

SECHABA

official organ of the african national congress south africa



Explosions scatter pamphlets

STAFF REPORTER

FO EXPLOSIONS in Johannesburg yesterday afternoon scattered hundreds of subversive leaflets at Faraday Station and outside the "Daily Mail".

The blast at Faraday Station took place during the rush hour, but none of the hundreds of African commuters was hurt.

An explosive device went off on a nightwatchman's shack at the M1 motorway.

Mr. Samuel Nkomo, a council member, said he had seen a council member guarding a building near the site.

"I was about 100 metres from the explosion, and saw papers shot into the sky and were buried as they fell on the overhead motorway."

Mr. Nkomo said he had seen many suspicious people. A lot of people picked up papers and looked at them, he said.

CARRIER

Leaflet bombs hit Jo'burg

SUNDAY EXPRESS

JOHANNESBURG, AUGUST 16, 1970

PAMPHLET BOMBS NO WIDESPREAD PLOT

From HUGH ROBERTS

LEAFLETS IN OTHER CENTRES

THE distribution of illegal pamphlets was reported from three other centres last night.

THE 'BOMB' WARN POLICE

Blasts scatter leaflets

The Star

JOHANNESBURG FRIDAY AUGUST 14 1970



Policemen recover parts of the two leaflet bombs that exploded in Johannesburg today. Above, left: policemen examine the spot where the bomb exploded at the university — one of them is holding one of the illegal leaflets — and in the other picture police gather parts of the bomb that exploded in Diagonal Street.

"A stunt" — Venter

MORE A.N.C. BOMBS HIT

A.N.C. STILL ACTIVE

ALTHOUGH no further pamphlet-bombs have been reported, the Minister of Police said the explosion in Johannesburg was a warning to the African National Congress that it must stop its activities in South Africa.

Mr. Venter said a total of 10 leaflet-bombs were scattered in Johannesburg yesterday. Most of them were in the areas of the University of the Witwatersrand and the University of Natal. He said that the police were picking up the leaflets, but a number of them were still in the air when they were shot.

Breakfast quip



"Careful—it may contain subversive pamphlets!"

DREA.N.C. BOMBS

TWO "BOMBS" containing illegal pamphlets were exploded in Johannesburg yesterday. One exploded in the foyer of the University of the Witwatersrand and the other in the foyer of the University of Natal.

At about noon a bundle of papers was tossed into the air from a motor car in the city centre. The papers were scattered in the air and many people picked them up. The papers were found to be illegal pamphlets.

Pamphlet bombs explode

SECHABA

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SECHABA

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FIGHTING TALK

The wave of angry protests which swept through many countries, in most parts of the world, directed against the intended resumption of the sale of arms to South Africa by the recently elected Conservative government in Britain has temporarily succeeded in slowing down the negotiations between Pretoria and White Hall.

One fact which is highly significant about these protests is that they are not confined only to government circles. More and more youth have been drawn into the struggle and quite significantly in African countries such as Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Nigeria and elsewhere, militant demonstrations have taken place making various demands, chief amongst which has been a call for the withdrawal of independent African countries from the Commonwealth.

At a demonstration jointly organised at Dar-es-Salaam University by the TANU Youth League and the University Student's Committee on the 29th July, members of our organisation not only participated but our representative made a statement to the demonstrators on behalf of the African National Congress. In Lagos and Kano thousands of Nigerians took to the streets in protests organised jointly by the Nigerian Youth Council, the Nigerian Trade Union Congress, the Nigerian Youth Thinkers Club and the Black Renaissance Movement.

Similar demonstrations were organised by the U.N.I.P. Youth League in Zambia.

Tanzania and Uganda have already declared their intention to withdraw from the Commonwealth should Britain go ahead with the sale of arms.

A meeting of Presidents Nyerere of Tanzania, Kaunda of Zambia and Obote of Uganda held in Dar-es-Salaam on July 23, voiced the strongest opposition to the resumption of arms sales in a message which was subsequently sent to the British government. Strenuous opposition was also voiced by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers of India, Ceylon, Guyana and Malaysia.

Highly significant and, indeed most welcome, is the opposition expressed by Mr. Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada who in a personal letter to Mr. Edward Heath the British Premier said:

"In taking your decision I would strongly urge that you take full account of the likelihood that the provision of any military assistance to South Africa will be interpreted by many Commonwealth countries as an implicit gesture of acquiescence in the policy of the South African government towards the African population."

Opposition has also come from many other countries who are not members of the Commonwealth. International organisations also expressed their opposition, and the World Council of Peace called for the world-wide observance of August 22 as "No Arms for Racist South Africa Day."

A resolution sponsored by the African and Asian members of the United Nations Security Council calling on all States

NO ARMS FOR SOUTH AFRICA

to bar the sale of arms to South Africa "unconditionally and without reservation" was approved without a dissenting vote.

This resolution strengthened the 1963 and 1964 resolutions against arms sales to South Africa by applying it also to spare parts, the training abroad of South African forces, and foreign investments in, and the granting of licences and patents to the South African arms industry.

From the foregoing it will be observed that the movement in opposition to the arms sales to South Africa has assumed a truly international character. This is a clear indication that more and more countries especially in Africa and Asia are no longer prepared to be taken in by arguments that seek to rally them for the defence of the Western world against the so-called threat of Communism. They recognise the fascist Republic of South Africa as nothing more than a threat to the peaceful and stable development of the African Continent and as a menace to world peace. It should, however, be noted that South Africa is not without extremely powerful friends. In the midst of the massive international protest against arming the Apartheid Republic, and only 13 hours after the United Nations Security Council's call to bar arms sales to South Africa, France delivered a 850-ton, deep-diving submarine to a crew of 54 South Africans who had trained with the French submarine fleet.

In Britain the ruling Tory Party is deeply committed to supporting South Africa. Well over half the total amount of recorded political donations-£615,727 to be exact-made to the Conservative Party for its recent electioneering campaign were made by companies with South African subsidiaries.

As Charles Douglas Home noted in the London "Times" of 10. 10. 69:

"It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the Conservative Party is . . . mortgaged to the obviously partisan attitude of those people who have investments in South Africa . . . It may be coincidence - but an unfortunate one - that Tory policy seems to reflect so unalternably the views of firms with such obvious vested interests."

No one should, therefore, be lulled into thinking that the wave of protests, powerful as they have been, have stopped Britain from supplying arms to South Africa. Far from it. The decision to go slow is no more than a recognition of immediate realities. The British Government, and Foreign Secretary Sir Douglas Home in particular, overcome by their unexpected election victory rushed headlong to meet their commitment to South Africa. The storm of protest has made them more guarded and in the months to come we shall witness some new and devious methods being used to sanction the sale of arms to South Africa.

In the light of this, the world and, in particular, the Afro-Asian members of the Commonwealth must be extremely vigilant. We note with pleasure that several Commonwealth

countries are fully aware of this danger and according to a report by Hugh Macpherson, published in the London "Times" of 13. 8. 70, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania and others have been looking at plans to reduce trade with the United Kingdom for some time. Macpherson adds that these plans could be part of the contingency plans which have been completed to counter an arms deal. "Indeed the first exploration of such a strategy came with the pressure by Zambia on Barclays Bank D.C.O., whose chairman, Sir Frederick Seebohm, was a member of the United Kingdom South Africa Trade Association. Tanzania, and more recently Uganda, have already nationalised Barclays branches," states Mr. Macpherson.

We hope other Commonwealth countries will follow suit and make plans to effectively stop Britain from treating the United Nations and the Commonwealth with contempt.

Appeal by Chief Lutuli to the British People in May 1963

The Government has insanely committed itself to rule by the machine gun and armoured car; has elected to go down in a messy welter of blood and destruction rather than work out a clean and honourable solution. The police vote of 1962 soared to 40 million rand (\$56 million); the prisons vote to 10.5 million rand (\$14.7 million); the defence vote - greater than that in wartime - to 120 million rand (\$168 million).

Helicopters, paratroopers, white women's pistol clubs, armoured cars, strafing planes, automatic weapons, the integration of the police force ("one of the largest police forces . . .") with the Army - the whole ferocious panoply of war is being marshalled - in peace time and with frank avowal that it is not for any outside enemy but to put down the people of the land. This is the pitiful state of my country today.

In the meantime we urge all our many supporters to intensify their campaign to stop the sale of arms to South Africa. These campaigns must highlight the criminal attitude of the French government who openly defy all resolutions by the United Nations in this regard.

We also urge our supporters to link the "No Arms for South Africa" campaign with the major campaign for the total isolation of South Africa in every possible field: Military, economic, diplomatic, cultural and sporting.

