UNITA, Myth and Reality



By Augusta Conchiglia

Translated and edited by Marga Holness

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NOTE

The photographs on pages 19 and 45 are of President José Eduardo dos Santos with Government troops in southern Angola.

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Map of Angola showing provinces and provincial capitals.

INTRODUCTION

When the New York tripartite agreements were signed, stipulating a timetable for Namibia's independence, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 435, and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, South Africa undertook to cease military aid to UNITA. For the Angolan government, seeking to 'put an end to foreign interference in Angola's internal affairs', this was a first step. It also offered better prospects for restoring peace in Angola, and in March 1989 a national reconciliation plan was approved by the Angolan People's Assembly, or parliament. The plan, which provided for the reintegration of Unita members and leaders - with the exception of Jonas Savimbi into Angolan institutions, was to be carried out within the context of respect for the Constitution.

At a time when South African aggression was ending, the Angolan government thus showed its willingness to do everything to hasten the restoration of peace throughout the country. National reconstruction in a country devastated by fourteen years of war could in its view no longer be delayed.

The Angolan government did not however conceal its strong reservations in respect of Savimbi, who had been excluded from the amnesty already extended to UNITA members who renounced the use of force, and it was decided that he should go into exile. Indeed, the role Savimbi had played since the fifties, in the struggle to free the country from colonial rule and subsequently in the resistance against South African aggression, meant there was every justification for the stand taken by the government.

The reasons for this emerge very clearly from this dossier prepared for ECASAAMA in late 1988, aimed at recalling the history of Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader, still presented in a persistent international campaign fuelled especially by the White House as a man who has spent the past thirty years fighting for a 'truly independent' Angola and a defender of democratic freedom.

Yet Savimbi's personal history, his alliances and the very nature of his fight against the Angolan government give a very different picture of a man driven by inordinate ambition to throw all principles to the wind. Indeed, Savimbi has collaborated closely with the direct enemies of Angola's independence - the colonial authorities and the South African apartheid regime.

Contrary to what is mechanically repeated in the media, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA have no claim to historical legitimacy, because they did not fight Portuguese colonialism. They collaborated with colonial and fascist Portugal's army and political police 'in the common struggle against the MPLA', as Savimbi himself wrote in his correspondence with officials of the colonial regime.

The dossier provides irrefutable proof of this collaboration and details of the circumstances under which UNITA signed a ceasefire with Lisbon and became a party to the Alvor Agreement under which a transitional government was set up.

It also shows the responsibility of UNITA and the FNLA for the breakdown of the agreement and Savimbi's complicity with the South African army during the 1975 invasion of Angola.

The type of fight UNITA has waged against the Angolan government since independence is also gone into. UNITA's guerrilla war - made possible by Pretoria's logistical and military support, and fought in tandem with direct aggression by the South African army based in Namibia, obliging the Angolan forces to focus their efforts on that main front - bears very little resemblance to a 'people's war'. Horrendously murderous and destructive, it reflects UNITA's military strategy of concentrating on the sabotaging of civilian targets and the intimidation of the population.

Unlike the public image it has presented through the showcase of its Jamba headquarters - with wonderstruck visitors enumerating its schools and hospitals - whatever ground UNITA has gained has been through military force, and it has served as a surrogate of the South African army.

After independence it swelled its ranks by resorting to obscurantist tribalism. To renew its forces, it then embarked on the systematic abduction of young Angolans in areas in which it operated militarily. According to testimony from within UNITA itself, Savimbi's organisation, which claims that it controls large parts of Angola, has never promoted the literacy of its members or the population.

Conversely, it has plundered and terrorised civilians who refused to collaborate, especially in the regions inhabited by Savimbi's own ethnic group.

This brief research into the history of UNITA and its founder also covers factors which reveal UNITA's way of operating and the nature of its internal conflicts, recording the serious violations of human rights to which some of its members, including former leaders, have been subjected.

Finally, the dossier outlines the major international sources of political and media support for UNITA, especially in Europe, which have enabled Savimbi to build up his image as a guerrilla leader fighting for the 'values of the free world'.

These lobbies overlap to a remarkable extent with pro-South African groups and American right wing extremist organisations such as the World Anti-Communist League. By passing from the tutelage of the Portuguese colonialists to that of the apartheid regime, Jonas Savimbi inherited a whole network of relationships from his past and present 'allies'. To these must be added the White House which, after Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, became the UNITA leader's major diplomatic and military backer. President George Bush has followed in the footsteps of the Angolan predecessor by continuing to exert every kind of pressure on the Angolan government to ensure that Jonas Savimbi 'takes his place' as leader of the country.

We hope the dossier helps to explain what is really at stake in the pro-Savimbi campaign and makes it possible to assess the danger to Angola of any attempts to impose his participation in government.

I. JONAS SAVIMBI AND UNITA

Jonas Savimbi pictured with Pik Botha.

THE history of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) cannot be dissociated from that of its founder, especially when that founder was Jonas Savimbi, Unita's near-uncontested leader from the start, in 1966.

This is a view shared by others. Indeed, over the past few years there has been a growing number of sources of information on the life of Savimbi; whole books have been devoted to a man variously described as 'Africa's saviour', 'the greatest revolutionary of our times', 'the black de Gaulle'; even 'the African Mao'.[1]

However, the wealth of material available on 'the deeds and feats' of this Angolan — virtually unknown a dozen years ago — is not always of much help to a researcher seeking to reconstitute the different phases of his life. The writings are often mutually contradictory. Dates, places, facts and even Savimbi's own views on one or another event are quite divergent. Yet most of the writers use the same source — Savimbi's own statements.

It soon becomes evident that Savimbi re-invents his past every time he talks about it. sometimes forgetting the last version he gave. His idolisers do not take the trouble to consult existing documents or even letters written by Savimbi at different periods. Yet some of these enable one to reconstitute part of what is historically true; not all, since much of what was written in the letters is inaccurate or untrue, even when there was no apparent reason to lie.

Thus, in a letter written in December 1960 to the leadership of the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which he wanted to join, Jonas Savimbi, then a student in Switzerland, described himself as the son of 'farmers' in Angola's Central Highlands. Although trivial, this information was false. His father was stationmaster at Munhango, on the Benguela Railway, something of which Savimbi greatly prided himself in more recent accounts, since, as he has said, he was 'the first black stationmaster on the railway'.[2]

Born on 3 August 1934 (in 1936, according to one of his letters) in Munhango, near Andulu, Bié Province, Savimbi completed his primary education in Protestant mission schools and attended secondary schools in Silva Porto (Kuito), Nova Lisboa (Huambo) and Sá da bandeira (Lubango). He went to Lisbon in October 1958, but although twenty-five years old failed his final secondary school exams. Towards the end of 1960 he went to Switzerland after alleged problems with the PIDE (fascist Portugal's political police), which had singled him out at his school to deliver a speech on Portugal's civilising mission, a propaganda exercise Savimbi claimed to have refused.

In his first letter to the MPLA leadership in Conakry, dated 12 December 1960, Savimbi referred to those events, adding that in order to be able to leave Portugal he had been 'made to sign an undedrtaking to return to Portugal within 90 days and finally start working for the PIDE', which had meanwhile withdrawn his identity card.

Indeed, there was already a certain ambiguity in his relations with the PIDE, since Savimbi decided on his arrival in Switzerland to write to PIDE headquarters in Lisbon announcing his intention 'not to collaborate with them any more' and to struggle for the independence of Angola.[3] Was this bravado or evidence to be shown to anyone who might accuse him of being a Lisbon agent?

In Switzerland, after unsuccessfully trying to enrol in the French-speaking universities of Lausanne and Geneva, he had to accept Fribourg where, with a grant from the American Evangelical Missions, he started his first year in medicine.

FROM THE MPLA TO THE FNLA

At the time, in late 1960 and early 1961, Jonas Savimbi corresponded frequently with the MPLA, especially with its main representative in Europe, Luis de Almeida, then a student in Federal Germany and currently Angola's Ambassador to Ethiopia. These letters completely contradict his subsequent statements on that period, particularly as regards his relations with the MPLA.

Savimbi now claims that he was rejected by the MPLA for essentially racist reasons, because he was black and came from the Central Highlands and the MPLA, 'led by mulattos, despised Ovimbundus'.[4]

In fact, in his many letters to the MPLA he made far more of his anti-capitalist, even pro-communist convictions, of his bitterness towards the churches — 'the

Catholic one serves dictatorships and the Protestant missionaries are American ambassadors' (17 December 1960) — and of his problems as a student (an inadequate grant, material difficulties, relations with religious groups, etc).

Savimbi also stressed his 'terrible disapointment' with Holden Roberto, leader of the Union of the People of Angola (UPA) — subsequently renamed the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) — whom he had first met in Switzerland. He reaffirmed his contempt for the religious fanaticism of the UPA leader, who was very close to the Baptist Church. In a letter to Luis de Almeida dated 31 January 1961 he wrote: 'Roberto has tried to convince me to head the UPA office in New York, but I have realised that he is a traitor . . . the imperialists always buy off faithless people'.

However, Savimbi displayed an apparent interest in uniting the anti-colonialist forces. He proposed to the MPLA a strategy 'aimed at annexing UPA without its leaders noticing'. He elaborated on this idea in several letters. 'The MPLA must agree to collaborate with UPA under conditions which may seem unfavourable to us, but our party is stronger and we will have no trouble in eliminating their leaders one by one.' In another letter he wrote, 'we could infiltrite UPA in order to take it over from the inside'. Yet he always added that he would take no initiative which would be 'contrary to the lofty principles which govern our MPLA', and that he was awaiting instructions from the Movement. Moreover, he wanted to open an MPLA office in Switzerland.

Savimbi, whose status in the MPLA had not been defined, repeatedly asked for official accreditation to enable him to act in its name. Finally, on 7 March 1961, he received an MPLA Student Union card, for which he warmly thanked Luis de Almeida, and the Movement's programme, which he said it was 'needless to comment on', since he 'fully agreed' with it.

It was as a member of the student youth that the MPLA proposed that he should go to Uganda to make a speech at Makerere University on the situation in Angola, where the MPLA had launched its first military attack on colonial rule on 4 February 1961.

In the version he now gives of his trip to Uganda, Savimbi claims to have had a stormy meeting with Almeida in Germany about the content of the speech, which Almeida had wanted to be too favourable to the MPLA. Having come close to breaking with the MPLA, Savimbi says, he nevertheless agreed to take with him the text of the speech, which he then left in the Frankfurt airport toilets.[5]

That, he now says, was the last time he contacted Almeida, and he paints an extremely offensive picture of this military MPLA *mestigo*.

Not only had the speech been jointly written, but Savimbi, as is his wont, had lent it his customary inflammatory tone. His relations with Almeida and the MPLA they did not however end there. The letters written on his return were as warm as before, signed 'your eternal servant and companion', or 'accolades from your right-hand man ready for action'.

Yet something important had happened at Makerere, whree Savimbi met Tom Mboya, close to Jomo Kenyatta and Secretary General of the Kenya African National Union (KANU). According to Savimbi, Mboya persuaded him to leave the 'communist MPLA' and to join Holden Roberto's UPA.

Savimbi told his biographer Fred Bridgland that another Kenya leader, Odinga Oginga, had on that same occasion told him not to listen to Tom Mboya, who had become a CIA agent, but to re-join the MPLA.

Finally, it was Mboya's view — and that of Kenyatta, who also thought he should

join UPA — that prevailed. It was later learned that Mboya, who was leaving for a UN General Assembly session in New York immediately after Makerere, had been personally entrusted with handing to Holden Roberto, who was already in New York, a letter signed by Savimbi in which he applied to join UPA.

Following a direct telephone conversation between Holden Roberto and Savimbi, then in Lausanne, the UPA leader formally told Savimbi, in a letter dated New York, 24 April 1961, that he had accepted his candidacy and that he 'informed the friends in Léopoldville (Kinshasa) as follows: as from today our dear compatriot Savimbi is our offical representative in Europe, and in that capacity, can assume his responsibilities, speaking in the name of the party and everything'.

In a letter to Luis de Almeida dated 14 April 1961, Savimbi wrote of 'our complete success' at the Makerere conference, 'where I was the first of the sixty speakers present'. he added that he had passed through Kenya to meet the country's leaders, and Tanganyika, where he had 'furthered the common cause'.

From Lausanne, to which he had meanwhile transferred, Savimbi remained in contact with Almeida, always asking him for propaganda material for distribution in Switzerland, where he claimed he had been given official government authorisation to do political information work on Angola, although 'with many restrictions'.

In order to be able to work in Switzerland, he added, 'one has to show oneself to be a hypocrite and a Christian, which I find very hard because Christianity is repugnant to me. I condemn it as much as colonialism'. (3 June 1961).

He also told Almeida that he had written to the MPLA leadership in Conakry to renew his proposal regarding UPA. Savimbi was still hoping to persuade the MPLA to allow itself to be absorbed by UPA, a tactic which according to him was aimed at 'annexing Holden's organisation'.

During a subsequent meeting in Geneva, he once again put his scheme to Almeida and other MPLA members, without ever revealing that for some months he had already been UPA's official representative in Europe. His arguments did not convince them, since they saw no valid reason for leaving the Movement to 'infiltrate' UPA.

Savimbi continued to feign allegiance to the MPLA which, according to one of his last letters to Almeida, he hoped to represent at an International Students Conference (COSEC) meeting in Holland.

Savimbi finally decided to leave the MPLA, which learned from a UPA defector about the double role he had been playing.

According to some sources, the meeting with Mboya, which Savimbi now refers to as a turning point in his life, also marked the start of his relations with the CIA. In his book *Inside Boss*,[6] former South African intelligance agent Gordon Winter stated that Savimbi was controlled by a Senior CIA operative, James Cunningham, in charge of political affairs at the United States Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia. Winter added that the PIDE , when it formally recruited Savimbi after he left UPA in 1964, was unaware that the future leader of Unita was already a CIA front man.

Even if Winter's version is correct, it should be added that the CIA was banking almost exclusively on Holden Roberto's organisation up to the time of its disintegration in 1975, since it seemed more capable of winning a direct confrontation with the MPLA and taking power in Angola after the overthrow of the Portuguese fascist regime on 25 April 1974.

SAVIMBI IN THE FNLA: AMBITION AND TRIBALISM

Towards the end of 1961, Savimbi finally went to Léopoldville, officialising his membership of UPA, of which he became secretary-general. According to the version given by Bridgland, despite the fact that 'the civil conflict in the newly independent country grew bloodier', Savimbi 'cound not postpone his meeting with Roberto indefinitely and on 1 February 1961 he flew to Léo and was inducted into UPA'. But the dates given in the book about this whole period are in total contradiction with Savimbi's letters and his trip to Uganda.[7]

In any event, it was during this first trip to Léopoldville that Savimbi met some of his future right-hand men, notably José Ndele, Ernesto Mulato, N'Zau Puna and António (Tony) de Costa Fernandes. Some were already UPA members, while others were among the many Angolan refugees in Congo-Léopoldville (Zaire).

Indeed, after the FNLA's first armed action against colonial rule and white farmers, on 15 March 1961, the Portuguese army unleashed the most indiscriminate and ferocious repression against the population of parts of northern Angola, causing a mass exodus. By the end of 1961, there were an estimated 150,000 Angolan refugees in Congo-Léopoldville.

In March 1962, UPA merged with the tiny Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) and became the FNLA. Two months later, the FNLA, inspired by the Algerian model, set up an 'Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile' (GRAE). Savimbi, then in Switzerland, was appointed foreign secretary, which apparently displeased him. Neverthless, it was in this new capacity that in May 1963 he attended the DAV summit in Addis Ababa, where he was asked to make a speech on behalf of the African liberation movements.

On 29 June, Congo-Léopoldville recognised GRAE and banned all MPLA activity on its territory. The leaders of Agostinho Neto's Movement — and Neto himself — were hunted down by the Congolese army and had no alternative but to leave the country clandestinely. They went to Brazzaville, where the newly established government of Massamba-Debat showed itself to be well-disposed towards them.

Internationally, the situation was swinging more and more in the FNLA's favour. After a meeting of the DAV Liberation Committee held in Dakar in August 1983, most African countries — except for Guiea, Ghana an Congo-Brazzaville — recognised GRAE.

However, the war the FNLA claimed it was waging against colonial rule was making no headway. Its leaders were incapable of organising an armed struggle; there was increasing embezzlement of funds intended for supplies for the fighters. Hence the first serious internal crisis, which resulted in a mutiny at Kinkazu, the FNLA's main training camp in Congo-Léopoldville.

Order was restored by the Congolese army, which intervened brutally and brought most of the deserters back to the camp. Many were from the Ovimbundu ethnic group, a tiny minority in the FNLA who had some good reasons to feel uneasy among the Bakongo majority, the traditional base of the Front, UPA's precursor having been the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (UPNA). Cohabitation between the Bakongo and Ovimbundu was also difficult owing the periodical resurgence of separatist feelings among the Bakongo, demanding only the independence of the old Congo Kingdom, which had extended across the borders of present-day Angola, Congo and Zaire.

Savimbi also helped to deepen the split, in late 1963, by organising his supporters into a force which might challenge the leadership of Holden Roberto, whom Savimbi

was ever more openly rivalling. It was for similar reasons that Savimbi opposed the entry into the FNLA of an MPLA renegade, Viriato da Cruz; he feared him as a potential rival in the struggle for power and warned Roberto about his pro-Chinese ideological views.

Relations between Savimbi and Roberto deteriorated rapidly, and in May 1964 Savimbi returned to Switzerland to pursue his studies in political science at the University of Lausanne, having meanwhile abandoned medicine.

In July, however, he went to the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in Cairo, where Roberto refused to meet him, even though he was still officially GRAE's foreign secretary. Savimbi was no longer in the FNLA's good graces and he decided to be the first to make a break. Moreover, the FNLA was rapidly losing prestige internationally after the bloody riots at Kinkuzu and the growing awareness that its military activity against the Portuguese army amounted to little or nothing.

At the summit meeting, the OAU called into question the representativity of the so-called Angolan government in exile and under pressure, especially from the Ghanaian leader Kwame Nkrumah, decided to reconsider the exclusive support given the FNLA/GRAE the previous year and to set up a committee of African governments to try to bring about a reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA.

In typically sensational fashion, Savimbi announced that he was leaving the FNLA, during a press conference in Cairo at which he accused Roberto of 'tribialism and subservience to American imperialism'. He also criticised GRAE which, 'far from intensifying military activity . . . has confined itself to hollow speeches'.

The nucleus of Ovimbundu who were close to him also left the FNLA. So did a small number of Bakongo, including the Cabindan N'Zau Puna. They were to remain in close contact with Savimbi.

After Cairo Savimbi started talks with the MPLA with a view to the possibility of joining it. Neto received him soon after in Brazzaville, but could not agree to Savimbi's conditions: he wanted a responsible post in the MPLA leadership right away, either the vice-presidency or foreign affairs.

He left Brazzaville for Switzerland without clearly explaining his intentions towards the MPLA. Soon after that he want to China to seek support for a project which was still ill-defined. According to the US historian John Marcum,[8] officials in Peking received him with some reserve because of the anti-Chinese stand he had taken during his arguments with Roberto about Viriato da Cruz joining the FNLA.

However, since it was then pursuing a policy towards the third world of systematically opposing Soviet positions, China agreed to establish relations with Savimbi in order to counter the expansion of the MPLA, to which the socialist bloc had given some assistance. China said it was prepared to train some of Savimbi's supporters. So a group of eleven, including N'Zau Puna and Samuel Chiwale, who was to become his chief-of-staff, spent a few months in a Chinese military camp in 1965.

Savimbi went back to Lausanne where, in July 1965, he finished his university course in political science with a paper on Yalta and Africa.

THE CREATION OF UNITA AND COLLABORATION WITH THE COLONIAL REGIME

In Switzlerland he worked on setting up UNITA and drafting its programme with

Tony Fernandes. In November 1965, after a second trip to China to see to the installation of his eleven men, Savimbi went to Cairo with Fernandes, who was to remain there for several years as UNITA representative,[9] Savimbi was given a visa by the Zambian ambassador and went to Lusaka, as he explained to Bridgland, to organise the recruiting of peasants in eastern Angola for the future UNITA.

According to the official history, UNITA was created on 15 March 1966 at Muangai, a village in the Angolan province of Moxico, by a small group of men including those who had undergone military training in China. The first armed attack against Portuguese rule was on 25 December 1966, at Teixeira de Sousa (Luau), a border town on the Benguela Railway.

Most sources estimate that UNITA losses in that attack carried out by ill-prepared and poorly armed men amounted to 300 dead. Although at a high cost in human life, Marcum noted, the Benguela Railway, vital to Zambia's copper exports, was cut during the attack. The event was reported in the press and marked UNITA's entry on the Angolan political scene.

However, the Zambian authorities did not appreciate the threat UNITA posed to a line which was that landlocked country's main outlet to the Atlantic. They demanded an undertaking from Savimbi that he would not repeat his exploit.

Although Savimbi had given his word, in March 1967 UNITA twice detailed trains on the Benguela Railway, which had to be closed to traffic for some weeks, Savimbi, in Cairo at the time of the acts of sabotage, did not return to the Zambian capital until June. But the matter had not been forgotten, and he was met at the airport by Zambian security men, arrested and held in a Lusaka prison for six days before being expelled and sent back to Cairo.

His enforced distance from UNITA lasted a year. It proved fatal to the new organisation, which ceased all activity.

In July 1968, Savimbi, accompanied by N'Zau Puna - who joined him in Cairo coming from Tunisia where he had attended a school of agronomy - returned to Zambia clandestinely through Tanzania. He went back to eastern Angola where, as he tells his biographers, 'everything had to be started again from scratch'.

The rebirth was rapid, if one is to believe UNITA war communiqueés - mostly issued by the Cairo office headed by Fernandes - which, after September 1968, announced many military operations, including clashes with combined Portuguese and South African forces in central Angola. South African intervention was however rare at that time and it is highly improbable that Pretoria's forces would have bothered with Savimbi's men. The version Savimbi gave Bridgland of this period was very different. 'The key problem was that although our men were very brave, they were also very amateur. We lost a lot of men because of that.'

The question that needs to be asked is whether Savimbi really tried to set up a liberation movement or whether he was all along working for the PIDE, especially since his contacts with it in 1960, or whether he attempted to infiltrate nationalist and anti-fascist circles in Portugal, where he was in touch with Communist Party members, and then the MPLA and UPA/FNLA, before setting up his organisation which he placed at the service of Portuguese colonial interests.

Since we have no proof of Savimbi's continued relations and collaboration with the Portuguese authorities, we shall confine ourselves to documents and testimonies compiled since the overthrow of fascism in Portugal on 25 April 1974. They are for the most part Savimbi's own letters to civilian and military representatives of the colonial regime, their replies and their own internal documents, copies of

which were found in Lisbon, in the archives of the PIDE and General Staff Headquarters.

As regards the authenticity of these documents - said by Savimbi to be forgeries by his detractors and particularly the Soviet KGB - it should be recalled that the former Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano, in his book Depoimento published in Brazil in 1976, confirmed the agreements reached with UNITA. General Costa Gomes, commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Angola from 1970 to 1972, and President of Portugal after Spinola's resignation in September 1974, also confirmed that the correspondence with Savimbi was authentic and that the colonial army's understanding with UNITA had helped it in its struggle against the MPLA in eastern Angola.

Captain Sousa e Castro, a leading member of the commission set up to dissolve the PIDE, stated in 1980 that the Democratic Alliance — the then ruling coalition in Lisbon, which was openly sympathetic to Savimbi and claimed it knew nothing about his relations with the PIDE — 'knows perfectly well that the documents related to UNITA's collaboration with the colonial power are genuine. He added that 'if the Democratic Alliance has any doubts about this, it can always address them to our commission and verify their authenticity.'

In a recent book, *Operation Timber* — Pages from the Savimbi Dossier,[10] the writer William Minter for the first time published in United States English translations of a substantial part of Savimbi's correspondence with the Portuguese authorities in Angola, as well as letters, messages and notes exchanged by the army and the PIDE, and between them and the civilian authorities. The documents cover the period from 1971 to 1974, until just after 25 April.

In a very interesting introduction to the dossier, Minter expresses his conviction that the documents are irrefutable proof of UNITA's collaboration with the colonial regime.

The documents, together with others in our possession, show that relations between Savimbi and the Portuguese authorities — at least after the creation of UNITA — were not always easy and were sometimes even marked by distrust.

This can be deduced from the first letter addressed by Savimbi 'to the representatives of the Luanda general government', dated 3 March 1969, at a time when the UNITA leader and N'Zau Puna claimed they were 'restructuring' UNITA.

The four-page letter opens with a complaint about the 'arrogant and ignorant' behaviour of the PIDE officials in the Luso (Luena) area of Moxico, with whom Savimbi was in touch and who transmitted decisions to Luanda. He told the Portuguese government in Angola of his wish 'not to continue corresponding with the PIDE' and 'in future to deal solely with representative of the general government', the only body Savimbi recognised as having 'authority over the affairs of Angola'.

Savimbi had fallen out with the Luso PIDE, as he explained, because they had dared to arrest 'Arturo, the UNITA agent who had come from abroad', and this had caused the incident of 7 March 'when men were killed' — probably among those who made the arrest — an incident he 'greatly regretted.

In the next two pages he expounded on somewhat confused theories — even less comprehensive in view of the fact that he was writing to the colonial authorities — regarding such matters as 'the freedom of the sacred country of the blacks'. He blithely went on to put forward his conditions for collaboration. He demanded the return to UNITA bases of those detained by the authorities after the incident,

particularly Arturo, 'with everything he brought with him', and Sachilombo, to whom the Portuguese should give 'a certain quantity of arms and ammunition, at your discretion, so that we can fight those who attack our defenceless population, as you proposed'.[11] This was a reference to their agreement to attack the 'common enemy', the MPLA, more explicitly stated in other letters and later embodied in a formal agreement.

Savimbi also wrote that 'later we shall indicate the areas where we shall operate', rejecting a previous suggestion of 'having your agents in our areas, since they understand nothing about politics and most of them are corrupt'. This time he was referring to the PIDE agents in Moxico, who probably had a less Machiavellian concept of politics than Savimbi.

He further requested that they 'cease anti-MPLA propaganda in Angola and abroad' which, in his opinion, was dangerously increasing the MPLA's prestige, and asked them to release two of five UNITA prisoners in Luanda who could help them 'to understand the (political) scene in Angola better'.

Finally, he pointed out that 'Mr Martins from Gago Coutinho supplied badly — made Enfield bullets at Chirongoi' (eastern Angola), although he had 'given his word of honour'.

The letter ended on a somewhat philosophical note: 'On our side, as on yours, it seems there is always a temptation to set traps.... But nothing ventured nothing gained, so we must persist!"

Like most of his letters to the colonial authorities, it was signed Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, BA Political and Legal Sciences, University of Lausanne, President of UNITA.

This letter is a document of the greatest importance, since it shows that Savimbi's relations with the PIDE dated back to at least before 1968,[12] as did arrangements for collaboration between Savimbi and the colonial authorities, who had already agreed to the principle of supplying UNITA, albeit with weapons of dubious quality!

It has not yet been possible to establish the precise context or date of the start of this collaboration. Most articles on the subject, the first of which appeared in *Afrique Asie* in July 1974, put the first formal contacts between Savimbi and the colonial authorities between 1970 and 1971. It is generally felt that the coming to power, in August 1968, of Marcello Caetano — who succeeded the dying Salazar — had encouraged the development within the colonial army of more modern anti-guerrilla techniques, including so-called 'psychological warfare'. The use of Savimbi and his group to halt the expansion of the armed struggle waged by the MPLA in the east of the country could have been part of this new policy.

The aims of this collaboration — viewed from both sides — and its effects in the field, as revealed in existing documents and the press of the time, will be dealt with in the next chapter. It can then be judged whether or not, as claimed by the US State Department, certain Portuguese politicians and much of the press, among others, Savimbi is a 'black guerrilla leader whose credentials for fighting Portuguese colonialism are impeccable'.[13]

II. UNITA: PROPAGANDA AND REALITY

Please, sirs, help me to prepare the «façade», there's a Western journalist coming to interview me !

In the UNITA programme drawn up when it was founded in 1966, which opens with a quotation from Mao Tse-tung, one of the stated aims is to 'instil in all Angolans living abroad the idea that true independence can be won only through armed struggle against the colonial regime inside the country'. It further states that 'UNITA must struggle without let-up for the formation of a united front of all Angolan nationalist forces without any discrimination'. As for the organisation's ideology, it says that it intends to 'rely on its own forces' and reject all forms of imperialist hegemony.

A document issued in December 1970 is more in keeping with the traditional Marxist-Leninist language more openly used after 1968. Addressed to 'UNITA activists inside the country and abroad', it called for 'an inflexible and unfailing political policy based on the proletarian philosophy of the peasants, workers and revolutionary intellectuals'. And 'the political and military philosophy of UNITA and FALA (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola) is based on a scientific Marxist analysis which allows for no compromise with the enemy'.

While the ultra-revolutionary language used by UNITA aroused the sympathy of far left and especially pro-Chinese groups in Europe, inside Angola Savimbi and those closest to him were doing their best to create conditions for systematic collaboration, with the very enemy for whom such hatred was expressed in their official propaganda.

It would appear that despite contacts with PIDE agents in the Luso area in 1968 and 1969 and Savimbi's successive personal appeals to the general government in Luanda, agreement on collaboration terms acceptable to the UNITA leader came only later.

Since he could not use the Benguela Railway for blackmail, given the risk of aggravating his already difficult relations with the Zambian authorities, Savimbi turned to timber merchants in the area and proposed allowing them to continue their activities on certain conditions.

A dossier on Savimbi published in the Portuguese weekly O Expresso in 1979, reproduced in full in William Minter's book, includes letters written between August and September 1971 by Edmundo Rocha, a local UNITA official, to two timber merchants in Moxico, Zeca Oliveira and Antnio Duarte. The aim was to establish a modus vivendi with the two Portuguese settlers whereby UNITA would not attack them if they refrained from expanding their tree-felling areas towards bases of the 'guerrilheiros', at least without Savimbi's prior consent.

The merchants were delighted with the opportunity to work in relative security. In a letter dated 11 September, Zeca Oliveira proposed to the UNITA official 'aid of 2,000 escudos ($70) a month, provided we can cut all the timber in the area already marked out which extends to the Lunguê-Bungo River', where the UNITA bases were. As for the population living in the area, Oliveira wrote, 'they can work in tree felling and will be well paid'. 'We are going to collaborate in the struggle against UPA and the MPLA which, influenced by foreign countries, want to ruin our Angola and cause so many victims among the innocent population'.

In his answer dated 14 September, Edmundo Rocha promised to have his superiors examine the proposal on the lumber areas, but he agreed in principle. He suggested a number of commercial deals. UNITA could supply the merchants with wax and puma skins - 'trading in them is forbidden,' he added, 'but it's good business,' - in exchange for goods. UNITA accepted the promised 2,000 escudos, to be used for making purchases in the shop belonging to the two settlers.

'As for cooperation in the struggle against the MPLA or even UPA,' Rocha wrote, 'we are always ready for such cooperation... If you can tell us the terms I will inform my superiors... I am sure that sooner or later we will become friends.'

The following 10 November, the Luanda headquarters of the General Security Directorate (DGS), as the PIDE was renamed after Caetano came to power, sent all the correspondence between Rocha and the timber merchants to Rebocho Vaz, the Governor General. Oliveira and Duarte were in fact working for the political police in Luso. The DGS proposed to the Governor General a closer relationship with UNITA, especially with Savimbi, in order to reduce the military pressure exerted by the MPLA. It was pointed out that efforts to this end had already been made, but the DGS felt there was a need to go further and told Rebocho Vaz that a commission had been set up, headed by Bettencourt Rodrigues, the general in command of the eastern military zone, with the full support of Ernesto Ferreira Macedo, Governor of Moxico district.

The Governor General sent the entire dossier to Lisbon on 22 November 1971,

to Silva Cunha, Overseas Minister, with handwritten comments. 'Read with great interest'. 'I approve all the activities undertaken and the initiatives with a view to contacting UNITA for possible collaboration against UPA and the MPLA'. 'If the answer is positive, this government is ready to make immediate efforts to support all the population under UNITA influence. In any event, I think it would be interesting to give Savimbi a status, agreeing to collaborate with him in the abovementioned struggle and for the advancement of the population.'

Anbal So José Lopes, DGS Director in Luanda, in turn sent the dossier to his superior in Lisbon, Maj Silva Pais, Director General of Security, with a favourable comment.

OPERATION TIMBER

A working group was set up comprising representatives of the army, the DGS - which also acted as military intelligence in the colonies - and the Luanda government, and the foundations of Operation Timber were laid.

On 3 December 1971, a memorandum from Army General Staff Headquarters to the Governor General of Angola requested final approval of the following points:

'(1) Savimbi's future - the possibility of giving him an administrative post, as an administrator or something else.

(2) The integration of UNITA guerrilla combatants as irregular troops.

(3) Making funds available:

— for the socio-cultural advancement of the population in the main centres in UNITA-controlled areas and in nearby centres under our control;

— for the establishment of irregular troops (about 500 men).'

For some months after this, before Operation Timber was effectively launched in September 1972, many letters, messages and internal memoranda were exchanged by those concerned.

On 26 September 1972, Jonas Savimbi addressed a memorandum to Gen Luz Cunha, commander-in-chief of the Portuguese armed forces in Angola, and Gen Bettencourt Rodrigues, commander of the eastern front. In a lengthy preamble he wrote of the evolution of the regional situation, especially an agreement to be reached between UPA and the MPLA - which would allow the latter to operate from Zairean territory for the first time since it had been banned from doing so in 1964. He also wrote of the role of Mobutu and the United States.

