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
FOCUS ON LABOUR

Southern Africa REPORT

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Southern Africa REPORT

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COSATU launch, Capetown, 1985

The Question of Support

With this issue we embark on our second year of publication. We are extremely gratified by the strong positive response we've received from those of you who are seeing *Southern Africa REPORT* regularly – even if the number of our subscribers remains a bit too low for us to rest easy. On this latter front we have done some promotions with some success, but we're still largely reliant on word of mouth to mobilize the constituency which we feel the magazine deserves. So – *pass the word!*

Equally important, *keep in touch!* It's only in this way that we can hope to fulfill the mandate we took for ourselves a year ago: not only "to confront the most challenging questions about Southern Africa" but also to provide "a forum for all those who wish to participate with us in the kind of informational work and creative dialogue which the importance of the current moment in that region of the world demands."

* * *

It is pursuant to this mandate, in fact, that we broach a particularly delicate issue in our lead article: *the debate in Canada regarding the South African trade union movement*. Not that we need debate the point, emphasized in previous issues of *Southern Africa REPORT*, that the emergence of the independent trade union movement has represented one of the most important fronts upon which resistance to apartheid has advanced in recent years. As is well known, this movement has recently found its most

important focus in last November's launching of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), a new trade union central which draws together the most vibrant of the trade unions that have emerged in South Africa in the past decade or so. Representing 34 constituent union bodies and over 500,000 workers, COSATU launched itself by presenting a dramatic political challenge to the apartheid regime (see *Southern Africa REPORT*, I, 4); much will depend on its ability to follow through on this challenge.

The article which follows has something more to say about COSATU's emergence and the considerable promise which South Africa's trade union movement represents. However, the primary intention of this article is to raise a rather more controversial issue. In question is the manner in which Canadian trade unionists have themselves been encouraged to support South African workers in their struggle against apartheid and "racial capitalism." Different factions within the Canadian trade union movement have, in recent years, put forward very different readings of the South African labour scene and called for very different kinds of support by Canadians. Unfortunately, in TCLSAC's view, the contending positions of the various protagonists have too often been one-sided and misleading, have too often falsely polarized and rendered rancorous the debate about South Africa in this country.

Our intention in the article is to help provide a way through this minefield. For it is not the parochial dispute it might at first appear to some of our readers. On the one hand, we must see the Canadian labour movement as a major protagonist in the development, past, present and future, of an effective anti-apartheid movement in this country. Anything that can be done to further focus and unify the efforts of this constituency would therefore be important. Beyond the labour

movement *per se*, however, the attempt to "clean up" the Canadian end of the working-class' struggle against apartheid is also of potential importance. For the Canadian anti-apartheid movement generally will be the beneficiary if we can learn better methods to discuss and to reconcile our differences.

Of course, we cannot pretend that the reading of South African developments which anchors our own intervention in the debate is above dispute. We put this article forward tentatively, as a possible focus for further discussion, rather than as any kind of last word on the subject. Nor would we broach these issues - issues which we have found to be difficult to summarize and deeply controversial - if we thought such an intervention would merely have the effect of further polarizing things. It is, however, our conviction that the polarization we have seen here in Canada is largely unnecessary. There are, to be sure, grounds for differences of opinion about the precise degree of importance to be attached to the various organizations engaged in South African trade union struggles, grounds, too, for differences of opinion about the exact weighting of priorities as regards actions to be taken in Canada in support of South African workers. But these are differences of emphasis which South African workers, now more than ever, are themselves learning to identify, to debate, to reconcile. We can and must take our cue from them. True, as we shall also see, the impact of obsessive ideologizing and institutional self-interest may mean that not everyone within the Canadian trade union movement will welcome the kind of flexible and open-minded approach which we recommend. But we hope other readers will find our thoughts on these matters to be of some assistance.

* * *

Other articles in this issue cover closely related themes. One dis-

cusses the efforts within South Africa's emergent trade unions, especially those most strongly rooted on the shop-floor, to place feminist issues more firmly on the agenda. Another tells the too-little-known story of present-day working class assertions in Namibia. In addition, Jim Cason and Mike Fleshman, in their regular column, complement our account of the Canadian trade union scene with an overview of a U.S. labour movement distinguished by very similar accomplishments - and contradictions.

On other fronts, we are pleased to welcome as our regular correspondent on "Sports and Apartheid," Bruce Kidd, one of Canada's best-known athletes and now an equally well-known writer on sports and other social concerns. And there is also Judith Marshall's important first-hand comparison of two societies under siege: Mozambique, where she has lived and worked for many years, and Nicaragua, where her work on adult literacy took her for a number of months last year. Marshall adopts the forthright stance - supportive but critical enough when the situation demands it - appropriate to the complex and contradictory reality of these societies. But she never loses sight of the essential unity of their struggles against the external intervention of such enemies as South Africa and the United States.

The same is true of the essential unity of our "anti-imperialist" efforts here in Canada. Thus mention of Marshall's article provides us with the perfect opportunity to pass on our congratulations to an important companion organization in Toronto on a very noteworthy occasion. TCLSAC, in its fourteenth year of activity, salutes the Latin American Working Group (LAWG) as, this month, it celebrates its twentieth anniversary of exemplary support and informational work in Canada around Latin American concerns. One struggle, many fronts, indeed.



Margie Bruun-Meyer

COSATU launch, Durban, 1985

South African Trade Unions: The Canadian Connection

The links established between Canadian and South African trade unionists have been and will continue to be of considerable importance. Moreover, much that is positive has been accomplished by Canadian workers in support of the anti-apartheid efforts of their South African counterparts. There is also a darker side to the picture, however. The question of South Africa's trade unions has become entangled in Canada's own internecine trade union politics. And this, in turn, has led to some measure of polarization between the positions of different trade union constituencies — in particular between the Toronto-based SACTU Solidarity Commit-

tee and its supporters in a number of major Canadian Labour Congress affiliates on the one hand and the International Affairs Department of the CLC and its supporters among CLC top brass on the other. Such polarization has not been helpful. It has distorted the understanding many Canadians have of the realities of developments in South Africa and it has tended to compromise, to some degree, the effectiveness of anti-apartheid work in Canada. The following article seeks to explore this problem in some depth.

It will be useful, however, to begin such a discussion by reminding ourselves of the importance of what has been happening, in recent years,

inside South Africa itself. As our editorial in this issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* has reaffirmed, the emergence of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) is the culmination of a dramatic process of working-class self-assertion in South Africa over the past 15 years. Thus, one of the most crucial moments in the re-emergence of a politics of resistance in South Africa was the out-break of strike activity in Durban in the early 1970s (this outbreak itself prefigured, it bears noting, by important strike activity, somewhat earlier, in Namibia). Since then, the growth of the independent trade union movement, in initial defiance of most of apartheid's laws in the labour relations sphere, has continued to gain momentum. Unable to crush this movement outright — although the repressive arm of the state has continued to harass the trade unions to the present day — the state has

been forced to permit certain reforms in the collective bargaining process. Of course, the chief aim of such initiatives has been to so institutionalize union participation within the new structures as to domesticate and control them. However, in spite of the difficult circumstances presented by the downturn in the economy, the independent trade unions have resisted both cooptation and repression, and have advanced. When COSATU leaders, at the new federation's founding convention, laid down a strong and articulate political challenge to the apartheid state, it was hard to overstate the impact of the event (see *Southern Africa REPORT*, 1, 4).

It is true that perhaps only 15 to 20 percent of the black work force is organized in South Africa. But a union of some 500,000 members is a formidable force nonetheless. For that reason, and because it is growing in both numbers and influence, it is a force the state will not cease to harass. Nor does it pass unchallenged in other ways. There is still, for example, the old "multi-racial" trade union, the Trade Union Congress of South Africa (TUCSA), which long ago chose to play the apartheid game by establishing "parallel" unions (subordinate to the present white unions and relatively powerless) for their black membership. Some TUCSA unions still seek to undercut the independent trade unions by promising sweetheart deals to management. But they are, nonetheless, a rapidly declining force.

Absent from COSATU, too, are unions which have adopted a "black consciousness" perspective as central to their activities. One of these, the Azanian Confederation of Trade Unions (AZACTU), is of little importance, but the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) has rather more substance (even though it was markedly weakened last year by the defection of its most important affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), to



SACTU Solidarity Committee

the COSATU camp). Yet COSATU continues to hold the door open to CUSA and the obvious groundswell of support for COSATU may yet draw it in. Far more sinister is the emergence of the United Workers of South Africa (UWUSA) in Natal. This union, largely run by African businessmen, seeks to challenge COSATU on behalf of Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha movement and in the interests of an extremely conservative economic posture. Representing one more ploy by Buthelezi designed to undermine the forces of resistance, UWUSA may prove to be primarily of nuisance value. Yet given Buthelezi's ruthlessness the costs of that nuisance could be considerable.

Beyond these challenges to its

existence, COSATU is addressing what is, perhaps, an even bigger issue, especially for the long run. It concerns the link between COSATU on the one hand and the national liberation movement (the centrally important ANC, in particular) on the other. On the ground inside South Africa the question has presented itself concretely in debates about the kind of relations to be established between the trade unions and the United Democratic Front, this latter being the most important of the broad-gauged popular-democratic political movements which has emerged and also the one most closely linked, in its overall policy thrust, to the ANC.

There is also the question of the kind of link to be established between COSATU and the South

African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). SACTU was the key trade union central of the 1950s, closely linked to the ANC at that time and ever since operating alongside the ANC from exile. There has been some debate, as we shall see, about the relative importance of SACTU – operating underground – to the dramatic resurgence of the South African trade union movement in recent years. One thing is clear, however: the months since the founding of COSATU have seen what appears to be a fruitful interchange between COSATU on the one hand and the ANC and SACTU on the other. The most telling proof of this was the joint meeting between the three parties earlier this year in Lusaka, its conclusions summarized in a joint communiqué which we highlighted in the last issue of *Southern Africa REPORT* (1,5).

The Canadian Connection

We shall return to a further analysis of developments in South Africa shortly, but first we must seek to characterize briefly the relationship of the Canadian trade union movement (outside Quebec, where a rather different situation prevails) to the working-class struggle in South Africa. This is no simple matter, however. As pointed out at the outset of this article, a split exists between the solidarity activities of the upper levels of the Canadian Labour Congress (as represented, most vocally, by the Congress' International Affairs Department) on the one hand and a number of the CLC's affiliates on the other. Many of the latter have taken a position far more supportive of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) than has the International Affairs Department. This is due, in large part, to the dedicated efforts, over the past several years, of the Toronto-based SACTU Solidarity Committee (SSC), a small group of tireless anti-apartheid activists who have come, with a SACTU mandate, to represent that union in Canada.

The SSC's achievements have been substantial. The Committee has linked up effectively with sympathizers in a wide range of trade unions (and not merely within the CLC – the SSC has also established a notably non-sectarian relationship with the independent, nationalist-minded Confederation of Canadian Unions, for example). In doing so it has begun to place such things as boycotts and embargoes, pension fund divestment and contributions to South African strike funds more firmly on the agenda of the Canadian trade union movement than ever before; it bears emphasizing that this represents a breakthrough that the CLC's International Affairs Department has never been able to facilitate to anything like the same degree. Moreover, the SSC's educational work, premissing and underwriting the action component of its programme, has also been noteworthy, helping raise and reinforce Canadian worker consciousness about South African struggles within a framework which is far more anti-imperialist than merely charitable in its connotations.

The SSC does have its critics, however, even outside the International Affairs Department (to whose specific preoccupations we shall turn shortly). The main complaint is that the SSC tends to make exaggerated claims on SACTU's behalf, suggesting SACTU's role to be more central to current trade union struggles inside South Africa than in fact it is. In years past, for example, the SSC was slow to grant full legitimacy to the independent trade unions that emerged so powerfully from the labour confrontations of the 1970s – most notably, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), now part of COSATU. Too often the SSC allowed the implication to stand that the establishment of direct links – links which did not pass through SACTU – with these unions was profoundly suspect, and that groups in Canada

which supported such links were suspect also. Yet many of these independent unions, it was argued outside the Committee, were extremely important and eminently progressive, even if they had few ties to SACTU.

In 1985, of course, the independent unions focussed their activities more forcefully than ever by creating COSATU and began, too, to discuss openly with both the ANC and SACTU the future direction of developments in South Africa. In this new context the SSC has now seemed as eager to obliterate the distinction between SACTU and the independent trade unions as it had once been ready to insist upon it. Witness, for example, the statement of a visiting SACTU activist, Colin Belton, (quoted with evident approval in the SSC *Solidarity Bulletin* of April, 1986) that "COSATU and SACTU are the same people".

It must be noted that, touching this latter point, there is one very considerable grey area where competing claims are by the very nature of the case difficult to arbitrate. We refer to the question of the SACTU underground and the extent of its role in providing an infrastructure for present-day trade union activism. Most anti-apartheid activists would acknowledge that SACTU's historical role of militant activity provides, by example, an important legacy for contemporary South African workers to build on. And there can be little doubt that a number of workers involved in SACTU-led struggles of the 1950s have turned up again in more recent organizing drives. But the SSC wants to claim a far more central role for the SACTU underground *vis-à-vis* the "above-ground" trade unions than that (claiming rather more for it, in fact, than many SACTU officials in Africa would be prepared to do). A second statement by Belton, in the interview cited above, exemplifies the tone: "There would be no COSATU if there was no SACTU underground"!

