentrated in the hands of a tiny minority within the minority white community. On the extent of poverty and inequality, it points to the richest 5% of the population owning 88% of all personally-owned wealth.

The country is also landed with a 30% unemployment rate, with 50% of the population earning less than the minimum subsistence levels. The ANC adds that over 40% of rural African and 15% of rural black children suffer from malnutrition, according to 1985 figures.

But poverty and inequality are only one aspect of the economic reality that South Africa has to confront.

According to the ANC, the economy has stagnated since the mid-1970s. In the decade 1960-1970, the economy grew by an average of 5.8% a year. Between 1970 and 1979, it grew

by only 3.1% each year. Between 1975 and 1982, the growth rate fell to 1.9% a year, and between 1983 and 1989, the economy grew by an average of only 1.4% a year.

These rates of growth are below those of the country's population, estimated to be growing at between 2.4% and 2.8% each year. This means that, in recent years, the average income per person has actually been falling.

A national development strategy based on the perspective of a mixed economy is needed to remedy these economic ills, the ANC argues in its paper.

Here we publish an abridged version of that paper.

1. National development strategy based on the perspective of a mixed economy

The ANC basic perspective is that of a mixed

economy in which all sectors contribute towards defining and achieving broad national goals and objectives for the benefit of all. The task confronting us requires action, not only by central and local government but also by the trade union movement, co-operative and community organisations, women's and youth organisations, civic associations and business — all of which have an important role to play.

2. The overall goals of economic policy

The current plight of our country's economy demands an economic policy prioritising, as a matter of extreme urgency, the achievement of the following broad objectives:

- ★ Creating new jobs and progressively eliminating unemployment;
- ★ Raising real incomes;
- ★ Increasing output and productivity to meet the basic needs of the majority of the people;
- ★ Correcting racial and gender imbalances;
- ★ Implementing a land reform programme — responding to the acute land hunger, and increasing food production;
- ★ Developing major new housing, education, health and welfare programmes;
- ★ Promoting greater democratic participation in economic life and a more equitable pattern of economic ownership;
- ★ Creating a more democratic industrial relations framework;
- ★ Guaranteeing high standards of administration in economic affairs, and ensuring that destabilising financial imbalances (for example, unmanageable budget and balance of payments deficits) do not occur;
- ★ Promoting new forms of involvement in beneficial international economic relations, and co-operating with the OAU and SADCC.

3. Key elements of a national development strategy

The ANC believes that among the elements

essential to the formulation of a national development strategy are the following:

3.1 Using redistribution to satisfy basic needs and create new patterns of demand

A massive new injection of finance will be required to meet basic social needs in such areas as welfare, housing, health and education. At the same time, it will be necessary to avoid inflationary spending policies.

3.1.2 Welfare and pensions

The future democratic state would bear ultimate responsibility for the provision of welfare and pensions.

3.1.3 Housing and social services

The provision of sufficient affordable housing would be a national priority. A public housing sector, providing low-cost rented accommodation, has an essential contribution to make. A future democratic government would also need to investigate the possibility of using prescribed asset regulations to encourage financial institutions to make a portion of their funds available to finance low-cost housing projects.

3.2 Turning the industrial sector into an engine of growth through redistribution

The first priority of industrial planning would be to ensure that new productive capacity emerges to meet the new demands for basic needs in food, housing, welfare and so on, created by redistribution.

Industrial policies should, secondly, aim at transforming imbalances between blacks and whites, men and women, between urban and rural areas and between regions.

An alternative industrial strategy would, thirdly, need to overcome the current extreme dependence of the manufacturing sector on imports.

The scope for the development of small-scale enterprises needs to be recognised, and a future democratic state would need to establish an agency to support and direct such ventures.

3.3. Husbanding our mineral resources to maximise benefits

The policy of a democratic, non-racial government should aim to enhance the role of the sector as a job creator, foreign exchange earner and supplier of raw materials to local industry.

Given the volatile nature of mineral prices, a policy of stabilising prices through the formation of cartels should be seriously considered. The formation of a State Minerals Marketing Authority would also need to be investigated. Given the wasting nature of our mineral assets, high priority would need to be given to the creation of resources-based industries which add value to mineral products.