He went on to state: 'Our position is irreversible. We are no longer interested either in the OAU or the present Zambia, let alone in an alliance with the MPLA... Whatever the government's intentions may be... we shall not be involved in the illusion of taking up arms against the authorities. We are using them to the full to ensure that the MPLA is eventually forced to abandon the east...'

Savimbi added that, in his view, 'peace in the east means taking into account the following factors'.

'(a) Weakening the MPLA forces inside Angola to the point of liquidating them. This task can be fulfilled through the combined efforts of the military and para-military forces and the UNITA forces.

(b) Liquidating the MPLA camps in the regions on the border between Angola and Zambia. This can be more easily achieved by UNITA, since we have no political status that would make it possible to open any legal dispute within an international body... Our plans have already gone beyond the planning stage...

(c) Discrediting the MPLA... We are thus aiming at the OAU itself, at least as

far as the liberation movements are concerned. The weakening or liquidation of the MPLA in the east will open the way to broader horizons for us...' 'Our intelligence network abroad is very extensive and we can still make use of this apparatus to ensure that the struggle against the MPLA is waged not only arms in hand, but also at the diplomatic level...'

Savimbi raised practical issues related to Operation Timber. 'UNITA requests of Your Excellencies provisional permission to use the corridor between the Lufuta-Luanguinga and Luanguinga-Luvo rivers. The authorities know that we have a mobile force on the banks of the Luanguinga, near the Zambian border. This was the force that attacked the MPLA in Zambia, in April and May, and drove those people out of Lutembo. But these forces run the risk of being attacked by the Lutembo militia. They have instructions never to answer militia fire in the event of an unexpected encounter but, on the contrary, to withdraw as rapidly as possible and have me warned.' There followed details of the locations of MPLA bases detected by UNITA, and of UNITA operations against the MPLA in July and August 1972.

Savimbi recalled the promises of material aid made by the colonial authorities and drew up a list of goods he wished to receive, ranging from cattle to seeds, school materials and medicines.

'I should like to add to this memorandum, in which I have tried to be as sincere as possible,' he further wrote, 'what I regard as a request of a special nature. I am once again requesting Your Excellencies to supply me with at least 1,500 7.62-calibre bullets, because our actions against the MPLA and UPA are always carried out with weapons of this calibre... My request for hand grenades is cancelled because we have enough for the time being.'

'As regards camouflage, we shall ask the timber merchants for other cloth, following your recommendations. But if possible, I should like to be sent at least two uniforms in good and genuine camouflage, one for myself and one for Puna.'

'I was forgetting to mention the possibility of your sending fishing nets and hooks of various sizes, so that we may exploit the possibilities of the Lunguê-Bungo. The hooks should be big and thick, because there are only big fish in this season. And I hope that we shall also be sent syringes with the medicines.' He ended with the traditional formula: 'Please accept, Your Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.'

Savimbi's views and those of the colonial authorities were in essence almost identical. Writing on behalf of Gen Costa Gomes, commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Angola, Lt-Col Arménio Nuno Ramires de Oliveira expressed his satisfaction in a letter to the UNITA leader dated 4 November 1972.

'The analysis you make of the internal and external situation of the subversive movements in Angola, and of the relations between those movements and the African countries that support them has been duly studied and highly appreciated. As I have already had occasion to tell you, it largely coincides with our own.'

Going to great lengths to express approval of military and intelligence operations carried out or planned against the MPLA and UPA, and suggesting others, Lt-Col Ramires Oliveira gave some details of the colonial power's intentions in respect of UNITA. 'We are not speaking in terms of surrender but of "integration",' he assured Savimbi, 'although this concept must be defined at meetings attended by yourself... Unfortunately, the secret nature of these contacts entails certain drawbacks...'

'One drawback,' he continued, 'is the impossibility of granting authorisation for the free use of the corridor between the Lufuta-Luanguinga and Luanguinga-Luvo rivers. Each time it has to be used the Command will have to be forewarned, so as to take our troops out of the region for the requisite time on some pretext or other...'

'Your forces can operate in Zones 2 and 3 until the end of November. They must not, however, leave the confines of those zones because military operations are planned in the south, especially near the Luela and Carilongue rivers. I take this opportunity to extend our congratulations to you on the results achieved against the common enemy.'

As for activities in Zambia, the Portuguese lieutenant-colonel wrote: 'We are of the opinion that the destruction of MPLA bases outside the country is extremely important. But we also think this should be done with some guarantee of success and with every requisite precaution, so as not to compromise the national authorities.'

The Portuguese general staff wished to establish very cordial, even fraternal, relations with UNITA. 'Before ending this letter,' wrote Ramires de Oliveira, 'we have received the request of Captain Clemente of UNITA regarding a medical appointment for yourself. We hope it is nothing serious, but His Excellency the General has instructed me to renew his firm guarantees in respect of your safety, regardless of what is required for your full recovery.'

On 2 December 1972, a military doctor accompanied by other military men and the timber merchant Antnio Duarte visited Savimbi somewhere in the Moxico bush. The DGS director in Luanda, reporting on this to his chief in Lisbon, said that Savimbi had told them he would like to spend Christmas at his home in Cangumbe. His wish was granted.

On 23 May 1973, the new Governor General, Fernando Santos e Castro, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Angola, Gen. Joaquim Luz Cunha, issued a 'joint directive' on Operation Timber.

It dealt with various aspects of the 'collaboration and reintegration' of UNITA. The two high Portuguese dignitaries were against expanding the areas in which UNITA was authorised to operate. 'Areas can be assigned for action against the enemy, but only temporarily and if controlled and coordinated by the Commander of the Eastern Military Zone'. They asked for the presentation of 'this year's budget for social and economic support for UNITA, although it has not yet been decided how such aid is to be granted while the Reintegration plan is in progress'.

As regards reintegration, they foresaw a gradual process whereby, 'at first UNITA must remain clandestine, so as to be able to collaborate in the struggle against the Enemy on National Territory or carry out action abroad, while able to act internationally'.

But the love affair between Savimbi and Lisbon was suddenly interrupted in late 1973. Although the utmost confidence still reigned between UNITA and the colonialists, the 'Kuito' guerrilla camp was suddenly attacked by Portuguese troops. Savimbi confided to one of the timber merchants that he could not believe it until he had gone to see for himself. He came back shattered.

A few months after the return to Portugal of Gen Costa Gomes, who had personally supported Operation Timber, further changes in the colonial hierarchy in Angola altered the army's attitude to UNITA. The new commander of the Eastern Zone, Gen Abel Barroso Hiplito, a hard liner from the Salazarist old guard, did not approve of the steps taken by his predecessor Gen Bettencourt Rodrigues.

None too convinced of UNITA's effectiveness, especially since the MPLA was still fighting, he decided to end the understanding with Savimbi. Moreover, the latter was demanding ever more insistently to be told what his future role would be in an Angola with autonomous or federal status linked to Portugal. Savimbi, who had certainly got wind of the book by Gen Antnio de Spnola, Portugal e o Futuro - in which the former Governor of Guinea Bissau questioned the possibility of a military victory over nationalist resistance - was continually and vainly asking for a meeting with the Portuguese authorities at the highest level.

While Bettencourt Rodrigues had played for time, avoiding a break, Gen Abel Barroso Hiplito wanted no ambiguity and flatly demanded the integration of Savimbi's men into the colonial army, like the flechas and other African units.[1]

Resolutely opposed to Spnola's neo-colonial approach, Barroso Hiplito represented a tendency in the army which believed that any relaxation of Angola's colonial status would endanger the empire as a whole.

UNCERTAIN TIMES FOR SAVIMBI

In a letter addressed to his 'dear brother' N'Zau Puna on 3 October 1973,[2] Savimbi did not conceal his dismay. He castigated his men, 'incompetents' who had been unable to avoid a Portuguese army attack on 21 September in which two UNITA officers had died.

He also attacked Samuel Chivale, 'a useless fellow', and Antnio Vakulukuta, unofficial representative in Zambia, 'who takes plane trips in a hostile country - Zambia - while we have no money'.[3] The UNITA leader was so annoyed with the behaviour of his men who, he said, got drunk whenever they could, that he promised to punish them. 'Seven days detention, four without food (for some) and fifty lashes' was what awaited them on their return to base, 'although they really deserve the death penalty', he wrote.

'Our men are not serious,' he admitted to his friend, 'but what really eats me is the fact that the peace with the "Tugas" (Portuguese) has ended... I am going to try a last-minute move and send another letter (to the Portuguese) and repeat our offer for a meeting, but I am not very hopeful.'

The answer could not have been positive, since Savimbi decided to show the Portuguese generals that he was not to be ignored. Towards the end of 1973 he ordered an attack on a timber company. This none too glorious action, which caused only material damage, was seen by Savimbi as a way of persuading the Portuguese to talk to him again.

This can be deduced from a letter from Savimbi's lieutenant Sabino Sandele (nom de guerre of Cornélio Antunes) to timber merchant Zeca Oliveira. The Luso DGS sent the letter to Luanda on 10 January 1974. Sabino explained to Savimbi's old friend that after the Portuguese army's attacks, they had had to 'acquiesce to supporters of the hard line in UNITA', but that Savimbi was 'studying the possibility of entering into direct contact with Luanda'. The DGS said it favoured 'maintaining contact with UNITA through the timber merchants, regardless of any action the Portuguese army might take against Savimbi's men'.

Contact was finally restored despite a few minor attacks on civilian targets by small UNITA groups. The main architect of the reconciliation was Father Antnio Arajo de Oliveira, who worked with the Luso DGS. After meeting UNITA officials, the padre was received in Luanda by the government Secretary-General. He

returned with a letter from the latter to Savimbi.

The message was delivered on 14 February, during a meeting with Savimbi's envoys in the Moxico bush.[4] A further meeting was fixed for the 28th, to be attended by Savimbi himself. The agenda included a possible ceasefire and a secret meeting between the UNITA leader and the Secretary-General in Luanda.

There was a report on relations with UNITA by army General Staff Headquarters in Luanda dated 21 February 1974. After 'the neutralisation of Operation Timber and the resumption of relations between UNITA and the civilian authorities', there was some uncertainty as to what kind of relations should be established with the *'guerrilheiro'* group.

Lt-Col Tomé Pinto, an officer at the military analysis centre, wrote that restoring relations of confidence with them would enable the army to concentrate its action on the FNLA and MPLA in the east, as well as in the north and Cabinda, where pressure had to be increased on those 'subversive' movements. He added, however, that it should first be verified whether Savimbi was 'in good faith on every level, also in respect of the nature of his relations with international organisations, other movements and China'.

While the factors at stake in this affair were being calmly weighed by the General Staff, operations against UNITA by special units continued. Savimbi complained about this in a letter to Father Arajo de Oliveira dated 22 February 1974. Yet he expressed his delight on receiving the note from the government Secretary-General, a sign that he should not lose hope of re-establishing an understanding with the colonial regime. 'I hope,' he wrote, 'that you have brought back proposals on an immediate ceasefire, which we shall scrupulously respect and which will enable us to start a dialogue at the highest level.' And he asked the padre to send him a copy of the book by Spnola, whose views indicated that Lisbon's colonial policy might soon be revised.

There was still some reluctance on the Portuguese side to reach any decision on UNITA, perhaps because of differences simmering in the army in early 1974. It was while UNITA's position was still unsettled that what Savimbi most feared happened: a change of government in Lisbon before he had been able to sign an agreement ensuring his future in Angola. Savimbi was as yet unaware that not everything was lost for him, because although the overthrow of Caetano, on 25 April 1974, represented a radical change for Portugal, nothing changed in Angola. The men who had served Caetano's fascist and colonial regime still controlled both civil and military structures.

III. UNITA AND 25 APRIL

Five days after the coup d'état in Lisbon, Savimbi wrote to Father Arajo de Oliveira. It was a very bitter letter in which he claimed he had predicted the events which had just shaken Portugal and expressed amazement at the language used by the media to describe the overthrown regime. 'A rotten, lying, incompetent fascist regime... it's unbelievable,' he wrote.

What most worried him were the criteria Lisbon would use in choosing whom it would talk to in the colonies. 'Whom will they seek?' he wrote. 'Communists?... We have never been communists, but Alvaro Cunhal (the Portuguese communist leader), fresh back from Moscow and given a hero's welcome in Lisbon, is an avowed and long-standing communist . . .' Despite his concerns, Savimbi trusted that Spinola 'an intelligent and courageous man', would take the right path.

Until the end of May the situation remained undecided for Savimbi, who had not yet succeeded in arranging the longed-for meeting with the Portuguese authorities in Luanda. He continued to write to the padre. 'I no longer live in a fixed place, but go wherever my presence is needed...'

Indeed, Savimbi was in a flurry of activity, inciting his men to carry out as many military actions as possible to show UNITA's presence in eastern Angola. Yet the targets chosen were not always such as would help to reburnish UNITA's image. Apart from a few militiamen, UNITA attacked mainly civilians, both Portuguese and Angolan, including peasant families, essentially in order to acquire what it needed in order to survive.

Thanks to the padre's intervention, however, a meeting with high-ranking officers from the General Staff in Luanda was finally held near Cangumbe, Mexico, on 14 June 1974. It went well for Savimbi, since a ceasefire was signed. It was also a success for the colonial army, which was signing its first agreement in the colonies before Lisbon had even agreed to the principle of decolonisation.

The long and detailed report on this meeting drawn up by the Portuguese army[1] states, under the heading 'military issues', that Savimbi 'appeared very shocked' at the list of victims, including Angolan children, of UNITA attacks over the past few days. He promised to take disciplinary action against those responsible. The Portuguese army, for its part, undertook to halt operations against the groups involved.

It having been officially decided to end hostilities, 'status quo' areas were established. These were based on the areas already demarcated during Operation Timber, in the Lunguê-Bunge river zone. In these areas, the report stated, UNITA agreed to 'exercise its control in order to prevent possible MPLA infiltrations'. Whereas a UNITA captain at the meeting wanted these areas to be expanded, 'Dr Savimbi took the opposing view that they should instead be reduced, since, as he said, UNITA cannot assume that responsibility in too vast a territory because of the MPLA's fire power...'

The Portuguese army report further revealed that: 'Dr Savimbi also said he was worried by probable FNLA infiltrations across the northern border at Teixeira de Sousa, and felt it necessary to establish an intelligence group in the Sandando area. UNITA will make a practical proposal on this matter to be presented to the eastern zone command through Father Oliveira.'

Savimbi had not changed. He had no hesitation in offering his services to the Portuguese army, in order to limit the influence of two other movements. Furthermore, according to the Portuguese army report, he feared that a 'regime of total democracy' might be established in Portugal and that such a regime 'would not be capable of carrying through the decolonisation of Angola'.

'Savimbi,' the report continued, 'said he favoured a strong regime which had to be led by Spinola. He did not conceal his concern about statements by the latter, who has just promised to hand over power in Portugal to legally elected bodies within a year. This is too short a period for the Angolan decolonisation process to take place, according to Dr Savimbi.'

A communiqué announcing the ceasefire with UNITA, issued in Luanda on 17 June, referred to the 'climate of cordiality and mutual respect' in which the meeting with UNITA had taken place, 'propitious to political dialogue with a view to the restoration of peace'.

At the same time, Agostinho Neto stated in Brazzaville that the MPLA would not cease hostilities 'until we are convinced that Portugal is really determined to transfer power to the people of Angola'. Indeed, the appointment as Governor General of Angola of a man like Silvino Silvério Marques - who had already held the post under Salazar - together with the fact that senior DGS officers and personnel hostile to the changes in Lisbon were kept in Angola, meant there was every reason for concern about Portugal's intentions in respect of the country's future.

News of the agreement with UNITA also brought a strong reaction from the FNLA which, in a statement issued in Kinshasa, denounced 'the event stage-managed by the Portuguese colonialists which led to a so-called ceasefire agreement... While they are officially negotiating with the genuine representatives of the peoples of Guinea and Mozambique, the Portuguese colonialists have chosen clandestinity and political intrigue for Angola, in order to try to impose on the Angolan people ready-made neo-colonial solutions.'

Indeed, as from May, even before the ceasefire was signed, there was a vast publicity operation in Angola in favour of UNITA and its leader which strongly contrasted with the reservations, even the distrust, expressed at the time by the Portuguese authorities and the media regarding the MPLA and FNLA.[2]

On 6 June 1974, the special envoy of *Le Monde* in Angola wrote: 'Portuguese military chiefs in Angola talk of the personality of Dr Savimbi and his current role with an "understanding" which is certainly not wholly disinterested. This charm offensive by the Portuguese army would appear to coincide with political and diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at undermining the credit of the MPLA leader best known abroad, Agostinho Neto, whose socialist and non-racist tendencies are not liked by all the protagonists in this vast African chess game.'

Savimbi sought to justify the lack of clarity shown by the Portuguese authorities in Angola on the subject of decolonisation by stating in Luso that 'the people of Angola are not ready for immediate independence'.

The official trust placed in UNITA after the signing of the ceasefire encouraged whites who were opposed to genuine independence to come out ever more openly in support of it. UNITA favoured this development while at the same time trying to establish itself in the central regions of Huambo and Bié, where Savimbi came from, and to strengthen its military base by recruiting members of the Ovimbundu population. UNITA's weakness in this respect was acute, especially when compared with the guerrilla forces of the other movements. According to Portuguese army reports, on 25 April UNITA had only a small number of *'guerrilheiros'*, two or three hundred.[3]

Meanwhile, tension was mounting in Angola, where punitive expeditions into the *Luanda musseques* (shanty towns) by fascist settlers, backed by the most reactionary sectors of the army and police, were causing a mounting death toll among the black population, and where there was a very active current in favour of a Rhodesian-style unilateral declaration of independence.

Demonstrations against the MPLA and in favour of UNITA took place in the capital, attended by numerous whites. During one of these, in early August, hundreds of whites drove about in cars shouting 'Portuguese Angola' and distributing thousands of photographs of Savimbi. In protest against the curfew imposed by the authorities after the demonstrations, there were violent incidents on 6 August in which several people were killed and dozens wounded. According to the Portuguese news agency ANI, the agitation was caused by a movement called the 'Armed Revolutionary Front', made up almost exclusively of Europeans.

In fact, many parties and movements came into being in Angola after 25 April, encouraged by the policy of President Spinola, who at first wanted to keep Angola under Portugal's control in some kind of federation. He Hthen shifted to a more traditional neo-colonial model and decided to favour the FNLA, in accordance with the wish of United States President Nixon, whom Spínola had met in the Azores in June 1974.[4]

THE START OF DECOLONISATION

The replacement of Governor Silvério Marques, in late July, by an officer who had played an active part in the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (MFA), Admiral Rosa Coutinho, was a turning point in the decolonisation process in Angola. As 'President of the Government Junta', Rosa Coutinho, who had been sent to Angola without any precise guidelines on Lisbon's policy towards the colony, first set about ensuring the enforcement of the laws in force in Portugal since 25 April, the dismantling of the DGS and so forth. He took action against the troublemakers and the Rhodesian tendency within the white community, and called on the FNLA and the MPLA to sign ceasefires with the new military authorities.

However, Spinola went ahead with his plan aimed at ensuring a predominant position for the FNLA in a future Angolan government. He signed an agreement to this end with President Mobutu of Zaire during a meeting on the Isle of Sal, Cape Verde, on 15 September 1974.[5]

It was only after Spinola's resignation, following an abortive attempt to restore authoritarian rule in Portugal on 28 September 1974, that the MFA officers finally decided on a decolonisation policy for all the colonies, especially Angola, where they now intended to deal only with movements which had fought against colonial rule.

A ceasefire was signed with the FNLA in Kinshasa in early October, and one was signed with the MPLA in eastern Angola on 21 October.

Although the major documents proving UNITA's collaboration with the Portuguese army - depriving it of any legitimacy as a liberation movement - had already been published in June (*Afrique Asie*, No. 61), the main MFA officers in Portugal deemed it opportune - even after 28 September - not to exclude Jonas Savimbi from the negotiations on Angola's independence. Fearing an armed takeover by the FNLA which, according to many sources, had a force of between 15,000 and 20,000 men, directly supported by the Zairean army and aided by the United States, the MFA hoped UNITA could act as a kind of buffer to balance the forces in the field.

As most in the MFA then saw it, barring the way to a possible armed takeover by the FNLA also meant reducing the danger of serious racial conflict which would have caused a large part of the Portuguese population in Angola to return to the 'mother country'. In view of the social and economic situation in post-fascist Portugal, this was not at all desirable.[6]

Although it allied itself ever more openly with Portuguese capitalist circles in Angola - which did not place their trust in militarily weak UNITA - the FNLA could not rid itself of the well founded reputation it had earned among the white population - after the murderous acts which had marked its entry into the war in 1961 - of being a basically racist movement.

While the MPLA was alone in having a clear and consistently anti-racist position, with even some white nationalists in its ranks, there were those in the Portuguese General Staff who saw UNITA as a former collaborator, a 'faithful ally' who would always defend Portugal's interests.

After the arrival in Luanda, in November 1974, of delegations from the FNLA and the MPLA, finally able to work as legally recognised political organisations everywhere in the country - this had already been the case for UNITA since June - the conditions existed for common agreement as to how Angola's independence was to take place.

THE ALVOR AGREEMENT

Thanks to the mediation of Admiral Rosa Coutinho, the three movements finally agreed to take part in a transitional government with Portugal. On 15 January 1975, in Alvor, southern Portugal, an agreement signed on the setting up of a quadripartite government also laid down that elections should be held in Angola before independence on 11 November 1975.

Under Portuguese pressure, the OAU recognised the 'third' Angolan movement, UNITA.

The transitional government took office in Luanda on 31 January. Three prime ministers, one from each movement, took monthly turns at the head of the government,[7] while Lisbon, which had recalled Rosa Coutinho's team, was represented by a High Commissioner. The man appointed was Gen Silva Cardoso, whose political views were to prove closer to Spinola's than to those of the ruling MFA.

This encouraged the FNLA's attempts to seize power. Backed by growing military aid from the United States,[8] in March it started a series of attacks on the MPLA, first in the north of the country where it had some tribal support and the help of the Zairean army, then in Luanda and elsewhere.

At this stage UNITA stayed out of the confrontations while taking part in various attempts at reconciliation between the three movements.

Under Silva Cardoso, the progressive withdrawal of the Portuguese armed forces from various parts of the country - as stipulated in the Alvor agreement - took place in such a manner as to ensure the military strengthening of the FNLA - which took control of Negage, the largest airbase in the country - and of UNITA which, in Nova Lisboa (Huambo) and Silva Porto (Kuito), was seeking to build up a force capable of facing the MPLA.

UNITA CHOOSES ITS SIDE

Seeing with some anxiety that the Portuguese army was losing control of Angola, and not having received the assistance he had hoped for from the United States - which believed only in the strength of the FNLA[9] - Savimbi tried to establish links with Pretoria, which was openly concerned about the situation in Angola.

On 3 May 1975, the UNITA leader, in an interview granted to the South African newspaper The Star, praised President Vorster as a responsible man, opposed the armed struggle to liberate Rhodesia and Namibia, and concluded that 'it will be realistic for Angola to cooperate with South Africa'.

Going over from provocation to armed attacks, the FNLA, which had maintained a climate of tension in the capital, launched its biggest offensive against the MPLA on 9 July. But this time, after a week of street fighting in which the population of Luanda spontaneously joined on the MPLA's side, the FNLA was finally driven out of the city.[10]

As in the case of the previous FNLA attack on the MPLA, on 6 June, following this one which, according to the Portuguese authorities, resulted in the death of two hundred people, the Defence Council headed by High Commissioner Silva Cardoso officially blamed the FNLA for breaking the Alvor Agreement, saying it had 'committed premeditated and coordinated acts'.[11]

The FNLA forces routed in Luanda went back to positions in the north held by the Front since March with the help of armoured units of the Zairean army. As for UNITA, which had withdrawn to Huambo without taking an official stand on

the conflict, on 4 August it finally declared that it was on the FNLA's side.

Roberto had already transferred some of his units to the Central Highlands, supported by ELP (the 'Liberation Army of Portugal', made up of white extremists, mostly former members of special units of the colonial army). This reassured UNITA, which decided to attack MPLA garrisons and offices in Bié and Huambo.

Hundreds of MPLA sympathisers and members, including some of its top leaders from that area - notably Political Bureau member Joaquim Kapango and Central Committee member Albano Machado - were arrested, thrown into camps and, later, killed. (In February 1976, after the retreat of the South African army, their bodies were found in mass graves.)

That August, the MPLA, joined by Angolan units which had left the Portuguese army - which had extended compulsory military services to Africans in the last years of colonial rule - and by thousands of volunteers who responded to the call for general mobilisation, launched a multi-pronged offensive to recover the areas and towns which the FNLA and UNITA had seized by force. By the end of the month, the MPLA controlled twelve of the country's sixteen districts.

The MPLA's military successes caused alarm in the most conservative Portuguese military circles in Luanda which, after setting up a provocation, attacked the MPLA headquarters in the capital. The MPLA asked for the departure of the 24,000 Portuguese troops still in Angola and the recall of the High Commissioner. This crisis, the most serious since the Alvor Agreement, was a matter of grave concern for the MFA in Lisbon, which urgently sent two officials who prevented a break between the Portuguese authorities and the MPLA.

High Commissioner Silva Cardoso was recalled to Lisbon, but the officer who replaced him in the interim period announced, on 28 August, that he was suspending the Alvor Agreement and himself assuming all the functions of the transitional government. He added that this would not change the date fixed for Angola's independence.[12]

The MPLA, which was not to blame for the collapse of the quadripartite government - the FNLA having used military means to try to seize power and UNITA having left Luanda almost secretly - strongly protested against the Portuguese authorities' decision and kept its ministers in their posts.

However, although it had only a few foreign instructors at the time - Cubans, Portuguese and Africans from friendly countries - and few weapons, owing to restrictions imposed by the Portuguese authorities,[13] the advance of the MPLA was also worrying the United States and South Africa, which were closely watching the evolution of the balance of forces in Angola.

While Washington granted further aid to the FNLA, as well as to UNITA, which received its first substantial contribution at that time,[14] Pretoria started to prepare for direct intervention aimed at eliminating the MPLA once and for all.

According to Admiral Rosa Coutinho and other MFA members, this operation, which was to be secret and completed before the date set for independence, was decided on at a meeting in Windhoek in late August.

In the presence of United States, Zairean and Portuguese envoys, as well as representatives of the FNLA and UNITA, the decision was taken to launch a simultaneous invasion of Angola from the north and the south, to end in a pincer movement on the capital by Zairean and South African forces, acting under the cover of the FNLA and UNITA, and also units controlled by Chipenda[15] who, although he joined the FNLA in late 1974, still maintained a certain autonomy.

An attack on Cabinda by Zairean forces and mercenaries, under the cover of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC), was also planned for the same time. It took place on 6 November, but failed.

Zaire's cooperation was indispensable to ensuring a simultaneous operation north and south of the capital. Moreover, Washington and Pretoria had already agreed with Kinshasa to put Holden Roberto and his FNLA in power in an 'independent' Angola on 11 November.

In fact, Savimbi later told Bridgland that he had been shocked to learn from South African Prime Minister John Vorster himself, on the eve of independence, of the secondary role assigned to him in the US-South African plan, after the taking of Luanda.[16] He told Bridgland in 1980: 'The main part of the 2,000-man South African force was in our area, and yet they (the South Africans and the West) had planned to take over Luanda and give it to the FNLA without telling us. What sort of friendship was that?'

IV. THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVASION AND SAVIMBI'S VERSION

These «medals» he has were given to him by South Africa for every bomb placed, for the murders carried out in our villages !

On the pretext of defending 'an installation vital to South Africa', on 9 August 1975 the South African Defence Force (SADF) occupied the Calueque hydroelectric dam on the Cunene River, in southern Angola near the Namibian border. This first violation of the Angolan border, for which there was no justification, did not give rise to any international protests, not even from Portugal, which had undertaken to lead its largest colony to independence 'without external interference'.

In September, the SADF sent officers and NCOs to Huambo to provide basic military training for hastily recruited UNITA men. Events over the following week proved this concern to be justified.

In October, South African combat troops, including armoured units, were sent to the Central Highlands by air. These forces were to help in halting the advance of MPLA units on Huambo.[1]

The balance of forces between the MPLA and its adversaries was changing

significantly as Zairean troops became directly involved in the fighting in the north and the SADF reinforced UNITA positions in the centre-south. On 14 October, the 'Zulu' military column, composed mainly of SADF regular troops, crossed the Namibian border into Angola. The invasion had started.

It was the first reports on the invasion, together with the massing of more troops and equipment on the Namibian border, that prompted the MPLA leaders to appeal to Cuba to send regular army volunteers who could handle conventional weapons, like artillery, and face up to the fire power of the aggressors. On 5 November, Cuba agreed to give its support, and Operation Carlota was started two days later. An airlift was established. There were 7,000 Cuban troops in Angola by December, and 12,000 by January.

The military column from Namibia - which the FNLA and UNITA called the 'Chipenda brigade' after the former MPLA member seen abroad as the commander of the 'anti-MPLA forces' on the southern front - also included Namibian troops and Portuguese from ELP. However, the proportion of South African troops increased after 23 October, with the arrival of reinforcements to start invading the west and centre of the country.

The main task of the FNLA and UNITA was to occupy towns attacked and taken by the SADF after overcoming resistance which was often heroic but ill- prepared to confront armoured units and fire power greater than ever seen during the anti-colonial struggle in Angola. As the Zulu column advanced in a north-westerly direction, there were ever more South African forces on the frontline. Portuguese residents of Lobito said the forces which took the town were 80% South African troops and a few Portuguese units.[2]

Savimbi, however, gave a very different version of these military events to the press, including his friend Fred Bridgland.

On 26 October, UNITA officially announced the capture of Sá da Bandeira (Lubango) by its men. Arriving in Lusaka on the 30th, Savimbi said UNITA had also taken Mocamedes (Namibe). 'Friendly countries,' he said, 'now know we have a port through which we can receive supplies.'

Surprised at UNITA's military successes, which nothing had given cause to foresee at his last meeting with Savimbi a few weeks earlier, Bridgland left Lusaka for Huambo on 1 November. Savimbi told him that 'UNITA might take Lobito within another two or three days' and that 'we have a force of 5,000 men and 55 armoured cars advancing on it from three directions'.

Still according to Savimbi, on 4 November a thrust by 2,000 UNITA soldiers had resulted in the capture of the town of Cela (Wako Kungo), about 200 km north of Huambo. Bridgland concluded from what Savimbi told him that UNITA's thrust was two-pronged - one along the coastline and the other some 250 km inland. That was precisely how the SADF was proceeding!

Bridgland then decided to hurry back to Lusaka - in the private jet provided for Savimbi by Lonrho[3] - to file reports to Reuter on UNITA's amazingly rapid advances. Savimbi went to the airport to give him his latest war communiqué: 'UNITA forces were entering Lobito. UNITA now controlled most of the Benguela Railway.' On 10 November, the day before independence, Bridgland was again in Angola. He wanted to visit Lobito, newly-captured by the UNITA column which was now attacking Novo Redondo (Sumbe), as he wrote in his book.

He noted that UNITA was not the only force in Lobito. There was also the FNLA and 'many of their officers seemed to be Portuguese'. Although Bridgland had

already seen other white soldiers and recognised their characteristic South African accent, he made no mention of this in the stories he filed. Until well after independence he merely repeated the version of events supplied by Savimbi. Yet in the chapter South African Invasion, Bridgland wrote that during a stopover in Bié, on 7 November, on one of his flights to Huambo, 'I again saw the flaxen-haired white man with a group of black and white soldiers gathered around a Panhard armoured car'. He added that 'it was beginning to look clear what had made Savimbi's phenomenal advances possible'.

BRIDGLAND LOYAL TO SAVIMBI OR PRETORIA?

On 10 November, Bridgland and Mike Nicholson, a British television journalist, left Lusaka for Lobito in the Lonrho jet. There was no jet fuel at Huambo airport, he explained, and the British pilots had to refuel elsewhere. They flew south across the border into Namibia, landing at Rundu, the biggest South African base in the region.

'Peeping over the bottom edge of window, as the pilots supervised the refuelling and talked on the tarmac to South African officers,' he wrote, 'we saw that we were at the centre of what could only be Pretoria's military staging post for Angola. Lined up were columns of Panhard armoured cars of the kind I had seen hundreds of kilometres inside Angola: there were white men in the gunnery and driving positions... Their immediate destination was a distant parking area, where we could see waiting Hercules C-130 transport planes in exactly the same camouflage... as I was to see later that same morning deep inside Angola.'

He went on to give further evidence he had gathered before independence of the extent of South Africa's intervention in Angola. However, 'I decided that before I telexed my story to London I needed to question Savimbi. So, on 13 November, Mike and I again returned to Angola...' Bridgland described Savimbi's answers as 'understandably ambiguous'. 'There are no South African troops committed by the South African government here. I agree that we have some white troops - not soldiers, but technicians - working for us here doing things that we don't know how to do.'

Bridgland finally sent Reuter his story on the war in Angola and the presence of foreign forces on 14 November. But he could not have been very convincing since, according to his book, the agency did not give a clear account of events and made no mention whatsoever of South Africa. The agency report started as follows: 'Columns of armoured vehicles manned by white personnel are slicing across great tracts of Angola through the defences of the Marxist-oriented MPLA... The major unanswered question is the origin of the white soldiers.'

There is reason to doubt whether Bridgland sent his agency even a third of the evidence on the South African invasion that he gave in the chapter of his book on the subject. It remains to be seen whether he deliberately omitted facts known to him in order to please Savimbi, whose personal friend he became, or the Pretoria regime.

It was only on 22 November, he wrote, 'that I finally persuaded the agency to name the South Africans, and the next day the story appeared on the front page of the Washington Post'.