WIDESPREAD

UKHONGOLOSI (AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS) UTHI KU-VORSTER NAMAKHAKANE AKHE




UKHONGOLOSE UTHI KU VORSTER NAMANKENTSHANE AKHE:



AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ERE GO VORSTER LE BOTSOTSI BA:



THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS SAYS TO VORSTER AND HIS GANG:



HA E MATSATSI A HAO A SET

★ O re Mothomotsho o botsos, khathe ka mofotut dichelele, khathe le teng Mosebetsi eo moshoeu eo o Mozfrika jaaka Morena.
 ★ O iketsa o kare ha o tsebe, o re Mothomotsho g sitang le Bahialefi Dingaka Bomaitsoa nape (Diag bana ditshoanelo tse lekanang le Sethotho sa Lekho.
 ★ O na le manganga Lefatshe le rona hore o re M motasmai eo Moshoeu eo o sekeng a be a heme mo me ebe enne Morena gore buse.
 ★ Jaaka Legodu le lenang le feshano o batla gore ea rona Sechaba e mana dihukung tsa Lefatshe la r khathe motse oa Lekho le leng le nna mo g leng mabothobotho mo Lefatshe je o le utsoitseng.
 ★ O nagana gore o ka tshoara Batho bo rona jaak (ditsho) dibapale ka bana goea Parliamenteng. e ere a khathe moemedi ea gage goea Parliamenteng. e ere ga akake a ipusa eilang le mo Lefatshe le bo bonv madi tse ditshoau ka Parliament ea lona e e bolafen di fetileng.

RONA MMOGO LE BAMBALA LE MAINDIA RE GO TS
 RE RE MO GO OENA TLOGA ESENG JALO RE TLA G
 RE TLA TSAEA LEFATSHE LA RO!

YOUR DAYS ARE COMING TO AN END!!

★ You teach that black is lazy yet wherever you look it is our sweat which makes your gold and money while even the most useless white stands there as our boss.
 ★ You pretend that black is ignorant. But you know that even our professors, our doctors, our lawyers and our teachers have less rights than even the most ignorant white labourer.
 ★ You have the cheek to say that in our own country black is foreign whilst every white immigrant who has never before breathed the air of Africa can come here and become our lord and master.
 ★ Like a lying thief you want the world to believe that the national home of the black people is in those little corners of our land which you call "Bantustans" whilst the natural home of every white is in the rich cities we have built and on the land which you have stolen from our forefathers.
 ★ You think you can treat black people like children and you give us toy parliaments to play with whilst every white youth from the age of 18 can vote for the parliament which rules our country and the Bantustans.
 ★ Because you are frightened of us you spread the lie that the black people of the world are not fit to rule even in their own countries yet you know that it is the white imperialist governments who have in this century killed and maimed more people than at any time in history.
 WE LAUGH IN YOUR FACES AT ALL THIS NONSENSE AND TOGETHER WITH OUR COLOURED AND INDIAN BROTHERS WE SAY "MOVE OVER OR YOU WILL BE PUSHED"
 WE WILL TAKE BACK OUR COUNTRY!

aphe nibeka
 bafokazana
 uthi ngisho
 lo ngisho
 ni, ngisho
 ke kube
 vo thina
 enithike
 zethu,
 ama-
 rakeni
 kanye
 abo;
 phe
 LU!

LEAFLETEERING INSIDE S.A.

A.N.C. ACTS IN MANY CENTRES

Thousands of A.N.C. illegal leaflets were disseminated in twelve different places in all the major urban centres recently. The leaflets were attached to explosive devices which were suspended from large buildings in built up areas and were scattered at approximately the same time. The leaflets were snatched up by passers-by and hidden before the police arrived on the scene.

This leaflet distribution is the largest activity of this type undertaken for a long time and the press reported it extensively. Die Transvaler and Die Burger, Government supporting papers, printed facsimiles of the leaflets and gave front page coverage to reports from all centres. Other papers, too inhibited by Government proscriptions to give the contents of the leaflets, nevertheless described the event in bold headlines on the front page.

Police reaction was immediate. They rushed to the scene, seized any remaining leaflets, sealed off the area, and took possession of the remnants of the explosive devices. A nationwide hunt for the leafleteers was promised but they complained of lack of information.

The Minister of Police, Mr. S. L. Muller, made the observation that the explosions were an indication that undermining elements were still active in South Africa. He added, "The Public must not think that the dangers are a thing of the past. It is something with which we will just have to live."

The African National Congress salutes the activists involved in the action which was reported throughout the world. The struggle goes on!

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THE SIMONSTOWN AGREEMENT

The Simonstown Agreement was signed with the United Kingdom on June 30, 1955. It provides for co-operation between the two countries to ensure the safety of the sea routes round Southern Africa, from Kosi Bay on the east coast to the Kunene River mouth on the west coast. South Africa was at the time a member of the Commonwealth and the agreement was therefore not registered as a treaty with the United Nations.

Although the contract could be said to have ended when South Africa left the Commonwealth, Lord Swinton, (who was Secretary for Commonwealth Relations in the Conservative Government which negotiated the agreement in 1954/5) informed the House of Lords on January 26, 1968, that Dr. Verwoerd had undertaken to maintain it "in full force". Lord Swinton said this undertaking was given to him personally by Dr. Verwoerd at the time South Africa decided to leave the Commonwealth.

Part of the agreement was that South Africa would take over the Simonstown Naval base from the Royal Navy, maintain it to certain specifications, and provide accommodation in it for Royal Navy ships.

In addition, South Africa undertook to buy from Britain £18-million worth of warships to strengthen its own fleet. The deal was to be completed by 1963.

With regard to regional defence both the United Kingdom Government and the South African Government agreed that "Southern Africa and the sea routes round Southern Africa must be secured against aggression from without". It was also recognized by both Governments that the defence of Southern Africa against external aggression lay not only in Africa but also in the gateways to Africa, namely in the Middle East.

Mr. Botha quoted from the documents in Parliament on February 20, 1968. One passage dealing with Britain's commitment read:—

"(It is) the declared policy of the United Kingdom Government to contribute forces for the defence of

Africa, including Southern Africa and the Middle East, and, secondly, of the Union Government to contribute forces in order to keep the potential enemy as far as possible from the borders of South Africa, in other words, for the defence of Southern Africa, Africa and the Middle East gateways to Africa.

... in order to implement the above policies, the lines of communication and logistic support in and around Southern Africa must be adequate and securely defended."

Mr. Botha emphasized that "the adequacy and security of logistic facilities and communications within Southern Africa and particularly along the lines of communication to the Middle East "were considered of such importance that both Governments undertook to sponsor a conference to develop the planning already begun and to discuss storage and stockpiling arrangements, repair facilities and kindred matters.

However, owing to rapid and unfavourable political developments in the Middle East "with led to the total collapse of the concept of a regional defence set-up for the defence of the gateways to Southern Africa" the projected conference never materialised.

In 1966, the United Kingdom decided, on grounds of economy, to withdraw from its South Atlantic Station and in January 1967 arranged for South Africa to take a greater share of the sea defence around Southern Africa in the event of war.

Mr. George Brown, the British Foreign Secretary, stated the Government's attitude to the Cape route: he said that it was clearly one of Britain's lifelines but it was also important to other countries in the West, in Asia and to South Africa herself. He said it did not by any means follow that because Britain had decided to uphold the United Nations resolution on the supply of arms that this major artery of world trade would be in jeopardy.

Labour Party Policy

The Labour Government of Britain, in maintaining the arms embargo, have acted in conformity with established Labour Party policy.

The sixty-second annual conference of the Labour Party held at Scarborough, September 30 to October 4, 1963, unanimously adopted a resolution on South Africa which said, in part:—

"This conference expresses its deep concern at the growing dangers to world peace which arise from apartheid and racial repression and from the increasing disparities between the standards of those in industrialised countries and the peoples of the underdeveloped nations. Conference congratulates the National Executive Committee on its opposition to arms for South Africa . . ."

Speaking to this resolution Mrs. Barbara Castle said:—
". . . we should stop strengthening Dr. Verwoerd militarily, and I am proud that we have taken an unequivocal stand on this question of an embargo of the export of arms. We accept the Security Council resolution; we intend to operate it. The Government attacked Harold Wilson when he gave that unequivocal pledge, and now they are trying to climb down and say 'We scrutinise the orders on political grounds'.

We know that the Buccaneer aircraft are still being made in British factories for South Africa. The order has not been cancelled. We say that a Labour Government would cancel that order and substitute a better one, because there are many better purposes to which those aircraft could be put . . ."

Shortly after becoming the Government in October 1964, the Labour Party put its policy into effect. Mr. Wilson announced in the House of Commons on November 17, 1964:—

"The Government have decided to impose an embargo on the export of arms to South Africa. Since the Government took office no licences for the export of arms to South Africa have been issued. It has now been decided that all outstanding licences should be revoked except where these are known to relate to current contracts with the South African Government. The contract to supply sixteen Buccaneer aircraft is still under review.

Outstanding commitments by the Ministry of Defence will be fulfilled, but, as from today, no new contracts will be accepted for the supply of military equipment. The Ministry of Defence will proceed with manufacturing agreements that have already been concluded, but not yet executed. Licences for the export of sporting weapons and ammunition will be revoked and shipment will be stopped forthwith. In other cases, when licences are revoked, fresh licences will be issued to the extent necessary to permit the execution of current contracts. These decisions bring the Government's policy into line with United Nations resolutions on this question, the latest of which was the Security Council resolution of June 18."

On November 25, 1964 Mr. Wilson told the Commons that

the 16 Buccaneers would be sanctioned "but no further South African contracts will be entered into."

