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**INDIAN COMMUNIST PARTY**  
**DOCUMENTS**  
**1930 - 1956**

Compiled by the Research Staff  
of the Democratic Research Service  
with an Introduction by  
V. B. KARNIK

THE DEMOCRATIC RESEARCH SERVICE  
127, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Bombay, India  
**AND**  
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A non-profit, non-partisan organisation devoted to the spread of democratic values and information. Its aim is to contribute towards the education of public opinion in India to a fuller realisation of the need to defend India's national independence and her culture and of the possibilities of social and economic advance through democratic processes.

It will be appreciated if any reader who is in sympathy with the aims of the Democratic Research Service or desires any information writes to the following address:

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## C O N T E N T S

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>DOCUMENT NO.</b>	
1. Draft Platform of Action .. .. .	1
2. Statutes of the Communist Party of India .. .. .	22
3. Plan of Work: Communist Plot Against the C.S.P. .. .. .	36
4. Message of Greetings between Mao Tse-tung and B. T. Ranadive .. .. .	46
5. Statement of the Editorial Board of <i>Communist</i> on L.P.P.D. Article .. .. .	49
6. Questions to and answers by R. P. Dutt .. .. .	61
7. Tactical Line (1953) .. .. .	71
8. Andhra Thesis (1953) .. .. .	86
9. Draft Political Resolution (1953) .. .. .	93
10. Review Report of the Polit Bureau (1953) .. .. .	125
11. Ramamurthy's Letter to N. M. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff (1953) .. .. .	179
12. Resolution of the CC to the Party Congress (September 1954) .. .. .	195
13. Draft Resolution for the Emergency Session of the Central Committee (October 1954) .. .. .	208
14. CC Resolution on R. P. Dutt's Article (1954) .. .. .	215
15. CC Resolution on Andhra Elections (1955) .. .. .	216
16. Report to the Party Congress (1956) .. .. .	224
17. Organisational Methods and Practices of Party Centre (1956) .. .. .	304
18. Report of Ajoy Ghosh to the Fourth Congress of the CPI (1956) .. .. .	322

## Introduction

This is a compilation of some of the documents of the Communist Party of India. It is in no sense a complete record. It would be obviously impossible to collect together in one volume hundreds of programmatic, propagandist or polemical documents published by the Party in the course of the last thirty years. There would be moreover no point in publishing the collection. Many of those documents are available in books and journals published by the Party and others.

The documents collected in this volume are of particular significance. The first document is the Programme of the Party prepared as a draft in 1930 and adopted a little later. It still continues to be the programme, though strategy and tactics have changed many times since it was adopted. The next document contains the Rules and Regulations which lay down the structure of the party and duties and obligations of its members.

The third document, a secret circular outlining the course of action to be pursued in relation to the Congress Socialist Party, has been included as it exposes the treacherous manner in which the communists pursue their tactic of a United Front. The rest of the documents belong to the more recent period of the post-independence era. They outline the aims, the strategy and the tactics that the Party is pursuing at present and as such will be of great interest to any student of contemporary affairs.

Most of the documents included in the volume were at one time secret and confidential documents. They were not expected to be seen by any one but the workers of the Party. Some of them, like Document No. 7 *The Tactical Line* were withheld even from members of the Central Committee of the Party. It is through the enterprise of the Democratic Research Service that they became available to the general public. There is no question now about the authenticity of these documents. In the beginning, communist leaders denounced them as forgeries. But when challenged to take action against the organisation for publishing forged documents, they failed to go to a court of law.

Subsequently, even they were forced obliquely to admit their authenticity.

The experiment in democracy that is taking place in India is of crucial significance to democrats all over the world. The failure of the Indian experiment would probably seal the fate of democracy in all countries of Asia and Africa. That failure would also weaken the existence of democracy in West Europe and North America. The gravest threat to the young Indian democracy proceeds from the activities of the international communist movement operating through the Communist Party of India. Those who are interested in the success of the Indian experiment must therefore study the aims, objects and methods of operation of the Indian Communist Party. A knowledge of its intentions and an insight into its working may enable them to frustrate the Party's designs. The compilation is intended to provide in some measure that knowledge and that insight.

The Communist Party of India was avowedly a section of the Communist International as long as the latter existed as a separate organisation. Document No. 1, the Programme of the Party, declares towards the end: "The C.P. of India declares with pride that it considers itself a part of the organised world communist movement, a section of the Communist International." The Statutes of the Party, published as Document No. 2, also makes a similar declaration. The Statutes moreover provide in Rule 11 Clause (d): "Decisions of the Comintern and higher party organs are unquestionably obligatory for lower organs and for all members of the party." The words "unquestionably obligatory" are of particular significance. There cannot be any questioning of the instructions received from the Communist International. They must be immediately put into effect.

In the famous "Assembly Letter"—a letter of instructions clandestinely sent from abroad to the Indian communists by M. N. Roy, one copy of which fell in the hands of the police and was later read in the then Central Legislative Assembly by the then Home Minister of the Government of India—it is stated: "A C.P. must be an organic part of the world communist organisation. It cannot be otherwise and call itself 'communist'."

The dissolution of the International in 1943 has made no difference to the Indian communists' dependence on and blind acceptance of the instructions received from Moscow. Many

things have happened since then which should have opened their eyes and put an end to their allegiance to Moscow. But in an article published in the February 1949 issue of *The Communist*, B. T. Ranadive, the then General Secretary of the Party declared: "Defence of the Soviet Union was the acid test of internationalism." And even after Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and his regime, Ajoy Ghosh, the present General Secretary of the Party, made the following reference to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in his concluding report to the Palghat Congress of the Party held in April 1956 : "All this, let me repeat again, should not be allowed to blur in any way the gigantic achievements of the USSR in other spheres, the immense advance registered by the world communist movement and the outstanding role played by Comrade Stalin in all this. . . . ."

"We must not permit a spirit of cynicism to develop in relation to the USSR and CPSU. They will be fatal to our movement. The CPSU remains the leading party of the international communist movement. . . . ."

"The CPSU has been the party which has acted as a model for the international communist movement and Comrade Stalin was the international leader of the communist movement".

The socialist leader, Mr. Jayaprakash Narayan, was struck by this abject subservience of the Indian communists to Moscow even after all that had happened during the last ten years, more particularly the brutal suppression of the heroic revolution of the people of Hungary. In an Open Letter addressed to the communists in November 1956, he asked them : "The question is : have the Indian Communists spirit enough to declare their independence of Moscow and to choose their own road to socialism? My communist friends might reply that they have in fact been always independent. It would be a pity if they said so, because they know that would be a lie and no one would believe them anyway." To this challenging question put to them, the communists had no answer except quibbling and prevarication.

This dependence on Moscow is the direct result of the manner of the origin and growth of the Party. The communist movement did not grow in the country spontaneously. It was nurtured abroad and transplanted into the Indian soil. It owes its origin to the activities of the late Mr. M. N. Roy who embraced Marxism during his sojourn in the United States and Mexico and rose later to a high position in the hierarchy of the Communist

International. From Moscow and Berlin and Tashken he made through personal letters and through the publication of books and journals several contacts in India and established the first communist group. Later Moscow sent other emissaries like Percy Glading, George Allison, Philip Spratt, Benjamin Bradley, and others and the combined activities of all these agents of Moscow resulted in the formation of the Communist Party of India.

Since its establishment the Party has all along relied on the Communist International, the Communist Party of Britain or special emissaries who came from time to time for guidance in its long-term as well as day-to-day activities. This will be abundantly clear from the many twists and turns that the Party has executed during the last thirty years, on each occasion on the basis of instructions received from abroad.

Until the end of 1928, the communists were generally following the line laid down for them by M. N. Roy. His books, *India in Transition*, *One Year of Non Co-operation* and *Future of Indian Politics* were like gospels to them and, as directed by him, they were working in the Indian National Congress as national revolutionaries and trying to influence its policies. This line of action had yielded good results and the communists had acquired important positions in the national movement as well as the trade union organisations.

In 1929, there was a sharp turn to the left. The communists broke away from the Indian National Congress and started condemning it as a counter-revolutionary political party of the bourgeoisie. They opened a war on the mass movement of the Indian people which was then developing in the country under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi. They also broke away from established trade unions and began to develop revolutionary trade unions. They began to organise strikes which often ended in the complete destruction of unions. There was incessant talk of a general strike, of the establishment of Soviets and of the revolutionary overthrow of the established order. This sharp change in the course of action was effected on the basis of instructions received from Moscow in pursuance of the new line adopted by the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International. The Communist International decided to change the line in accordance with the new policies of the Government of Soviet Russia. The new line of the International was imposed upon the Communist Parties of all countries including the young

Communist Party of India. In India the instructions from Moscow reached a couple of days after a national conference of the communists had met in Calcutta and unanimously endorsed the old line. On the receipt of the instructions the conference met again, scrapped the earlier resolution and adopted a new resolution accepting with equal unanimity the new line decided in Moscow! This incident throws revealing light on the relations that exist between the Indian communists and their masters in Moscow.

This disastrous, adventurist line was pursued by the Indian communists until about 1935 when it was changed, again under instructions from Moscow. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International met in Moscow in 1935. It was decided at the Congress to make a sharp turn to the right. The new *Front Populaire* line was evolved and communists all over the world were ordered to abandon their narrow, sectarian outlook and to work together with Social Democrats in Europe and with national movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries. The Indian communists were ordered to drop their opposition to the National Congress and support its leaders in their struggle for national independence. This instruction was conveyed to them through special messengers as well as through the so-called Dutt-Bradley Thesis entitled "The Anti-Imperialist Peoples' Front in India."