In fact, it had already become difficult to be hazy about the real protagonists in the war raging in Angola. An article in The Observer on 16 November was

headlined 'South African troops join Angola civil war', and Nicholson's ITN report had already been shown on British television. In his commentary on the pictures he had brought back from Angola he said: 'The most important thing for us here is that we now have proof that white South African regular troops were directly involved in the re-taking of the seaport (Lobito) and are still fighting with - and, furthermore, are directing - UNITA troops further north'.

The South Africans who, under the Defence Act, had imposed censorship on their own press on any references to their participation in the war in Angola, could no longer conceal their direct involvement. On 28 November, South Africa told the London Times that 'with the concurrence and to the satisfaction of Dr Savimbi, we are operating on the other side of the Angolan border to protect our interests'.

Relations between Savimbi and the Pretoria regime had developed rapidly in only a few months. On 10 November 1975, just a few hours before the proclamation of independence, Jonas Savimbi flew to Pretoria in the same plane that had refuelled at Rundu that morning with Bridgland aboard. He was received by senior South African officials, including Prime Minister John Vorster. This prevented him from attending the ceremony in Huambo where UNITA and the FNLA proclaimed the independence of the 'Democratic People's Republic of Angola'.[4] The UNITA leader says he convinced his illustrious hosts not to withdraw their forces on 11 November, as provided for in the invasion plan, because if the FNLA and UNITA could hold most of the important towns in the country until 9 December, there was a hope that at the special OAU summit meeting on Angola to be held on that date, a majority of African countries would vote for a coalition government of the 'three movements' in Angola.

There is every indication, however, that the SADF, whose advance on the Angolan capital was soon halted by Angolan-Cuban forces on the southern bank of the Keve River, 250 km from Luanda, fully intended to complete its mission, despite the delay.

Until mid-December there was increasingly fierce fighting on the Keve River Hand in the east, from where the South Africans hoped to be able to break through to Luanda.

It was only when all attempts to reach Luanda had failed and the cost in human lives and material had far exceeded Pretoria's forecasts, that South Africa decided to withdraw. Continuing its military involvement in Angola would have meant substantially increasing the numbers of men in the field and their equipment. It would appear that public opinion in South Africa, which had not been informed of the extent of the regular army's intervention in this African country, was not prepared to accept this.

THE FAILURE OF THE INVADERS

Routed at the gates of Luanda on 10 November 1975, the FNLA forces were in disarray and unable to reorganise, despite the support of the Zairean army and the former Portuguese commandos in ELP. The recruitment, with CIA assistance, of American and British mercenaries who were sent into the theatre of operations in January merely served to discredit the FNLA even more.

In the south, the South African army, increasingly bogged down on the Keve River front where it was suffering the heaviest losses of the invasion, soon had no choice but to withdraw.

The now irrefutable proof of South African intervention and UNITA and FNLA

complicity caused strong reactions in the world. In Africa, a country like Nigeria, which had never had any special relationship with the MPLA, recognised the Angolan government and campaigned on its behalf, both in the OAU and internationally. The military defeat was followed by a diplomatic one.

In the United States too, there was no longer unanimous agreement on the Ford administration's policy towards Angola. Proof of its direct involvement on the side of South Africa and Zaire in the invasion of Angola, to say nothing of the military and financial support given to the FNLA and UNITA, had created strong dissent in the Senate and the House of Representatives. On 5 December, Senator Dick Clark, the first to protest publicly about CIA activities in Angola, denouncing the fallacious arguments put forward by the agency to justify its policy, proposed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act banning all 'covert aid' to anti-government forces in Angola.

On 19 December, the Clark Amendment was approved by the Senate by 54 votes to 22. Of the $37.7 million the 40 Committee had allocated for the CIA's Angola Task Force, John Stockwell was to reveal two years later, only nine million were still used for operations in Angola, mainly for recruiting mercenaries, in a last vain attempt to take Luanda from the north.

The attitude of the US Senate shook the South Africans, and also Savimbi, who hurried to Pretoria the day after the Senate vote. He was no longer asking that the South African forces hold their positions until the OAU summit, postponed until 10 January 1976, but wanted them to advance on Luanda. According to Bridgland, Vorster could only assure him that South African troops would not withdraw before that date, but ruled out the possibility of advancing beyond Wako Kungo.

In fact, Vorster had no choice. His forces were completely pinned down south of the Keve River and he would have needed a renewed American commitment to be able to consider reinforcing his troops substantially and relaunching the offensive against Luanda.

The secret blitzkrieg-type operation planned by the South African General Staff - seventeen days to reach the capital from the Namibian border - was no longer possible. Any fresh attempt to take Luanda would have meant a large-scale direct confrontation with Angolan-Cuban forces.

Seeing disaster looming on the horizon and fearing that he might be left in the lurch, Savimbi made a third trip in late December to try to persuade the South Africans not to withdraw. The meeting, in Windhoek, was apparently with Pieter Botha, then Minister of Defence. Pretoria would no doubt have liked to grant Savimbi's wish, but could not expose its army to a new offensive and more losses. Maintaining the status quo in the field was already a big effort. Furthermore, the Angolan-Cuban forces had captured more SADF regular soldiers. In all, seven were captured. The situation was becoming untenable.

At the OAU special summit there was not an immediate majority in favour of recognising the MPLA government, with 22 votes for and 22 against. However, recognition some weeks later by Ethiopia - which, as the host country, had chosen to abstain during the summit - made the admission of the People's Republic of Angola automatic. One month later, 41 of the OAU's 46 member states recognised the Angolan government, followed by the EEC countries a few weeks later. On 20 January, Savimbi flew to Kinshasa to meet Gen Vernon Walters, then Deputy Director of the CIA. But whatever promises were made by the American general,

it was objectively impossible for the US to change the course of events. Savimbi was desperate. The inevitable South African withdrawal started in late January and was completed on 27 March 1976. UNITA, which had put up no resistance to the advance of the Angolan army and its Cuban allies, followed Pretoria's troops and sought refuge in Namibia, as did Chipenda and his men. However, a few UNITA groups hid in the bush in the Central Highlands. On 10 February, Savimbi made his final challenge, stating that his movement would wage guerrilla warfare against the Angolan government.

Dropped as he was by his friends, Savimbi could not be a serious threat to the government. His only ally, the South African regime, internationally isolated, embarrassed by its unforeseen military defeat in Angola and shaken by the proportions of the riots which broke out in Soweto, could not give him consistent aid at that time.

He had to wait until Pretoria pulled itself together again and embarked on a fullblown strategy of restoring its supremacy in the region, in order to be able to play a role within the context of South African plans to destabilise Angola.

V. UNITA AND SOUTH AFRICAN DESTABILISATION

287 people were killed by UNITA in Canhala, Huambo Province, October 8th 1976.

In 1976, while the People's Republic of Angola set about repairing the enormous damage caused by the South African invasion - an estimated $6.7 billion[1] - UNITA tried to remain active by taking advantage of difficulties the Angolan army had in controlling every part of the vast country.

The armed groups which hid in the Central Highland forests after the South African retreat, sometimes forcing the inhabitants of villages on their way to follow them, maintained a climate of instability. Their most frequent targets were civilian vehicles transporting foodstuffs, rural shops opened by the state to replace the network of Portuguese traders who fled on the eve of independence, and such communications infrastructures as bridges.

On 4 August 1976, a UNITA official told the Johannesburg correspondent of *The Times* the strategy of the moment. 'Our present policy is not to attempt to seize those towns held by the MPLA... we're not ready for that yet... but to use the guerrilla forces to paralise communications and to ruin the economy.' These acts

of sabotage - which greatly worsened the living conditions of the rural population, already difficult after two years of social disruption, destruction[2] and war - caused many Ovimbundus to refuse to cooperate with, and especially feed, UNITA men. UNITA reacted by using intimidation and brutal reprisals. A number of villages were to experience UNITA's methods of retaliation.

In mid-July, there was a massacre in Catota, a village in southern Bié accused of not wanting to cooperate; 101 peasants were killed and dozens wounded.

Canhala, a small village of 500 families in the Huambo region, had always been close to the MPLA. During the general mobilisation which preceded the South African invasion, 108 young people from Canhala had joined FAPLA (the armed forces of the MPLA and of independent Angola). During President Neto's visit to Huambo in 1976, a large number of people from Canhala attended the rally he addressed. This was too much for UNITA.

At dawn on 8 October 1976, the village was surrounded. People were forcibly dragged from their huts and slaughtered with machetes, resulting in 287 dead and more than a hundred wounded.

Contrary to UNITA propaganda, the MPLA had many members in the Central Highlands, especially in Huambo and other urban centres, but also in rural areas where some of its leaders and guerrillas were from. During the occupation of the region by UNITA and the South Africans, hundreds of MPLA supporters and members were arrested. After liberation, as the Angolan and Cuban army descended the coast and entered the Highlands - without meeting any resistance from UNITA - the most horrific mass graves were discovered near Lobito, Benguela, Huambo and Kuito, where MPLA members had been massacred.

There are countless examples of indiscriminate killings by UNITA forces, both in predominantly Ovimbundu areas and elsewhere. We cite only a few. The sabotage of the Benguela Railway 19 km from Luena, Moxico, on 26 July 1983: 50 dead and 216 wounded, all civilians. The attack on the village of Ucua, in the Kwanza Norte coffee area, in September 1984: 32 dead. The massacre of Camabatela, Kwanza Norte, on 8 February 1986, recorded in a horrifying film made by an Angolan TV crew that rushed to the spot: 107 people hacked to death with machetes. The attack on Masseque, Kuando Kubango, during a South African offensive against Cuito Cuanavale, on 9 August 1986: 20 dead, including many children. A few days later, on 19 August 1986, it was the turn of Dima, a village on the outskirts of Cuito Cuanavale: 51 dead, most of them blown to bits by hand grenades. In October 1986, there was a massacre in northern Malange, an act of reprisal against the inhabitants of the village of Marimba, who had discovered UNITA arms caches and reported to FAPLA: 271 dead. In Alto Hama, northwest of Huambo, on 19 July 1988, ten people were killed and 30 wounded in a UNITA attack.

One could add to this far from exhaustive list of civilian victims dozens of people killed and hundreds maimed in bomb attacks in markets and other public places in Huambo, the provincial capital which has most greatly suffered from UNITA terrorism. There was also the foiled attack on Huambo Cathedral on Easter Sunday in 1988, where a powerful explosive was discovered just before the service was due to start.

From 1976 to 1979, despite the instability maintained by UNITA in the centre of the country and some military activity by the SADF, which made a number of incursions into southern Angola,[3] Angola enjoyed a period of relative calm and many economic activities were resumed. The Benguela Railway was reopened to

traffic in 1978. The first Zairean manganese was transported to the Atlantic coast in August 1979, and the first Zambian copper in July 1980. Funds were raised, under European Ecomonic Community (EEC) auspices, to finance the rehabilitation of the line.

The resumption of mining at the Kassinga iron mines in the southeast of Hula Province was also planned.

Furthermore, the situation was returning to normal in the Central Highlands where, after a number of FAPLA offensives, UNITA was losing ground. Peasants who had been forced to follow UNITA into the bush were gradually returning to their villages in a state of total wretchedness and asking the authorities to assist them.

But Pretoria did not want things to return to normal and was determined to prevent this African country which had achieved independence against its will from living in peace and achieving economic development.

In 1979, Pieter Botha, Minister of Defence during the invasion of Angola, replaced Vorster as Prime Minister. The green light was given for stepping up direct attacks against Angola and reinforcing UNITA.

On 26 September 1979, the South African air force bombed the centre and outskirts of Lubango, 300 km north of the border, and the town of Xangongo on the Cunene River.

There were many attacks in 1980, including 'Operation Smokeshell', in June, in which there were more SADF troops in Cunene and Kuando Kubango provinces than during the 1975 invasion.

There were ever more incursions and the occupation, for greater or lesser periods, of Angolan territory. The pretext officially given by Pretoria was the presence of SWAPO bases in the areas attacked. Yet it was above all the Angolan army that the SADF attacked, as well as the country's economic facilities. Attacks by sea-borne South African commandos on the Lobito oil tanks, in 1980, and on the Luanda refinery, in 1981, were sufficient to give the lie to Pretoria's justifications. The target was the People's Republic of Angola and its economic potential.

The setting up, after Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, of the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), with the main aim of reducing the economic dependence of Southern African countries on South Africa, led to an escalation of Pretoria's destabilisation of Angola and Mozambique and its extension to the whole region.

In August 1981, the SADF launched 'Operation Protea' in southern Angola. Armoured units supported by the air force entered Cunene Province. FAPLA stopped the invaders at Cahama, 110 km from the border, but the SADF occupied a large part of the province for more than three years. Apart from the material damage, the social effects were appalling. South African occupation led to the first population exodus to the north; 130,000 people left their villages to seek refuge in Hula and Huambo provinces.

UNITA, no longer a threat to the Angolan government in 1979, was to benefit from South Africa's increased military involvement. In August 1981 the Johannesburg daily, The Star, reporting on Operation Protea, commented that 'SA raids will strengthen UNITA'. Indeed, the South Africans intended to transform UNITA and ensure that it had real military force.

The testimony of a UNITA prisoner, Januario Kossuma from Bié, captured by FAPLA near Mavinga, Kuando Kubango, on 23 August 1985, provides a summary

of the events which gradually led Savimbi's organisation to acquire its military capacity. 'I joined UNITA at a meeting in September 1974. I was given rudimentary military training in the Moxico bush. I stayed in that region during the South African invasion in 1975, but I had to leave in June the following year when FAPLA launched an offensive after the South African retreat in March 1976. I then hid in the forest in Bié with a UNITA group. We had few weapons and we didn't do much, just some attacks on civilian convoys. We fed ourselves on the stocks of villages in the area.' 'In Septembr 1979, UNITA sent us an envoy from Kuando Kubango. Everyone had to go to the Namibian border, to Jamba. When we arrived, in December, we were immediately taken to a camp in Namibia, Dodge City. We had three months' infantry training. The instructors were whites from the South African army. Portuguese and Angolans translated from Portuguese and Umbundu. We continued our training inside Angola at Cuangar, a Kuando Kubango border post with Namibia. We were forming UNITA's first semi-regular battalion - 350 men. 'Then we went into action. The aim was to take centres and posts in the south and east of Kuando Kubango where there were no Angolan armed forces. We took Calai, then Luengue. We also encircled Rivungo, on the Zambian border, Lupire, east of Cuito Cuanavale, and Mavinga. But with the arrival of FAPLA reinforcements, things became difficult and we were driven out of Cangombe, north of Lupire. We returned to Jamba, taking with us young people we had kidnapped to train at our bases...'

'In 1982 I took an infantry lieutenant course at the Tiger camp near Jamba.

There were South African instructors there, but not the same ones. Three months later we formed an elite brigade composed of three special forces battalions of 170 men each... In 1984, I again underwent military training at the Tigre and Palanca bases near the Namibian border. We were officered by fifteen South Africans. Six months later we formed a battalion equipped with artillery and anti-aircraft guns.'[4]

Although the UNITA forces made undeniable progress over these years in acts of sabotage and the destruction of economic targets, they were rarely successful in clashes with the Angolan army. In August 1983, when a UNITA attack on a small garrison at Cangamba (Moxico), 450 km from the border, was turning out badly for Savimbi's men, who were about to be wiped out, the South African air force intervened, bombing Angolan army positions. UNITA then announced to the press that it had taken Cangamba after weeks of fighting.

However, proof of South African intervention left no doubt as to who was responsible for the attacks which temporarily dislodged the Angolan armed forces.[5]

The SADF's continued occupation of large parts of southern Angola, obliging the Angolan army to keep the bulk of its forces in the area, and the fact that the SADF's presence in Angola facilitated its logistical support for UNITA, enabled Savimbi's men to step up operations and acts of sabotage in the south while breaking through to areas north of the Benguela Railway. In 1984, UNITA 'battalions' reached the provinces of Lunda, Malanje and Uge. Military supplies were provided through regular parachute drops by the South African air force in a number of places in the country. There has been substantial proof of these operations and many eye-witness accounts.[6]

Pretoria did not confine itself to training and logistical support, since it also provided the bulk of the military equipment used by UNITA.

William Casey, the CIA director who died in 1987, admitting his admiration for South African intelligence to Bob Woodward,[7] said he was sure South Africa had

supplied UNITA with at least $200 million worth of weapons by 1983. He regretted the fact that the Clark Amendment had not allowed the CIA to contribute to these funds.

But the Reagan administration which, according to John Stockwell, always found ways round the Clark Amendment ban on aid to UNITA,[8] supported the SADF's repeated attacks in southern Angola. The United States consistently vetoed or abstained on resolutions demanding sanctions against South Africa for its acts of aggression against Angola.

In 1983, Operation Protea was followed by Operation Askari. Between the two Pretoria's air force made repeated bombing raids, including one, in May 1982, which damaged the Kassinga mining centre and the Namibe Railway. During Operation Askari, aimed at expanding the area occupied through Protea, South African units reached areas 300 km from the Namibian border, including the town of Kassinga. It was only stopped after the SADF sustained heavy losses as a result of the Angolan army's resistance at Cahama and in other parts of Cunene and Kuando Kubango provinces.

The operation caused a further gigantic movement of displaced persons - 600,000 from 1981 to 1984 - and extremely high material losses, including the bridge over the Cunene River, the longest in the country, destroyed for the second time since 1975.[9] It was followed by negotiations between Angolans and South Africans, with the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, as mediator. Agreement was reached in Lusaka, in February 1984, on a South African withdrawal from the areas occupied since Operation Protea.[10]

This South African 'disengagement' was only temporary and did not affect Pretoria's attitude to UNITA, or that of Washington. On the contrary, Savimbi had meetings with Chester Crocker and South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan in May 1984, three months after the Lusaka understanding, and received Malan in Jamba in July.[11] He said the SADF had continued its support for UNITA.

A few months later, in September, to seal that unfailing friendship, Savimbi accepted Pieter Botha's invitation to attend his investiture as State President of South Africa.

While South African troops withdrew from Angola very slowly - it took them 15 months instead of the 30 days agreed on at Lusaka - UNITA continued its operations in the country with the SADF's secret support.

Attacks on economic centres and the frequent taking of foreign technicians as hostages after 1982, acts of sabotage against roads, dams and so forth, and the instability maintained in traditionally productive agricultural regions all had disastrous effects on the country's economy and the lives of its inhabitants. However, the fact that UNITA's forces were dispersed over many fronts greatly decreased its effectiveness.

The reinforcement of the Angolan army in Malanje, Uge and Lunda, in 1984, stopped Unita's push into the north. Fighting with FAPLA, restructured to be better adapted to the kind of war waged by UNITA, resulted in serious setbacks for UNITA, whose decimated 'battalions' dispersed in the bush. As happened in 1976, after the South African retreat, the survivors fought mainly to feed themselves. Moreover, since these regions were ethnically hostile to the tribalist UNITA, more and more of Savimbi's men gave themselves up to FAPLA.

The peasants were again the victims of this 'cassava war'. They stopped going to their fields for fear of coming across UNITA men looking for food or stepping on one of the many anti-personnel mines the latter left behind them.

The establishment, around 1985, of bases in Zaire where UNITA could seek refuge after carrying out actions, enabled Savimbi's forces to relaunch operations in the north of the country.

By continually re-training UNITA forces until battalions of 600 or more men were formed, as well as brigades with increased fire power, the South African army hoped that UNITA might eventually be able to face the Angolan army on its own.

Yet these calculations proved wrong. During fighting with the Angolan army from 1984 to 1987, UNITA lost a few thousand men, especially in the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale areas. In order to prevent the annihilation of its protégé, the South African army had twice to intervene massively.[12]

Indeed, in 1985 and 1987, Pretoria's army carried out its biggest military operations in Angola since the country's independence. In both cases UNITA thought it could win a 'conventional' war against the Angolan army in order to dislodge FAPLA from Cuito Cuanavale and make it a UNITA base. (Cuban forces intervened only much later, in January 1988, when the South African contingent had been increased to 7,000 men.)

In 1985, South African Defence Minister Magnus Malan publicly admitted that his army had intervened to defend UNITA. Supporting Savimbi, he said, served the interests of the 'free world', and 'Savimbi stands for the same norms and values in which we believe'.[13]

In reality, however, the South African army did not confine itself to 'defending' UNITA but also acted on its behalf. The most significant case of this was the attempted sabotage of the installations of the US oil company Gulf-Chevron in Cabinda, on 21 May 1985.

A South African commando unit led by Capt Wynand Petrus Du Toit was intercepted by an Angolan army patrol that day. During an exchange of fire, Du Toit was taken prisoner and two South Africans were killed. Speaking at a press conference in Luanda on 28 May, Du Toit said that since 1982 he had been a member of South Africa's special forces, the Fourth Reconnaissance Regiment, and had taken part in a number of missions in Angola and Mozambique. He made special mention of the sabotage of the Giraul Bridge, Namibe Province, for which UNITA had claimed responsibility, and an attack on the ANC office in Maputo on 17 October 1983.

The Cabinda sabotage was also to have been presented as a UNITA action, said Du Toit, who had brought with him the explosives, guns and ammunition needed for the operation, together with UNITA leaflets and photographs of its leader.

Although United States interests had almost fallen victim to Pretoria's all-out war strategy, barely two months later the Reagan administration - contrary to all logic - succeeded in having the Clark Amendment repealed. For nine years it had officially banned all US military aid for Angolan anti-government groups.

The Congress decision was welcomed with delight by ultra-right-wing groups in the United States, notably Citizens for America, which had shown its support for UNITA by organising a meeting at Jamba in June attended by representatives of the Nicaraguan contras and Afghan and Laotian anti-government groups.

The US public relations firm Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly organised a visit to the United States by Savimbi, in January 1986, which took place amid great pomp and ceremony.[14] It was strongly backed by the very reactionary

Conservative Caucus. Received with full honours by members of the administration and President Ronald Reagan himself, Savimbi, who was not on his first visit to Washington, was given formal recognition this time. This gave rise to considerable criticism in the United States press and caused Angola to suspend talks on a negotiated settlement. The United States had lost its credibility as a mediator.[15]

Savimbi also obtained aid for 1986 officially worth $15 million - renewed the following year - and, more important, assurances that he would be sent portable surface-to-air Stinger missiles and could use Zaire as a rear base for operations inside Angola and American arms deliveries.

In 1986 and 1987 there was indeed an increase in UNITA sabotage operations on the railway line[16] and a marked rise in activity in the north and northeast.

In July 1987, the Angolan army launched several simultaneous operations against UNITA, especially in the east and south. A FAPLA military convoy advanced from Cuito Cuanavale to Mavinga, in Kuando Kubango Province, where UNITA bases had prospered under South African army protection. Despite the sophisticated weapons it had been provided with, UNITA was unable to hold its positions under growing FAPLA pressure. There was fierce fighting on the Lomba River in which UNITA suffered heavy losses. Repeating exactly what had happened in 1985, the South African army again intervened. After a few weeks, FAPLA's supply lines were cut by constant South African heavy artillery attacks, using G-5 and G-6 guns, and the Angolan army had to pull back to Cuito Cuanavale. Pretoria's army then tried to ensure a lasting change in the balance of forces in UNITA's favour by attacking Cuito Cuanavale directly. If this Angolan army base were eliminated, UNITA would have greater security in the region and could strengthen its position further north.

While UNITA claimed that it had forced FAPLA to pull back, the South Africans launched a vast operation against Cuito Cuanavale, code-named 'Operation Modular'. But once again it was not the lightning operation planned by Pretoria's General Staff. FAPLA resisted and fought back, causing deaths in the increasingly demoralised SADF ranks. Morale among Pretoria's troops, most of them young conscripts, was so low that President Pieter Botha felt it necessary to visit them in person inside Angola in early November.

Gen Magnus Malan's public announcement of Botha's tour of Kuando Kubango and, hence, of the aggression in progress, took the press by surprise, since most had believed in UNITA's military successes. The South Africans were determined to win the battle; their credibility depended on it. They raised the number of their troops to 7,000 and sent more military hardware into Kuando Kubango, while launching attacks in Cunene Province.

Starting in September 1987, South African artillery shelled Cuito Cuanavale round the clock for weeks on end. Pretoria's air force intervened only sporadically and at great risk. The balance of forces in the air had changed. It was in the face of this South African relentlessness that, in January 1988, Cuban troops - which had played an essentially deterrent role for some years, remaining on a defence line about 300 km north of the border - reinforced the Angolan units still defending Cuito Cuanavale.

A decisive battle took place a few kilometres from Cuito Cuanavale on 27 March. The South Africans were driven back 40 km to the south, from where they continued to keep Cuito Cuanavale under long-range artillery fire. But the retreat was irreversible. Now South Africa had to find a way to save face.

Interviewed by the correspondent in Namibia of Le Figaro (1 April 1988), South African chief-of-staff Gen Geldenhuys denied having wanted to take Cuito Cuanavale while admitting that the aim of the operation was to support UNITA. He also acknowledged the presence of 'a little more than 5,000 men', the same number, he added, 'as already entered Angola in the past for other operations'. He gave South African losses as 'thirty-two dead and three times as many wounded, twenty of them seriously'.

It was in the officers' mess at Omega, Oshakati and Ondangwa, South African bases in northern Namibia, that the *Figaro* journalist was told the real intentions of the SADF. 'We are going to cross the Cuito River soon,' Maj Keith confided. 'We want to take Cuito and of course we can.'

Col Franshoek told him that 'at Cuito we concentrate the attention of the Angolans and Cubans on us, while UNITA can act elsewhere'.

The journalist, who did not believe the South Africans could 'do as they want in the field', as they claimed, also interviewed a senior army intelligence officer. 'The military create circumstances in which we can act diplomatically,' he was told. 'If negotiations take place in perspectives which enable us to ensure our security - I am thinking especially of Namibia - so much the better. Our strategic interests are more important than our losses in men. Anyway, we don't need to put our soldiers in danger, there's UNITA...'

After that quadripartite talks between Angola, Cuba, South Africa and the United States took part in a number of world capitals. South Africa's withdrawal from Angola was decided on during the first sessions. Pretoria respected the timetable by withdrawing its forces from southern Angola by 1 September. In fact, the advance of the Angolan-Cuban forces to the Namibian border - in Cunene and western Kuando Kubango - had changed the balance of forces. The SADF was forced to leave Cunene Province, including the hydroelectric dam at Ruacaná, and wished to seek shelter for the bulk of its expeditionary force in Kuando Kubango. However, South Africa's withdrawal from that province was prevented by the advance of the Angolan-Cuban forces from Cunene, along the Namibian border. An 'honourable' diplomatic way out of this embarrassing situation for Pretoria was found, and for once South Africa accepted and complied with a date set for its withdrawal.

VI. ZAIRE

UNITA equipment captured in Cazombo, Moxico Province in 1983. Supplied by the U.S.A. it has come through Matadi, Zaire's only Port.

The conclusion of the quadripartite talks, following South Africa's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale and the SADF's withdrawal from southern Angola, deeply worried Jonas Savimbi, especially since FAPLA soon drove UNITA out of places it had held on the Benguela Railway.

Moreover, the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 435 and consequent withdrawal of the SADF from Namibia would be a serious threat to UNITA, whose survival would greatly depend on the role played by Zaire.

Following the spectacular reconciliation between Angola and Zaire in 1978, the expulsion from Zaire of FNLA leaders and the repatriation of tens of thousands of Angolans who had fled from northern Angola at the start of the anti-colonial war, there was a certain détente in relations between the two countries. But after the Reagan administration took office in 1981,[1] Zaire once again became closely involved in the US policy of destabilising Angola. After Washington had officially resumed aid to UNITA, it associated President Mobutu increasingly openly with

its anti-Angolan strategy. Notwithstanding Kinshasa's constant denials, Zaire's complicity became so flagrant that in April 1986 Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda denounced 'the evident wish of the United States to cause a conflict between Angola and Zaire'.

On 1 April 1986, the South African newspaper Beeld reported the US government's decision to supply UNITA with surface-to-air Stinger missiles via Zaire. 'This is a precaution taken in agreement with CIA Director William Casey, who went to Pretoria, in order to avoid involving South Africa in the affair,' it said.

The Zairean government immediately issued a 'formal' denial and stressed its 'excellent relations with Angola, with which it has agreements on good neighbourly relations'. However, these professions of constancy were scarcely credible, coming as they did immediately after the kidnapping of 97 foreigners working for the Angolan diamond company, Diamang. UNITA released them on Zairean territory and, more precisely, at Kapanga, in Shaba Province, where Mobutu's army had just set up a training camp for elite troups with US assistance.[2]

KAMINA, ZAIREAN SECURITY AND THE CIA

In 1986, CIA-chartered planes delivered US weapons for UNITA to the Kamina military base in the heart of Shaba, which has two runways for long-distance aircraft.[3] The Washington Post revealed in November 1986 that the American company Santa Lucia Airways had made several such flights to Kamina between March and October that year, always careful, except on one occasion, to land at night. By concealing the true nature of its cargo, it had been able to make stopovers on the Cape Verde Islands, where it was subsequently banned from using the airport.

In early 1987, the United States concluded a formal agreement with Zaire on the use and repair of Kamina for which, according to the American press, the Pentagon allocated $2 million to start work to modernise the runways and buildings. US engineers who visited the base in 1985 had estimated that work to be done there would cost $60 million.

An agreement on the granting of the base to the US army was signed in late February during a private visit to Washington of Mobutu, who met Vice-President George Bush and Frank Carlucci, Reagan's National Security Advisor. In exchange, the Reagan administration promised that the US Congress would approve increased financial aid to Zaire, refused until then because of the human rights situation in that country.

An on-the-spot investigation by James Brooke of the New York Times, published on 1 February 1987, confirmed the use of the base to supply UNITA. Two Zairean security reports to 'founder president' Mobutu, ten days later, referred to the article, its consequences and steps to be taken 'in respect of the operation related to the delivery of arms to the lodger' (i.e. Savimbi).

Noting the 'errors' contained in the New York Times article, especially the statement that a black American colonel was in charge of arms delivery operations, the Zairean security official wrote to Mobutu: 'There are no black colonels at the American embassy in Kinshasa, or even in their Consulate General in Lubumbashi. In fact, the operation is directed by a white officer from the CIA with the rank of major... The operation has gone well up to now and all the personnel involved (Zairean and American) have behaved correctly, as moreover acknowledged by

the Assistant Director General of the CIA in charge of operations, Mr Clair E George, in his letter to the Founder President dated 3 February 1987.'

As for 'security measures' to continue the operation, mentioned in the second report, the same senior security officer added: 'The CIA will provide regular information on all journalists who apply to enter Zaire. Basing itself on this, the AND will draw up a list of undesirables to be sent to all our embassies and consulates.' Referring to Jim Brooke's article, he said 'the CIA has undertaken to mobilise all its friends in the international press to counter any such action in future'.

'This is to be done in two ways:

- Denying all Zairean assistance in the delivery of American aid to UNITA.
- Increasing the number of articles in favour of UNITA and against the MPLA. This is to distract the attention of public opinion so that Zaire is forgotten.'

In July 1987, the authenticity of these documents was confirmed to the same *New York Times* journalist by western diplomats in Kinshasa.[4]

The first US-Zairean joint manoeuvres since the restoration of the Kamina base were held in May 1988. The Zairean army's 22nd Brigade and an American rapid deployment brigade took part, together with 450 UNITA elements trained at Kamina by Israeli specialists.[5] According to Angolan military intelligence, one of the major purposes of the joint manoeuvres on the Angolan border was to organise and supply new bases for UNITA on Zairean territory - notably Kitona, Kinkuzu (already used by the FNLA in the past), Dilolo, Kimpeze and Cahemba.

A NEW JAMBA?

Fearing the SADF's definitive departure from Namibia, which would do away with Pretoria's protective umbrella in Kuando Kubango and leave the Jamba headquarters dangerously exposed to Angolan army attacks, UNITA was said to be seeking to establish a new fief in the forests of northwest Angola, in Uge Province. The Kimbele area, west of the Cuango River and near the Zairean border, was mentioned in the press as the future 'new Jamba'.[6]

Although geographical conditions in Kimbele are better suited to guerrilla warfare than the Kuando Kubango savannahs, the same cannot be said of the demographic situation. Whereas Kuando Kubango is extremely sparsely populated, there are far more people in the northwest, the vast majority of them Kikongos. With the complicity of a handful of former FNLA officials who had not yet returned to Angola, UNITA proceeded to recruit some Kikongos of Angolan origin in Zaire.[7] But without the direct support of the SADF, UNITA could never recreate the public relations showcase that Jamba is today, although this will not prevent it from carrying out effective attacks in the area. Strategically, the kind of war waged by UNITA requires a nearby source of supplies, including airborne logistical support, and a reliable rear base country in which to shelter after each operation. Moreover, the opening of a permanent base like Jamba in northern Angola would require air cover which Zaire is not in a position to provide without involving itself in a direct confrontation with Angola, with unforseeable consequences for its own stability.

In any event, Mobutu is by no means short of advisors on the matter. Apart from the many American 'experts' in his country, now he also has the views of Gen Jannou Lacaze, a former chief-of-staff of the French army who, in his new capacity as

personal advisor to the Zairean President, went to South Africa in early 1988 to discuss the 'transfer' of Jamba.[8]

According to Portuguese sources, UNITA has several offices in Kinshasa, including one used as its general staff headquarters, at 419 Avenue des Tropiques, in the Limete neighbourhood. Those reportedly working in this office are Maj Daniel Zola Passy and his deputy, Maj Afonso, as well as Capt Mayamba Mayamona and Preta e Corney. This military office is said to have local branches, headed by José Chiwala in Lubumbashi, Enoque Sá Jamba in Kamalondo, José Quindy in Kenia, David Londaka in Ruashi, Mdumba Beston in Katuba, and José Marcos in Western Cassai.[9]

This information was regularly given to the Zairean authorities during meetings of the Angolan-Zairean Joint Security Commission set up in 1985, but Kinshasa continued to deny UNITA's presence on its territory.

