




# SECHABANA

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MOSES MABHIDA 1923 — 1986

# SECHABA

## MAY 1986

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*Back cover, top: (from left to right) Steve Dlamini, OR Tambo, Dorothy Nyembe, Gladys Manzi, Josephine Bhala and Jean Noel.  
Bottom: A guard of honour from the Mozambican Armed Forces at the coffin of Comrade Mabhida.*

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# EDITORIAL

## LIBERATING EDUCATION

The December 1985 Consultative Conference on Education decided that pupils should return to schools after a lengthy boycott where, in some schools, attendance was bordering on zero. This was subject to Pretoria fulfilling certain demands within three months.

The Second National Consultative Conference, which met in Durban in March, was called to assess and evaluate progress in this regard and to decide on what action to be taken.

Before the opening of this important conference, which was attended by 1 500 people, the delegates stood with raised fists and observed a minute of silence in memory of the recently deceased Comrade Moses Mabhida.

The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) had convened the conference, but the main force behind the committee was the UDF.

The NECC meeting this March decided not to boycott the reopening of Black schools on April 2nd. But several demands were made: free tuition and books for children of all race groups (free tuition in South Africa is only for Whites up to the age of 16); the rebuilding of all schools; the unbanning of COSAS; the removal of troops from the townships and that the state should provide creches, nursery schools and after school centres for all children.

The NECC conference did not erect an artificial wall between educational and political matters. It went further and called for a stayaway on June 16th, 17th and 18th to mark the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. June 16th was declared a National Youth Day. The conference came out with a call for a May Day stayaway to celebrate the centenary of the day. It condemned Reagan's support for UNITA and demanded the release of all political prisoners and detainees, including students and teachers.

New and creative techniques were discussed and adopted, such as taking control of schools, using them as a base for political organisation and introducing a liberation-oriented "people's education." The consumer boycott of White businesses, refusal to pay rent and work and school stayaways were all part of these techniques.

There were disturbing incidents at the conference — the Buthelezi-Muzorewa option. Gatsha Buthelezi said the NECC did not concern itself with educational matters, and indeed they chose Durban as a venue because they wanted to mobilise Black pupils there to do their political work for them. Rather full of himself and expressing an inflated and exaggerated opinion of his importance, he said the conference was aimed at giving evidence that it was possible "to attack me from bases very near my home."

The NECC conference suffered sporadic attacks by Gatsha's Inkatha; people who were armed with sticks, rocks and assegais; people who were ferried by two PUTCO buses hired by Inkatha to storm the delegates four hours before the start of the conference. These Inkatha people are supposed to be as concerned about their children's future as any parent should be. Two of them died during the attack, and the conference declared that Inkatha is an "enemy of the people" which has to be exposed, isolated and fought against because it is in league with the racists.

This conference was not just another meeting at which political slogans were shouted. There was a recognition of the link between national liberation and a liberated education; an education system initiated by the people and accountable to the people. The students, parents and teachers do not want an education equal to that of the Whites, but are fighting for a new education system that is free, equal, democratic and dynamic. This is all the more so because the Blacks see the present education system as preparing them for subservience and dividing them into classes and ethnic groups. No vision of a better society. The future of Black education must be decided by Black parents, teachers and pupils rather than by the state. This unity in action helps to destroy social stereotypes such as young rebel street fighters versus confused, conservative parents.

It is this unity in action that the ANC calls for. We must fight the enemy on all fronts. The education front is an important battlefield.



# PEOPLE'S WAR, REVOLUTION & INSURRECTION

*Ronnie Kasrils speaks to Sechaba*



Ronnie Kasrils, a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe from its beginnings, spoke to *Sechaba* about the development of MK and the unfolding of the people's war.

**What can you tell us about the growth of Umkhonto we Sizwe over 25 years, in numerical strength, arms and training and influence among the people of South Africa?**

MK has made tremendous strides in admittedly a long period, but a very difficult period of our history. It has grown out of a few small sabotage units which were based in the main centres of our country in 1961. A couple of hundred brave cadres constituted the vanguard of the people's army-to-be, and performed heroic deeds. Several hundred more were recruited in that period for training abroad, and left the country.

We were based inside our country, rooted among our people. We had the political base of the ANC and the SACP to rely on. We were linked to the people and to the political organisations and the leadership. This was a great advantage of that time.

Those first units received rudimentary training inside South Africa. We made our own explosives from chemical powders; dynamite sticks

were smuggled out of the mines, or we stole explosives in raids on quarries. We embarked with high hopes on the first phase of our armed struggle, and that was sabotage action.

Our leadership had decided to embark on the mode of armed struggle because all forms of peaceful struggle had been exhausted, and it was necessary to demonstrate that we were embarking on a new form of struggle. The sabotage campaign was intended to give us experience in this new form of struggle, and to enable us to strike blows at the regime and its economy (which is vulnerable to such actions); it was meant to inspire our people, and build our forces, the nucleus of a people's army to be. This was a period of armed propaganda, propaganda by force.

We waited expectantly for the return of those who had gone abroad to acquire the advanced skills of warfare. On their return, it would be time for the launching of the armed struggle proper.

There were actions against the lines of communication in the country — the railways, electrical installations — pylons were a key target — and on occasions cities were plunged into darkness. There were audacious blows against government buildings, like pass offices, and in

1962 the office of the Minister of Agriculture in Pretoria, the heart of the government centre, was blown up and demolished.

We shall never forget some of those early leaders of MK, such as the great Vuyisile Mini, Zinakile Mkaba and Wilson Khayingo, who were executed for their activities, Looksmart Solwandle Ngudle, who died in detention, comrades like Jack Hodgson, who taught us the skills he had learned during the war, and the redoubtable Joe Gqabi.

Of course our early hopes and expectations were dashed by the ferocity of the enemy's counter-attack. We had to learn the hard way about mastering clandestine methods. It is history that with the Rivonia arrests in 1963 our leadership was imprisoned or forced into exile, and our movement at home crippled. To a certain extent, the people were demoralised as a result, and in those ensuing years, the mass struggle was certainly at a low ebb. The regime thought they had smashed the movement, and repeatedly boasted about it.

Of course they were to be proved wrong; but all this was a great setback to our plans. There was no surrender; we strove to push on with the struggle. At the most difficult period a comrade like Wilton Mkwayi, heading Umkhonto in the period 1963-64, managed to carry on with some actions, but in the end he and his group were also arrested.

The spirit of determination and commitment to the struggle was best demonstrated in the Zimbabwe campaign of 1967-68 and the deeds of the Luthuli Detachment. Their aim, of course, was to reach home and begin guerrilla-type actions there. Our comrades fought gloriously, and many died; among them, comrades who shall never be forgotten, like Delmas Sibanyoni, James Masimini, Paul Petersen (Basil February), Patrick Molaoa, Michael Pooe.

Many of the comrades who fought in that campaign are leaders of MK today; and, though we failed in our objective of getting home, our comrades gained invaluable experience. This was an historic milestone in the struggle, and a true baptism of fire.

One problem of the time was the fact that we were a long way from our country. Also our underground inside the country had virtually ceased to exist, and the situation at home was cer-

tainly no stormy period of mass struggle. We still kept trying over the next few years, however, and never stopped the process of infiltration. But the going was slow.

It was the upsurge of struggle at home in the period 1973-74, the big strikes, and then the new mood of the youth, the Soweto uprising of 1976, that changed the situation. The Soweto uprising was like a flash of lightning that showed an entire generation the need for arms, and it heralded a period when mass struggle was once more in the ascendant. This struggle of our people has grown dramatically year by year, and now month by month, virtually week by week. Hundreds and even thousands of recruits have joined Umkhonto as a result. Our people's army has grown tremendously. We now possess many skills and, thanks to our friends in the socialist world, especially the Soviet Union, we have at our disposal all forms of modern weapons suited to our struggle.

This period has witnessed a great and dramatic increase in the combat actions at home, including many brilliant and brave ones. There have been the attacks on SASOL and Voortrekkerhoogte, Koeberg, the bomb blast outside the South African Air Force headquarters in Pretoria, the attacks on the enemy's communications, the limpet and land mine attacks on his borders and deep in the country. Most significantly, there was the land mine action in Mamelodi recently, where an armoured vehicle full of soldiers was destroyed. Grenade attacks are now taking place in many of the townships from the Cape to the Reef, and there was the recent audacious bomb blast at John Vorster Square. There have been physical attacks on soldiers and police, so we now see mounting casualties on the side of the enemy. All these demonstrate the effectiveness of our combatants, and some of the actions show tremendous skill.

MK has never been so popular among young and old as it is now, and we witness at the demonstrations and funerals the people clad in khaki uniforms and berets, carrying wooden AK rifles and singing MK songs. *Hamba Kahle, Mkhonto!* has become the song of the streets and barricades, and it's clear that the stone throwers, the hurlers of petrol bombs, all regard themselves as would-be soldiers of Umkhonto we Sizwe.

I would like to mention the names of some of our outstanding combatants, who, by their deeds and sacrifices, wrote glorious pages in the com-



*New Brighton, Port Elizabeth, March 1986.*

bat record of Umkhonto We Sizwe during this decade of rebellion, and have contributed to the revolutionary upsurge of our people. They were comrades such as Solomon Mahlangu, Jerry Mosololi, Marcus Motaung, Simon Mogoerane, who bravely faced the Pretoria hangmen. There were those who fell at Matola, Maseru, Gabarone and elsewhere, such as Motso Mokgabudi, Mduduzi Guma, Krish Rabilal, Zwelakhe Nyanda, Nomkhosi Mini (daughter of Vuyisile), David Skosana, Titus Jobo and Harold Dantile (Morris). There were many who fought it out to the last bullet or hand grenade, comrades such as the Silverton heroes, Thami Makhuba, Wilfred Madela and Fanie Mafoko, Linda Jubane, the "lion of Chiewelo," Khuduga Molokwane, the Dobsonville schoolteacher. There was Richard Molokoane (Barney), one of our most outstanding commanders, who died with Victor Khayiyane and Vincenzo Sekete only last December, after a daring bid to attack Sasol once again with rockets, Linda Khuzwayo, who fell in Ingwavuma in 1984, Livingstone Gaza, Vincent Tshabalala, Lucas Njongwe, Eldridge Yakiti, Jerry Nene and Samuel Segola (Elias Banda), courageous fighters all, the last falling valiantly in a shoot-out with police as

recently as March this year in Kattlehong.

Martyrs like these, and our leaders and combatants imprisoned for years for MK and other actions, performed indispensable tasks, and will never be forgotten. Their brave deeds inspire our army and our people, and their spears have been picked up by others.