Obedient as the Indian communists have always been, they accepted without any hesitation the new thesis and began giving effect to it. Overnight they became Indian patriots. They liquidated their red trade unions and the Red Trade Union Congress and a number of such other so-called revolutionary organisations that they had set up during the earlier period. It was during this period that the communists effected their alliance with the Congress Socialist Party, which proved a death trap for the latter.

The next occasion to effect a sharp turn in the party line came when Hitler attacked Soviet Russia in June 1941. Until then the Second World War was to the communists in India, as elsewhere, an imperialist war which had to be opposed and resisted. The Indian communists were until then engaged in an anti-war movement. Involvement of Soviet Russia in the war along with Great Britain and France created a very difficult situation for them. Owing to the difficulties created by the war six months

elapsed before Moscow could send them instructions about their line of action. These arrived towards the end of the year and in a day the imperialist war became a peoples' war! The communists then became ardent supporters of the war effort. They were all released from jails. The ban on the party was removed. A secret understanding was reached between the then British Government and the leaders of the Communist Party and the communists began their activities for the success of the war efforts. This brought the communists in sharp conflict with the National Congress and the "Quit India" movement which it had begun in August 1942 under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi.

The need for another change of front arose in 1945. It was effected as usual under instructions from Moscow. The leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain, Mr. Rajani Palme Dutt was at that time in India to initiate and direct the change.

There was another sharp turn in 1948 when, in pursuance of the new tough line introduced by Andre Zadnov, the Indian Communist Party was egged on to embark on insurrectionary activities. The decision to that effect was taken at the Second Congress of the Party held in Calcutta in February 1948 where a number of foreign communist leaders were present as the emissaries of Moscow.

When the line failed in India, in Burma, in Malaya and other countries a new line was spelled out again for the Indian communists through an article published in the Cominform journal, *For Lasting Peace and People's Democracy*, on 27th January 1950. As usual the new line was immediately accepted. Document No. 5 the statement of the Editorial Board of the *Communist*, the monthly journal of the Indian Communist Party, hailed the article as a "brilliant contribution to the Indian peoples' struggle for national independence and Peoples' Democracy."

In the post-independence years contact with Moscow was much easier. Communications were quicker and it was even possible for leaders of the Communist Party to go to Moscow on one excuse or the other to get instructions. One or the other leader used to fall ill and go to Moscow for treatment. Ajoy Ghosh, S. A. Dange and A. K. Gopalan have made several such trips to Moscow. Leaders of foreign communist parties have also visited India. Through many such sources and through articles in the Cominform journal instructions have been sent to India from time to time regarding the course of action to be pursued

by the Party. The most notable of the recent instructions is the document, *The Tactical Line* published as Document No. 7 in this volume. The document was prepared in Moscow after the visit of a commission of the Indian Communist Party consisting of Ajoy Ghosh, S. A. Dange, Basava Purniah and Rajeshwar Rao. A policy statement on the lines of that document was later prepared and published by the Polit Bureau of the Party, carefully omitting references to such insurrectionary activities as the partisan struggles of peasants and the general strike of workers. That statement has since guided and even now continues to guide the activities of the Party.

A more recent instance of such instructions received from Moscow is the Shepilov or Zhukov letter reported to have been brought to India on the eve of the visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev. The Party has denied the existence of the letter but, even after close questioning, has never gone beyond a mere denial. There is evidence, however, that the letter was mentioned and discussed in the Palghat Congress of the Party.

It should be clear from this rapid survey of the policies pursued by the Communist Party during the thirty years of its existence that it has all along acted on the instructions, and as the agent, of the international communist movement. The Kremlin has found in it a useful and pliant instrument for the pursuit of its policies. Apart from ideological and political guidance, Moscow has also given it from time to time considerable financial assistance for building up its organisation and carrying on its activities. No definite statement can be made about the actual sums received. Mr. M. R. Masani has in his book *The Communist Party of India: A Short History* (published by Derek Verschoyle, London and Macmillan Co., New York) given some incontrovertible information about the financial assistance received during the earlier years. No such information is available about later years. Circumstantial evidence, however, leads one to believe that considerable sums of money have been placed in the hands of the leaders of the Party. The huge country-wide apparatus that the Party has built up would require the expenditure of over a million rupees per year. During the first general elections of 1952 the resources at the disposal of the Party were next only to those at the disposal of the National Congress. Various explanations are current about the manner in which the Party gets the funds. One story is that the sale proceeds of vast quantities of Soviet literature sold in the



country go into the coffers of the Party. Another source may be the trade transactions which are now taking place on an ever-increasing scale between India and Soviet Russia. The Communist Party of Italy, it is said, receives large amounts of money through such transactions.

This should not, however, lead one to believe that the Indian communists are mere mercenaries. Many of them are devoted and dedicated men who were attracted to the Party by the dream of a new civilisation that Soviet Russia held out in its early years. Having joined the Party they have suffered and sacrificed for it. They have no life apart from the Party and, having cut themselves away from all contact with the outside world except for the purposes of combat or propaganda, their thinking power is now atrophied and they cannot intelligently judge and discuss the rights or wrongs of Party policies. That is why they have stuck to the Party loyally and obediently in spite of its violent gyrations from one extreme to the other. Many of them have themselves admitted: "The tradition of our party has been to swing like a pendulum from one extreme to the other." (Masani, p. 105). And yet very few have had the courage to break away from it. The Communist Party of India has converted many fine young men of the country into unthinking automatons and the tragedy is that they have been placed at the disposal of the international communist movement to further its designs against freedom and democracy.

The ultimate objective of the Communist Party is the establishment of a Soviet dictatorship. At the conclusion of its programme published in this volume as Document No. 1, it calls upon the toiling masses "to rally under the revolutionary banner of the Party and carry on the struggle to the successful conquest of power and the establishment of democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry in the form of Soviets" (page 19). More than twenty-five years that have elapsed since the programme was drafted and the peaceful attainment of national independence during the period have not made any difference in this ultimate ideal that the communists have set before themselves. The Documents of the post-independence period, more particularly Document No. 7, *The Tactical Line*, published in the volume will bear this out.

*The Tactical Line* enunciates in clear terms the path to be followed for the conquest of power and the establishment of a

Soviet regime. It says : "When the maturing crisis gives rise to partisan struggles on a wide scale, when the partisan forces in several areas are battering against the enemy, the workers in the cities in vital industries and especially in the transport system will have to play a decisive role. The onslaught of the enemy against the partisan forces, against liberated areas will have to be hampered and paralysed by mass strike action. With hundreds of streams of partisan struggles merging with the general strikes and uprising of the workers in the cities, the enemy will find it impossible to concentrate his force anywhere and defeat the revolutionary forces but will himself face defeat and annihilation."

It has stated at another place that in India "Parliamentary possibilities are restricted and that their replacement of the present State upholding the imperialistic feudal order by a Peoples' Democratic State is possible only through an armed revolution of the people." Emphasising the same point again, it says: "Partisan war must be one of the major weapons in our armoury as in the case of all colonial countries. But this weapon alone cannot ensure victory. It has to be combined with the other major weapons, that of strikes of the working class, general strikes and uprising in the cities led by armed detachment of the working class. Therefore, in order to win victory of the popular democratic revolution, it is absolutely essential to combine two basic factors—the partisan war of the peasants and workers' uprising in the cities."

The Policy Statement which was adopted by the Communist Party in May 1951 on the basis of *The Tactical Line* also says the same thing but in a little more guarded fashion. It says: "Even the most hardened liberal would now feel ashamed to maintain, let alone the Communist Party and other democrats and revolutionaries, that this Government and the classes that keep it in power will ever allow us to carry out a fundamental democratic transformation in the country by parliamentary methods alone. Hence, the road that will lead us to freedom and peace, land and bread, as outlined in the Programme of the Party, has to be found elsewhere. . . . ."

"For a time, it was advocated that the main weapon in our struggle would be the weapon of general strike of industrial workers, followed by countrywide insurrection as in Russia. Later, on the basis of a wrong understanding of the lessons of the Chinese Revolution, the thesis was put forward that since ours is

a semi-colonial country like China, our revolution would develop in the same way as in China, with partisan war of the peasantry as its main weapon. . . . .

“After a long discussion, running for several months, the Party has now arrived at a new understanding of the correct path. . . . .

“The working class, relying on agricultural workers and poor peasants, in firm alliance with the peasantry, together with the whole people, leads the battles in towns and rural areas to liberation, to land and bread, to work and peace.”

While following this path and working for the ultimate ideal the Communist Party does not neglect **partial demands and partial struggles**. A whole series of partial demands for various sections of the people such as workers, peasants, artisans, youths, students, soldiers and others have been formulated in the programme. Document No. 1. The object of putting forward these partial demands and developing struggles for securing them is also clearly stated. The programme states: “At the same time, with the object of developing the mass revolutionary struggle and revolutionary education of the mass of toilers, the C. P. of India puts forward partial demands the struggle for which will facilitate the mobilisation of the mass of the people in revolutionary insurrection for its emancipation”.