Zaire has also been an indispensable rear base for UNITA infiltration into Angola's Cabinda Province. President dos Santos told an American journalist at a press conference in Luanda in May 1988:

'Yes, there are in fact infiltrations by UNITA elements in northern Angola. You know, for example, that Cabinda Province is separated from the rest of our national territory by the Zaire River and a part of Zairean territory. Therefore, it is impossible to take weapons or transfer elements into Cabinda Province without using Zairean or Congolese territory. The border with the People's Republic of Congo is small and we have reliable information that there are no inflitrations from Congo. The infiltrations are from the territory of the Republic of Zaire.'

'We have made public statements to this effect and we have also used diplomatic channels to denounce these situations with the Zairean government.. We want a peaceful solution, we want increased understanding and good neighbourliness between Angola and Zaire, so that there may be stability along our common border, which is very extensive, and the normal circulation of people and goods through border posts.'

Angola's Ministry of Defence continued to receive proof of the Zairean authorities' involvement in UNITA activities in the north and northeast of Angola. Violations of Angolan airspace by Zairean planes, especially in the east of the country, were also recorded in the course of 1988. Cases of arms found by the Angolan army in UNITA caches in the east were marked 'Matadi', the Zairean seaport in the Zaire River estuary.

During a meeting in Lubumbashi, on 9 March 1988, with UNITA leaders - including Tito Chingunji, in charge of foreign affairs, and Alcides Sakala, representative in Lisbon - and the deputy head of Zairean military intelligence, Célestin Ilunga, two Americans from the CIA,[10] expressed concern at the amount of information the Angolan authorities might have on the movements of UNITA men in Zaire! They reportedly suggested that Zairean security should exercise greater control over Angolan refugees and Portuguese living in Zaire.

Although there is little reason to doubt the active part played by Mobutu in military destabilisation of Angola, the many failings of his security services and the almost proverbial ineffectiveness of his army have not made him a very fearful enemy for his southern neighbour. However, the American and Israeli military presence in the country is definitely an asset for UNITA. Furthermore, UNITA would improve its international image by moving to Zaire, its close collaboration with the apartheid regime having so far deprived it of more open support in the

West, as well as in Africa.

Mobutu was also involved in diplomatic manoeuvres aimed at ensuring the political future of UNITA and, should the occasion arise, of his former FNLA protégés. In Africa, along with Morocco and Cte d'Ivoire, he helped to open the doors of certain so-called moderate regimes to UNITA.

The question of UNITA's future was also the main issue at talks between Mobutu and South African President Pieter Botha held in Gbadolite, on 1 October 1988, during Botha's first official visit to Zaire. During the meeting in the village of Mobutu's birth, the Zairean leader said South Africa was an important partner for Africa, especially Africa south of the Equator. South Africa's current phase of transition and reform, he said, was an important element in future relations in the region and in achieving peace... and the Cuban presence in Angola had to be removed, preferably as a sequel to national reconciliation in Angola.

The South African President, who was accompanied by his ministers of Defence, Magnus Malan, and Foreign Affairs, Pik Botha, said Zaire was a key country and President Mobutu a respected African statesman. 'I have often stated that South Africa has something to convey to Africa, and especially to southern Africa. It appears that Africa is suddenly coming to grips with this truth.'[11]

VII. UNITA FROM THE INSIDE

UNITA calls itself a 'movement' although, at least in theory, it is structured like a traditional party, with a central committee, political bureau, secretary-general - Miguel N'Zau Puna - and mass organisations, LIMA for women and JURA for the youth. Its symbol is a black cockerel. Jonas Savimbi is president of UNITA and commander-in-chief of FALA, its armed wing.

Since 1980, FALA has gradually been structured by the South Africans along the lines of a conventional army, with brigades (made up of several battalions), regular battalions (900-1,500 men), semi-regular battalions (300-500 men), and 'special forces' (small groups of a few dozen men normally used for sabotage operations).

Despite successive purges, there are still a number of 'founder members' in the leadership, all compromised by collaboration with the Portuguese army in the colonial period. They include Miguel N'Zau Puna, Ernesto Mulato, Jeremias Chitunda, António Dembo and Samuel Epalanga, all members of the political bureau or central committee. The name of Tony Fernandes, co-founder of UNITA, did

not appear on the list of political leaders for a long time, although he was appointed minister of the civil service in the provisional government formed by UNITA on 24 March 1988 and, more recently, foreign minister.

Other UNITA officials from the colonial period, like António Vakulukuta, Jorge Sangumba (responsible for foreign affairs from 1969 to 1978) and Samuel Chiwale (chief-of-staff until 1980), have been removed or physically eliminated, according to the testimony of UNITA deserters and prisoners. One such prisoner, Teodoro Silva Gideo, a former UNITA political commissar, said Sangumba and Chiwale were sacked at the 1982 UNITA congress, accused of plotting a coup d'état. Chiwale was reportedly executed soon afterwards.[1]

The fate of Vakulukuta, 'crown prince' of the Kwanyama kingdom in the Ngiva area, is also cause for concern among members of his ethnic group. After having expressed disagreement with Savimbi in 1984, this former political bureau member was arrested by the South Africans in Namibia and handed over to Savimbi's men. Nothing more has been heard of him since July 1986.[2]

In 1974-75, the original nucleus of UNITA was joined by young people from Ovimbundu areas like Jaka Jamba, João Vahekeni, Jorge Valentim and Fernando Wilson dos Santos, who held ministerial posts in the transitional government and were to play a role in UNITA's public relations, especially in Europe.[3]

It is from among these people, or others close to them, that we now find the harshest critics of the absolute power exercised by Savimbi and the corporal punishment inflicted on UNITA members.

André Serafim Yamba Yamba, responsible for the UNITA youth in Coimbra, Portugal, told the Portuguese weekly O Expresso in April 1988 that there had been three executions of UNITA leaders and Wilson dos Santos had been arrested at Jamba.[4] In response to denials by UNITA headquarters, Yamba Yamba said he had personally attended 'mass rallies where enemies of the revolution were denounced and beaten'.[5]

On 7 May, *O Expresso* published a statement by another UNITA student in Portugal who, during a visit to Jamba, had seen a member accused of spying put to death. He was burnt alive with all his family, including children, he said.

There has been an increasing number of eye-witness accounts of people being burnt at the stake in Jamba. A former UNITA captain captured at Cuito Cuanavale, Sebastio de Almeida, said on Angolan television in December 1987 that Savimbi had ordered the burning to death of women accused of using witchcraft to bring bad luck to UNITA, particularly its defeats at Cangamba in 1983 and Cuito Cuanavale the following year.

The former UNITA captain also said that 'many UNITA people disappeared. Anyone who rebelled against UNITA's atrocities disappeared, like one man who compared Savimbi to the dictator Bokassa'. 'Even those closest to Savimbi lived in a terrible climate of terror,' he said, 'and were not immune from such disappearances, which have been very frequent in Jamba recently.'

The diary of Brig Alberto Chendovava, commander of the UNITA forces in eastern Angola, where he died in August 1985, confirmed the climate of terror. Chendovava wrote that if he failed to win the battle of Cazombo - as indeed happened - Savimbi's anger against him would be terrible. He also confided to his diary that problems with women had worsened his relations with his chief and, in short, that he feared for his life.

In 1985 and 1986, a group of UNITA dissidents circulated anonymous

communiqués from Brussels, Paris and Lisbon under the heading 'UNITA, the true black cockerel movement'. Written in Portuguese and French on green paper and sent to the press by post, they fiercely attacked the 'dictator and traitor Savimbi' who had 'sold out to the worst enemies of the Angolan people, the South Africans'.

A May 1985 communiqué asked: 'What good is false propaganda about our spectacular military successes when we all know that, without weapons, transport facilities, petrol and radio sets supplied by South Africa, our fighting strength would soon be exhausted? The price we pay for all this is humiliation! Why were our veteran combatants forced, on the orders of South African officers, to destroy Ngiva completely when they retreated?'

Still supporting UNITA, but wanting peace between 'Angolan brothers', the anonymous dissidents denounced 'the torture used against countless members of UNITA who refused to obey unconditionally'. An August 1985 communiqué cited the case of members who had disobeyed an order to kill fourteen villagers. 'Alright, they were accomplices of the Luanda regime, but they were fourteen women and children.'

'The UNITA of Savimbi's clique,' it continued, 'murders civilians, kidnaps foreigners... This is how we are losing our people.'

'We are losing our people,' a November 1985 communiqué said, 'because Savimbi's gang has delivered our proud UNITA into the hands of the murderers of Moloise, handed over many of our black brothers to the jailers of Mandela, the bombers of our villages, the CIA and Reagan, and therefore to the interests of a superpower.'

In September 1985, the dissidents denounced an agreement reached with the South Africans on the setting up of a radio station for the 'Voice of resistance of the black cockerel', to broadcast from the Transvaal and not from Jamba, as announced on the station. UNITA had agreed that the radio could also be used by anti-Mugabe Zimbabweans and the Mozambican MNR, 'although true UNITA militants want nothing to do with the MNR's white mercenaries'.

In December 1985, when UNITA had just suffered a serious defeat at Mavinga which obliged the South African air force to intervene, the 'true black cockerel' dissidents wrote that Savimbi had decided to transfer Jamba into Namibia. 'It's the beginning of the end for Savimbi.'

'The Ovambos, Chokwes, Kalengas and Kwanyamas are opposed to Savimbi's hegemonistic pretensions and thirst for power. Chief-of-staff Demostenes Chilingutila (who replaced Samuel Chiwale in 1980) sympathises with us.'

In February 1986, a dissident communiqué in Portuguese, entitled 'Flight from Savimbi's Dachau', reproduced the testimony of António Sandele, a UNITA cook at Jamba. He spoke of harassment and torture inflicted on victims - all UNITA members - by two white men. Sandele, accused of trying to poison Savimbi, was sent to a camp near Jamba where people were tortured. He was asked to name those on whose orders he was supposedly acting. After witnessing the torture of three other prisoners, he slit his wrists and finally escaped from the hospital to which he was transferred. The communiqué, the last sent to the press by this group of dissidents, ended with the words 'freedom for the prisoners in the camps and the hell of Savimbi's torture!'

In 1988, another dissident group, UNITA-D (democratic), issued two communiqués in Lisbon. 'Angola wants peace, Angola belongs to the Angolans: no to mines, which is terrorism,' they wrote, calling on 'brothers in UNITA' to denounce the excesses

to which they were subjected.

They demanded freedom of expression and discussion, saying they were 'tired of seeing brothers and relatives' die in an endless war. 'Those who disagree with Savimbi - especially if they are from the north - are isolated if not arrested or shot.' Claiming to be practising Catholics, they said they were horrified by the lack of scruples of their leader, who had had a bomb placed in a Huambo church after previously kidnapping the 'very respectable' Archbishop of Lubango, Alexandre do Nascimento (now a Cardinal).

UNITA-D proposed that the MPLA should negotiate with it if it wanted talks with UNITA. As for Savimbi, 'he must be forgotten as a political figure, but remembered as the cause of our people's suffering and of this war fuelled by ambitions for an anachronistic and segregationist regime'.

Added to this dissidence are the personal frustrations caused by Savimbi's absolute power, tribal contradictions and also political ones, since UNITA's subordination to South Africa is not always accepted by younger people with a certain educational and political level. This latter aspect, however, seems to be of lesser importance, barely affecting UNITA's military hierarchy, within which disagreements have more to do with power struggles and tribal conflicts.

There is discontent among Kwanyama members (from the Cunene-Namibia border region), commander Marcial Y Hamukwaya having spoken out in defence of Vakulukuta;[6] and among Chokwes (from the east). There are, however, very few of them in UNITA, which is dominated by Ovimbundus. More fearful of ambitious members of his own ethnic group, Savimbi has been actively concerned about neutralising or eliminating potential Ovimbundu rivals like Samuel Chiwale and Jorge Sangumba. Key posts in UNITA have been given to unquestioning Ovimbundus from Andulu, the area of this birth, or members of his family. The chief of UNITA's secret police (national brigade for the defence of the state), Col Silas, is a relative. Two nephews, Brig Arlindo Pena 'Ben Ben' and Lt-Col Steves Pena Cami, are deputy chief-of-staff and head of military intelligence. Also from the Andulu clan are Altino Bango Sapalalo 'Bock', head of logistics, Col Begini and Demostenes Amos Chilingutila, chief-of-staff.[7]

The fortunes of the former 'foreign minister', the young Gen Pedro 'Tito' Ngueve Chingunji - brother-in-law of Fernando Wilson dos Santos - are said to have declined after he opposed the formation of a provisional UNITA government, although he was a member of it.[8] The setting up of this 'government' was announced on 24 March 1988, only a few days before the biggest South African offensive against Cuito Cuanavale, which Pretoria and Savimbi were convinced the SADF would take. On 27 March, however, the South African army was driven back by the counter-offensive launched by the Angolan army and its Cuban allies, and had to abandon positions near the besieged town - together with large quantities of military material - before retreating to Mavinga, 200 km to the south.[9] The UNITA provisional government, which was to have established itself in the ruins of Cuito Cuanavale, taking advantage of the international impact of an Angolan-Cuban defeat, therefore remained a dead letter.

In late 1988, Tito Chingunji was sacked from his post and recalled to Jamba from Washington. Suspected, among other things, of having contacted the Angolan government without Savimbi's permission, Chingunji was arrested and tortured. The illtreatment suffered by Chingunji was denounced by a number of UNITA dissidents who criticised the despotism of UNITA's leader.[10] But the press showed

little interest in these statements, especially since Savimbi tried to end all speculation on the fate of Chingunji by issuing a statement announcing that his former 'foreign minister' had been appointed deputy secretary general of UNITA.

However, on 11 and 12 March, The World This Week programme, on British television's Channel 4, interviewed a nephew of Tito Chingunji, Dinho, and Sousa Jamba, brother of Jaka Jamba, UNITA's current education secretary. The statements of these two former UNITA members, who had just asked for political asylum in Britain, and those of journalist Fred Bridgland, had the effect of a bombshell.

The press took up the affair[11] and the myth created around Savimbi in the West was seriously damaged. 'I believe Savimbi killed six members of my family, including my father and grandparents,' said Dinho Chingunji, a UNITA-funded student in London for the previous 18 months. 'He has also been responsible for the burning and killing of young children.'

Sousa Jamba revealed more details of the killing of a group of 13 or 14 people, including three children aged from 7 to 16, who were burned alive in September 1983, accused of witchcraft. This killing already denounced in the Portuguese press by André Yamba Yamba was described by Sousa Jamba as 'an outrageous and completely appalling thing'. 'These people were just brought to the middle of the stadium and they were doused in gasoline, petrol, and they got firewood and they just burned them to death. And Savimbi stood and saw everything. And one of the women tried to escape. Savimbi pulled that famous ivory pistol, it has only come out once to be used, and that was to try and shoot that woman who had fled from the place, that was being burned.'

Sousa Jamba said he heard this from eye-witnesses - 'My nieces and my sisters were there' - and had finally decided to speak out about what was going on inside UNITA 'in order to save other lives'. 'Over the last few months,' the Channel 4 commentator recalled, 'Amnesty International has received a number of allegations of political murders within UNITA. Jorge Sangumba, one of Tito Chingunji's predecessors as foreign minister, is said to have been beaten to death in 1979. Col Valdemar Chindondo, ex-chief-of-staff, also disappeared in 1979. Gen Alberto Vinama is reported killed in 1986. And Dr António Vakulukuta... is said to have died after being beaten in the same year. There are rumours of many other deaths. Amnesty International say they are taking these allegations very seriously.' Fred Bridgland confirmed the allegations of Chingunji's nephew and Sousa Jamba. '...I am pretty certain that what they are saying is at least 80 to 90% correct.'

Bridgland went to Jamba just before Christmas to ask Savimbi about Tito Chingunji. Chingunji was present at the meeting, 'looking extremely nervous'. Since then Bridgland had received further information about what exactly happened to him. 'From sources I do trust very much I have heard that there was a trial, a kind of trial of Tito at a place called Bembua outside Jamba where UNITA used to imprison its Soviet and Cuban POWs in the past. Four very senior members of the UNITA politbureau demanded of Tito that he confess to crimes of witchcraft and plotting to overthrow Savimbi. Afterwards Tito was led away to a hut and people who were there have told me privately, although they are just not prepared to go on record at all, that they have heard screams coming from that hut during the night...'

On 11 March, in a communiqué broadcast by the BBC, UNITA denied claims of Chingunji's arrest. The following day, in another communiqué distributed in Paris,

Lisbon and London, signed by Chitunda, N'Zau Puna and Chilingutila, UNITA made a very strong attack on Fred Bridgland, accusing him of acting for basely lucrative reasons. 'Lured by the profits from the book Savimbi a key to Africa that he wrote, Mr Bridgland embarked on a joint venture with former UNITA representative to the United States, Brigadier Tito Chingunji, - a movie about a Cuban deserter, General del Pino. Fred Bridgland resigned from his job to work full-time on this project which never actually materialised. Then he put pressure on Brigadier Chingunji to pay him unemployment compensation.' In November 1988, UNITA indeed transferred $4,000 into Bridgland's Swiss bank account. 'Now that Mr Chingunji has remained in Angola,' the communiqué continued, 'and our representation in Washington has received instructions from the leadership to cease such payments, who is paying Fred Bridgland at this moment?...Will there be more British journalist mercenaries like the famous Callan of the FNLA in 1975?' (sic)

The break between Savimbi's UNITA and Bridgland therefore seems final. Denials about Chingunji's fate are still vague and even show a certain bitterness towards him. Worse still, on 12 March the UNITA radio, The Voice of the Black Cockerel, broadcast a most suprising recording in which two top UNITA members, Jorge Valentim and Peregrino Wambu, called for the death of Tito Chingunji for treason against Jonas Savimbi. The recording, made at a rally in Jamba, said textually: 'Death to the traitor Tito! Tito used witchcraft to be president of UNITA! Tito the self-styled intellectual he never was! Tito's behaviour finally explains the offers of golden exile made to president Savimbi...'12

However, the coverage given by the press to the accusations against Savimbi and a US State Department decision to investigate the assassinations inside UNITA had seriously affected the image of the counter-revolutionary organisation, and something had to be done quickly. Savimbi stopped all criticism of Chingunji and took the initiative of inviting some conservative European MPs, American congressmen and journalists to Jamba. The right-wing US Heritage Foundation also sent an observer, Michael Johns, to UNITA's fief. On their return they all stated, with greater or lesser conviction, that Tito Chingunji was well and denied 'speculation' about him. Wearing a general's uniform, Chingunji had received the visitors at Savimbi's side... The friendships Chingunji had made in the United States, particularly in Congress, while UNITA representative there, have perhaps shielded him against the prolonged illtreatment which caused the death of other former UNITA leaders in the past. Savimbi cannot afford to alienate the sympathies he still has in Washington. Yet seeds of doubt have been planted in the minds of many of his former supporters, especially since Chingunji is still being kept in Jamba, as some of them have observed.[13]

In any event, under present conditions the power struggle within UNITA can only be intensified, especially among the Ovimbundus, who have a better chance of replacing Savimbi at the head of UNITA or taking over one of its factions.

When handing out roles in the UNITA leadership, Savimbi has always been generous to the small group of Kikongos who left the FNLA when he did in 1964, particularly the Cabindans N'Zau Puna and Tony da Costa Fernandes, and Ernesto Mulato, from Uge. Removed from their own ethnic group - which the FNLA sought to control for many years[14] - these Kikongos have no ethnic base in UNITA, which has almost no soldiers from the north, let alone among the Ovimbundus, since those who joined UNITA voluntarily did so precisely for tribalist reasons.

Moreover, there has been open hostility between the Ovimbundus and Kikongos

since colonial times. The settlers, mainly by imposing high taxes, forced the Ovimbundus to work on coffee plantations in the north, where they replaced local Kikongo labour which had rebelled against inhuman working conditions in 1961. They were never able to dispel the deep suspicion this caused among the population of the coffee regions. Tactical alliances sought at the head of the FNLA and UNITA always failed in practice. And after the transition to independence, the many incidents between the two groups leading to bloodshed greatly affected relations between their members and sympathisers.

However, there are no fundamental political differences. UNITA's more frequent use of terms like 'socialism', 'négritude' and, more recently, 'democracy', does not imply that its political thinking is any more clearly defined that that of the FNLA was. Both organisations have shown the same ideological opportunism, seeking to please whomsoever they happen to be talking to - whether the United States, China or reactionary African regimes.

References to an egalitarian or populist ideology still found in some UNITA statements bear no relation to reality. There is nothing 'popular' about its war against the Angolan government. UNITA fighters, trained in the most traditional military discipline, do not try to win over the population, but simply to dominate it and take maximum advantage of it. The same was true of the FNLA, both before and after independence, until its virtually complete dissolution in the late 1970s.

Indeed, if UNITA has fared better than the FNLA it is for purely circumstantial reasons: the fact that the regions where it could use tribalism to gain some influence were closer to South African-occupied Namibia and, of course, the lack of scruples of its leader, who had no hesitation in allying himself with the most hated regime in the world. Pretoria's strategy of destabilising Angola has been enormously facilitated by the attitude of the leaders of UNITA, which the South African army transformed into a relatively effective military force.

It must also be acknowledged that Savimbi is far more skilled than Roberto at promoting his image. Assisted by big United States and British PR and promotion agencies, Savimbi has created for himself the image of a 'fighter for the free world'. In the Reagan era, this could not but succeed. The cornerstone of the PR operation was UNITA's headquarters at Jamba, which became a kind of showcase of anti-communist guerrilla warfare. Savimbi has misled more than one thrill-seeking journalist. Some of them, however, have revealed the Hollywood side of the performance,[15] the nearby airstrip where private South African airlines come and go, bringing visitors and journalists in comfort. Even more important is the proximity of the Namibian border, where South Africa's army and air force watch over the peaceful sleep of the 'freedom fighters' and their guests.

However, many partisan or gullible journalists have returned fascinated by the '*Son et Lumi re' display* UNITA offers to visitors, full of admiration for the hardworking and disciplined 'Jamba people' and utterly devoted to their 'charismatic' leader.[16] Owing to the manifold activities of these ingenious people, they wrote, jamba was 'almost' self-sufficient. They grew maize in such quantities that there was enough to export, some wrote. People were making bazookas or repairing used artillery pieces with scrap metal from MiGs shot down and patiently recycled by combatents of the people. In the many sophisticated hospitals, they wrote, all kinds of operations were carried out, while the classics were being taught in the schools. Latin and learning Cames by heart.

This parody of the Vietnamese guerrilla war, raved about by more than one Portuguese visitor, unfortunately includingJoãoSoares, son of Portugal's president, was taken to the point of absurdity. How could anyone take seriously filmed reports of football matches in Jamba in which local teams were better dressed than their European first division counterparts, where school children paraded with impeccable uniforms and satchels, and traffic police dressed to the nines in white gloves gesticulated at crossroads in the middle of the bush?[17]

In an account of his trip to Jamba published in the Sunday Times of 8 May 1988, Julian Amery, a British conservative MP involved in all pro-UNITA campaigns, stressed the good South African logistics. 'From a private airstrip in Namibia a "mercenary" pilot flew me to Jamba. Once in Angolan airspace we flew "on the deck" to avoid hostile interception and landed at an airstrip in the bush. Our aircraft did not linger on the ground... We ate (with Savimbi) in the officers' mess. Food was frugal but good, with Portuguese wine. There was Scotch whisky and South African beer in my hut. Transport was in robust South African vehicles...'

The real situation is very different, not only according to UNITA dissidents but to people in areas affected by UNITA activity. Many unfortunate peasants in Cazombo, Moxico and Malanje were robbed of their belongings and held to ransom for months or even years on end, forced to grow crops to feed Savimbi's men, while the latter abducted their sons to make 'guerrillas' of them. Prisoners or deserters from UNITA we have interviewed confirm these facts. Many of them were victims of forced recruitment.

It should be noted that none of the adult soldiers we met had learned how to read and write in schools at UNITA headquarters. Most were still illiterate, as they had been when they joined UNITA, and others had learned to read and write in Protestant mission schools before independence, or in Angolan state schools afterwards.

As the war became more protracted, UNITA had to step up its kidnapping of young people, adolescents and even children. Some of them have indeed attended schools shown in the lauditory reports, but in 1985 and 1987 they were also used for the hasty formation of battalions sent to the Mavinga and Cuito Cuanavale fronts, after summary training, to replace the decimated UNITA brigades South Africa had put in the frontline during the fighting.

Former UNITA captain Sebastio de Almeida also spoke of the discontent in UNITA at the time of his capture in December 1987, which, he said, was 'partly because battalions were now made up of children from 12 to 15 years old'.[18]

Within the framework of its so-called policy of self-reliance, UNITA also boasts of its exploitation of Angola's riches, like timber, ivory and diamonds. The great publicity UNITA has given to this trade is aimed at putting over the idea that, concerned with maintaining his independence, Savimbi pays for the arms supplied to him by South Africa. A statement to this effect made by Savimbi in an interview with Paris Match[19] caused some upset in the South African high command, only too aware of the limits of this 'independence'. It is a fact, however, that UNITA works with South African companies, trafficking in ivory and timber, two commodities which are strictly controlled in South Africa.

According to the South African Weekly Mail, over the past few years UNITA has sold in South Africa the tusks of many thousands of elephants it has killed in Angola. On 9 December, the director of the Namibian nature conservation office, interviewed by The Namibian, denied that such a large quantity of ivory could

have passed through the country. He added that UNITA smuggling shipments could have gone through Botswana or Zambia.

However, The Namibian reported, a Washington conservation group had given detailed evidence to the United States Congress to back up allegations that South Africa was running a massive international ivory smuggling ring. The vice-president of the Conservation, Environmental and Animal Welfare Consortium, Monitor, Craig van Note, reported that 'these herds have been systematically anihiliated by armed UNITA bands in Angola', and that 'an investigation of South African exports for the years 1982 and 1983 showed that ivory tusk shipments were at least ten times the amount officially exported'. He said he had gathered 'much of his information during a field trip to Angola and Namibia in the mid-1980s'.

As regards timber, although the Kuando Kubango forests do not have such valuable woods as are found in some regions of Moxico and, especially, the Mayombe forest in Cabinda, according to the London Observer UNITA sold 'thousands of tons of timber to the South African firm Frama Inter-Trading, based in Johannesburg'. The weekly paper owned by Lonrho reported on 4 May 1986: 'The valuable wood is felled by UNITA soldiers, frequently working under the supervision of white South African conscripts. Then the wood is floated down the Cuando River out of southern Angola to an assembly point near Kongola in the Caprivi Strip (eastern Namibia). The 3,000 square mile Caprivi Strip is a huge military base, housing two of South Africa's mercenary battalions, 32 or Buffalo Battalion and the battalion of so-called 'bushmen'. The area has been cleared of its local population and virtually the only civilian traffic seen on its extensive road network are heavily laden timber lorries travelling to a sawmill at Rundu. After being sawn, the logs are transported to Johannesburg.'

As regards diamonds, UNITA readily states that it derives annual profits of about $60 million from its sales in these precious gems.[20] It is, however, unlikely that UNITA is able to supply itself as regularly as it claims. Apart from armed attacks on mines in Lunda Norte and Malanje in 1984 and 1985, during which UNITA indeed seized some already pre-selected diamonds, it is not so easy for it to acquire such quantities every year. Although UNITA is undoubtedly involved in the smuggling of Angolan diamonds, especially through Zaire - where the most active network is - the profits cannot be so great.

However, all this proves that there is no reason to fear for Savimbi's future. If forced to give up his role as 'freedom fighter', he can easily recycle himself as a businessman or smuggler.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL PRO-UNITA NETWORK

Victims of UNITA derailing of civilian train, Moxico Province, July 1983.

UNITA could never have existed or survived without the support and complicity of colonial Portugal and, later, South Africa and the United States. This is still a fact as far as Pretoria and Washington are concerned. They have both been indispensable to building up UNITA as a military force and, especially Washington, to the many information - or rather disinformation - campaigns used to create a certain image of Savimbi, that of a man fighting for the ideals of the 'free world'. Powerful organisations in the United States with direct influence on the administration, like the American Security Council (ASC), the Heritage Foundation and the World Anti-Communist League (WACL), have used their propaganda machinery on UNITA's behalf. In particular, they achieved the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985, and official recognition of UNITA by the US administration in 1986, when the White House put out the red carpet for Savimbi and he was received by Reagan himself. That same year, Congress granted UNITA $15 million in covert military aid, renewed in ensuing years and reportedly substantially increased by the Bush administration in 1989.[1]

In one of its reports, the ASC[2] described Savimbi's visit to the US in 1986 as 'the culmination of ten years of efforts deployed in favour of the recognition and the backing of UNITA'. Savimbi and his entourage were in fact guests of the ASC, whose president, John Fisher, said the ASC had already invited the UNITA leader in 1975. 'We paid for a plane to bring him here with a dozen staff from Africa. We set them up in a hotel for ten days. We set up congressional meetings.' But it was too late. In the field, after the South African retreat, UNITA was unable to withstand the government offensive, and the US Congress was about to pass the Clark Amendment. After Ronald Reagan's victory in November 1980, the ASC took up its fight for UNITA again. In 1981, it invited Savimbi to its Virginia estate and organised meetings with the then Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. By 1986, they had won.

The effort to aid UNITA was so crucial to the ASC that it gave its 1986 Distinguished Service Award to Senator Bob Dole for his behind-the-scenes work on UNITA's behalf. (Dole tried to secure the same kind of recognition for the Mozambican MNR.)

The WACL, headed by Gen John Singlaub, has a kind of South African branch run for many years by Ivor Benson, who has also been a correspondent of The Spotlight, a magazine known for its anti-semitic views published by the near-nazi Liberty Lobby. Although he prefers to stay in the background, Benson has addressed at least one meeting of the WACL, which has been actively supporting UNITA and the MNR since the early 1980s.

In 1987, a Belgian general, Robert Close, announced the launching of a newspaper 'financed by industrialists interested in the ideals of the WACL'. He promised more direct support for the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe radio stations and the setting up of a 'Free Mozambique' station.[3]

The Conservative Caucus, also part of the WACL, lobbies vigorously for UNITA and, with the ASC, attempted to start a corporate campaign against Gulf Oil-Chevron for extracting and buying Angolan oil. The Caucus works directly with South African government officials. Caucus chairman Howard Phillips co-sponsors trips to South Africa (at a $4,000 fee) which offer 'confidential intelligence and financial briefings' and meetings 'with the very highest officials of government, business, banking and the military in South Africa'.[4]

These organisations and others close to them, like the International Freedom Foundation (IFF) headed by Jack Abramoff, have many branches and 'correspondents' in Europe to promote the political groupings of which they are so fond. Thus, the Nicaraguan contras and other right-wing guerrillas the world over, including UNITA and the MNR, have gained powerful sponsors and access to ruling political circles in most West European countries.

Indeed, the British branch of the IFF, the International Society for Human Rights, based in Frankfurt with branches in major European capitals, and Resistance International, based in Paris with branches in Europe and the US, are among the organisations which support and finance UNITA's propaganda activities.

Other pressure groups which support UNITA in Europe involve ultra-reactionary circles, like the Pan-European Union headed by Otto Von Hapsbourg,[5] and its offshoot the Institute for Security Matters (EIS).[6] The EIS was founded by right-wing European MPs like the French Olivier d'Ormesson, the Belgian Beyer de Ryke, the British conservative James Scott-Hopkins, and the German Helmer Brok, all of whom visited Jamba in 1983. The EIS also has among its members active

and retired military men, including high-ranking NATO officers, and business lobbyists.

One of its members is a Belgian, Nicholas de Kerchove, well known in right- wing circles in his country and owner of the Transmarcom company, said to have made several shipments of arms to Savimbi through the Zairean port of Matadi.

An Antwerp diamond dealer, Marcel Pruwer, director of International Economic Strategy, which has links with the Heritage Foundation, is one of Savimbi's personal friends. Pruwer's interest in diamonds - one of the contraband activities of Savimbi's organisation - is not the only reason for his attachment to the UNITA leader. Pruwer has political ambitions. In early 1988, he tried to organise a conference on peace in Angola, i.e. reconciliation between the Angolan government and UNITA. He also has economic projects for a UNITA-controlled Angola which go beyond the field of diamonds. He helped with the writing of a UNITA book on economic options for Angola's future - *Angola tomorrow: national reconstruction* - and personally financed a fund-raising campaign for Fred Bridgland's book of apologetics on Savimbi, for which he negotiated the film rights, as he revealed in a letter to the *International Herald Tribune.*[7] There are pro-Savimbi and UNITA groups in most European conservative and right-wing parties, but they are minorities within their own organisations. For example, although the British pro-Savimbi lobby is relatively big, it has no significant influence on government policy towards Angola.

In a new development, a few voices have been raised in Scandinavian countries to demand 'humanitarian' aid for Savimbi. Swedish conservative MP Birger Hagard has been criticising his government since 1984 for its aid to Angola. Honorary chairman of the 'Swedish Angola Groups', Hagard went to Jamba in 1989 with the Danish conservative MPs Major Helge and Adam Moller. The visit was organised by the Norwegian 'Institute for Freedom', whose president is Bjorn Hallstrom. The Institute would appear to be part of the international network set up in most western countries connected with the Heritage Foundation and WACL.

International pro-UNITA lobbies and organisations, and the people behind them, often have close links with the notorious 'Reverend' Moon of the Reunification Church and International Caucus. *The Washington Times,* owned by the 'Moonies', consistently echoes UNITA and South African propaganda.

UNITA also has the solid support of some of the major far right parties in Europe, including the French National Front and the Italian Social Movement (MSI), as well as people even further to the right who have been involved in terrorism or were members of the French Secret Army Organisation (OAS), which used terror to oppose a negotiated end to the Algerian war of independence.