This firm line was recorded in the Parliamentary report to the 1965 Labour Party conference at Blackpool, September 27 to October 1:—

"Since taking office the Government has missed no opportunity of voicing its abhorrence of the South African Government's policy of apartheid. It at once imposed an embargo on all future arms contracts with South Africa. Britain's policy on the supply of arms is now at last in line with United Nations resolutions."

The Labour case for continuing the embargo was impressively stated in the Commons by Mr. Stewart, First Secretary of State on December 19, 1967. Dealing with one Tory argument that the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1964 were not mandatory, so any British Government were entitled to ignore them, Mr. Stewart said:—

". . . It was not mandatory, but it was right for a great power, particularly one with our history of dealings with the coloured section of mankind, to give the most careful consideration to the expressed opinion of the nations in a world forum, on one of the greatest of world issues, the relations between the white and coloured races.

It is on this point that in my judgement Opposition members have failed to get the thing in proportion. They have completely underestimated how great, and how terrible — and, if things go ill, how deadly — an issue this could be . . .

For two centuries the white sections of mankind had treated the coloured sections as instruments of white purpose, and this was not forgotten . . .

We and other nations of the world who lorded it in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have got to accept this as part of the making of a new world. We have got to go on with the job, difficult as it is, of reconciliation. And in that task of reconciliation one's attitude towards apartheid is crucial . . .

I have tried not to use the word 'morality' at all. I appeal only to the House for wisdom, to realise that to make the wrong decision here would be a disaster to this country far out-weighting any immediate economic difficulties . . ."

Conservative Party Policy

On December 19, 1967, Mr. Heath, the leader of the Conservative Party, declared in the House of Commons that the Labour Government decision to maintain the embargo on arms to South Africa would be reversed by a Conservative administration. Mr. Heath advanced several arguments to support the Tory case for lifting of the ban:

- (i) the arms required by South Africa were for external defence and not for dealing with civil disturbances;
- (ii) by refusing to supply the arms, Britain was preventing South Africa from carrying out her obligations under the Simonstown Agreement;

- (iii) the British ban would enable France to become the permanent supplier of arms to South Africa and inevitably to take over the facilities at Simonstown;
- (iv) the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1964 were not mandatory, so any British Government were entitled not to follow them;
- (v) Britain drew £57-million a year from South Africa in dividends from over £1,000-million investment;
- (vi) South Africa is Britain's third largest customer, accounting for 5 per cent of British exports.

Sir Alex Douglas Home, former Conservative Prime Minister, paid a three-weeks visit to South Africa in February 1968 and stated immediately on his arrival at Johannesburg:—

"A Conservative Government would operate the same system as it always had with South Africa — selling arms to her for her defence. It would not be restricted by the United Nations embargo."

During his stay, Sir Alex visited Johannesburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban, speaking at many engagements organised by the South African Foundation and trade associations. He also had a private talk with Mr. Vorster and broadcast over the national radio network.

At a gathering called by the South African Foundation in Cape Town, he said the Cape route was the main artery of the Western world "and must be kept secure." Regarding South Africa's policy of apartheid, Sir Alex said the Conservative Party believed there should be no interference in the affairs of another country. Reiterating the Tory undertaking to supply arms to South Africa if they won the next election, he said: "Your Ministers would like to buy British and we would certainly like to sell British."

In a radio broadcast Sir Alex said:—

"You must not hold me guilty of the arms embargo because that would not have happened if I had been a member of the British Government."

Questioned in Durban on the meaning of the Tory definition of "arms for external defence", Sir Alec replied that he was confident that South Africa would only wish to buy from Britain bigger weapons needed for external defence, as smaller weapons for internal security were already manufactured in the Republic.

Other Tories who visited South Africa and emphasized the Tory resolve to reverse the Labour ban, included Lord Fraser of Lonsdale, Mr. Richard Sharples, vice-chairman of the Conservative Party, Sir Percy Rugg, chairman of the Greater London Council, Major Patrick Wall, M. P. and Sir Cyril Osborne, M. P.

Industrialists' Support Tories

The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) expressed bitter resentment at the Government's decision to maintain the arms ban.

Sir Stephen Brown, president, said after a CBI council meeting:—

"The Council sees in the Government's decision a cynical and depressing example of attributing high moral

purpose to a political compromise of the most unpleasant kind."

A South African report published in the Observer on January 21, 1968, said that leading Tories and British industrialists were trying energetically to persuade the South African Government to postpone committing itself to arms purchases from France or other Continental countries. The campaign took the form of visits and letters by MPs and industrialists, in co-operation with the South African Foundation. The report said the CBI was also involved — asking members to strengthen their existing ties with South Africa "against the day when the present Government's irresponsible obstacles are removed."

Sir Eric Yarrow, the Clydeside shipping magnate, who spent three weeks in South Africa in February 1968, said that if the arms embargo continued, his company would do everything it could to help South Africa build her own naval vessels. He said South Africa already had ship-building facilities and his company would be "only too happy" to provide the know-how.

During his visit Sir Eric had discussions with Mr. Botha, the Minister of Defence, and Mr. Schoeman, the Minister of Transport and met several members of the Cabinet.

The £ 200-million Bait

The main argument used by British businessmen and politicians who want the embargo ended is that Britain needs the arms contracts because of her continuing balance of payment crisis.

Various estimates put the value of these contracts at about £200 million over a ten-year period, beginning with immediate orders worth about £75-million. Of this, the Hawker Siddeley Group was ready to supply equipment costing about £48-million, viz. 16 Buccaneer strike aircraft (£20-million); eight Nimrod maritime reconnaissance machines (developed from the Comet jet airliner) (£16-million); six HS125 light jet transports (£2-million); and ship-to-air missiles, radar and other equipment (£10-million). Other items on South Africa's order list were four missile frigates at approximately £6-million each.

Following Mr. Wilson's declaration that the Government would adhere to its policy of no-arms for South Africa, Hawker Siddeley Aviation announced a 20 per cent reduction in the labour force of 5,000 at its Brough factory, where the Buccaneer aircraft are built. These redundancies were, however, mainly due to defence cuts which included Buccaneer bombers for the Navy.

The Atlas Aircraft Corporation, which is manufacturing Macchi military jet aircraft under Italian licence at its factory near Johannesburg, promptly offered to employ some of the Brough employees. Macchi jets, considered "ideal for counter-insurgency" were supplied to the Rhodesian Air Force by Atlas for use against African Nationalist guerillas. The jets are powered by Bristol Siddeley Viper engines, imported from Italy, where they are built under licence by the Piaggio Aircraft Company.

The Current Shopping List

Diplomatic sources in Britain have revealed a number of articles on South Africa's shopping list as follows:—



S.A.A.F. Buccaneers have arrived in the Republic, thanks to the expert work of S.A.A.F. The men went ahead to official stopping places from the United Kingdom to the Republic to ensure S.A.A.F. servicing for their pilots.

- (A) £15-million (R26-million) order for Buccaneer aircrafts, vetoed by Wilson in 1964.
- (B) £150-million (R260-million) missile system, blocked in January 1965.
- (C) £15-million (R26-million) order of Jaguar Anglo-French trainer aircraft, stopped by London last year.
- (D) Other items are naval shells worth £2,000,000 (R3,400,000); frigates; the modernization of existing

vessels supplied by Britain and Nimrod aircrafts and helicopters.

Prepared by:
Asian Mission of the
African National Congress (S. A.)
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New Delhi-1.

July 17, 1970.

The South African Journalist's Circle has recommended Govan Mbeki as a candidate for the International Organisation of Journalists prize for 1970. Here is their biography of this prisoner on Robben Island.

GOVAN MBEKI



Govan Mbeki

Govan Mbeki, one of the foremost leaders of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, now serving a life sentence in the notorious Robben Island prison off Cape Town, was born in July 1910 in the Nqamakwe district of the Transkei, an African reserve in the Eastern Cape Province. The son of a well-to-do African farmer with large flocks of sheep, goats and horses and a substantial house, he grew up in the traditional tribal atmosphere and started his education at the local mission school.

Mbeki's interest in politics was aroused while he was still a boy when the location in which he lived was visited by an African minister who was a member of the African National Congress. At a fund-raising concert the visitor addressed the audience on what the African National Congress stood for and discussed the pass system restricting freedom of movement and land hunger.

Later Mbeki attended the secondary school at Healdtown in the Eastern Cape. At this time he used to attend meetings of the Industrial and Commercial Worker's Union (I.C.U.), the pioneer African trade union in South Africa which was active amongst the Transkei peasants.

After passing his matriculation examination, Mbeki attended the Fort Hare University College where he was a contemporary of Matanzima, the present stooge Chief Minister of the Transkei Bantustan. But whereas Matanzima chose the road of collaboration with the oppressor, Mbeki embarked on the course of struggle for full democratic rights for his people to which he dedicated his life. He graduated in 1936 with a B.A. and a diploma in education and taught at a secondary school in Durban and later at the famous Adams College. After investigating conditions among African workers in Durban, he made

his first entry into political journalism with a series of articles on the political and economic disabilities under which they suffered.