**You have described how MK played its role in popularising the idea of armed revolutionary force. Of the other aims of MK itself, what still remains to be done?**

One aim was the training and organisation of our people as armed combatants; to arm them. That is now our central task. Our army exists; we have a nucleus of trained combatants who are fighting inside the country, or receiving training abroad. But of course when we see our people, the people of South Africa, still largely confronting the enemy with stones in hand, we have to admit that our aim of arming the people has a long way to go. That army of stone-throwers has to be transformed into an army with weapons. Our people have the mood and spirit; every stone-thrower wants a gun. We have to put guns in their hands.

Another aim was to present an effective method for the overthrow of White supremacy and the apartheid state. Without an instrument of force we would be like the proverbial toothless bulldog — all bark and no bite. So, for us, another essential task is the building up of our revolutionary army of the people.

We're also achieving the merging of our combatants with our people — that, after all, is a prerequisite for successful armed struggle and revolution.

We will only have achieved all our goals when we have achieved the seizure of power.

**Not all acts of revolutionary violence in South Africa today can be attributed to MK; many have come from among the people. How do you evaluate these?**

In the last two years the insurrectionary mood of our people has grown; we've seen the people resorting to acts of force. Such acts have been inspired by the example of MK, and by the ANC's call to the nation, and our people showed their readiness to follow such a lead. Of course the people are reacting to their conditions of life, they're showing that they demand change. Where people have no forms of democratic political expression, then they must — it's only natural — find other ways to express their urge for changed conditions of life, even to the point of sacrificing themselves, even to the point of death.

We've seen the development among our people of forms of warfare, and our people are showing tremendous creativity. We've seen the growth of barricade tactics; we've seen the digging of ditches and traps for the Hippos and Casspirs; we've seen barbed wire being strung across the roads to catch the enemy forces; we've seen the development of street fighting in the most tactical sense, the most skilful sense, with the people using the labyrinth of township lanes and streets to lure the enemy into ambush. We've seen the stone being transformed into the petrol bomb and hand grenade; we've seen the people using knives to kill police and soldiers; we've seen the people seizing the enemy's own weapons to use against them. There was a story in the *Cape Times* last year of a boy in Fort Beaufort who used his catapult to damage a helicopter flying overhead — this is a wonderful example of the weapons our people are able to improvise and



use, and, side by side with limpet mines and hand grenades and AKs, home-made weapons have a very important part to play in our struggle.

We've also seen people counter-attacking in the White suburbs and city centres, creating confusion and fear in the enemy's ranks.

We've seen them attacking the community councillors and the informers — and here they've had to resort to rough justice, for the state relies on its loathsome army of sell-outs and informers, and, unless a people arisen can purge its community of the enemy within, it is not possible to advance.

In this way the townships have been made no-go areas for the enemy. The first line of the enemy's control in the townships has been destroyed. The enemy can only enter those townships in massive convoys, and all the time those armoured convoys are being pelted by stones and are under fire from petrol bombs, so that it's only for those fleeting minutes, as the convoy passes the street, that a state force is present. In the vacuum that's left we've seen the rudimentary organs of people's power being created. This is a significant development, because our people are beginning to take control of their lives, whether it's the question of keeping the streets clean or the question of responding to the death squads of the enemy and the izimpimpi. In that situation we're seeing a people's militia, a people's self-defence force, emerging; this is in its embryonic stage, too. Such developments are of tremendous revolutionary significance, and are part of the whole climate, the mood of insurrection.

**At present, we see the people with improvised weapons fighting the army and the police, and on the other hand we see MK carrying out a different kind of operation. You spoke earlier about MK "merging" with the people. How is this to be done? Is MK a people's army or the nucleus of a people's army?**

With the transformation of the situation at home, our base is once more inside our country, amongst our people. What has been a low-intensity war over 25 years is now taking off into fully-fledged armed struggle and people's war, involving our people in their hundreds of thousands. The mass struggle and the armed struggle are merging in the sense that the armed struggle is being situated among the masses, and our trained combatants are now able to merge among our risen people, more and more of whom are being brought into MK units at home.

We have never held the view that an elite force of guerrillas, of full-time combatants, would alone be the instrument of victory. It is the people who make history, who make revolutions, not an elite force. Our movement has always looked to the people; our aim has always been to gain the active support of the people, and their involvement. That is why we say ours is a people's war..

Now a people's war surely needs a people's army. What we are seeing at present is the preliminary form of that revolutionary people's army.

As you say, at present we see MK actions on the one hand and on the other the sometimes spontaneous, sometime organised, violence of the people. While the mass struggle shows the elements of revolutionary violence we have referred to, we cannot yet say it fully represents armed force — after all, stone-throwing is stone-throwing, not skilful military operations. So the gap you mention is there.

Our people are aroused for action, and what they really represent is an aroused political force. Our task is to transform the political force into a revolutionary people's army. Lenin referred to this as transforming the "political army of the revolution" into the "revolutionary armed forces" or "the people in arms." This is what our movement has been calling a "people's army."

**Comrade, can you clarify further the concept of a revolutionary people's army?**

I would say a revolutionary people's army may consist of three parts. First, there are the organised advance detachments — the vanguard; second, the revolutionary armed people, and third, those elements of the enemy forces which may be won over to the side of the revolution. The first and second parts alone would constitute a people's army, but where elements of three are present a much-sought-after third dimension is achieved, as with the Bolshevik, Chinese and Cuban experiences.

The organised vanguard detachment — in our case, MK — is, in terms of your previous question, the nucleus of the people's army. This is the element that is organised initially into combat units of various types, which may be urban combat groups, sabotage units, assassination squads, and other special forces situated anywhere in the countryside, town or city, and acting, of necessity, in a clandestine, secret way. The guerrilla units of the countryside are part of this vanguard — they may operate more openly, depending on the terrain of the country, because it's the terrain that determines the size of a group, its mode of operation and so on. By the way, since rural guerrilla warfare is often taken to be the main form of armed struggle. I would like to stress that it may be only one element, and maybe not even the leading or dominant mode.

Another element of this vanguard will be the people's self-defence militia, based in the factory, township and village; these units may be legal, semi-legal or illegal, depending on the conditions and possibilities.

The second component, the revolutionary armed people, is an active, conscious part of the political army, ready with arms in hand to unite with, and under, the organised command and leadership of the advance detachments of the revolutionary army, to take part in the armed struggle for political power.

The third component, the units of the enemy armed forces, that join the revolution, may be a difficult section to organise, but nevertheless this remains a vital ingredient. Of course, the extent to which such elements may be won over depends on the situation in a particular country. But I would like to deal with this a little later, if I may.



## **How is this army formed? How is it built up?**

Let's deal first of all with the vanguard detachments. We began in 1961 to form our vanguard detachment, which is Umkhonto — we've seen how over 25 years various elements have developed and grown, showing that the process is not completed overnight. This is particularly true of the self-defence groups; we've seen how only lately the conditions have matured for these to emerge as, for example, the *amabutho* of the Eastern Cape, or the Young Lions of Alexandra and elsewhere. The organisation of the vanguard detachments will start with the creation of the leadership organs for combat work; it will involve the training of specially selected cadres and recruits; it will involve the creation of the various combat units I've referred to, and it will involve the early operations of this vanguard, which in time develops and grows, as MK has.

Concerning the building of the "revolutionary armed people" — this is an even more complex and advanced problem than the first task of forming the advance organs, and the actions of the advance detachments play a vital role in accomplishing the task.

We are here talking firstly about the development of mass political consciousness, and consciousness of the need to fight with arms. We are talking about the task of bringing military skills and training to the people, and building up reserves of arms inside the country so that side by side with the developing armed struggle (carried out in the first instance by the advance detachments) we have the schooling of the people in the use of arms, building on their own use of rudimentary forms of warfare and the improvisation of weaponry; being able to bring weapons into their hands, being able to organise them into disciplined groups. As the struggle develops, so more and more of the popular masses are brought into organised forms of people's war and swell the ranks of the people's army. In this way the nucleus — or the vanguard — bridges the gap between itself and the masses, and finds ways of arming the people and creating the revolutionary army we speak about.

The question of how to win over the third element, some sections of the enemy's army and police, is an extremely important one. We are

not talking about winning over huge numbers from the enemy army, but certainly affecting it in such a way as to render it less efficient to the state.

In our situation, where we now have bantustan armies and where the state needs more and more Blacks to do their dirty work for them, we have the chance of working within the enemy forces, and winning over at least some Black soldiers and police, if not some progressive-minded Whites. We see that there are certainly possibilities of affecting the troops in the White conscript army. This would mean the organisation of specialised structures dealing with work within the enemy forces; for that work needs to involve the creation of underground groups and organs of the movement within the enemy forces, the creation of patriotic and democratic groups and organisations affecting the enemy forces, such as the armed forces movement in Portugal, and also the conduct of agitational and propaganda work among the enemy forces and among the civilian population.

Where this work is successful, the enemy armed forces and police will be undermined, and decomposed from within; elements will be neutralised, and, at crucial times, the revolutionary army of the people may find its ranks increased by some elements of the enemy forces ready to pass over to the side of the revolution.

During the process, we gather our forces, build our combat units, and develop from a nucleus to a fully-fledged people's army waging a people's war. The stage of an armed uprising may well arise during this process, where the goal of seizing political power will be achieved.

The time scale may be protracted, or more rapid than we imagine.

**From what you say, comrade, it seems we've come quite a way from the classical form of guerrilla warfare. The task of MK in South Africa has always differed from the task of guerrilla movements elsewhere in Southern Africa and the world — the terrain isn't thickly wooded; there's an absence of friendly borders; much MK work has to be done in the cities. To what extent have these conditions constituted problems for MK, or to what extent have they determined MK's mode of working?**

It would be helpful to remind ourselves that there are various forms of revolutionary violence, not

only guerrilla warfare. Comrade Mandela cited four at the Rivonia Trial: armed uprising or insurrection; sabotage, civil war, terrorism. A revolutionary people's army can use any one or any combination of these forms of force, and the choice will depend on the existing conditions in a country.

Guerrilla warfare in its classical sense conjures up images of liberated zones, friendly borders, rear bases, large detachments, forest and mountain sanctuaries, which do not appear to be readily attainable in our situation.

This is not to rule out the possibilities of guerrilla actions in the rural areas or bantustans. South Africa is large, has lengthy borders, some mountainous areas and plenty, if inextensive, areas of bush. For most of 1984, some of our combatants managed to live and organise among the people in the Lebombo Mountains in the Ingwavuma area, and this example gives us the understanding and the inspiration to repeat such activities. The countryside offers us possibilities of developing guerrilla actions, although the conditions and the terrain will of necessity reduce the size of our units operating in such areas.