The fact is that there are relatively few observers of the South African trade union scene who would agree with all of the SSC's claims (*à la* Belton) regarding the extent of the importance of the SACTU underground. Moreover, it is precisely the SSC's exaggerations which appear to anger the CLC's International Affairs Department so much. Yet if many (including TCLSAC) in the Canadian solidarity network are moved merely to qualify, at the margin, their praise for the SSC's exemplary activism because of their annoyance at its somewhat overbearing "SACTU chauvinism", the International Affairs Department goes much further. Its mood is one of outright hostility towards the SSC, and even towards SACTU itself.

The strength of the Department's position is that it grasped, from quite an early date, the importance of South Africa's independent trade union movement, championing the cause of such unions as FOSATU, the National Union of Mineworkers, and the new federation, COSATU, while also making important financial support available to many of them. Even one of the Department's severest critics (Marv Gandall in his "Foreign Affairs: the CLC Abroad", *This Magazine*, February, 1986) is forced to concede that "in South Africa, the CLC and the other Western labour federations can at least claim, whatever their self-interest, to be supporting vital and growing unions".* Any criticism of the CLC cannot

*As Gandall further notes: "SACTU represented the movement in the fifties and early sixties until it was driven underground by fierce repression. Since then, a new and stronger labour movement has arisen in South Africa, largely independent of SACTU." He notes further that "SACTU's precise influence is hard to gauge", while adding, correctly, that it is nonetheless, "more than the 'exile organization' Harker [John Harker, director of the International Affairs Department] claims it is."



SACTU solidarity demonstration, Toronto.

SACTU Solidarity Committee

be of this kind of support. Rather the criticism must be of the Department's own sectarianism – the militant exclusivity of its support for the "independents" and its attendant denigration of SACTU.

The result of this brand of sectarianism is probably even more damaging than any sectarianism practiced by the SSC. For one thing, it leads to a variety of quite demagogic charges being made behind the scenes by the department: that the SACTU underground is a myth, that the union doesn't really exist inside South Africa, that (most damning of all) the Strike Fund money doesn't find its way into the country! Why this ugly kind of overkill, striking, as it does, a note which lends too much credibility to Gandall's charge that "in South Africa (the CLC) is working to isolate the ANC's trade union ally, the South African Congress of Trade Unions"?

Certainly few others who find some grounds for criticizing the SSC would go nearly so far, their concern being primarily to *qualify* the SSC's more ambitious claims rather than to deny them altogether. True, some would question such claims more broadly than others – there is, after all, considerable room for honest difference of opinion regarding the precise dynamics of the present situation in South Africa – though all would probably note such things as the extreme unevenness of SACTU's impact in regional terms. (In this regard, for example, they would emphasize that some unions – the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), general unions which have been far closer to the United Democratic Front (UDF) than FOSATU, although also now in COSATU – have seemed far more plugged into whatever SACTU network does exist than others.) But who besides

the CLC's International Affairs Department would feel the need to question, in such extreme terms, the SSC's (and, indeed, SACTU's) integrity?

To repeat the question: why this "overkill"? As noted, CLC officials will say that their approach does spring from a refusal to yield uncritically to the SSC's overly ambitious claims on behalf of SACTU. And they also express a concern about the links which SACTU has both with the Communist Party of South Africa and with the Soviet-influenced World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Here, too, there may be certain legitimate grounds for concern. After all, what model of worker-state relations can SACTU have in mind for post-liberation South Africa with such a background? Why, for example, does SACTU apparently manifest such one-sided indifference to the struggles of the workers' movement in Poland? These are certainly questions some trade unionists inside South Africa have asked themselves.

Yet it seems equally clear that the model of "free trade unionism" which premisses this kind of CLC preoccupation really has little to do with safeguarding a revolutionary role for the working-class against the depredations of some future quasi-Stalinist bureaucracy. Instead the model which underpins it seems to be one all too familiar in Western trade union circles, the model of a fundamentally depoliticized trade union movement. Such at least is the apparent import of the controversial correspondence unearthed by Gandall for his above-mentioned article. This correspondence finds John Harker, director of the International Affairs Department, suggesting that external trade unions intercede at the behest of the South African conglomerate, Barlow Rand, to help form a union. One reason: so as not "to leave a vacuum which could be filled by political agitators"!

In fact, it can be argued, the Harker approach emerges as the familiar form of red-baiting so often indulged in by right-wing social-democrats. It thus appears to be fully consonant with the cold war preoccupations and bureaucratic interests of such important influences on CLC headquarters as the ICFTU (the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions).** In short, if the SACTU Solidarity Committee can be accused, with justice, of pushing its brief much too onesidedly, the charge against the International Affairs Department must be an even sharper one. For by using the South African trade union movement as a tool in its own brand of globalist politics, it runs the risk of blurring the positive image of the very South African trade unions whose exemplary cause it professes to be championing. It thus helps to produce a situation in which many of the most progressive elements in the Canadian labour movement, suspicious of the motives of the International Affairs Department and eager to support the national liberation movement in South Africa, are encouraged to back SACTU uncritically while keeping COSATU somewhat at arm's length. In the process, extremely important questions which are currently under debate within the South African trade union movement are never really brought into focus for many Canadian workers.

***The heavy hand of the AFL-CIO may also be felt here. But central actors in that body seem prepared to go very much further to the right than anyone in Canada, the AFL-CIO's African-American Labour Center even dabbling with so venal an organization as Chief Buthelesi's UWUSA in recent months (see the article by Cason and Fleshman elsewhere in this issue). And whatever may be true of its approach to SACTU, the CLC's foreign policy makers have also been far more openly supportive of the African National Congress itself than its counterparts in the United States.*

Learning from the South African Example

It is all the more important, therefore, that the independent unions have proven to be quite capable of speaking for themselves. At a recent meeting in Africa with western trade unions, for example, COSATU made it quite clear that it could not affiliate with, nor even accept money from, the ICFTU. (It seems no more interested in affiliating with the WFTU.) And in a recent trip to Canada to attend the annual convention of the CLC a COSATU delegation told CLC officials that it had no interest in being played off against SACTU by them. Unfortunately, however, some of the thrust of the delegation's intended impact on the convention got swamped, once again, by the politics at the Canadian end, the various protagonists in Canada tending to hear only what they wanted to hear.

Thus a speech to the convention by Jay Naidoo, general secretary of COSATU, which stressed the links of solidarity COSATU feels with SACTU was fielded by some pro-SACTU trade unionists as evidence that COSATU was merely SACTU in disguise. The equally strong statements made by the delegation that COSATU was certainly not to be thought of as being represented by SACTU and that any financial assistance which trade unionists might want to provide to it should come to COSATU directly was interpreted by the International Affairs Department as vindication of their starkly polarized (pro-COSATU, anti-SACTU) way of looking at the world. A dialogue of the deaf indeed. And so unnecessary at a time when, in South Africa, there is a genuine fluidity, a period of innovation and creativity, in the trade union sphere.

The formation of COSATU has itself been an important index of this, given the way it has brought together independent unions with markedly different approaches un-

der a common umbrella. Thus, a number of its component unions (the FOSATU unions in particular) have, for many years, emphasized that consolidating working-class strength and democratic involvement at the shop-floor level must be understood to be at least as important as entering more directly into broader political battles. It is people in such unions (including some non-FOSATU unions) who have argued, retrospectively, that SACTU may have moved too quickly into the political arena in the 1950s without fully consolidating its own working-class base; it is they who have, more recently, kept their critical distance from the UDF (albeit while beginning to produce, through participation in boycotts, stay-aways and the like, a "working-class politics" of their own). Such people have also been circumspect about links to the national liberation movement (the ANC-SACTU alliance), emphasizing the need to protect a certain independence of working-class action both now and in the post-liberation phase.

In joining COSATU such unions have found themselves working closely with others (general unions like the aforementioned SAAWU and GAWU, for example) that are much closer to the UDF, to the ANC-SACTU tradition of trade union activity, to more community-centred political preoccupations. But if the FOSATU unions have come some way towards these latter unions on the question of politics, there has also been movement in the other direction. For the emphasis on building strength on the shop-floor has provided a crucial base for union survival during the current recession; general unions have acknowledged this reality by now agreeing to recast their activities along industrial union lines, realigning their membership in other COSATU unions so structured. Needless to say, the precise terms of the new unions' political programme as well as the specific modalities of juris-

ditional realignment are still subjects of debate, even struggle, within COSATU. But how dramatic and important a development it is that these debates and struggles are now taking place within the broad framework of a common project. (On this subject see also the interview with Geoffrey Spaulding, "One Person, One Vote in a Unified South Africa" in *Southern Africa REPORT*, I, 3).

Equally important is the outreach that COSATU - for all the differing shades of opinion existing within it - has made to the national liberation movement. As noted above, at the recent meeting in Lusaka there was fulsome mutual acknowledgement of each other's importance by the ANC and COSATU, and also agreement between COSATU and SACTU both "that the widest possible unity of trade unions in our country is of utmost importance" and "that there was no contradiction whatsoever arising from their separate existence". Two things distinguish this meeting. Like the negotiations which produced COSATU it was impressive for the very effort to achieve unity of purpose which it exemplified. There is a lesson in this for Canadian trade unionists. Equally important, it is very much a unity in diversity, a unity fraught with question marks, with risks, challenges, promise, for all parties, a unity which, inevitably, must be in a constant process of definition and redefinition. It also behooves us to take these "question marks" seriously.

Thus, for SACTU, the link between itself and the African National Congress, at the centre of the broad movement for national liberation, is virtually unproblematic. We have seen that COSATU also accepts the ANC's primacy in the political arena. Nonetheless, as suggested earlier, there are strong currents within COSATU who also see potential problems. They query what role SACTU as an organization can see for itself in the longer

run, and what role the ANC can see for SACTU: some may even feel that the ANC would be well advised merely to disband SACTU and deal directly with COSATU. And, of course, there are others in COSATU who feel that the two unions can expect to blend their identities rather more smoothly than this over time.

It could be argued that such debates are not immediately relevant to Canadian workers, that they will merely muddy the waters of anti-apartheid work within the Canadian union movement. But discussion of such issues as the role of shop-floor democracy, now and in the future, or the degree of autonomy necessary to working-class organizations from even the most progressive of political movements should not be marginal to the concerns of Canadian workers. They are, in any case, among the issues that South African workers are debating most urgently and they are likely to become even more central as time goes by. In short, things in South Africa are far more complicated than either the positions of the SSC or the International Affairs Department tend to suggest, and the polarization which has taken place between the positions of these two wings of the Canadian labour movement has helped to blur that fact.

Thus, just as the SACTU Solidarity Committee tends to downplay some of these issues, so others in Canada, equally supportive of an ANC-led liberation struggle, will wish to raise them more centrally. These latter (TCLSAC included) make more of a distinction between COSATU and SACTU than does the Committee and some of them also find a particular virtue in that distinction (valuing it, perhaps, in the interests of safeguarding a strong and relatively autonomous workers' movement). For these reasons they may even want to tilt the balance of their support rather more towards COSATU than towards SACTU (although most will think it advisable to support both to some degree). What bears stress-

ing here is that the anti-apartheid movement in Canada will do well to interpret such differences of emphasis as reflecting a *legitimate diversity of opinion* (one eminently open to reasoned discussion) amongst co-workers in a common cause, co-workers who have merely somewhat different readings of South African realities, a somewhat different sense of tactics, a somewhat different politics.

But even if the SSC and other groups were increasingly to operate in this comradely manner, can one hope for as much from the CLC's International Affairs Department? The institutional and ideological pressures - in particular those emanating from the steamy milieu of international labour politics - may be such as to deny to some within the CLC hierarchy the flexibility of approach which seems so necessary. We would not presume to prejudge such a question here. But how much better if, in the course of continuing the very positive support it has been giving to trade unions which are central to the struggle in South Africa, the Department were to advance any criticisms it may have of the SSC/SACTU in far less combative terms. How much better if, instead of fetishizing exclusivity of support for COSATU, it were to acknowledge the acceptability, in principle, of a two-track policy of support.

But whatever may prove to be the practice of the International Affairs Department in this respect, others certainly can be expected to "learn from the South African example" and to emulate the openness of debate, *the unified diversity*, that the movement there has begun to exemplify. For it is only in this way - and not merely with reference to trade unions but in many other spheres as well - that Canadians can hope to work together to keep pace with the complex processes of change which will continue to mark the transition to a non-racial future in South Africa.



Leslie Lawson/Working Women

Annual general meeting of Transport & General Workers Union at Moreno Stores, Katlehong, 1982.

Broadening the Agenda: Cosatu Resolution on Women

COSATU's adoption of a comprehensive set of resolutions (see box) on women at its founding conference last year represents a significant moment in the struggle of black women workers in South Africa.

This is not so much because the COSATU resolution covers a vast number of women. On the contrary, in domestic service and agriculture, still the major sectors of African female employment, worker organization is negligible. And although, in recent years the percentage of black women in the industrial labour force has risen dramatically, only a small proportion of these workers are organized, and an even smaller proportion in COSATU unions. In some of the major industries where women are concentrated, such as clothing and textiles, workers are organized, in closed shop agreements, by the more conservative non-independent unions. For all this, the numbers of women workers in the independent trade unions have increased, and are increasing, significantly.