Attention would also need to be paid to the demands and needs of mine workers. Consideration would have to be given to the nature and extent of state intervention and ownership.

3.4. Promoting agricultural development and land reform

The ANC has established a land commission to conduct research and mobilise popular participation in formulating a policy of land reform. Priority in such a policy should be given to immediately returning to the land those removed from black freehold land or from plots held under labour tenancy agreements.

Beyond this, the aim of policy should be to ensure that those who benefit from a land reform programme are provided with support to enable them to raise productivity and output.

3.5. Developing our human resources

The content of all education and training programmes in technikons, universities, schools and other institutions will need to be critically examined to ensure that they are appropriate for changing labour market needs and contribute to affirmative action policies.

The current policy of the state to create employment through deregulation and privatisation is not a solution. A democratic state would address employment through public works programmes, retraining, and by the re-deployment

of resources from apartheid-orientated projects into employment-creating activities.

4. Financing the reconstruction

While the end of apartheid will undoubtedly create prospects for renewed inflows of foreign capital, it would be imprudent to rely on injections of resources from abroad to rescue us from the inherited economic plight.

The ANC is of the view that the main emphasis in financing the reconstruction of the mixed economy should be placed on domestic savings. Inflationary financing through money creation should be avoided.

4.1 The capital market

Mobilising domestic savings requires a critical examination of the institutions of the capital market. The current capital market does not sufficiently direct savings into productive activity or into critical areas of infrastructure. Instead, paper chases paper in a scramble for short-term speculative profit. A new government would need to rationalise and restructure the financial sector, and develop new institutional arrangements for both primary and secondary bond markets.

Consideration will also have to be given to the establishment of new state-owned financial institutions, as well as to the transformation of existing bodies in order to direct international and domestic finance to the critical development needs of the country.

4.2 Taxation policy

The other crucial mechanism for mobilising savings for investment is taxation policy.

The present tax burden is carried disproportionately by individuals through both personal direct taxation and indirect taxation. The ANC supports shifting more of the tax burden towards corporations (in part by closing loopholes) and applying the principle of progressive taxation — in which individuals with higher incomes pay proportionately more.

5. The tasks of government in reconstructing the mixed economy

5.1 Formulating a national development plan

Placing the economy on a new growth path will require government to initiate a macro-economic planning process and to co-ordinate the contribution of all sectors and interest groups. The ANC believes that major attention should be paid to involving mass-based organisations in planning the reconstruction, and consulting widely with all significant interested parties. Commandist or bureaucratic planning methods will be avoided.

5.2 Using fiscal policy as a means of promoting growth and redistribution

The state budget is a major potential instrument of redistribution. It will be imperative to recognise the limitations on what can be achieved in this way. A future democratic government would need to avoid running up large budget deficits.

5.3 Turning the public sector into an instrument for development

This does not mean creating large, profligate public corporations and parastatals. They will need to operate within strict budgetary controls and be accountable through democratic processes to government and people.

The ANC is staunchly opposed to the current government's plans to privatise the public utility corporations. Any public utilities which are privatised will be subject to immediate re-nationalisation.

In addition to public utility corporations, it is envisaged that planning processes for different sectors will lead to the identification of strategic enterprises whose role is central to the realisation of development objectives. It could be anticipated that there will be cases where it would be advantageous to have public corporations operating in these areas.

6. The role of civil society

While a future democratic, non-racial govern-

ment will have the duty to lead the restructuring process, other forces in civil society will also have an indispensable role to play if we are to achieve the goals of promoting growth through redistribution.

6.1 Organised labour

The ANC is committed to guaranteeing organised labour a central role in the formulation and implementation of all economic policy.

6.2 The private sector

Private business has a major role to play in the economy of a democratic, non-racial South Africa.

The ANC believes that a future democratic government should actively strive to build confidence within the private sector, and encourage maximum co-operation in pursuit of democratically defined development objectives.

At the same time, the ANC is concerned about a number of features of the currently existing private sector, which remains profoundly marked by its origins in apartheid society. These include: ★ First, the gross under-representation of black-owned business and of black people in senior managerial positions.

Only about 2% of the total assets of the private sector are owned by black people, while over 90% of top managerial positions remain in the hands of whites.

★ Second, the extreme centralisation of economic power in conglomerate hands. Over 80% of the shares traded on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange are controlled by four large conglomerates.