It's a question of getting the correct balance. Of course, the urban areas are vital terrain of our struggle, and the decade of rebellion has certainly reminded us of this. At the same time, we must be aware of our weakness in the countryside and in the bantustans particularly, though it is encouraging to see that the revolt of the townships has spread to many rural settlements. Only recently we've seen the struggle develop in Bophuthatswana, in the northern and eastern Transvaal, as it had already developed in the small villages and dorps of the eastern Cape.

For the development of our people's war we have to move forward side by side, the people of the towns and the people of the countryside. The enemy's great weakness is his numbers, which are so few compared to the people's, his isolation and the vast tracts of our country and its borders that he has to police and control, so that activity anywhere in our country, armed blows anywhere in our country, people's resistance anywhere in our country, stretches the enemy's resources and manpower to a tremendous degree. This, indeed, is his Achilles' heel, and our strategy must be imbued with an approach that forces him to disperse his forces throughout the country.

At our National Consultative Conference, the commission dealing with strategy and tactics made what I think was an important contribution by stating that, given our situation, in the whole question of advancing the armed struggle we should situate our strategy within two key realities, the one unfavourable, the other favourable. The negative is that we have not until now had the possibility of a friendly border with rear bases in the fullest sense of the term, and this has been an unfavourable condition for us. The positive, favourable factor is our strength in the urban areas, based on the people of the townships, the working class, the youth.

These urban centres have a thousand and one links with the bantustans and the rural areas, and we should utilise our urban strength, our township strength, our working class strength, as a springboard to develop our organisational strength and our armed strength within the countryside itself. For example, Mdantsane, that great urban township of the eastern Cape is the main springboard into the Ciskei; KwaMashu and Umlazi have the same relationship to KwaZulu and so on. The urban bases could become the rear bases of our struggle in the countryside.

Of course we will use whatever possibilities exist to reach the bantustans and the countryside, but surely the urban situation allows us this other way to develop our struggle. We should remember that in Cuba, for example, the guerrilla struggle, which was based largely in the countryside, in the mountains, had its springboard in the urban centres, in the city, where the movement had its strongholds in the first place.

But we must never lose sight of the fact that, whether in the course of a guerrilla war of the bush, or a civil war, or through urban guerrilla struggle, armed insurrection must figure as the key way in which power may ultimately be seized. For, unlike FRELIMO or the MPLA, we are not fighting a bush war against a colonial power that may ultimately grant independence after negotiations, and withdraw. In our situation, if real change is to be achieved, we have to face up to the question of state power. How will the existing state structures and instruments of force be destroyed? How will the revolution be defended?

**What conditions are necessary for the armed uprising, the insurrection? How do you see it taking place? Is it possible in South Africa, with its powerful military machine?**

Armed insurrection, in some form or other, rather than guerrilla warfare, but often as a culmination of guerrilla warfare, is the classic method of making a revolution. There appear to be two main categories into which insurrections fall — the spontaneous mass uprising, as in Iran, and the planned uprising, as in Petrograd, October 1917. These stand at either end of a scale of varying possibilities.

In the first category there is no prearranged plan or date, with an entirely unexpected, even extraneous event sparking off the conflagration. In such a situation, revolutionaries struggle to gain control, and organise the seizure of power.

In the second category, insurrection is deliberately timed as the final move in a carefully prepared plan of revolutionary action — in which the balance of forces has been finely calculated. The Bolsheviks struggled to gain control over the forces unleashed by the February Revolution, an unexpected event, and directed these forces to the planned seizure of power in October 1917. What we can be sure about is that every revolution which must depend for its ultimate success upon popular support demands an active revolutionary situation before insurrection can be safely launched. It also needs a movement which has the forces and means powerful enough to overthrow the existing order.

Now, we have been working over the years to bring about that revolutionary situation and to build the forces necessary for victory. Ours has indeed been a difficult and protracted struggle. How much more time is required before an active revolutionary situation matures cannot be exactly predicted. A Bolshevik has stated of the February Revolution: "The idea of going into the streets had long been ripening among the workers, only at that moment nobody imagined where it would lead."

We must remember that we do not control every act of the people's, or the response of the enemy authorities. But the mass struggle is advancing at such a pace that we must prepare to take advantage of any swing in the situation, and work with utmost speed to build the type of organisation ready to take control and direct any

uprising, which may well begin fairly spontaneously. Above all, this means the presence of a Political Army of the Revolution (the ANC and the popular mass organisations) and the Revolutionary People's Army.

If we are to learn from our people, the township revolts, the decade of rebellion of 1976-86, then surely we need to devise a strategy based on an 'insurrectionist' approach? This would consist of a meshing of political and armed struggle of all types, guerrilla warfare in the countryside and the remarkable phenomenon of popular uprisings in the cities and towns. Such a strategy would have to plan for perhaps a succession of local and general uprisings, as well as for the unexpected.

The unexpected will also involve reformist or ultra-right attempts by sections of the ruling class to divert or block the path of the revolution. These might very well be unexpected shifts in the political situation, which could present us with a revolutionary situation or a grave threat. We must also remember that history does not often present revolutionary situations.

Turning to the SADF and SAP, the pillars of White supremacy — history shows that, in the last resort, success or failure hinges upon the attitude which the armed forces of the status quo government will take towards an insurrection. Revolutionary movements seldom achieve their objectives unless they can convert the soldiers whose duty it is to uphold the existing regime, or weaken their spirit.

I have already indicated that while we may not expect to convert large numbers of White soldiers, we can succeed in weakening the spirit and morale of a good proportion, and that we can win over Black soldiers and police.

While the Bolsheviks could concentrate on undermining the already discontented Russian army, persuading wavering troops to their side, we will have to weaken the SADF and perfect a strong insurrectionary fighting force. The late David Rabkin wrote in *Umsebenzi*:

"Although the SADF is a powerful military machine, it needs political direction in order to function. But politics has to consider other factors beside force. We can **paralyse the political direction** behind the SADF so that it becomes unable to act."

The SADF is a largely conscript army, subject to all the pressures and tensions of South



*Nucleus of a people's army.*

African society — political, moral and material. Just as they are not impervious to MK bullets (and unfortunately this is the main way in which White South Africa's eyes will be opened) neither are they ultimately impervious to the mass struggle and the policy of the ANC. The SADF is no monolith, and during a revolutionary crisis its fabric will be placed under tremendous strain. Differences between the conscripted 'troopies' and the officer corps will be accentuated, as well as the old English-Afrikaans language divisions and the differences between those officers and men following Botha-Malan-style reform and those whose allegiances lie with the unpredictable HNP-CP rebels.

Under the conditions of a revolutionary crisis

it is quite conceivable that the security forces of the state will not be operating at full strength, will be suffering from desertions and demoralisation, from mutiny among Black troops, from indecision and differences at the top, and will not be able to cope with the situation.

At that time, when the civil machine and military machine are not powerful enough to withstand the rising revolutionary pressures, our struggle will triumph.

**Thank you, comrade.**

Thank you, and my revolutionary greetings to all our combatants, in this the year of Umkhonto we Sizwe, the People's Army.

# STATEMENT

## COSATU, SACTU & THE ANC

*This communique was issued jointly by COSATU, SACTU and the ANC.*

Delegations of the Executive of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) the National Executive Committee of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress (ANC) met in Lusaka on 5th and 6th March 1986.

The respective delegations were led by Comrade Jay Naidoo, General Secretary of COSATU, Comrade John K Nkadimeng, General Secretary of SACTU and Comrade Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC. During the course of the discussions COSATU and SACTU held a separate session to discuss matters of common interest as trade unionists.

The meeting resulted from the common concern of all parties arising from the fundamental and deep-seated economic, social and political crisis into which the Botha regime and the apartheid system of national oppression and class exploitation have plunged our country. There was common understanding that the Pretoria regime and the ruling class of South Africa are powerless to provide any real and meaningful solutions to this general crisis, that lasting solutions can only emerge from the national liberation movement, headed by the ANC, and the entire democratic forces of our country, of which COSATU is an important and integral part.

In this regard it was recognised that the fundamental problem facing our country, the question of political power, cannot be resolved without the full participation of the ANC, which is regarded by the majority of the people of South Africa as the overall leader and genuine representative.

The meeting recognised that the emergence of COSATU as the giant democratic and progressive trade union federation in our country is an historic event in the process of uniting our

working class and will immeasurably strengthen the democratic movement as a whole.

After extensive discussions on the current internal and international situation, characterised by a warm spirit of comradeship, the three delegations agreed on a number of important issues. They agreed that the solution to the problems facing our country lies in the establishment of a system of majority rule in a united, democratic and non-racial South Africa. Further, that in the specific conditions of our country it is inconceivable that such a system can be separated from economic emancipation. Our people have been robbed of their land, deprived of their due share in the country's wealth, their skills have been suppressed and poverty and starvation has been their life experience. The correction of these centuries old economic injustices lies at the core of our national aspirations. Accordingly they were united not only in their opposition to the entire apartheid system, but also in their common understanding that victory must embrace more than formal political democracy.

### **COSATU Position**

The Cosatu delegation explained that the principal tasks facing their federation is to consolidate their membership and affiliates, rapidly effect conversion of the general unions which are part of Cosatu into an industry-based union, within each industry bring about mergers in order to realise the principle of one industry, one union and to unite the entire working force of our country under the banner of Cosatu. At the same time, as a representative of our working class, Cosatu is seized with the task of engaging the workers in the general democratic struggle, both as an independent organisation and as an essential component of the democratic forces of our country. In this regard, the advancement of the interests of the workers and the democratic struggle of our people requires that Cosatu, in working together with the other democratic mass organisations, seek to build disciplined alliances so as to ensure



that the mobilisation of our people in united mass action also deepens the organisational basis of all democratic organisations of the people.

### **ANC Positions**

The delegation of the ANC also reported to the meeting on its policy, its programme, its strategy and tactics. The ANC emphasised the need for the greatest possible mobilisation of all the people of our country to join in united political action against the apartheid regime, equally and in combination with the mass political struggle. The ANC also stressed the importance of the armed struggle to defend the people against the enemy armed forces and to give the people the possibility to seize power from a White minority regime which holds on to power by the use of force.

The three delegations agreed that it is of central importance that the campaign for the immediate unconditional release of all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, should develop with even greater intensity. They agreed that the three organisations would do their utmost in pursuit of this goal.

As the crisis of our country deepens, so too does the resistance, anger and the will of our people to fight back. In the process many issues have emerged and will continue to emerge as central campaigning issues.