That the Women's resolution was included in the formative platform of COSATU clearly does reflect this heightened profile of women in the labour, and indeed, liberation movements. (There are, in fact, few comparable commitments to working women's rights at the level of national union federations in other countries, even those where women constitute a far more significant part of the industrial labour force and are actively organized in feminist caucuses.) But it is not as though the presence of women in the South African labour movement is being felt only for the first time. Though few in number, black women workers have been perhaps inordinately militant and vociferous in the course of South Africa's labour history, producing, in the process, some outstanding women organizers. Moreover, the very discriminatory workings of the pass laws with respect to African women and their extremely vulnerable and exploitable position in the labour market, distinguish

black women as a specifically oppressed section of the labour force in a way that cannot be ignored. The specificity of the situation of black women workers has in fact long been acknowledged within the male-dominated independent labour movement – generally in the familiar terms of ‘triple oppression’ – as black, as workers, as women.

What, then, is the significance of the COSATU women’s resolution? In the first place, the content of the resolution reflects and implies a subtle but critical shift in the posing of the question of women within the progressive labour movement. As one of the women involved was heard to say: “Two years ago this could never have happened”. Secondly, the resolution breaks new ground in presenting possibilities and prospects for women workers to organize further around the issues of their concern. In short the resolution represents a broadening of the agenda of organized workers’ struggle, to include, far more squarely, the issue of gender subordination.

Shifting Debate

One of the shifts in the discussion on women workers that has been taking place in South Africa recently is encapsulated in the difference between conceiving women abstractly ‘as oppressed’, and talking about gender relations which name men as involved in that oppression. To be sure, acknowledgement of gender subordination is very tacit and indirect in the COSATU resolutions, but it is there, in the clause on sexual harassment and the reference to gender discrimination in society and in the labour federation itself. These rather oblique references do not go very far in capturing the thrust and tenor of women unionists’ voices on this issue. The FOSATU Workshop on Women in 1983 brought their arguments most forcibly to the attention of the independent trade unions. Here women spoke about the severe inequalities they faced in work conditions and the lack of women’s active involve-



Women Workers/FOSATU

ment in the unions. They linked this to the extra burden of domestic responsibility that women carry, expressing bitterness that men found time to read, drink, and socialize, at the expense of women’s extraordinarily long working day. They broached too the issue of black working class women’s sexuality – the phenomenon of sexual exploitation in the workplace, the threat of sexual assault in the townships, and sexual coercion at home – the ‘third overtime’ in bed, as one woman put it.

Gender Challenges

In a more recent and hard-hitting article in *Third World Women News*, June Nala, activist in the emergent independent trade union movement, goes even further in confronting the gender issue. “The strength of the labour movement” she argues, “has been slowed down by male domination that does not allow women to use their power . . .” And men in the trade unions, she challenges, “have to question their role in the patriar-

chal system . . . are they on the side of the oppressor in these patriarchal relations, or the oppressed?”

Women who raise questions about gender inequality are of course subjected to the familiar accusation of sowing division, and of falling prey to Western values, contrary to ‘our tradition’. To which women have replied: “Unions were not our tradition either; we must go forward, not backwards”. A group of women textile workers in Durban recognised the basis for male resistance to the raising of ‘women’s problems’ in the union. Men will feel threatened if women receive equal pay and do the same jobs, they said, “And this will disturb relations at home . . .”

It should be said that some men in the unions are starting to accept some of the points that women have been making, such as the unfairness of the prevailing domestic division of labour. At the FOSATU Workshop one man agreed that male silence on the oppressive conditions that women face in the

workplace was in fact complicity in the oppression of women. Others seemed to understand what Maggie Magubane, then Secretary-General of the Sweet Food and Allied Workers' Union, was saying when she spoke of gender divisions weakening the workers' movement: "... if we don't address the problems, the bosses will play the women off against the men." This argument appealed to the self-interest of at least one worker who recognized that lower women's wages might result in men being undercut and 'chucked out'. He warned his brothers: "Then we will cry!"

Another aspect of the shifting debate reflected in the COSATU resolution is the growing acknowledgement that the achievement of a unity and equality amongst men and women workers necessarily involves addressing the specificities of women's situation - the differences between men and women. Most obviously this involves addressing issues related to women's reproductive capacity. But it also involves ensuring that the forms of union organization do not discriminate against women, and that union procedures and organizational norms are appropriate to the exigencies of women's lives and to their capacities and experiences.

Reproductive Rights

The main reproductive item of the unions' agenda today is the maternity agreement which only in very recent years has started appearing as a feature of industrial negotiations.

The COSATU resolution was in fact proposed by CCAWUSA (Commercial, Catering and Allied Workers Union), the union which has been pioneering maternity agreements. The most favorable one to date has been for a 12 month leave with proportional pay for several of those months and a 3-day paid paternity leave. In relation to reproductive rights, it should be noted though that the COSATU resolution makes no reference to the issue of contraception - which for many women workers involves submitting to harmful Depo-Provera injections as a condition for recruitment for a job. Nor does it mention abortion, which in South Africa is a widely practised, illegal, and again highly dangerous form of 'contraception' which women workers are in many cases compelled to undertake in order to keep their jobs.

Despite its very close relevance to conditions of employment, abortion has not been articulated as an issue of working women's struggle in South Africa as it has been, so centrally, in other national labour movements. This is in large part because abortion has not been unambiguously constructed as an issue in the broader non-racial women's movement there.

Significantly, the clauses on children and maternity are careful not to exclude paternal responsibility in their formulation - they talk of "workers' family responsibilities" rather than women's. But the fact that specific clauses on child-care and family responsibility fall under

the general resolutions on women indicates quite clearly the prevailing reality that it is overwhelmingly women who bear full responsibility for children in South Africa.

Masculinist Organization

Turning to the question of union organization, it seems from some of the observations of women unionists that as far as women are concerned, democracy and equality reign at the formal level only. A number of women argue that men dominate the key organizing positions, while women do the more menial clerical jobs or are given the position of treasurer, being perceived as more reliable with money (the treasurer of the important National Union of Mineworkers is a woman). This gives men a monopoly of organizing skills, information and control over union policies.

There certainly are some highly prominent women in the independent trade union leadership. (COSATU has recently added one woman to its otherwise all-male executive, and there are women secretary-generals in a couple of other important unions.) But as June Nala points out, not all women trade unionists are necessarily committed to promoting women's issues. "Women in the trade unions are divided", she says. "A small minority at the leadership level are fighting for a broader consciousness along feminist lines. Others in leadership positions are content with their role as leaders and as a part of a hierarchy that treats them as 'special women', that is, honorary men."

KEY EXTRACTS FROM THE COSATU RESOLUTION ON WOMEN - DECEMBER 1985

COSATU resolves to fight:

- Against all unequal and discriminatory treatment of women at work, in society and in the Federation;
- For the equal right of women and men to paid work as an important part of the broader aim to achieve full and freely chosen employment;
- For equal pay for all work of equal value - the value of work must be determined by organized women and men workers themselves;
- For the restructuring of employment so as to allow women and men the opportunity of qualifying for jobs of equal value;
- For childcare and family facilities to meet workers' needs and make it easier for workers to combine work and family responsibilities;
- For full maternity rights, including paid maternity and paternity leave and job security;
- For the protection of women and men from all types of work proven to be harmful to them, including work which interferes with their ability to have children;
- Against sexual harassment in whatever form it takes;
- For adequate and safe transport for workers doing overtime and night work.

The problem pertains not only to the level of leadership. Lydia Kompe, of the Transport and General Workers' Union, spoke of the lack of representation of women at lower levels of union structures. "Women have shown commitment in the trade unions. They have shown bravery. They have been active in the shop stewards' committees. We have got unions where the majority of members are women. But why have we not seen a woman as chairperson of one of these unions?" One of the reasons is the power of patriarchal ideology. Women union members perceive men as having more authority, and continue to elect them as their representatives.

Participation in unions for black women workers is fraught with deterrents and discouragement. In union meetings women lack confidence to speak out, and when they do, feel their suggestions are not seriously taken into consideration. Domestic and child-care responsibilities, and suspicious husbands, further hinder their involvement. Some independent unions are trying to respond to these problems. For example, unions have written letters to husbands vouching for the involvement and integrity of their wives. And COSATU has resolved to fight discrimination in the union federation, committing itself to "actively promote the necessary confidence and experience amongst women workers so that they can participate fully at all levels of the federation".

Prospects and Possibilities

The commitment of the new union federation to fighting both for women's concrete demands and for more organizational equality does indeed represent a victory for women workers. But the resolution and its various clauses remain, as yet, on paper. Their struggle for the rights of women workers, far from being over, has only just entered a newly structured phase.



Annual general meeting of Transport & General Workers Union of South Africa, 1984.

Leslie Lawson/Working Women

It could be expected that some of the women union activists who have worked so hard to get women's issues on the agenda might be feeling some apprehension at this point. That the resolution was passed with virtual unanimity is not necessarily an index of male unionists' position and practice on gender issues. It could well mean that the issues that women are raising have not yet been experienced by men as important or challenging, have not in fact really been confronted. And the experience of women unionists in other countries has so often been that of a loss of control over the struggle for women's rights and a consequent demobilization of women, once their demands have been formally incorporated in bureaucratic union structures.

Within COSATU, however, there are grounds for optimism that women's issues will not be buried. The women's resolution itself includes provisions for implementation - in the form of an education program on the specific conditions suffered by women workers and the

ways to overcome these, and a sub-committee with a separate budget to monitor progress. The structure of COSATU, with its emphasis on strong, local, cross-union shop steward councils, and its regional congresses is one that will potentially allow for organization around women's issues at the local level where women have a stronger union voice. Those industries and regions where women are more prominent and organized will be the source of demands for women workers that can - again potentially - find their way through the regional congresses to the central executive committee.

COSATU'S politics and commitment to participatory democracy also constitute a potentially enabling political context for the advancement of gender struggle. Firstly, women in COSATU will not be seeking to raise their demands in an entrenched, 'traditional' and shopfloor-bound definition of trade union jurisdiction. In South Africa, the stark relationship between national oppression and labour exploitation has always posed a challenge to such a narrow focus of union

activity. The merger of the different union tendencies within COSATU has produced a union terrain which embraces both commitment to autonomous worker organization as well as to general political and community struggles. Thus COSATU's acknowledgment that the 'extra-industrial' aspect of workers' lives are significant points for organized workers' action means that there is - logically, at least - a legitimate space for the consideration of women's 'extra-industrial' issues. (In other labour movements, the insistence of male union hierarchies on a narrow, industrial focus of union concern, has been the major means for excluding women's issues from the agenda.)

The emphasis in the COSATU unions on democratic organization is also an important point of manoeuvre for women workers striving for equal representation. The union context in which women are starting to assert their power is not one governed by well-established, hierarchical and bureaucratic procedures. Rather it is one characterized by a dynamic, fluid and formative attempt at realizing democracy in organizational practice.

But finally, it is the collective organized strength of women workers - in the factories and at all levels of the union federation - that will determine the process and extent to which the women's resolution moves off the paper and into practice. The challenge facing women within COSATU at this point is precisely that of how to organize to ensure that their issues remain activated on the federation's priority agenda, and to see that the rather abstract formulations of the resolution are translated into concrete union actions and agreements.

Times are hard for this enterprise. The climate of continuing political upheaval in South Africa has tended to draw COSATU's attention away from what seem like the more amorphous and long-term is-

ues, to concentrate on the pressing exigencies - such as the organizing of the spectacularly successful May Day stay-away and defending members against state-instigated right-wing attacks. When asked about the progress on the women's resolution, a COSATU leader replied, a little defensively, that there had not been time or space since the founding of the federation to consider the question.

Moreover, the issues for women workers become muddled and complex when considered in concrete contexts and particularly against the background of women's extremely vulnerable position in the labour market. Patriarchal pass laws and the absolute necessity for family-supporting women to have some access to income render African women desperate for employment. Fighting for union recognition, for equal pay and even for slightly improved working conditions can so easily result in the loss of jobs - not merely for the victimized unionists but for the female labour force itself. There is at least one example where women factory workers were retrenched after the union won an equal pay agreement. This dilemma faces organizers in the Bantustans too, for there women are most exploited, most vulnerable and most often in need of paid employment.

If anything, the practical difficulty and complexity of addressing gender inequality in employment makes it all the more important that women are well-represented in all union structures, including negotiating teams. They need to be in a position to subject all industrial agreements, union strategies and tactics to the scrutiny of their perspective, to identify and draw attention to the gender implications of these. (Note that Clause 3 in the resolution includes provision for organized women workers to be involved in determining the value of work). To take an example: the *siyalala* (sleep-in) tactic is currently being hailed as the most effective way

for striking workers to prevent firings, scabbing and the resumption of production, and also for involving the workers' community in the labour dispute. But does this tactic have the same possibilities for women as for men? It is predominantly women who are organizing the logistical support for the sleep-in strikers, bringing food, clothing and blankets to the factory gates at night. Is it as easy for women with children to occupy a factory? None of the reported instances of factory sleep-ins mention women as participating in the strikes other than in a supporting role.

The point is that such questions, and similar ones related to wage increases, retrenchment procedures, over-time rules, etc., have only recently begun to be taken seriously in the unions. There are seldom 'gender-correct' bargaining positions, and besides, the bargaining process itself is hardly a 'pure' one, particularly in South Africa. It seems, though, that it has been the 'industrial' unions, rather than the 'political', community-oriented unions within the COSATU umbrella which have made the most significant strides in raising gender questions and incorporating them in agreements. This may of course reflect only the distribution of women workers in the industries organized by what were previously the FOSATU unions, CCAWUSA and Food and Canning for example. But it does seem to suggest that focussed, democratic, shopfloor-grounded organization has constituted a particularly constructive forum for the identification of working women's concerns and the sharpening of gender awareness. Maggie Magubane suggested this when she said: "Old practices die hard. However, with the discussion around democracy and equality within the unions, and the increasing involvement of women in trade unions, we hope to start changing attitudes." Women in the COSATU unions now have this newly broken ground on which to advance.