This not only represents a massive concentration of power in the hands of the 1 000 odd white males who comprise the controlling boards of these companies. The conglomerate structure is, in our view, detrimental to the achievement of balancing economic growth in the interests of all the people of South Africa.

Forward to a democratic economy!

LETTERS FROM READERS

Dear Media Workers

I have been a contributor, whenever possible, to the journals of the liberation movement. I have therefore been also a reader of the various journals.

My worry is that in the newly-opened space for 'legal' publications we might make the same mistake we did in exile: that is, allow journals to proliferate without control. There was absolutely no reason for the women, the youth, culture, health or any other section of the movement to have their own journals.

These sections should have contributed to the internal and external organs of the ANC — *Mayibuye* and *Sechaba*. Instead, their irregular production and lack of issues to address regularly meant that the movement could not address certain issues regularly. Again, people who should have been seconded to the main journals were not available to contribute, as they were 'busy' producing the sectional journals. ***We must not repeat these mistakes.***

I am not saying that a wide choice of publications is bad, but that it need not always be a must. South Africa has a myriad of journals presently. Many of them are, of course, of no political consequence, i.e. ideologically, except for the political distraction of their readers. However, the liberation movement must now be prepared to offer steep competition to all established political journals.

As I see it, the first step would be to limit the journals that are published. One journal (preferably) should be built up and made into a household name. People should know that for guidance on the movement's policies they should go to such and such a journal. They should find their favourite columns in this journal — done in such a way that they appeal to them and are not above their level in content and direction.

The second step is overcoming the fear of

breaking new ground. The lifeline of a magazine, newspaper, radio or television is advertisements. Sales are important but they also determine how many more advertisements you will receive as a consequence of your rising or falling sales. As a movement, we have not been advertising, except in the old days of the *New Age*, etc. We must now begin to do so. We must take in all adverts save those that promote the apartheid system or any other similar system like Zionism as practised by the Israeli state against the Palestinian people.

The third step lies in knowing exactly what we want out of our information drive as a movement. If we know that we want to capture the minds and hearts of the majority of South Africans; if we know that we want to transform our popular support into actual membership support; if we believe that our political views are the key to South Africa's future, then we will go all out to spread our information to all corners of our country. In short, we should not be extravagant with our financial resources, and neither should we refuse to spend as required on our information drive.

As far as human resources are concerned, we would have to take on the best within our movement and try as much as possible to take on as many people as the successful publishing of this journal demands. For far too long our journals have relied on a very small staff, assisted by contributors who have other tasks to perform as well. Too often, financial considerations rather than the political have determined our information policy.

I will not go into editorial policy, which would require its own letter or article — time and space allowing. Suffice it to say that I would title it, *Time for an Autonomous Editorial Policy.*

Fred Kamanga

Dear Editor

I wish to add to the helpful article in the September *Sechaba* by Xoliswa Skomolo, in order to widen the discussion. Most of the article is about the education of young people, though she does include "continuing education," but only "for the upliftment, encouragement and professional growth of black teachers."

My task here is to press the case for adult or continuing education for all. Apartheid has so failed the majority of our people that we need to look beyond youth if we are to meet the huge amount of educational need felt and expressed by many of our people, some of whom cannot be considered young.

Continuing education is important for many of our people who have had some educational training but need to supplement it or otherwise

prepare themselves for changing needs. Providers of education will need to consider the implications for a democratic South Africa of an education system for liberation. While the issue of access to education is important and urgent, we must also be constantly aware that the content and delivery of education are also very important. We need also to realise that part of the agenda of education in South Africa, by enabling a minority to succeed, has been to fail the majority. This, however, was done in a way which had the appearance of objectivity, thus compelling that same majority to accept that this "failure" was as a result of their inferiority. When our people rediscover their ability to learn, South Africa will rediscover its vitality.

