
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED
BY THE CENTRAL
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE COMMUNIST
PARTY OF INDIA

New Delhi, 6 to 11 July 1965

COMMUNIST PARTY PUBLICATION

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CONTENTS

Condolences	1
Indo-Pak Ceasefire Agreement in Kutch	1
Food Crisis and the Way to Solve it	5
Oil Crisis	11
Com. Bhupesh Gupta's Memorandum and Letter	13
Our Policy in Relation to the Rival Party	13

CONDOLENCES

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India commenced its meeting by paying homage to the memory of—

- * COMRADE T. B. VITHAL RAO, member of the Central Control Commission, trade union leader and Treasurer of the AITUC
- * COMRADE HIRA SINGH DARD, renowned writer of Punjab, member of the CPI, who died at the age of 80
- * COMRADE B. D. PARAB, well-known working-class leader of Bombay and member of the Communist Party (Marxist) who died in a jail hospital while under detention under the DIR
- * Over 500 workers who lost their lives in the Dhori coalmines disaster

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INDO-PAK CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT IN KUTCH

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India is of opinion that the ceasefire agreement between the governments of India and Pakistan, relating to the Rann of Kutch formally and factually restores the *status quo ante* as it existed on January 1, 1965. A positive gain for India is the withdrawal of the Pakistani army from Kanjarkot, Biarbet, Chadbet, Sardar and other points which had been forcibly occupied by the Pak aggressors in April last.

Not only that, the ceasefire agreement also gives immediate relief from the threat of escalating the Kutch clashes into a full-scale war between India and Pakistan all along the border. Nobody can contemplate with equanimity such a war between India and Pakistan and the consequent ruination and fratricidal destruction of both countries that would result therefrom. For these reasons, the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India supports the ceasefire.

At the same time, the Central Executive Committee shares the deep concern of our people at certain dangerous and dishonourable terms in the ceasefire agreement.

When Prime Minister Shastri had publicly committed his government last May to the restoration of the *status quo ante* as the minimum precondition for any ceasefire agreement, the country was naturally led to believe that the only issue involved in this was the vacation of Pak aggression in the Rann of Kutch and withdrawal of Ayub Khan's armed forces to their side of the international Kutch-Sind border.

But now the publication of the terms of the ceasefire agreement of July 1 reveals that India too has to pay dearly for the government's utter incompetence in handling defence matters and for its deliberate policy of keeping our people in the dark.

Not only have the Pak aggressors to withdraw, but India herself, the victim of aggression, has also to withdraw her military force from her own territory in the Rann of Kutch because prior to 1st January, 1965 it was not our army but only the Gujarat state government's police which was "defending" this area!

Secondly, Pakistan is given police patrolling rights, along with Indian police, in the 18-mile strip between Ding and Surai on the Indian side of the border because she has "proved" that she was so patrolling previously along a track constructed by the Pakistanis, but unknown to the Indian government!

These humiliating provisions have had to be accepted by India as part of the *status quo ante* because of the Congress government's utter irresponsibility in defence matters, its failure to move the army in time into "live" border areas and its criminal

complacency and lack of vigilance in the matter of military intelligence.

Any democratic government worth the name should have taken the public into confidence regarding the facts of such Indian and Pakistani military movements and dispositions as were bound to affect the terms of any ceasefire agreement. Further, the public should have been told that Pakistan had already in 1960 raised territorial claims which went far beyond the mere question of demarcating the Kutch border and India had agreed, at that time, to collect facts and data for discussing this question. The public should have been told of the 1959 agreement by which India had agreed to refer disputes regarding determination of the border to arbitration by a tribunal.

But the government of India deliberately kept the people in the dark. Instead, it preferred the tortuous paths of secret diplomacy and that, too, under the umbrella of British "mediation". Having apparently learned nothing from India's bitter past experience of British imperialist machinations which were responsible for partition of the country, for the Kashmir crisis and for the anti-Indian bellicosity of Pakistan's rulers as a military ally of the west, the government of India, instead of relying on our people, once again preferred to rely on the so-called good offices of the imperialists at Whitehall.

The principal result of this has been that the terms of reference of the proposed future tribunal are no longer limited to the question of demarcation of the existing international border but have been extended to cover the entire territorial claims of Pakistan, amounting to 3,500 square miles in this area. Thus Indian sovereignty over the Rann of Kutch has been made a subject matter of arbitration.

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India considers this to be a provision which is fraught with grave dangers for India at the hands of the western imperialists and their agents. This is the logical outcome of the Shastri government's dependence on Britain for finding a "solution" to Indo-Pak differences.

Hence, while supporting the ceasefire, the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India calls upon the

people, upon all democratic and patriotic parties, groups and individuals to unite and activate their forces throughout the country into an all-out mobilisation for defeating the imperialist manoeuvres behind the arbitration proposals and for compelling the Shastri government to give up its weak and vacillating policy in the matter of defending Indian sovereignty over Indian territory under pressure of the Anglo-American patrons of Pakistan.

It is clear that effective defence of our borders and the firm and consistent upholding of India's sovereign rights cannot be ensured by mere reliance on the Congress government.

The organised and united might of the democratic forces must make itself felt to see that the dangerous implications of the ceasefire agreement are negated and Pakistan's fantastic territorial claims are not imposed on India under the guise of an arbitration "award".

Hence, the people's forces must exercise utmost vigilance during the coming weeks and carry on a ceaseless countrywide campaign to ensure that —

— All efforts are made even at this hour to bring about a peaceful settlement through direct, bilateral talks between the governments of India and Pakistan, at summit level if necessary, and without the mediation of any third party or tribunal. In this connection, the Central Executive Committee appeals to the popular, democratic forces in Pakistan also to strive for a mutually acceptable settlement through direct negotiations, which would be in the interests of both countries

— The government of India stands firmly by the contention that a well-established boundary exists, running roughly along the northern edge of the Rann of Kutch and only needs to be demarcated on the ground

— No extension of arbitration procedure is made to cover the Kashmir "dispute" on any false analogy of the Kutch ceasefire agreement

— India's nominee on the tribunal must be from among friendly countries which are genuine anti-imperialist or socialist

— No British or US national is accepted as a member of the tribunal since both the UK and the USA are actively interested parties in Indo-Pak matters and have their own imperialist designs therein

— The government's reliance on Anglo-US "aid" for India's defence is given up; all available arms and equipment and technical know-how from the USSR and other socialist countries are unhesitatingly accepted; and all necessary steps are taken, first and foremost, for development of India's independent defence potential and reliance on her own resources in men and materiel.

FOOD CRISIS AND THE WAY TO SOLVE IT

After a temporary lessening of the acuteness during the last few months, the food situation is again becoming serious. Food-grains cannot be had anywhere in India at prices fixed by the respective state governments on the basis of all-India prices fixed by the agricultural prices commission of the government of India, which are in fact the legalised blackmarket prices of last year.