Mozambique and Nicaragua: The Politics of Survival

BY JUDITH MARSHALL

Judith Marshall, one of the founding members of TCLSAC, has worked in the Ministry of Education in Mozambique since 1978. She accompanied four Mozambican provincial literacy instructors on a four-month study visit to Nicaragua and Brazil at the end of 1985. On her return to Mozambique, she did research on a workplace literacy programme in the CIM milling company in Matola.

"WE'RE TRYING TO SURVIVE. THE AMERICANS HAVE PROJECTS BENT ON DESTROYING US." - Comandante Bayardo Arce, Managua, September 1985.

Comandante Bayardo's words at a meeting with education workers set us once again pondering Mozambique and Nicaragua. Two small peripheral countries each embarked on a socialist project, one in Reagan's backyard, the other in that of his great friend, apartheid South Africa. Here they were, eleven and six years along their respective paths, fighting desperately for survival. Both were pitted against all that is being done to turn their dreams of development and peace into nightmares of hunger, shortages and the prolonged agony of war.

In some ways, we envied Nicaragua the clarity with which it could define its enemy. For a country already invaded by Yankee imperialism with such regularity over the past 70 years, the present situation has the ring of familiarity in a way that the Mozambican situation does not. Nicaraguans, independent since 1821, no longer harbour the illusion that the mere fact of national independence guarantees that the country's resources will be utilized for



"The Sandinistas will not be overcome nor sold out"

the prosperity of ordinary people. The Somoza dictatorship, representing internal social forces prepared to be intermediaries for imperialism's continued hold, is a bitter memory, and a fresh one. The successors of Somoza are ready once again to manage Nicaragua for larger multinational interests. For the ordinary Nicaraguan worker whose dreams of a different kind of society began to seem possible with the Sandinista victory, the defeat of the Sandinistas has clear implications. Somoza's successors are no further away than Miami.

For Mozambique, neither the external nor the internal enemy is so clear. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that the country was ruled historically by a weak colonial power. Portugal was content to supervise Mozambique's integration into a regional economy dominated by South Africa through the mechanisms of migrant labour and a regional transport infrastructure. But the nationalist project of Frelimo shifted towards a socialist path after 1975, disturbing the tranquility of the region. Mozambique was visibly non-

racial in a part of the world where throughout recent history race has been used as an important mechanism for social control. It was no longer a zone of secure foreign domination by large multinational interests, supervised locally by the South African regime.

The eleven years since independence have been years of an undeclared war in Mozambique, waged by Mozambique's equivalent to the *contras*, the Mozambique National Resistance, known both as MNR and Renamo. Established during the struggle for Zimbabwean independence by the Rhodesian army, it brought together disgruntled Portuguese settlers, fleeing members of the Portuguese army and secret police, and dissident elements in Frelimo. Since Zimbabwean independence in 1980, Renamo has been taken over by the South Africans and has systematically destroyed selected targets including vital infrastructures, key socio-economic projects and local level leadership. Its favoured targets in recent years are projects designed to counter South Africa's hegemonic control

of the regional economy. These SADCC projects include power, pipeline, road and rail links to Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and Swaziland. Renamo has also terrorized the rural population through brutal raids on villages, and attacks on buses and produce trucks linking countryside and city. Foreigners have been a stated target; hence kidnapping from project sites and more recently, mines placed on the beach in the capital, Maputo.

It is a war of attrition, wearing women and men down, wearying them. The sense of shortages of everything, that nothing works anymore, that there is no end to it all, has become pervasive. This is exacerbated by a skilful disinformation campaign mounted by South Africa that lays all of this at the feet of the Frelimo Party's socialist option.

In fact, there has been more destruction in the past eleven years than there ever was during the colonial war. Important components of the infrastructure, including industrial installations like the Luabo sugar refinery in Zambezia province have been totally smashed.

The actual enemy, however, has been difficult to identify. While Reagan has come out and openly identified himself as a *contra*, it took the Nkomati Accord 'peace' in early 1984 to have South Africa's role as sustainer of Renamo openly established. Yet at the same time, the rhetoric of Nkomati saw this newly proven enemy now presented as a 'good neighbour'. Nkomati represented an effort by the Frelimo party to buy a little space for manoeuvre. Frelimo assumed that by tilting towards a neo-colonial posture it would be possible to exploit the contradictions within the South African regime between those intent on smashing it definitively and those wanting to woo it into continued dependence in a regional economy. But this antithesis was never a real option. The more apt characterization was always that of the *good cop* - *bad cop* as two faces of the same re-

ality. This misreading led to inconsistency and vacillation within Frelimo. Throughout the post-Nkomati period, it issued conflicting signals concerning the nature and identity of the enemy. Even party militants were left uncertain.



Remains as they are found in both countries - Fuel tanks destroyed by the CIA at Corinto, 1983.

Any pretension of 'good neighbourliness' on South Africa's part has long since been exposed. For Mozambique, the documents captured in Casa Banana, Renamo's main base in the Gorongosa mountains in central Mozambique, tell all. They indicate clearly the active and continuing role of the South Africa Defence Force (SADF) in orchestrating Renamo, both pre- and post-Nkomati. The memos captured give accounts of SADF 'friends' instructing Renamo on how to present its struggle during the clandestine visits of South African Deputy Foreign Minister Louis Nel to Renamo bases in Mozambique. They are strongly reminiscent of CIA tutelage of *contra* leadership. For the southern Africa region, the outrageous attacks in mid-May on the capitals of Zimbabwe, Zambia and Botswana are but another grim incident in an ongoing regional process of destabilization. It includes continued invasions of Angola, engineering of the recent coup in Lesotho and a constant posture of bullying and belligerency. South Africa's capacity to carry out these policies with impunity in a period of tremendous

internal pressures from the ever-expanding popular uprising, an economic crisis of dramatic proportions and growing international pressures, underscores that it has powerful backers.

If the exact mix of South African and Portuguese actors, plus the array of Israeli, Saudi and Malawian backers is at times complicated, the question of identifying the internal enemy is even more difficult. Portuguese colonialism gave little space for a Mozambican national class to emerge that could ally its interests with the continued regional hegemony of South Africa. For Mozambicans, the possibility of the Frelimo government's collapse presents a huge unknown. Obviously a rollback to colonial times is not on the agenda. But unlike the Nicaraguans, the Mozambicans have no fresh memory of a neo-colonial variant. As the war of attrition takes its toll, the idea of any alternative begins to look attractive to a growing number, even to those to whom a neo-colonial solution would bring little benefit.

Enemy Footholds

The sheer power of the enemy in both countries is formidable. There is no doubt, however, that some of the internal policies of the two countries, along with their weaknesses as a result of inexperience and scarce resources have given the enemy an added foothold. The rural areas are especially problematic for both countries. The elections in Nicaragua in 1984 indicated weaknesses in the rural areas. Our discussion with an agriculturalist who had formerly worked in Mozambique was a profoundly discouraging moment. He saw major errors in both countries in agricultural policies. Each passed through a phase of somewhat uncritically embarking on large-scale projects to the detriment of a coherent policy for the family sector and small-scale producer. The result was rural sectors detached from any kind of national project. The new order has, in

Ritchie/Anti-Intervention Handbook

fact, brought little change to peasants' lives. Whether or not these areas actually succumb to counter-revolutionary propaganda, they are without doubt a weak link in their defence of the regime.

This false start in dealing with the problem of building new structures in the countryside has been recognized in Nicaragua and to some extent countered. The pace of land reform has been slowed; more land is going to individual producers than was originally envisioned, giving the peasants a stronger stake in defending the country. They are now fighting for their own land.

If Renamo did have a political project for Mozambique, it could undoubtedly win peasant support. Both party and government structures have proved very weak in carrying out their rural strategies. The Frelimo Party report to the IV Congress in 1983 made a strong self-criticism of its agricultural policy, speaking of virtual abandonment of the family and cooperative sector in favour of large scale projects. Not only have rural producers been abandoned in terms of marketing structures, inputs, incentives and supports; they have also been left without any protection from brutal attack.

The war has been characterized by Frelimo as the work of 'armed bandits', orchestrated by South Africa. But some commentators argue that the war could not have reached the scale that it has without a strong measure of local support.

Given the continued brutality of Renamo and its complete lack of a political project, there is little evidence that it actually recruits into its ranks. During a two-week visit to Morrumbene district in southern Inhambane in early January, I poked away at this question in a number of different contacts. This district has basically returned to Frelimo hands this past year after a period of complete infiltration. By January, Ren-

amo's actions consisted of sporadic and brutal attacks on remote villagers, often old people and children. The economically active group had already congregated in the district capital or moved to Maputo or Inhambane city.

I asked a number of people who these 'bandidos' really were, querying whether they were strangers or people from around the area. Everybody agreed that their own sons and nephews were out there but all negated the idea of their having opted to go. "Nobody from here is recruited by the 'bandidos.' They



Sam Barnes

carry out raids and force people to go with them. If you resist, they'll kill you instantly. Then they involve you in a raid on a village. They convince you that if you try to run back to Frelimo, you'll be in trouble there too. It makes it difficult for our local forces; they know that attacking the 'bandidos' is attacking their own relatives."

Peasant support - or lack of peasant resistance? With attacks on farms, homes and the new health centers and schools that had begun to be established, most peasants ei-

ther flee the countryside or try not to attract undue attention from either Renamo or Frelimo forces. Undoubtedly a more vibrant process of rural transformation would have altered the effect of the onslaught of the 'bandidos'.

Signalling the Economic Policies

The worsening economic situation is another enemy foothold. During our visit to Nicaragua, the discussion about economic difficulties and policies showed great similarities between the two countries. In Mozambique, the official rate of exchange is 40 meticaís to US\$1.00; black market rates ran at 1500-2000 per dollar. In Nicaragua, the official rate was 28 cruzeiros to the dollar; we were told that black market rates were about 1 to 700. In both countries, the cost of consumer goods was impossibly high. An imported American shirt sold freely in a Managua market cost one and a half times a Nicaraguan worker's monthly salary. In Maputo, where price controls on fruits and vegetables had resulted in empty market stalls, the mid-1985 price liberalizations resulted in a sudden flood of goods. Initial enthusiasm at the abundance rapidly turned to demoralization as it became evident that the prices were going to remain accessible only to those with black market incomes. A kilo of bananas cost 200 meticaís; tomatoes and onions were selling at 1000 per kilo. Yet the average monthly salary was less than 3000 meticaís.

For urban workers in Maputo like Aida Amosse whom I met in the literacy center at CIM, the situation is dramatic:

"The literacy book is right beside me but there is no room in my head for anything to enter. My head is too full of problems. My husband abandoned me to go to South Africa. How can I bring up seven children on my salary of 3,300 meticaís? I have to buy oil and soap on the black market, since there hasn't been any on the rations. A bar of laundry

soap costs 1300 meticaís. Cooking oil costs 1500. The literacy book is there but there's no space in my head for anything to enter."

As visitors to Nicaragua from Mozambique, we were struck by the way the economic policies were signalled to the people. The Nicaraguan news media gave prominence to policies such as channelling goods to the war zones, defending urban workers' real salaries through workplace access to goods, and encouraging rural producers through pricing and marketing policies. During the national meetings last September of the CST, the main trade union central, full vent was given to debate on economic conditions and the impossibility of urban workers surviving with present levels of inflation. President Daniel Ortega spent considerable time in the debates with the workers; trade union leaders had honest replies. There was solid discussion about how much salary increases would contribute to increased inflation. We had the impression that workers were gaining real insights into some of the intractable problems of their economy and its insertion into the world market, and recognizing that there were no easy answers for the actual crisis.

By contrast, in Mozambique there was little political work going on around economic questions. People confronting the food shortages in Maputo had little sense of an economic strategy at work. Neither the government's efforts to channel scarce resources in the most rational and responsible way within a war economy nor Renamo's actions bent on systematic destruction are made very visible by the media. Laudable policies existed, such as guaranteeing resources first to the army, setting higher prices for rural producers, channelling consumer goods to rural areas through the parastatal AGRICOM, and giving workers' canteens priority in the distribution of scarce items. They were presented piecemeal, however, with no implication of coherent strat-

egy at work. A tone of *onward and upward developmentalism* seems to characterize the daily newspapers' approach to economic questions, with endless headlines on cooperation agreements and development projects. Even those at the CIM complex benefitting from a second set of monthly rations and basic goods available through the factory itself did not interpret this as a conscious strategy to protect urban wages; they felt themselves just as vulnerable as any other workers, hopelessly trying to match a monthly salary of 3,300 meticaís to black market absurdities.



Nicaraguan wall mural with organizations in literacy campaign

Deborah Barndt/Canadian Action for Nicaragua

People's Power – People's State

We also found in Nicaragua the same tensions between trying simultaneously to create a popular state and new forms of people's power that we have experienced over recent years in Mozambique.

The problems were all too similar – with enormous difficulty in maintaining dynamic organization at the base after the initial euphoria of victory. The mass organizations were all running campaigns of revitalization. The ample debate in the me-

dia about the CDS (Sandinista Defence Committees – block committees) showed, as similar debates so often did in Mozambique, that the sternest critics of the process were those within it. The honesty in condemning local leaders for abusing their power, reverting to work methods of commandism rather than mobilization, using privileges of leadership to avoid actual work, and siphoning off for themselves scarce resources allocated to the community were reminiscent of similar litanies of ills in the Dynamizing Groups and block committees in Mozambique's equivalent structures.