Pandula

WHERE TO CONTACT THE ANC IN SOUTH AFRICA

ANC NATIONAL OFFICE

Munich Re Centre
54 Sauer Street
JOHANNESBURG 2000
Phone: (011) 834-5301/8
Fax: (011) 834-1019

PWV REGION:

10th Floor
Essenby House
175 Jeppe Street
JOHANNESBURG 2000
Phone (011) 29-6066
Fax: (011) 29-3030

NORTHERN TRANSVAAL:

Office 1 & 2, 1st Floor
Mimosa Building
Market Street
PIETERSBURG
Phone: (01521)
921241/922183
Fax: (0521) 914215/913121

EASTERN TRANSVAAL

37 Promenade Building
Henshall Street
NELSPRUIT 1200
Phone: (01311) 53864
Fax: (01331) 27782

NORTHERN CAPE

Finance House
16 Stockdale Street
KIMBERLEY 8300
Phone: (0531) 812578
(01531) 812583

WESTERN CAPE

Community House
Salt River Road
SALT RIVER
Phone: (021)
417-6806/697-1190
Fax: (0121) 403-4483

EASTERN CAPE

344 Main Street
Standard House
3rd Floor
PORT ELIZABETH
Phone: (041) 555979/443289
Fax: (041) 564337

BORDER

14 Recreation Road
ALICE
Phone: (0404) 31842/
(0431) 43220
Fax: (0431) 43220

TRANSKEI

28 York Road
UMTATA
Phone: (0471) 24671/23178
Fax: (0471) 25651

NORTHERN NATAL

11 Steelway Street
EMPANGENI RAIL
Phone: (0351) 21673
Fax: (0351) 921054

SOUTHERN NATAL

130 Field Street
3rd Floor
DURBAN
Phone: (031) 301-5551
Fax: (031) 301-6611

NATAL MIDLANDS

Davis Alexandra Hse
Suite No 5
145 Church Street
PIETERMARITZBURG 3201
Phone: (0331) 946558/9
Fax: (0331) 427612

SOUTHERN OFS

Tile House Building
22 Fort Street
BLOEMFONTEIN 9301
Phone: (051) 326513
Fax: (051) 352839

NORTHERN OFS

SA Breweries
CNR Ryk and De Kaap Str
WELKOM
Phone: (0171) 41994
Fax: (0171) 74421

REVIEWS

Critical Choices for South Africa, a collection of studies published by the University of Cape Town.

Critical choices for South Africa is a self-consciously ambitious project which sets out to "provide a map for future state policies." Four principal themes have been identified: — the restructuring of the state; addressing the inequalities imposed by our past; managing resources, and devising strategies for change.

Twenty-six authors, representing various disciplines, participated in a project of the same name under the supervision of Robert Schrire of the University of Cape Town. The outcome is the collection of essays under review.

Much has, in recent years, been said and written about the erosion of old-style apartheid. Allister Sparks, the former editor of the *Rand Daily Mail*, after a two-year absence from South Africa, made so bold as to pronounce apartheid, as he knew it, dead. Sparks' enthusiasm was stimulated by the sight of black executives, managers, technicians and administrators in a number of South African corporations. While one should certainly not belittle these developments, it nonetheless remains true that they are a very marginal re-ordering of the racial division of labour.

The concentration of decision-making, managerial, technical, administrative and specialist personnel among whites in both the economy and the state remains one of the inescapable features of apartheid. Owing to the accumulated advantages of decades of racial domination, this is a feature that has acquired a momentum of its own, and is, therefore, likely to reproduce itself even in the absence of statutorily enforced racial privilege, a prospect of which many recent converts to racial-liberalism are not unmindful.

Any radical restructuring of the body politic would place inordinate power in the hands of those who could gain control of the state, we are warned. The objects of power — the direction of state policy — barely receive mention though everyone is keenly aware of them.

Historically, the South African state has played

a central role in the development and evolution of the modern South African economy. Two periods are particularly significant in this respect. The first coincides with the establishment of a countrywide transport and communications system — roughly the 1890s to the end of the first World War. The second was the creation, during the 1920s and 30s, of the country's heavy industry base, particularly the energy sector. The manipulation of the state by the ruling Afrikaner National Party, to assist the development of a specifically Afrikaner fraction of big capital in the context of expanding manufacturing and finance, over the past forty years, represents the substantial continuation of this policy thrust.