The passing of laws in 1936 depriving the Africans of the Cape Province of their common roll franchise rights made Mbeki realise that Africans would only obtain advancement through their own efforts and he then joined the African National Congress. During school vacations he worked in a shop in Johannesburg and came into contact with members of the trade union movement and the Communist Party. An attempt to form a trade union for his fellow workers earned him dismissal from his job. Returning to the Transkei, Mbeki ran a small shop to support his wife and four children. At the same time he continued to occupy himself with the affairs of his people and began the profound study of the Transkei which has been his major life's work.

Entry into Journalism

In 1939 he published a book of essays called "The Transkei in the Making". In 1941 he became secretary of the Transkei African Voters' Association which aimed to restore the African voters to the common roll for elections to the South African Parliament. Two years later he was appointed general secretary of the Transkei Organised Bodies, a federal organisation of peasant and other bodies which drew up a charter of demands of the Transkei people — chiefly for more land. Eventually he was elected a member of the Transkei Territorial General Council, or Bunga, the advisory representative body for the territory provided for in the South African constitution at that time.

In 1949 Mbeki was co-author of a new policy document drawn up for the African National Congress, "African Claims", setting out the demands of the African people and indicating the more militant lines of struggle which must be adopted to achieve them. He attempted to advance the interest of the people of the Transkei by the formation of co-operatives and published a booklet called "Let's Do It Together". He was also one of the directors of the weekly newspaper "The Guardian", a left-wing newspaper which became the voice of the Communist Party and the Congress movement. In 1955 he became Port Elizabeth manager and editor of "New Age", the paper which succeeded "The Guardian" when it was banned by the Nationalist Government under the Suppression of Communism Act.

For the rest of the time that he was at liberty in South Africa, Mbeki devoted himself to a career combining journalism with active political work. By nature and training an intellectual, Mbeki was above all a realist who perceived that the political progress of the African people could only be achieved on the basis of solid organisation and struggle. On the one hand he devoted himself to the extension of the influence of the African National Congress and helped build the Eastern Cape into the strongest and most effective region of the ANC in the whole country. On the other hand, he sent a steady stream of remarkable dispatches to "New Age" which both highlighted the plight of the people in the area and also helped them to struggle and organise for revolutionary change.

During the 1950s he became a member of the executive of the African National Congress and was a member of the joint committee of the Congress Alliance which organised the historic Congress of the People in 1955 which gave birth to the "Freedom Charter" – still the basic document of the aims and objects of the national liberation movement in South Africa. Mbeki also joined and became one of the leaders of the underground Communist Party, banned by the Nationalist Government in 1950.

He was jailed for five months without trial during the 1960 emergency, and used the opportunity to perfect organisation amongst his fellow Africans in jail. Two years later he was arrested following the initial sabotage operations in the Eastern Cape of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the military wing of the liberation movement. Charged under the Explosives Act, he spent several harrowing months in solitary confinement before eventually being acquitted. During all this period of work and agitation, Mbeki continued with his studies and his journalism. His articles continued to appear regularly in "New Age" and other journals. The fruit of his years of study of the Transkei situation was a book "South Africa: The Peasants' Revolt", published in the Penguin African Library in 1964.

Underground

In 1963, after a house arrest warrant had been served on him in Johannesburg, he went underground to assist in the work of the banned ANC and Communist Party. He was one of those arrested with Nelson Mandela at a farm at Rivonia, near Johannesburg, in July 1963, and, after a

trial which attracted world-wide attention, sentenced to life imprisonment for "sabotage".

Giving evidence at his trial, Mbeki freely admitted his membership of the ANC, the Communist Party and Umkhonto we Sizwe, which had been working for the revolutionary overthrow of the white dominated state and the substitution of a democratic regime. They were all banned organisations and their doctrines were illegal. Nevertheless, said Mbeki, he had no intention of changing his plea to one of guilty. To do so, he said, would be tantamount to admitting his moral guilt and he did not feel that any moral guilt attached to his actions.

Mbeki said he had been offered rewards for information while he was in detention. They included cash, freedom from prosecution, freedom from exposure as an informant and police protection. He had rejected these offers with contempt.


In jail Mbeki has maintained the spirit and determination which have marked his whole life. He has often been called as a witness for the defence in other political trials. Giving evidence in one trial in 1965, Mbeki said he still felt as ardently about his political beliefs as before being sentenced in the Rivonia trial. Asked by the prosecutor what he hoped to achieve, he answered: "Justice. Equal rights for all Africans". He said that the paramount thing for him was the plight of the African people. To bring about the political changes he wanted he would willingly have sacrificed his life.

Asked what the policy of the ANC was, he replied: "It is first and foremost to achieve equal political rights for the African. It is to unite the African people to achieve this. It is to see that all national and racial groups in South Africa shall live on a basis of equality".

For political prisoners in South Africa, there are no favours and there is no remission. Imprisonment for life means just that – the convicted person will remain in prison for the rest of his natural life. Political prisoners start on the lowest grade with the harshest treatment and the fewest privileges. They are subjected to intolerable humiliations and indignities, and often outright brutality.

Despite all these handicaps, Govan Mbeki has been able to continue with his studies. On May 16, 1970, the degree of B.A. Hons in economics was conferred on him in absentia at a graduation ceremony at Fort Hare university.

Giving evidence to a delegation of the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid in London in April 1964, during the Rivonia trial, Mr. Mbeki's eldest son Thabo said of his father: "I believe that the years of his political activity have derived their inspiration from his love of his people. During these years, as his associates would testify, he has earned the respect of his people and his colleagues. Not a single one of the many South African courts has found him guilty of a petty or indictable crime. Yet today he stands accused, and his accusers, who only yesterday found glory in Nazi Germany, stand in the full twilight of their cynical and inhuman power. For decades, he, together with the rest of the African people, has appealed to the White Governments of South Africa, not for the exaltation of the African people to a position of dominance over the White, but for equality among the peoples. The only reward he has earned, is what we have all earned, the brutal might of South African Law".



JOHN VORSTER —
saviour of civilisation
or police state boss?
It depends on your colour,
says a white South
African who left his
country because of his
hatred of apartheid



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HUGS

These pictures were taken in a Johannesburg street. The Africans were queuing outside a furniture store. A slight disturbance broke out. Instantly, white South African police attacked with dogs.

The cameraman had courage. Photography is a dangerous hobby in modern South Africa. When Johan Smit took an innocuous snapshot of a non-European restaurant, secret police noted down his name and the number of his car.

Smit is a 40-year-old Doctor: Dutch ancestry. English-born, a South African resident since he was 13. Now he lives in London with his wife and small son. They've quit South Africa for ever, sickened by the brutality of apartheid.

But fear remains. Johan Smit is not his real name. He's afraid that if he were identified his relations in South Africa would suffer for his outspoken criticism of the Vorster regime.

"It's a nightmare place" he says. "South Africa is the worst police state in the world. Only Nazi Germany was worse.

"I've always had misgivings about apartheid. Under Verwoerd there was at least some attempt at justification; a political philosophy that the races should be kept apart to develop their own cultures. Under Vorster it's lost all semblance of anything but gratuitous brutality.

"You see it in the streets every day. My nine-year-old son watched an African youth beaten bloody by two Afrikaans policemen. It's reflex with them.

"You go to your office and find that one of the messenger boys isn't there. He's been pulled in for not carrying a pass . . . the police have hired him out to a farmer on the fringe of town. He's kept in a compound under guard, half-starved, working without pay. Technically it's illegal. It happens all the time.

"The government - and the vast majority of people - believe in the intrinsic inferiority of the African. They want to see him put down. Whole families die of malnutrition. Nobody could care less.

"If you shoot an African in the street, the police tell you to drag the corpse into your garden. You won't be arrested. You've found him burgling your home . . . shot him in defence of your property and life.

"I know of an Afrikaans farmer who beat a native to death. The man was disobedient. The farmer put him in a gunny sack, tied him to a tree and whipped him until he died. That was one case that got into the newspapers. Nobody was particularly shocked . . .

"In Johannesburg I saw a native girl being beaten by a group of Africans. Three policemen were standing nearby. They just shrugged their shoulders. They were completely indifferent.


"So I drove to the police station. There was a white woman in the waiting room. When I told her what was happening she just said: 'So what? One kaffir less' "She'd come to inform on a white man for sleeping with a black girl!"

The Immorality Act forbids sex relations between the races. Smit shows you a pile of South African newspapers, all gloating over tragedy. The young couple whose marriage was forcibly annulled, when the wife was found to have Coloured blood. The small girl expelled from school for the same reason. A picture strip shows a white man and two small black children, Headline: The sex-buster . . . and two kids for forbidden love. Caption: Ace Immorality Act cop Sergeant Piet Ras and the two Coloured children of so-and-so . . . both parents were jailed.

"To sleep with a native girl is like sleeping with an animal", says Smit. "That's how the Boer thinks of the

OFF THE CUFF

Marcelino Dos Santos talks to Sechaba



Marcelino Dos Santos

The international community can contribute to the success of the struggle for national liberation of the Portuguese colonies at two essential levels,

said MARCELINO DOS SANTOS, Vice-President of FRELIMO in an Exclusive Interview with SECHABA:

Contd. from Page 13

African. It's a criminal offence. And there are plenty of informers. Men have been known to blow their brains out rather than face charges under the Immorality Act.