At this very moment the entire democratic movement is confronted with the task of finding the correct campaign basis to destroy Bantu

Education and establish in its place one single democratic, non-racial, free and compulsory system of education for all the children of our country.

### **Campaigning Together**

Similarly it has become imperative that the workers of our country, together with all the democratic forces, work together to destroy the pass laws — the badge of slavery — and the whole system of influx control and prevent the Botha regime from re-introducing this hated system in any guise whatsoever.

In these and all other campaigns facing our people it is the duty of the democratic forces to work together and consult one another in order to establish the maximum unity in action by all our people. The delegations further agreed that the obstacle to any negotiated solution is the Botha regime. They concluded that no negotiations are possible while the leaders of the people are in prison and while the Pretoria regime refuses to accept that our country should be governed by all its people, both Black and white, as equals, as brothers and sisters. In this context the national liberation movement, headed by the ANC, explained that neither negotiations nor "talks about talks" have taken place and that the ANC is committed that any negotiations, if and when they should take place, must be public and involve the entire democratic movement.

In the discussions between COSATU and SACTU, both agreed that the widest possible unity of trade unions in our country is of utmost importance in our people's struggle against the apartheid regime and the bosses. Both agreed that there was no contradiction whatsoever arising from their separate existence.

The meeting between all three organisations was characterised by an overwhelming optimism that despite all the manoeuvres by the Botha regime and its allies, despite the heightening repression, victory over the system of white minority racist rule is not far off.

The meeting reiterated the commitment of the three organisations to fight for a society free from the chains of poverty, racism and exploitation which would require the restructuring of the present economy.

7th March, 1986

# ANC INTERNATIONAL

## US COMMUNISTS SUPPORT THE ANC

At the invitation of the *People's World*, the California-based organ of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), Comrade Francis Meli, editor of *Sechaba* had the occasion to visit the area. The week-long speaking engagement was part of the *People's World* campaign and ideological work in preparation for and in commemoration of the merger of two papers: the *Daily World* of the East Coast (New York area) and the *People's World* of the West Coast (California area). The new daily — *People's Daily World* — will be launched on May Day.

This occasion — a rare occasion — afforded the ANC the opportunity of addressing the American public on the problems of the press in South Africa and on the unfolding struggle in that southern part of Africa.

While he was in the US, Francis Meli spoke to trade unions and workers, students at universities, artists and activists of the Free South Africa Movement. CPUSA functionaries such as Kendra Alexander, state chair, Communist Party of California, were helpful in organising such meetings. Francis Meli visited party bookshops, and the press and radio were ever present.

The interest in our struggle and the commitment to supporting it were unmistakable. So wrote the United Transportation Union:

"On behalf of the San Francisco School Bus Drivers of United Transportation Union 1741, we send greetings to the African National Congress in its struggle against the forces of apartheid. Your victory is ours."

And Northern California Newspaper Guild stated that:

"We applaud your efforts, through the pages of *Sechaba* and other actions of the African National Congress, to inform the people of the world of the mass upheavals taking place in South Africa.

"The Newspaper Guild has an honourable record of supporting the just struggles of South African people against apartheid. We trust that your distinguished presence in the Bay Area will encourage others to do so as well."

And the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union pledged their continued support for the ongoing struggle against the evil system of apartheid. Many and similar messages of support were received.

At a banquet in Los Angeles, Comrade Meli spoke to over 1 000 people, who had come to listen to him and to express their solidarity with the struggling people. The question of international solidarity with our people became the central theme. This solidarity is in the interests of the American people, because the fall of the apartheid regime will definitely weaken American imperialism — "and this will be our contribution to the struggles of the American people," Comrade Meli said.

At the party headquarters in New York, the ANC met Comrades Gus Hall, Charlene Mitchell, James Jackson and the workers and staff of the *Daily World*. Again sentiments and feelings of solidarity with our people were expressed, this time by Mike Zagarell, the editor.

## KOREA

The Korean Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity in Pyongyang, North Korea, issued a statement on March 21st, the anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre. We quote part of it here:

"Today, the South African people, under the leadership of the African National Congress of South Africa, the legitimate organisation of their struggle, are waging a vigorous struggle in various forms, including armed struggle, to deal telling blows at the imperialists and racists.

"The final victory belongs to the South African people, who are striving for their just cause."

# CONDEMN APARTHEID AGGRESSION



## APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA DESTABILISES ZIMBABWE

By Jeffrey Khensani Mathebula

Following the explosion of a number of land mines planted by combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the border areas of the north-western Transvaal last December, the P W Botha regime, supported by the South African mass media and its counterpart in the West, has once again accused the ANC of killing 'poor innocent civilians' and going for what the enemy press terms 'soft targets.' The South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, went further and falsely accused Zimbabwe of threatening South Africa's security by allowing ANC guerrillas to use its territory as an infiltration route, for which he threatened to launch 'hot pursuit' raids against the neighbouring country. But when one examines the facts of the matter, the opposite turns out to be the case: South Africa is threatening the security of Zimbabwe.

Long before the explosion of these land mines, the illegal South African racist minority regime decided to go on the warpath against independent Africa by expanding its military and police forces in response to the challenge that the achievement of independence by African coun-

tries in the 1960s may pose against it in the future.

Among the first steps it took in expanding its forces was the construction of three military bases for the South African Air Force (SAAF) in the northern and north-eastern Transvaal in 1966. One was established in the Pietersburg district, not very far from the border with Zimbabwe, and equipped with a squadron of Sabre jets and three S247 super-sensitive surveillance radar systems supplied by the British company, Marconi Avionics Ltd, a subsidiary of GEC. Another was established at Nelspruit for use by border ground and air patrols, and another at Dunnottar as the headquarters of the 40th Air Squadron and major training centre for Harvard planes. The authoritative *Jane's Weapons System Yearbook* once mentioned the highly sophisticated radar system installed at the Pietersburg military air base, which allows the planes stationed there and at the nearby air force bases to carry out operations in all kinds of weather, and described the S247 as a "high-powered static radar system used for defence purposes."<sup>1</sup>



## **Ground Attack Squadrons**

In 1977, the South African regime began to construct another military base, this time at Hoedspruit in the eastern Transvaal, under the pretext of the need to deploy reconnaissance and interceptor planes in order to "defend South African air space." However, it later turned out that the first air unit to be permanently stationed there was in fact the No. 1 Squadron, which was recently joined by the No. 2 Squadron, both of which are ground attack squadrons equipped with Mirage F-1 supersonic fighter planes. The air base, which is located within 15 miles of the Mozambican border and lies within 15 minutes' flying time from Maputo, the capital of the People's Republic of Mozambique, became fully operational in 1981. According to the commanding officer of the No. 1 Squadron, the Hoedspruit air force base will enable the SAAF "to cover all borders from northern Natal up to the Zimbabwe border," and will also provide it with "strategic depth."<sup>2</sup>

In 1981, the regime opened another military base at Phalaborwa in the north-eastern Transvaal, to serve as a training centre for the 7th Infantry Battalion. The military base cost R6 million to construct. Speaking at its opening, Magnus Malan issued one of his many threats against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Front Line States, declaring that "every country that harbours terrorists must know it stands to lose in this struggle," and that South Africa is "determined to wipe out terrorists even if" it has "to cross borders to do it."<sup>3</sup>

At the beginning of 1982, the South African Minister of Manpower Utilisation announced that plans were afoot to construct a new military air base for the SAAF in the Louis Trichardt district, close to the border with Zimbabwe, in the northern Transvaal. Later, when asked to elaborate on the new military base, the Minister referred to it as a "tactical air force base." He further added that, when complete and opened, the new base would serve as the focal point for the entire northern border system, and it would be bigger than the one located 100 kilometres away in Pietersburg.<sup>4</sup> To drive the point home about the aggressive intentions of the regime towards Zimbabwe and the rest of the Front Line States, the South African prime minister, P W Botha, declared later, in September 1982, that, "South Africa's sphere of influence extends to all its

neighbours."<sup>5</sup>

## **Military Bases and Forced Removals**

In various parts of the country our people have suffered both directly and indirectly as a result of this military build-up in the border areas. In 1977, an undisclosed number of our people, mostly peasants and rural workers, were forcibly removed from their traditional homes, in an area covering 24 000 hectares around the Sibasa district in the north of the Venda bantustan, to another in the north-western district of the same territory, in order to make way for a military buffer zone completely under the control of the SADF south of the Limpopo River and close to the border with Zimbabwe.


Again, in 1979, more than 1 000 of our people were forcibly removed from their traditional homes at Kliplaatdrift, in the north-western Transvaal just outside the Lebowa bantustan, to Kromhoek near the town of Alldays, for military strategic reasons. More than 3 000 of our people have been forcibly removed from Sodwana Bay and St Lucia, nearly 20 000 from Reserve Four are still under the threat of forced removals, and many others have been removed in northern Natal in order to make way for the construction of a missile testing range and setting up of military camps in the area. When one considers these, then it becomes clear that the remark made by the commanding officer of the No. 1 Squadron about the range covered by the Hoedspruit air force base and the Zimbabwe border was not accidental nor without foundation.

The latest example of such removals is the one which about 3 000 of our people have suffered at Mogopa village near Ventersdorp and towards the border with Botswana. To prevent any information on the magnitude of the violence involved in removing the village from reaching the outside world, the South African regime initially declared it an 'operational area' which no one except a specially selected group of journalists were allowed to enter, and then only under police escort. However, White farmers were allowed to have free access to the area to purchase the villagers' livestock, which, by 1980, consisted of 4 000 cattle, 1 000 sheep, 300 goats, 100 donkeys, 50 horses and a large amount of poultry, at a tenth of its value. In order to facilitate this operation, the racist regime sent a task force of 90 armed policemen under a certain Major A Scheepers from Potchefstroom,


*Continued on page 18*



Below: Dramatisation of workers' lives, SACTU anniversary, KwaThema, 1985.



# MAKE MAY DAY



National Union of Mineworkers' delegates to the launch of the half-million-strong COSATU.

# A PAID HOLIDAY

ostensibly to protect the removal squad sent by the Department of Co-operation and Development. Such and many other types of removals constitute a serious violation of international law, which, among other things, clearly states that:

"Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is therefore prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless, for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved ... so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under the satisfactory conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected with the conflict."<sup>6</sup>

Seen in the above context, the recent attempts made by the South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, to equate the just and legitimate struggle of the South African people under the leadership of the ANC with international terrorism, as defined and understood by the international community and particularly the United Nations, is as far removed from the truth as fantasy is from reality.