The domination of the South African economy by the state's economic position and interventions however pre-dates the ascendancy of Malan's National Party in 1948. Its principal elements include regulation of the labour market through such statutory devices as the 1913 Land Act, the Poll Tax, the Urban Areas Act, and other legislation directed specifically at the African population. State ownership and control over industries at the core of the economy — electricity supply, iron and steel, transport, telecommunications and fertilisers — which themselves became veritable engines for building up capital stocks, invariably enhanced the state's ability to direct the economy. Such state-owned enterprises today account for a high proportion of fixed capital formation in the country, financed by state borrowing from the surpluses generated in the private sector. Latter-day talk of privatisation still has not significantly diminished the state's role in the economy.

Lastly, one has to refer to the ownership and control of the private sector. This has become highly concentrated in the hands of a few large corporate conglomerates such as Anglo-American, South African Mutual, Sanlam, plus about two others. This concentration of economic power owes much to the manner in which capital

was accumulated on the basis of profits from gold mining and the racially exclusive practices, encoded in law, ordinance and in social mores, affecting access to productive property.

In recent years the degree of monopoly ownership in the hands of these large groups has been intensified by their purchase of existing firms in a continuing process of centralisation.

The concentration of ownership is linked to four other phenomena. Firstly, the corporate conglomerates control huge enterprises in all sectors of the economy, incorporating under one corporate umbrella enterprises in gold mining, coal mining, manufacturing, agriculture, banking, finance and commerce. Secondly, the market for many commodities is effectively controlled by one supplier or a small group of suppliers who can act as a cartel. Thirdly, linkages between state and private capital greatly facilitate the state's capacity to intervene in economic development. Fourthly, concentration has fostered a transition from a labour-intensive to a capital-intensive economy.

The handful of token blacks invited on to the boards of Anglo-American and Sanlam demonstrate more sharply the extent of white monopoly over the modern South African economy. The derisory contribution of black business to the South African economy, less than 1% of the GDP, is the true index of its powerlessness.

That black strivings for justice, of necessity, include the issue of economic power should hardly be surprising. An all-pervasive tension, which can barely be concealed by the human ecology of our country, afflicts South African society — affluent white cities serviced by a propertyless mass of blacks, marginalised in ghettos and rural slums. Is it any wonder that the claims of the poor and powerless against wealth and power easily translate into the claims of blacks against whites?

The nine essays on the economy insist that the South African economy is too small to meet the rising expectations of the poor. All of them agree too that it would be ill-advised for the state to intrude itself too prominently in the economy. Few white politicians would have considered this helpful advice when they tried to address the 'poor white problem' of the 1920s and 1930s.

The six authors who take up the issue of inequalities are a little more even-handed in their approach. The most daring among them is Neville Alexander, who attempts to deal with the extremely sensitive issue of language and its place in a future democratic South Africa. That the spread of Latin owed more to the prowess of Caesar's legions than to the Consul's rather inelegant prose style might be a commonplace, but it is one that is rarely recognised when certain languages are relegated as parochial, regional and local. His recommendations for the standardisation of Nguni and SeSotho into two languages rather than six are very radical, but might prove impractical in view of the literatures in each of these languages. There is, nonetheless, food for thought here.

With the exception of Mark Swilling's stimulating exploration of the possibilities created by the political space captured in the process of urban struggles, the authors set out with a prior commitment to uncovering an elusive middle ground that holds out the prospect of a compromise. The fleetfootedness of events has already outstripped the predictions of Herbert Adam, who appears to be sold on the state's capacity to retain power in the teeth of popular pressures from below. Much of what he has written has already been rendered obsolete by homeland leaders, or their military personnel, one after the other, seeking out the ANC. There could be no clearer indication of the fragility of the regime's alliances and it should serve as a timely warning against placing too great a reliance on its black auxiliary forces.

The collapse of the securocrat machinery set up under Botha has however, left in its wake the volatile Natal situation and other local flashpoints where past counter-insurgency strategies dictated that the regime arm and protect auxiliary black forces. Though some acted in pursuance of their own agendas, they nonetheless dovetailed with those of the state. It remains to be seen to what extent such black clients can survive once state protection is either withdrawn or significantly diminished. An imponderable is the role mavericks in the State's security organs can play to maintain them in the field.

Adam might have a point regarding the impor-

tance the regime's constituency attaches to culture, but he cannot explain their political preference for Anglo-South Africans, with whom they have little or no cultural affinity, rather than the Coloureds, with whom they share a language and numerous other cultural traits. Race is clearly the answer. Culture and cultural autonomy are at best polite code words for the obscenities of apartheid.