"At the weekends you get gangs of drunks going through the border into Swaziland, where they can get sex without getting arrested.

"The newspapers are crammed with propaganda. The Rand Daily Mail is one of the few free-speaking papers in the country, and it has to fight like hell to stay that way. Television is banned. It's said to be a corrupting influence. They're afraid of broadening the consciousness of the people.

"The South Africans think England is degenerate. That it's betrayed the white man. They see themselves as the true saviours of white civilisation. The last bastion of Christian virtues. They find excuses for apartheid in the Bible.

"The chairman of the South African Broadcasting Corporation has a son named Izan. It sounds like a nice Old Testament name. Until you spell it backwards.

"Many Boers wanted the Nazis to win the war. Hitler's racist policy agreed with their own. They used to beat up their own soldiers who'd enlisted to fight Germany. Today the police wear blue-grey uniforms like the Wehrmacht. There's a Superman complex. Johannesburg is full of weight-lifting clubs, ju-jitsu clubs.

"As a matter of fact Johannesburg is grotesque. The last bastion of civilisation? Certainly, if you equate civilisation with juke-boxes and drive-in cinemas and an astronomical divorce rate. Everything's a pale copy of America. Ci-

vilisation . . . if you don't notice the police beating up old native women and the black children trying to sell flowers when they should be at home in bed.

"The whole country is mentally under siege. They're terrified that the guerillas may come down from the north. It's almost impossible for an able-bodied man to leave the country between the ages of 18 and 28. He has to be ready to fight in the Defence Force. They're marching against the flood of history. They can only hope to keep the Africans down by strengthening the police force.

"It's a police state. But that doesn't mean that the police will go into action if you have a burglary. They're absolutely inefficient as far as normal police duties are concerned. But they'll always be there to see the blacks have their passes, that they don't go in the subways reserved for Whites.

"South African whites are completely brainwashed. They can't talk about anything except rugby and servant trouble. That's why sport is so important to them. They haven't got anything else. The anti-Springbok demonstrations hurt them very much. It's a pity Britain has to suffer. But thank God somebody is making an effective protest. I've left for good now. My only regret is that I didn't leave sooner. There's a new brand of refugee today. People like me, who have grown to detest the way of life in South Africa.

"We don't pretend that all black men are saints. But they're human beings. The way they're treated is inhuman. They're harassed and hounded all day and all night.

"The white man is dragged down too. He's besmirched by association with this regime.

"To live in South Africa today is to be degraded."

1. Direct help to the national liberation movements;
2. Propaganda and moral support for the struggle.

Comrade Dos Santos spoke to SECHABA in Rome while attending the recent international conference in support of the liberation fighters of the Portuguese colonies.

He said: "Since we are engaged in an armed struggle we require armaments, uniforms, and so on, but then there is also the work in the liberated areas which involves education, health and production.

Of course everybody cannot give arms but there are those who can. We have real needs in this sector, therefore material assistance must cover military aid. There are the Socialist countries who can do this and they do it. With uniforms it's the same. On the level of National Reconstruction we have programmes for education, for health and production. For example in the programme of education in our country, we have to develop primary education, create new schools, produce new books for the pupils, increase the stocks of books, organise training courses for new teachers, improve the level of existing teachers, and expand literacy classes for adults. We also have other sectors of higher education for "cadres", mechanics and other technicians for which we do not have sufficient material means at present, particularly for nurses, electricians, etc.

CADRES

The formation of "cadres" is a difficult problem since we depend on certain material resources which are not always easily obtainable. There are two solutions: either we organise it ourselves with financial assistance or we send the trainees to other countries. The guerillas have undergone such courses in the countries where they trained. What we now want is to do these programmes ourselves in accordance with our needs. We therefore need external aid and we don't know to what extent non-governmental organisations can help. We have found that political organisations and committees of support have great difficulties in finding material resources to help in such programmes, but it is not impossible. It means hard work and the mobilisation of individuals and organisations which are not in direct contact with us. We have already certain religious organisations from which we receive substantial assistance. In our health programme we have a real need to greatly improve our hospitals which are in the bush. Conditions are very poor and there is a great shortage of medicines.

Then we have programmes for the increase of production because we want to produce as much as we can for ourselves by our own labour. We also want to improve the quality of this production, by improving the techniques used and by diversification.

We have a special section dealing with these aspects, but it is not yet of a very high standard. We have a section of production and commerce and we hope to develop it into a Department precisely to increase production. We badly need agricultural equipment. We do not produce this equipment and yet this is the very basis of agricultural work."

SECHABA asked Comrade Dos Santos several questions and his answers revealed in vivid description

HOW FRELIMO LAUNCHED THE ARMED STRUGGLE

Sechaba. We would like to turn to the struggle itself, particularly to the beginning of the armed struggle in Mozambique. Can you tell me how FRELIMO set about the task of launching the armed struggle? Did you begin with political work; did you send cadres in to prepare the ground before you started the guerilla action? What was your "modus operandi"?

Dos Santos. When FRELIMO was created we were almost completely convinced that only an armed struggle would allow us to fulfill our aspirations. We did not make a great discovery, in reaching this conclusion, as Angola had already started, and Guine as well. It was therefore not difficult to see that the Portuguese Government would not reserve some special treatment for the people of Mozambique. Nevertheless we were trying to create the minimum conditions for embarking on this armed struggle. At our congress in September 1962 we had no idea when we would start. But we set ourselves a number of tasks; first, to consolidate the organisation inside the country, the political organisation.

Were the people in the north of Mocambique well politicised before this stage? Had they participated in any kind of political movement before you started laying the basis for the armed struggle?

There were small groups which had been formed after the last war, to be more exact from 1948-49. They were spread quite widely, particularly in the towns, all clandestine and unknown to each other.

IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

But in the countryside?

First they grew in the towns but certain other movements, such as the cooperative cattle movement, were formed in the countryside. They were not at first a political movement but the nature of Portuguese Colonialism forced them into political commitment. There were conflicts with the Administration and the disputes became political. But it was the little groups I first mentioned which had clear political objectives. From 1955 some of these groups learnt about each other and linked up. In this way the political work progressed. There were also organisations such as the Mozambique African National Union which organised in the North at Cabo Delgado, or the Democratic union of Mozambique, formed, around 1960 which organised in the provinces of the centre and the South. But it is in the Northern district that important work was done. All these groups were inherited by FRELIMO, as most of the comrades who worked in these groups in Mozambique left for Tanzania after independence and arrived there after November 1961. These comrades had contacts with the external organisations who managed to organise the meeting of 25th June 1962 and then the Congress of September 1962.

FRELIMO proceeded to consolidate them into a network inside Mozambique whilst defining the tasks of the new organisation.

From the very beginning the task of the organisation was to transform the consciousness of the people, to bring them to accept the idea of National Independence, to have a

clearer idea of the meaning of this and also convince the people that only an armed struggle would make it possible to reach this goal.

MILITARY CADRES

While carrying out this mobilisation for armed struggle and structural activity we were also organising the training of military cadres.

As early as 3rd or 4th January 1962, that is only three months after the Congress, the first group of 80 comrades left for Algeria to learn the art of guerilla warfare. Later we sent other groups to Algeria where about 250-300 guerillas were trained. When we had the minimum military organisation to launch the armed struggle we turned our attention again to the problem of the political structure which would support a minimum military network.

The problem was to establish what was a minimum military organisation - how many comrades? Further, it was not possible to determine the level of political consciousness necessary to support armed struggle. We also realised that it was not possible to develop a strong political organisation under a fascist system. You may have a clandestine political network but at a certain level it becomes vulnerable to enemy action. We therefore created the minimum network to give assistance to the fighters, by supplying food, organising hiding places and to give information to the guerillas. We then felt that it was through the armed struggle that the political organisation would grow.

So at first there was only the political network, then, when our comrades had trained in Algeria we had a military organisation which was received everywhere by the political wing. We then started our action in Cabo Delgado, Nyassa, Zambesi and Tete. But we were forced to stop the action in Tete and Zambesi in July 1965 because of insufficient supplies.

I must say that the political work was essential, the armed struggle being only an instrument, a tool. But it is now the principal action for independence. Others have had to mobilise the masses as their principal action towards independence, but for us it has been the armed struggle, whilst political work has not been neglected and is a determining factor.

NEW CONDITIONS

What was the effect of the armed struggle on the political work? Was there higher morale?

The start of an armed struggle created new conditions for a new development of the political organisation. Under a fascist colonial system there are many militants who are not sure of the other militants. They are not sure who is with or against them. Because conditions are so difficult, people don't trust each other. When the armed struggle starts, two camps are established; the one who shoots at the Portuguese can surely not be on the wrong side. We then have a sure test. Whilst at the stage of political organisation, people are never sure even when somebody makes the right political statements, but when he fires on Portuguese troops and kills them you know who to trust. Secondly this military action creates the conditions for cleaning up and detecting the enemy elements and to destroy them, thereby creating new conditions for more efficient action by the organisation. This is how the armed struggle contributed to the political network.

DOS SANTOS THEN DISCUSSED POLITICAL-MILITARY ORGANISATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

When you made the recent attacks in Tete did you prepare the ground with political work there too or was it a question of the "focus" opening the way?