The Italian neo-fascist Stefano delle Chaie, responsible for bomb attacks which caused horrific bloodshed in Italy in the late 1960s, was Savimbi's personal advisor in 1976,[8] taking over from the writer Dominique de Roux, who worked for the French secret service and was a close friend of its then head, Alexandre de Marenches. Delle Chaie had links with Aginter, an international neo-fascist organisation based in Lisbon, until 1975, and headed by a Frenchman, Guerin-Serac, a former OAS member. It was probably through Aginter that delle Chaie came to work for the UNITA leader.

The relationships Savimbi has established over the years and UNITA's sponsors in different countries are in fact nothing but the logical end result of a history of subordination to the interests of colonial and imperialist powers which tried, and are still trying, to maintain their hegemony over Southern Africa, where Angola is a key country.

IX. UNITA SUPPORT IN FEDERAL GERMANY

For many years it was in Bavaria, fief of the late Franz-Josef Strauss, leader of the Christian Social Union (CSU), that Jonas Savimbi was always given the warmest welcome. 'He is a good friend,' Strauss told the press in 1980. From the late 1970s until Strauss' death in September 1988, the two men often met.

UNITA opened an office in the Bavarian capital, Munich, in early 1980, and another in Bonn four years later. The Hans-Seidel Foundation, which is close to the CSU, covered most of the costs.[1]

In January 1988, Strauss went to Southern Africa. After eight days of talks in South Africa he made brief visits to Mozambique and Namibia. He had an appointment to meet his old friend Savimbi in South African-occupied Namibia. The South African Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, accompanied Strauss to the meeting, which took place 'somewhere in the Kalahari', according to the press, not at Jamba. It would indeed have been unwise to go to UNITA's headquarters. There was fierce fighting in Angola's Kuando Kubango Province and Jamba was not a safe place for such an important visitor.

However, at that time the South Africans were still confident that they would win. Cuito Cuanavale was about to fall. It was believed in Pretoria that the formation of a provisional UNITA government could be announced at a press conference in 'liberated' Cuito Cuanavale. They were counting on the propaganda effect this would have to embarrass the Angolan government which, Pretoria felt, would be forced to talk to UNITA and consider 'national reconciliation', i.e. power-sharing with Savimbi's organisation.

Strauss, self-styled champion of the settlement of conflicts in the region through dialogue, announced to the press in Windhoek that Savimbi had told him he favoured peace negotiations,[2] as did the South Africans, whose military involvement in southern Angola was at its highest at that precise moment.

Denying that he wished to replace the US in the role of mediator in the search for a peaceful settlement, Strauss told journalists that the purpose of his trip was to gather information for Chancellor Kohl.

But the CSU leader's report to Kohl was overtaken by events. Nothing went as planned by Pretoria. Cuito Cuanavale withstood the military pressure of the South African army for months on end, and by April all the SADF could do was return to its bases in northern Namibia. South Africa's withdrawal from Angola was formally decided on during the first rounds of the quadripartite talks which started in May, from which UNITA was excluded, and South Africa was forced to agree to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia's independence.

All this was bad news for Strauss, who was more interested in the future of South Africa than that of Namibia. His involvement in the region's affairs was motivated by the close relations he had long had with the Pretoria regime. During his last visit, he made very benign remarks about the apartheid system and made no secret of his friendship with President Botha, for whom he felt 'the greatest respect'.[3] During a press conference in South Africa, he also pleaded Pretoria's cause by asking the international community to recognise the bantustans and grant them development aid.

Strauss' relationship with Savimbi was encouraged by Pretoria when it decided, in the late 1970s, to take UNITA under its wing and mobilise its friends to promote the Angolan 'contras' on the international political scene.

In 1979, before the intensive training and equipment provided by Pretoria had made UNITA into a military force, UN moves on the setting up of a demilitarised zone between Angola and Namibia - after the adoption of Resolution 435 - had endangered the future of Savimbi's organisation.[4] For South Africa, the survival and strengthening of UNITA was an integral part of its strategy of delaying Namibia's independence or making it impossible, and of destabilising the progressive governments in Angola and Mozambique. International recognition of UNITA was indispensable for Savimbi to be able to play a regional role, which meant he had to claim control over areas of Angola to which access would be blocked by UN troops on the Namibian side of the border.[5]

Franz-Josef Strauss, who until then had only had relations with Holden Roberto's FNLA, through the intermediary of the CIA,[6] went along with the South African strategy, especially since the right and some business circles in the FRG had a direct interest in preventing Namibia from becoming part of independent Africa.

Jonas Savimbi was in Bonn in December 1979. Snubbed by the Foreign Ministry because a German citizen living in Angola had been taken hostage by UNITA shortly before,[7] he was nonetheless received by Christian Democrat (CDU) officials and, notably, by Hans Stercken, chairman of the Africa-Germany Foundation, campaigning for the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the government set up in Windhoek by South Africa. He was of course received with open arms by Strauss and the CSU in Munich.

On 28 August 1980, Carlos Kandanda, the Munich-based UNITA representative in the FRG, addressed the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, which had asked him to explain the reasons for UNITA's fight against the Angolan government to a selected audience. He met people there who were later to form the circle of Savimbi's truest friends, particularly a CDU MP, Schwarz, and Admiral Gunter Poser, political advisor to the Foundation and former chief of NATO information services in Brussels. The Admiral, who was invited by the South Africa Foundation in 1976, is known for his writings on military strategy in which he advocates collaboration with the Pretoria regime.

Despite the opening of diplomatic relations between the People's Republic of Angola and the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979,[8] the German right did its best to improve UNITA's status in the country. Through right-wing foundations, it granted study grants to its members[9] and in 1984 it arranged for the opening of its office in Bonn, at Altenburgerstrasse 41. A UNITA student, Alcides Sakala, became official 'representative in Federal Germany'. The following year, four German MPs, including Elmar Brok of the CDU, were part of a delegation of right-wing European MPs who visited Jamba.

Angola protested strongly against Bonn's hostile attitude. In 1985, Luis de Almeida, Angolan Ambassador to France and the FRG, persuaded the federal government to close down the UNITA office in Bonn and expel its most prominent members, including Alcides Sakala, now representative in Lisbon.

Efforts by the German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, to develop relations with the legitimate Angolan government - including an agreement on cooperation in 1986 worth DM30 million - always come up against the open hostility of the right, even from inside the government itself.

As a result, a new UNITA office was opened in Bonn in 1987, at Am Schlossplatz 23. The new representative, Adolosi Mango, announced this at a press conference sponsored by a new organisation, Stiftung Hilfe in Not e.V (Aid in Want), which has the official support of Hans Klein (CSU), federal Minister of Economic Cooperation. The latter campaigned on behalf of the organisation and its humanitarian aid 'for Angolans in the territory controlled by UNITA', particularly in an article about UNITA he wrote for a special edition of the daily Die Welt on 20 March 1988.[10]

This was to prepare the way for a visit by Jonas Savimbi a few months later, during a tour of Africa (Côte d'Ivoire and Morocco), the United States and Europe (Britain, Switzerland and FRG). Officially invited by Aid on Want, which covered the costs of his stay - including DM50,000 for security - Savimbi started his visit to Germany on 7 July 1988, going to Munich to see his friend Strauss. Through Strauss, he met the powerful Bavarian financial and industrial lobby, including officials from the MBB armaments industry, of which Strauss was an administrative board member.

According to well informed sources, Savimbi and his travelling companion, Jeremias Chitunda - appointed 'prime minister' in the 'provisional government' - also met business circles already involved in the purchase of ivory, timber and diamonds that UNITA, assisted by the SADF, smuggles out of Angola into Namibia and South Africa, from which it reportedly makes some DM2 million a month.

He left Munich for Bonn on 11 July in Strauss' private plane. On his arrival at Cologne/Bonn airport, a waiting helicopter belonging to the *Bunesgrenzschutz* (federal border guards) took him to the capital, protected by security personnel *(Sicherungsgruppe)* normally used for visiting heads of state. 'General' Savimbi was given a first class welcome and received that same evening by Horst Teitschik, Chancellor Kohl's advisor on foreign affairs. During an hour-and-a-half meeting, the two men agreed on the need for increased pressure on the Angolan government to make it accept 'reconciliation' with UNITA. Germany would press for this with its main African partners, especially Nigeria, Kenya, Cte d'Ivoire and Zaire. (This seemed unnecessary in the case of the two latter countries, already openly involved in supporting UNITA. Cte d'Ivoire had issued many diplomatic passports to UNITA leaders, including Adolosi Mango and Savimbi himself.) However, Teitschik wisely considered that the policy of wresting concessions from the Angolan government should be pursued in coordination with the United States.

During a reception in his honour in Bonn, Savimbi met CDU MPs Schwarz and Stercken, as well as the liberal Wolfgang Rumpf, Secretary of State for Agriculture in Rheinland Pfalz, who publicly criticised Foreign Minister Genscher for having refused to meet Savimbi, although, he stressed, he had received Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC.

Genscher was also criticised in the *Bundestag*, where CDU MP Jäger asked why he 'did not receive the pioneer of the black Angolans who are fighting the white oppression of the Cubans'. The Minister replied that 'the federal government maintains relations with the government of Angola, not with the Angolan resistance movement'.

During the parliamentary debate, the Green Party MP Uschi Eid asked how it was that Savimbi's visit had been treated as an official one, against the wishes of the Foreign Minister. A spokesman replied that the federal government was

'ready to talk to all political forces who are able to make a contribution to a peaceful solution to the conflicts in Southern Africa'. This answer did not convince MPs from the Green Party, one of whom, Jürgen Maier, a member of its executive council, said the visit of 'the terrorist Savimbi is a vile provocation' and that the only thing to be done was to 'arrest him and hand him over to the Angolan government'.

AID ON WANT (Stiftung Hilfe in Not)

Founded in December 1986 by a circle of friends, according to its own official publication, Aid on Want has set up 'humanitarian' projects, first in Afghanistan and in UNITA areas of Angola where, according to Aid on Want and the Minister of Economic Cooperation, '3.5 million Angolans live'.[11]

Presided over by Dietrich Kantel, Aid on Want, which has an information agency, the Humanitarian Information Service, made a trip to Angola in 1987 at the end of which it stated that it had decided to grant humanitarian aid to UNITA. A team of doctors was sent under the auspices of a committee set up for the purpose - the German Angola Committee.

Aid on Want is also thinking of starting projects 'with the black tribes of Namibia' and its information agency is expected to open an office in Windhoek soon.

It shares offices in Bonn with another group, the German Committee for Afganistan (DAK), which is part of European Humanitarian Coordination for Afghanistan, headed by an extremely right-wing Swiss, Peter Sager. A deputy from the Democratic Union of the Centre, formerly known as the Conservative Peasants, Sager is an ardent supporter of the Nicaraguan contras and a member of the very reactionary Hofer Club. The DAK, most of whose funds come from the United States, acts along the same lines as the International Society for Human Rights. (See below.)

At this joint address, Aid on Want in fact has only an answering machine which tells one to call the German Committee for Afghanistan. The 'circle of friends' which runs Aid on Want has links with right-wing European networks, particularly the East Institute in Bern, whose president is the same Peter Sager, which supply it with the personnel to carry out its projects. Those in progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan, for the Afghan 'resistance', have been partly financed by the FRG government.

Close to the CSU and the right-wing of the CDU, Aid on Want uses the services of a lawyer, Karl Daniel, who has worked for the Nicaraguan contras and is also the lawyer of the CDU Youth and Konrad Adenauer Foundation.

The results of the fund-raising campaign for UNITA launched by Aid on Want in November 1987 are not yet known, nor the full amount of aid so far given. It is, however, probable that after the public support given to it by federal Minister Hans Klein, together with the mobilisation around Savimbi's visit, Aid on Want has increased its ability to assist UNITA.

X. INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

A UNITA massacre in Kwanza Norte Province on January 8th 1986 resulted in the deaths of 107 men, women and children.

The International Society for Human Rights (ISHR), which campaigns in support of Unita and the Mozambican MNR in a number of European countries, has a history which warrants some attention.

Created in Frankfurt on 8 April 1972 as the Society for Human Rights - it only became 'international' in 1981 - its roots are much older than that. Nine of its thirteen founders are descendants of Russian émigrés who were Gestapo agents in the part of the USSR occupied by the Germans from 1941 to 1945. At the time they founded an organisation called NTS (*Nationalno Trudovoi Soyuz*).

After the defeat of Nazi Germany, the NTS was temporarily forced to suspend its work. According to its own account, its members were scattered, its archives destroyed, and many of its activists sought by the repatriation commissions for extradition to the Soviet Union under the Yalta Agreement.[1]

Ivan Agrusov, general secretary of the SHR/ISHR since its inception in 1972, was among those wanted for war crimes. According to an article in a West German

publication,[2] he served in Hitler's police in the occupied part of the USSR.

After the war the group continued its activities in the FRG with the support of the British services and later the CIA. Abductions and mysterious attacks were attributed to it at the time. Towards the mid-1960s, the NTS partly changed its tactics and began to use the human rights issue for its anti-communist campaign. However, even after it became the ISHR, it maintained its relations with networks like the 13 August Action Group, which did not rule out the use of terrorism. The ISHR, which also has contacts with the World Anti-Communist League (WACL) and Resistance International, publishes a magazine called *Menschenrechte* (human rights).

Presenting itself as an association for the defence of human rights, the German ISHR receives messages of greeting from Chancellor Kohl and is even trying to secure United Nations recognition, arbitrarily using the UN emblem beside its own. It has received subsidies from the FRG government and the Ministries of Culture of some German Länder.

Since 1982 the ISHR has opened other branches in Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Britain, the United States, Australia, Norway, Sweden, Italy, France and Belgium. Reinhard Gnauck was then elected president of the ISHR - Agrusov was still general secretary - and three vice-presidents were chosen from the French, Swiss and US branches. The headquarters of the International Council remained in Frankfurt.

In its fight against 'totalitarianism', the ISHR identifies countries like the FRG and El Salvador as constitutional states, while describing Eastern European countries, Cuba and Sandinista Nicaragua as totalitarian. According to its criteria, violations of human rights take place in the USSR, the Warsaw Treaty countries, Afghanistan, Albania, Ethiopia, Angola, China, Cuba, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Nicaragua. Chile and South Africa, on the other hand, were presented a few years ago as countries evolving towards greater democracy.

The ISHR claims that it does not support liberation movements because, to quote general secretary Agrusov, 'we do not intervene on behalf of people who, in their human rights commitment, use, support or propagate violence'. (12 March 1983.)

While classifying the ANC and the FMLN in El Salvador as 'terrorist', the ISHR supports the Nicaraguan contras on the grounds that by destabilising a revolutionary regime they are trying to 'replace it with the rule of law'. Favourable treatment is also given to the Mozambican MNR, a representative of which was invited to the ISHR general meeting in 1986. Since then, the London address of the MNR, acting under the cover of the Mozambique Solidarity Campaign, has been the same as that of the British branch of the ISHR - 27 Gloucester Street, WC1.

Since June 1985, the ISHR has been campaigning in favour of Chief Buthelezi, 'the third path' for South Africa 'between apartheid and revolution', and against SWAPO. Whereas it uses very moderate language when criticising the apartheid system, its efforts to discredit SWAPO have been extremely vigorous.

In 1985 the ISHR launched a merciless campaign against the Namibian nationalist organisation recognised by the UN as the sole representative of its people. It held a human rights conference in Namibia for the purpose of accusing SWAPO of all kinds of crimes, notably ill-treating Namibians in refugee camps, torturing, murdering, raping and so forth. The campaign, taken up by the German media to some extent, coincided with the setting up in Windhoek by South Africa of a 'transitional government of national unity', which the ISHR described as 'moderate, a democratic alternative to a Marxist, Moscow-dominated SWAPO'.

At the same time, the ISHR's close collaboration with the Namibia Office in Bonn, which represents the Windhoek 'government', together with the participation in the anti-SWAPO campaign of people well known for their pro-apartheid connections, make it quite clear what its true motives are.

The ISHR has worked closely on the Namibian issue with the British branch, whose president is Conservative MP David Atkinson. As happened in Germany, Atkinson mobilised British groups on the far right to support the ISHR's causes. These included, in particular, former members of the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS) - expelled for extremism by the Conservative Party itself in 1986 - which set up the Conservative Student Foreign Affairs Group.

Among the leaders of the old FCS were Karen Cooksley, working in the secretariat of the British branch of the ISHR, and former vice-president David Hoile and his colleague Marc Gordon, who now play high profile roles in the international ultra-right-wing network. Marc Gordon, in particular, although only 24 years old, was put in charge of the International Freedom Foundation UK by Jack Abramoff, international chairman of the Washington-based IFF. He is very active in campaigns in support of South Africa, UNITA, the MNR and the Nicaraguan Contras. SWAPO and the ANC are among his favourite targets.

The French branch of the ISHR, which publishes *Voyageurs de la Liberté*, is presided over by Michel Holthoer and has two general secretaries, Karine Leverger and Sabine Renault-Sablonière, also respectively president and general secretary of the Association for a Free Russia. They are close to Fran ois Léotard, president of the Republican Party and former Minister of Culture, the only member of the Chirac government to receive Jonas Savimbi officially during his visit to France in 1986.

Other members of the ISHR secretariat have worked for the Association for a Free Russia, including Francis Bergeron, its former president who is now ISHR personnel manager and in charge of a geographical commission. Bergeron headed the National Front list in the 1986 legislative elections in the Indre Department and works on the National Front's daily paper, *Présent*.

Another leading light in the ISHR is Pierre Rigoulot, editor of *Est-Ouest*, an essentially anti-communist publication launched by the late George Albertini and Hippolyte Worms.

In May 1988, *Est-Ouest* published a booklet by Branko Lazitch, assisted by Pierre Rigoulot, entitled Angola 1974-1988: *Un échec du communisme en Afrique*. This pro-UNITA propaganda pamphlet, although full of historical and factual mistakes, had a preface by right-wing writer and journalist Jean-Fran ois Revel, whose inordinate praise gained it some undeserved press coverage.

The ISHR is deeply rooted in the cold war era. It seeks to maintain a climate of confrontation and conflict between East and West and puts the true liberation movements and countries which have fought for their independence in the 'enemy' camp, the East, in order to secure an international consensus in favour of counter-revolutionary organisations and right-wing dictatorships, including the apartheid regime.

One of its sources of funds is the American National Endowment for Democracy (NED), set up in 1983 on Reagan's instigation to 'transfer our know-how on holding elections, conducting a campaign, drafting reforms, etc'. (George Shulz, 22 February 1984.) The sending of international observers to see that elections in El Salvador were free was cited by the former US Secretary of State as an example of NED activities.[3]

XI. UNITA SUPPORT IN THE UK

**South Africa is racist and genocidal . . .
But since she feeds us and protects us,
I have to pay her back somehow !**

UNITA's relations with the British government, or at least its secret service, date back to events before Angola's independence. In March 1976, the International Herald Tribune published an investigative article by Gelb on the Angolan war, which had just ended with the South African retreat. Basing himself on official statements by the Ford administration, he wrote that France and Britain had given UNITA and the FNLA 'covert assistance'.

Perhaps because of its special relationship with South Africa, Britain's MI6 was more interested in UNITA. It was, for example, on its instigation that the British company Racal supplied UNITA with communications equipment, particularly long-range radio transmitters, as well as installation and maintenance technicians. In Bié in late 1975, during the South African occupation, Fred Bridgland met a British engineer working for Racal agents in Lusaka who told him such transmitters had been set up in Lusaka, Huambo and Mocâmedes (Namibe).[1]

The British newspaper *The Observer* of 16 October 1988, described James Scott-

Hopkins, one of a group of right-wing European MPs who visited Jamba in 1983, as 'a former military intelligence officer', who was 'also an MI6 agent'.

It is also possible that the decision of Tiny Rowland, head of Lonrho, to put one of his executive jets at Savimbi's disposal was influenced by British intelligence's benevolent attitude towards Savimbi.

Also during the South African invasion, MI6 sent UNITA an advisor, Evan Davies, a former Kenyan Special Branch officer and tobacco firm security advisor. Davies went to Angola with Robert Moss, who later helped him to set up the Institute for the Study of Conflict (ISC). Moss, editor of The Economist's '*Foreign Report*', was one of a small but influential group of journalists who launched successive media campaigns in favour of UNITA and, indirectly, South Africa.

Another person who worked with the ISC, headed by Moss and Brian Crozier, was Louis de Bailey, a top British military intelligence official until 1974. In the late 1960s, the ISC published a number of reports on Angola under Moss' name which were so close to South African views that the Afrikaaner daily *Die Burger* commented in 1976 that 'it is strange that it took a British journalist to write in English about South Africa and Angola in a way that tangibly rouses our national pride and self-respect'.

Before setting up the ISC, Moss and Crozier ran Forum World Features for five years. It was closed down after a scandal about its main sources of funds - the CIA and British intelligence. Moss is also well known in British anti-apartheid circles. In 1977, as head of the British National Association for Freedom, he tried to undermine a boycott of South Africa goods launched in Brussels by a group of European trade unions.

His relations with MI6 and the CIA also reflec coperation on Southern Africa between the two intelligence services during the 1975 crisis. Indeed, MI6 supported the CIA in its last-ditch attempt to oust the MPLA from power by using mercenaries. Most of the 'soldiers of fortune' who entered Angola from Zaire in 1976 were recruited in Britain with CIA funding, $300,000 according to Stockwell. From statements by surviving mercenaries it was later learnt that there were at least two MI6 officers with them in Angola. Their presence was not much help, however, since one of them, Vic Gawthrop, in his fifties, died of a heart attack when out on his first patrol in the bush. Another, John Lockyer, although wounded when a jeep hit a mine, returned to England safely. Other mercenaries later named two other people on the expedition as MI6 men, Lou Elford and Barry Thorpe.[2]

The Englishman John Banks, the main recruiter of the mercenaries, told the press he had no troubles with the British police because 'at the time I had a close relationship with the Special Branch for about three years and had told them about the recruitment'. Banks was also acquainted with Maj David Walker, a key figure in KMS Ltd, the semi-official recruiter of ex-SAS personnel for mercenary work, and Maj Andrew Nightingale, one of the main organisers of KMS and second-in-command of SAS Group Intelligence Unit.[3]

The mercenary operation in Angola was a resounding failure. The capture of 14 of them, including the famous 'Col Callan', led to an international trial during which irrefutable proof was given revealing the role of western intelligence services in sending them to Angola.

UNITA, which worked directly with elite South African military units, apparently declined an offer to send mercenaries to Angola's Central Highland areas. In January 1976, Jorge Sangumba, in charge of foreign affairs in UNITA, went to

London to meet representatives of British companies with interests in Namibia and South Africa. He reportedly told an official from Rio Tinto Zinc - which mines Namibian uranium, among other things - that 'we would be glad to accept finance, arms and political and diplomatic support from Britain, but we do not need mercenaries'.[4]

In 1980, UNITA expanded its lobby in Britain, mainly through the personal involvement of the Conservative Lord Chalfont, who invited Savimbi to London to address a meeting of the International Institute of Strategic Studies in July 1980. Chalfont helped to launch Savimbi in the press by writing articles for the London Times in which he called on the Western allies to give practical support to UNITA. He even specified the types of arms the 'freedom fighters' should receive. The list included Puma helicopters.[5] Chalfont is a member of the Foreign Affairs Research Unit, founded in 1974, mainly through funding by the South African Ministry of Information, which was at the centre of the Muldergate scandal, to the tune of $85,000 a year.

The Foreign Affairs Research Unit, like the ISC, has good relations with the South African Freedom Foundation and the South African Institute for International Affairs. In 1978, the Foreign Affairs Research Institute and the ISC jointly organised an international conference in Brighton - attended by German CDU and CSU delegates - which led to the setting up of private bodies, like the Freedom Blue Cross, to finance counter- revolutionary organisations the world over.

The ISC was then working with people like Sir Edward Peck, former chairman of an organisation connected with British intelligence, and anti-insurgency specialists Richard Clutterbuck and Robert Thompson.

Chalfont also has links with right-wing international bodies like the World Anti-Communist League and Resistance International. In 1984, Chalfont was honorary chairman of a Resistance International debate on 'the role of disinformation in the modern world', attended by the ubiquitous Robert Moss, and the American Arnaud de Borchgrave - current editor of the *Washington Times* and actively involved with the WACL and the Heritage Foundation.

Resistance International had indeed invited real disinformation specialists, people who practised it on a large scale. One of them was Claire Sterling, who distinguished herself in this field by writing *Times of the Assassins*, a book on the attempted assassination of the Pope later revealed to be a sheer CIA fabrication.

Although he could count on support in powerful circles, Savimbi did not go to Britain in 1986, when he was invited to Europe by right-wing members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg and visited Paris and Federal Germany. The Foreign Office, fearing the reaction of a number of Commonwealth countries highly critical of Britain's special relationship with South Africa, had announced that he would not be officially received. It apparently wished to show a certain neutrality on the Angolan conflict.

This was not at all to the liking of the conservative right and the influential pro-South African lobbies. After 1986 a proliferation of committees and associations in support of UNITA and the MNR were added to the already prosperous Namibia 'offices' financed by South Africa.

Mainly staffed by leading members of the Federation of Conservative Students (FCS), dissolved by the Conservative Party in November 1986 for its ultra-right-wing views,[6] pro-South African pressure groups and ultra-conservative American institutions set up a network to support the Angolan and Mozambican counter-revolutionaries.

The ex-FCS provided not only the leaders and organisers of the British branches of institutions like the Washington-based IFF and the Frankfurt-based ISHR, but shock troops for demonstrations outside the SWAPO office in London and the Wembley concert to mark Nelson Mandela's 70th birthday. Marc Gordon, a leading figure in these neo-fascist activities and chairman of the IFF in the UK, goes about with his colleagues sporting T-shirts marked 'Hang Nelson Mandela' or 'Victory to RENAMO' (MNR).

The IFF, headed by Jack Abramoff[7] in the US, publishes the *Southern African Freedom Review*, which has as one of its main advisors ambassador Charles Lichtenstein, a Heritage Foundation senior research fellow. It carries articles violently attacking Frontline states, particularly Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and singing the praises of UNITA and the MNR as fighters for 'democracy and freedom'. The *Southern African Freedom Review* has an office in Bryanston, South Africa, because, according to its own publicity, 'After closely analysing events in Southern Africa, where increasingly the area is shaping up to an ideological confrontation between the forces of reform and freedom on the one hand, and violent revolution and totalitarianism on the other, it was decided to establish an office in South Africa'. The IFF 'feels that up to this point the international debate concerning South Africa has simplistically focused on the abolition of apartheid as the most important policy objective, rather than focussing on the crucial issue of what is going to replace apartheid in South Africa'.

At the same address as the British branch of the IFF - a luxurious building at 10 Storey's Gate, Westminister - South Africa set up its Namibia Office, recently renamed Strategy Network International, which serves as an embassy and information office for then the pro-South African 'government' in Windhoek. The SNI, run by Steven Gouvier and Capt Patrick Watson,[8] publishes a bulletin called *Namibia Now* which goes on at great length about the war in Angola, the withdrawal of Cuban forces and the stance of the Windhoek government 'resolutely in favour of national reconciliation between UNITA and the MPLA'.

However, there is no point in going to the IFF address to find out more about its activities. Apart from SNI, there are officially only commercial offices at 10 Storey's Gate. Three of them on the third floor provide a mailing address for the IFF. The only one that admitted to having a relationship with the IFF was a staff recruitment agency (Norma Skemp Personnel Services, belonging to the Wood group and run by a J M Du Bois). As for Marc Gordon, he only sees people on appointment.

The same is true of the UNITA office in London, at 3 Clifford Street, W1 - behind a front commercial company - which receives people elsewhere and only on appointment.

Starting in 1987, pro-UNITA activities increased and took shape. The Free Angola Campaign was launched in 1988. It distributes a free bulletin, *Angola Today*. It's editor, Charles Dudley, reproduces UNITA communiqués and views, peppered with caustic comments about the failure of the British press to recognise UNITA as the champion of freedom he claims it is. Dudley is also an assiduous writer of letters to the press in which he consistently defends Savimbi.

In the first issue of *Angola Today*, Prof David Marsland wrote an editorial in which he lashed out at British 'enemies of freedom in Angola'. Immediately after naming 'active supporters of communism', Marsland described anti-apartheid activists as 'like the professional anti-fascists of thirties Germany, who played into Hitler's hands by smearing democrats, the avowedly liberationist lobby among opponents of apartheid are willy-nilly enemies of freedom everywhere - but

especially in southern Africa'.

When Savimbi was about to visit London, the pro-UNITA campaign was stepped up. On 9 July, the Coalition for a Free Angola published an advertisement in the *Daily Telegraph* to welcome Savimbi. It was signed by fifty or so people, mainly Conservative MPs and members of right-wing associations and foundations who supported UNITA's demands and claimed that 'UNITA has been fighting Portuguese colonialism and then the Cuban-supported unelected MPLA regime in Angola since 1964', i.e. since two years before it was formed!

The Foreign Office announced that Savimbi was visiting Britain as a private citizen and 'his visit would have no official standing'. Indeed, he was not received by any leading official in Margaret Thatcher's government, despite the welcome he had just been given at the White House. However, certain institutions closely or directly related to the government, like the Royal Institute of International Relations and the Foreign Press Association, housed in premises owned by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, opened their doors to the UNITA leader.

During his three-day stay in London, Savimbi was guest of honour at several receptions at which he met right-wing Conservative MPs, representatives of the business world, including the arms industry, and ambiguous political figures like John Gouriet, head of the National Association for Freedom, who once distinguished himself in a trade union dispute by taking the postal workers' union to court.

Some Conservative MPs who are active Savimbi supporters are also known for their dubious pro-South African activities. Julian Amery, for example, reportedly had contacts with people implicated in a 1987 scandal involving the attempted kidnapping of ANC officials in London. Among the pieces of evidence missing from the file on the mercenaries accused of planning the kidnappings were, among other things, hand-written letters from Amery.[9] Amery, who has also visited Jamba, has never concealed his sympathy for the apartheid regime.

At the reception held by the Free Angola Committee at the Oxford and Cambridge Club, the person handing out invitations was Toby Baxendale, who most recently cropped up as chairman of the British Campaign Against Terrorism and who can be found at the London offices of Western Goals UK. The latter was launched by a Washington parent organisation dissolved after a controversy during Irangate about the handling of funds and dealings with Col North.[10]

The British branch of Western Goals has been very active in campaigning against non-governmental organisations doing relief work in third world cuntries, like Christian Aid, Oxfam and War on Want.

One of Savimbi's first engagements in London was to speak at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, a British establishment stronghold. However, Savimbi was met at the doors of the Institute by an angry demonstration organised by the British Anti-Apartheid Movement, which had already officially protested against the fact that he was allowed to enter Britain.

Unlike what happened in other European countries he went to, Savimbi's visit to Britain caused great indignation in many sectors of society. An advertisement condemning his visit signed by more than 200 individuals and organisations was published in *The Independent*. It strongly dissociated the signatories from the visit, stating that it could 'only undermine the prospect of achieving peace in Angola' and describing UNITA as 'a surrogate of South Africa'.

XII. UNITA IN PORTUGAL

Train derailed by UNITA in Moxico Province.

It is in Portugal that UNITA has the biggest support network and the greatest number of friends in Europe. Yet it is also the most contradictory country in this respect. Although honoured by the friendship of President Mário Soares, Savimbi has not been able to go to Portugal since 1975.

None of the successive governments since the overthrow of Marcello Caetano's fascist regime has wished to grant the UNITA leader a visa, some out of conviction but most out of pragmatism, since the importance of Portugal's trade relations with Angola has justified such caution.

Prime Minister Cavaco Silva categorically refused a visa application made by Savimbi at the Portuguese embassy in Rabat before his European tour in July 1988. While the Prime Minister and his government, mostly members of his Social Democratic Party (PSD), all proclaimed that Portugal 'has relations only with the legitimate Angolan government', Dias Loureiro, secretary general of the PSD, proposed that the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs should receive

Alcides Sakala, UNITA representative in Portugal. When put to the vote, the proposal was adopted despite the opposition of the Communist Party and the Democratic Intervention and Socialist Party (PS) deputies. For the first time, an official Portuguese body met a UNITA envoy.[1]

When Cavaco Silva gave UNITA officials 40 days to leave Portugal,[2] in 1986, Savimbi's organisation handed the bulk of its propaganda activities over to Portuguese citizens such as Fátima Roque (a member of the UNITA women's organisation!)[3] and to political activists in the PSD, the SP and, of course, the Democratic and Social Centre (CDS), on the right of the current political line-up.

CDS sympathy for UNITA dates back over a number of years. The first office opened in Lisbon by UNITA in 1975, after the Alvor Agreement, was in the CDS building in Campo Grande. To this day, CDS president Freitas do Amaral is still one of Savimbi's staunchest defenders among Portuguese politicians. On 19 July 1988, part of his speech on the 14th anniversary of the CDS was devoted to the wisdom of granting Savimbi an entry visa.

Manuel Monteiro, leader of the CDS youth, has campaigned for the UNITA youth movement to become a member of the European Democratic Students. Monteiro and Margarida Mayer, deputy secretary general of the CDS, have also been members of the Portuguese Forum for Democracy and Peace, whose main aim is to publicise and promote UNITA in Portugal.

Created in April 1988, the Forum took over from another organisation, the Democratic Association of Portugal-Angola Solidarity (ADESPA), also close to UNITA, voluntarily dissolved itself following differences in its ranks. The PSD, CDS and PS members who had formed ADESPA disagreed on what its role should be. The Forum, headed by UNITA enthusiast Fátima Roque, includes some other members of the three same political parties, including Joao Soares, son of Portugal's President.