The untold misery that these and many other forced removals has caused to our people is comparable to the atrocities perpetrated by the Nazis during the Second World War against mainly, but not exclusively, the Jews, and those of the Zionists against the Palestinian people since 1948. Our people have lost good agricultural and grazing land, which is compensated for with reduced and less fertile land (if there is any compensation at all); they have lost water resources, material possessions and, employment opportunities; their family life has been disrupted; there is a high infant mortality rate caused by malnutrition and lack of adequate medical and health care.

### **Computerised Aggression**

In order to ensure that the military and air force bases spread across South Africa's borders with the Front Line States function smoothly, the regime has installed a highly sophisticated system of radar units with the help of mainly Britain and Israel along the borders of the country. In 1981

the British company, Plessey, supplied South Africa with a highly sophisticated mobile radar system, code-named AR3D, which, according to *Jane's*, facilitates "control of up to four simultaneous computer-assisted ground-to-air strikes."

The British Government was accused of collaborating with the South African regime in its military build-up against the South African people and the neighbouring countries by allowing Plessey to supply the radar system and thus violate the United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. It both defended itself and justified the sale by claiming that the equipment had "a genuine civilian application." But later, in 1982, it transpired that the British Government, following the defeat of Argentina in the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands war, had installed a similar system on the main island in its transformation into a huge Anglo-US military and air force base in the South Atlantic. The radar system, installed at Mariepskop in the north-eastern Transvaal, constitutes the main link of South Africa's air space command, and is ideally located for guiding South African military jets during their criminal and murderous raids against Mozambique and Zimbabwe, as well as dropping logistics and weapons for the counter-revolutionary bandits of the MNR.

In 1983, the Thatcher Government used the same argument to defend and justify the supply of equipment to update the £8 millions' worth of the old tropospheric scatter communications system which Marconi Avionics Ltd had sold to South Africa and which had been installed in Pietersburg in 1966. The British Government gave Marconi Avionics Ltd the go-ahead, in spite of strong opposition and condemnation by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement and other democratic and progressive forces, and in spite of abundant evidence that the South African regime intended putting the equipment to military use, in its programme of military expansion and modernisation. As the 1982 Defence White Paper put it, "fighter support on the borders of the areas where the main threat exists ... will improve as progress is made with the expansion and modernisation programme."

### **Israeli Complicity**

It was recently reported<sup>7</sup> that as part of the process of the militarisation of large areas of the

north-eastern and western Transvaal, a delegation from Pretoria has successfully negotiated the purchase of an electronic warning border fence from Israel. The equipment, called the *Gader Hama Arekhet*, is identical to the Jordan Valley electronic border fence used by Israel against the Palestinian liberation movement.

In demanding that the sale of this equipment to South Africa be put immediately on the agenda of the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament), Mr K Matti Peled condemned it, and declared that the sale of the equipment, which will be used "in the cruel war against South African Blacks, would be a most serious act of support to the racist apartheid regime."<sup>8</sup>

The recent acquisition of such electronic devices by Pretoria is intended to complement and modernise the "border wall," which consists of a complex of electronic sensors, command posts and dozens of highly sensitive electronic surveillance devices, as well as the deadly and high-voltage electric border fence, which were all put up with Israeli help some years ago along some stretches of the border with Zimbabwe, particularly between Beit Bridge and Sand River, and are monitored by the South African Defence Force (SADF) 24 hours of the day.<sup>9</sup>

Without this string of military and air force bases and camps, as well as the highly sophisticated radar network spread along South Africa's borders with the neighbouring countries, the effectiveness of the regime's ground forces would be severely curtailed and the air superiority of the South African Air Force reduced. This in turn would have made the regime's murderous raids into the Front Line States much more difficult to carry out.

### **Searching for a Pretext**

Beginning with the eve of Zimbabwe's independence in March 1980, the SADF issued a 24-hour standby order to all members of the 81 Armoured Brigade,<sup>10</sup> in preparation for military intervention during the election, should conditions prove favourable. Since then, the South African regime has been searching for a pretext to invade Zimbabwe. After it had failed to find a pretext for launching direct military intervention against Zimbabwe during the elections, it resorted to the recruitment into the SADF of large numbers of former members of the Rhodesian Army, particularly from the Rhodesian Special

Force units such as the SAS, the Selous Scouts, the Rhodesian Light Infantry, the Rhodesian African Rifles and even from Bishop Abel Muzorewa's rag-tag 'army' of auxiliaries.

Together with some disgruntled and misguided elements from within both the ZAPU and ZANU guerrilla forces, the South African regime used Muzorewa's 'army' of auxiliaries to establish what has come to be known as the 'Matebele Brigade' and 'Super-ZAPU.' In this way, the SADF succeeded in adding well over 5 000 troops, together with their weapons and other equipment, into its ranks. It is from these elements that the regime has infiltrated trained bandits back into Zimbabwe to wreak havoc and chaos against the Zimbabwean people.

### **Criminal Attacks**

These bandits have been responsible for cowardly and criminal attacks against schools, farms, homesteads and the transport system in Zimbabwe. Although Zimbabwe has not borne the main brunt of attacks by such bandits — in comparison with Angola and Mozambique — it has nevertheless suffered an incalculable loss in terms of human lives, mostly civilian, and economic damage.

During 1982, 120 people were killed in cold blood by these bandits and by South African soldiers. Amongst those murdered by racist South African soldiers was 19-year-old Emma Hlungwane, shot dead on the 18th May 1982 while doing her washing on the Zimbabwean side of the Limpopo River. On the same day, a group of South African soldiers crossed the Limpopo River and kidnapped a number of Zimbabwean women in another incident. During a trial of two men accused of murdering a constable in the Mwenzi district in 1982, it was revealed that at least 300 Zimbabweans had undergone military training that year in the various SADF training camps situated in the north-eastern and western Transvaal. Again, in 1982, three White South African soldiers were shot in southern Zimbabwe while on a mission the SADF claimed was "unauthorised."

During 1983, the Zimbabwean security forces captured a total of 400 bandits and seized a huge quantity of South African-made weapons. 200 of the bandits confessed to having been trained in South Africa. In the same year, the Zimbabwean security forces captured a group of armed

men, with bombs and explosives in their possession, on their way to blow up the Beit Bridge petrol depot. In October of the same year, two South African-trained bandits confessed that they were on a mission to "destroy everything" in sight under the instructions of the SADF. They confessed to having undergone four months' training in South Africa, murdered eight civilians, destroyed property, including bulldozers, and distributed pamphlets entitled *People's Power*, printed in South Africa and calling on villagers to rebel against the Zimbabwean Government. The two were part of an eight-man bandit group infiltrated from South Africa.

Then, in November 1983, the Zimbabwean Government accused the South African regime of using trained bandits dressed in Zimbabwean uniform to attack and harass Botswana citizens in order to cause conflict between the two Front Line states. This was confirmed by a clash between a group of unknown armed men, using South African-registered cars, and a Botswana security patrol during the same month. Referring to the incident, an editorial in the *Zimbabwe Herald* said "the discovery that a gang of armed men with weapons and walkie-talkies who clashed with a Botswana patrol last week used two South African-registered cars has finally exposed the Botha regime for what it is."<sup>10</sup>

### **Zimbabwe Accuses South Africa**

Since then, there has been a series of accusations by various Zimbabweans that South Africa is involved not only in training and infiltrating armed bandits into Zimbabwe to wreak havoc and chaos against that neighbouring country, but also that at least a third of the so-called dissidents operating inside the country have been trained and armed by the SADF. Following the recent land mine explosions in the north-western Transvaal and Pretoria's threat to attack the neighbouring countries, particularly Zimbabwe, under the pretext of pursuing ANC guerrillas, the President, Prime Minister and Minister of Information of Zimbabwe have all made yet more convincing accusations against the South African regime for planning to launch an armed invasion against their country. The most categorical accusation against South Africa came from Dr Nathan Shamuyarira, who declared that his "... government is fully informed about plans of the South Africans to set up an independent Zimbabwean

dissident organisation on the model of Renamo ... they have taken several steps to achieve this."<sup>11</sup>

Among those steps, he mentioned the continued broadcasts of "Radio Truth" against the government of Comrade Robert Mugabe, beamed from the northern Transvaal; the existence of a training camp specifically for Zimbabwean dissidents; and the continued and growing campaign of kidnapping school children in Matabeleland to be trained in this camp. In addition, Dr Nathan Shamuyarira declared that Zimbabwe is "living under the South African threat all the time ...(and Zimbabweans) ... believe this threat to be real."<sup>12</sup>

Shortly before this, the Zimbabwean Minister in charge of Security, Mr Emmerson Munangangwa, had accused South Africa of having violated the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Zimbabwe when South African jet fighters and helicopters crossed into 100 kilometres of Zimbabwean air space in the south-eastern corner of the country. In spite of persistent denials by South African officials, there exists more than enough evidence to show that Pretoria has over the years not only been threatening the neighbouring countries with direct military aggression but has also been making concrete preparations for such action.

### **Farmers Integrated into Military Strategy**

In 1979, the illegal South African regime passed the Promotion of Density of Population in Designated Areas Act, No. 87, in an attempt to stem the exodus of White farmers, caused both by economic factors and by guerrilla incursions into the north-eastern and western Transvaal, and increase the White farmer population in order to create a physical barrier against the infiltration of the cities by guerrillas. As the *Survey of Race Relations in South Africa* put it: "economic and agricultural policy has to be tailored to the needs of (military) survival."

It is therefore not accidental that the South African Agricultural Union, together with the SADF, Departments of National Security and Transport and the SA Police, participated directly, actively and fully in the deliberations of the sub-committee which was appointed by the Steyn Commission to look into how the White farmer population could be included in the defence strategy of the racist regime. In order to en-



courage the White farmers to stay and attract more to settle in these areas, the regime made at least R100 million available over a period of five to six years for the provision of loans and other assistance, under the stipulation of the Agricultural Credit Act No 28 of 1966, to those prepared to settle there, and for the renovation and construction of new strategic roads in the areas.<sup>13</sup>

The renovation and construction of new roads includes the conversion of some parts of national roads on South Africa's north-eastern and western borders (including northern Natal) into aircraft runways, in order to provide the SADF, particularly the air force, with 'strategic mobility.' By 1983 the SADF, in conjunction with the Department of Transport, had constructed two such dual-purpose airstrip-roadways, one at Swartwater, about 20 kilometres from the Botswana border and the other in northern Natal. With a width of 1.2 kilometres, the Swartwater

airstrip is big enough to accommodate aircraft up to the size of a Dakota transport plane.