In our work at the beginning of 1962, we started with the organisation of the political network. At that time there was no military organisation, so it was purely political work. Then when the comrades returned from training we had two sectors: the sector of political work and the one for military work. We tried to establish a coordination between the two but this was not always easy. Its not easy to say exactly why and to establish the link between all the factors. The people who made up the political network inside did not always have the highest political understanding. These were the people who had established little groups even before the formation of FRELIMO.

These organisers gained the respect of the people but they did not have any military training whilst those who had undergone guerilla training had also acquired political knowledge, and we were to find later that the latter were the best militants of FRELIMO, the true interpreters of FRELIMO policy, when the armed struggle was launched. When the comrades of the military sector arrived they were placed under the authority of the political organisation which gave the orders. But new problems arose with the armed struggle and the political organisation could not solve them. At the same time the population were saying that it was the military wing which was killing the Portuguese, not the political wing and this gave immediate prestige to the military wing.

When the Portuguese withdrew from certain areas which became liberated zones the people started to say that before the military wing arrived there was only talk of independence etc, so the prestige of the army grew. In the political network we had Group "Chairmen" at the District level who had previously done useful work educating the people but when the army units grew a certain rivalry started. The Chairmen, because of their lower political understanding, thought that the armed struggle would be short, leading to independence.

They believed that in the independant Mozambique under FRELIMO they would be the leaders of the new administration. Many of them began to behave as traditional chiefs. We must admit that the blame for this situation must be borne by the leadership of FRELIMO for failing to foresee such a situation. It was not the fault of the people but of the FRELIMO Command. We did not foresee these revolutionary problems and conflicts developing.

PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Once these conflicts came into the open we had to analyse the situation and impose certain solutions. This we did. But certain of the comrades had wrong conceptions about the Chairmen, in spite of their inability to govern the liberated areas. The population was always asking for solutions to problems such as how they were to obtain clothing etc after the departure of the Portuguese.

At this stage did the peasants feel that they were gaining from their new freedom?



Frelimo Women militants

Well, there was no more tax to pay, but where to get clothes, where to get soap? In 1965 we had not yet made provision for this. But the fighters had a good understanding of the situation and this was natural because they were forced to have this full comprehension of the problems. They understood that in the fight against the Portuguese they had to kill the soldiers or they would be killed; they were also forced to discuss and understand what relation they should have with the people.

But the population themselves; there must have been some conflict in their minds between the material conditions under the Portuguese and the new situation, and they had to choose?

They chose the bad conditions.

Why? What factors helped them to choose?

Just one at the beginning – freedom. They said we have nothing but we are free. But to be realistic this stage could not last long. There had to be something else. We had to satisfy their needs. But where to obtain clothes? And other materials? We knew that whatever our efforts we would not be able to supply all their requirements in this field. Therefore we were forced to give them something else – a political awareness. We had to develop political mobilisation. It was simply impossible to satisfy all the material needs. We had to explain this and show that we were creating conditions for improving the situation very quickly.

Were the conditions very bad at this point?

Yes, we had many cases where people went back to using bark to clothe themselves. But we explained to the people that it was a new situation for everybody and that we were trying to find solutions.

What about the urban groups during this period? Was there also struggle in the urban areas or not?

In the towns we only increased the pressure of the clandestine movements but did not take any military action.

THE PRESERVATION OF LEADERSHIP

To turn to another question, what is your policy on the question of preservation of leadership? Clearly a movement has to preserve its experienced cadres, this is an objective requirement, but at the same time there is a necessity to involve the leadership. What is your policy on this question?

Earlier we were talking of the political problems and we said that at the beginning we had two sectors and that we had many problems. We had to solve these problems by putting into practise our ideas of a guerilla movement: namely that everyone is a political cadre and yet everyone is also a fighter. But one must determine the tasks for each sector – for example what are the tasks of the guerilla? First to fight then mobilise the population, then to produce. What is the task of a peasant? First to produce, then fight in self-defence, and defence of the region where he is. For the teacher, his first task is to teach, then mobilise, then produce. The medical orderly, what is his task? First to treat patients, then produce, then fight. Everybody has a common task which is production. At every school there is a field for production, also in every base, in every hospital. It was established that this was necessary. But conditions differ greatly. When we wanted to re-start the fighting in Tete recently, we sent comrades who already had a politico-military formation. But there were islands of mobilised people in certain areas where the terrain was not favourable to an armed struggle. On the other hand where people had not been mobilised the terrain was favourable to guerilla action. With the help of the politico-military cadres we were able to detect the most favourable points for military action in the Tete province and carry out a simultaneous mobilisation of the population in these areas. In this way we were able to correct the deficiencies which had existed in Cabo Delgado and Nyassa and impose the practical solution of the politico-military cadre. We realised that there our tasks were really new. We observed that the problems were quite unpredictable, and we learnt that one must be attentive to all the phenomena and problems as they arise. This means that there must be comrades who are able to detect the problems quickly by observing and understanding the situation. This can only be done by responsible leaders being in the area. This is absolutely necessary. If we can then accept the idea of politico-military cadres and the need for the presence of responsible leaders, we can then talk of the preservation of the leaders. The requisite vigilance which must be assured but in the battle area, this is where it must be done. Every leader of FRELIMO has a security curtain around him, but I had to make this explanation to answer very clearly your question because it is often argued that the security of a leader places him outside the battle area. This is not the case, his security must be assured in this area.

Did you have any requests from the people in the South to introduce guerillas to fight for their defence?

Yes, we had our organisation in the South, clandestine and political, and the comrades trained in Algeria went to the South in 1964.

PROBLEM OF SUPPLIES

In view of South Africa's aggressive military strategy and the proposed base at Lilongwe in Malawi and others in Zimbabwe have you considered the possibility of a military

sealing off at the Tanzanian Border? In that event would you be able to carry on your struggle in Mozambique?

I am convinced that armed struggle cannot exist without supplies, but what are the possibilities of ensuring supplies?

Without any doubt Tanzania and Zambia play an important role but at the present stage of our struggle I think that even if the border with Tanzania was closed, we would not stop our fight. Why? because the resources of our struggle are now very large. Our ability to create at this stage are very good.

It is possible to break through any such barrier and I must say that we would be able to stop the creation of a barrier. Furthermore there are other ways of assuring supplies.

Do you use the coast at all? Are you able to penetrate to the coastline? I understand that some coastline forts have been attacked by FRELIMO forces, have you been able to get to the sea and have you been able to establish some permanent presence on the coastline?

We have already some presence on the coastline.

S. A. INVOLVEMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE

What reports do you get from inside on the SA economic and military presence in Mozambique?

The information which we have is that South Africa is trying to consolidate her position in Mozambique by investing in companies and also by direct military intervention. For example there are SA battalions at Fingue and Chiane,

three batalions of 600 each, in the province of Nyassa there were 25 SA planes two years ago. Then there are the personnel and technicians of SA in the hospitals of Bede and Nampole. Tete has doctors and nurses in large numbers and certain means of transport purely SA. They have their own security personnel and their own camps for their soldiers and police.


I think that the South African's policy is that if the Portuguese Government cannot ensure the defence of Mozambique, South Africa will do it. They say it openly. South Africa is at present an Imperialist nation in Southern Africa and unless she changes her present policies it is SA which will be the great enemy of everybody. Portugal will be the secondary enemy. We are now fighting the Portuguese but it is South Africa which directs the strategy and determines the policy. But we are convinced that if our fight develops in Mozambique, if it continues to develop in Angola, if the South African people develop their liberation struggle with the Zimbabwe people it will be South African forces which we will have to engage in the war. It is difficult to see an Independent Mozambique or Angola whilst there is a fascist South Africa and Rhodesia, unless there is a change in the orientation of imperialism.

So you see your struggle as a protracted war, with a steady increase in territorial power in Mozambique, but at the same time a situation of constant struggle until the whole of Southern Africa is free?

I agree with this perspective. And this points to certain responsibilities which we must shoulder to create greater cooperation. We must learn to coordinate our action to face the enemy and assume our historic responsibilities.

(To be concluded in the next issue)

Frelimo guerillas



BRAM FISCHER in PRISON

by David Evans



Bram Fischer

David Evans served five years as a political prisoner in South Africa when he met and came to appreciate Bram Fischer. He recently left South Africa and is now able to write for publication for the first time since his release from prison in November 1969. His personal impressions of Bram Fischer helps to fill in the picture of one of South Africa's greatest sons. David Evans was at the time of his conviction a member of the NCL-ARM and before that of the Liberal Party. (A special article on Bram Fischer has been published by the United Nations Unit on Apartheid this year.)

Bram Fischer's achievements – the brilliant career as a barrister, the dedicated service to the Congress Alliance and the Communist Party of South Africa, and, through them, to the cause of freedom, the dramatic months in disguise, fighting apartheid from underground, the brave speech at the subsequent trial – have been written down elsewhere. This is an attempt to tell a little about the man I knew in jail.