In Mozambique, the immediate post-independence political work to dismantle the vertical and severely formal structures inherited both from traditional and colonial society is now only a faint memory. Now the political and organizational health of structures of people's power is even more in question. In a huge and diverse country of 13 million, with only a limited history of popular organization, and the additional burden of a crippling small number of political cadres, it is hardly surprising that this should be so.*

The organizational and political health of the mass organizations in both countries is intimately linked to some of the most vexing questions in establishing and maintaining people's power.

The Sandinista Front and Frelimo both directed lengthy struggles on diverse fronts. Subordinated groups contested the space allocated to them under the existing social orders of Portuguese colonialism and the Somoza dictatorship.

*One of the fascinating questions for future investigation in Mozambique is the process from 1975-1977 when the Dynamizing Groups were most active as expressions of people's power. What were the implications of the III Congress decision to move towards transforming them into party cells of the newly established Marxist-Leninist party, the Frelimo Party?

mozambique

The struggle by trade unions for workers' rights and wages, by peasants to have and work their own land or by women to participate actively outside the domain of family resulted in new institutions. The popular movement expanded, diversified and gained in organizational strength over the years of the struggle.

New forms and popular leaders emerged. In contesting their own subordinated positions, and linking their struggles to other groups challenging the prevailing social order, those linked to the popular movement created a sense of themselves as a people. Within their newly won social space, they begin to create a new social order. A sense of ownership, of the right to speak, to act, to create won through struggle was an important component of this experience.

In both countries, the question of finding an appropriate post-liberation stance for these organizations seems fraught with difficulties.

Somehow the vitality seems to get sapped very quickly when it is all 'us' within a popular state. The mass organizations orchestrated

from the top quickly become mere cheer leaders for the regimes, echoers of the party line, losing their credibility with the base. Yet so many popular regimes, especially when under attack - and when is this not the case - have a tendency to deny the space for real expressions of people's power. The prospect of demands for which there is no immediate response is threatening. It is often feared that popular energies will run out of control. This is compounded, certainly in Mozambique, by the role of the middle level cadres who all too often feel so unsure of their own role that they impose a kind of political orthodoxy and effectively stifle expression at the base.

How do you create space for workers to build effective forms of workers' control and for people to build institutions as women, as youth, or with agendas related to ethnic, racial, professional and religious identities? This is not to suggest that in either country the regime comes down with a heavy hand to repress such initiatives. It is more a question of how to foster them. The tendencies to homogenize, routinize, and ultimately to demoralize and demobilize are there.

How can a process of transition to socialism engender a new vitality in workplace and community? How, in other words, can women and men construct new forms to express their lives?

Capitalist systems historically have robbed people of any sense of collective commitment to and control of workplace and community life. Through its multiple forms and institutions such as the bureaucracy, the media, schooling etc., the capitalist state claims, both implicitly and explicitly, the prerogative to define acceptable ways of *being* and *doing*. How can a popular state signal a different kind of freedom? How can it find new ways to be the state, fostering a vital popular democracy at the base, with genuine and diverse forms and institutions of people's power?

Clearly these are not easy questions to resolve. They are forced on the agenda, however, by real experiences within processes of transition such as those of Mozambique and Nicaragua. And clearly how these questions are tackled has everything to do with the success or failure of the transition project.



AMASP - Associação Mocambicana de Amizade e Solidariedade com os Povos

War and Rumours of War – The Politics of Information

Clearly for both Nicaraguans and Mozambicans, war is an ever present reality. No area is free from its impact, whether felt as front-line combat or the acute and growing shortages of food, drugs, clothing and transport in the rearguard areas. No family with draft-age young people is unaffected. The armed and uniformed presence amidst the population was a familiar enough sight to us coming from Mozambique. The feelings about the war in the two countries, however, were very different.

I think information policies and the pedagogical style of the leadership expressed through them were the key to this difference. In Nicaragua, the war is lived at every moment through the media, with radio, newspapers, TV and billboards communicating messages about it. One picked up a sense of combativeness, a determination expressed on several occasions in the form of "What happened in Grenada won't happen here. A lot of us will die defending Nicaragua." Managua itself is a visibly defended city with tank positions established on key access roads, air raid drills rehearsed on national television and bomb shelters a commonplace in homes and factories.

While we were there, Voluntary Military Service was dragging and top leaders arranged time in busy schedules to go to recruitment rallies and sustain lengthy question periods with young people and their families about the war. Every effort was made to keep the balance between 'voluntary' and 'obligatory' military service tipped on the side of voluntary.

The human face of the war was most touching. There were front page pictures in the national newspapers several times during our two month visit showing Daniel Ortega holding a mother who had lost her son or daughter in the war. In one



Funeral for Nicaraguan agricultural technician murdered by the 'contras'.

tiny locality, we participated in a service commemorating the death of a local student, Eddy Guzman. His mother was present on stage and was applauded with compassion; later we joined friends who went by their home where the son's school notebooks and Sandinista Youth badge were proudly laid out on display. Just prior to our arrival, the historic battle to take Masaya, a key center close to Managua, was reenacted by thousands of Nicaraguans.

These public and collective expressions of the reality of the war, the ways that those fallen remain 'present,' were encountered on many occasions. They were tremendously moving – but also tremendously mobilizing.

In Mozambique, the information policy on the war has been more often characterized by silence than by an attempt to create an informed, and to that extent, mobilized population. Long before the added confusion engendered by South Africa as the 'good neighbour', Mozambique showed a marked reticence to deal publicly and politically with the war. Attacks that had the entire country agog were often not men-

tioned by the national newspapers. Working journalists at times got no reply when they asked the Ministry of Defence to confirm or comment on reports coming out in Zimbabwe or Portugal or on the BBC about the fighting. While the news releases of the Mozambique News Agency, AIM, have been more forthcoming over recent years, these are channelled principally for foreign rather than internal readers. There are still amazing lapses. When I left Mozambique in mid-April, there had still been no mention in national media of the fall of Casa Banana back into Renamo hands. Although the action had taken place in the centre of the country, all of Maputo was talking of it within hours of the event. Clearly, silence on the part of official sources simply lays the field wide open for rumours and speculation. This tends to create profound individual demoralization exactly at a time when collective mobilization is most needed.

The Political Bureau, expanded for the occasion to include senior provincial leaders and all Central Committee members in Maputo, met for a 14-day marathon session in mid-February. The main conclu-

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sions were a reaffirmation of a socialist project and a renewed commitment to strengthening the party. This was followed almost immediately by a national conference of the OJM (Mozambique Youth Organization) in March. Both meetings made thorough assessments of the overall situation with particular attention given to analyzing the military. To Mozambique's credit, weaknesses and instances of corruption in the military were openly debated. President Samora was a constant figure in attendance at the OJM conference and was extremely frank. He concurred that there were individuals in the army "who don't want this war to end. They're making a profit out of it. They don't pay their soldiers, and steal the money to build houses for themselves."

Indeed there are fundamental problems in the way the war is being waged. The situation is markedly different from province to province. There are provinces such as Inhambane where long, hard political work at the base is paying off. Renamo control has been overturned. Local militias have been mobilized and armed. They are backed up by strong army support, and all is held in place by solid political leadership in provincial level party, military and government structures. There are other provinces, however, in complete disarray.


Also debated at length was the policy of recruitment to the army, where coercion has at times been practiced and where whites, Indians and Mozambicans of mixed

race have been, in practice, exempt. While the criticism was expressed in terms of race, the debate showed it to be profoundly a class question. In truth, amidst the acute shortages of trained cadres in all sectors, the military has been particularly lacking in allocations of skilled personnel. It has been trying to defend Mozambique's ten provinces in a war master-minded by the South African Defence Forces. These include a strong army, navy and air force, using a mixture of conventional and guerilla tactics and special forces, all backed up by ultra-sophisticated systems of communications, transport and surveillance. The old advantages of guerilla tactics have passed to SADF/Renamo. Defence of fixed targets in Mozambique, such as bridges, railways, key economic installations and development projects is in the hands of inexperienced, poorly fed and clothed and often inadequately armed conscripts, without so much as a functioning system of field communications, not to mention an adequate engineering corps, navy or airforce.

What remains to be seen is whether the resolve to strengthen the party and the military, and the subsequent reshuffles in party and government can begin to turn the situation around. The Political Bureau communique was the strongest statement of continued commitment to a socialist project since the Nkomati Accord, frequent American statements about Mozambique's redeemability for capitalism notwithstanding.

The massive funeral ceremonies for the South African Communist Party General Secretary, Moses Mabhida, in April, led to a convergence of South Africans on Maputo. ANC participation included a planeload from Zambia. Two busses of UDF members were present from South Africa itself. President Samora Machel, ANC President Oliver Tambo, South African Communist Party Chairperson Joe Slovo and UDF leader Archie Gumede all gave moving tributes to Mabhida, who was also the vice-president of SACTU and a member of the national executive committee of the ANC. Some commentators later went so far as to say that the funeral marked the burial of the Nkomati Accord! Be that as it may, it did seem to signal a clear recognition that any respite from South African aggression would come only with the smashing of the apartheid regime's hold on South Africa itself.

Future prospects? Carlos Cardoso, the Director of the Mozambique News Agency, suggested after his recent visit to Nicaragua that Mozambique, in the long run, may be luckier than Nicaragua. He was only partially in jest. Although Nicaragua may have the advantage of a more clearly defined enemy, in the long run it is a particularly intractable one. At least the South African people are militantly on the move to put an end to the apartheid regime. The blood and thunder crowd in Washington is rather more secure than its counterpart in Pretoria.



Toronto Rallies Against Apartheid



The people of Toronto turned out in the thousands to express their opposition to apartheid during the *Toronto Arts Against Apartheid Festival* in May. The week of political, educational and cultural events climaxed in a rally of over 12,000 people.



Margie Bruun-Meyer



Namibian Workers: Intensifying the Struggle

During the past several years, the efforts of Namibian workers to organize themselves to fight for their rights have reached new heights. This has been the case particularly among industrial workers, whose opposition to South African occupation of their country first attracted international attention in December 1971. At that time, some 20,000 workers called a general strike against the whole system of pass laws, migrant labour and criminal indenture. In the forefront of this action were the mine workers, who brought Namibia's foreign-owned mining sector virtually to a halt.

Namibian and South African Mineworkers: Forging Links

Again, mine labourers in Namibia have been taking the lead in organizing worker opposition to apartheid, in addition to consolidating their links with workers' struggles in South Africa. In December 1985, workers at the Rössing Uranium Mine decided to formally approach the South African National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) - with whom they had had contact since 1978 - with a view to either joining NUM or forming their own trade union. Explorations between workers at Consolidated Diamond Mines (CDM) in Oranjemund and NUM had reached the point that by November 1985, NUM and the mine management were ready to draw up an agreement.

Nor has the South African created "transitional Namibian government" been silent in light of these developments. On November 18, 1985, the "National Assembly" of Namibia - formed earlier that year by the South African State President - passed the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act.

Among other things, this Act prohibits (without permission of "Cabinet") non-residents from "advocating, encouraging or promoting the establishment of any trade union or in any manner whatsoever assisting in the establishing of any trade union" in Namibia. The Act also prohibits branches of South African trade unions from being registered in Namibia.

There is no doubt that the above Act is aimed at thwarting developments such as intensifying relationships between Namibian workers and South African (and other) trade unionists. Immediately following the tabling of this Act - which has not yet received formal "approval" from the South African appointed Administrator-General for Namibia - NUM took legal advice and has decided to take the challenge to the courts as soon as the Act is signed.



Mining companies have also protested the proposed Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, and particularly the fact that they were not consulted by the "transitional government" about its plans. Unlike the state, which sees any kind of worker organization as a threat, some boards of management see trade union formation as another way to "contain" workers.

In Namibia, it has not been easy for black workers to organize themselves into unions and negotiate for improved wages and working conditions. Overt attempts to do so have been consistently met with hostility by the authorities as well as by discriminatory laws and practices. The main legislation controlling labour activities in Namibia is the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance (No. 35). At the time of its enactment in 1952, "natives" (i.e., Africans) were expressly excluded from the definition of "employee" and were barred from joining trade unions. Farm labourers and domestic workers - which together comprise the largest group of black workers in the country - were also excluded from provisions in the Ordinance. In addition, only white and coloured workers could strike, and then only if certain conditions were met, e.g., strikes were prohibited in "essential services." Thus, strikes by black workers in Namibia are illegal - though they still occur.

In July 1978, the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Ordinance was amended, and workers of all races were allowed to join trade unions. In theory, this means that black workers can join existing trade unions, or form their own, and even apply for registration - a pre-condition for taking part in collective bargaining.

In practice, the situation has been quite different.

The 1978 amendment also makes it illegal for any registered trade union or employee's organization to affiliate to, or have any kind of financial arrangement with, any political party. This amendment is considered to be specifically directed towards the National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW), a country-wide union formed in 1977 and closely affiliated to SWAPO.

National Union of Namibian Workers (NUNW)

Formed as an independent trade union umbrella organization, NUNW's objective has been to promote black trade unions in Namibia as affiliated local unions representing workers in different sectors: mines, factories, farms, transport, harbours, schools, etc. Since its formation, however, NUNW has been a constant target of official and police harassment. Workers' groups formed by NUNW at CDM and Tsumeb's Neumont and Amex mines were ultimately destroyed when their leaders were detained and organizers fired. In 1979, more than 5,000 workers and about ten NUNW leaders were detained, and in 1980 almost the entire executive of NUNW was arrested and imprisoned by the South African Police. Since that time, NUNW has not been able to operate openly inside the country. Even as recently as April 1986, a NUNW publication entitled "Basic Course in Trade Unions" was declared an undesirable publication by the Cape Town Directorate of Publications, making it an offence to import and/or distribute this publication inside either Namibia or South Africa.