In states like Kerala, Bihar, UP, Maharashtra and West Bengal, the food situation has already reached a critical stage. It is reported that the blackmarket price of a kilo of coarse rice in Kerala is anywhere between Rs. 1.50 to Rs. 2.00 whereas the control price is Re. 0.72. In West Bengal it is Rs. 1.20 to Rs. 1.50.

In parts of Bihar, people have already taken to eating jute leaves and other substances along with small quantities of food-grains.

All this despite the claim of the government of India that "the overall picture of foodgrain production during 1964-65 (i.e. 87.2 million tonnes according to recent estimates) is *very encouraging* and a sizable increase over the previous record level of 81 million tonnes attained in 1961-62," a bumper rice crop of 38.73 million tonnes and the record level of imports of 62.7

lakh tonnes of foodgrains in 1964 from America, Canada, Australia and other countries.

The temporary lessening of the acuteness of the food situation during the last few months is due to the coming of the harvests of foodgrains and heavy imports. The coming months are lean months every year, when prices generally shoot up. The most difficult period every year for rice growing areas is from September to November and for wheat growing areas later. If the situation is already serious now itself, we can very well imagine what is going to be the fate of people in the coming lean months.

It is very clear that prices are going to shoot up, artificial famine will stalk our country and people's life will become unbearable if the hoarders and landlords are allowed to have their own way.

The people had forced the hands of the Congress to take some measures to check the rise in prices through various forms of actions—the memorable statewide *bandhs*, under the leadership of the working class in which all sections of people participated, *dharnas*, *gheraos*, *satyagraha*, strikes for increase in DA, mass dehoarding activities, etc.

But these are only half-hearted measures meant to see that the situation may not go out of control, while at the same time not to displease the hoarders and blackmarketeers in foodgrains very much. They are not meant either to solve the food crisis or to alleviate the sufferings of the people by providing them foodgrains at prices within their reach.

The central government has set up a foodgrains corporation for the purchase and distribution of foodgrains. The object is not the monopoly procurement of foodgrains, but to act as a "countervailing force to the speculative activity of the trader." They want to do this through buying of only about 3 million tons of all types of cereals out of the total marketable surplus, both by the central and state governments.

As yet the foodgrains corporation has started its activities only in the four southern states. It is reported some of the state governments are buying foodgrains on their own account. Except in one or two states, the state governments have not taken it seriously because the hoarders' and landlords' representatives

are directly sitting in the state ministries to safeguard their selfish interests. The UP government has formally abandoned the procurement scheme altogether just after starting it.

Even in the few states where the state governments have taken it seriously, they are meeting powerful resistance of the hoarders and landlords on every inch of the ground. The chief minister of Maharashtra had to make a public acceptance recently that his government's procurement policy failed because he could procure only 7 per cent of the marketable cereals. He made a forthright attack on the half-hearted measures of the central government and supported the scheme of "monopoly procurement" on the basis of remunerative prices for peasants as a solution to the food crisis.

It is now admitted on all hands that in all the states in the country most of the foodgrains have gone into the hands of the hoarders and landlords who are holding the people to ransom.

Another measure of restriction of credit undertaken by the government—to the foodgrain traders—is obviously inadequate to check the rise in prices. The banks are advancing credits to the speculators by various dubious ways. No effective check in rise of prices of consumer goods can take place as long as the banks are kept in the hands of monopolists. It is urgently necessary to nationalise banks in order to check prices and to have sufficient capital in the hands of the government for successfully implementing the scheme of wholesale trade in foodgrains.

As regards distribution machinery, the government has failed completely. Even the imported and procured foodgrains stocks that are in the hands of the government are not reaching the people. A big part is going into the hands of the blackmarketeers because of the defective distribution system.

As yet statutory rationing is introduced only in Calcutta. In some other cities and the deficit state of Kerala, informal rationing has been introduced. A miserable pittance of daily requirements is given to the people in these places through this system. For the major part of their requirements, people are forced to depend on the blackmarket.

The government claims that it is supplying foodgrains at

cheap rate in other areas where there is no informal rationing through 1,04,802 fair-price shops. This is a complete hoax. Most of the grains supplied to these shops goes into the blackmarket. Besides the grain that is supplied is of a very inferior quality.

The entire distribution machinery has to be overhauled and statutory rationing has to be introduced in all big cities and towns and heavily deficit areas like Kerala and informal rationing in the petty towns and other deficit areas, if foodgrains have to reach the needy people.

Another measure of the central government for controlling the food crisis is dependence mainly upon PL-480 imports from the USA. For 1964 alone, our government had imported 62.7 lakh tonnes of foodgrains at 226.25 crores of rupees. The agreements that were signed in 1964 with the USA expired by the end of June this year. US imperialists are also utilising the foodgrains as a means of political pressure to get the government of India to completely surrender to their reactionary plans of war-mongering and domination of backward countries. They are refusing to sign fresh agreements for supply of foodgrains under one pretext or other.

While it is true that India cannot dispense with import of foodgrains for the next few years, it is dangerous for our country to depend on the American imperialists for ever. We have to use every means at our disposal to increase our food production, reduce dependence and become self-sufficient in a few years.

Though the government has armed itself with all powerful DIR, it does not deal severely with the hoarders and black-marketeers who steal people's food. Even if some of them are arrested for blatant violation of the essential commodities act and other regulations regarding foodstuffs under public pressure, they are either let off or given light punishment and if they are jailed, they are treated as state guests at the expense of the public exchequer and provided with all luxuries.

On the other hand, the DIR is used freely to arrest and jail thousands of public workers, for suppressing the people's movement and even stifling democracy as in Kerala recently.

The present prohoarder and prolandlord policies of the gov-

ernment have to be revised and the present half-hearted measures have to be replaced by the adoption of the following radical measures if our people have to be saved from the impending catastrophe on the food front. A system of state-trading in foodgrains has to be implemented effectively by means of which the government procures sufficient stocks to enable it to control the prices *effectively* as well as to take direct responsibility for feeding the masses of the people. For this, people should demand unitedly:

1. *Monopoly purchase of foodgrains* through the foodgrains corporation along with the following steps:

- a) Guarantee of reasonable fair price to the peasants
- b) Supply of necessary goods to the peasants at reasonable prices
- c) Complete ban on bank credit to grain traders
- d) Imposition of a levy on landlords
- e) Ban on movement of foodgrains from one state to another on private account.

During the period before the government's monopoly purchase is introduced, the Central Executive Committee demands that the government must take over the accumulated stocks in the possession of big stockists like rice and flour mills, wholesalers and traders.