It is with this object in view that the Party is to work, as stated in Document No. 2, “in all the mass organisations of the toilers, including the most reactionary organisations, seeking to win over the toiling masses of members of these organisations to its side and to isolate the reformist, the national reformist and social democratic leaders.”

The Communist Party is the agency organised by the international communist movement to develop these revolutionary activities. As far back as 1930 it was stated in the programme: “The building of a centralised, disciplined, united mass underground communist party is today the chief and basic task.” (page 20). As stated in the Statutes, Document No. 2, the party is conducted “as a strictly underground organisation.” (page 26). Rule 2 of the Statutes defines the duties and obligations of the members of the Party. According to clause (a) a member of the Party must “observe the strictest party discipline and maintain reticence with regard to secret matters, actively participate in the political life of the party and the country,

carry on in practice the decisions of the Communist International, the party and the party organs.”

Clause (d) enjoins upon him to “join mass organisations of toilers, trade unions, etc., who are under the influence and leadership of the reformists and national reformists and other opponents, and carry on there a tireless everyday ideological and organisational struggle for liberating the toiling masses from the influence of the class enemies, winning these masses to the side of the Communist Party and thus isolating the reformists from the toiling masses.”

In the Meerut Communist Conspiracy Case launched by the then Government of India in 1932, a vast quantity of evidence was collected about the day-to-day and other activities conducted by communists in pursuance of these rules. After weighing all that evidence the District and Sessions Judge pronounced his findings. M. R. Masani has summarised those findings on page 37 of his book. They will bear repetition here as they are equally true of the present day activities of the communists :

“From these documents, which became available for open investigation, the duties and tasks of the Communist Party of India as enjoined from time to time by the Comintern were for the first time brought into daylight. These injunctions were concentrated on organisations: take part in the everyday struggle; do not disregard the smallest demand; be conspicuous in all strikes and demonstrations; every single strike, large or small, is a lesson; train leaders from the rank and file; inculcate discipline; expose reformists; oppose all phrases about non-violence or passive resistance; deprecate tactfully the influence of religion; denounce capitalists; explain that the Government is an instrument of the capitalists; introduce political subjects and issues; create discontent and intensify it where it exists; demonstrate the international character of the class struggle; praise the Red International of Labour Unions (Profintern) and denounce the International Federation of Trade Unions, Amsterdam; and draw illustrations from Russia.”

Even now it is through such activities that the communists seek to build up their party and to rally under its banner all discontented and dissatisfied sections of the population. The Policy Statement of 1951 also emphasises day to day patient work amongst the masses on the basis of their immediate demands. It says : “All these tasks call for the most intense, patient and

daily work among the masses, continuous agitation on our basic programme and immediate, simple demands of the people, a concrete working out of such demands for every section of the people according to general and local conditions, practical leadership of mass struggles, a combination of various forms of struggles, and a systematic building up of a network of mass organisations. . . . .”

The political resolution adopted at the Madurai Congress, Document No. 9, points out how the struggles of the people for day to day demands can develop into a struggle for the overthrow of the Government. It says in paragraph 41: “Struggles for the immediate demands of the peoples through all forms corresponding to the consciousness of the masses— petitions, signatures, strikes, hartals, demonstrations, marches, mass civil disobedience etc., struggles against the attacks of the Government, landlords and monopolists are the most important tasks facing the mass movement and constitute the most effective weapon for building the Democratic Front. Through these struggles are to be built the mass organisations with their unity embedded in the people. In these struggles will be trained and steelled cadres coming from the masses.” Such struggles for day-to-day demands, asserts the resolution, “grow into the common struggle for the replacement of the present government.”

The Communist Party has no scruples about the means and methods to be utilised for the attainment of its aims. It will use legal as well as illegal means and democratic and peaceful as well as insurrectionary and violent methods. It lays special emphasis upon the combination of legal and illegal means. While it exhorts its members “to make resolute use of any legal and semi-legal opportunity for public action and mobilisation of the masses around working class slogans” (page 9) it emphasises that “the party is conducted as a strictly underground organisation.” (page 26). It is interesting to observe the special provision made in the Statute for what is enigmatically called “special work”. In the Central Committee, the Provincial Committee and the town and local organisation there is a separate functionary called “Head of the special apparatus”. The rules moreover lay down: “Special work must be entirely separated from the general party work” (page 28). It appears moreover from the same Document that apart from factory, chawl or street cells some “special cells” are also organised. Rule 36

provides : "Special cells act on the basis of special instructions of the Central Committee." (page 32) Naturally enough, the Documents do not describe the "special work" that the Party carries on. But one can easily imagine the nature of that work from the reference to illegal activity which occur in many of them.

In recent years the communists have been talking a lot about peaceful and democratic methods. For example, Ajoy Ghosh, the present General Secretary of the Party, dilated at length in his speech to the Palghat Congress (Document No. 7) on peaceful transition to socialism. But this peaceful transition is to be brought about, according to him, "through a mass revolutionary movement." In communist parlance a mass revolutionary movement is nothing but "hundreds of streams of partisan struggles merging with the general strike and uprising of the workers in the cities" as defined in *The Tactical Line* (Document No. 7). Ajoy Ghosh has, moreover, emphasised that, however peaceful the transition to socialism, the leadership must remain in the hands of the Communist Party. He drew the particular attention of the Congress to Khrushchev's exhortation that, "whatever the form of transition to Socialism the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class aided by its vanguard. Without this there can be no transition to Socialism."

It should also be clear that the talk of peaceful transition to socialism is used by the communists as a tactic. Ajoy Ghosh has stated in his speech that "it is a big weapon in our hands." He has made the purpose clear. He says: "It enables us to heal the split in the socialist movement. It enables us to forge links with socialists who sincerely desire socialism but abhor civil war". The talk about peaceful means is therefore a manoeuvre to inveigle the socialists and others into a struggle which will put the communists into power.

The Communist Party was supposed to have been built up as a disciplined and united organisation. But all along there have been any number of dissensions within the Party. In the earlier years there were dissensions between the more senior members involved in the Meerut Communist Conspiracy Case and the younger recruits who joined the Party after their arrest. Later, there were quarrels amongst the new recruits themselves until the older members returned after serving their jail terms

and one of them, Mr. P. C. Joshi, was installed as the General Secretary of the Party. P. C. Joshi was removed from the position and ignominiously expelled in 1948 as, it was alleged, he had through his policies landed the party into the "morass of bourgeois reformism." In the later period also there were many quarrels and dissensions amongst the leaders. There were many a visit to Moscow during the last few years to find a solution to those political and personal quarrels. But even these visits and special instructions received from Moscow from time to time do not seem to have put an end to the internal dissensions.

Document No. 16 throws a revealing light on the internal situation within the Party. It was presented to the Palghat Congress. It was originally a part of the "Report to the Party Congress", Document No. 16. But later it was omitted from the version of the Report that was released for public information. The leaders of the Party must have thought that it would not be to their advantage to let the public know about the real state of affairs that existed in the organisation.

At one place in the Document it is stated: "This crisis has reached such a state that there is no Party Centre worth the name today. . . . The Central Party organ, the publication and sale of pamphlets and other literature, the activities of the comrades working in the all-India mass organisations and even the organisation of the work of the comrades working in the Centre—all this remains unattended to. This is breeding a sense of frustration and cynicism". At another place it is stated: "Sense of frustration and inactivity are growing. Sense of discipline is loosening, decisions of Party Committees remaining un-implemented. Irresponsible talk is going on on a big scale and the prestige of the Party is going down."

The document then talks of the differences that grew in the Polit Bureau and the Central Committee and how an intensive political struggle "became the main feature of inner party from the top to the bottom." It gives information about the work done by each member of the Polit Bureau and points out how "they did not function as a collective team." This failure of Polit Bureau members, who should subordinate their individual activity to the need of the common activity, is characterised as "individualism, a trait that is characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie."

It then concludes mournfully that "the net result of all these

procedures is that the entire party is divided from top to bottom around the main trends which express themselves at the level of the top leadership of the Party." It is clear from the Document that the Communist Party is a divided house with important members pulling in different directions. This should not, however, lead to any minimisation of the communist danger as Moscow can intervene any day and put the house in order.

The Documents collected in the volume, many of which are highly secret and confidential, give a glimpse into the communist mind. They show that the Communist Party of India is a conspiracy directed from Moscow and working secretly and illegally for the violent overthrow of the established State, that it is wedded to the path of armed uprisings of workers and peasants in cities and the countryside and that all its activities are inspired by the sole motive of preparing for those uprisings. Legal and constitutional activities of the communists, whether amongst peasants or in the trade union field or in legislatures, are only a facade behind which they work for fomenting unrest and for building up organisation for armed insurrection. The long-term aim of the communists remains, as always, the strengthening of their Party with the ultimate object of the capture of political power. Those who have to deal with the communists would do well not to lose sight of this motivating factor of all their activities and policies.