The Promotion of Density of Population in Designated Areas Act stipulates that in recruiting or attracting potential White farmers to these areas through the provision of loans and other economic incentives, special attention should be paid to ex-servicemen. The Act further stipulates that the loans be given on condition that the farms and any other property in these areas be managed according to the directives of the SADF.

Under these terms, the SADF is empowered to enter any property within a 10 kilometre zone of the borders with Botswana, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe, and demolish or erect military facilities or any other structure without the consent of the owner, or compensation.

In addition, the Act stipulates that all the White farmers in those areas must undergo military training and be members of the regional and area commandos as well as make themselves available

to the SADF and Department of National Security to carry out reconnaissance and intelligence tasks whenever called upon to do so. The farmers are also to be instructed in the use and handling of security equipment such as security fences and alarm systems. Already, some farmers have been supplied with sub-sets to link them up with the military area radio network known as Marnet.

### **Farms, Towns Are Military Bases**

Most, if not all, of the farm buildings have been constructed in such a way as to constitute a chain of defence strongholds along the borders ready to be used as bases by the SADF whenever necessary.

Under the regulations of the Act, the Ministry of Defence and Department of Transport are both empowered to penalise any contravention or failure to comply with the SADF directives. Failure to comply with, or contravention of, these regulations carries a minimum penalty of R2 000 fine or two years' imprisonment. Subsequent contraventions of the regulations can result in a R5 000 fine or five years' imprisonment.

Messina and Louis Trichardt in the northern Transvaal, Alldays, Ellisras, Thabazimbi and Zeerust in the north-western Transvaal, Piet Retief and Amsterdam in the south-eastern Transvaal, and others, are all key towns in the military strategy of P W Botha's regime to launch armed aggression against the neighbouring countries and to militarise the border areas in a futile attempt to keep out ANC combatants from infiltrating the urban areas. At this stage, it is important to point out that during the parliamentary debate on the Bill that led to the promulgation of the Promotion of Density of Population in Designated Areas Act, the Progressive Federal Party, New Republic Party and the South African Party all strongly supported it. Given the fact that the PFP and NRP represent the political interests of that section of South African capital whose companies are under contract to supply ARMSCOR with component parts for the production of military weapons and at the same time are among the biggest exploiters of Black labour, this is not surprising at all.

### **Contempt for Human Life**

The extent to which the illegal regime is prepared to go in the militarisation of White areas and the White population in the border regions at

whatever cost, even if it means putting the precious lives of young children at risk as targets of guerrilla attacks, is shown by the inclusion of White school children between the ages of 13 and 17 in military programmes.

Recently, it became clear that the regime intends to continue with such programmes, when the College of Education for Further Training, which falls under the Transvaal Education Department (TED), organised an eight-day "Youth Preparedness in Perspective" course for 300 teachers and their pupils at a veld school called Schoemansdal near Pietersburg. During the course, which forms part of a two-year in-service training programme organised and sponsored by the TED, the teachers were given lectures "on military tactics, taught to use weapons, and engaged in camouflage and other military techniques" by military and police officers.<sup>14</sup> Afterwards, the teachers had to run the same course for the pupils at their schools. All this is being carried out in spite of the fact that many White parents have expressed their concern, and some have complained, about the manner in which their children are being indoctrinated during these programmes.

The contempt with which the regime holds the lives of both White adult civilians and children (not to mention Black lives) can perhaps be understood better if one recalls that Geneva Protocol of 12th August 1949 explicitly states that:

"The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations."

In addition, Article 13 of the same document goes on to state that such:

"civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Party, unless and for such a time as they take a direct part in hostilities."<sup>15</sup>

No wonder the South African racist minority has always refused to sign this international convention in whose formulation 109 governments, 11



national liberation movement organisations and 50 international organisations took part and which undoubtedly constitutes one of the best monuments to world statesmanship.

### **Puppet Forces in the Bantustans**

As if this was not enough, the P W Botha regime has established Bantustan armed forces in Venda, Gazankulu, Bophuthatswana and the other bantustan territories. This was in addition to the setting up of military units consisting of Blacks (Africans) and organised along 'ethnic' lines in the SADF. Already, the following military units are in existence: the 11th Battalion composed of Swazis, the 112th Battalion (Vendas), the 113th Battalion (Shangaans) and the 121st Battalion (Zulus).

Although Blacks represented a mere 5% of the troop strength of the SADF during the late 1970s and early 1980s, they nevertheless constituted 20% of all the troops deployed in the 'operational areas.' Speaking at a Nationalist Party public meeting in the north-eastern Transvaal town of Hoedspruit, the South African Minister of Defence, General Magnus Malan, recently revealed that "according to the latest figures, 66.16% of all the soldiers deployed against terrorism in South West Africa (Namibia)" are Black.<sup>16</sup>

According to General Malan's thinking, this is proof that the SADF is representative of all South Africa's people. But looked at from another perspective this is a clear indication that the P W Botha regime, true to its racist nature, intends using Blacks as cannon fodder in the front line of its defence. This is completely in line with the creation of tribal regiments (*amabutho*) and secret death squads, along the style of Latin America, by its puppets and security and intelligence services, in an attempt to 'Lebanonise' a struggle which is essentially anti-colonial in nature, and for national liberation, and afterwards present it as 'Black on Black confrontation.'

As for the explosions of landmines planted by the combatants of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the north-western Transvaal, in which some farmers and their relatives as well as soldiers lost their

lives and others were injured, it is only detractors of our struggle, if not people of the same ilk as P W Botha and General Malan who dare accuse the ANC of killing 'poor innocent civilians.' They know very well that it is the regime that took the first step towards obliterating the distinction between the civilian and military, when it deliberately decided to declare those areas military zones, and proceeded to incorporate the White farmers into its military defence and security network.

The threats to launch a military attack against Zimbabwe and the other neighbouring countries is a pretext through which the illegal South African racist minority regime intends forcing the Front Line States into 'helping' it to curb ANC activities inside South Africa, something which it has failed to do itself. The ANC is the people.

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7. BBC Monitoring Report/Capital Radio, Um-tata, 20.11.85.
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10. The 81st Armoured Brigade forms part of the 8th Armoured Division, a Citizen Force formation which is specifically trained for conventional warfare. With a troop strength of 7 000, and equipped with tank, armoured car, artillery, infantry and engineer regiments, the 81st Armoured Brigade is undoubtedly the most heavily armed of the six conventional warfare brigades in the SADF.
11. *Rand Daily Mail*, 26.11.83.
12. *Weekly Mail*, 20-26.12.85.
13. *The Star*, 10.7.89.
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# BOOK REVIEWS

## LABOUR AND THE UNIONS

Editor: R Southall, *South African Labour (Special Issue) Labour, Capital and Society*, Vol. 18 No 2, 1985, Centre for Developing Area Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada.

This special edition of an international Journal on labour studies in South Africa coincides with the centenary of May Day. About the same time that the first migrant miners entered the South African gold mines in 1886, a labour organisation in the United States of America called upon American workers to refuse to go to work on May 1st and to demonstrate for an eight hour day. In two cities, Milwaukee and Chicago, this action led to a general strike, which the police mercilessly put down. In Chicago six workers were shot on May 3rd in response to which a massive demonstration took place at the Chicago Haymarket Square. Police attacked the demonstrators and a dynamite bomb was thrown and several policemen killed. Eight leaders were put on trial and sentenced to death, not for having been involved in the throwing of the bomb but for having spread "ideas which caused another, unknown, person (possibly an agent provocateur) to throw the bomb".

International protests from the working class led to the reduction of three of the sentences to life imprisonment. A fourth man killed himself prior to the hanging of the four remaining martyrs on November 11th 1887. Two years later, the Socialist Congress, meeting in Paris, adopted a resolution to regard May 1st as an international day of struggle for workers' rights, solidarity and peace. And so it has been celebrated by the workers of the world since then, South Africa included.

### **ANC and May 1st**

Despite the continuous repression over the century since the Chicago shootings, the labour movement in South Africa has stressed both the international and national message of May Day. In the teeth of State repression in the mid fifties, Moses Kotane called upon the oppressed people

and democrats to celebrate the International Workers' Day at a time when the State "through false race theories, apartheid measures and economic and social bribes" was doing its utmost to eradicate the idea of May Day. Yusuf Dadoo exhorted the workers to strengthen working class and trade union unity. In a reference to the women, he urged them to stand firm and fight the attempts of the regime to degrade and humiliate them under the Pass Laws. In the same year, 1956, the ANC stressed the need for workers' unity and called upon the South African working class to redouble its efforts to secure an improvement in their living conditions. Earlier, SACTU had adopted May 1st as its day, Workers Day, which had long become part of an annual tradition for workers' unity and the social emancipation of the working class internationally.

Over the years the Communist Party, the ANC and the trade unions have combined to commemorate the international day of the working class and to use it to resist the state's assaults on the workers and their organisations. It was in this context that May 1st was celebrated in 1950. The Communist Party, South African Indian Congress and the ANC declared a stay-away on the Rand in protest against unjust laws and the Suppression of Communism Act, which was designed to outlaw the Communist Party and threaten workers, trade union activists and the national liberation movement. The strike was largely successful despite the strike-breaking activity of the police, the killing of four workers in Benoni and the injuring of at least 17 protesters on the East Rand. In Pretoria, the army surrounded the township; in Alexandra a cinema was burnt down and in Sophiatown demonstrators were fired upon. In total 18 people were killed and 30 seriously injured.

May Day thereafter assumed a new significance. It was more consciously combined with working class internationalism and resistance to national oppression in South Africa: June 26th was the date first chosen to honour the fallen of May Day 1950 and has been observed

as Freedom Day for over 30 years since then. In the 1980s May Day has been retrieved by the democratic trade union movement and fittingly, 100 years after the Chicago massacres, the National Union of Miners have won May 1st as a paid workers' holiday. The demand for May Day to be conceded as a national day of the South African workers is currently high on the political agenda of COSATU and SACTU. The heritage of May Day and the struggles that have accompanied it, cannot be easily eradicated. They are part of the history of the South African labour movement.

### Editing Out ANC's Experience

It is this history which the authors of the essays on the South African trade union movement in this special volume of the journal, *Labour, Capital and Society*, too easily ignore — not specifically the history of May Day but the historical effect on the working class of the formative organisations for national liberation and working class emancipation. Despite the transformation of the economy, the size and nature of the work force, changes in the labour process, and the restructuring of the labour relations system by the State between the 1960's and 1980's, the working class are not a clean slate awaiting the imprint of a workers' movement removed in outlook, concern and content of struggle from the ANC and its allies. But the working class is reinforced in its conflict with

employers and the state as they see their unions develop in strength and confidence as a result of their collective energy and trade union activity. The latter is one of the sites of struggle in a war of resistance and challenge that is raging all around them.