It is possible to love people without admiring them, and, conversely, to admire without loving. Political ideology can be as divisive, I think, as "cultural" or "national" differences. These days the so-called "generation gap" seems, so very often, to bar young off from old – even in the same family. In Pretoria Local Prison the South African state

has since 1962 flung together people whose creeds range from Christian-liberal to Communist and whose ages reach from the twenties into the sixties. I know of no one who was there who doesn't feel the greatest respect and affection for Bram Fischer. Most of us grew to love him.

Bram Fischer is admirable because of his courage and his integrity. Both have been demonstrated amply throughout his public career. But it is far harder to show these qualities, locked away by those who hate you, far from the approval and support of the crowd, the interest of the mass media and the protection – however inadequate – available to the ordinary citizen. It is no secret that, in the early stages of his imprisonment, the authorities tried to wear away Fischer's will. He was kept for a time in virtual isolation in a dingy cell with a foul sanitary pot and a thin mat to lie on. He was given menial jobs – polishing and brushing the long cement passage floor on his knees, cleaning the drainpipes in the exercise yard with a toothbrush, scouring the latrines manually. It's questionable whether it's fit work for any man. It certainly wasn't work for an elderly man of failing health.

Placed over Fischer for a long time was a sullen and capricious warder who had a gift – familiar to anyone who has been in a prison – of using wide and vague powers to humiliate and debase his charges. He was determined, as one of his subordinates explained, to see Fischer "Bow the knee."

Fischer never did. Characteristically, though younger prisoners tried to shield him from unpleasant or "undignified" work, he insisted on doing his share – and more –

of prison tasks. The difficulty, in fact, was to prevent him from doing too much in trying to help others through their day. He encouraged us all – by word, by example, by shafts of satirical humour. And while he took his own treatment impassively he spoke out bluntly and fearlessly about general grievances. Gradually he won the respect of the authorities – and with it, I think, respect, if not agreement, for the Values he represents.

I don't know what communists are like elsewhere, but Bram Fischer's communism seems to me fine because this belief is based in a belief in man. This gives him a great compassion, a great sympathy and a great patience which was particularly evident in the rapport which developed between him and the younger prisoners. He didn't simply listen to them or talk to them. He **enjoyed** them – their opinions, their nonsense, their relish for life. It is a quality all great South Africans I've known had abundantly – Alan Paton, Govan Mbeki being in their very different ways examples. It cannot be feigned.

I think too that Bram Fischer impresses non-communists

because what he says is consistent with what he does and is: he seeks to live his socialism. It is because of this that he stepped out of a comfortable life down to where the ordinary people are – to share, for better or for worse, their fate.

I know of no man who has a greater love for his country. For its many people and for the infinitely varied land itself. His anger – and resolution rather than anger distinguishes his attitudes – is directed at those who knowingly and viciously are strangling South Africa's great promise in a tangle of restrictive and inhuman laws. What he wants, he wants for all South Africa's people, even those who now oppose his vision. No one knows how long Bram Fischer will be kept in prison. No one – whether prisoner or captor – believes for a moment that he will ever cringe a centimetre from his beliefs. "He'll never give up," a senior prison official said to me a fortnight before my release. It was said with the kind of pride one Afrikaner reserves for another – and it illustrates, perhaps, the kind of influence Fischer could have in a changed South Africa. That is part of the tragedy – and part of the hope.



BOOK REVIEWS

REVOLT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1896-7

REVOLT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA 1896-7

by T.O. Ranger

(Heinemann Educational Books) 63s.

In July 1952 when Joshua Nkomo returned to Rhodesia he was met at the airport by a ninety year old survivor of the 1896-7 risings who handed him a spirit axe as a symbol of resistance and so that he might 'fight to the bitter end'. In 1896 the people of Matabeleland and Mashonaland had risen against white settler rule, taking, completely by surprise the British South Africa Company administration, which had governed Mashonaland since 1890. In Matabeleland the rebellion broke in March 1896; in Mashonaland in June of the same year. By the middle of April Bulawayo was invested on all sides except the south-west by strong rebel African forces. On April 17 the Bulawayo Staff Officer, Newman, cabled to Cape Town: 'Rebels continuing to increase in numbers and proximity round us to north and east, forming semi-circle about 3 miles on the Umgusa River, 6 miles from here, our scouts and patrols being always in touch and fighting with their advance guards. The gravity of the situation is hardly realised even by the local population.' Newman reported that there was a real danger that Bulawayo might be rushed and the whites gathered there wiped out. While the white community's fighting men were away fighting in Matabeleland, the Shona rising broke. There were links between the risings, and between them they presented an unprecedented challenge to White settler rule in Rhodesia in the last decade of last century.

In this study of the Rhodesian revolts Terence Ranger sees these risings in their context of African history, and African society. Why did these revolts break out when they did, he asks, and how were they organised? What links are there between this early, primary resistance, and with the armed struggles of our time? And, he asks, discussing the field which this and other histories of primary resistance are exploring, why did other societies not resist, and are there traceable consequences of co-operation as distinct from the consequences of resistance?

The Pioneer Column of 1890 organised by Rhodes and the armies which shattered the Ndebele monarchy in 1893 were deployments of white power on a scale unrivalled anywhere else in East and Central Africa, though not, of course, in South Africa itself. From the first moment of company rule, a settler community existed, with a company administration dedicated to further the interests of settler traders, farmers and mining prospectors. The rapidity and totality of the African resistance in Southern Rhodesia, argues Ranger, cannot be explained merely in terms of

a generalised will to resist, but must be explained also in terms of the peculiar pressure of company rule, and this took different forms in Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

WHITE SETTLER PRESSURES

The Mashona regarded themselves as unconquered, and they therefore rejected the right of the company administration to demand tribute and collect tax from them, and refused to accept that they were under the company's 'protection'. They laboured under widespread grievances which accounted for a general disposition to rebellion. Into the bargain Ranger says, they were controlled by a 'native' administration as weak as any in early colonial East and Central Africa, and yet they were exposed to white settler pressures which had no parallel anywhere except perhaps in Tanganyika under the German administration where there was enforced collective cash crop farming that precipitated the Maji-Maji rising. The settler pressures on Mashonaland created a common environment of oppression and produced a common desire to act; what was needed was some effective machinery of co-ordination, and when the time came, this was produced.

Matabeleland, by contrast, had experienced a long history of diplomatic relations between the Company and the Ndebele which had produced a bitter resentment even before the conquest of 1893. Moreover, "the manner of that conquest as well as the fact of it added to Ndebele grievances. The Ndebele aristocracy regarded the war of 1893 as an unjustified and unprovoked attack upon a monarch (Lobengula) who was seen as having gone to almost humiliating lengths to avoid war with the Whites . . ." The systematic deception practiced by Rhodes and his agents had left a deep resentment; added to this was hatred of the system of administration set up by the white conquerors. The defeat of the Ndebele led to a veritable land rush: literally the whole of the Ndebele home area was given away in the few months which followed the conquest. Land was given out lavishly not only to reward volunteers of the war but also to give important sections of English society a stake in the success of the new colony. There was also the immediate expansion into Matabeleland of the economic energies of South Africa; mining prospects were thought to be favourable and there were greedy eyes on rich Ndebele herds and land. Ndebele grievances, in the nature of the conquest

and the impact of the conqueror, were more dramatic, and commoners were drawn more rapidly than the peoples of Mashonaland into wage employment. In Mashonaland, on the other hand, "it was not the mode of arrival of the alien power, still less a history of previously unsatisfactory relations with it that was resented, but its steadily increasing pressure on peoples who regarded themselves as still unconquered." As different as the circumstances of their subjection to white power, both parts of Southern Rhodesia were simmering towards rebellion.

THE GENESIS OF RESISTANCE

Ranger's material is fascinating on the distinctions between the organisation of the two African states of Mashonaland and Matabeleland, and hence the different genesis and development of resistance leaderships and organisation. Under the Shona dynasties like the renowned Mutapa Kingdom the monarchy was closely associated with a system of spirit mediums. The mediums had an important role, political as well as ritual; in fact the two were inextricable.

They guaranteed and at the same time limited the power of the king, and they acted as a centralising and stabilising factor. There was no political superstructure like a federation in Mashonaland, but many of the famous prophets who acted as counsellors to the chiefs were known and consulted all over the land. They played a decisive part in the rising in Mashonaland and, too, in Matabeleland, among the Shona living there, for they were deeply involved in its leadership.

The Ndebele state was of a different character. The state derived its unity and discipline almost exclusively from the institution of the monarchy. The system was designed to eliminate sectional loyalty and to assimilate other groups and unify them within the one system which derived the military state. The command of the military system was in the hands of a special caste, the Zansi, from which virtually all the regimental commanders and other officials were drawn.

Between the 1893 war and the outbreak of the 1896 rebellion there was no instance of Ndebele resistance by force to confiscation of cattle or compulsion of labour. But underneath the apparent acceptance of these measures there was movement towards resistance. The Ndebele were striving to protect their threatened institutions and their economy by the re-establishment of the Kingship, destroyed after the 1893 war. Ndebele indunas who gathered to discuss the issue were dealt with punitively: Lobengula's brother, for instance, was banished for holding an illegal council of indunas. By the end of 1895 it was clear that no restoration of the Kingship could be hoped for within the framework of Company administration and that the Ndebele way of life could be preserved only by flight or resistance. Early in 1896 another of Lobengula's brothers did trek with his followers out of the Company's area of control northwards across the Zambesi. Most other members of the royal family and the regimental commanders were coming rather to the conclusion that they must fight. An opportunity was needed – and in January 1896 it was given. The news came that Jameson, on his last and

fatal gamble, had led the great majority of the white police of Rhodesia into defeat and capture in the Transvaal. From that moment a rising was decided upon.