However, only the CDS officially supports UNITA. Owing to its governmental responsibilities and, perhaps, the firm stand of the Prime Minister, who has described UNITA as a terrorist movement,[4] the PSD as a party has never supported UNITA publicly.[5]

The situation in the PS is even more confused. Although influential, the pro-UNITA nucleus - notably Joao Soares, Joffre Justino and José Brandao - is very much a minority in the party. The refusal of socialist MPs to agree to the meeting with the UNITA representative, in July 1988, provoked reactions within the PS. Sottomayor Cardia, for example, wanted to telephone the Prime Minister to persuade him to grant Savimbi a visa.

Although a UNITA observer attended the Democratic Convention of the Left promoted by the PS in December 1986, at the 7th congress of the PS in February 1988 no debate on a motion in support of UNITA was allowed since there was not the requisite minimum of fifty signatures.

Lopes Cardoso, leader of the PS and national secretary for the *autárquias* (local governments), has no sympathy for the UNITA leader and has said that 'there are Socialist Party officials who may favour Savimbi's coming, but that is not the official position of the PS'.[6]

A pro-UNITA lobby also exists in some trade union organisations such as the General Union of Workers (UGT) which includes PS and PSD members. Support for UNITA recently caused disagreement, the PSD accusing the PS of having transformed one of its affiliated members - SITRA, the transport union led by José Brando - into a UNITA branch in Lisbon. Its offices and printing equipment were

being used for UNITA propaganda.

The pro-Savimbi lobby is therefore wide-ranging. Alongside a few strayed socialists there are also people from Salazarist circles, like the writer Jaime Nogueira Pinto,[7] whose editorials praising Savimbi and harshly criticising the government appear in some of the main right-wing newspapers.

Jaime Nogueira Pinto is not unfamiliar with Angolan problems since he was a member of the Angolan Resistance Front (FRA) formed in Luanda after 25 April 1974 by settlers who called for the use of force to oppose independence. On his return to Portugal, he joined the Independent Movement for National Reconstruction (MIRN), set up by Gen Kaulza de Arriaga and others nostalgic for the colonial past. Kaulza de Arriaga led the Portuguese armed forces in Mozambique during the liberation struggle. He was responsible for the brutal offensive launched against Frelimo combatants in the late 1960s known as Operation Gordion Knot, and for many massacres of civilians, including Wiriyamu.[8]

In 1980, Jaime Nogueira Pinto took part in the formation of the so-called Nationalist Intervention, a branch of the Portuguese far right, secretly linked with New Order. In its public statements, Nationalist Intervention condemns decolonisation as a betrayal of the fatherland. In Washington, in 1984, Nogueira established close relations with the Unification Church and Heritage Foundation. He attended several meetings and conferences promoted by them in Washington as well as in Pretoria and Lisbon.

In Portugal, the most extremist retornados (settlers who returned to Portugal after Angola's independence) and hankerers for the fascist past, particularly in the armed forces, have been and still are UNITA's major supporters. They provide material and financial support.

The 10 August 1986 issue of *Africa Confidencial*,[9] a pro-UNITA bulletin published in Portugal, wrote of the retornados: 'Many of them, well established businessmen, are reliable supporters (of UNITA). They even sponsor scholarships, book publishing, the purchase of medicines and fund-raising, to which they themselves contribute generously. The *retornados* are also responsible for a series of inter-related lobbies which exert pressure on Portuguese parties and governments.' It added that UNITA regarded Portugal as 'an extremely important strategic front in the political and diplomatic fight'.

This explains an annual expenditure on UNITA structures in Lisbon of around 10 million escudos ($70,000) and the posting of senior UNITA 'cadres' there. Indeed, Savimbi has appointed five 'central committee' members to the UNITA office in Rua Rodrigo da Fonseca. Maj Alcides Sakala runs the office with a secretariat which comprises Paulo Chipilica, Miranda Dias, José Champalimaud and Carlos Fontoura. The last three are Portuguese and among the very few white UNITA members. In fact apart from Sakala all members of the secretariat hold Portuguese passports and have regular jobs. Thanks to UNITA's good relations with certain government circles, Paulo Chipilica was made a 'legal advisor' in the Ministry of Culture. Whereas they run no risk of expulsion, a threat made from time to time against active UNITA members in Portugal, Alcides Sakala's position is less secure, at least in theory, since he holds an Ivorian passport.

Yet threats against UNITA are never actually carried out owing to Savimbi's many political supporters in the ruling parties and military circles.

Indeed, officers ousted after 25 April for their fidelity to the old regime have gradually regained control of the army and pushed out the major figures responsible for the overthrow of fascism.[10] So UNITA has regained some 'old friends'. The

Portuguese press revealed in 1983 that UNITA enjoyed the protection of certain government departments, particularly the intelligence services.

Reserve officers, in liaison with retornado groups, have also set up mercenary recruitment networks for UNITA. Among those involved is 'captain' Ferreira, one of the instigators of the settler and military rebellion of 7 September 1974 in Mozambique against the signing of an agreement on the independence of that former colony.

Ferreira reappeared in Angola the following year, with the FNLA. He was later implicated in an armed attack in Portugal. Arrested, he escaped soon afterwards and went to South Africa.

Also actively involved in recruiting mercenaries is Col Gilberto Santos e Castro. Governor of Lunda Province in Angola during the colonial period, he is the brother of Fernando Santos e Castro, the former Governor General of Angola who had relations with Savimbi.

In 1962, Col Santos e Castro created the special units, or commandos, of the colonial army in Angola. In 1975, he commanded the FNLA troops in their joint offensive with Zaire aimed at taking the Angolan capital. After independence, according to former CIA agent John Stockwell, the CIA gave him half a million dollars to recruit mercenaries. To this end, he opened an office in Madrid, from which he coordinated a network of former colonial army officers. He also founded the Association of Commandos, an ultra-right pressure group of ex-servicemen in Portugal.

Former colonial armymen and PIDE officials are currently in the SADF to officer such mixed units as 32, or Buffalo Battalion, and UNITA. One such is Oscar Pi arra Cardoso, who founded and led the flechas during the colonial war.[11]

A dense network of small businesses run by Portuguese nationals in South Africa take care of part of UNITA's logistics. The most important of these is Frama Inter-Trading, run by Francisco Lopes. It has offices in His Majesty's Building on the corner of Joubert and Commissioner Streets in Johannesburg.

In Portugal, where UNITA is also engaged in illegal activities such as diamond and ivory smuggling, its name sometimes crops up in criminal cases. During a lengthy trial in 1985 to which considerable press coverage was given, it was revealed that two associates of the main defendant, Dona Branca, a usurer and speculator, Figueiredo 'Valdinho' and Dantas Barros, were involved in arms trafficking for UNITA.[12]

Savimbi's organisation was also named in a forgery scandal uncovered in 1987. Forgers of Portuguese currency told a Monchique court that they had printed the false notes for UNITA, to finance its diamond smuggling.[13]

Also in 1987, during the investigation of a case of mercenary recruitment in Portugal for GAL, a Spanish terrorist group, it was revealed that one of the recruiters, Mário Correia da Cunha, had worked for DINFO, the intelligence division of the army, in Angola before independence, and had gone to South Africa in the context of his activities.

MNR deserter Paulo Oliveira revealed that DINFO was also involved in South African operations in support of the Mozambican terrorists. A DINFO officer, Col Fernando Silva Ramos, was taken to MNR bases in Mozambique by the South African army. Oliveira said this had been done with the knowledge of Gen José Lemos Ferreira, chief-of-staff of the Portuguese army. He added that a Portuguese journalist, Eduardo Mascarenhas - who worked for the Catholic radio station, *Rádio Renascenca*, and the daily *O Século*, then headed by Jaime Nogueira Pinto - had

gone to MNR bases and brought back a report for Gen Lemos Ferreira on the situation and MNR needs.

The latter is also in contact with Jannie Geldenhuys, commander-in-chief of the SADF, who went to Lisbon for talks with him immediately after the first round of quadripartite talks held in London in May 1988.[14] Are the upper ranks of the army still banking on a Savimbi victory in Angola?[15]

In any event, apart from the fascination some Portuguese political and press circles seem to feel for Jonas Savimbi, some of the high-level complicity with UNITA must be ascribed to the zealous Atlanticism shown by Mário Soares. After 25 April 1974, Portugal became a focal point of intensive activity by the CIA,[16] which was often involved in attempts, involving greater or lesser degrees of violence, to remove the left-wing civilian and military forces in power. However, President Ramalho Eanes, representing the moderate tendency in the army, was able to prevent a slide to the right or even an unconditional alliance with the United States, particularly in respect of Portuguese policy towards the former colonies. Contrary to all logic, it has been socialist governments that have shifted from that policy to a closer alignment with the US.

Moreover, Washington tried to make Mário Soares' Portugal play a more significant role in the negotiations between Angola, Cuba and South Africa on a regional settlement. Former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, has more than once called for increased diplomatic involvement by the former colonial power in Angolan and Mozambican issues. He also shares Soares' views on UNITA's right to share power in Angola.

The pro-Savimbi Portuguese press has made the revival of the Alvor Agreement its special hobby horse. It is regrettable that the same media consistently conceal the facts as to who was really to blame for the failure of the transitional government set up after the agreement in January 1975. Lisbon was partly responsible for this, as well as for having passively witnessed the start of South Africa's invasion of Angola.

Most of the Portuguese media are careful not to mention Lisbon's responsibility for the conditions under which decolonisation took place. Nor is anything said about the consequences for Angola today of fascist Portugal's very questionable colonial rule. While avidly repeating Savimbi's attacks on the Angolan government, whose mistakes and difficulties are stressed with open hostility, such journalists minimise the terrible colonial heritage and salvage their own consciences. What mention is made, for example, of the illiteracy rate in Angola at the time of independence? Indeed, support for Savimbi is not devoid of colonialist and even racist thinking. Savimbi typifies the colonialist image of a black leader: authoritarian, demagogic, charismatic and opportunist.

Highly indicative of this attitude bordering on contempt were answers given byJoão Soares, in September 1988, to questions put by Augusto de Carvalho.[17] While admitting that he would not want a president who had collaborated with the fascist PIDE for Portugal, President Soares' son said it was 'not the same thing' for Angola. João Soares, who felt there were 'mitigating factors' in Savimbi's 'possible' collaboration with the PIDE, went on to say: 'Indeed, you can't compare the Angolan situation with ours...' After all, Angola is Africa!

XIII. UNITA AND FRANCE (from Giscard to Mitterrand)

Survivors of UNITA Massacre.

The PIDE archives taken over by the MFA officers after the overthrow of fascism in Portugal contained very interesting documents on the anti-colonial struggle, notably on UNITA's collaboration. But they also revealed the attitude of the 'western democracies' towards the Lisbon regime.

Thus it was discovered for example that the French External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE) had good relations with its PIDE counterparts, so much so that one of the best known leaders of the PIDE, Agostinho Barbieri Cardoso - who organised the kidnapping and assassination of the famous opposition general Delgado in 1965 - was given refuge in France after 25 April 1974. Protected by the SDECE and the Directorate for the Surveillance of the Territory (DST), he settled in the Paris region.[1] The exchange of information between the two services enabled the PIDE to follow the movements of African nationalists from its colonies who had found refuge in France. The list of 'terrorists' or 'deserters from the Portuguese army'[2] was later dug out by the Chirac

government, since many leaders, even ministers, from the former Portuguese colonies, in Paris in transit, were held up by immigration officials for 'questioning'. Only after repeated representations by Angola's Ambassador to France, and even a meeting with Charles Pasqua, then Minister of the Interior, did this unpleasant harassment end.

Apart from its collaboration with the PIDE, the SDECE has been directly involved in the Portuguese colonies. Its most flagrant interference after 25 April was in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda. The oil-rich enclave wedged between Zaire and Congo was coveted by its neighbours and, of course, by some oil companies working in the region. In 1962, Congolese President Fulbert Youlou opened a conference at Pointe Noire on 'the unity of the Cabindan people', which ended with the bringing together of Cabindan separatists in the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC). However, unable to organise a struggle in the field, FLEC carried little weight after 25 April. Yet in 1975 the SDECE and Zaire[3], with support from the CIA and the aid of mercenaries, used it as a cover for a crude attempt at Cabindan secession from Angola.

On 5 September 1975, a strange journalist called Michel Lambinet, author of Lettre d'Afrique, a confidential newssheet published in Paris, wrote to Claude-Pierre Brossolette, Secretary-General of the office of the French President. He asked for an urgent appointment to discuss 'important events to take place in Cabinda which would be of interest to the CFP and ELF-ERAP' (French oil companies).

Lambinet added that he had just returned from a visit to Kinshasa 'at the invitation of the Zairean President for whom I have been working for about fifteen years' and that 'Colonel Robert, former assistant to M. de Maranches (SDECE director - ed.) and currently a director of ELF-ERAP, is aware of this matter'.[4]

The operation launched on 8 November, three days before the proclamation of independence, was a resounding failure. Col Bordes, responsible for Angola in the SDECE, was transferred. But this did not put an end to the secret operations against the MPLA. On 26 December 1975, the Washington Post wrote of aid for FLEC, adding that 'France is cooperating with the CIA in the supply of arms and funds to the FNLA'. SDECE operations against the Angolan government continued even after the South African retreat and the routing of the FNLA.

In May 1977, the *Sunday Times* announced the launching of 'Operation Cobra 77', a four-pronged invasion of Angola, from Cabinda, Zaire, Namibia and the sea. The operation, organised 'from Senegal, whose pro-French President Senghor has refused to recognise President Neto's regime',[5] was to be carried out by a few hundred men trained by an SDECE agent, Jean da Costa, and including the well known mercenary Bob Denard and a Monsieur Charles, a friend of Michel Lambinet.[6]

This umpteenth operation against the Angolan government never took place, since President Neto denounced it in a speech to the diplomatic corps in Luanda even before it started. But the SDECE did not give up its attempts to destabilise the Angolan government and concentrated its efforts on UNITA.

Alexandre de Marenches, head of the SDECE, was well aware of the problems involved in keeping UNITA alive; he knew of the role it had played during the South African invasion. Furthermore, a friend of his, the writer and journalist Dominique de Roux, who had known Savimbi in the colonial period and become his friend and advisor, had inundated the SDECE with reports in which he

exaggerated UNITA's importance. De Roux, who had rendered the SDECE many services, was not reputed to be very serious. A source close to the SDECE said of him: 'De Roux took a sly pleasure in undercover agitation, inventing clandestine operations which he described in copious detail in reports sent to the SDECE and BOSS (South African intelligence)'.[7]

Former South African agent Gordon Winter wrote in his book Inside Boss[8] that when he had spoken to his chief Jack Kemp about him, he had received the following response: 'We know all about him. He's on file. He's a senior French intelligence officer who uses journalism as a cover. He arranges regular shipments of arms and ammunition to UNITA and in addition he also revamps all Savimbi's war communiqués before he passes them on for release through UNITA's office in Paris.'

Kemp explained that the logistic and propaganda support of Dr Savimbi and his UNITA movement was a mutual relationship between French intelligence, the CIA and South African military intelligence to 'keep Savimbi afloat until such time as the MPLA is brought down'.

De Roux, who died of a heart attack in 1976 at the age of 43, bequeathed to Savimbi his network of friends, particularly his relationship with de Marenches, who lyterally fell in love with the UNITA leader. In a book on his eleven years of running French intelligence, published in 1987, de Marenches admitted that he felt 'boundless admiration and affection' for Savimbi.[9]

'People believe in Savimbi,' he wrote, 'because he is a prodigious man cxarismatic, with immense courage, and because after having struggled against Portuguese colonialism in its time, now he is fighting an infinitely more powerful colonialism: Soviet colonialism.'

So he was very disappointed by President Giscard d'Estaing's decision to cut all relations with UNITA after France's diplomatic recognition of Angola in 1977. He tried to prove to Giscard that he was making a serious mistake by abandoning his friend Savimbi. He had sent 'one of his best men' to Angola who had risked his life[10] to gather evidence of UNITA's war against the Angolan government. But, he complained, not even photographs he brought back of the sabotaging of the Benguela Railway had changed the French President's mind.

'Dr Savimbi,' he continued, 'wrote me several letters in superb French (sic) to tell me that without our decisive aid the great anti-communist resistance movement, UNITA, which currently controls an area bigger than France, would have been annihilated. For political reasons President Giscard d'Estaing took a different course to the one we had recommended in respect of Savimbi... I was therefore advised at the highest level to stop the support I was giving Savimbi.'

De Marenches explained that he regretted the French President's decision all the more in that the US administration had been forced by the Clark Amendment to suspend its aid to Savimbi. However, he stressed, 'the man is a giant in history, not only a physical giant, but an intellectual and moral giant'.

'From time to time he came to see me in Europe or Morocco, I would send a plane to fetch him...' Then, without informing the French President, he finally decided 'to visit him in his guerrilla area of Angola, secretly of course'. De Marenches wanted 'to show president Savimbi and the brave men fighting around him that at least one western country, a European one, and France at that, was sufficiently interested in them to come and visit them'.[11]

De Marenches' pro-Savimbi crusade did not end in May 1981, when he resigned from the SDECE after Mitterrand was elected. He continued to plead his friend's

case in the United States. On 21 November 1980, he had already discussed the matter with Ronald Reagan at his Californian ranch. Reagan was newly elected but had not yet been sworn in as President. 'You must meet Savimbi,' de Marenches told him. 'To understand what hell is you have to talk to those who have been there.'[12]

The book in which de Marenches wrote about Savimbi appeared just a month before the latter's visit to Paris in October 1986. It was a godsend for the UNITA leader, who needed good publicity since his very compromising relations with the apartheid regime had not always given him a good press.

In 1986, with the right again in power after five years of socialist government, the climate was more favourable for a Savimbi visit. Assorted right-wing MPs in the European Parliament[13] seized the opportunity to renew their invitation for him to go to Strasbourg. A previous invitation had come to nothing when France had refused to grant Savimbi a visa.

This time, however, despite the protests provoked by the news of Savimbi's arrival in France, also from many French-speaking countries[14] and the acting Chairman of the OAU, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo, Paris decided to let the UNITA leader come. Anti-Savimbi mobilisation did produce some results though. Strasbourg was anything but a triumph. He was refused access to the platform - left-wing MPs were determined to prevent him from speaking - and Pierre Pflimlin (UDF), President of the European Parliament, cancelled a meeting with the embarrassing visitor from abroad.

Savimbi's visit to Paris was also fraught with embarrassment. Apart from Fran ois Léotard, Minister of Culture and Communications, who received him in his capacity as President of the Republican Party, Jacques Toubon, Secretary-General of Chirac's party, the RPR, and Chaban Delmas, President of the Assembly,[15] the UNITA leader was not received by any political figure or member of the government, unless secretly.

Although Jacques Chirac, then Prime Minister, did not receive Savimbi, at least not officially, Jacques Foccart, his advisor on African Affairs, did so on his behalf. The caution shown by Chirac was significant in view of the fact that before he was elected he told the Portuguese weekly *O Jornal:* 'I think it legitimate for us to have contacts and understand the position of UNITA, which is in the majority and is struggling for the liberation of its country. It is authentic liberation in a country whose regime seeks to impose itself through force from abroad.'[16]

Of course, once in power Chirac had to show realism. The interests of French companies in Angola justified a few precautions. But the excitement shown by the far right over Savimbi's visit had somewhat dampened the enthusiasm of Chirac's moderates. UDF deputy Charles Millon held a reception in Savimbi's honour in the National Assembly, to which the National Front sent its best known leaders, causing some MPs from the 'traditional' right to boycott the event.[17] Only a few diehard anti-communists like Jean-Francois Deniau and Frédéric Dupont (UDF), and Robert André-Vivien of the RPR, publicly displayed their sympathy for Savimbi alongside the National Front.

Francois Léotard's interest in Savimbi is directly related to his political activities. As pointed out in an earlier chapter, he is one of the main sponsors of the French branch of the ISHR, and one of his advisors and friends, Patrick Wasjman - editor of *Politique Internationale* - has close links with ultra-conservative US circles and the Pretoria regime. Sabine Renault-Sabloni re, secretary-general of the French

ISHR, is also on the editorial board of Politique Internationale and wrote an article in the Republican Party paper on the Léotard-Savimbi meeting, which had been attended by Wasjman.

Savimbi's circle of friends is in fact very small, considering that no well known person agreed to head the France-Angola Association[18] set up in May 1988 to boost the pro-UNITA lobby. Only the National Front weekly *Présent* mentioned it in December 1988, explaining that another aim of the association was to 'provide useful details on UNITA's ideology'. The author of the article, Francis Bergeron, also in charge of one of the ISHR departments, was seeking to allay the fears of readers who might believe that Savimbi still used 'Maoist language'. 'UNITA always refers essentially to the Ivorian model where Africa is concerned, and it does not conceal its pro-western feelings or its ties of friendship with South Africa.'

The pro-UNITA association may also have been set up because of the relative ineffectiveness of the Resistance International[19] propaganda office opened in Paris in 1983 by the anti-Soviet Vladimir Boukovsky and the Cuban dissident Armando Valladares. The 'information' office, to publicise counter-revolutionary struggles in the third world, did not have the intended impact on the media. Unduly monopolised by Soviet dissidents and 'cold war warriors', Resistance International neglected propaganda work and the issuing of communiqués from the various 'fronts', confining itself to holding sporadic 'forums' and round table meetings to debate the end of 'third worldism' or the failure of communist experiences in the third world.

A book on Savimbi published in 1987, *Portrait d'un Révolutionnaire en général*,[20] was a product of the club of friends of the UNITA leader, or their descendants! Indeed, it was jointly written by the journalist Yves Loiseau and none other than Pierre-Guillaume de Roux, son of Dominique de Roux! In the introduction, de Roux junior recalls his father's friendship with the hero Savimbi and says that he himself sides with 'minds open to geo-politics' like... and the example he gives is Alexandre de Marenches.

Another ambiguous figure in the entourage of Minister of the Interior Charles Pasqua,[21] under the Chirac government, was Jean Taousson, a key man in the pro-South African lobby in France. Taousson is editor of *Le Courrier Austral Parlementaire* (CAP), published in Paris, which has connections with the most reactionary MPs in the European Parliament. CAP was cited during the Muldergate scandal as one of the publications funded in the 1970s by the South African Ministry of Information. Taousson is an Algeria veteran, having headed one of the 'Delta' groups which terrorised the former French colony during the liberation war.[22] His name came up frequently during the inquiry into the assassination of Dulcie September, ANC representative in Paris. According to the press, he provided the liaison between South African intelligence and a faction in French intelligence which made it possible for the assassins to kill the anti-apartheid militant in the French capital and then get away.

CAP is published by the Association for the Development of Exchanges and International Relations (ADERI), also headed by a former OAS member. ADERI has been a distribution centre for UNITA communiqués relayed by Resistance International and the Paris office of UNITA itself. It has acted as a public relations office for UNITA, organising trips to Jamba by French and other European right-wing figures and journalists.

Far right control of all pro-Savimbi demonstrations has been very evident. During

the visit of President José Eduardo dos Santos in 1987, the UDF youth organised a protest march with the UNITA representative in Paris, 'general' Gato.[23] But even before the few dozen demonstrators had finished assembling, their leaders were completely pushed into the background by members of the National Front, who had responded to UNITA's call in far greater numbers.

Although, as UNITA's unofficial representative in Paris admits, socialist government and party officials have always refused any contact with Savimbi's organisation, it would not appear that the intelligence services have observed the same principle.

Soon after he was elected President, Fran ois Mitterrand appointed Pierre Marion to head the SDECE, renamed the DGSE.[24] No decision to resume contacts with UNITA was taken during his tenure of office. Only in 1982, under his successor, Admiral Pierre Lacoste,[25] was the question of resuming aid to UNITA raised. According to the monthly *Raids* - 'for men in the field', with many former DGSE officials among its contributors - experts from the Action Service of the DGSE were sent to Angola in 1984 to carry out joint bomb attacks with UNITA. The January 1988 issue of *Raids*, which His modelled on the American Soldier of Fortune, carried an article stating that Action Service had trained UNITA men at the Cercotte base in France - 20 in 1984 and 17 more recently, the latter falsely passing themselves off as Zaireans.

The article is less credible when it describes an allegedly successful operation by UNITA members trained in France, a bomb attack in Luanda in which 'many top Angolan and Cuban officers, including Cuba's Deputy Minister of Defence' were killed. No such attack ever took place. When information experts are at work it is indeed difficult to sift the real information from stories planted to mislead public opinion.

It is also difficult to know whether these services acted with the consent of the socialist government and President Mitterrand, or on their own initiative, as they are wont to do. In any event, the government denies having any kind of cooperation with UNITA.

However, the presence in the presidential entourage of such people as Gen Jeannou Lacaze, former chief-of-staff of the French army and Mitterrand's personal chief-of-staff until 1985, might explain the ease with which 'independent' intelligence service initiatives are taken. Lacaze, a friend of Admiral Lacoste, has made trips to South Africa to meet military and security officials in his current capacity as personal advisor to President Mobutu.[26] Lacoste, who resigned as head of the DGSE after the Greenpeace affair, also wished to go to South Africa to return a visit by the head of South African intelligence. But in 1988, Lacoste - now president of the National Defence Studies Foundation (FEDN) - was banned from going to South Africa by the Minister of Defence in the Rocard government, in view of the sensitive posts he had held in the past.[27]

Appendix: The Savimbi Letters

Cover of UNITA-D information bulletin.



UNIÃO NACIONAL PARA INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA
DEMOCRÁTICA
UNION NATIONALE POUR L'INDEPENDANCE TOTALE DE L'ANGOLA
DEMOCRATIQUE
UNITA-D

BOLETIM INFORMATIVO DA UNITA-D
Nº2 JUNHO 1988

ANGOLA E UTA DESEJOSA DE PAZ. ANGOLA PERTENCE AOS ANGOLANOS. NÃO A UNIÃO É TERRORISMO



7-11-60

Meu Irmão Nyota

Agradeço a tua carta, não as tuas palavras sem insultos mas também pela rapidez da resposta.

Estivesse um brasileiro? Se, por acaso algum compatriota, agradeço que me procures para um contacto pessoal: um sítio calmo. Estou-me instalando na Faculdade de Medicina. Sinto-me bem. Exames de 15 em um fulcro ou três conforme a preparação que alcançar. O meu Jonas Malheiro [illegible] 7 de Agosto de 1936 Filho dos meus agricultores. Sempre continuar o curso de Medicina. Fala francês, consegue bem o inglês e sabe a opinião [illegible] Tenho 3 semanas de planeto. Caso o governo Tunga não consegue comprar passagem para cá na Tunga para não tenho possibilidade de [illegible] e [illegible] um Francês. Caso, o governo não pode [illegible] não gosto [illegible] Kasoro, Humanha. Essential ou Praga. Uma vez chegado a Tunga não quero mais habitar um país capitalista. Gostaria para não ter que a dois anos para ver de conseguir passar um dois lugares com convenção para se juntarem à nós. Como sabes, os tuaiss são agora o dinheiro. Italy na União dos Bancos Tunga. A Tunga faz o passar por um país automaticamente e muito. Um dos países comunicamente capitalizados do ocidente. Jogo a luta entre o dinheiro de [illegible] não [illegible] mais um passar por cima da nação [illegible] uma mínima margem de liberdade uma

Handwritten letter in which Savimbi said his parents were farmers.

Wait . . . the chief is burning personal documents !

LETTER FROM SAVIMBI TO THE MPLA LEADERSHIP IN CONAKRY DATED 12 DECEMBER 1960

Esteemed brothers and comrades

I shall first introduce myself, since I believe few have heard of me.

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, from Andulo, Bié, Angola. I arrived in Lisbon in September 1958 to finish my 7th year since I did my 6th in Sa da Bandeira. I enrolled in the Passos Manuel Secondary School, where in March 1959, on the occasion of overseas week, I was asked by the Rector to make a speech on 'Portugal's civilising work', a theme chosen by the Government. First they asked me to make a speech only for my schoolmates, at the request of my philosophy teacher Dr Joel Serrao. But when the latter realised that the sinister hand of the Government was involved he withdrew his invitation and took my side, giving the excuse that I had little experience of political matters. The Government chose the Geographic Society as the venue for the speech. Once the danger had been averted with the boundless help of my philosphy teacher, I started to face the coersive activity of the political police (PIDE) on my own. As regards the comrades in Guinea, you need only talk to Engineer Amilcar Cabral, who encouraged me with his simple but sincere words at the most difficult moments. I went through difficult times of doubt and discouragement. I lost two years doing my 7th year, which under normal circumstances I would have done in a year, without claiming to be bright. The two years were spent in a struggle, sometimes acute and sometimes less so, but I have not been able to do my 7th year up to now. The outcome of the oral physics exam in September this year was the worst manifestation of lack of character I have so far seen. In the practical test they gave me 5 points and in the written test 19. I went to the oral one with 12. They failed me without any excuse to justify my failing. Anyone interested in looking into the matter would conclude that I was unlucky! I left Portugal under difficult circumstances, but friends (in the Portuguese CP) were as cooperative as could be, although this did not prevent me from having to sign a statement that I would return to Portugal after 90 days and finally collaborate with the PIDE. They took my Identity Card which after all I don't need here at all. The Portuguese consulate in Lausanne has tried by all possible means to contact me. After two years it is absolutely certain that they will refuse to renew my passport. I did a supplementary exam in physics/chemistry and French to be able to enter the Faculty. Since there are no places in Lausanne or Geneva, I came here where I have to learn German, since classes are in German although it is a bilingual town. I will do the exam in French although this has not decreased the burden of work at all. But I am determined once and for all to face the dangers and difficulties all this involves and am not lacking in the optimism needed to continue. I have a scholarship from the Evangelical Missions. You are well aware of the humiliating policy of the missionaries, whether they be Catholics or Protestants. But up to now I have lacked nothing. The grant is limited,

especially in view of the high cost of living here in Switzerland. However, when one is struggling for a given purpose needs and shortages do not matter. The Swiss missionaries have already started say I am a communist. The Americans are so afraid of the word communist that if they ever hear of this I don't know if they will have any hesitation in cutting off my grant. As you know, Switzerland is one of the most capitalist countries in this rotten West. And they do not allow foreigners to engage in politics in Switzerland. In theory! So long as one takes the necessary precautions without directly offending the local authorities, we carry out our mission without them realising we are doing political work in Switzerland. The Swiss CP, although very small, is reasonably strong. I shall soon send you an anti-colonialist information bulletin published by the MDE (democratic student movement).

Although politics is a necessity and spontaneous activity for oppressed peoples, it still lacks wise guidance because it is an art. Although we learn much more from our own mistakes than from the dialectics of a monotonous and routine-bound professor, experience is still of capital importance. I am confident that with your cooperation ready to point out mistakes made from lack of experience, I will be able to be useful to our cause for which you have already been working for many years. I hereby offer my humble contribution to the building of an ideal and winning back of the Heritage which has been in the hands of the Usurper for 500 years. I should like to be informed about what is going on in Angola, the militant movements of the sons of our beloved land which has never known the happiness of its loved ones. if there is a fund to which each of us should contribute as best he can, I would be madly happy to pay my share. If there are information bulletins or magazines, either specifically about Angola or African in general, I am prepared to pay for subscriptions. When you can write to me on political matters use this address:

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, Case Postale 395 FRIBOURG 1 SWITZERLAND.

If it is purely friendly:

27 Av. Weck-Reynold FRIBOURG SWITZERLAND.

I sincerely wish you all a Happy Christmas and a decisive New Year.

A fraternal embrace from your servant,

(signed) ***J. Savimbi***



12/12/60

Prezados irmãos e camaradas

Logo em privado levar uma auto-apresentação, pois creio que vossos ouvidos falar de mim.

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, do Andulo-Bié, AMPLA. Cheguei em Lisboa em setembro de 1959 para terminar o 7º ano pois fiz o 5º em Sá da Bandeira. Matriculei-me no Liceu de Passos Manuel, onde em março de 1959, por ocasião da semana do ultramar fui *pedido* pelo Reitor a fazer um discurso sobre "a obra civilizadora de Portugal" tema escolhido pelo Governo. A principio resistindo para fazer um discurso só para os dois colegas por iniciativa do meu professor de Filosofia Dr. José Ferreira, quando este se apresentou que na sugestão tinha intervido a mão oculta do Governo, retirei o meu convite e passei para o meu lado apresentando uma resposta baseada na pouca experiência que eu tinha dos assuntos políticos. O Governo escolheu como lugar de apresentação do discurso, a Residência de Segurança. Convencido à porta com a ajuda per intermédio do meu professor de Filosofia passei a enfrentar sozinho a acção corrosiva da polícia internacional (PIDE). Para os camaradas que estão na Guiné, pode ao menos falar com o Abel Cabral que sabe bem como difícil é de ser solteiro com as mesmas palavras. Angolano ainda mais. Cansei por momentos difíceis, de dúvida e de desânimo. Perdi dois anos para o 7º ano que em circunstâncias normais teria em um ano ser professor de ser esquecido. Os dois anos passaram com a luta uma vez mais acentuada outras mais pacata mas o 7º ano não se concretiza fazer até a data presente. O desfecho do exame final de Fim, em Setembro deste ano, foi a mais enfadonha manifestação de falta de carácter que assisti até hoje. Na prova prática deram-me 5 valores e na prova escrita 19. Fui à final com 12. Chamaram-me aí a renhor desculpa que justificasse a derrota. Quem quiserem se debruçar sobre o problema dirá por fim que tinha sido novos arbitrai de Portugal em circunstâncias difíceis, não críticos do (P.C. Português) deram-me a maior oportunidade possível mas isso não evitou que "o rio subisse" a obtinar uma cor. Logo segundo a qual representaria a Portugal depois de 90 dias e colaborei finalmente com a PIDE. Receberam-me o Bilhete de Identidade que afinal não me fez falta alguma não é como lido português em Lausanne tem tentado por todos os vias estrar em contacto contigo. Depois de 2 anos é certíssimo sou vai se renovar a renovar-me o passaporte. Fiz um exame complementar Físico-Química e Francês para poder entrar na Faculdade, como e Lausanne ou Genève não ha lugares, via para a onde eu obrigado a aprender a falar pois se não sou em Alemão apesar de ser uma vila bi-lingue. Agrei o ex



II

es fr pode e eu não digual de forma alguma o dever do trabalho de ar que tes decidido ir a vos por to ne a enfrentar os perigos e a vi "Liberdade" que isto tudo aconteça e não me falta o optimismo para renunciar. Tenho uns soles das lisões vos-fiéis, de boais e ite de Ultimo hostilmente dos nacionalistas seja dos católicos ou protestantes, ... ao presente sou se fe tes não. A bolsa é restrita e muito ... carência na vida cá na suiça. Contudo enquanto as luta pura ... do fim não importam a desilusões ou arrefecimento. As misérias ... conseguir com a lícua e ou ser comunista. Os americanos tem um tal ... do terro comunista que um ... chamado ao seu ouvido não sai e tenho ... ter a falar, ao tom atado ... é um ... estrangeiros fazerem politica dentro do país. Teoricamente ... que ... temos de levemos preocupar em ofender directamente os autori ... levamos a cabo o nosso ... que de encontrar ... estão ... estigo. O P.C. estigo apesar de ser muito diminuto tem uma força ... Proximamente enviar-vos-ei um boletim de desinformação anti-colonialista editado pela M.D. (Movimento democrático de estudantes).