The problem of knowing the real mind of the communists has become much more urgent as a result of their recent victory in Kerala, one of the smaller States of the Indian Union. As a result of their electoral victory the communists are now the ruling party in the State. The Communist Party has declared that the communists in Kerala will work within the Constitution, that they will not foment or accentuate any conflicts with the Central Government. In other parts of the country as well the communists are at present following what may be called a soft line. They are utilising the favourable atmosphere created by the pursuit of the soft line for consolidating their strength. But nobody can tell how long the present policy will continue. Already there are indications that there is dissatisfaction with the policy. A sufficiently powerful trend has developed in the Party demanding frontal assault upon the Indian National Congress and its governments at the Centre and in the States and mobilisation of all dissatisfied elements for establishing the



so called alternative governments of democratic unity. The leaders of the Party and their mentors in Moscow may not judge it appropriate to effect the change immediately. They may still want to play for time. But the change is bound to come sooner or later, for the communists will cease to be communists if they will be content with gradual and peaceful progress attained under conditions of democracy and freedom.

*Bombay, April 30, 1957*

V. B. KARNIK

## **Draft Platform of Action**

*(Published in the "International Press Correspondence," "The Daily Worker," London and "Pravda," Moscow in December 1930*

The Draft Platform is a detailed analysis of the Indian situation. It also contains the programme of the Communist Party. In that the Communist Party declares itself a part of the World Communist Movement, a section of the Communist International.

The Indian National Congress is branded as a reactionary organisation and an ally of British imperialism. "The greatest threat to the victory of Indian revolution", says the Draft Platform, "is the fact that the great masses of our people still harbour illusions about the National Congress and have not realised that it represents the class organisation of the capitalists working against the fundamental interest of the toiling masses of our country."

Gandhiji is branded as a reactionary and an ally of the British.

The C.P.I. feels that the most harmful and dangerous obstacle to the victory of the Indian revolution is the agitation carried on by Left elements of the National Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru, Bose, Ginwala and others. "Under the cloak of revolutionary phraseology", says the document, "they carry on the bourgeois policy of confusing and disorganising the revolutionary struggle of the masses, and help the Congress to come to an understanding with British imperialism. Particularly blackguardly and harmful is the part played by the

national reformists in the labour movement in which they try in every possible way to substitute the methods of class collaboration for the method of class struggle doing their best to bring the workers under the influence of the ideas and the organisations of the Indian and British exploiters.”

Joshi, Chamanlal and Giri are branded as agents of British capitalism and Bose, Ruikar and Ginwala as sham Left national reformers.

## PART I

### MAIN TASKS OF THE INDIAN REVOLUTION

The Indian people is groaning under the yoke and the exploitation of British imperialism. Relying upon their political and economic supremacy, and requiring billions of rupees year by year out of the miserable income of India, the bloodthirsty imperialists have brought the toiling masses of the people to a state of famine, hopeless poverty, intolerable slavery and mass extinction as a people.

With all the power of the state in its hands, controlling the main branches of industry, railways, sea and river transport, banks and the credit system, the greater part of the land, forest and irrigation system, British imperialism has retarded and still obstructs the economic development of our country in every way, supporting and relying upon all that is backward and reactionary in town and country.

The supremacy of British imperialism is the basis of backwardness, poverty and endless suffering of our people. Only by the merciless and violent destruction of the political and economic supremacy of the British imperialist will the working masses of India succeed in rising to their feet, achieving their independence and creating the condition requisite for further development, and for the reconstruction of society in the interest of workers and peasants and for the purpose developing further towards socialism. In the enslavement of Indian people British imperialism

relies upon the native princes, the landlords, the money-lenders, and the merchants, utilizing the assistance of the national bourgeoisie. The system of land ownership by the landlords, native princes and money-lenders and the relics of serfdom in the land system of India (and consequently in all India's social and political institutions) represent the main bulwark of British supremacy.

In order to destroy the slavery of the Indian people and emancipate the working class and the peasant from the poverty which is crushing them down, it is essential to win the independence of the country and to raise the banner of the agrarian revolution, which would smash the system of landlordism surviving from the middle ages and would cleanse the whole of the land from all this mediaeval rubbish. An agrarian revolution against British capitalism and landlordism must be the basis for the revolutionary emancipation of India.

Linked up as it is with the system of landlordism and usury, and terrified at the thought of a revolutionary insurrection by the toiling masses, the capitalist class has long ago betrayed the struggle for the independence of the country and the radical solution of the agrarian problem. Its present "opposition" represents merely manoeuvres with British imperialism, calculated to swindle the mass of the toilers and at the same time to secure the best possible terms of compromise with the British robbers. The assistance granted to British imperialism, by the National Congress takes the shape at the present time of a consistent policy of compromise with British imperialism at the expense of the people, it takes the form of the disorganisation of the revolutionary struggle against the native States, the system of landlordism and the reinforced exploitation, jointly with the imperialists, of the mass of the people, of the working class in particular. The greatest threat to the victory of the Indian revolution is the fact that great masses of our people still harbour illusions about the National Congress and have not realized that it represents a class organisation of the capitalists working against the fundamental interests of the toiling mass of our country.

The policy of Gandhism, on which the programme of the Congress is founded, uses the cloak of vague statements about love, meekness, modest and hardworking existence, lightening the burden on the peasantry, national unity, the special-historic mission of Hinduism, etc. But under this cloak it preaches and

defends the interests of the Indian capitalists, the inevitability and the wisdom of the division of society into rich and poor, eternal social inequality and exploitation. That is, it preaches the interest of the capitalist development of India on the bones and the sweat of the working masses of the people, in alliance with world imperialism. The National Congress betrayed and disorganised the struggle of the toilers in 1919-21.

The National Congress supported the manufacturers against the workers during the textile strikes and in fact assisted in the passing of anti-labour legislation. The National Congress refused to support the fight of the Railwaymen against British imperialism, suggesting that they should ask Lord Irwin and MacDonald to arbitrate. The National Congress opposed the peasantry in their struggle against the money-lenders, the big landlords and the native princes.

Jointly with the liberals, the landlords and the manufacturers, the National Congress has produced the anti-popular Nehru Constitution, in which it declared the necessity of preserving the landlords, the rajahs and the money-lenders, remaining as a junior partner in the British Empire and leaving supreme authority in the hands of the British Viceroy and the Governor-General.

The National Congress issued the Delhi Manifesto supporting Gandhi's eleven points, which represented the programme of the Chambers of Commerce and similar associations. It carried on negotiations with the Liberals in prison trying behind the scenes to come to an understanding with the British Government and so forth. The National Congress and particularly its Left Wing, have done and are doing all in their power to retain the struggle of the masses within the framework of the British imperialist constitution and legislation.

In this connection—world history and the lesson of the class struggle in India prove that only the leadership of the working class can ensure the fulfilment of the historic task of emancipating the Indian people, abolishing national slavery, sweeping aside all the fetters which check national development, confiscating the land and effecting far-reaching democratic reconstruction of a revolutionary character. The working class of India organized by the industrial process itself and by the class struggle, will, under the leadership of the communist vanguard perform its historic task of organising the scattered masses of

peasantry and town poor for struggle against British domination and landlordism.

But in order to organise the mass of the workers; in order to rally the proletariat as a distinct class conscious of its distinct class interest and fighting for the leadership of the national movement for emancipation; in order to bring about the revolutionary alliance of the working class and the peasantry; in order to liberate the working class, the peasantry and the town poor from the hands of national reformism and direct their revolutionary struggle towards an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution — for all these purposes the working class requires its own proletarian Communist Party.

The Communist Party of India is the party of the working class, the final aim of which is the achievement of socialism and ultimately of communism. The Programme of the Communist Party is totally different in principle from the programmes and ideas of the other parties and groups, which are parties of the capitalist class and petty bourgeoisie not excepting the national revolutionary parties. While the latter are striving for the development of capitalism in India, the Communist Party is consistently and firmly fighting for a socialist path of development. While the national revolutionary groups are fighting for bourgeois rule and bourgeois form of government the C.P. of India is fighting for the democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry, a workers' and peasants' Soviet Government in India.

The only form of government which can safeguard the interest of the workers, peasants and toilers generally is the Soviets. The Soviets, set up in the course of the revolutionary revolt of the working masses, as insurrectionary bodies for the overthrow of British supremacy, will be the sole genuine seats of authority, elected directly in the factories, works, villages, etc. ensuring confiscation of the land and the satisfaction of the vital needs of the mass of the people. The Soviet Government alone will be capable of ensuring the national minorities their right to self-determination, including that of complete separation, and at the same time achieving the maximum unity in the ranks of the toilers of various nationalities engaged in common revolutionary struggle against the enemies of the Indian revolution. The Soviet Government alone will be able to effect an alliance with the world proletariat for the purpose of defending

the liberty and the achievements of the Indian revolution against the attacks of world imperialism and the Indian exploiters. Only such a government will be able to make an alliance with all other Soviet States against international imperialism and for the final victory of the world revolution. Firmly and courageously, and notwithstanding any sacrifices, the Communist Party will defeat the disorganizing and treacherous work of the national reformists. It will organize the masses of workers and peasants and lead them to victory over imperialism and take the lead in the further march towards socialism.

Adopting these as its guiding principles, the C. P. of India advances the following main objects for the present stage of the Indian revolution:

- (1) The complete independence of India by the violent overthrow of British rule. The cancellation of all debts. The confiscation and nationalisation of all British factories, banks, railways, sea and river transport and plantations.
- (2) Establishment of a soviet government. The realisation of the right of national minorities to self-determination including separation. Abolition of the native states. The creation of Indian Federal Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic.
- (3) The confiscation without compensation of all the lands, forests and other property of the landlords, ruling princes, churches, the British Government officials and money lenders and handing over for use to the toiling masses of peasantry. Cancellation of slave agreements and all the indebtedness of the peasantry to money-lenders and banks.
- (4) The 8-hour working day and the radical improvement of conditions of labour. Increase in wages and state maintenance for the unemployed labour.