### Organising Workers: Sactu's Detractors

Two of the essays respectively trace the development of the democratic trade union movement and "theorise" the 'political unionism' of SACTU. The latter by Rob Lambert entitled *Political Unionism and Working Class Hegemony: Perspectives on the South African Congress of Trade Unions 1955-1965* claims to situate Sactu "within the great strategic debate in the European worker's movement at the turn of the century" that is Bernstein and revisionism. The thrust of Lambert's thesis is that in its combination of economic and political struggles SACTU adopted an organisational form that was distinct from the major historical traditions of working class organisation but similar to working class experience in countries where the workers are excluded from the political process. As a consequence SACTU was not constrained by a consciousness confined to the shop floor and did not have the limitations of structure which conventionally tied trade unions to capitalism. On the contrary, its political unionism prevented it from "spillage into instrumentalism" (that is being used by any other body in the wider process of



SACTU anniversary meeting — KwaThema, Springs, 1985.

social emancipation) because its form of organisation created the basis for politicising the workers and "giving them a sense of their own leading role in the struggle to create a socialist society".

The flaw in the argument is that SACTU had no separate ideology from its allies; it was deeply integral to the Congress Alliance and as such directed its energies to the development of democratic trade unionism and the winning of the workers to the side of national liberation as a necessary step towards economic emancipation — as defined in the Freedom Charter.

Johan Maree's *The Emergence, Struggles and Achievements of Black Trade Unions in South Africa from 1973-1984* is generally a succinct but comprehensive overview of the development of the democratic trade union movement in South Africa. Organisationally, it begins rather belatedly in the 70's and thereby omits the impact of SACTU and the level of state repression in the 1960's. The changes (over two decades) in agriculture, mining, services and manufacturing industry, however, create the basis for industrial unionism in the seventies and eighties and, though thin, provide an appropriate introduction to the essay. The cautious development of the contemporary trade union bodies from non-trade union umbrella structures into bona fide federations, is instructive and an important reminder of the relative infancy of the Black trade union movement as currently constituted. Its formal and procedural agreements (as well as its current unity in COSATU, unfortunately achieved subsequent to the presentation of these essays) are indications of the extent of union mobilisation and their confrontation with capital.

Roger Southall's *Monopoly Capital and Industrial Unionism in the South African Motor Industry* describes the profound transformation of the South African economy since World War II. According to his analysis, South Africa has moved from competitive to monopoly capitalism. This involved the merging of firms, a greater centralisation of capital and by implication a re-ordering of alliances and a closer nexus between multi-nationals, local monopolies and the state. The increased intervention of the South African state and its activist economic role in the adoption of import substitution strategies to develop (strategic) local manufacturing capacity, was a consequence of the shift to monopoly capitalism.

It had the effect of deepening South Africa's dependence on foreign funds and at the same time required repressive state measures against the Black working class in order to secure the cheapness of the cost of labour.

A boom (accompanied perhaps rather than caused by) the suppression of the "nationalist movement" facilitated rapid industrial growth and continuing dependence on the advanced capitalist powers. All this entailed a programme of diluting traditional craft skills, historically monopolised by Whites, and the employment of stabilised urban workers rather than a large component of migrants. The latter argument however is more pertinent to the motor industry than the metal sector generally, as the two final essays show.

Southall's essay is potentially the most interesting and analytical in so far as it treats with the changes in the economy and the state's strategies to deal with the "billowing disorder" resulting from the widespread strikes and stoppages after 1973. One of the consequences of the state's restructuring of the relations between labour and capital (the Wiehahn reforms), was the space it gave for the development of industrial unionism as the model for which Southall takes an extended and illuminating study of the automobile industry.

**Isolating Workers From The Struggle**  
Eddie Webster and Ari Sitas address different aspects of workers in the foundries on the East Rand. In his *Work, Worker Organisation and Labour Market Segmentation in South Africa Foundries*, Webster analyses the changes in the labour process using oral history techniques to supplement a complex analysis of the changes in the racial division of labour and segmentation of the labour market. The testimonies of the workers interviewed — two "labour aristocrats" (Whites) a (Coloured) machine production moulder, and two African shop stewards — encapsulate the decline of the craft industry, the inequalities of the apartheid labour system and the impact of the democratic trade unions on the lives of the migrant metal workers. These for the most part are valuable contributions to the growing body of literature on South Africa's rich labour history. But it seems surprising that the A.N.C or the Freedom Charter should not feature in these illuminating interviews.

LNM

The campaign to save the lives of the Sharpeville Six, sentenced to death for the murder of a Lekoa Community Councillor, Khuzwayo Jacob (Sam) Dlamini, is being led in South Africa by the United Democratic Front and the Vaal branch of the Detainees' Parents' Support Committee. People who wish to support the campaign should read this carefully researched and factual pamphlet. It has been produced by the South Africa the Imprisoned Society Committee, which is convened by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, and which campaigns in Britain on behalf of political prisoners in South Africa.

The six people are: Mojalefa Reginald Sefatsa, aged 30; Reid Malebo Mokoena, aged 22; Oupa Moses Diniso, aged 30; Theresa Ramashamola, aged 24; Duma Joshua Khumalo, aged 26, and Francis Don Mokhesi, aged 28. They were tried with Motseki Christiaan Mokubung, aged 23 and Motsiri Gideon Mokone, aged 21, who were acquitted of the murder but sentenced to eight years for 'public violence.'

The events leading up to the trial, the arrest and detention of the accused, the charges, the trial itself, the sentences, all illustrate the nature of the racist South African regime — its repressive character, its terrorism, the tortures it inflicts on its prisoners, the way it manipulates the legal system and the courts in order to destroy its victims.

The death of Dlamini arose out of a protest against rent increases in September 1984. A march was planned to the offices of the Orange Vaal Development Board; the police arrived in the township and began shooting early in the morning, before people had begun to assemble. The councillors were invited to join the demonstration, but they refused, and, borrowing the tactics of the police, fired on the people. At the end of the day, there were said to be over 250 dead and wounded (official statistics are not available, as the police forbade the hospitals to publish them) and Sam Dlamini was among the dead.

The whole story follows a familiar, sickening pattern. The eight people were arrested at their homes a few days later. They were tortured in detention, and some of them showed the marks

# NO APARTHEID EXECUTIONS



of it afterwards.

They pleaded not guilty to all charges, and continued to protest their innocence. Theresa Ramashamola said she had withdrawn from the march after being hit on the head by a rubber bullet; Sefatsa said he hadn't reached Dlamini's house until after Dlamini was dead; Khumalo said he hadn't got to Dlamini's house at all, having stopped to help someone who had been shot in the ankle; Mokhesi said he hadn't even gone on the march, but had been kept at home by a football injury.

When they were finally convicted, it was mainly on the evidence of two state witnesses, referred to as Mr X and Mr Y. It was clear that Mr Y had been assaulted by the police before he agreed to testify. The testimony of Mr X was contradicted in part by another witness, and worst of all, a statement he had previously made to a solicitor, saying that the police had told him to incriminate one of the accused, could not be used as evidence in court because the judge ruled it 'privileged.'

All over South Africa, township people, who now reject the community councils and regard the councillors with contempt and hatred, have exercised their votes to elect leaders and spokesmen in their own democratic organisations — residents', parents', women's and youth organisations affiliated to the United Democratic Front. It is these organisations that township people regard as their own decision-making bodies, representing their interests and expressing their wishes. Some of these leaders and spokesmen have been found murdered — sometimes horribly — in mysterious circumstances. The police have never brought anyone to court for these murders.

Meanwhile, at the time of writing, the Six are on death row. All except Theresa Ramashamola have young children.

JM

# OBITUARY

## Hamba Kahle Comrade Moses Mabhida

Moses Mabhida, the General Secretary of the South African Communist Party, member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC and Vice-President of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, was buried in Maputo on March 29th. At the funeral, President Samora Machel said:

"Dear comrades, the whole of Africa, of progressive mankind and all revolutionaries bow in homage to the personality and exemplary life of Moses Mabhida. Moses Mabhida has bequeathed us his example as a determined fighter for the ideals of freedom, justice, equality, democracy, socialism and peace.

"We know him thus since the start of our national liberation struggle. Moses Mabhida was an elder brother to us. Patiently and modestly he passed on to us his long experience of struggle. His advice was always valuable.

"In all his dealings with us he displayed his simple, modest and fraternal nature and showed his love of mankind.

"We remember the long nights when under the starlight we shared the dreams of the future we were building in combat. What would our countries be like. How would our children grow up. How would our peoples' aspirations be achieved. His vision of the future revealed the profound humanism that underlay his thinking.

"In the most difficult moments we went through together he radiated always his calmness, the breath of hope and the certainty of victory.

### Symbol of Fraternity of Peoples

"Moses Mabhida, our brother, our comrade, felt as his own our freedom, our independence. He was an integral part of the Mozambican people. Moses Mabhida will remain as a symbol of the indestructible fraternity of the South African and Mozambican peoples, of the profound identity of our peoples' struggles.

"Moses Mabhida leaves a part of his life in Mozambique. He chose to live out his last days with us, he chose to bid farewell to life on the frontier of his country. In other parts of the world where he would have been welcomed with equal

solidarity and comradeship, he would have found more comfort and more sophisticated medical attention for his failing health. He preferred to remain here in a free country, close to his own.

"He was denied his soil in life and it is denied to him after death. But he will not be buried in a foreign land. Mozambique is his country too. The Mozambican soil which he also loved and of which the struggle made him a brother will enfold him with love and respect. We shall be the guardians of his body, which is a banner of victories. Men who die fighting, who refuse to surrender, who serve the people and their ideals to the last breath, are the victors. Moses Mabhida is a victorious combatant. His immense personality rests in the heart of all Africans, in the heart of all revolutionaries and lovers of peace."

Joe Slovo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party, said:

"The racists hate South African communists with a special venom. To discredit what we stand for, they spread the myth that the communists are a strange people from faraway places, who import foreign ideas from Europe which are dangerous for Africa.

"Comrade Baba Mabhida, the leader of South Africa's communists, personified the real essence of our land and its people."

Other speakers included John Nkadimeng, Secretary-General of SACTU; Dan Tloome, member of the National Executive Committee of the ANC, and Archie Gumede, President of the United Democratic Front in South Africa.

Moses Mbheki Mcane Mabhida was born on October 14th, 1923 at Thornville, in the district of Pietermaritzburg, Natal. Under the influence of Harry Gwala, now serving life imprisonment on Robben Island, he was introduced into trade unionism, and joined the Communist Party and the ANC. This was in 1942.