Se a política para as novas sociedades é uma necessidade e uma manifestação espontânea, ela não deixa de carecer de uma orientação sábia porque é uma arte. Se aprendemos muito mais com os nossos próprios erros ... a dialéctica de um estudantino monotono e rotineiro, nos deixa de ter importância em tal ... experiência. Estou confiante que com a nossa colaboração prestar a indispensável ajuda ... ser falta de ... a nossa causa ... útil a nossa ... para a mãe ... Lutando ... a oferecer os meus fracos ... edifícios ... conquista do nosso património que ha 500 anos ... poder. Gostaria de saber da corrente ... Militantes dos filhos da pátria querião que nunca conhecera a alegria ... seus entes queridos. Se ha um fundo para o qual devemos contribuir ... segundo as suas possibilidades, terei um alívio louco de dar a ... quanto-parte. Se ha Boletins Informativos ou Revistas quer especificas ... Angola ou Africanos em geral, estou pronto a pagar assinaturas. Quando se puderem escrever, em carácter político utilize o ... endereço:

Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, Case Postal 395 FRIBOURG 1 SUISSE.

Se for de carácter puramente amizavel:

27 Av. Weck-Reynold FRIBOURG SUISSE

A todos desejo sinceramente um natal alegre e um ano ... decisivo.

Abraço fraternal deste vosso servo

LETTER FROM HOLDEN ROBERTO TO JONAS SAVIMBI DATED 24 APRIL 1961

Dear brother,

After talking to you I received a communication from Chipenda. I gave him your message, he promised to pass by here on Tuesday and perhaps I will phone you together with him.

I am sending you some sheets of the Organisation's letter-headed paper and some badges.

I told the friends in Leopoldville that as from now our beloved compatriot SAVIMBI has become our official representative in Europe, so that you can already take up your duties, speaking in the name of the party and everything. As soon as I arrive in Leopoldville, we are going to deal with sending you help. If you can get some scholarships for students please let us know so that we can arrange for students to travel immediately. Such students could also work with you in the Lausanne or Geneva office.

I am also sending you some membership cards.

Courage and may our Lord bless you.

Your brother and reliable friend
(signed) ***Holden Roberto***



UNIAO DAS POPULACOES DE ANGOLA

B. P. 1330
LEOPOLDVILLE

New York, 24 de abril de 1961.-

Caro irmão,

Depois de ter falado comsigo recebi uma communicação de Chipenda. Ual lhe conhecimento da sua resposta, ele prometeu-me passar cá na terça-feira e talvez vamos lhe telefonar junto com ele.

Envio-lhe algumas folhas do papel timbrado da Organização e algumas " insígnas ".

Informei os amigos em Leopoldville que o nosso querido compatriota SAVIMBI passa ser a partir de hoje o nosso representante official na Europa, de forma que já podes tomar as suas responsabilidades, quer dizer falar em nome do partido e tudo. Logo que chego a Leopoldville, vamos já tratar de lhe enviar ajuda. Se puderes arranjar algumas bolsas dos estudos para alunos faça favor de nos comunicar assim agora faça o necessario para que o alunos sigam imediatamente. Tais alunos podem tambem colaborar comsigo para o escritorio de Lausanne ou Genebra.

Envio-lhe tambem algumas cartoes de membro.

Coragem e que o nosso Senhor lhe abençoe.

seu irmão e amigo certo

P.S. O cartao custa 100 Fr.-congoles.-

Sigo já para Leopoldville via Tunis e Accra

HOLDEN ROBERTO

'TOP SECRET' REPORT FROM THE PIDE HEADQUARTERS IN ANGOLA TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF SECURITY IN LISBON, DATED 5 DECEMBER 1972

Subject: UNITA - possible recuperation of its members
Refs: Top secret despatch 297/72-D.Inf/2Sec. of 4/12/72 from this office.

1. *Further to the referred despatch, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that on 2 December SAVIMBI was examined by a military doctor who went into the bush for this purpose, accompanied by two soldiers and the timber merchant ANTNIO FERNANDES DUARTE.*
2. *The meeting took place with nothing new to report. According to the timber merchant, SAVIMBI was optimistic and expressed the wish to solve the situation quickly. He expressed the desire to spend Christmas in his house at CANGUMBE. DUARTE is of the opinion that it would be a good opportunity for those involved in OPERATION TIMBER to contact him, since he has expressed an interest in a greater rapprochement, wishing to spend Christmas in CANGUMBE in an attempt to meet the authorities, especially since he asked him who was in the "working commission" and he said he was surprised that there was no one prepared to go ahead and solve the situation.*
3. *I take this opportunity to present my sincere greetings.*

FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION

(signed) ***THE DIRECTOR***


screviam em 1969?
Sebastião Mucavela

MUITO SECRETO

Direcção-Geral de Segurança

LISBOA

ASSUNTO: UNITA - Possível recuperação dos seus elementos

REF.ª: - Of.muito sec. 297/72-D.Inf/2ªSec. de 4DE72, desta Delegação

1. Em aditamento ao ofício em referência, tenho a honra de informar V.Ex.ª que teve lugar em 2DE2 a consulta do SAVIMBI por um médico militar, que se deslocou, para o efeito, à mata, acompanhado doutros militares e do madeireiro ANTÓNIO FERNANDES DUARTE.

2. O encontro verificou-se sem qualquer novidade.
Segundo aquele madeireiro, o SAVIMBI mostrou-se optimista e com vontade de resolver depressa a situação. Manifestou o desejo de vir passar o Natal em sua casa, em CANGUMBE. O DUARTE é da opinião que seria uma boa oportunidade para as entidades que fazem parte da "O.T. MADEIRA" tentarem, pois mostrou interesse numa maior aproximação, sendo o seu desejo de passar o Natal em CANGUMBE uma tentativa para se encontrar com as autoridades, tanto mais que lhe perguntou quais as entidades que compõem a "comissão de trabalho" e mostrou-se admirado por não haver qualquer elemento disposto a avançar na resolução da situação.

3. Aproveito o ensejo para apresentar a V.Ex.ª os meus melhores cumprimentos.

A BEM DA NAÇÃO

Luanda, 5 de Dezembro de 1972.

O DIRECTOR,

Direcção-Geral de Segurança

LETTER MARKED 'TOP SECRET' TO SAVIMBI FROM THE OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF ANGOLA, DATED 23 MAY 1973

His Excellency the Governor-General has instructed me to express his best wishes to you, conveying his appreciation and the importance he gives to the matters dealt with in your letters of 11 January 1973 and 23 February 1973.

Moreover, you have already had the opportunity to note that His Excellency, during a visit to the district of Bié, made some deeply significant comments about yourself and your colleagues.

So it is within this context that His Excellency has instructed me to state the following:

1. *In accordance with the principles it has always affirmed, the Government welcomed with satisfaction your wish for reconciliation and reintegration in the national community.*

   And the commitment never again to take up arms against the National Forces which you reiterated in the letter of 11 January this year is another greatly appreciated fact; it is sincerely believed because UNITA has always observed it with exemplary scrupulousness. On the part of the National and State Government you have the continued guarantees contained in the despatch of 1 March 1972 and the solemn undertaking that at no time will you or people with you be called to account for activities which, perchance, you may have carried out within or outside the national territory.

   Although recognising that you do not put in question the value of commitments made in this Portuguese State of Angola, I should like to remind you that the President of the Council of Ministers, Prof Marcelo Caetano, has repeatedly stated that we are ready for any talks with a view to the return to their land and the reintegration in the Portuguese Fatherland of those who have abandoned us.

2. *The Eastern Military Zone Command, on the joint decision of the H Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in Angola, will continue to represent the Governor in the current phase of the process of reintegration, which it is hoped to speed up with a view to readjusting positions and defining issues of interest to the fulfilment of the common objective.*

In order to facilitate the mission, I should be most grateful if you, our illustrious interlocutor, were to present to the Command any suggestions that occur to you on this matter.

However, you may rest assured that:

a) *Reintegration in the National Community will also include all UNITA members living abroad, leaders or activists, to be indicated by you.*

b) *All your members shall be entitled, under the law in force, to hold public posts for which they are properly qualified.*

c) The active contribution you continue to give us, once the reintegration process is completed, for Peace in Angola, will be greatly appreciated.

In respect of the above, His Excellency hopes that steady progress will be made on the path that has been taken, so that the common Objectives may be attained as soon as possible, prompted as we are by legitimate faith based on the results already achieved.

FOR THE GOOD OF THE NATION

Office of the Governor-General of Angola, Luanda, 23 May 1973.

OFFICE DIRECTOR
(signed)
JOO NOTASCO TOTTA



MUITO SECRETO

REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA
PROVÍNCIA DE ANGOLA

-2-

Gabinete do Governador-Geral

Para o efeito de facilitar a missão, muito grato ficaria se o nosso ilustre interlocutor apresentasse àquele Comando todas as sugestões que lhe ocorrerem sobre o caso.

Entretanto, pode V. Exª. ficar ciente de que:

a) A reintegração na Comunidade Nacional abrangerá também todos os filhos de Angola residentes no estrangeiro, dirigentes ou activistas, que o Dr. Savimbi inclua;

b) A todos os seus membros é reconhecido o direito, em conformidade da lei vigente, ao desempenho de funções públicas para que tenham preparação adequada;

c) Será muito apreciada a contribuição activa que continuo a dar-nos, finda o processo de reintegração, para a Paz em Angola;

Pelo exposto, aguarda Sua Excelência que se progride com firmeza no caminho que vem sendo seguido, por forma a que os Objectivos comuns sejam atingidos com a necessária brevidade, atendendo à fé que nos é legítimo possuir com base nos resultados já obtidos.

A BEM DA NAÇÃO

Repartição do Gabinete do Governo-Geral de Angola, em Luanda, aos 23 de Maio de 1973

O CHEFE DO GABINETE

JOÃO NOTASCO TOTTA

MUITO SECRETO

MUITO SECRETO

REPÚBLICA PORTUGUESA
PROVÍNCIA DE ANGOLA

Gabinete do Governador-Geral

EXCELENTÍSSIMO SENHOR

DR. JONAS MALHEIRO SAVIMBI

Sua Excelência o Governador Geral encarrega-me de apresentar a V. Exª. as suas saudações e tem a satisfação de lhe dar a apreciar e a importância que lhe tem merecido as suas últimas duas cartas de 17/4/73 e de 25/4/73.

Atrás, o Sr. Dr. já teve oportunidade de verificar que Sua Excelência, visitou o distrito do Bié, fez algumas considerações, de profundo significado, que ouviu a seu propósito e a dos seus colaboradores.

E, portanto, muito contente que Sua Excelência me encarrega de lhe representar o seguinte:

1. No respeito aos princípios que sempre tem afirmado, o Governo acolhe com o mais vivo satisfação ou seja votou da reconciliação e de reintegração na comunidade nacional.

E o compromisso de nunca mais pegar em armas contra as Forças Nacionais que referiu na carta de 17/4/73 do corrente ano é outro facto que muito me apraz registar e em que sinceramente se escuta porque a Guerra é tão respeitado com o capitular consegido.

Da carta do Governo Nacional e Nacional tem o Sr. Dr. as garantias constantes do despacho de 6/12/72 e o compromisso solene de que as mesmas instituições vão cumprir plenamente, a si e as as pessoas que lhe estão ligadas, das actividades que, porventura, hajam tenham a efeito dentro do área do território nacional.

Sua Excelência do reconhecer que o Sr. Dr. não pôde ou cumprir o valor dos compromissos tomados neste Estado Portugês de Angola, pretende de lhe recordar que o Presidente do Conselho de Ministros, Prof. Marcelo Caetano, tem afirmado, repetidamente, que estamos prontos para todos os contactos que tenham por objecto o regresso à sua terra e à integração na Pátria Portuguesa daqueles que nos abandonaram.

2. O General da Zona Militar Leste, por determinação conjunta do Governador-Geral e do Comandante-Chefe das Forças Armadas de Angola, continuará a representar o Governo no seu curso do processo de reintegração que se deseja acelerar com vista ao rejustamento de posições e definição das questões que interessam à concretização do objectivo comum.

MUITO SECRETO

REPORT TO PRESIDENT MOBUTU FROM HIS SPECIAL ADVISOR IN ZAIRE'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, DATED 26 MAY 1983

NOTE TO THE FOUNDER PRESIDENT

My Respects,
My General,

SUBJECT: ***SECRET MEETING IN KINSHASA BETWEEN THE SPECIAL ENVOY FROM THE USA, THE ANGOLAN FIGHTING MOVEMENTS AND THE OTHER PARTIES INTERESTED IN THE SITUATION IN ANGOLA***

Those present:

CONCERNED PARTIES:
- UNITA with three people,
- Special US envoy,
- Military envoys from the RSA, including a member of the national intelligence service.

OBSERVER:
- The Israeli military advisor in Kinshasa.

REPORT TO THE FOUNDER PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: ZAIRE ACCUSED BY THE "NEW YORK TIMES" OF THE TRANSIT OF AMERICAN ARMS FOR UNITA.



REPUBLIQUE DU ZAIRE
Président de la République

CONSEIL NATIONAL DE SECURITE

CONFIDENTIEL

Kinshasa le 26 MAI 1983

N/CNS/BCS/026/83.

BUREAU DU CONSEILLER SPECIAL DU CHEF DE L'ETAT.-

NOTE AU PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR

Mes Respects.
Mon Général.

CONCERNE : ENTRETIEN SECRET A KINSHASA ENTRE L'ENVOYE SPECIAL DES U.S.A., LES MOUVEMENTS DE LUTTE ANGOLAIS ET LES AUTRES PARTIES INTERESSEES SUR LA SITUATION EN ANGOLA.-

Etaient presents :

PARTIE CONCERNEE :

- L'UNITA avec trois personnes.
- L'envoyé spécial des U.S.A.
- Les emissaires militaires de la R.S.A., dont un membre du service national de renseignement.-

PARTIE D'OBSERVATION :

- Le conseiller militaire d'ISRAEL à KINSHASA.-

.../...

NOTE D'INFORMATION AU PRESIDENT-FONDATEUR.-

CONCERNE : LE ZAIRE ACCUSE PAR LE " NEW YORK TIMES " DE TRANSIT D'ARMES AMERICAINES A L'UNITA.

Mes respects !

Maréchal,

Le Journal américain, " New York Times ", a dans son édition du dimanche 01 février 1987, fait état du passage par la base de Kamina au Zaïre des armes américaines destinées à l'UNITA. Cet hebdomadaire, pour étayer cela, écrit que deux avions de la Compagnie Américaine SANTA LUCIA AIR-WAYS (C130 et le Boeing 707) transportent ce matériel et que les premières opérations de livraison, ont eu lieu la nuit entre la période du 20 mars à la mi-octobre 1986. A l'exception d'une seule qui s'est déroulée le jeudi au mois de Mai de la même année. En outre, le Journal rapporte que cette opération est dirigée, côté américain, par un Colonel.

L'auteur de cet article est Mr. JIM BROOKE, correspondant du " New York Time ", établi à Abidjan réputé gauchisant et qui a séjourné dernièrement au Zaïre. Sa publication a été non seulement du chœur par d'autres journaux étrangers, mais aussi, commentée en nous disant.

My respects!
Marshal,

The American newspaper "New York Times", in its issue of Sunday 1 February 1987, reported the transit of American arms for UNITA through the Kamina base in Zaire. In reporting this, the daily wrote that two planes belonging to the American company SANTA LUCIA AIRWAYS (a C130 and a Boeing 707) transported this material and that the first delivery operations took place at night during the period from 20 March to mid-October 1986. Apart from just one which took place by day in May that year. Furthermore, the newspaper reported that, on the American side, the operation is run by a Colonel.

The author of the article is Mr JIM BROOKE, "New York Times" correspondent based in Abidjan, reputedly left-wing, who has recently been in Zaire. His article has not only been repeated in chorus by other foreign papers, but has also been commented on in various ways.

On analysis, it appears that everything said in this sensationalist article have already been said before. They are not new facts as might be thought.

A. THE TRANSIT OF ARMS

It will be recalled that in April 1986 President Kaunda announced that ZAIRE was being used for the transit of American arms for UNITA. These allegations were made at a press conference after a meeting of Front Line countries held in Luanda. These tendentious statements were taken up by the Zambian and Tanzanian press under different headlines. "MOBUTU WORKING AGAINST PEACE IN THE REGION" was the "TIMES OF ZAMBIA" headline, and "Transit of arms in Zaire" appeared as a banner headline in the "DAILY NEWS", the Tanzanian government daily.

B. THROUGH KAMINA BASE

The news came from the left-wing western press, particularly 'THE OBSERVER", "AFRICA NOW" (British) and DE MORGEN (Belgian).

C. ON PLANES BELONGING TO THE AMERICAN COMPANY SANTA LUCIA AIRWAYS

The "WASHINGTON POST" published this in its columns in November 1986.

As we have noted, no new factor, apart from a black American (a certain Colonel) has been added to this traditional accusation. Neither the periods indicated nor the famous black Colonel correspond to reality. Moreover, there is no black Colonel at the American Embassy in Kinshasa, or even at their Consulate General in Lubumbashi.

In fact, the operation is directed by a white officer from the CIA with the rank of Major.

In any case, the content of the article is nil. Its author has not backed it up with compromising elements like a photograph of

the Kamina base, the material supplied, quantities and nature, the aircraft and their flight plans indicating the full and precise itinerary from departure until their arrival in Jamba, passing through Zaire (Kinshasa-Kamina), let alone details of crew personnel, the Zairean team and their specialised field, nor even the service to which they belong.

The operation has gone well up to now and all the personnel involved (Zairean and American) have behaved correctly, as moreover acknowledged by the Assistant Director General of the CIA in charge of operations, Mr CLAIR E GEORGE, in his letter to the Founder President dated 3 February 1987.

However, the article by JIM BROOKE has the merit of its author having stayed in Zaire, mainly in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, in the 2nd fortnight of January 1987. He moreover stressed this in his article and stated that he Hhad been neutralised by the very vigilant Zairean Security Services. This is the reason for the invalidity of an article unbacked by the proofs so avidly sought during this trip by the journalist with so much hatred for Zaire and its Leader.

In fact, JIM BROOKE already had his article written and could have published it without visiting Zaire.

His trip to Zaire was merely a pretext to justify the following:

- *Entry and exit stamp put in his passport in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi;*
- *Meeting with the United States Ambassador in Kinshasa and his visit to the US Consulate General in Lubumbashi;*
- *His having been taken care of from Kinshasa until his arrest in Lubumbashi;*



- 2 -

Après l'analyse, il apperc que tous les éléments qui font l'objet de cette publication à sensation, l'ont déjà été auparavant. Il ne s'agit plus des faits nouveaux comme on peut le croire.

A. DU PASSAGE DES ARMES :

On se souviendra que le Président KAUNDA a, au cours du mois d'Avril 1986, annoncé que le ZAIRE sert de transit d'armes américaines destinées à l'UNITA. Ces allégations ont été faites au cours d'une conférence de presse après la réunion des pays de la Ligne de Front, tenue à Luanda. Ces déclarations tendacieuses ont été reprises par la presse zambienne et tanzanienne, sous différents titres. " MOBUTU TRAVAIL CONTRE LA PAIX DANS LA REGION ", avait intitulé " TIMES OF ZAMBIA " et " Transit d'armes au Zaïre ".. en grandes machettes par " DAILY NEWS ", quotidien gouvernemental tanzanien.

B. PAR LA BASE DE KAMINA .-

La nouvelle est venue de la presse occidentale fouineuse particulièrement " THE OBSERVER","AFRICA LAW " (Britannique) et DE MORGEN (Belge).

C. A BORD DES AVIONS DE LA COMPAGNIE AMERICAINE SANTA LUCIA AIR-WAYS .-

C'est " WASHINGTON POST " qui avait publié cela dans ses colonnes au mois de Novembre 1986.

Comme on peut le constater, aucun élément nouveau, en dehors des dates, d'un noir américain

- 3 -

(un certain Colonel) n'est venu s'ajouter à cette accusation traditionnelle.

Ni les périodes indiquées ni le fameux Colonel noir, ne correspondent à la réalité. D'ailleurs, à l'Ambassade américaine à Kinshasa, il n'y a pas un Colonel noir, même pas à leur Consulat Général à Lubumbashi.

En réalité, l'opération est dirigée par un officier blanc de la C.I.A. qui a le grade de Major.

Du reste, le contenu de cet article est creux. Car son auteur ne l'a pas appuyé par des éléments compromettants tels la photographie de la base de Kamina, des matériels fournis, leur quantité et leur nature, des avions et de leurs plans de vol indiquant l'itinéraire complet et précis depuis leur départ jusqu'à leur arrivée à JAMBA, en passant par le Zaïre (Kinshasa-Kamina)encore moins les détails sur le personnel de l'équipage, de l'équipe zaïroise et la spécialité de cette dernière, ni même le service auquel ils appartiennent.

L'opération s'est bien déroulée jusqu'à présent et tout le personnel affecté (zaïrois et américains) s'est comporté correctement comme le reconnaît d'ailleurs le Directeur Général (Point de la C.I.A., chargé des opérations Mr. CLAIR E. GEORGE, dans sa lettre adressée au Président-Fondateur datée du 3 février 1987.

All this was merely to prove and give weight to the claims published by this irresponsible man.

This was all JIM BROOKE sought and his article paved the way for other investigations.

In order to avoid a repetition of such events, we recommend the following to the Founder President:

- *Increase vigilance at points of entry to Zaire, particularly Ndjili Airport and Lubumbashi, especially that of the specialised services in those places (RVA, ZAIRE-SHELL and FAZA);*
- *Forbid access to the Kamina Base to any foreigner and close it during the period of operations;*
- *Control all African or non-African journalists who want to visit Zaire to report on it. Any application for an entry visa to Zaire should have the prior authorisation of the External Documentation Service and our Embassies should be instructed to this effect.*

GOUDOC/AND



Néanmoins, l'article de Jim BROOKE le ce mérite que son auteur a séjourné au Zaïre, principalement à Kinshasa et à Lubumbashi dans la 2ème quinzaine de mois de Janvier 1987. Faits d'ailleurs qu'il a soulignés dans son article en mettant en évergue sa neutralisation par les services de sécurité zaïrois très vigilants. C'est ce qui explique le caractère de cet article non rédigé par des preuves lors recherches lors de son voyage sur le terrain par ce journaliste haïtien à l'endroit du Zaïre et de Son Chef.

En réalité, Jim BROOKE avait son article déjà rédigé qu'il entrait publier sans la visite au Zaïre.

Son voyage au Zaïre n'a été qu'un prétexte pour justifier qu'il les éléments suivants :

- Cachet d'entrée et de sortie apposé dans son passeport à Kinshasa et à Lubumbashi;
- Entretiens avec l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis à Kinshasa et sa visite à leur Consulat Général à Lubumbashi;
- La prise en charge depuis Kinshasa jusqu'à l'arrestation à Lubumbashi.

Tout cela pour attester et donner le poids aux propos publiés par cet irresponsable.

C'est tout ce que Jim BROOK recherchait et son article a permis son voyé à d'autres recherches.

...//...

- 2 -

Pour éviter la répétition de tels faits, nous faisons les recommandations suivantes au Président-Fondateur :

- Accroître la vigilance aux points d'entrée du Zaïre, notamment à l'aéroport de Ndjili et à Lubumbashi, étant qu'aux services spécialisés à ces endroits (R.V.A, ZAIRE-SHELL et FAZA);
- Interdire l'accès de la Base de Kamina à toute personne étrange à cet et la fermer durant la période des opérations;
- Contrôler tous les journalistes africains ou non, désireux que de venir sur place enquêtes et reportage. Toute demande de visa d'entrée au Zaïre devra rendre l'accord préalable de notre Service de Documentation Extérieure et nos Ambassades devront être instruites dans ce sens.

COMMUNIQUÉ ISSUED BY THE 'TRUE BLACK COCKEREL MOVEMENT', A UNITA DISSIDENT GROUP

APPEAL TO ANGOLAN PATRIOTS

We, the combatants in Angola and those forced to go into exile, are united by our deep concern about the destiny of our country, given the lamentable situation in which our previously proud Union finds itself.

- Internal democracy,
- Tolerance and political co-existence,
- The will to cooperate,
- The aspiration to national unity,
- The struggle against terror for its own sake.

These were the virtues of our Union! They have been wiped out, and not only by the behaviour of our adversaries. It is with deep anger that we have to state that part of our leadership had sacrificed those virtues. They have abandoned sacred principles and debased our proud movement in the eyes of peoples!

There is one among them who has never had these virtues: Jonas SAVIMBI! He is, has been and remains the man most acceptable to the PIDE, the CIA, BOSS (NIS) and other enemies of the Angolan people, but who never has been and never will be the representative of our people!

We raise the following questions and demands decisive to UNITA's future:

- Are we a liberation movement of our black brothers or are we an extension of the arm of Pretoria? Our position on South Africa should be unequivocal. Acknowledging the support given during the hardest years should not necessarily exclude the categorical rejection of apartheid, condemning terror against our brothers and sisters in AZANIA.

As the UNITA leader who was the courted guest of honour at the ceremony of investiture of P W Botha, the traitor SAVIMBI could not have done greater harm to our cause!

- What is the purpose of SAVIMBI's call for concentrating on terrorist acts?

The blood of our brothers and sisters in Angola will not remove the Soviets, Cubans and other eastern vassals! National unity will not be achieved through war between brothers!

SAVIMBI's statement about wanting to destroy American, British and West German companies in Angola will shake the confidence of our western friends! If the Americans continue to negotiate with the MPLA, we will be left with only a secondary role! With that we will not win the support of the OAU and our African brothers and sisters either!

- What good is false propaganda about our spectacular military successes when we all know that, without weapons, transport facilities, petrol and radio sets supplied by South Africa, our fighting strength would soon be exhausted? The price we pay

for all this is humiliation! Why were our veteran combatants forced, on the orders of South African officers, to destroy NGIVA completely when they retreated?

- What kind of socialism did SAVIMBI write at the time on our flags, a socialism he has now transformed into a personal dictatorship in line with his motto: "UNITA is me"?

On all the points listed above we blame SAVIMBI for betraying the ideals of UNITA and the Angolan people!

"The Angolan Road to National Recovery" of November 1984 will remain mere paper if we do not change course. We do not want another party. Our party is UNITA - the once proud cockerel! Down with the traitor SAVIMBI!

THE STRUGGLE TRIUMPHS
UNITED WE SHALL WIN

New York, Brussels, Munich, May 1985.



UNIAO NACIONAL PARA INDEPENDENCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA
(UNION NATIONALE POUR L'INDEPENDANCE TOTALE DE L'ANGOLA)

UNITA

UNITA
THE TRUE BLACK COCKEREL: MOVEMENT
LE MOUVEMENT DU COQ NOIR AUTHENTIQUE
LA VOIX DE LA RESISTANCE ANGOLAISE

APPEL AUX PATRIOTES ANGOLAIS

Nous, les combattants en Angola et ceux qui ont été forcés d'aller en exil, unit la préoccupation profonde du destin de notre patrie en égard à la situation lamentable dans laquelle se trouve notre Union si fière jadis.

- la démocratie intérieure,
- la tolérance, la coexistence politique,
- la volonté à la coopération,
- l'exploitation à l'intérieur comme,
- la lutte contre la et non pour la terreur,

c'étaient les vertus de notre union! Elles ont été ankeenties non seulement par le comportement de nos adversaires. C'est avec une colère profonde qu'il nous faut constater qu'une partie de nos dirigeants a sacrifié ces vertus. Ils ont abandonné les principes sacrés et ont rabaissé notre fier mouvement aux yeux des peuples!

Il y a bien eux qui n'a jamais possédé ces vertus: Jonas SAVIMBI ! Celui qui était et reste l'homme convenant le mieux à la PIDE, à Da CIA, au BOSS (NIS) et à d'autres ennemis du peuple angolais, mais qui n'était et ne sera jamais le représentant de notre peuple!

Nous soulevons les suivantes questions et revendications décisives au futur de l'UNITA:

- Sommes-nous un mouvement de libération de nos frères noirs ou sommes-nous le bras allongé du Pretoria?
Notre position au sujet de l'Afrique du Sud doit être sans équivoque. La reconnaissance pour le soutien obtenu au cours des années les plus dures ne doit forcément pas exclure le refus catégorique de l'apartheid, la condamnation de la terreur contre nos frères et soeurs à AZANIA!

Le dirigeant de l'UNITA comme d'insulte d'honneur courtisé aux cérémonies. Introduisant: P. W. BOTHA dans ses fonctions le traître SAVIMBI n'aurait pas du rendre un service plus néfaste à notre cause!

- A qui sert l'appel lancé par SAVIMBI de s'orienter surtout aux actes terroristes?
Le sang de nos frères et soeurs en Angola n'emportera pas les Soviétiques, les Cubains et les autres vassals orientaux! L'unité nationale ne se fera pas à force de la guerre contre des frères!

La déclaration de SAVIMBI de vouloir détruire des entreprises américaines, britanniques et ouest-allemandes en Angola ébranle la confiance de nos amis occidentaux! Si les Américains sont prêts à négocier avec le MPLA, il ne restera à nos autres qu'à l'UNITA de comparer! Avec cela nous n'obtiendrons non plus le soutien de la OUA et de nos frères et soeurs africains!

- A quoi bon la propagande mensongère parlant de succès militaires spectaculaires, surtout que nous savons tous que sans les armes, sans les moyens de transport, sans l'essence et sans les postes de radio fournis par l'Afrique du Sud, notre force de combat s'épuiserait vite? Le pire pour tout cela est l'humiliation! Pourquoi donc a-t-on forcé nos vieux combattants sous l'ordre d'officiers sudafricains de détruire complètement NGIVA lors de leur retraite?

- Quel genre de socialisme est-ce que SAVIMBI a écrit à l'époque sur nos drapeaux, un socialisme qu'il a transformé maintenant dans une dictature personnelle selon sa devise: "L'UNITA - c'est moi"?

Dans tous les points énumérés ci dessus, nous reprochons à SAVIMBI la trahison des idéaux de l'UNITA et du peuple angolais!

"The Angola Road to National Recovery" du novembre 1984 restera du papier-lettre, si notre cours ne changera pas. Nous ne voulons pas d'autre parti. Notre parti, c'est l'UNITA - le coq si fier de jadis! A bas le traître SAVIMBI!

LA LUTTE TRIOMPHE
UNIS NOUS VAINCRONS

New York, Bruxelles, Munich, en mai 1985

COMMUNIQUÉ BY THE 'TRUE BLACK COCKEREL MOVEMENT' DATELINED LISBON, BRUSSELS, AUGUST 1985

AUGUST 1985 BULLETIN

American arms to support the terror of Savimbi's party?

We bow our heads in profound sorrow to the memory of more than 30 courageous sons of our proud UNITA! We share the suffering of the innumerable people tortured! They did not lose their lives in the struggle against the enemy; They did not suffer pain in combat. No, they were victims of the dictator and his clique. Anyone who does not obey unconditionally is tortured or killed. Last month Savimbi had five of our soldiers, including an officer, killed for 'cowardice'. Yet what were their crimes? They did not obey orders to kill 14 villagers. Alright, they were accomplices of the Luanda regime, but they were 14 women and children. We loudly state, so that everyone can hear us, that this is not UNITA's way of acting but the style of SAVIMBI and his clique of traitors. True to our proud black cockerel, we pledge to continue the struggle against that band until its downfall, so that the just values of our movement may again light up our people's path and terror and violence may no longer keep them in darkness and fear.

In ANGOLA, UNITA is no longer present everywhere, because the clique of traitors prefers military struggle to winning over the hearts and minds of our people - the only guarantee of our victory. Wherever the arm of SAVIMBI reaches, the cult of guns reigns supreme. Another IDI AMIN sows violence and reaps hatred. This is why we are gradually losing our people. This is why more guns at this moment means more power for that clique of assassins, which power they would also use against the movement itself. Furthermore, this would give the hawks in Luanda a pretext for demanding new arms and clinging even more closely to Htheir foreign support. HWithin this context, we believe that the decision of the American Congress to resume arms supplies is a serious mistake. It could have the effect of a black mamba on a negotiated peace. At least since October 1983, when Chester CROCKER was informed of CHITUNDA'S falsifications, the American government has been aware of this point of view. CROCKER and other politicians gave the impression that they accepted it. Now, it must be openly admitted, we were mistaken. We were misled. Washington does not want any negotiated peace, but prefers to score points in the elephantine race of the superpowers. It also wants the conflict of the giants in our country. And SAVIMBI is its devoted servant.We are of the opinion that ANGOLA can solve its problems alone, if it is not involved in the East-West conflict, if it refrains from anti-Americanism and anti-Sovietism, if it acts on the basis of non-

alignment, internal tolerance and assured economic progress.