The Communist Party of India will fight for these main demands, which express the interests of the mass of the people, and the achievement of which will create the conditions for and render possible further development in the direction of the building of a socialist society in India. At the same time, with the object of developing the mass revolutionary struggle and revolutionary education of the mass of toilers, the C. P. of India puts forward partial demands the struggle for which will facilitate the mobilisation of the mass of the people in revolutionary insurrection for its emancipation.

## PART II

### THE FIGHT FOR PARTIAL DEMANDS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

The C.P. of India considers that the sole and historically tested means of winning independence, carrying out the agrarian revolution and achieving democratic reconstruction, is the path of the revolutionary struggle of the widest possible mass of the people, developing on to a general national armed insurrection against the British exploiters and all their allies in our country.

The propaganda of non-violence of Mr. Gandhi, Nehru and the other leaders of the National Congress is intended to prevent a general national armed insurrection of the toiling masses against British rule. By his own confession in his autobiography, Gandhi took part in the armed suppression of the rising of the Zulu peasants in Africa and assisted the British robbers in their fight against the German capitalists for the right to exploit colonial peoples. Gandhi recruited Indian peasants into the British army, and sent to their deaths hundreds of thousands of Indian workers and peasants in the interests of the British robbers. And today Gandhi tells the peasants and workers of India that they have no right to, and must not, revolt against their exploiters. He tells them this at the very time when the British robbers are making open war on the Indian people in the North West Province and throughout the country.

The toiling masses will understand this double game of the National Congress. The workers and peasants of India will not give up their right to smash the whole feudal and imperialist system of exploitation, and their right to bring about the violent overthrow of British rule.

This emancipation of India cannot be achieved by a terrorist movement. The supporters of the terrorist movement of our country do not see and believe in the struggle of the broad masses of the people, and do not understand the connection between the agrarian revolution, the struggle of the working class and the overthrow of British domination. They try by brave and single-handed terrorist acts to achieve victory over British imperialism.



While recognising the devotion and self-sacrifice of the terrorists in the cause of the national emancipation of India, the Communist Party declares the road to victory is not the method of individual terror but the struggle and the revolutionary armed insurrection of the widest possible masses of the working class, the peasantry, the poor of the towns and the Indian soldiers, around the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party of India.

The most harmful and dangerous obstacle to the victory of the Indian revolution is the agitation carried on by the Left elements of the National Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru, Bose, Ginwala and others.

Under the cloak of the revolutionary phraseology, they carry on the bourgeois policy of confusing and disorganizing the revolutionary struggle of the masses, and help the Congress to come to an understanding with British imperialism. Particularly blackguardly and harmful is the part played by the national reformists in the labour movement, in which they try in every possible way to substitute the methods of class collaboration for the method of class struggle, doing their best to bring the workers under the influence of the ideas and the organisations of the Indian and British exploiters. The treacherous part played by the National Congress as regards the peasantry has once again shown itself in the appeal of the Left Congress leaders to the British Governor-General of Bengal to send troops to crush the peasants' revolts at Kishoreganj. In these circumstances some of the Left national reformists (supporters of Roy and others), who realise that the masses are becoming disillusioned in the Congress have cleverly put forward the advice to win the National Congress from within. Nominally their object is to revolutionize the Congress, in reality it is to restore the prestige of the Congress by replacing the old treacherous leaders by new leaders who are no better than the old.

The exposure of the Left Congress leaders who may again undertake to set up a new party or organisation like the former League of Independence in order once again to mobilize the mass of the workers, is the primary task of our party. Ruthless war on the Left national reformists is an essential condition if we are to isolate the latter from the workers and mass of the peasantry and mobilize the latter under the banner of the

Communist Party and the anti-imperialist agrarian revolution in India.

The Communist Party of India calls upon all the toilers to form a united front against the imperialists, the landlords, the money-lenders and the capitalists. The C.P. of India calls upon the Moslem and Indian workers and peasants not to be tricked by the cunning provocative methods of the British Government and the reactionary native exploiters, who set the toilers of different nationalities and religious beliefs against one another and provoke conflicts between them.

The C.P. of India calls upon all the toilers, including the untouchables (pariahs) not to permit such disorganization and splitting of the united revolutionary front of the oppressed who suffer equally at the hands of their own and British exploiters. In its struggle to win leadership of the masses, the C.P. of India calls upon its supporters to make resolute use of any legal and semi-legal opportunity for public action and mobilisation of the masses around working class slogans. On every occasion they must expose the treacherous part played by the National Congress. Against the bourgeois compromise front established by the national reformists, they must create the united front of the toilers from below, on the basis of the definite proletarian revolutionary demands and activities.

As one of the practical means of explaining to the toiling masses the exploiting and the treacherous policy of the Congress leaders, the C.P. of India recommends to its supporters to make use of their activity in the trade unions, municipal councils (Calcutta, Bombay, etc.) and similar institutions.

The C.P. of India calls upon its supporters and organizations to develop mass revolutionary activities and the struggle of the working class for their political and economic demands, mass refusal by the peasants to pay taxes, levies, rent, debts, particularly in districts where there are large landed estates—thereby mobilising and preparing the mass of the toilers for revolutionary struggle against imperialism. The C.P. of India calls upon all the class-conscious workers and revolutionaries to assist in transforming individual strikes of the workers into a general political strike, as a resolute step in organizing the revolutionary struggle of the mass of the people for independence, land and a workers' and peasants' Government under the guidance of the working class.

## A. GENERAL DEMANDS

In order to develop mass revolutionary struggle and the political training of the people, the C.P. of India puts forward and fights for the following demands:

1. Expulsion of the British troops, abolition of the police and general armament of the toilers.
2. Immediate liberation of all political prisoners including those who have committed acts of individual and mass violence.
3. Unlimited freedom of speech, conscience, press, meeting, strikes and associations for the toilers and abolition of all anti-popular laws (Trades Disputes Act, the prohibition of picketing, the regulation for the deportation of revolutionary workers, Press Act, etc.)
4. The abolition of rank, caste, national and communal privileges, and the full equality of all citizens irrespective of sex, religion and race.
5. Complete separation of religion from the state and the expulsion of missionaries as direct agents of the imperialists, with confiscation of their property.
6. Complete separation of religion from the state, and at any time on the demand of the majority of the electors.

## B. SPECIAL WORKERS' DEMANDS

In order to organize the widest masses of the working class, defend the day to day interests of the workers and maintain the general revolutionary struggle of the toiling masses in our country, the C.P. of India calls upon all class-conscious workers to concentrate every effort on the creation of a revolutionary trade union movement.

The C.P. of India deems it essential to organize mass trade unions based on factory committees, with the leadership elected directly by the workers and consisting of advanced revolutionary workers. The trade unions must become regularly functioning mass organisations, working in the spirit of the class struggle, and all efforts must be made to expel and isolate reformists of all shades, from the open agents of British capitalism such as Joshi, Chamanlal, Giri, etc., to the sham Left national reformists such as Bose, Ruikar, Ginwala, and other agents of the

Indian bourgeoisie who constitute a reactionary bloc for joint struggle against the revolutionary wing of the trade union movement. At the same time the C.P. of India works for the transformation of the All-India Trade Union Congress into a fighting all India centre of the labour movement on a class basis.

- I. The C.P. of India calls upon all its supporters and all class-conscious workers to help in organizing factory committees in all factories, railways, docks, etc. throughout the country. In cases where, owing to victimisation of the employers or British authorities, the factory committees have to work semi-legally, the C.P. advocates putting forward the demand for recognition of the factory committees as one of the principal demands in strike movements. The C.P. of India calls for the countrywide organization of workers' defence detachments, both to defend workers' strikes and demonstrations and to take part in the general revolutionary struggle.
- II. The C.P. of India calls upon all class-conscious workers to help the party to organize the movement and the struggle of the unemployed for regular relief at the expense of the state and the employers. It calls for the countrywide organization of unemployed councils, demonstrations and joint struggle with the workers in industry for the partial demands of the unemployed, monthly unemployment benefit at the minimum cost of living, refusal to pay rent, free supply of fuel and food stuffs by the municipal authorities, etc.
- III. Taking note of the semi-slave conditions of the plantation and agricultural workers, the C.P. of India calls upon class-conscious workers to take part and assist in the organization of the trade unions of plantation and agricultural workers. The fight for complete abolition of all systems of serfdom, compulsory and contract labour, deprivation of rights and unprecedented exploitation of the agricultural proletariat is one of our main aims, linked up closely with the aim of mobilizing the broad masses of peasantry to fight imperialist and feudal exploitation, under the leadership of the working class.
- IV. With the object of protecting the working class from physical and moral degeneration, and also in order to

raise its capacity to fight for emancipation, the C.P. of India fights for:

1. Limitation of the working day to 8 hours for adults and 6 hours for youths from 16 to 20. Introduction of the 6 hour working day in all harmful industries, including coal mining, and free supply of milk and butter to the workers in these industries.
2. Complete freedom of trade unions, demonstrations, picketing and strike.
3. Equal pay for equal work for women, youths and men.
4. Complete abolition of compulsory contract labour and systems of legal bondage of the workers.
5. A compulsory weekly rest period on full payment and a paid annual holiday of 4 weeks for adults and 6 weeks for youths.
6. State Insurances against unemployment, sickness, accidents, industrial diseases, old age, loss of working capacity and orphanage and compensation for disablement.
7. Establishment of a state minimum wage of 50 rupees a month, prohibition of contract system and establishment by law of weekly payment of wages.
8. Prohibition of deductions from wages for any reason or purpose whatsoever (fines, bad work, etc.)
9. Introduction of properly organized factory inspection, workers being elected members thereof, to supervise labour conditions in all factories employing hired labour.
10. The abolition of the system of hiring workers through jobbers, sarangs, etc., employment and dismissal of workers to take place through labour exchanges, controlled and supervised by the trade unions.