Workers and their families in Namibia desperately need the kind of protection trade unions could provide. Unemployment has escalated in the past few years, and is estimated to have doubled from 10.5% in 1969 to 20.6% in 1984. A more recent survey done by the paras-

tatal Nasboukor (National Building and Investment Corporation of Namibia) says that a conservative estimate for national unemployment is now around 30%, and in some areas as high as 55%. There is no mandatory minimum wage for Namibian workers, no effective system of employment benefits, inadequate safeguards for workers' health and safety, etc. The Legal Aid and Community Advice Bureau - LACAB, formed in August 1985 by the Khomasdal Residents' Association in the Khomasdal "coloured township" near Windhoek - reports that 40% of the cases it deals with concern unfair dismissals of workers. There are also reports that employers are telling job applicants that they must have completed military training before they can be offered a job. This represents a deliberate attempt at forcing military conscription upon a population which has made only too clear its opposition to the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa.

Action on Namibia



Manpower Bureaus: Apartheid's Tightening Control

In addition to the Wage and Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act, there is also other legislation being proposed in Namibia which is directed against workers' organization. In early 1985, the Department of Civil Affairs and Manpower drafted a proclamation to establish Manpower Bureaus throughout the country. Among other things, this proclamation stipulates that all job-seekers must register with the Bureaus (penalty of violation includes a fine of R500, six months in prison

and possible relocation), and that all employers must register their employees.

Workers and employers have both opposed this proclamation, though for very different reasons. For workers, Manpower Bureaus represent an attempt by the government to "smuggle through the back door the old, hated pass laws." In addition, workers fear the proposed bureaus will be used similarly to the Manpower Development Centre in the so-called Ciskei "homeland." Among other things, this Centre collects vast amounts of information on workers and blacklists those who have participated in political activity or industrial unrest. For employers, the proposed bureaus "totally infringe on the basic tenets of the free-enterprise system" under which employee records are considered personal and private to the employer. In other words, employers want full control over their own activities, particularly in relation to their own work force.

Other ways that management has tried to "contain" workers and their efforts to organize is through the introduction of "liaison committees" which ultimately come under the control of management. Rössing is only one of several overseas companies which have established such committees, as well as having their own private police force to suppress worker "agitation".

Rössing Uranium Mine only began paying taxes in 1984 after the initial cost of R350 million for sinking the mine was recovered. As of December 1985, there were 2,550 permanent employees, mainly from northern Namibia, on the mine. The failure of Rössing's "liaison committees" - perceived by workers as having little real power and as creating division in their ranks - as well as problems with health and occupational safety on the mine, pensions and so forth, are only some of the reasons that workers decided to explore union formation and to seek out contact with NUM.

Namibian Workers Broaden the Struggle

Though the mining sector has traditionally been the most active area of worker organization in Namibia, there are also important trade union activities occurring in other sectors of the economy. Since February 1986, rumours have been strong that about 60-65% of the 4,000 members of the Nurses Association want to form a new union. The main reason is that senior officials of the Nurses Association are considered to be in the hands of the South African government, rather than organizing to end apartheid. In April 1986, the Namibia Wholesale and Retail Workers Union (NWRWU) stated its recognition of the UN Council for Namibia as the legal authority of that country. And other workers have said they will initiate shop boycotts in six months if apartheid has not ended in Namibia.

In recent months, several new organizations have sprung up inside Namibia with the objective of assisting trade union formation. One is the Workers's Action Committee, formed in November 1985 to help workers organize to protect and defend their rights. Another is the Namibia National Trade Union (NNTU), formed in January 1986, and calling for the provision of unemployment benefits, free health care, and lower fares on public transport for workers. Though it is still too early to fully assess either the programme of these two groups, or whom exactly they represent, the NNTU has already claimed that their mail is being intercepted and their activists watched and/or cross-questioned by police.

It is also not easy to assess the nature and extent of trade union activities of the NUNW, particularly as this body has been forced to work underground. There is no doubt, however, that Namibian workers are intensifying their struggle, and that this intensification is occurring on many fronts.



You read the ad in the *Globe and Mail*.
You saw the commercial on *CTV*.
Now experience the movie —
experience the real South Africa.



"Paint your summer PRETTY IN WHITE! A film to put on your must-see-again-and-again-and-again list. Bring your friends, drive them, bribe them, drag them, gag them, stuff them in a crate and ship them — do anything to force them to see it. What Profenstahl's 'Triumph of the Will' was to a previous generation, Botha's PRETTY IN WHITE will be to this."

SOLDIER OF LINES MAGAZINE

"PRETTY IN WHITE is a tear-gas canister of delight! Christians everywhere should embrace this film, embrace our friend Pistor Botha's reformist policies in South Africa. Perhaps it will convince the world that if blacks were allowed to govern, South Africa would collapse into communism. Godless savagery would erupt... there would be great repression and bloodshed and carnage. Any security measures the government imposes on power-hungry blacks to prevent this are moral and right. It is the moral majority that counts — and the only majority that's moral is white."

REV. JERRY FALLWELL, THE MORAL MAJORITY

"... it sends you out of the theatre in a giddy euphoria. What a pleasure to watch President P.W. (Pretty in White) Botha act — at 70 he has done more to dismantle apartheid, to work towards a more perfect democracy, than any other man. If Botha's a racist, then Reagan's a warmonger. He has given blacks more freedom than ever before; but instead it focuses on the minor conflicts that accompany any country's path to enlightenment, making them major. This one-sided coverage must be restricted. Everyone concerned with fairness, with giving the other side a chance to speak, must see PRETTY IN WHITE."

GLENN DABO, JARVIS SACR TO COMRADE

"They have eliminated the segregation that we once had in our own country."

U.S. PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, AUGUST 27, 1986 (SfMio House, Sp... (woman Lany Szabo explained later that the President had meant racial segregation in South Africa has... not totally... been eliminated)

"States have a duty to protect the lives and property of their citizens in times of unrest."

SOUTH AFRICAN EMBASSY ADVERTISEMENT, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, MARCH 15, 1986



There is no real majority in South Africa.
Just a real man. P.W. Botha is

pretty in white


When the blacks are red, the whites must rule.

FREE WORLD PICTURES Presents P.W. BOTHA RONALD REAGAN "PRETTY IN WHITE"

MARGARET THATCHER VITZAK SHAHRI DESAMOND TUTU as "The Phoenix" with 4.5 MILLION WHITES as "The Majority" and 23 MILLION BLACKS as "The Combustion of Minorities"

Screenplay by JERRY FALLWELL & JESSE HELMAS. Adaptation by BARBARA JIT'S BETTER THAN COMMUNISM AMIN Weapons and Nuclear Know-How by AMERICA'S FRIEND ISRAEL. Shoes by BATTY SHOES

Cigarettes by ROTMAN'S Loans by THE COMMERCIAL IMPERIAL BANK OF CANADA Directed by P.W. BOTHA TECHNINWHITE



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South Africa's War

..... (continued)

Our last issue (Vol. 1, No. 5) focussed on "South Africa's War on Southern Africa". The events of Monday, May 19, provided further grim confirmation of the importance of that focus and of the correctness of our concern. The next day a member of the editorial team of *Southern Africa REPORT* presented the following "Commentary" on CBC national radio:


"On January 12, 1981, South Africa staged a brutal air-raid into neighbouring Mozambique, leaving 12 dead. This inaugurated a wave of direct military strikes by South Africa against its neighbours over the past five years. Yesterday, as we know, the wave crested in savage attacks on Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Analysts have generally agreed that the timing of that first raid on Mozambique – it occurred almost simultaneously with Reagan's first inauguration – was no accident. South Africa took the election of the conservative Reagan as a virtual greenlight for its most aggressive foreign policy designs.

It is no more coincidental that yesterday's Rambo-like attacks came hard on the heels of Reagan's own lynch-law approach to Libya. Indeed, the South Africans have quite explicitly invoked the Libyan precedent in justification of their actions.

White House spokesmen have, to be sure, condemned South Africa and disowned any such parallel. But they have done so on the apparent grounds that these states have actually done little to aid the African National Congress, South Africa's ostensible target.

This is true. South Africa's neighbours have indeed been fearful of doing very much. Moreover, the fact is that the main source of ANC strength is to be found inside South Africa, in the massive politi-



cal support it receives from a highly mobilized black population. As one South African professor recently observed, "the ANC has won the battle of ideas in South Africa." The apartheid regime must not be allowed the pretence, implicit in the raids which it mounts, that its problems come from outside!

At another level, however, the American argument is misleading. Zimbabwe Prime Minister Robert Mugabe was quite correct yesterday when he labelled South Africa a "terrorist state"; it is probably far more deserving of that epithet than Libya, for example. Faced with the violent intransigence of the Pretoria regime, the African National Congress has had no alternative but to confront that regime by all means possible, including military ones. In consequence, South Africa's neighbours should be praised and defended for what little they have been able to do to support the ANC, not praised and defended for what they have been unable to do!

What of Canada's position? Several weeks ago, on the eve of his departure for China, Prime Minis-

ter Mulroney made the astonishing statement that things were improving in South Africa. There was almost no evidence to support that particular reading of the situation at the time; there is even less after yesterday's raids. Indeed, the group of "Eminent Persons" from the Commonwealth, on whose initiatives the Prime Minister had apparently pinned such hopes, have now announced that, disgusted with South Africa's actions, they will abandon their peace mission on the ground. Perhaps Mr. Mulroney will now see more clearly the need for stronger sanctions against South Africa. Perhaps, too, he will begin to question the wisdom of retaining diplomatic links with apartheid South Africa, while also finding ways to support more explicitly a far more legitimate representative of the vast majority of South Africans, the African National Congress."

The immediately following days have produced signs that Canada will indeed strengthen its commitment to sanctions against South Africa. The Canadian Ambassador to South Africa has also, at least for the moment, been

withdrawn. We will continue to monitor Canada's actions on this front over the summer with an eye to up-dating last fall's evaluation of Canadian policy (see Linda Freeman, "Keeping Up with the Joneses: Canada and South Africa 1985" in *Southern Africa REPORT*, I, 2) in our next issue.

"What Can Become of South Africa?"

It is not just the U.S. state department which is blurring the realities of what is at stake in Southern Africa. A virtual cottage industry has sprung up dedicated to this purpose - as well as to seeking to domesticate and control any process of transformation which may have taken place. One of the most graphic examples of this is a recent widely-read article by Conor Cruse O'Brien in *Atlantic* entitled "What can become of South Africa?"

No friend of socialist revolution, O'Brien presents himself as being equally concerned about the possibility that sheer anarchy will eventuate during the transition period in South Africa. Indeed, his controlling metaphor for structuring an analysis of current developments is the "necklace", a flaming petrol-filled tire which has been used, in the townships, to assassinate police informers and other collaborators. His fear: "... the rule of the children, or rather of whichever ominous child emerges as victor out of the internecine competition for power within a political movement whose sanction, symbol, and signature is the burning alive of people on the street." This is extremely demagogic stuff and there is much more of the same in the article. There is method to O'Brien's hyperbole, however. By both overstating the prevalence of such practices and by systematically understating the importance of the impressive organizational infrastructure that has given much shape to township political life (civic associations, trade unions, student associations more or

less disappear in his sensationalist account), O'Brien seeks to rationalize his preference for what he terms a "multi-racial bourgeois coalition".

As an outcome of the anti-apartheid struggle such a coalition, O'Brien notes, might not be "wholly attractive", although "it might, with luck, work quite well". For it could help stave off the demands, in particular, "of all the 'outs' of black society, including the politicized unemployed"! Fortunate, then that the "new black South Africa, unlike other African countries, will have a large black middle class", a "black bourgeoisie" ready to form



Len Sak/New Internationalist

a "middle class government", ready to "find allies among the whites", ready to facilitate the emergence of "a multi-racial coalition", a "coalition of all those with something to lose, whatever the colour of their skin". Moreover, O'Brien seems confident of the ability to enlist both "organized labour" and the ANC to the service of this projected domestication of the liberation struggle, citing as an example - but seeming to imply much more - that Oliver Tambo, the ANC's president, "is essentially a liberal; he will get on well with Dr. Slabbert" (i.e., Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, leading South African liberal and, until recently,

head of the opposition Progressive Federal Party, who is among those most concerned about the future perils of "majority domination"!)

Opinions will differ, of course, about the likely cooptability of the ANC and other actors into some future "multi-racial bourgeois coalition" against "all the outs of black society". But O'Brien does at least remind us that the intellectual ground work for rationalizing the latter outcome is already being laid.

Soweto Life

Not much better than O'Brien's piece is a seamy little article in *Canadian Business* (The Case for Staying Put, *Canadian Business*, March, 1986) by Marc de Villiers. When otherwise engaged, de Villiers is the editor of the flash lifestyle magazine *Toronto Life*, but in *Canadian Business* he seeks to counter "the hopelessly overromanticized view of South Africa offered by television news, which treats the country as if it were just one great march on Selma, Alabama". (Sarcasm is one of de Villiers' strong suits, incidentally.) But his main aim is to offer Canadian business the comforting assurance that it must oppose sanctions against South Africa - since such sanctions will only make matters worse.