2. *Nationalisation of banks* together with the following steps:

- a) Supply of ample agricultural credits to peasants at bank rates
- b) Advance to the peasants as the price of goodgrains to be purchased, i.e. forward purchase of foodgrain directly from the peasants.

3. *Statutory rationing* in big cities and towns and heavily deficit rural areas; informal rationing in petty towns and other deficit areas.

4. *Imprisonment and heavy fines for food thieves.*

5. *Make our country self-sufficient in foodgrains* and end dependence on imperialists.

All fallow lands must be distributed to the agricultural labourers and poor peasants.

Implement genuine agrarian reforms and give land to the tillers. Provide cheap credit, fertilisers and other facilities to the peasants for carrying on improved methods of cultivation and produce more foodgrains.

PROGRAMME OF ACTION

The entire party must be thrown into mass campaigns for food in order to develop anti-hoarding action wherever the situation is acute. Such actions are to be directed against trader-hoarders, rice-mills and landlords. Other forms of mass action in order to compel the government to change its prohoarder policy must also be planned and developed by every State Council.

The Central Secretariat will submit a memorandum to the central government on the all-India situation. State Councils also have to lead deputations to the state governments and submit memorandums on the food situation in their respective states.

Food conferences have to be organised with the cooperation of other parties, organisations and individuals wherever possible at state, district and town levels.

The Central Secretariat is directed to coordinate these movements in different states into a common all-India struggle of both the urban and rural masses, for food and other necessities of life, in the course of the next three months and working-class actions for increase in wages, DA and bonus.

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India directs the Central Secretariat to take steps jointly with other parties and personalities to organise a food convention in Delhi on the basis of a common charter of demands, urgent measures and immediate steps for the mitigation of the crisis.

OIL CRISIS

The deliberate policy adopted by the three principal oil companies (Caltex, ESSO, Burmah Shell) during the last two months to sabotage the distribution of high-speed diesel and kerosene and thus hold the nation to ransom once again underlines the urgency of the demand that the Congress government must forthwith nationalise the foreign oil companies.

Even though it is a known fact that the price of Soviet oil is cheaper than of oil from western sources, even though some 50 crores of rupees worth of foreign exchange could be saved by replacing imports of petroleum products through the western oil companies by imports from the rupee payment area, mainly the Soviet Union—the government delayed taking any step in this direction until actually forced to do so in March this year by the compulsion of the acute foreign exchange crisis.

The western oil companies, in an effort to retain their monopoly, retaliated against the government measures. They refused to distribute Soviet oil ostensibly on the ground that in principle they could not handle oil which was “politically priced”, but really to exploit the situation created by the public sector’s lack of storage and distribution facilities. Not only that: they have even sought to aggravate the scarcity by holding up the normal distribution of the output of their refineries in this country, a fact revealed by the oil minister himself.

It is this policy of blackmail pursued by the western oil monopolies which is responsible for the acute diesel and kerosene crisis in the various parts of the country for the last two months.

At the same time, these oil companies have also started attacking the job security of the organised workers through schemes of so-called “voluntary retirement” as well as by the introduction of automation in a big way.

All that the government has done so far to fight back this blackmail of the oil companies was to issue two ordinances on paper on June 10 “enabling” it to take action against the companies. But till today no action has been taken under these “enabling” powers.

COMRADE BHUPESH GUPTA'S MEMORANDUM AND LETTER

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India takes note of the memorandum submitted by Comrade Bhupesh Gupta for the consideration of the National Council and decided that discussion of this memorandum be placed on the agenda at the next meeting of the National Council.

The Central Executive Committee also takes note of Comrade Bhupesh Gupta's desire to resign from the CEC and the Central Secretariat, expressed in his letter to the General Secretary and decides that this too should be placed on the agenda at the next meeting of the National Council.

The Central Executive Committee draws Comrade Bhupesh Gupta's attention to the fact that until this issue is discussed and decided upon by the National Council, he continues to be a member of the CEC and the Central Secretariat and is expected to carry out his responsibilities as a member of the CEC and the Central Secretariat.

OUR POLICY IN RELATION TO THE RIVAL PARTY

I. PARTY CONGRESS RESOLUTION—FOUR POINT POLICY

1. The Seventh Congress of our party held at Bombay in December 1964 laid down the clear outlines of the policy and tactics to be pursued by us in relation to the rival party. They are as follows:

The split in the CPI is a settled fact. Now the question arises as to what attitude we take towards the split-away section. In spite of all the disruptive, uncommunistic, nauseating methods and language some of the rival party leaders use, which is being aped by a good number of their cadres, we should adopt an attitude of patience, reason and fraternity. A good number of party members, cadres and even

Not only that: more concessions and collaboration ventures with the western oil monopolies are being discussed in connection with the expansion of existing refineries and the setting up of new refineries, which will mean giving these monopolies the unlimited right to import all the crude for the refineries from sources of their own choice, which means western sources. Such concessions and agreements will only help the western oil monopolies to draw the noose tighter round the nation's neck.

At a time when India's own oil exploration work is progressing so successfully and when the Soviet Union is willing to extend to us the fullest aid in this field, why is the government continuing its policy of appeasing the western monopolies?

It is time the government put an end to such promonopoly policies and took firm steps to halt the blackmail of the oil companies. The government must immediately take over the storage and distribution machinery of these monopolies as a first step and thereafter proceed to nationalise the foreign oil companies. The implementation of this demand cannot brook further delay. The present serious foreign exchange situation and the sabotage tactics adopted by the foreign oil monopolies warrant this step as an immediate national necessity.

The Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of India directs all party units to run a national campaign for the above demands as well as to evolve and put into practice suitable concrete local slogans and forms of action in order to fight the monopoly of the western oil firms and help forward the storage and distribution capacities of the public sector. Municipal, corporation and local authorities should henceforth not permit the proliferation of the petrol and oil pumps of the foreign companies and instead all facilities must be made available only for the Indian Oil Company. In order to bring relief to the mass of the common people acutely affected by shortage and high price of kerosene oil, mass campaigns must be organised to realise the demand that the government must set up centres of distribution of kerosene oil to be supplied by the IOC. Such centres must be opened in cooperation with popular committees for distribution to genuine retailers for sale to the consumers.

some leaders were swept away by the left demagoguery and falsehood spread about certain leaders of our party, spy-mania created by these slanders and by parochial and local chauvinist feelings. These are the ways of the left adventurists and dogmatists, as is proved by the practice of the world leaders of this trend, the leadership of the CPC.

The rival party leaders have elevated slander against our party leaders and character assassination almost to the level of tactics. In some states they have declared the CPI as a reactionary party and have given a call for its total annihilation. They have declared that their main task is to fight out the CPI. Unless we clearly understand the politics and philosophy behind their tactics we will fall into the trap. They want to create and maintain a permanent tension between their ranks and our membership. If there is no such tension and if their members are allowed to think coolly and in a dispassionate manner, the rival party leaders fear that they cannot retain even those who have temporarily gone with them. We must be patient in explaining to their ranks and try for united actions on all people's issues and other political campaigns. Such a fraternal attitude will help their ranks and the people following that party to understand whose policies are correct and are helping the movement.