In addition the C.P. of India supports and fights for each and every demand intended to improve the conditions of the workers, building of new houses at governments' or employers' expense, provision for proper lavatories, clean dining rooms etc.

The C.P. of India is definitely against the principle of arbitration and interference by capitalist arbitration courts. It emphasises most definitely that the sole means of winning any serious concessions on the part of the exploiters is resolute class struggle by strikes and mass revolutionary activities.

### C. PEASANTS' DEMANDS

- I. The C.P. of India fights for the confiscation without compensation of all land and estates, forests and pastures of the native princes, landlords, money-lenders and the British Government and their transference to peasant committees for use by the toiling masses of the peasantry. The C.P. of India fights for wiping out the medieval system of landlording, to cleanse the whole of the land from the rubbish of the middle ages.
- II. The C.P. of India fights for the immediate confiscation of all plantations and their transference to revolutionary committees elected by the plantation workers. The allotments to which the planters assign their contract workers and also the land not in cultivation, to be handed over to the labourers and the poor peasants as their property. At the same time the C.P. of India is in favour of the nationalisation of large-scale machinery-equipped plantations, and workshops connected therewith, for utilisation in the interests of the whole Indian people.
- III. The C.P. of India fights for the immediate nationalisation of the whole system of irrigation, complete cancellation of all indebtedness and taxes, and the transference of the control and supervision of the work of irrigation to revolutionary peasant committees elected by the working peasantry.
- IV. In order to disorganise British rule and maintain revolutionary pressure against it, the C.P. of India calls upon the peasantry and agricultural proletariat to engage in all kinds of political demonstrations and collective refusal to pay taxes and dues, or to carry out the orders and decisions of the Government and its agents.
- V. The C.P. of India calls for refusal to pay rent, irrigation charges or other exactions, and refusal to carry out any labour services whatsoever (begar) for the landlords, native princes and their agents.
- VI. The C.P. of India calls for refusal to pay debts and arrears to Government, the landlords and the money-lenders in any form whatsoever.
- VII. As a practical watchword for the campaign among the

peasantry, and as a means of developing more political consciousness in the peasant movement, the C.P. of India calls for the immediate organisation of revolutionary peasant committees in order to carry on a fight to achieve all the revolutionary democratic changes required in the interests of emancipating the peasantry from the yoke of British imperialism and its feudal allies.

- VIII. The C.P. of India calls for the independent organisations of the agricultural proletariat, particularly the plantation workers, and its amalgamation with the proletariat of the towns under the banner of the Communist Party, as well as its representation in the peasant committees. The C.P. of India is firmly convinced that the complete thoroughgoing and permanent achievement of the above mentioned political and social changes is possible only by the overthrow of British domination and the creation of a Federal Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Republic.

#### D. EMANCIPATION OF THE PARIAHS AND THE SLAVES

As a result of the rule of British imperialism in our country, there are still in existence millions of slaves and tens of millions of socially outcaste working pariahs, who are deprived of all rights. British rule, the system of landlordism, the reactionary caste system, religious deception and all the slave and serf traditions of the past throttle the Indian people and stand in the way of its emancipation. They have led to the result that in India, in the twentieth century, there are still pariahs who have no right to meet with their fellowmen, drink from common wells, study in common schools, etc.

Instead of putting an end once and for all to this shameful blot on the Indian people, Gandhi and the other Congress leaders call for the maintenance of the caste system, which is the basis of and justification for the existence of the socially outcaste pariahs. Only the ruthless abolition of the caste system in its reformed, Gandhist variety, only the agrarian revolution and the violent overthrow of British rule, will lead to the social, economic, cultural and legal emancipation of the working pariahs and slaves. The C.P. of India calls upon all the pariahs to join

in the united revolutionary front with all the workers of the country against British rule and landlordism.

The C.P. of India calls on the pariahs not to give in to the tricks of British and reactionary agents who try to split and set one against the other the toilers of our country.

The C.P. of India fights for the complete abolition of slavery, the caste system and the caste inequality in all its forms (social, cultural, etc.). The C.P. of India fights for the complete and absolute equality of the working pariahs and all the toilers of our country.

#### E. STRUGGLE FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE TOWN AND PETTY BOURGEOISIE

The C.P. of India calls upon the small producers in the towns to support the revolutionary struggle against British domination, the landlords, the princes and the money-lenders.

The capitalist class and the National Congress, in their search for a compromise with imperialism are betraying the interest not only of the workers and peasants but also of wide sections of the town petty bourgeoisie (artisans, street traders, etc.).

Only the complete abolition of British rule bringing in its train the liberation of our country, the radical alterations of the whole policy of the Government and the abolition of landlordism and survivals of serfdom throughout the Indian social order, will create the conditions requisite for developing the economic life of the town petty bourgeoisie, handicraft workers and town poor. The C.P. of India fights for the cancellation of all the usury which has enslaved the poor people of the towns. The C.P. of India fights for the cancellation of all direct and indirect taxes, excise and other forms of taxation of wages and small earnings which are ruining the artisans, street traders, employees, etc. It stands for the replacement of such taxes by a progressive income tax on the capitalists, bond holders, banks and inheritance. The C.P. of India fights for all revolutionary measures which serve the interests of the proletariat and are intended to improve the conditions of the town poor.

#### F. EMANCIPATION OF THE TOILING WOMEN

The toiling women of India are in a semi-slave condition under a double burden of the survivals of feudalism and



economic, cultural and legal inequality. The toiling women have no right whatsoever to determine their fate, and in many districts are forced to drag out their existence in purda under the veil, and without the right not only of participating in public affairs, but even of freely and openly meeting their fellow citizens and moving through the streets. At the same time the exploitation and working conditions of the women workers are surely unheard of in their brutality and sweated character. The semi-slave conditions of women in India are the result of the widespread survival of relics of feudalism throughout the social order of the country and its careful preservation by British imperialism.

Noting that the present bourgeois national women's organisation, "The All India Women's Conference" led by Sarojini Naidu, one of the leaders of the National Congress is not carrying on a genuine struggle to emancipate women but in reality is co-operating with British imperialism, the C.P. of India calls upon the working masses of India to join the common revolutionary struggle of the toiling masses, under the leadership of the Communist Party, for the overthrow of the social order and social system which gave rise to the slave conditions of Indian women.

The C.P. of India fights for the complete social, economic and legal equality of women. It fights for the complete abolition of night work for women and the prohibition of underground work for women (in the coal mines and in all branches harmful for females).

The C.P. of India fights for leave of absence from work at full rates of wages two months before and after child birth, with free medical aid, and for the establishment of creches in all factories and workshops employing women, at the expense of the employers such creches to cover small children and infants at the breast, with a special apartment for feeding. Nursing mothers to have their working day reduced to 6 hours.

### G. SOLDIERS' DEMANDS

I. In the struggle for the emancipation of our country the C.P. of India calls for the spreading of revolutionary propaganda among the soldiers and police and explanation of the necessity

for their armed insurrection together with the toiling masses of the country against British rule.

II. The Indian soldiers and police are, socially, in the main, poor peasants who have been forced to seek employment in the army by poverty, landlessness and hunger. The C.P. of India fights for the allotment of land to the soldiers equally with all the other toiling peasants. The C.P. of India calls upon its supporters to explain to the soldiers and ex-soldiers that the only means of acquiring land, abolishing indebtedness and getting work is the revolutionary overthrow of the British and the feudal supremacy.

III. The C.P. of India calls upon its organisation and class conscious workers and revolutionaries to begin organising revolutionary groups among the soldiers. The aim of these groups must be to persuade and prepare the soldiers to take action in support of a general armed insurrection of the people for liberty, land and a workers' and peasants' Government. It is necessary to explain to the soldiers by concrete examples drawn from their daily lives (arbitrary action by the officers, shooting down of demonstrators, workers' strike, etc. flagrant inequality of treatment of white and Indian soldiers—worse food, clothes, allowances, etc.) that Indian soldiers are only a blind tool in the hands of the British robbers, who use them to maintain the national and social oppression of the toiling masses of our country.

IV. The C.P. of India calls upon its supporters to organize the ex-soldiers who have had practiced proof of the swindling and exploiting character of the British rule and to build up revolutionary ex-soldiers' organisations among them and, wherever possible fighting detachments to prepare and support the future national insurrection and agrarian movement under the leadership of the party.

V. The C.P. of India calls upon the conscious workers to organise fraternisation with Indian soldiers, with the object of establishing closer friendship and explaining the solidarity of the interests of workers, peasants and soldiers in the fight for freedom and the abolition of all forms of exploitation.