The policy of SAVIMBI and his clique is a caricature of UNITA's own ideals. In the name of our proud movement, under South African instructions, he destroys SWAPO bases, with the collaboration of South African experts he organises attacks on international enterprises (Gulf Oil in CABINDA), concludes a useless "historic treaty" in Jamba creating a "democratic international" against "Russian imperialism and communism", murders civilians and kidnaps foreigners.

We ask what distinction there still is between that clique and the RNM (MNR). Do we really want to wait until neighbouring African states form a common military front with Luanda against us? Might not what is now happening between FRELIMO, Tanzania and Zimbabwe be followed by the MPLA, SWAPO and Zambia?

It is high time to put an end to the activities of the traitors.

Drive SAVIMBI's clique of assassins to the wall! H Support the True Black Cockerel Movement!

The struggle will triumph!
United we shall win!



FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I

1. Paul-Loup Sulitzer in *France Soir,* 31/10/86
   Yves Loiseau & Pierre Guillaume de Roux, Portrait d'un Révolutionnaire en Général (La Table Ronde, Paris, 1987).
   Ockrent/Marenches, *Dans le secret des princes* (Editions Stock, Paris, 1986).
2. Fred Bridgland, *Savimbi: a key to Africa* (Mainstream Publishing Co Ltd, Edinburgh, 1986).
3. Loiseau/de Roux, op cit.
4. Ibid.
5. Bridgland and Loiseau/de Roux, op. cit.
6. Gordon Winter, *Inside BOSS* (Penguin Books, London, 1981).
7. There is a difference of up to a year between Savimbi's account of this period, as given in Bridgland's book, and when the events actually took place. The Makerere conference, for example, was in April 1961, not in late 1960.
8. **John Marcum has written several books on Angola, notably** *The Angolan Revolution,* Vols I and II (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass, 1978)
9. According to Gordon Winter, Tony Fernandes later became UNITA's CIA link man in London.
10. William Minter, *Operation Timber - pages from the Savimbi dossier* (Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey, 1988).
11. Ibid, see chapter on Operation Timber.
12. In 1979, the weekly *O Expresso* published a letter from a Portuguese soldier who, in early 1969, had involuntarily witnessed a meeting in the bush between a colonial army unit and UNITA men. The latter were then driven to the town of Gago Coutinho to meet Maj Martins, in charge of operations in the area and head of the local PIDE. There had already been a number of such very cordial meetings.
13. *The Sunday Telegraph,* London, 17/7/88.

CHAPTER II

1. The *flechas* were generally liberation movement deserters used by the Portuguese army and by the PIDE, which acted as military intelligence in the colonies. The colonial army also used units of former Katangese gendarmes who had fled Congo-Léopoldville after the fall of Tschombe.
2. He addressed N'Zau Puna by his nom de guerre, Chimbindinbau.
3. It is interesting to note that both Samuel Chiwale and António Vakulukuta have recently been expelled from UNITA or even physically eliminated, according to UNITA deserters.
4. William Minter, op cit. In his introduction, Minter notes that one of the envoys mentioned by the Governor of Luso in a report on the meeting to the Governor General in Luanda was Samuel Epalanga, said to have become a UNITA political bureau member in 1982. Indeed, there are many UNITA members who knew about the treachery and still hold leading posts.

CHAPTER III

1. The report, consisting of 18 hand-written pages, dealt with both military and 'political' matters.
2. The media, including the Portuguese press, were continually quoting UNITA and its leader. On 15 June 1974, the day after the signing of the ceasefire, the centre-right *Século Ilustrado* published a several-page spread on UNITA's programme and 'ideological foundations'.
3. Portuguese army reports on the presumed numerical strength of each movement - to which, among others, Admiral Rosa Coutinho had access on his arrival in Luanda in July 1974 - gave the following figures: 15-20,000 for the FNLA, 3,000 for the MPLA (which was said to have lost about 2,000 men in 1972 through Chipenda's 'Eastern Rebellion'), and

2-300 for UNITA, which the Portuguese General Staff moreover knew best. According to CIA estimates, in August 1975 the three forces were as follows: MPLA 20,000, FNLA 15,000, UNITA 4,000 (Stockwell, op cit).

4. Admiral Rosa Coutinho stated, on the 10th anniversary of 25 April that, although a member of the Junta of National Salvation, he was never either officially or unofficially told what was discussed by the two heads of state at the meeting in the Azores.
5. Nor did Rosa Coutinho know what agreements were reached by Spinola and Mobutu on the Isle of Sal. Yet he knew for certain that undertakings were made, because after the fall of Spínola, on 28 September, Mobutu sent a message to the President of the Government Junta in Luanda, Rosa Coutinho himself, asking 'if the agreements signed in Sal are still valid'.
6. Despite the MFA's precautions, there was an exodus of some 300,000 Portuguese in 1975. A wave of panic, mainly caused by unfounded but deliberately circulated rumours, swept the white community, although it was not attacked by any Angolan movement. An airlift was established, with the help of some European countries, to fly the vast majority of whites resident in Angola to Portugal between July and 1 November 1975. This caused serious problems for the Portuguese government at the time. Most of the *retornados* strengthened the right-wing parties and some even promoted the creation of new far right organisations, groups and publications.
7. The Alvor Agreement also provided for the setting up of a joint army to which each movement was to contribute 8,000 men. UNITA therefore had to recruit enough men to form its contingent very hastily, and this it did only in the Central Highlands, among the Ovimbundu.
8. Only a few days after the signing of the Alvor Agreement, the Ford administration, with the approval of the National Security Council's 40 Committee, granted the FNLA $300,000 in covert aid. Soon afterwards the FNLA broke the Agreement by attacking the MPLA. (Stockwell, op cit).
9. Despite the massive and repeated external assistance it received, the FNLA's military strength proved to be a myth, particularly when it tried to take the capital from the north. Roberto's army was also known for its extreme brutality, so that it never gained the trust of the population, especially in Luanda.
10. Driven out of Luanda, the FNLA troops holed themselves up in the So Pedro da Barra fortress to the north of the capital, from which they were only dislodged a few weeks later.
11. *Le Monde, Paris,* 14/7/75.
12. *Le Monde,* 29/8/75.
13. The Portuguese authorities, who had withdrawn from everywhere in the country apart from Luanda, were supposed to be ensuring that the Alvor Agreement was respected and no arms supplies were allowed in. This was enforced in respect of the MPLA, whereas the FNLA, and later UNITA, freely received arms sent in from Zaire and Namibia.
14. In February, the 40 Committee refused to grant $100,000 in assistance to UNITA, although it was helping the FNLA. Things changed over the ensuing months. Mobutu was given $2,750,000 to send arms to the FNLA and UNITA, while the two organisations were directly allocated $2 million. Part of $8 million granted by the Ford administration on 27 July 1975 was used to supply Savimbi in Huambo. UNITA also benefited from further US military and financial assistance to the two groups granted on 20 August. (Stockwell, op cit)
15. Daniel Chipenda, who had led a tribally-based rebellion against Neto's leadership of the MPLA in eastern Angola in 1972, had taken a few hundred bunda guerrillas to Zaire with him. He joined the FNLA in 1974, but because his men were ethnically different from the FNLA's Kikongo base, he remained more or less autonomous. After the South African retreat into Namibia, Chipenda's men joined the SADF and formed the bulk of 32 or Buffalo Battalion, officered by mercenaries, which has operated continually in southern Angola, often jointly with UNITA. Chipenda, who lived in exile in Portugal, recently returned to Angola under the government's policy of clemency towards former opponents.
16. Fred Bridgland, op cit, p 148.

CHAPTER IV

1. Franc Wilhelm Heimer, *O processo de descolonizaçao em Angola 74-76 (A regra do jogo, Lisbon, 1980).*
2. Valdemiro Sousa, *Angola a guerra e o crime* (Planeta: Editorial Formacâo, Lisbon, 1976).
3. Tiny Rowland, head of the British company Lonrho, with extensive activities in Africa, especially in mining, provided Jonas Savimbi with a Hawker-Siddely 125 executive jet, according to Rowland at the request of Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda.
4. This 'independence' proclaimed under the protective umbrella of the South African army, was rendered even less credible by the many clashes between the FNLA and UNITA. Owing to the lack of political agreement, it was not until 1 December that the FNLA/UNITA 'coalition' announced the names of the members of its 'government'.
5. John Stockwell, op cit.

CHAPTER V

1. United Nations Security Council Resolution 387 (1976) condemning South Africa's aggression against Angola called upon the South African government 'to meet the just claims of the people's Republic of Angola for a full compensatoin for the damage and destruction inflicted on its State and for the restoration of the equipment and materials which its invading forces seized'.
2. In 1976 the Angolan government had listed more than a hundred bridges of different sizes destroyed during the South African invasion. Communications difficulties between consumer centres and production areas, coupled with the disappearance of the network of middlemen, had greatly affected the peasants, especially in the Central Highlands.
3. Between 27 March 1976 and 11 June 1979, the SADF carried out 193 military and mine-laying operations; 21 border provocations; 7 aerial bombings and a large-scale combined operation by air and ground forces against the Namibian refugee camp at Kassinga in which 612 people were killed, including 167 women and 298 children. Total damage during the period was $293.3 million. (Report presented to the United Nations by Angola on 25/7/79.)
4. *Afrique Asie,* Paris, No. 362 of 2/12/85.
5. *The Times,* London, 5/9/82: 'For the first time, a large UNITA force tried to take a government position. It seems they failed and the South Africans intervened.'
6. UNITA prisoner Januario Kossuma (*Afrique Asie article cited*) stated: 'In June 1983 we destroyed the bridge over the Kuango River between Lunda Sul and Malanje. Supplies were parachute-dropped to us. Those were the "vertical operations": after radio contacts with Jamba we lit fires in a clearing, and the planes passed over during the night and dropped us boxes of ammunition, weapons, uniforms, food and medicines. It had been agreed that we were entitled to an average of four planes a quarter.'

   Joseph Hanlon, *Beggar your Neighbours* (CIIR, London, 1986): Between 19 and 27 April 1985, the Angolans found 40 tonnes of assorted weapons and explosives that had been parachuted into Malanje by South African planes but which UNITA had not been able to pick up. According to the to the government, it included more than 500,000 rounds of ammunition, 1,000 mortar shells, 1,800 hand grenades, more than 1,000 mines and nearly 7 tonnes of explosives. There were also large quantities of UNITA propaganda.'
7. Bob Woodword, *Veil: The secret wars of the CIA 1981-1987* (Simon and Shuster, New York, 1987).
8. John Stockwell, interview in *Afrique Asie* No. 265 of 10/5/82: 'Washington has never abandoned Savimbi'.
9. The reconstruction of the bridge over the Cunene River cost $8.3 million. Total damage between 11/6/79 and 31/12/81: $635 million; between 31/12/81 and September 1984: $155 million. (Memorandum on South African aggression, People's Assembly, Luanda, November 1987.)

10. A Joint Monitoring Commission comprising Angolan and South African military personnel was to oversee the withdrawal, to take place within a month. Joseph Hanlon (op cit) wrote that in the Lusaka understanding 'it was agreed that no ''outside forces'' - that is UNITA or SWAPO - would move into the zone.. South Africa admitted that it had installed UNITA units in the area during the occupation, and that some were trying to stay behind after the withdrawal.'
11. *Daily Telegraph,* London, 25/6/85.
12. The SADF in fact intervened on many occasions. On 19 August 1985, for example, Gen Constans Viljoen, the SADF commander-in-chief, announced the death in Cazombo (Moxico Province), 500 km north of Namibia, of a South African officer who had been helping UNITA. Savimbi told the *Washington Post* of 31 June 1986 how 2,000 of his soldiers were flown to Cazombo from the Mavinga base, in August 1985, in South African air force Hercules C-130s. The Egyptian Mohamed Kamel Amir, spokesman of the UN commission that went to Angola in October 1985 to assess the damage caused by the latest South African army and air force incursions, stated: 'It is impossible to make a distinction between South Africa and UNITA.'
13. The *Guardian,* London, 21/9/85; The Times, London, 23/9/85. Curiously enough, Malan repeated the same phrase during South Africa's intervention in Kuando Kubango in 1987; *Le Monde,* Paris, 17/11/87.
14. This American public relations firm was paid $600,000, for the year 1986, to organise a campaign to promote Savimbi.
15. On 8 January 1986, addressing Chester Crocker in Luanda, the Angolan President asked 'whether Savimbi's visit (to Washington) and the military and other assistance the United States intends to give him should be regarded as a form of pressure on Angola or as a declaration of war by the United States, a great power, against the Angolan people'. A few months later the Angolan government questioned United States credibility as an honest mediator between itself and South Africa and suspended talks with Washington.
16. In 1987, UNITA, on Washington's advice, announced that it would cease acts of sabotage against the Benguela Railway if the Angolan government agreed not to use it for military purposes. This announcement, made because of the economic importance of the line to landlocked countries in the region, was in fact sheer bluff. It was intended to gain some respectability for UNITA at a time when the question of the rehabilitation of the line had again been taken up by the Société Générale de Belgique - which owns 90% of the shares in the Benguela Railway Company - and was being debated by the EEC. There was no marked decrease in acts of sabotage on the rail line and related communications facilities until the Angolan armed forces stepped up operations in the centre and east of the country in August and September 1988 - when South African troops withdrew from Angola under the New York agreements - and took back important places held by UNITA in those areas.

CHAPTER VI

1. Many secret meetings attended by South African and US representatives were held in Zaire after 1981. We have in our possession confidential reports on some of these from Zairean security to President Mobutu. Of special interest is the report on a meeting held on 25 June 1981: 'Secret meeting at Kitona between the Angolan fighting movements on the situation in Angola and Cabinda. Those present: UNITA with three people, COMIRA with four people, the two FLECs with seven people, and the remarkable presence of Mr Armand Agnarelli (a mercenary - ed.). Also attending: the RSA with two people (military envoys), the USA with two people, a special envoy and a CIA member at the Kinshasa Embassy.' 26 May 1983 - 'Secret meeting in Kinshasa between the special US envoy, the Angolan fighting movements and other interested parties on the situation in Angola. Those present: UNITA with three people, the special US envoy, military envoys from the RSA, including a member of the national intelligence service.'

2. Kapanga was one of a number of bases (with Lubumbashi, Kopakoli and Mahagi) opened in 1985 by Zairean military intelligence with the aid of the US Embassy in Kinshasa (particularly that of Douglas S Smith, deputy head of the US military mission in Zaire), to train commandos for 'specific' missions, as Mobutu's special advisor wrote in a letter to Mobutu published in the Belgian magazine *Solidaires* on 18/3/87.
3. Built by the Belgians in 1950, Kamina is at the centre of an important rail junction, crossed by the line from northern Zaire - Kisangani and Kindu - which meets up with the Benguela Railway hundreds of kilometres further south, east of Kolwezi. Built as two bases, Kamina 1 and Kamina 2, one for the army and the other for the air force, the Kamina complex is about 15 km from the town of the same name. Kamina 1, which covers a very vast area, was built to hold 70,000 men. The air base, Kamina 2, which was very modern for its time, is 8 km further on. Equipped for night flights, it also has two 2,800-metre runways permitting intensive aircraft movement.
4. *New York Times,* 27/7/87.
5. Zaire, one of the first African countries to restore diplomatic relations with Israel in 1982, has Israeli military instructors training some of the elite units of its army. According to the Angolan Ministry of Defence, Israelis are also training UNITA elite units, including those which have taken part in manoeuvres.
6. *Africa Confidential,* London, 27/5/88.
7. A former FNLA minister, Ngola Kabango, reportedly helped UNITA to enlist men who had fought in the FNLA's ranks. Some time later, in May 1988, Kabango and other former FNLA leaders like Samuel Abrigada, Benjamim da Silva, Miguel Daniel, Inocancio de Sousa and Celestino Joao attended a meeting in Paris with Holden Roberto aimed at reorganising, or rather ressuscitating the FNLA in the hope of taking part in negotiations on 'reconciliation' in Angola alongside UNITA.
8. *Africa Confidential,* London, 27/5/88.
9. *Africa Post,* Lisbon, 16-30/7/88.
10. *Africa Post,* Lisbon, 15-30/6/88.
11. *Summary of World Broadcasts,* BBC Monitoring, Reading, UK, 3/10/88.

CHAPTER VII

1. Marga Holness, *Angola the Struggle Continues,* in *Destructive Engagement (Zimbabwe* Publishing House, Harare, 1986).
2. *Africa Confidential,* London, 13/8/88. Interviewed by Radio France Internationale on 28/2/88, Tony Fernandes said that *'Valulukuta died of an illness' and 'the International Red Cross can confirm it'.*
3. Jaka Jamba was Secretary of State for information and Joao Vahekeni Secretary of State for the Interior in the transitional government. Wilson dos Santos was for a long time representative in Portugal and accompanied Savimbi on several of his trips to Europe. He was also the UNITA representative in 'Resistance International', formed in Paris in 1983.
4. Some Portuguese and a Belgian-based British diamond merchant, Marcel Pruwer, who went to Jamba after the article appeared in the Portuguese journal, said they had seen Wilson dos Santos, who was in good health.
5. *The Guardian,* London, 2/5/88.
6. *Africa Confidential,* London, 13/8/88.
7. Ibid.
8. *Africa Confidential,* London, 15/7/88. Ministers in UNITA's 'provisional government', with two exceptions, Jeremias Chitunda and Ernesto Mulato, were selected from among minor figures or leading members who, for one reason or another, had been keeping a low profile for some time.
9. The South African army's *débâcle was somewhat mitigated by its sustained use for weeks on end, 40 km from Cuito Cuanavale, of long-range guns, the G-5 self-propelled artillery system and the mobile G-6, which provided cover for the South African retreat towards Mavinga and then to the Namibian border.*

10. Testimony of 'Manuel Barros' in Africa Analysis (London, 3/2/88) and that of Marcolino Dumbalo Faustino, a UNITA major who gave himself up to the Angolan authorities, in *Africa* (Lisbon, 29/3/89). Dumbalo Faustino, former head of personal security of UNITA secretary general N'Zau Puna, spoke of widespread intimidation inside Savimbi's organisation, especially against anyone tempted to give himself up under the Amnesty Law which came into force in Angola in February 1989. He said that, in order to dissuade anyone from doing so, some were beaten and others shot. Among those shot, he cited the names of Tchindondo and Jorge Sangula.
11. Particularly an article in the British Sunday Telegraph (13/3/89) by Bridgland himself, and others in *The Independent* (14/3/89) and *The New York Times* (12/3/89).
12. Transcript published in ANGOP *News Bulletin,* London, 23/3/89.
13. *Africa Analysis* (31/3/89) wrote of the American William Pascoe, 'an influential architect of conservative support for UNITA and RENAMO who has privately insisted that Savimbi must let Chingunji travel unchaperoned to Washington to meet with old friends and allay their fears'.
14. Although the MPLA has always had - and still has - a large number of Bakongo members, especially among its political and trade union cadres, the FNLA used tribalism to gain some popularity in northern regions which it lost in 1975-76. In Cabinda Province, inhabited by a group affiliated to the Bakongo, the MPLA has always been more popular than the FNLA, Cabindan tribalists who rejected the multi-ethnic MPLA having been absorbed by the various factions of the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave (FLEC).
15. 'Bush warfare, Gucci-style', by Shaun Johnson, *The Guardian,* London, 27/6/88.
16. Much along these lines has been published in many Portuguese papers and most representative of this fascination is a book by six Portuguese women journalists, *Seis portuguesas em terras da UNITA* (Bertrand, Lisbon, 1988). Their account of their visit to Jamba reads almost like a fairy tale.
17. Such images appeared in many newspapers and on Portuguese TV in July-August 1988.
18. ANGOP *News Bulletin,* London, 20/7/88.
19. Interview by Jean Larteguy, *Paris Match,* 18/3/88.
20. *Africa Confidential,* London, 2/86.

CHAPTER VIII

1. The granting of this sum by Congress for 'covert' aid makes it impossible to know if, for example, deliveries of Stinger surface-to-air missiles are covered by it. What Unita actually receives is probably very much more. Part of the aid goes through Zaire - one of the African countries to which the US gives substantial military aid - and through South African-occupied Namibia. According to former CIA agent John Stockwell, the CIA and other agencies through which covert aid is given have never really respected the restrictions of the Clark Amendment.

   Washington, USA, September 1988.
3. *L'Humanité,* Paris, 11/9/86.
4. Political Research Associates, op cit.
5. The Austrian Otto Von Habsbourg, a German MP in the European Parliament, is virulently anti-communist and anti-Soviet. He told the *Courrier Parlementaire d'Afrique Australe:* 'My colleagues from the European Parliament were able to see on the spot that Jonas Savimbi's UNITA... is inflicting on the Marxists their first military defeat since the end of the second world war.' (3rd Quarter of 1983.)
6. *Africa Now,* London, April 1985.
7. *The International Herald Tribune,* London and Paris, 12/12/87.
8. Frédéric Laurent, *L'Orchestre Noir* (Stock, Paris, 1978).

CHAPTER IX

1. According to an investigation by **Der Spiegel** (3/3/80), the Hans-Seidel Foundation cooperates with the CIA. A CIA report quoted by the German magazine stated that the Foundation worked directly for Franz-Josef Strauss, both in gathering intelligence abroad and in diplomatic or covert actions. Still according to the CIA, the Hans-Seidel Foundation is also involved in the arms trade, particularly in connection with the Bavarian industry MBB, and does good business in a number of countries, primarily Namibia, Zaire and Nigeria, followed by Morocco, Togo, Greece, Portugal, Saudi Arabia and others.
2. *Le Monde,* Paris, 30/1/88.
3. Ibid.
4. The Namibian independence programme contained in the UN plan, the implementation of which is demanded in Resolution 435, was negotiated in Southern Africa by the five Western countries of the 'Contact Group', Angola, SWAPO and South Africa. The proposal to establish a demilitarised zone on the Angolan-Namibian border was made by Angolan President Agostinho Neto.
5. In fact, the only area where UNITA could claim to be was in the south-east of Kuando Kubango Province, a strip along the Namibian border, facing the Caprivi Strip, which is only about one-tenth of the approximately 1,500-km border.
6. Holden Roberto met Strauss, accompanied by CDU deputy Werner Marx, in Munich on 16 October 1976. The FNLA leader, disappointed at not having H received arms Kissinger was to have sent him (which Mobutu reportedly kept for his own army), reminded the CDU chairman of promises the Germans had made him. (*Der Spiegel*, 3/3/80.)
7. The hostage was freed soon after Savimbi's trip to Germany.
8. Federal Germany was the last EEC country to recognise the government of the People's Republic of Angola. Its delay in doing so hindered EEC initiatives to assist Angola.
9. There are about 150 pro-UNITA Angolans in the FRG. Those who do not have passports from African countries sympathetic to UNITA (Cte d'Ivoire, Morocco, Zaire) have been granted the status of political refugees by the government.
10. The special four-page edition, bearing no indication of being a paid advertisement, consisted of several articles on a trip to Angola made in November and December 1987. On the last page was an article by Walter Rueb on Aid in Want's relief work in Jamba and an Aid in Want ad in which a photograph of Genscher with Angolan President dos Santos of the 'Marxist regime' was contrasted with another of a happy mother and baby being cared for in Jamba by a nurse from Aid in Want.
11. This figure represents about half the population of Angola. According to the most recent statistics, more than 50% of the entire population lives in urban centres. Yet UNITA does not control a single urban centre and cannot rationally claim to control the whole countryside.

CHAPTER X

1. NTS, Possev Publishers, Frankfurt, 1979.
2. *Die Tatz,* 12/6/76.
3. Mention should be made of the Franco-Belgian publication *Celsius,* which in January and June 1988 carried articles on the ISHR in France and Federal Germany to which we are indebted. For the history of the NTS, we recommend Alain Guérin's book Les commandos de la guerre froide (Juillard, Paris, 1969).

CHAPTER XI

1. Fred Bridgland, op cit.
2. People's News Service, California, USA, October 1978.
3. **Time Out, London, July 1978.**
4. **People's News Service, October 1978.**
5. The Times, London, 7/7/1980.
6. The FCS's former right wing faction leaders, who ran the Federation from 1980 until its demise, 'are now running rightwing pressure groups with access to government, occupying influential party positions and making use of funds from domestic and American business which run into hundreds of thousands of pounds'. (*The Guardian,* 4/11/88)
7. Jack Abramoff and the Conservative Caucus chairman, Howard Phillips, supported campaigns calling for the dismissal of Chester Crocker and George Shulz from the State Department because they were seen as insufficiently supportive of South Africa. (Political Research Associates Report, September 1988.) Jack Abramoff has produced a film, The Red Scorpion, filmed in Namibia with the assistance of the SADF and based on UNITA and its leader. Already released in the US it was due to be released in Europe during 1989.
8. Watson and Gouvier, assistants of Sir Trevor Lloyd-Hughes when he headed the Namibia Information Office, are still connected with the propaganda network set up by the South African Administrator General of Namibia in 1986, through the Windhoek-based Transcontinental Consultancy run by Sean Cleary, a South African diplomat.
9. *L'Humanité,* Paris, 2/4/88, basing itself on articles published in the British press.
10. *The Observer,* London, 9/10/88.

CHAPTER XII

1. Shortly afterwards, the UNITA representative in Lisbon was officially received by Alberto Joãao Jardim, president of the Madeira regional government and a national leader of the PSD.
2. *O Expresso,* Lisbon, 14/2/86.
3. Fátima Roque is co-author, with five other Portuguese women, of the rapturous book on UNITA entitled *Seis portuguesas em terras da Unita',* (Bertrand, Lisbon, 1988).
4. In an interview published in *O Expresso* (10/9/88), Joãao Soares accused the Prime Minister of this and described as 'ridiculous' his request to the US to stop its aid to UNITA.
5. However, two PSD members of the European Parliament were among the group of twelve 'liberals' who in 1986 signed an invitation to Savimbi to go to Strasbourg.
6. *Diário de Noticias,* Lisbon, 17/7/88.
7. In his youth he was a member of such fascist organisations as 'Young Portugal'.
8. On 16 December 1972, commandos from the colonial army's 17th Battalion and PIDE units from the town of Tete encircled the village of Wiriyamu and massacred the inhabitants. More than 50 men, women and children were killed. (*The Times*, London, 10/7/73.)
9. For a while, the *Africa Confidencial* newsletter launched in Lisbon in 1985 had an English edition edited by a South African journalist, Ken Pottinger, 'known for his excellent security sources in Pretoria', according to the 'real' *Africa Confidential* published in London for many years, which added that the Portuguese newsletter of the same name had meanwhile been bought by UNITA. (French-language edition, 19/10/88.)
10. Among the most significant proofs of the reversal of attitudes on the colonial past is a book on the 'Africa campaigns' written for the army's General Staff by officers who had opposed decolonisation. One was Gen Themundo Barata - the highest ranking officer in the editorial team - who in 1974 had rebelled against the authorities set up in Angola by the MFA and tried to recapture the townof Cabinda in order to drive the MPLA out of it. *Resenha Histrico-Miltar das Campanhas de frica 1961-1974,* Lisbon, 1988.
11. Fernando Semedo and Joãao Paulo Guerra, *Operacâo frica (Caminho, Lisbon, 1984.*
12. Jo°ao Paulo Guerra, *Os Flechas atacam de novo* (Caminho, Lisbon, 1988).
13. Lusa news agency, Lisbon, 19/3/87.

14. *Southscan,* London, 11/5/88.
15. Army officials rarely voice support for Savimbi in public. Reserve officers do so more frequently, like Lt Col Ferreira de Cunha, who attends public pro-UNITA events and campaigns against Portugal's recognition of the People's Republic of Angola.
16. After 25 April, the US sent a very special ambassador to Lisbon: Frank Carlucci, later deputy director of the CIA and, after the Irangate crisis, Reagan's advisor on security matters and Defence Secretary.
17. Former chief editor of *O Expresso,* who in late 1988 launched a new daily, *O Europeio,* in Lisbon, a specialist on the former Portuguese colonies, where he lived before and after independence.

CHAPTER XIII

1. Roger Faligot and Pascal Krop, *La Piscine - Les services secrets francais 1944 - 1984 - L'epreuve des faits* (Seuil, Paris, 1985).
2. The list drawn up by the PIDE included especially white and mixed-race nationals of the former colonies, for whom military service was compulsory in the early 1960s when the national liberation war was launched. Indeed, many patriots who were not black fled military service or deserted from the colonial army to join the MPLA.
3. Faligot and Krop, op cit.
4. A photocopy of the letter was reproduced in full in the Faligot and Krop book.
5. *Sunday Times,* London, 29/5/77.
6. Faligot and Krop, op cit.
7. **Pierre Péan,** *Affaires africaines* (Fayard, Paris, 1984).
8. Gordon Winter, op cit.
9. Ockrent-Marenches, Dans le secret des princes (Ed. Stock, Paris, 1987). In the chapter on Angola - *'Un front oublié'* - de Marenches makes some unbelievable historical mistakes. For example, he accuses Portuguese Admiral Rosa Coutinho of having 'handed the keys to Angola to the representatives of people from the East'. Yet Rosa Coutinho headed the Junta in Angola for only a few months of the transitional period, it having been agreed that he should return to Portugal in January 1975, when the quadripartite government provided for under the Alvor Agreement was set up. He could not have known what was going to happen after he left, and his successor favoured the FNLA and was openly hostile to the MPLA. As regards the relations countries in the region should have with South Africa, de Marenches wrote: 'One must be pragmatic, like that old African sage the President of Malawi, Hastings Banda.'
10. On 10 December 1978, President Agostinho Neto made a public speech in which he revealed the presence of a French agent in Angola. The agent was almost captured by the Angolan army during a clash with UNITA. De Marenches' envoy escaped only because of the intervention of the South African army, which sent a helicopter. The text of the message sent to the SADF, signed by N'Zau Puna, was found by the Angolan army.
11. Faligot and Krop, op cit.
12. Bob Woodward, Veil, The secret wars of the CIA 1981 - 1987 (Simon and Shuster, NY, 1987).
13. The invitation to Savimbi was signed by 50 Christian Democrats, 14 right-wingers, 12 Liberals, 17 Conservatives and 10 Gaullists.
14. *Le Monde editorial,* Paris, 25/10/86.
15. The attitude of Jacques Chaban Delmas provoked a strong reaction from the Angolan Ambassador to France, who issued a statement expressing amazement that 'one of the most prestigious representatives of the resistance to Nazism' could have received 'the most zealous collaborator of the most execrated regime in the world'.
16. *O Jornal,* Lisbon, 20/3/86.
17. *Le Monde,* 25/10/86.

18. This association, at 19 rue de Berri, Paris 8, is headed by Philippe Bohn, an obscure journalist who works on the confidential newsletter of *L'Echo d'Afrique,* edited by the right-wing Marc Kalfl che. It should not be confused with the France-Angola Association at 5 rue Auguste Comte, Paris 6, chaired by the Socialist senator Guy Penne, whose members include many French businessmen working in Angola, like Francis Bouygues and Michel Doumeng, and representatives of big companies, like André Tarallo of Elf-Aquitaine.
19. Resistance International had invited 'resistance' movements to the opening session - UNITA, the MNR and the virtually unknown UCID from Cape Verde, as well Afghans, Laotians and Vietnamese and dissidents from every Eastern European country including Yugoslavia. RI 'has set itself the goal of creating an organisational structure bringing together the representatives in exile of movements of resistance to totalitarianism'.
20. Yves Loiseau and Pierre Guillaume de Roux, *Portrait d'un révolutionnaire en général: Jonas Savimbi* (La Table Ronde, Paris, 1987)
21. In November 1987, during a visit to Jamba, the RPR deputy Eric Roult presented a signed copy of the latest book by the former Minister of the Interior.
22. *La Lettre du Continent,* Paris, 2/4/88, and Southscan, London, 13/4/88.
23. Although not officially, UNITA has an office at 72 Avenue Parmentier, Paris 8, which is tolerated by the French government. But press statements issued by the office are merely headed 'UNITA mission abroad'. There is also a bulletin, *UNITA Echos*, edited by Tchiako Tchizovo'o. The UNITA representative reportedly holds an Ivorian passport and some of his colleagues, like M Pilares, who works in a Portuguese bank in Paris, have Portuguese passports. So they have no fear of expulsion.
24. Pierre Marion was not a career official. A technician, he was bought from Air France.
25. After a traditional navy career, Admiral Lacoste worked at the Armed Forces Perspective and Evaluation Centre from 1978 to 1980 and headed Raymond Barre's military office. He was DGSE director from 1982 to 1985.
26. *Africa Confidential,* London, 27/5/88.
27. *La lettre du continent,* Paris, 5/1/89.

ECASAAMA

This publication forms part of the ongoing programme of the European Campaign Against South African Aggression on Mozambique and Angola (ECASAAMA), an umbrella organisation linking national organisations from 15 countries in Western Europe. The aims of ECASAAMA include:

- to increase public awareness of the history of South Africa's strategy of regional aggression and its costs in human terms
- to document the role played by the South African surrogate forces of the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) and UNITA in the implementation of this strategy
- to expose the support that these forces have been receiving from Western governments, political groupings and institutions.

In the current climate of change in Southern Africa, it is sometimes overlooked that Angola and Mozambique are still suffering the effects of over a decade of apartheid aggression, with massive human and economic costs. ECASAAMA is working with a broad spectrum of organisations, including the anti-apartheid movement, trade unions, aid agencies and religious bodies, to keep this issue on the agenda.

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