Only world events and experience of the movement will show what is right and what is wrong. Arguments and correct approach will help the party members, cadres and even some leaders to understand the lessons of the movement and change their mind.

2. At the same time, side by side and integrated with the above the Party Congress resolution stressed the need for firm and principled ideological and political struggle in the following words:

This does not mean that we will not fight their wrong and harmful ideological and political understanding or their disruption of mass movements. We will fight their disruptive activities in every sphere, consistently and concretely, of course, in a patient and fraternal way. This attitude alone

will help us to make them see how their ideological, political and organisational positions are wrong and harmful.

3. Concretely in the case of the mass organisations and particularly the trade unions, the Party Congress resolution emphasised the need to fight the disruptive activities of the rival party in the following words:

In the case of the mass organisations, our general line is that it is harmful for people if they are split and we must strive our best by not only adopting correct slogans, forms of struggle and methods but also correct attitude towards unity of these mass organisations.

The Party Congress resolution in this connection quotes with approval concrete directives by an earlier Central Secretariat document on the splitting activities of the rival party in the TUs as a guide to comrades on all mass fronts in fighting the splitting activities and preserving the unity of mass organisations.

Reports go to show that the sectarian splitters are out either to capture the AITUC for themselves or split it after gathering sufficient votes in it. They speak of not dividing the mass organisations. But it is only a smokescreen behind which to prepare for the capture or split. Hence party members in the trade unions and STUCs must not remain complacent and must be firm in giving a rebuff to the splitting activities in the TUs and AITUC.

4. The Party Congress resolution finally emphasises the need for working out and implementing our mass line in *practice* as the surest way of combating the split and winning over masses of the rank and file of the rival party to our side through their actual experience.

While the rival leaders speak revolutionary phraseology, it is the party which has been at the head of all militant working-class and people's movements in the past eight months. While they emit fire against the present government, it is the party which has succeeded in mobilising the broadest section of the people against its anti-people policies and

against vested interests and reaction. While they may talk of people's democracy and even more radical goals, it is the party which is forging real sanctions, building unity of progressive forces in action.

More of such all-India and statewide movements and struggles will go a long way in making the masses, rival party members and cadres, even some leaders, to realise the correctness of the political line, forms of struggle and methods pursued by our party. We can successfully fight this bitter struggle with the leaders of the rival party in the political field only by building a strong mass movement and unity of the democratic forces.

Thus the Party Congress resolution outlined an integrated Four-Point Policy, the elements of which are the following:

- (a) Attitude of patience, reason and fraternity and maximum efforts for joint action on common issues
- (b) Firm principled ideological-political struggle
- (c) Firm rebuff to their splitting activities on the TU front and fight for preserving unity of mass organisations
- (d) Work positively to build up and extend mass movements and unity of the democratic forces in practice.

II. LESSONS OF KERALA, CALCUTTA AND AHMEDABAD

Six months have passed since the Bombay Party Congress. During this period important developments have taken place. It is necessary to review these developments and draw the necessary lessons from them in order to further enrich and carry forward the basic directives laid down by the Bombay Congress.

The first big political test in real life of the correctness or otherwise of our party's political policy on the one hand and that of the rival party on the other came barely three months after the Bombay Congress with the Kerala elections and the corporation elections in Calcutta and Ahmedabad.

Our party pursued the basic electoral line laid down by the Bombay Congress that we could fight the Congress government effectively and replace it by a progressive government only if the CPI and the rival communist party stand firmly together

and forge unity of all the left democratic parties on the basis of a principled programme that will expose and fight not only anti-people policies of the Congress but also at the same time, the right reactionary and communal forces as well. This policy could be implemented in the case of both the Ahmedabad and Calcutta corporation elections (though in the latter case there were some obstacles in some places coming from disruptive elements belonging to the rival party). In both these cases, the actual results clearly show the correctness and effectiveness of our policy. In the case of Ahmedabad corporation (which has remained the fortress of Congress rule till now) the left and democratic forces could successfully rout the Congress as well as the Jana Sangh, Swatantra, etc. and bring into power a left progressive rule in its place. In the case of the Calcutta corporation, the left and the democratic forces could make considerable advance and almost come to the point of toppling the Congress majority.

A sharp contrast with the experience of Ahmedabad and Calcutta was the experience of Kerala. In the case of Kerala, Comrade EMS rejected the policy suggested by us and put into practice the electoral policy of the rival party of uniting with anybody and everybody to beat the Congress and of treating our party as an enemy. The election results in Kerala have shown the error of this policy as a means of fighting the Congress effectively.

The National Council meeting of April 1965 underlined the above lessons for the left and democratic movement of our country:

The fight against Congress monopoly of power, the fight against the anti-people policies of the Congress, cannot be effectively conducted unless we simultaneously meet and defeat the challenge of reactionary and communal forces. The Kerala experience has once again underlined this elementary lesson for all the left democratic forces.

At the same time, the National Council made self-criticism of our own mistakes in the case of the Kerala elections—the mistake of losing our bearings in the situation that followed after

Comrade EMS had broken the left united front, of departing from the perspective laid down in the Bombay Congress resolution, of falling a prey to the provocations of the rival party and switch over to a mood of counter-retaliation.

Our party did its share of self-criticism drawing from the lessons of Kerala, Ahmedabad and Calcutta. But while these experiences have no doubt had an impact on the rank and file of the rival party and contributed to rethinking on their part, their top leadership in Kerala stuck firmly to its old erroneous policies.

The Kerala state committee of the rival party under the leadership of Comrade EMS (who is also at present general secretary of that party) in its resolution on "Kerala Elections and Post-Election Situation", while stating that joint agitation and work is possible on such issues as release of detenus, scrapping of the DIR etc. states categorically: "But it must be made clear that it would be impossible to forge unity with the right communists in the political field, including that of elections, as long as they do not discard the attitude of displaying more antagonism to the enemies of the Congress than to the Congress, and continue to stand by their sectarian position, i.e. opposition to minutely study (and make use of) the contradictions in the enemy camp in order to strengthen the position of the working class."

In the context of the phrase "making use of contradictions in the enemy camp", against the background of the policy pursued by EMS in Kerala elections the reference to "enemies of Congress" obviously can only mean the right reactionary and communal parties like the Muslim League, Jana Sangh and Swatantra. In fact, the top rival party leadership in Andhra is approaching the Swatantra Party for electoral alliance against Congress; in some places, it is even allying itself with most reactionary groups inside the Congress, for example, the group of the notorious landlord the Raja of Challapalli.