## H. YOUTH DEMANDS

I. The C.P. of India calls upon the revolutionary working class

youth to build up the Young Communist League. The Youth Communist League of India, being an illegal organisation owing to the complete lack of rights and the prevailing terror, has as its object to organise the widest possible masses of working class, peasant and revolutionary student youth around the banner of the Communist Party, doing so either directly or through the medium of auxiliary, legal and semi-legal mass organisations (youth section in the trade unions etc.).

II. The Y.C.L. of India as the helper of the Party has the special task of organising the working youth under the banner of communism. The Y.C.L. of India must come forward as a political organisation which subordinates economic, cultural, sports, etc. activities to the interest of the political struggle namely, the overthrow of the imperialist yoke and the winning of power by the working class and the peasantry.

III. The C.P. of India calls for the countrywide organisation, both of mixed and of separate workers', peasants' and students' detachments, both to defend the people's demonstrations, strikes, etc., and in order to make systematic preparations for the armed struggle of the Indian people.

IV. The C.P. of India calls upon the honest revolutionary youth to help in spreading political propaganda among the soldiers and police. The C.P. of India considers that the call of the Left nationalists to the soldiers to leave the army and take their discharge, in accordance with Gandhi's philosophy of non-violence, is a mistake. The task of genuine revolutionaries is to persuade the soldiers, while staying in the army, to prepare and to raise, when the time is ripe, the banner of armed insurrection and, shoulder to shoulder with the toiling people, overthrow British rule.

V. With the object of protecting the toiling youth against physical and cultural degeneration, and in order to develop its revolutionary offensive for the national and social liberation of the toiling masses, the C.P. of India fights for:

- (a) Limitation of the working day to 6 hours for youths from 16 to 20. Prohibition of employment of children under 16.
- (b) Universal free and compulsory education up to 16 in the national language of the pupils. Free feeding, clothing and supply of text books to children at the expense of the State. Introduction of vocational training for youths at the expense of the State and the employers.

- (c) Paid weekly and annual (6 weeks) holiday for youths.
- (d) State maintenance for the unemployed youths at rates equivalent to the cost of living.

## CONCLUSION

The Communist Party of India, putting forward its programme of demands of the Indian revolution, calls upon the toiling masses to rally under the revolutionary banner of the Party and carry on the struggle to the successful conquest of power and the establishment of the democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasantry in the form of Soviets.

The C.P. of India declares that the successful solution of the problems facing the revolution against feudalism and for emancipation will open up the possibilities (with the help of the international proletariat and the class offensive of the exploited masses of our country,) of the revolution, thereby creating the requisite conditions for the development of our country on socialist lines, avoiding the further stage of domination of the capitalist system.

In this struggle the Indian people are not alone. They have an ally in the revolutionary workers of all countries in the world. The workers of the whole world are fighting for the overthrow of the international imperialism and the abolition of the whole system of capitalist exploitation, which is now going through a very profound crisis. The crisis of the feudal and capitalist system of exploitation in India is at present being combined with the world crisis, which leads to the great sharpening of all antagonisms, the approach of wars, and the rise of a new wave of revolutionary struggles. The growing crisis is producing the growth of stubborn resistance and counter-offensive on the part of the international proletariat and the colonial peoples. The strength of the international revolution is growing. In one of the countries of the world, Soviet Russia, the working class has long ago overthrown the power of the exploiters and is successfully building up a socialist state of society. The workers of the Soviet Union have created a firm bulwark of the International Communist movement, and are showing in practice how the world ought to be reconstructed in the interests of the workers and peasants. The Soviet Union is a reliable ally

of the colonial peoples, including the toilers of India. The toiling masses of India will receive the support of the revolutionary workers of all countries, particularly of the developing Chinese revolution. The toiling masses of India will also be supported by the revolutionary workers of Great Britain, led by the British Communist Party, while the ruling Labour Party of MacDonald and Independent Labour Party of Maxton and Brockway, who are part and parcel and agents of British imperialism, will do everything in their power to tighten and maintain the noose of slavery and poverty round the neck of the Indian people. In spite of all the devices of the imperialists and their reformist agents, the revolutionary front of the world proletariat and colonial peoples is growing stronger and wider every day.

But to ensure the victory to the Indian revolution, there is required a Communist Party of the proletariat, the leader and organiser of the toiling masses of our country. The building of a centralised, disciplined, united, mass underground communist party is to-day the chief and basic task, long ago overdue, of the revolutionary movement for the emancipation of our country.

The C.P. of India declares with pride that it considers itself a part of the organised world communist movement, a section of the Communist International. The C.P. of India calls upon all advanced workers and revolutionaries devoted to the cause of the working class to join the ranks of the Communist Party now being built, in order to fight to carry out the historic tasks of the Indian revolution. In the conditions of British supremacy and terrorism, the Communist Party can only exist and develop as an underground party, applying and utilizing all forms of legal and illegal activity to develop its mass struggle, and to incite the toiling masses for the fight for democratic dictatorship of the working class and of the peasantry. The Communist Party of India sets up its party organisation and groups in all towns and in all factories and workshops throughout the country.

The Communist Party of India organises the working class and the basic masses of the peasantry under the banner of the Indian revolution.

In spite of all difficulties, sacrifices and partial defeats, in spite of all the attempts of the imperialists and the Indian bourgeoisie

to separate the revolutionary movement of India from the international proletariat, the Communist Party will lead the struggle of the toiling masses to the complete overthrow of British rule and of the system of landlordism and serfdom, in order thereafter, together with the world proletariat, to march forward in the struggle to set up a socialist system of society in our country and throughout the world.

Long live the independence of India!

Long live the working class, the leader of the toiling masses!

Long live the revolutionary insurrection for independence,  
land and bread!

Long live the workers' and peasants' Soviet Government!

Long live the world revolution!

(Taken from *India and Communism*, 1935 - pp. 328—343.)

## **Statutes of the Communist Party of India**

*(Published in the International Press Correspondence  
dated 11th May, 1934)*

The Draft of the Provisional Statutes carries detailed instructions to party workers on the methods of party organisations. It also outlines the task of party members. The following is one of the tasks enjoined on the party worker. "To observe the strictest party discipline and maintain reticence with regard to secret matters, actively participate in the political life of the party of the country, carry on in practice the decisions of the Communist International, the Party and the Party organs."

Gandhism is looked upon as one of the enemies of the Communist movement. Dealing on the question of expulsion, the document says "Open or concealed supporters of Gandhism, Roy group and other political trends condemned by the C.I. as enemies of communism and as disorganisers and betrayers of the struggle for national independence" will be expelled from the party.

On the organisational structure of the party the document says "The party is conducted as strictly underground organisation."

One of the important principles of the organisational structure of the party is to consider "decisions of the comintern and higher party organs as unquestionably obligatory for lower organs and for all members of the party."

"All the party organisations are autonomous in deciding local questions, provided these decisions do not

conflict with the decisions of the party and the Comintern”.

The communist party of India being a section of the Communist International is the most advanced organised section of the proletariat of India, the highest form of its class organisation.

The Communist Party of India carries out the leadership of the proletariat, the toiling peasants and all the toiling masses, organising them in the struggle for the victorious anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution for the formation of a workers' and peasants' government on the basis of the Soviet power, for complete state national independence and for a further struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat and the full triumph of socialism according to the programme of the Communist International. The Communist Party of India is a united fighting organisation cemented by conscious iron proletarian discipline. The party is strong in its unity, unity of will and unity of action, which are incompatible with any deviation from the programme, any violation of party discipline and factional grouping inside the party.

The Communist Party of India demands from its members active and self-sacrificing work for carrying out the programme of the C.I. and the draft platform of action of the C.P. of India. It demands also the carrying out of the statutes of the party and fulfilling all the decisions of the Party and its organs, the guarantee of the unity of the ranks of the Party and the strengthening of fraternal international relations both between the toilers of the various nationalities of India and with the proletariat of all countries of the world. The party works in all the mass organisation of the toilers, including the most reactionary organisations, seeking to win over the toiling masses of members of these organisations to its side and to isolate the reformist, the national reformist and social democratic leaders.

## (1) PARTY MEMBERS AND THEIR DUTIES

(1) A member of the party is any person who recognises the programme of the C.I., the draft platform of action of the Communist Party and who works in one of the party organisations,



obeys the decision of the party and the Communist International and regularly pays membership dues.

(2) A member of the party must:-

- (a) Observe the strictest party discipline and maintain reticence with regard to secret matters, actively participate in the political life of the party and the country, carry on in practice the decisions of the Communist International, the party and the party organs.
- (b) Tirelessly work to raise his ideological attainments, to master the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism and the chief political and organisational decisions of the Party and explain them to the non-party masses.
- (c) Be a member of mass organisations (trade unions etc.) and carry on tireless work there under the leadership of the Party committee for strengthening the political and organisational influence of the party.
- (d) Join mass organisations of toilers, trade unions, etc. who are under the influence and leadership of the reformists and national reformists and other opponents, and carry on there a tireless everyday ideological and organisational struggle for liberating the toiling masses from the influence of the class enemies, winning these masses to the side of the Communist Party and thus isolating the reformists from the toiling masses.
- (e) Besides participating, organising, and leading the everyday struggles of the workers and peasants for partial demands, to carry on tireless agitation and propaganda among the workers and other toilers, spreading the ideas of the anti-imperialist and agrarian revolution and the ideas of communism.