Since February 2nd, and after the Groote Schuur and Pretoria meetings, it is perhaps unfashionable to speak in terms of revolution in the South African context. The very term conjures up images of enraged masses storming the Bastille or the Winter Palace. However, this is a romantic and poetic image of revolution which has lost sight of political content because of its fixation on drama.

The reluctance (or is it incapacity?) of the authors to deal squarely with the issues of power and powerlessness, superordination and oppression, makes them appear like sloppy researchers, unable to decipher the real meanings behind certain political postures and rhetoric.

The central objective of the movements representing the disenfranchised and powerless

is the transfer of power from the dominant minority to the majority. That entails the creation of a democratic state. As conventionally understood, this means, in the first instance, a government of the people, by the people, for the people. In the South African context it is inescapable that such a government will reflect the numerical preponderance of the blacks, the African people in particular. Will such an eventuality constitute a revolution, albeit without the salvos of the Aurora?

While even the National Party has at last come to terms with the complexion of a democratic state, the major and undisguised fear of the dominant whites is its potential to pursue a socially radical programme. The five contributions on restructuring the state concern themselves with the containment of the powers of the state in the event of democracy. Could this be the result of a shared anxiety to cushion the white minority against the consequences of black empowerment? It would appear that most whites will experience such empowerment as revolution. Until this particular truth is grasped by our academics, there is little hope that South Africa will make the required 'Critical Choices'. —ZPJ

MAYIBUYE

Mayibuye, Journal of the African National Congress, Volume 1, July 1990 and Volume 2, September 1990.

The production and publication of an ANC journal at home in South Africa has been long awaited by ANC members and supporters alike. At last, this has become a reality — and Mayibuye proves to be no disappointment.

There is a great need for such a publication, especially now, as the movement goes about consolidating and strengthening its position inside the country after so many years of being banned. There is also a tremendous thirst among the people for information about the ANC and the current political processes under way in the country. It is also essential for all South Africans to read such publications and information to counteract the

regime's disinformation and propaganda, and to assist them in their political education. Information is strength in the struggle to build a new, democratic, non-racial South Africa.

To many people, the title *Mayibuye* may be new or be associated with the popular slogan, "Mayibuye Afrika!" But to many others it is associated with more than a decade of underground work, where it was produced in Lusaka, reproduced and distributed in South Africa.

In a conference of the Department of Information and Publicity in Lusaka in 1983, the role of *Mayibuye* within the overall ANC information milieu was described as that of organising the organisers. This was not a deviation from the widely accepted view that a newspaper, a journal, is the scaffolding around which mass organisation is built. Rather, it was facing up to the reality that

with our limited resources and objectively difficult conditions of distribution, we could not reach the masses in a very significant way. But we could reach our organisers, and we did. So the role of *Mayibuye* was to give guidance on ANC policy and campaigns to the movement's underground organisers, who, in turn, went out to organise and give guidance to the people.

Mayibuye is now on the streets of South Africa, and accessible to all the people. It continues to have the same profile, though in a greatly amplified way in terms of content, depth of analysis in the articles and number of subjects covered.

Its strength lies in its immediacy and timeliness. Both issues under review succeeded in covering events which were taking place at the time. Leaders of the ANC were interviewed on very topical issues and in depth. The vast amount of time it took for an issue of *Mayibuye* produced outside the country to reach the organisers inside the country has been eliminated. And the same will happen once subscriptions come in from outside the country. What this portends for local and overseas readers is that information and analysis about what is taking place in South Africa will cease to be a scarce resource.

These first two issues have been excellent in every way. Besides excellence in content and style, what is particularly striking about *Mayibuye*

is its polished and professional appearance. It is well laid out and well illustrated. Clearly, the editorial collective in Johannesburg has access not only to the latest desk-top publishing equipment but also to persons who can utilise these very efficiently.

The very excellence of the journal is cause for further anxiety. Has the standard been pitched too high? Will the collective be able to continue to reach the star it has touched?