Under the false charge against the CPI that it is displaying more antagonism to the enemies of the Congress than to the Congress, the leaders of the rival party are hiding their own line of "uniting with the devil to beat the Congress," i.e. uniting with

reactionary parties like the Muslim League, Jana Sangh, Swatantra, etc.

In fact, a theoretical justification for this policy has been worked out by EMS in his pamphlet "Revisionism and Dogmatism in the CPI" in the following words:

Every single political party and group in the country is guided by the ideology of the national bourgeoisie... (and) the dual character of the bourgeoisie—its class interests, as well as their reflection in the ideological field—therefore, become the common trait of all political parties including the most reactionary among them. (p. 104)

This means that there is nothing to choose between the Congress and the other reactionary parties. All are bourgeois parties, and since the Congress, in addition is the ruling party, we can unite with extreme reactionary and communal parties in the name of "utilising the contradictions in the enemy camp."

In the above-quoted lengthy resolution of the Communist Party (Marxist) as well as other articles published by it, there is not one word about defending the national policies of non-alignment or independent economic development or socialist aid which are attacked by the parties of extreme reaction and their powerful supporters inside the Congress; not a word about fraternising with and helping the progressive forces inside the Congress who are defending these policies.

Of course, according to the leadership of the Communist Party (Marxist) there is nothing to defend. India has already gone into the American camp.

The political line which the leadership of the rival party is today putting forward *vis-a-vis* Congress is one which was rejected as long back as 1956 at the Palghat Congress when the party was united. Its rejection was emphasised once again *unanimously* at Vijayawada Congress in 1961. Why are the leaders of the rival party resurrecting this line now?

From this basically wrong understanding of the Indian situation, the leadership of the rival party falsely attacks the CPI "that it wants general united front with the Congress", "that it seeks a coalition government, with one section of the Congress",

that it "sacrifices the working class to the leadership of the bourgeoisie" etc., when the real political position of our party is that it is fighting for the unity of all progressive forces, including those inside the Congress, against the imperialists and the reactionary forces both inside and outside the Congress, in order to replace the present bourgeois state by a national democratic state that will prepare the ground for a rapid transition to socialism.

The Programme adopted by the Bombay Party Congress clearly puts the issue of working-class leadership in relation to national democracy as follows:

As the national democratic front becomes ever more broad-based, militant and powerful in the course of the rising tempo of the mass movement, it defeats the forces of reaction inside and outside the ruling party and comes to the position of taking governmental power into its own hands.

As the national democratic front is born out of struggles, mainly led by the working class in alliance with the peasantry and the revolutionary middle classes, along with whom the patriotic section of the national bourgeoisie will also play a positive role and become its component part, the front on assuming power will eliminate the grip of foreign monopoly and break Indian monopoly combines, carry out fully all the necessary land reforms and establish national democracy.

The state will no longer be the organ of the class rule of the bourgeoisie developing capitalist economy accompanied by its inherent contradictions and crisis to the detriment of national interests and the interests of the common people. *The monopoly of power of the bourgeoisie will be ended.*

The national democratic state in the hands of the national democratic front will be a *transitional stage*, in which power will be jointly exercised by all those classes which are interested in eradicating imperialist interests, routing the semi-feudal elements and breaking the power of the monopolies. In this class alliance, the *exclusive leadership of the working class is not yet established though the exclusive leadership of the bourgeoisie no longer exists.*

As the government of the national democratic front and the class alliance it represents *will be based on the worker-peasant alliance as its pivot, the working class will increasingly come to occupy the leading position in the alliance*, as it is this class which is the conscious initiator and builder of the national democratic front...

The slogan of setting up the national democratic front and later the government of the NDF—the state of national democracy, has today the *greatest mobilising force*. That is why we make it the central slogan of this period.

Such a state including patriotic sections of the national bourgeoisie acting under the constant pressure of the national mass movement from below, will be *forced to act unitedly and implement the programme of national development in a non-capitalist way*, i.e. eliminating foreign monopoly, breaking Indian monopoly combines, carrying through radical agrarian reforms, extending democracy to ensure the active participation of the working class in the economic and political life of the country. *In this process the balance continuously shifts in favour of the working class and the worker-peasant alliance, paving the way for the leadership of the working class in the state, thereby creating the conditions for the transition to socialism.*

The correctness of our party's policy in fact stands out *even sharper today than ever before* in the context of the dangerous political situation brought about by American aggression in Vietnam, intensification of imperialist neo-colonial pressure on India and intensification of the offensive of right reaction both inside and outside the Congress. In such a situation, the policy of the rival party leadership can only bring grist to the mill of imperialism and worst reaction inside the country, however much they may talk in words about proletarian leadership and people's democracy.

Unless a steadfast and patient political-ideological and practical struggle is carried on by us continuously against this policy in such a manner as to carry conviction step by step to the rank

and file of the rival party, the cause of democratic unity cannot be carried forward.

III. NEW SITUATION—INCREASED OFFENSIVE OF IMPERIALISM & REACTION

The period following the Bombay Congress has been marked by the following features:

— American aggression on Vietnam and imperialist policy of war escalation

— Increased Anglo-American neo-colonialist pressure against India

— Increased consolidation and offensive of the right reactionary forces inside the country

— Growing vacillations and weaknesses of government policies

— Increased drive by the Congress government against democratic rights and parliamentary democracy and use of DIR and emergency powers in a lawless manner against the democratic movement.

This whole situation was analysed in detail at the National Council meeting of April 1965. We came to the conclusion that among the factors responsible for this deterioration in the political situation one of the most important is the disunity and disarray among the left democratic forces in the country, including the split in the CPI—a factor to which the Bombay Congress resolution had already drawn attention.

Taking this into consideration, the political resolution passed by the National Council posed the urgent task of “uniting the democratic forces to fight both the anti-people policies of the Congress rulers and the right reactionary forces’ efforts to subvert the basic policies and bring about a shift to the right.” The resolution rightly warned that “in carrying out this urgent task, the democratic movement needs to be on guard against any unprincipled compromise or alliance with reactionary parties in the name of fighting Congress rule. Such a course only offers opportunities for reaction to strengthen its position.”

The National Council resolution gave a significant call for joint action and united mobilisation:

— For solidarity and support to Vietnam and against American aggression and machinations

— Against DIR, for democratic rights and liberties, for the release of all detenus

— In defence of the economic policies and rights of the working people.

Vis-a-vis our party and the rival party, the Bombay Congress had stressed the importance of such joint actions as necessary steps to bring together gradually and steadily, step by step, the rank and file of both the parties and thus advance towards the ultimate objective of healing the split in the communist movement. In the new deteriorating political situation following the Congress, such actions become specially important to fight the anti-people policies of the Congress governments and the growing offensive of imperialism and reaction.