In fact, the article is a warmed-over porridge of Sullivan-principle Canadian codes-of-conduct style arguments. Show de Villiers a virulent pigmentocracy that has set itself the task of crushing (insofar as it has the power to do so) all demands for genuine democracy and he'll offer you the jejune prospect that "breaking down the *de facto* apartheid within the company structure is one way of undermining apartheid from within". Yet the South African government knows perfectly well how important continuing foreign investment is to its ability to sustain its rule; hence the shrillness of its resistance to any and all talk of disinvestment. And, to his credit, even Brian

Mulroney seems unable quite to buy the argument that an appropriate response to a people struggling for their basic freedoms might be likely to lie in such steps as helping "small, black-owned companies by lending them in-house expertise, such as accountants or legal advice, as well as some seed capital or forgivable loans based on performance"!

De Villiers does acknowledge that Winnie Mandela, Athol Fugard, Bishop Desmond Tutu and Nadine Gordimer – a pretty favourable team – would all disagree with him and strongly argue the appropriateness of economic sanctions against South Africa. To suggest that there is, nonetheless, room for significant difference of opinion on the issue, de Villiers summons up an alternative line-up on his side: Alan Paton, Gatsha Buthelezi, Kaiser Mantazima and Galvin Relly (four against four, get it). But what a suspect bunch. Alan Paton, his militant days long behind him, has in recent months come out in fullsome support both of President Botha's "reform" package and of the Emergency! Gatsha Buthelezi and Kaiser Mantazima, leaders of the fraudulent Bantustans of Kwazulu and Transkei respectively, have distinguished themselves primarily as brutal gendarmes in defense of the essence of the *status quo* in South Africa. (Mantazima has recently retired but his legacy lives on; regarding Buthelezi see the Notebook entry about him in *Southern Africa REPORT* I, 4, as well as the following item). As for Galvin Relly, chairman of Anglo-American and perhaps the most prominent spokesperson for the "very considerable resources of capitalism" in South Africa about which de Villiers seems so enamored: not only does Relly say, quite explicitly, that "I don't think our generation is going to see majority rule", but he approves of the fact (recall his prolix presentation on the subject to *The Washington Post* late last year, as quoted in our *Southern African REPORT* editorial, I, 3). But then de

Villiers, in his article, makes even less mention of the central issues of basic democratic rights and majority rule in South Africa than does Relly.

Black on Black?

In addition to its many faults, the O'Brien article, cited above, is also a classic case of "blaming the victim". Nor are O'Brien's "children" – and others who resist apartheid inside South Africa – victims only of the violence which the South African police mete out directly. An important recent volume also enables us to look beneath the surface of the so-called "black on black" violence of which the international press has made so much. The author is Nicholas Haysom and the book, entitled *Mabangalala: The Rise of Right Wing Vigilantes in South Africa* is published by the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.

Haysom tells a scarifying story of the extremely brutal manner in which right-wing black vigilante groups in South African communities have acted to crush the anti-apartheid activists. He is scrupulously fair, stressing the specificity of the various local circumstances in which the lack of political sophistication of the activists themselves have stirred up more negative reactions from some fellow blacks than were perhaps necessary.

Yet when all is said and done he confidently locates the core of vigilante action in that handful of Africans who have a vested interest in the apartheid system. "In the homelands", Haysom writes, "this takes the form of extra-legal violence, openly backed by homeland authorities and directed at pockets of resistance to the homeland regimes. In the case of the urban vigilantes, the violence is directed at leaders of popular organizations or youth groups, perceived by the officially-sanctioned black municipal authorities as a threat to their status, credibility, or security." Where

the tactics (extensively documented by Haysom in a series of chilling case-studies) of intimidation, house-burnings, beatings and assassination are successful, the vigilantes' goal of "disorganization of the community" can be achieved. For "a disorganized and cowed community provides a vacuum for community councils, development boards or homeland authorities to fill and on which they may impose their will."

In one chapter Haysom documents the brutal role of Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha movement as it has used the vigilante tactic in an attempt to crush, physically, the UDF in Natal; Marc de Villiers might like to take note of it. Moreover, in Natal as elsewhere – Haysom marshals a great deal of convincing evidence on this subject as well – such activities are carried out with at least the tacit approval of the police, and often with more aggressive connivance: "... in almost every case, the police have allegedly lined up behind the more conservative of the feuding groups: the fathers against the youth, the community councillors against popular civic organizations, homeland vigilantes against dissidents, and any group that challenges the UDF. Alleged police patronage of vigilantes need go no further than to afford such vigilantes a licence to continue their operations or lethargy in curtailing them. ... In other areas the police's role seems to have been to actively support the vigilantes ... (since) ... the South African Police (SAP) and the South African Defence Force (SADF) are limited by potential publicity and hindered by legal considerations in their ability to perpetrate the deliberate terror and violence needed to combat popular organizations"!

Black on black violence? This is its real meaning. The vigilante is probably also the true face of Conor Cruise O'Brien's "multi-racial bourgeois coalition", at war already against the "outs" of South African society. This is a reality the anti-apartheid movement must seek

further to expose and Haysom's volume provides a particularly useful tool for doing so.

The Coup d'Etat in Lesotho

Dan O'Meara's article on "The Coup d'Etat in Lesotho" in our last issue brought an interesting letter from Joe Hanlon, well-known author of books on Mozambique and on South Africa's destabilization activities in Southern Africa. In his letter he suggests that O'Meara overstates the South African role in the coup *per se*, arguing that South Africa's "target was the ANC, and only secondarily Jonathan".

In consequence, the post-coup government is not quite one of South Africa's own making: "I think (writes Hanlon) that the inclusion in the cabinet of Sello and Sefali are not, as (O'Meara) argues, 'little more than a gesture'. After all Sello

is known ANC and if that is a gesture it is a very important one. In practice, they are the King's men in the cabinet and are genuinely to the left of anyone in the previous government." On the other hand, Hanlon continues, O'Meara is right when he states that Lesotho's sovereignty has been deeply compromised: "The government is an unstable coalition, some of whose members will not please Pretoria, and thus Pretoria will try to divide the government and force the dismissal of men like Sello and Sefali."

Hanlon includes another even more controversial point in his letter, this one regarding the ANC's role in Lesotho: "By linking itself so closely to the Jonathan faction and not paying attention to internal politics ... the ANC found itself identified with Youth League and BNP misconduct. This seriously weakened its position locally, so there

was little opposition to its expulsion. A progressive foreign policy is not enough to compensate for a reactionary foreign policy, and did not protect Jonathan; a general dislike for the Boers did not protect the ANC because it was so closely linked to Jonathan. It seems to be the King, not the people, who are protecting what remains of the ANC."

Even if this were true, Hanlon doesn't quite explain what alternative the ANC had but to work with the government then in power in Lesotho. But he does provide food for thought, and we thank him for taking the trouble to write. A reminder: similar initiatives (letters, articles, epic poems) on the part of other readers will help us develop *Southern Africa REPORT* as the kind of forum for exploration and discussion of matters of mutual concern which we envision. We welcome your participation.

U.S. Unions & Apartheid:

Good News / Bad News

BY JAMES CASON AND
MICHAEL FLESHMAN

Last January Sidney Hill took a leave of absence from his job as an electrician in a coal mine near Birmingham, Alabama, to work full-time for the United Mine Workers union on its Shell Oil boycott. And by March 6 he had organized a local Shell boycott committee of labour, community and civil rights activists that holds pickets at Shell gas stations two or three days a week.

When asked about the campaign recently, Hill was rather apologetic, suggesting that he would like to have picket lines every day but that that might not happen for "a month or two". But despite Hill's reticence, the active picket lines in Birmingham - and in nine other cities around the country - are a welcome sign of the Shell Boycott that was launched in January. The original sponsors of the boycott were

the United Mine Workers union, the AFL-CIO and the Free South Africa Movement.

Since it was launched, the United Mine Workers union has hired seven full-time regional organizers as well as a national office staff in Washington to coordinate the campaign. UMW President Richard Trumka has personally participated in a number of local boycotts and has vowed to wage a "million dollar" campaign to get Shell out of South Africa. The Mineworkers have printed up a series of leaflets on the campaign and now have buttons, posters and even a slide show on Shell's involvement in South Africa.

The momentum of the campaign has slowly been built with AFL-CIO-initiated protests in March. The UMW organized demonstrations in Houston and Washington at Shell's annual meeting in May. Leaders of the Free South Africa Movement have been actively in-

involved in local campaigning in cities like Houston, Texas and have organized a number of sit-ins at Shell's Washington office.

Organizers are continuing to build local boycott committees around the country and are also now starting to wage a 'corporate campaign' against Shell that includes pickets against its board of directors and attacks on other companies and banks that have links to Shell. But despite these gains and the impressive list of trade union and anti-apartheid sponsors, the boycott has not attracted the type of broad-based support or publicity that the Free South Africa Movement was able to generate with sit-ins at the South African embassy last year.

Part of the problem is that the situation in South Africa is no longer on the front pages in the US every day. In addition, a direct focus on attacking corporations for their involvement in South Africa is a more difficult issue to organize around than the sit-ins at the South African embassy were.

But another part of the problem seems to be that by and large the anti-apartheid groups are leaving most of the organizing to labour. Other than the initial sponsorship by the FSAM, a couple of sit-ins at Shell's Washington headquarters and active involvement by a few local groups, anti-apartheid organizations have not put much time into the campaign. For their part, some groups argue it is difficult for divestment activists in the US to focus on a company like Shell that is not US-owned. Others, including some churches and civil rights groups, argue that pickets at local gas stations often end up hurting the local gas station owners - some of whom are black - rather than Shell itself.

This latter argument in particular is speculative at best and there are no reliable figures that indicate a significant number of black service station owners would be affected by the boycott. Indeed, the Detroit, Michigan association of black Shell service station operators, after initially reacting hostilely to the campaign, has now endorsed its goals if not the immediate tactics and is working to get black Shell service station operators to pressure Shell over its South Africa operations. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this and some other arguments are simply excuses for inaction.

And while there are legitimate questions and differences between labour and the anti-apartheid movement, there is a danger that these differences could impede the progress of this the first national, labour-led anti-apartheid campaign.

Although the Shell campaign is the first national labour campaign against apartheid, it complements years of trade union activism at the state and local level. UMW locals were involved in organizing boycotts of South African coal imports in the early 1970s and dockworkers on the west coast have long been active in efforts to boycott South African im-

ports. More recently, trade unions have played a critical role in the divestment of state and local government pension funds. In New Jersey, labour support for the divestment of their own pension funds tipped the balance in favour of divestment by the state legislature in 1985. Union pressure has helped win passage of divestment bills in West Virginia and Vermont in the last few months, and will be important in most of the thirty-six states now considering divestment.

Trade union activists also have organized local anti-apartheid labour committees in New York City, Boston, Philadelphia and San Francisco. The New York committee has organized a number of speaking tours for South African labour leaders, has promoted a boycott of South African-made headwear in the New York City area, and even sent a clothing union health and safety specialist to South Africa in 1984. In Boston, the labour committee organized a sit-in against Deak-Perrera's Boston offices in 1985 to protest that company's Krugerrand sales, marked the March 21 anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre and organized a major demonstration to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising.

To some extent these local committees are partly a response to growing rank and file dissatisfaction with the AFL-CIO's official policy toward South Africa and South Africa's emerging black trade union movement. Since 1978 the AFL-CIO's policy toward South Africa has been directed through its African American Labour Centre, an organization widely held to be linked to the CIA and funded almost entirely by the State Department.

So deep is mistrust of the AALC that in 1983 virtually the entire black trade union movement boycotted a tour of South Africa by AALC leaders Irving Brown and Patrick O'Farrell. This year, the secretary-general of COSATU told the North Carolina-based journal

Africa News that his union believes "certain sections of the AFL-CIO have been very divisive in their relation to the worker movement in South Africa According to the information we have, key individuals within certain of their departments have very suspicious links with the US State Department and intelligence circles."

Both COSATU and the smaller Council of Unions of South Africa announced earlier this year that they will not take AALC money, although one COSATU union has received AALC funding in the past year and a number of CUSA unions have also been funded.

More ominously, *Africa News* revealed in early June that a top AALC official, Nana Mahomo, met secretly in Washington with leaders from the new Inkatha-backed union federation the United Workers Union of South Africa (UWUSA). The American group is reportedly considering funding for the new 'federation', an extension of bantustan chief Gatsha Buthelezi's tribally-based political organization. UWUSA was formed on May 1 primarily to oppose COSATU and promote Buthelezi's opposition to economic sanctions and to the ANC.

Although the largest trade union federation in South Africa has refused to accept AFL-CIO funding, the State Department's Agency for International Development has increased its funding for the AALC's South Africa work from \$85,000 in 1983 to \$1.5 million this year.

By supporting non-affiliated unions and the frankly tribalistic UWUSA the State Department, through the AALC, is trying to create a right-wing counter to the progressive, militant and increasingly politicized black trade union movement. Washington is particularly worried by COSATU, which is not only the largest and most militantly anti-apartheid of the unions but is explicitly socialist.

(continued on page 31)

Lennox Farrell Acquitted

BY BOB KELLERMAN

Southern Africa Report asked Bob Kellerman, one of the defence lawyers for Lennox Farrell, to give comments on the case.


Those who have struggled for the end of apartheid over the years can take a good deal of credit for the recent acquittal of Lennox Farrell, who had been charged with an assault on the South African ambassador to Canada, Glenn Babb. Mr. Babb had been pursuing a strategy of arranging invitations for himself to extoll the virtues of the South African regime. In particular he felt that he could convince the Canadian public that good white folk like himself were holding the line on the African continent against the communist-inspired black revolt which threatened to eliminate the wonders of white Christian civilization as exemplified by the "democracy" which he represents. Unfortunately for Mr. Babb, the Canadian public has proved less gullible than he and his cohorts had imagined. Moreover, his appearances in public places provided a catalyst for the mobilization of the anti-apartheid movement.