The answer is yes, the standard can be maintained. And, through the maintenance of this standard, the projected goal of the ANC of organising into its paid-up ranks more than a million people, will be speeded up. And, if or when an ANC newspaper is launched, *Mayibuye* would be there to play its role in educating the supporters and members of the ANC on ANC policy, internally and internationally.

As yet, the articles are not by-lined, but an editorial decision may allow certain pages to be used for discussion articles, and these would be by-lined.

In conclusion, *Mayibuye* has proved to be well worth waiting for, and the R2 in South Africa and £2.00 outside the country well worth paying for it.


— DMS/SM



OBITUARY

FRANCIS MELI

A TRUE SON OF THE REVOLUTION



Francis Meli (whose real name was Allan Welemtsha Madolwana) died only a few months after returning home, ending 27 years of exile. He had left the country in 1963, responding to the call by the ANC. He went to Tanganyika (now Tanzania), which was the first port of call for ANC members before embarking for various countries where they received academic education or military training — both of which Francis received. The organisation sent him to the German Democratic Republic, where he studied and obtained a PhD in 1973.

After completing his studies, Francis went for military training in the Soviet Union in order to prepare for participation in the armed struggle against the racists in South Africa. The struggle has indeed lost a bright and fearless stalwart at a time when he was preparing to participate in the transitional phase towards the practical implementation of democracy in South Africa.

Francis was born in Berlin, a small place between King Williams Town and East London, in 1942, when the whole world was embroiled in a war against Hitler's forces of tyranny, domineering and racism. It was a war in which many blacks participated and died, but blacks were sidelined at the end in favour of the collaborating Afrikaner Nationalists.

He was born of these black people, inherited their sense of justice, their benevolence and forgiving nature; he was groomed by a political movement that was devoid of vindictiveness and revanchist tendencies, a movement convinced of the rightness of its cause, and certain of victory. He was a true son of the revolution.

The last-born in his family, he lost his parents while still very young, and grew up with his brother and sister under the guardianship of their uncle. He went to Welsh High School in East London, where, as was inevitable for a man of his short stature, he played scrum-half, and one day lost his front teeth because another player in the scrummage mistook his clean-shaven head for the ball, and kicked.

Francis went to Fort Hare, the Alma Mater of many of the leaders in the liberation movements in Southern Africa, but he did not stay long there. Responding to the ANC call, he left with other young people in 1963.

He had been actively engaged in ANC activities in East London since his early high school days, belonging to the ANC Youth League and the Volunteer Corps, and witnessing political events that saw East London rising strongly against oppression but transformed by the tyrants into one of the most repressive cities in South Africa.

After completing his studies, Francis went to Tanzania and then for military training. Returning to Tanzania, he was sent to Zambia. He was appointed Umkhonto We Sizwe Political Com-

missar in Angola at a time when hundreds of youth were joining the ANC and opting for military service shortly after the June 1976 confrontations in South Africa. He had to transform the anger of the youth into a disciplined force, apprising them of the power structures that the struggle was facing in the South African political arena. This office was not made any easier by the fact that the organisation did not possess huge financial resources, and could not provide its cadres with more than the bare necessities — a situation which became volatile at times. But Francis, armed with a huge fund of ready wit and humour, was always able to transform imminent angry scenes into political analysis, and, in the process, earned himself the respect of all, including the most recalcitrant malcontents.

The measure of his success as a commissar can be seen in the fact that a large percentage of the members who voted him on to the National Executive Committee of the ANC in the 1985 Consultative Conference were members of Umkhonto We Sizwe based in Angola and Central Africa, who had not had contact with him for more than eight years. In London, he was elected to, and served as chairman of, the Regional Political Committee from 1983 to 1986.

He was appointed editor of *Sechaba*, and sent to London in 1977, where, in the first year, he shared with two others an unused office as sleeping quarters. A highly dedicated stalwart, he threw himself into the arduous work of a journalist, spokesman and leader, and toured Western countries, canvassing for sanctions against South Africa, and soliciting support for the ANC.

Francis had a healthy appetite for debate, with a penchant for anecdote, and his company was quite delightful. His predilection for debate meant that *Sechaba*, during his editorship, was not encumbered by stringent and cramping editorial and journalistic practices that stifled discussion and restricted access.