That is why our party took initiative to approach the rival party leadership and set in motion such joint actions. We did this both on an all India plane and in the states.

An analysis of our experience during the last three months in regard to the limited joint actions we were able to achieve in some states shows that despite our best efforts the hard core of the leadership of the rival party either does not want such joint actions at all or, while formally agreeing, utilises even such actions to vilify and slander our party, spread confusion and push through their dogmatic and sectarian slogans.

In Kerala, in several places, the leadership of the rival party, while formally agreeing to joint release campaign, in practice sabotaged proper mobilisation or worked to keep their ranks out of it. Similarly EMS himself refused to join a united mobilisation to condemn American aggression on Vietnam and Pakistani aggression against India, a mobilisation which included some Congressmen also. The main reason EMS gave was the absence of the demand for release of detenus among the slogans. EMS very well knew that this particular slogan would not fit into the scope of that particular demonstration and that a joint demonstration to condemn American aggression against Vietnam with the participation of Congressmen was a

very big step forward for the democratic movement in that particular situation.

In Vijayawada, even on the release issue the rival party leaders adopted rowdy tactics to break up the united civil liberties convention, exclude all other parties from it and make it their own sectarian platform.

In the case of the Calcutta youth festival, while formally agreeing to stand united with us, the rival party leaders utilised the occasion for the narrow sectarian manoeuvres of their party and to turn the platform of the youth festival into their party platform.

Throughout this period, even while such joint release campaigns were being attempted by our party, the rival party organs (Telugu, Bengali, Malayalam etc.) continued their slander and vilification campaign against us, singling out "revisionism" as the main enemy to be fought and forgetting imperialism, the Congress government and the right reaction in the process.

A line of failing to concentrate on the main enemy in the course of joint actions (even while continuing the political-ideological debate in a fraternal manner) and of turning your guns instead against your ally in the joint actions will not only disrupt that joint action, but will have the effect of strengthening the common enemy. The tactics adopted by the rival party at the Vijayawada civil liberties convention will only have the effect of strengthening the hands of the Congress government in order to continue to keep the detenus in jail.

IV. EXPERIENCE ON MASS FRONTS

On the TU front, our party and AITUC unions have taken the initiative during the last three months to prepare for big united struggles on the issues of wages, bonus, DA, TU rights etc. The Sangram Samiti movement has been extended and strengthened in West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra, Rajasthan, Karnatak. Initial victories have already been secured in certain states like Rajasthan and Karnatak.

On the issue of bonus and against the shameful concessions given by the Congress government to the employers, a big round

of united struggles is in the offing. The Rashtriya Sangram Samiti is meeting shortly to discuss all-India action.

The great one-day strike of 2 lakh textile workers of Bombay against the bonus ordinance under our initiative has given an inspiring lead to the entire working class of the country to come out in action against the promonopoly policies of the Congress government. The heroic united struggle of the textile workers of Amritsar in the border state of Punjab for reasonable minimum wages, led jointly by AITUC, INTUC, HMS and other unions in the teeth of the DIR and mass arrests and repression, went on for 53 days in a situation of Pakistani aggression and anti-communist propaganda that national security was being endangered.

These struggles are big successes for our mass line and demonstrate who is *in practice* leading and organising the fight against the anti-people policies of the Congress government. The Punjab textile workers' struggle has in fact added a glorious chapter to the history of the Indian working-class movement itself.

Yet, at precisely such a time when more and more TU unity is the prime need of the hour (if the vested interests are to be fought *in deeds* and not merely in words) we find the leaders of the rival party continuing with their policy of splitting the AITUC unions themselves and disrupting the joint struggles.

In Bombay, they first gave the adventurist slogan of indefinite strike and when workers rejected this, they tried their best to sabotage the one day strike by sowing distrust about it. In this they failed miserably. And now they are busy slandering the role of the party in such a manner as to strengthen the anti-struggle and disruptive elements in the INTUC there.

Similarly in the case of the glorious Punjab strike, they are busy distorting and vilifying the role played by the AITUC and are trying to weaken and disrupt the unity forged in the course of the struggle.

In Kerala, they have split the State Transport Workers Union by adopting fraudulent and rowdy tactics to remove from the union such respected leaders as Com. T. V. Thomas, President, and Com. Surendran, General Secretary. They have set up a

rival AITUC union under the same name, board and registration number, the pattern they already adopted long ago to disrupt the textile union of Coimbatore and the tile workers' union in Mangalore. They did this in Kerala precisely at a time when the state transport workers were preparing for a big struggle for their demands. It is reported that efforts are under way to similarly split other AITUC unions in Kerala too and that all this activity has the approval of EMS himself.

Similarly on the kisan front also, the kisan sabhas have been split and rival organisations set up in the recent period in Punjab and Andhra.

V. POSITIVE PERSPECTIVE

It would however be wrong, on the basis of the negative experiences recounted above, to come to the conclusion that prospects and necessity of joint fronts and united actions between our party and the rival party are receding and diminishing. However hard and protracted the struggle against disruption may be, it must be remembered that:

(a) The increased offensive of imperialism and the reactionary forces, the worsening economic crisis (food, prices, etc.), the continued attack on democratic rights, civil liberties etc., are all creating an objective situation in which the democratic forces have necessarily to come together for action if they are to avoid a serious set-back.

(b) The broad masses of the people who are being adversely affected every day in respect of their economic conditions, living standards and democratic rights, feel frustrated and demoralised at the spectacle of disunity and disarray presented by the democratic and left forces in the country and the split in the communist movement. Popular sentiment among the anti-Congress masses and the progressive forces is one of dismay at this disunity and of support to every effort made to heal this disunity.

(c) In order to fight back the offensive of reaction and to strengthen the capacity of the democratic forces for effective and united mass movements, the unity in action of the pro-

communist masses (i.e., the masses who traditionally supported the CPI before the split and who are now divided or confused) must steadily be forged both on common political and economic issues as well as in the mass organisations.

The four-point policy laid down by the Bombay Party Congress is precisely based on the self-confidence that unfolding developments in the political situation, national and international, will generate objective forces that weaken the grip of disruptive sectarian and splitting activities in the mass movements and strengthen the forces of united action—provided of course that our party discharges its own tasks consciously and correctly.

VI. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY & TACTICS

In some of his public statements Comrade EMS has stated that the basic differences between our party and his party do not relate to ideological issues, but concern entirely the attitude to be taken towards the Congress.

In an important article in the rival party English weekly, *People's Democracy*, first issue dated June 27, 1965, the above point is emphasised once again in the following words:

We do not also hold that differences on the ideological questions that are being discussed in the international communist movement led to the disruption or constitute the stumbling block in the way of unity. Even today there is no unanimity of views on these issues among us who constitute the communist party of India. Nor do we think that despite formal resolutions, there is any such unanimity among the revisionists either.