Since then, he has been involved in all these three fronts of our movement, and rose to senior positions. He died of a heart attack on 8th March. The coffin was draped with banners

of the ANC and the SACP and at its head was a portrait of Comrade Mabhida while in the back stood four flags — those of the ANC, the SACP, the Frelimo Party and of the People's Republic of Mozambique. A guard of honour from the Mozambican Armed Forces stood motionless beside the coffin while guests and diplomats signed the book of condolence.

On March 29 the Mozambican government provided a state funeral with full military honours. The pall bearers from the Mozambican Armed Forces carried the coffin out of the Maputo Town Hall where it had been lying in state. To the mournful strains of three bugles, the coffin was placed on a military vehicle, and the funeral cortege proceeded slowly to Maputo's Hlanguene Cemetery.

Banners of the ANC, SACP and of the UDF were carried and ANC cadres sang freedom songs. Slogans proclaiming "Long Live the Friendship between the Mozambican and South African People" reflected the spirit of the day.

Below, we reproduce President Tambo's funeral oration.

"Comrade President Samora Machel, President of Frelimo, of the Republic of Mozambique, members of the Frelimo Politburo, Central Committee and Ministers, Comrade Joe Slovo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party, members and leaders of the South African liberation movement, our sister Lena Mabhida, your family, relations and friends, leaders of SAC-TU, Your Excellencies and friends, we have gathered here today to bid farewell to a warrior. We have converged from all corners of the globe to pay homage to a revolutionary. We have convened on this grieving piece of earth to salute a patriot.

### **A Colossus Supremely Human**

"We who have walked with giants know that Moses Mbheki Mabhida belonged in that company too. We who have filed among the ranks know that he was proud to count himself as a foot



*From right to left: Samora Machel, O R Tambo, Joe Slovo, Steve Dlamini, Archie Gumede, Curnick Ndlovu and Dan Tloome (at the microphone).*

soldier. A colossus because he was supremely human, Moses Mabhida has departed from our midst.

"A seeming void occupies his space, the air so still without his voice, without that quiet voice, that quiet laugh, like the pure note of a bugle. That voice rose from the depths of the Valley of a Thousand Hills and it multiplied, rose and grew and multiplied, reverberating from Durban's Curries Fountain until it was heard in Dar es Salaam and Havana, in Moscow and Managua, in London and Djakarta, in Peijing and Rio de Janeiro, in Prague and Washington. And in Pretoria, the centres and symbols of oppression and repression which are the Union Buildings and the Voortrekker Monument heaved and trembled as they received his message: 'An end to fascism, down with racism, freedom for my people.'

"It is rarely given to a people that they should produce a single person who epitomises their hopes and expresses their common resolve as Moses Mabhida did. In simple language, he could convey the aspirations of all our people in their magnificent variety, he could explain the fears and prejudices of the unorganised, and he could sense the feelings of even the most humble among our people. Moses Mabhida could do all this because he was of the people, a product of the stern university of mass struggle, a product of the life experience of the exploited and downtrodden workers and peasants of our country. It was that university, that education, that experience, which inspired Moses Mabhida to join the ANC, the South African Communist Party and the trade union movement, a trade union movement which ultimately coalesced in the South African Congress of Trade Unions.

### **Unity of Great Movements**

"In the ANC, Moses Mabhida rose from the lowest ranks to become a national leader who served on the National Executive Committee of the ANC, as a commander and commissar of the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe, secretary to the Revolutionary Council, one of the chairpersons of the Political Military Council, who served as an international representative and as an underground organiser. He rose through the ranks of the Communist Party to become its General Secretary while he served as Vice President of the South African Congress of Trade

Unions. This combination of functions sometimes surprised and puzzled our friends. For they wondered why Comrade Mabhida had to serve in so many senior positions in different organisations. But above all it was a combination of functions which enraged our enemies. This combination of functions in one leader of our people upset our adversaries because it reflected the permanence and acceptability among our people of the idea and the practice of the unity of the revolutionary democratic, the socialist and the trade union movements in the South African struggle for national liberation.

"It was part of Comrade Mabhida's greatness that having quite early on understood the importance of the unity of these great movements, he succeeded in ably serving each one of them individually, and all of them together. He served them together as a collective front for national and social emancipation. Throughout Moses Mabhida's lifetime, international reaction tried desperately hard and consistently to separate the three movements we have spoken of. It tried to separate the one from the other and to set them against one another. In this contemporary period we have seen determined efforts to separate the trade unions from the broad democratic movement and to persuade them to be nothing more than an agency to bring material benefits to a working class which remains enslaved. But Moses Mabhida knew that the very dignity of labour demands that those who toil should not only enjoy the fruit of their sweat, but should do so as free men and women. Accordingly, he fought against all attempts to turn the trade unions into appendages of the property-owning classes and he resisted all efforts to emasculate the working class as a leading social force for political change in our country. Likewise, he was fiercely opposed to all manoeuvres which sought to educate the working class to repudiate its own history and to allow itself to be turned into a base for the creation of a new political formation separate from and opposed to the ANC and the Communist Party.

### **ANC and SACTU: The Spear and Shield**

"Moses Mabhida could take no other position, because he had learnt and absorbed the lessons passed on to him and to us by the late Chief Albert Luthuli. That lesson was that the ANC and SACTU were to each other a spear and a shield.



Moses Mabhida knew that the durability of the alliance between the ANC, the Communist Party and the trade union movement lay in strengthening each as an independent formation and in securing their co-operation on an entirely voluntary basis. He therefore always worked to ensure that these formations respected one another and that they developed among them a deep-seated feeling of revolutionary unity and interdependence.

"Moses Mabhida knew it, as clearly as he was convinced of the certainty of our victory, that the historic and urgent issue of the day in South Africa is the question of the transfer of power to the people. He saw in the ANC the unique and authentic vanguard to mobilise and lead our people to victory. None among us was more conscious than he that the African National Congress could only carry out its historic mission if it maintains the character it has come to assume. That character was that of a parliament of all the people of our country, representative of our future, the negation of the divisions and conflicts that racial arrogance and capitalist greed have imposed on our people. That is why Comrade Mabhida fought hard and long to ensure that nothing should turn the ANC into a rabble of black chauvinists or a clique of leftist demagogues. He battled against all conspiracies designed to weaken the ANC as a fighting organisation of the people, as a true national movement loyal to the great principles which inspired its creation and have guided it to this day.

### **Tradition of Resistance**

"What an experience it was to listen to Madevu, as he was fondly called, as he spoke in Zulu, as he spoke, drawing on our heroic past, to fire the timid with enthusiasm, to encourage the brave and correct those who had erred. Images he so vividly portrayed were of a Shaka and a Dingane — great giants who if they were alive today would be with us as commanders of the People's Army, Umkhonto we Sizwe and not arrogant local government functionaries of a regime that despises everything African. The deep well from which he drew strength and courage, the undying tradition of our people's resistance to colonialism and racial tyranny, these enabled him to teach a whole generation not to fear the tyrants, however powerful they might seem. It gave him the foresight to recognise the enemy clearly, to

concentrate his fire upon the adversary, and never to turn his weapon against the people.

"Yet, comrades, today there are some in our country who claim that they drink from the same well, but, their manhood having deserted them, they are so petrified of the enemy, that they see its brutal armed strength as a superhuman machine — a machine in front of which we must cower and cringe. Moses Mabhida will not be with us on the glorious day of liberation. He will not be there when the voice of the liberation proclaims from the heights of the sign of our land, from the sacred mountains of Ulundi, when it proclaims that the cause for which so many perished has triumphed. Yet there is an error in those statements, because, wherever Moses Mabhida is in the end laid to rest, his grave shall be like a place of pilgrimage, a place of pilgrimage to all those who love freedom as he did, a beacon to the future for all those who value liberty more than their own lives.

"Moses Mbheki Mabhida will be there when the trumpets sound the salute to freedom. He will be there because the Young Lions who fed on his courage and daring, offspring of the lions and lionesses that our fathers and mothers are, they who have dared to rebel as Bambata rebelled 80 years ago, these Young Lions are his peers, they are the relay team to whom he has handed the torch that he carried for so long. He will be there because his sudden death on March 8th, International Women's Day, outside the borders of the country for whose happiness he had sacrificed so much, because that death was but Mkhize's call on us to do what remains to be done and we shall do it together in unity. Together we shall see victory.

### **Mabhida: Anti-Imperialist**

"Mozambican men and Mozambican women, you looked after our comrade and brother during the last days of his life. Comrade President Samora Machel, you have done more than your duty, you have exceeded our highest expectations, in the way you have gone out of your way, taking your people with you, to tend and honour one who was to you a comrade of long standing, a fellow combatant, a leader of the people of South Africa, a leader recognised by the progressive movements throughout the world, anti-imperialist. When Moses Mabhida departed, he was at peace because we too were in this city of

revolutionary change. We were here as your guests and fellow fighters for peace, freedom and social progress. We had come, as we must always come, to a liberated zone of humanity, to a corner of our continent that arouses the anger and the envy of our enemies because it is a liberated corner.

"Our common enemies are on all sides. They think they have surrounded us together. They imagine that they will pierce us with the pincers of an enveloping action, an action originating from the Nyasa province and the Cape province. What they do not know is that we are in their rear and on their flanks. It is their cause that is doomed. It is they who are in a hopeless position. It is they who are in a crisis moment which is without precedent in the history of southern Africa — the signal that death is for us but a renewal of life, that death is for us a defeat in battle, a rehearsal for a victorious war. Today Mabhida walks in the company of Magigwane and Ngungunyane. With these as our standard bearers, we can never be defeated. We cannot but be victorious.

"We wish to express our heartfelt condolences to the family of Comrade Mabhida, to all our people who feel bereaved by his departure. His family loved him, but they surrendered him to the revolutionary struggle because they loved freedom even more. Today, as we grieve with them, they can be justly proud of him and of his life. Farewell dear brother, uhambe kahle mfowethu.

"Those who have gathered here to make their pledge in public or in the silence of their hearts will be with you on the Maluti Mountains when you toll the bell of freedom. They will be with you from all the corners of the globe because your presence here signifies their own resolve to contribute all in order to wipe out a crime against humanity. You have been ordered to assert the dignity of all men and women across the oceans, on all the continents, permanently and unequivocally — Moses Mabhida lives. The struggle continues. Victory is assured.

**Amandla!"**



**The living close the eyes of the dead; the dead open the eyes of the living.**

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**SOUTH AFRICANS AND MOZAMBICANS  
HONOUR A GREAT REVOLUTIONARY**



**HAMBA KAHLE MOSES MABHIDA**