He was a Marxist, but not doctrinaire, and certainly not a demagogue. What comes out in his writings, speeches and conversations was a pithy, incisive personality with a profound knowledge of the history of South Africa, which came out smoothly, with a great deal of perspicacity but

without affectation.

He avoided the inevitable cabals that result from the frustrated life of exile, and instead devoted his life to the struggle. He wrote his book, *South Africa Belongs to Us*, with the intention of having it published as an official ANC publication, and therefore sought the endorsement of the organisation. But, confronted with four years of bureaucratic inertia, he reluctantly yielded to the suggestion that he 'carry his baby' alone.

He was putting the finishing touches to his second book, on the Comintern and Southern Africa, when he died. It is largely a translation of his German thesis, revised and with a few additions.

He always found time to give personal assistance to many who needed it. One of his chief traits was a kindly disposition, a non-patronising attitude towards all, and his ability to mix and treat all equally. Many turned to him for various needs, and he would find time to help them. His house welcomed all, and he was not selective by political affiliation.

Francis leaves an only child, a son, Phumelele, his grandson, Monde, his brother's wife and her children, and his sister and her children, who all live in East London.

This obituary began by saying that the struggle has lost a bright and fearless stalwart. But what South Africa has lost in the physical being of Francis is compensated for by his writings in numerous ANC books, pamphlets, journals; in *Sechaba*, in *The African Communist*, writing under the pseudonym 'Nyawuza'; and various bulletins and journals throughout the world; his speeches at hundreds of meetings. He has left a greater contribution in his book, *South Africa Belongs to Us*. It was published in 1988 by Zimbabwe Publishing House in Harare — which he chose for its proximity to South Africa, to the people for whom he wrote it and to whom he dedicated his life. There is also the as yet unpublished book on the Comintern, to which we look forward with great expectation.

Hamba kahle qhawe, hamba kahle, Nyawuza.

— *Ralph M T Mzamo*

Sechaba and other ANC publications are obtainable from the following ANC addresses:

Annual Subscriptions:

USA and Canada (air mail only): \$30

All other countries: £12

Please make cheques payable to:

Sechaba Publications c/o ANC PO Box 38 London N1 9PR

ALGERIA

5 Rue Ben M'hidi Larbi
Algiers

ANGOLA

PO Box 3523
Luanda

AUSTRALIA

Box 49 Trades Hall
4 Goulburn Street
Sydney NSW 2000

BELGIUM

PO Box 137
1040 Brussels

CANADA

PO Box 302
Adelaide Postal Station
Toronto
Ontario M5C-2J4

CUBA

Calle 21A
NR 20617
Esquina 214 Atabey
Havana

DENMARK

Landgreven 7/3 t.h.
1301 Kbh Copenhagen K

EGYPT

5 Ahmad Hismat Street
Zamalek
Cairo

ETHIOPIA

PO Box 7483
Addis Ababa

FINLAND

PO Box 336
00531 Helsinki

**FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY**

Postfach 190140
5300 Bonn 1

FRANCE

28 Rue des Petites Ecuries
75010 Paris

**GERMAN DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC**

Angerweg 2
Wilhelmsruh
Berlin 1106

INDIA

50KP Thacker Block
Asian Games Village
Siri Fort Road
Khel Gaon Marg
New Delhi-110049

ITALY

Via S. Prisca 15a
00153 Rome

JAPAN

Square-House Shin-Nakano
Room 105
4-38-16 Honcho Nakano-Ku
Tokyo

KENYA

PO Box 40432
Nairobi

MADAGASCAR

PO Box 80
Antananarivo

NETHERLANDS

PO Box 16657
1001 RD Amsterdam

NIGERIA

Federal Government
Special Guest House
Victoria Island
Lagos.

NORWAY

PO Box 6765
St Olavs Plass
N-0130 Oslo 1

SENEGAL

26 Avenue Albert Sarraut
PO Box 3420
Dakar

SWEDEN

Box 6183
S-102 33
Stockholm

TANZANIA

PO Box 2239
Dar es Salaam
PO Box 680
Morogoro

USSR

Konyushkovskaya Street 28
Moscow 123242

UNITED KINGDOM

PO Box 38
28 Penton Street
London N1 9PR

UNITED STATES

801 Second Avenue
Apt 405
New York NYC 10017

ZAMBIA

PO Box 31791
Lusaka