Still we of the CPI have been able to unitedly work out the strategy of the Indian revolution and the day-to-day tactics of the party.

It is amazing to find that a party that calls itself revolutionary and based on Marxism-Leninism should come forward and boldly declare that it is possible to work out the strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution, separately from, and irrespective of, the position one takes with regard to the ideological issues in-

volved in the controversy within the world communist movement. It is well known that these ideological issues relate to the basic assessment of the world situation that has emerged after the second world war and the changes which have occurred in this situation as a result of the war. Can any serious revolutionary hold that the strategy and tactics of the revolution of any country can be worked out without taking into consideration this new world situation?

In fact there is no communist party in the world which takes up such a position. Nor has the Indian communist movement ever since its inception in 1925 ever taken up such a position.

Our party has taken up a clear-cut position on these ideological issues, a position which corresponds to that accepted by the majority of the world communist movement. The strategy and tactics we have worked out in the Programme and the Political Resolution adopted at the Bombay Party Congress are intimately linked with the ideological positions we have accepted.

Similarly a close examination of the strategy and tactics worked out by the rival party as well as their political policies on issues will reveal that their programmatic and tactical slogans are also linked with certain positions regarding the ideological issues before the world communist movement.

Let us take a few examples as illustrations:

Our Programme puts forward the concept of national democracy as the path for attaining socialism in India while the rival party's programme puts forward the conception of people's democracy. The leaders of the rival party distort our position and make out that we are repudiating working-class leadership and accepting the leadership of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Jyoti Basu in a signed article in the *People's Democracy*, first issue, declares that we "are afraid of visualising working-class leadership lest the national bourgeoisie is frightened."

That this is a gross distortion of our Programme has been clearly revealed earlier by relevant quotations from our Programme itself. The difference between the programmatic concepts of national democracy and people's democracy does not lie in acceptance or rejection of working-class leadership. In fact it lies

in concrete path of achieving working-class leadership that opens out in the new world situation following the second world war.

Can it be denied that underlying the two programmatic concepts of people's democracy and national democracy lie two different concepts on the ideological issues that have arisen in the world communist movement, concepts relating to the decisive role of the world socialist system and the forms of transition to socialism?

Take again the question of socialist aid to India. Can it be denied that two basically different evaluations of the role of socialist aid will follow from the two different ideological positions on issues before the world communist movement?

Or take the question of the slogans of our party and of the rival party regarding India and Pakistan. Can it be denied that different slogans will emerge from different ideological positions, one that takes its stand on the peace zone and need for strengthening the peace zone and the other that takes its stand on the theory of intermediate zone?

In trying to make out that positions on the ideological issues in the international communist movement have nothing to do with the task of working out the strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution or evolving slogans on political issues, the leadership of the rival party is only trying to delude the ranks and cover up issues.

It is true that at their Calcutta congress the leadership of the rival party did not discuss the question of the ideological differences in the international communist movement and kept studiously silent on this. For a party that prides itself on being the true heir of Marxism-Leninism, this was an amazing position to take up. It can only be explained by the fact that they were actuated by purely opportunist motives and that if they had taken up the ideological issues for serious discussion at their party congress serious and irreconcilable differences would have come to light.

While therefore their Calcutta congress expressed no opinion on the ideological issues, at the same time, both before and after their Calcutta congress, their party papers in Bengali, Tamil,

Telugu, Malayalam and Hindi have regularly been expressing views on ideological issues (peaceful coexistence; socialist aid to the national liberation movements and to the newly-liberated countries; forms of transition to socialism; test ban treaty; disarmament; personality cult; significance of the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU etc.) which are in direct opposition to the views held by the majority of the world communist movement and which reflect the views of the hard core of the leadership of the rival party. These papers on several issues have also been expressing anti-Soviet positions, positions slandering the Soviet Union as having gone revisionist etc.

The truth therefore is that the differences between our party and the rival party relate both to basic ideological issues of the world communist movement and following from that and linked with that, are questions of strategy and tactics of the Indian revolution. The cause of unity will not be furthered by hiding the above fact from the rank and file of both the parties or by distorting each other's basic positions.

VII. POLITICAL DIFFERENTIATION IN THEIR RANKS

While some of our negative experiences have been detailed above, there have been important positive developments too on the other side to note during the recent period.

The experience of the international events of the last six months following American aggression on Vietnam, the experience following Pakistani aggression on India and Chinese support to Pakistan together with the impact of the developments inside India, have however helped to raise serious doubts and questions in the minds of sections of the rival party regarding the policies of their leadership during this period.

The significant and decisive help rendered by the Soviet Union to the people of Vietnam for their defence against American aggression contrasted with China's attitude of obstruction on this crucial question; the constructive steps taken by the Soviet party and the government in pursuance of the Moscow consultative committee meeting and China's arrogant rejection of every one of these steps; the manner in which China has stepped up the anti-Soviet campaign even in the present critical situation; Paki-

stani aggression against our country and China's support to that aggression and the failure of the hard-core of the rival party leadership to condemn it—all these have been the subjects of intense and heated discussion inside the rival party. As a result, a political differentiation has begun to take place inside that party between those who stick to the dogmatic positions of the leadership and those who disagree with these positions and are beginning to move away from them. Such political differentiation has been reported from several states.

Similarly a differentiation between pro-unity and anti-unity trends has also started crystallising. Inside the rival party there have been instances of those who sympathise with our efforts for united action and try to assert themselves against the rabid anti-unity elements who want to scuttle all united action. An encouraging example has come from Kerala where comrades of the two parties working on the kisan front came together to preserve the unity of the kisan movement. The result was that a very successful joint state kisan convention could be held at which the unity of the kisan sabha was safeguarded.

It is learnt that at the recent conference of the centrists in Calcutta a healthy pro-unity trend expressed itself. While the resolutions passed by the conference over-simplified the issue of unity, bypassed the basic political-ideological differences involved and contrary to facts reduced the whole matter to the question of Comrade Dange's chairmanship, yet the pro-unity sentiment underlying the conference discussions is one we should welcome.

It is significant that *Desh Hitaishi*, Bengali weekly of the rival party leadership, has come out savagely attacking the resolutions of the centrist conference, calling them "petty bourgeois" and repeating that the main enemy to be fought by "proletarian revolutionaries" is the "revisionism of the Dangeites" which "represents Indian capitalism."

VIII. CONCLUSION

Experience since the Bombay Congress thus fully confirms the validity of the four-point policy laid down by the Congress *vis-a-vis* the rival party, viz.:

— Attitude of patience, reason and fraternity and maximum efforts for joint action on common issues

— Firm principled, ideological-political struggle

— Firm rebuff to their splitting activities on the TU front and fight for preserving unity of mass organisations

— Work positively to build up and extend mass movements and unity of the democratic forces in practice.