CRACK REGIMENTS

Ranger's book gives a detailed account of how the rising was organised and co-ordinated. Most of the military effectiveness of the rebellion in Matabeleland came from the revival of the old regimental system: many of the crack regiments had not been destroyed as military units, though they were no longer organised in military formation, but scattered among the various kraals. The young men, the young warriors, had felt the impact of colonial rule most heavily. Intelligence reports on the rebel forces, Ranger reports, sound like a roll call of the old regime. Their leaders were the sons, brothers and nephews of Lobengula; senior indunas regimental commanders and kraal heads. "This", wrote one observer "is the Matabele war which did not take place three years ago."

However, there were complications. A ceremony was planned to initiate the rising and to proclaim a member of the royal house, Umfezela, the new King, thus inaugurating a new regime recognised by all regiments, and possessing a centralised directing centre. The ceremony was not held: there was opposition to Umfezela's candidature by some of the younger, militant indunas, and the differences involved different ideas about the rising and how it should be conducted. These differences were not resolved and throughout the rising the rebel Ndebele aristocracy was divided roughly into two factions. So the regiments that went into action did not act according to a single plan conceived by a single Ndebele military authority and some of the indunas actually held aloof from the plans for a rising, and refused to join it.

Yet apart from the important regiments that joined the rising, the Holi, the lowest caste of Ndebele society, also took part, by contrast with their passivity during the 1893 war, and the Shona people living as tributaries in Ndebele country, were also thoroughly committed. And when it comes to an explanation of how ordination was achieved between the Shona groups and the Ndebele, it was the leading officers of the Shona religious cult, which functioned also in Ndebele country, who lent both their moral support and their organisational apparatus to the campaign was in the hands of the regimental commanders; but the moral command was exercised by Mkwati, one of the leaders of the Mwari cult, and by others. Ranger sums up. "The rising in Matabeleland, then, was a coalition of different and even hostile groups combined in the common interest of overthrowing the whites. That these groups were able to launch an attack on outlying whites which was roughly synchronised and to put into the field a force to invest Bulawayo was partly due to the continued authority and efficiency of Ndebele institutions and partly due to the existence of a widely influential religious organisation which was at one and the same time in touch with the Ndebele leadership and with men of influence and decision in the tributary Shona areas . . . In most parts of Matabeleland and Shona men of authority joined with the Mwari priests to bring out their people."

THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL RELIGION

Then there is the story of how the rebellion spread to Mashonaland.

The White accounts of so-called inherent Shona disunity were exploded in the capacity of the majority of the paramounts to mobilise for the war. While in the Ndebele rising the military strength depended upon the surviving institutions of the Ndebele military system, with officers of the Mwari cult exercising a remarkable influence over the regiments, in the Shona rising the strength depended upon the mobilisation of the fighting men by the paramounts and their sons. This meant that the sort of discipline and regimental tradition which enabled the siege of Bulawayo could not be called upon in Mashonaland; on the other hand the traditional religious system and the hierarchy of the spirit mediums achieved an astonishing level of commitment and co-ordination, both between Ndebele and Mashona and to control the rising within the area itself. Charismatic prophet figures emerged to transform the appeal of the religious system into something more radical and revolutionary. Mkwati, for instance, sought not merely to coordinate resistance but to create a 'new order', and this radical vision was the direct fore-runner of the later revolutionary strain in the liberation movement.

Meanwhile, in Matabeleland, Rhodes had resolved to make contact with the Ndebele leaders and to offer a negotiated settlement. Despite the African successes there was some evidence that some of the senior indunas might welcome such overtures. It was Rhodes' plan to play on these divisions. Promises were made about the redress of grievances; and a new policy was inaugurated of according to tribal heads the authority they had in Lobengula's time and which in his overthrow they had lacked, the **Pall Mall Gazette** of the day worded it "the indunas are to get back all of their authority of Lobengula's time that is compatible with **white supremacy**", but it took some time for the reality of this to become apparent. There was, however, a determined struggle for some months within Matabeleland to stop the attempt 'to betray the revolution'.

CHIMURENGA – A TRADITION OF REBELLION

The Shona rising which broke out only two months before negotiations began with the Ndebele was not crushed until the end of 1897. Shona strongholds in mountain caves were ruthlessly dynamited, but the resistance held firm for a while, inspired by attempts, led by the religious leaders, to revive the former Rozwi paramountcy of earlier days. Innumerable small actions, the relentless destruction of crops, and the persecution, capture, and finally execution of the key mediums finally ended resistance in Mashonaland.

The effects of these heroic rebellions were several. In the first place, Southern Rhodesia moved steadily towards settler supremacy enshrined in the constitution; a mixture of Company and settler power was the form that white supremacy took in Rhodesia after 1898. The powers given the Ndebele indunas proved illusory, and helped, in the long term to lay a fresh basis for resistance to white sett-

ler rule. Few risings had presented such a formidable challenge to white rule and had achieved a similar degree of effectiveness, on a supra-tribal and supra-linguistic scale. There was mass commitment under a leadership – the religious mediums – that defied the technological superiority of white power with the superiority of an opposing African independence ideology. Other Shona risings broke out later, in mainly Portuguese territory, in 1900 and again in 1917. Likewise Ndebele and Zulu interactions meant that the Ndebele were touched by the Zulu rising of 1906, and Ndebele migrants southwards were influenced by the new forms of protest that were growing. Additionally the break of Rhodes' promises over land rallied the radical Ndebele movement and also made possible the transition from nineteenth to twentieth century rebellion. When the current phase of rebellion rose in Rhodesia, there was mass commitment to it: elite politics and constitutional solutions derived in the 'twenties and thirties' had never firmly caught on. The tradition of rebellion is deeply embedded in the rural masses and the phase of the struggle now being waged in Rhodesia – which is called once again by the Shona name for the 1896–97 risings – Chimurenga – is fired with the inspiration and the complex experiences of the rebellions seventy-odd years ago.

R. F.



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LIFE UNDER APARTHEID



Spotlight on a Police State

CALLOUS

A POLICEMAN said in the Vanderbijlpark Magistrate's Court that he had dragged an African under a barbed wire fence after arresting him in his hut for not being able to produce a reference book.

Jafta Mtebane 34, of Moowater District, Vanderbijlpark, is charged before Mr. G. F. Teynders with resisting arrest and failing to produce a reference book when asked by Constable S. S. J. Puth of the Barrage Police to do so. Mtebane pleaded not guilty to both counts.

NO EMERGENCY YET?

More than a thousand people in a Coloured township of Ennerdale, 15 miles outside Johannesburg were without water for 5 days.

The distressed people were forced to keep their children away from school because they were unable to wash. Many spent up to £5 on soft drinks for their families and fighting broke out at the borehole which did not have enough water.

The problem, the authorities explained, was caused by an influx of

squatters and the only borehole could not meet the situation. In an emergency situation they would consider introducing an extra tank.

MOVE ON

What is it like to be an African lawyer in South Africa?

In the booming metropolis of Johannesburg, a handful of African lawyers will be moved some 15/20 miles away from the Central law courts.

In terms of the Group Areas Act, Africans should not occupy or own premises in White Areas.

The same fate now looms over the non-white doctors.

OUTCAST

A White man in Pietermaritzburg, Mr. Owen Greenland, has elected to become an "Indian." He has converted to Islam "not for any other reason than being unhappy as a White man."

In an interview which apparently upset his family and friends, he said, "I have broken all my ties with White friends. All my friends now are Indians. I no longer take out White girls."

If Mr. Greenland is refused permission to live as a non-white, he will leave the country and "live as far as possible from South Africa."

NO PASS

An African, no matter what his status, can be subjected to a great deal of harassment. This was the experience of Mr. Gibson Kente, the producer of a musical whose rehearsals were held up for two hours.

Mr. Kente was arrested at the police station where he called to release a cast member who failed to produce his pass.

Both men were locked up until their passes had been fetched from their homes.

JAPANESE ARRESTED

The South African Police were baffled when a dog-handler raided a room in Durban's dockland and found a group of "Honorary Whites" Japanese seamen in the company of nude White women.

After lengthy discussions at the police station it was decided not to charge the Japanese as they are regarded as "Whites" in terms of the Immorality Act.

But Durban police are still not very happy. They want further official clarification as the "Honorary Whites" frequently make Durban one of their Ports of Call.

'CANCEL ALL AUSSIE TOURS'

CANBERRA. - An opposition Labour M.P. last night called on Australian cricket and Rugby authorities to cancel proposed tours of Australia by South African teams. The member, Mr. B. Cohen, said unless Australian sporting officials woke up now, there would be a disaster for sport. Speaking in the House of Representatives, Mr. Cohen said the policy of trying to change attitudes in South Africa by continuing sporting relationships seemed to have failed dismally.