Last November Babb was invited as the "honourary guest" to the University of Toronto Hart House Debating Society debate on divestment. This invitation was seen by many people as providing a platform for Mr. Babb, giving his regime legitimacy, and as an intolerable insult to black people everywhere. One of these people was Lennox Farrell, a well-known activist in the black community. Lennox and many others showed up at the debate, which proceeded in spite of the strong opposition that had followed its announcement. Mr. Babb showed up, too.

The debate was recorded for posterity on video by the U. of T. Film Board. At the end members of the audience were invited to express their points of view. The sec-

ond person to take up this invitation was Lennox Farrell. Lennox, who has a reputation as an inspiring orator, launched into an impassioned speech while Babb listened from his seat in the front row only a few feet away. After speaking for only a few minutes Lennox started to strike the table before him with his fist. He struck the table once for emphasis, and then he struck it again in rhythm with his speech.

The third strike was different. It was clear (as the video confirmed) that he had lost himself to passion and his fist came down with considerable force. The fourth blow was harder yet, and the wooden box that sat on the table shattered. There was a hush in the room and a slight pause and then "in one motion" (according



The Ilambian

to the testimony of prosecution and defence witnesses) Lennox picked up the ceremonial mace, which also lay on the table, and flung it in the direction of Babb. The mace sailed through the air towards Babb and others who sat around him (including R.C.M.P. security), and as it did so, hands came up to block its flight. The mace hit human flesh and fell to the floor. In an instant the police were on their feet and took control of Lennox, while Babb remained in his seat. The video shows Lennox standing in the same spot from which he had flung the mace, clearly emotionally shaken, with his hands over his face. The video then

shows him being quietly led from the room.

Three cameras were operating in the room during the period described above, but unfortunately for the search for truth, none of them recorded the landing of the mace. As a result, the prosecution had to rely on the observations of four witnesses to the event. Could the crown prove that Babb had been "hit on the head"? This is what the information alleged and this was what the crown was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. At least this was the original goal. Later, after all the crown witnesses had been heard, the judge agreed to the crown request that the information be amended to state that Mr. Babb was "hit in the body." But could the prosecution prove even this beyond a reasonable doubt?

Mr. Babb might have provided some evidence had he chosen to show up for the trial. But Babb was not about to expose himself to cross-examination in a court of law. He chose the option of hiding behind his diplomatic immunity. The prosecutor said privately that he would be crazy to call Babb, because this would give the defence "the chance of a lifetime." In the end the crown called witnesses to say that Babb had been hit, and the defence called witnesses to attest to the contrary.

What makes this trial interesting from a political point of view is that, on the bare facts, the outcome might well have been different. Had the allegations been that the American ambassador had been assaulted, for example, the case could have resulted in a conviction. But because the alleged assault was on the South African ambassador, the chances of an acquittal were tremendously enhanced. In order to understand this, it is necessary to realize that there are many variables which

determine the outcome of a criminal prosecution. Sometimes the unpopularity of the alleged "victim" and sympathy with the accused can be decisive. There is no question that the chances of victory in Lennox Farrell's case were greatly increased because it was one of those where public sympathy was on the side of the accused.

The depth of hostility towards the South African regime in almost all layers of Canadian society was manifest throughout the course of this prosecution. It is true that a political-legal decision was made to prosecute. I believe it is fair to speculate that the authorities who determined (a week after the event, after deliberation) that charges had to be laid felt that Canada could not be seen to allow assaults on ambassadors, even South African ambassadors, although they might have preferred not to bother with a case which would polarize the community around the issue and put the government in the position of seeming to prosecute the anti-apartheid movement. But it is also true that much more serious charges could have been laid. More serious charges, however, would have given Lennox Farrell the right to a jury trial. This is something prosecutors generally wish to avoid in a political case because it gives the defence a greater audience and because juries are not as politically reliable as judges.

The conduct of the prosecution was revealing in respects other than the choice of charges. The assistant crown attorney who was chosen to handle the case is one who is known as relatively fair, and relatively liberal. He is not one of the "dirty Harrys" of the crown's office. In his discussions with defence counsel he did not hesitate to indicate that he was no fan of the South African regime. He was also prepared to admit that the video recording of the event made it quite clear that Lennox had acted spontaneously. A more reactionary crown could have argued a differ-

ent interpretation, and this particular crown might have seen it differently had the alleged victim been a different ambassador.

The judge who was selected to hear the case was also a more open-minded and liberal type of person. During the course of the trial he stated very clearly his abhorrence with the South African regime and indicated that he would take judicial notice of the fact that it was an abhorrent regime. A judge is only entitled to take judicial notice of facts which are notorious in the community. Although the judge was saying this in the context of denying the defence's attempts to present evidence about apartheid, he could have accomplished that purpose without stating his feelings in this manner.

In a criminal prosecution the defence is given access to a summary of what the prosecution witnesses will say. It was clear from reading the accounts of the R.C.M.P. officers that they were not dressing up their evidence the way police sometimes do when they are hostile to the accused. In fact, there were even some helpful comments in the R.C.M.P. summaries. In contrast, a U. of T. security guard was clearly hostile to Lennox, and her summary of the events was filled with exaggeration and emotive language. The Warden of Hart House, who had sat next to Babb and who was struck with the mace when he raised his hand to stop it, was also a witness. But he was not at all anxious to be part of the prosecution in spite of the fact that he was injured. The prosecutor had wanted to charge Lennox with assaulting the Warden as well, or at least he threatened to do so, but Mr. Alway had strongly resisted this, possibly because as Warden of Hart House he wanted to avoid appearing as the enemy of the anti-apartheid movement. It is clear that anti-apartheid sentiment, his own or others, lay behind his reluctance to be part of the prosecution. Of course, he was forced to testify on the charge for the assault on Babb.

But it was also clear from the way in which he gave his evidence that he bore no animosity towards Lennox.

As the trial progressed those present could feel that the atmosphere in the court was different from that in other political cases. There was no sense that the accused was a dangerous terrorist. In part this was the result of the manner in which the defence was conducted, but it was also clear that the prosecutor and most of the prosecution witnesses were not out for blood. In the end the judge found that he had reasonable doubt that Babb had been hit, and that therefore Lennox Farrell had to be acquitted.

Those who are familiar with the workings of criminal justice in Canada know that the outcome of this trial could have been entirely different, and Lennox Farrell might today be sitting in a jail cell. It is clear that the extent to which anti-apartheid sentiment has permeated Canadian society was a big factor in determining the outcome of the case. Those who have struggled against apartheid should see this case as a measure of their success. Of course, had diplomatic relations with South Africa been terminated before November, Lennox Farrell would never have had his day in court.

U.S. Unions

(continued from page 29)

Far from supporting the emergence of strong democratic trade unions in South Africa like COSATU, the AFL-CIO has been working hand in hand with the Reagan administration to subvert the democratic movement in South Africa and so preserve Western capitalist interests. Ultimately, the goal of US government and AFL-CIO policy is, as COSATU deputy-president Makhulu Ledwaba said recently, "to disrupt and destroy" the challenge to apartheid posed by African workers.

The Sports Boycott: This Budd's Not For You

BY BRUCE KIDD

Bruce Kidd teaches physical education at the University of Toronto.

Those who argue that boycotts are ineffective should consider the international sports boycott against South Africa. When it was begun in the early 1960's by the athletes-in-exile who formed the London-based South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC), white South Africa was one of the world's sporting powers, with close ties to many other countries and friends and admirers in the most powerful sports bodies.

But since then, South Africa has been steadily excluded from international sport, so that today the quarantine is supported by the International Olympic Committee and most of the federations which govern international sport in the world, as well as the United Nations and most governments in the world. In 1985, the net closed around South Africa's most popular sport, rugby, when a New Zealand court granted an injunction to prevent the national team from travelling to South Africa for a test tour, and the British cancelled a similar tour. The only way South Africans can get anyone to play is by buying "rebel" tours of their own, made up of end-of-career and marginal players willing to risk the almost certain suspension they will draw for the colossal sums the South Africans are forced to pay.

No one has any illusions that the sports boycott can end apartheid, but it has encouraged black South Africans and it has brought home to whites the implacable hostility so many bear towards apartheid. There is hardly a day when the sports pages of the South African press do not report or comment on some aspect of the boycott. For at

least 15 years, it's had the leaders of white South African sport squirming to find a strategy which would allow them back into international competition. (These efforts have produced a series of cosmetic modifications, and most recently, highly orchestrated statements of opposition to apartheid, but little change of substance.)

To give it a Canadian parallel, imagine the censure Canadians would feel if no one would play us in hockey, our best athletes were barred from the Olympics, and those few Canadians who did manage to sneak into international competitions were met with massive demonstrations! That's the message - and the pressure for change - the sports boycott has achieved.

The boycott weapon has also been effective in bringing reluctant western governments and sports bodies into line. In 1970 and 1974, threatened boycotts of the Commonwealth Games by the black African nations under the leadership of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa pressured the British and New Zealand governments to cancel rugby tours of South Africa. Although the 1976 boycott of the Montreal Olympics by 31 non-white nations in response to the IOC's apparent indifference to another New Zealand rugby tour of South Africa was widely criticized in the western media, it had both immediate and long-term results. Within days, the international track and field and soccer bodies expelled South Africa from membership. In the Commonwealth, it led to the 1977 Gleneagles Agreement, in which member states pledged to "take every practical step to discourage contact or competition by their nationals with sporting organizations, teams or sportspersons from South Africa."



IDA/FA/Apartheid, The Real Hurdle

When Gleneagles didn't prevent a 1981 New Zealand rugby tour, another threatened boycott produced the 1982 Commonwealth Games Code of Conduct, which provides for the expulsion of countries which engage in sporting contacts with South Africa. The code had much to do with the cancellation of the recent British Lions rugby tour, for it created the very real possibility that British athletes might be barred from the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh this summer if the tour had gone ahead. It means that the effective basis of the Commonwealth Games is no longer the old British tie, but solidarity against apartheid sport.

The Canadian Position

Despite these successes, the isolation of apartheid sport is not complete. Some governments, while professing opposition to apartheid, have created loopholes in the various undertakings they have signed which allow some South Africans to circumvent the boycott. Canada is a case in point. In accordance with Gleneagles, the Canadian Government will not issue a visa to any South African athlete seeking to compete here and it requires all sports bodies receiving public funds to respect the boycott or forfeit its financial support.

Yet it exempts "non-representative" and professional athletes from these prohibitions, despite the fact that Gleneagles makes no such distinctions, on the dubious grounds that it doesn't know whether athletes competing on their own actually support apartheid and that professional athletes are really businesspersons whom Canada still allows to enter freely. This loophole, created by the Trudeau Liberals and enlarged by the Mulroney Conservatives, has meant that in those sports where the international federations still allow South African participation - principally golf and tennis - it's business as usual. Tennis Canada has made no effort to bar South Africans from its highly publicized competitions, but still receives

about \$400,000 annually in federal funds.

Although Canada signed the 1977 United Nations International Declaration Against Apartheid in Sports, on December 10, 1985 it abstained from the General Assembly vote on an International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, drafted to enforce the Declaration. The convention is hardly radical - it contains none of the enforcement mechanisms of the Commonwealth Code of Conduct, for example - but it emphatically rejects the laboured distinctions so prized by External Affairs. If it weren't for the international federations which police the boycott in their respective sports, one wonders whether Canada would have an effective policy at all.



Zola Budd

The Commonwealth Games has often been the focal point for the sports boycott, and this year may be no exception. At time of writing, an effort is being made to have the South African runner Zola Budd declared ineligible for the Games in an effort to close the "passport of convenience" loophole through which she and a small but growing number of South African athletes have been enabled to compete.

Born and raised in South Africa, in 1984 Budd obtained a British passport - in a record ten days - and a place on the British team to compete in the Los Angeles Olympics. Although a magnificent runner - since her ill-fated Olympic collision with Mary Decker, she holds one world record and won two world

championships - she has made no effort to leave South Africa or even say anything about apartheid. She continues to live in Bloemfontein, only leaving for competition. In the two years since she received her British passport, she has only lived in England for six months, and that, mostly to and from races. While she has bought a house there, she has never lived in it. She trains in South Africa, is coached and managed by South Africans, announces her races in South Africa, and clearly sees herself as South African. "I have decided to stay in South Africa, chiefly because I enjoy my athletics here more," she said shortly after the LA Games. "I hope that in the years to come I will mean something to South African athletics." Within South Africa, the propaganda effect of her accomplishments is widely recognized. "Zola has given this country the best publicity possible - publicity that in monetary terms is worth millions of rands," the mayor of Bloemfontein has said.

For several years, SANROC and its allies have been trying to outlaw "passports of convenience" without success, the international federations being reluctant to replace the test of citizenship with their own credentials process. But the Commonwealth Games provides the anti-apartheid forces with a new opportunity. Under the rules, a competitor must have resided for a minimum of six months during the 12 months prior to the closing date for entries to the Games in the country which s/he is to represent. In Budd's case, she has spent but eight weeks in England since the qualification period began, making it impossible for her to qualify properly. SANROC is calling upon the English association not to enter her in the Games, and failing that, a vote by the full membership to expel her.

Given the majorities on previous votes of this kind, I bet she won't be racing in Edinburgh. It will be another reminder that the circle is closing.



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