But in the light of the new developments and our experience since the Party Congress (outlined above), our policy may concretely be further elaborated in the following manner:

1. We must press unceasingly and continue to take new initiatives for joint action on common issues, exposing and isolating the anti-unity trends and encouraging the pro-unity trends. In every case, however, care must be taken to see that the question is fully reported and discussed in our party units and our party ranks convinced about it, since joint action cannot be furthered unless our party ranks themselves move in a convinced and disciplined manner.

Our experience so far in regard to joint actions teaches us that the most important tactical line to follow for forging such joint action on common issues is the following: While we approach the rival party directly for joint action on issues, we should simultaneously also take the initiative to build such wider and broad-based unity for action on these issues that the anti-unity trend inside the rival party gets isolated and the pro-unity trend gets strengthened. Such a simultaneous dual approach—directly towards the rival party, as well as for a wider and more broad-based front—will help draw all the forces together into a common stream of the movement. This lesson has come to us from the experience of the several trade union actions as well as political movements like the Ahmedabad corporation elections.

The Sangram Samiti experiences of Bombay, Ahmedabad, Kerala etc. clearly show that to the extent our TUs were able to take the initiative and forge a common front for action with the Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, Mahagujarat organisation, UTUC, etc., to that extent the rival party, too, was forced to come into the common front of action. Our experience of the Amritsar

textile struggle showed that our forging unity with the INTUC and HMS was mainly responsible for successfully isolating the anti-unity trend in the rival party and bringing their TU cadre too into the common struggle. Similarly, our experience on the TU front in Coimbatore shows that to the extent our unions are able to forge broad unity in action with the HMS and other unions, to that extent the rival unions of the rival party are also forced into such unity in action despite the anti-unity trend of their leaders.

In the same way, one of the reasons why we were able to form joint fronts successfully with the rival party in the Ahmedabad and Calcutta corporation elections and isolate the anti-unity trend was that we had simultaneously taken the initiative to approach the other left parties for joint electoral front and form a wider political front.

The above lesson must be properly learnt and applied by us in the coming period both on the mass fronts and on the political front. Only if we learn to approach the problem of joint action from both ends simultaneously, i.e. direct approach as well as for wider unity, can we succeed in isolating and defeating, step by step, the hardened anti-unity trend inside the rival party leadership.

The problem of forging joint action with the rival party must, therefore, be seen as inseparably linked with the problem of forging wider democratic unity and not as one isolated from, or contrasted to it.

2. Even while conducting such joint actions our party must continue the political-ideological debate from the separate platform and press but in a fraternal manner and avoiding unfriendly and degrading attacks.

We must realise that however much we from our side may desire unity, the road to unity will be hard and protracted. Here is a question of two separate parties based on two distinct understandings of the Indian situation and two programmes, following from two distinct ideological positions—and both contending for the masses in the name of Marxism-Leninism and in the name of the communist party. Unity can come only on the basis of principles, only on the basis of having arrived at common poli-

tical-ideological positions. Unity cannot come on the basis of concessions on principles or by relaxing the political-ideological debate.

This is what makes the battle hard and complicated—even while we recognise that possibilities for joint action too will increase in the coming period. This is why it is necessary to emphasise the importance of continuing the political-ideological dialogue together with joint action and educative practical experience. The purpose of this debate must be to help those who are breaking away from the positions of extreme dogmatism to come closer to us and to isolate the diehards. Direct personal contacts and discussions as well as group discussions must also be organised wherever possible.

At a time when experience is bringing a political differentiation among them, the political-ideological struggle conducted by us in a proper manner will help to speed up this differentiation.

The rival party leadership is intensifying its political ideological activity. We claim the same right for our party—but we shall not do it in the manner in which they do it. They use the methods of slander, abuse, attack—methods applicable to an enemy. We use the fraternal methods applicable to an ally in a common struggle against a common enemy.

3. We must open negotiations with the centrists and explore the maximum possibilities for united action with them. We must discuss political-ideological differences with them and find out what are the areas of agreement and disagreement. Such direct discussion can yield fruitful concrete results.

4. We must work out and implement a mass line on all fronts which will demonstrate to the masses that we are the best and most effective fighters *in deeds* (and not merely in words) against imperialism, right reaction and the anti-people policies of the Congress government. By demonstrating in practice that our line alone can mobilise the widest masses for action on people's issues and political issues can we speed up the process of winning over others to our party. Energetic and planned steps must be taken by our party to educate and unify our own ranks, from top to bottom, on the broad strategy and concrete tactics of this mass line which flows from our party programme and

policy resolutions, so that the great mass of our party members and sympathisers may swing into confident action.

5. We must fight to preserve the unity of the TUs and other mass organisations and firmly rebuff all attempts to split this unity.

Where AITUC unions have already been split and rival unions created under the same name, board and registration number (as in Kerala, Karnatak, Tamilnad, etc.) by the rival party, we must concentrate on exposing the splitters, strengthening and consolidating the genuine AITUC union and winning over the members of the rival union to the AITUC union.

On the TU front the following general directives given by the Central Secretariat in 1964 and approved by the Party Congress must be followed:

(a) We must lead trade union struggles boldly but in our own way without falling a victim to adventurist provocations.

(b) When and where to strike or not to strike and how to settle disputes is now well-known to our party members who have seen the AITUC line in action in these years. That line has proved successful and yielded good results and gains to the working class. In this we should not be sidetracked by the sectarian criticism or abuse.

(c) In the conduct of struggles, we should not refuse to cooperate with any section of TU leadership. We should not disrupt TU unity because of political differences, even with the splitters. At the same time, we must pursue our line and convince the workers about its correctness.

(d) We must not, however, be blackmailed into following a wrong line of action or organisational set up under the threat of split in TU unity. *We should take all the issues to the membership and the masses and not keep issues within the narrow circle of executives only.*

(e) In view of the split in the party, we must establish party fractions in all TU organisations. While decisions on TU work must first be discussed and decided in the TU fractions, our decisions must not be imposed on the TU executive where non-party masses are members.

(f) The party fractions at the state levels should immediately review the TU situation *vis-a-vis* the activities of the splitters and direct lower units to take concrete measures against disruption.

(g) Every factory or establishment must have party fractions or groups to guide TU work of the party among the workers.

(h) Vigorous drive to enrol new members from among workers should be undertaken through the TU fractions.

(i) Attention should be paid to the politicalisation of the managing committee or executive members of unions; political activity of the leading TU cadres must be attended to with particular care.

(j) Special attention should be given to work among those industries or trade unions which are not affiliated to the AITUC.

(k) In the light of all the above, it is necessary to carry on a persistent campaign inside our party to educate our ranks in the real spirit of the Bombay Congress decisions.