(3) Members are accepted into the party only individually and through party cells. Newly recruited party members must be confirmed by the city committee (or local committee).

(4) If whole groups from other political organisations join Communist Party, or if whole political organisations want to join the C.P., a proper decision of the Central Committee is required for acceptance.

*Note:* If leading members from other political parties come over to the party, in addition to the sanction of the town committee, it is necessary to have the sanction of the Central Committee.

(5) When accepting a new party member he must be vouched for by at least two members of the party who know him well both at his place of work and his place of residence. The comrades recommending him are responsible for him, and in case of improper recommendations will be subject to party disciplinary measures to the point of exclusion from the party. When a member of the communist youth organisation is accepted, a recommendation is required from the corresponding committee of this organisation of which he was a member before joining the party.

(6) Every member of the party who works in some local organisation and is going to work in the area of another local organisation, will be registered by the latter as one of its members.

(7) Members of the party will go to one district from another according to the rules laid down by the Central Committee. The consent of the Central Committee of the party is required to go to another country.

(8) The question of the expulsion of any one from the party is decided by a general meeting of the cell of which the given person is a member, and is confirmed by the town or local committee. Pending the decision of the town committee, the person in question can be removed from party work.

(9) The following are expelled from the party: (1) open or concealed supporters of Gandhism, of the Roy group and other political trends condemned by the C.I. as enemies of communism and as disorganisers and betrayers of the struggle for national independence; (2) open or concealed violators of the iron discipline of the party; (3) those who betray in any way secret party affairs (it must be remembered that this leads to a position that the party can be disorganised and party workers arrested); (4) provocators, careerists, traitors, morally degenerate people and those who by their improper conduct harm the good name and soil the banner of the party; (5) class alien and hostile elements who have crept into the party by deception, concealing their counter revolutionary or criminal past or their previous connections with the police.

## (II) THE ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

(10) The party is conducted as a strictly underground organisation. The underground organisation party in their work make it their central task to develop most widely mass work to establish its leadership in the mass revolutionary movement and with this aim combining the methods of underground work and open work.

(11) The leading principle of the organisational structure of the party is democratic centralism which means:—

- (a) All the leading organs of the party from top to the bottom are elected.
- (b) The party organs periodically report on their work to their party organisations.
- (c) The strictest party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority.
- (d) Decisions of the Comintern and higher party organs are unquestionably obligatory for lower organs and for all members of the party.

(12) The party is built on the foundations of democratic centralism according to the territorial-industrial principle. Organisations which embrace any districts are considered as higher than organisations which embrace part of the given district.

(13) All the party organisations are autonomous in deciding local questions, provided these decision do not conflict with the decisions of the party and the Comintern.

(14) The highest leading of every organisation is the general meeting, conference, or congress.

(15) The general meeting, conference, congress elects a committee, which is the executive organ and guides all the current work of the organisation.

*Note:* (1) For reasons of underground work, in accordance with the decisions of higher party committees, the lower party committee can be formed without elections at the corresponding party conference, but by appointment or also by combining election with co-option, etc., only a part of the party committee is elected at the party conference and the other part of the party committee is co-opted. (2) For reasons of underground work, it is also permissible for the elections to take place not at the party conference, but by selecting for the party

committee persons from among the best activists who have been selected in advance by the higher party committee from the cells and fractions in mass organisations, trade unions, etc.

(16) The organisational scheme of the party is as follows:

(a) Territory of India: All-Indian party congress, which elects the central committee of the C.P. of India.

(b) Province: Provincial party conference and provincial party committee.

(c) Town (or locality): Town (local) conference, Town (local) committee.

(d) Factory, chawl or village: General meeting of cell, Bureau, or Organiser of cells.

(17) Order of subordination of the Party organs: All Indian Party Congress, C.C.C.P. of India, Provincial party conference, Provincial party committee, Town (local) party conference, Town (local) party committee.

General meeting of the cell, Bureau Organiser of the Cell.

*Note:* In respect to provinces where a provincial committee has not yet been organised, the C.C. directly leads the local party organisations, and in places where there are no local organisations it directly leads the various cells. The same applies to the Provincial committees in provinces where local and district committees have not yet been organised everywhere. In such cases the provincial committee directly leads the work of the various cells and local party organisations.

### (III) THE CENTRAL ORGANISATIONS OF THE PARTY

(18) The highest organ of the party is the Congress. Congresses are called if possible once a year. Extraordinary congresses are called by the central committee on its own initiative or at the demand of not less than one third of the total number of members represented at the last party congress. Extraordinary congresses are called at the expiration of two months.

The Congress is to be considered as having full powers if it has representatives from not less than half the members of the party represented at the last regular congress. Representation quotas at the congress and the method of election are decided by the central committee.

*Note:* If it is impossible to call a congress of the party, the C.C. will call an enlarged session of the plenum of the C.C., with

participation of representatives of the Provincial committees. Such an enlarged Plenum of the C.C. has the right, by arrangement with the C.I., to change the composition of the C.C.

(19) The congress (a) discusses and confirms the report of the Central Committee; (b) revises and changes the programme and statutes of the party; (c) decides on the tactical line of the party on the basic questions of the current politics; (d) elects the central committee. During the sittings of the party congresses a small auditing commission has to be elected, which looks through the financial affairs of the past period, and at the end of congress reports the results of its work and is then dissolved.

(20) The Central Committee is elected by the congress. In case a member of the central committee leaves it, he will be replaced by one of the candidates in the order fixed by the congress.

*Note:* The central committee has a right to co-opt members to the central committee.

(21) The central committee organises the politbureau for current work. The politbureau appoints a secretary whose task is to guide all the work of the apparatus of the central committee, to guide the proper distribution of the party functionaries and control the fulfilment of the directives of the C.I., the decisions of the party congresses and the central committee.

(22) The members of the central committee are attached as instructors and representatives of the central committee to definite provincial organisations and also divide among themselves the various fields of the activity of the central committee:

- (a) Editor of the Central Party organ
- (b) A Manager of the Central Technical apparatus of distribution
- (c) Treasurer
- (d) Head of the work of party fractions in the mass organisations
- (e) Head of the special apparatus.
- (f) Head of the party educational department.

*Note:* According to the concrete conditions of the work, the central committee can combine some of these functions and give to one person, or set up new departments, etc.

*Note:* Special work must be entirely separated from the general party work.

(23) The central committee leads the whole work of the party in the interval between the congress, represents the party in its relations with other organisations and institutions, organises various party institutions and guides their activity, appoints the editor of the central organ, confirms the secretaries and editors of party organs of provincial party committees, distributes the forces and funds of the party and is in charge of the central funds.

(24) With the aim of strengthening the Bolshevik leadership over the work of the local party organisations, the central committee has the right to create in some parts of the country Regional Bureaux of the central committee which would include several provinces, to send representatives and instructors to the localities. The Regional Bureaux of the central committee, representatives and instructors of the central committee must work on the basis of special instructions laid down every time by the central committee or the politbureau.

(25) The central committee regularly informs the party organisation of its general work by sending out special information bulletins and also by sending members and representatives of the central committee to the localities to give reports on its work.

#### (IV) THE PROVINCIAL ORGANISATIONS OF THE PARTY

(26) The highest organ of the provincial party or organisation is the provincial party conference, and in the intervals between the conferences, the highest organ is the provincial party committee.

In its action it must be guided by the decisions of the congresses of the Communist Party of India and its leading organs.

*Note:* The provincial committee works on the territory included in the administrative boundary of the province. It might be formed from the town organisation of the main city of the province. When the town organisation of the provincial centre gets strong enough, the town committee while maintaining the functions of the leading organ of the town party organisation, takes on for a time, till a proper provincial committee is built, the rights and duties of the provincial committee and develops its work in the administrative limits of the province, beginning with the chief industrial centres.

(27) The regular Provincial Conference is called by the Provincial Party committee if possible once in six months. Extraordinary conferences are called at the decision of the provincial committee or on the decision of one-third of the total number of members of the provincial organisation, provided consent of central committee is given. Quotas of representation and the manner of election to the Provincial Conference are fixed every time by the Provincial Committee. The Provincial party conference discusses and confirms the report of the work of the Provincial committee, and elects the Provincial committee of six members and two candidates, and delegates to the All-India Communist Party Congress.

(28) The provincial committee appoints a secretary and an assistant. The secretary of the provincial committee carries on current work, directs the apparatus of the provincial committee, directs the proper distribution of party workers and ensures the fulfilment of the decisions of the provincial party conference, the provincial committee and the directives of the central committee of the party. The provincial committee gives regular reports on its work to the C.P. on the date and in forms as established by the central committee.

(29) In order better to carry out the task which faces the provincial committee, and to ensure the proper leadership of the work of the local party organisations, the members of the provincial party committee are attached to definite districts of the province and divide among themselves the functions of the provincial committee, such as:-

- (a) Editor of the provincial organ (confirmed by the C.C. of the organ)
- (b) The manager of the provincial technical apparatus and the organiser of the distribution of literature.
- (c) Treasurer.
- (d) Head of the work of the fractions in mass organisations.
- (e) Head of the special apparatus.
- (f) Head of the party educational department.

*Note:* According to the concrete conditions of the work, the provincial committee may combine several of these functions in one comrade, for new functions etc., or appoint comrades outside of the committee members to carry such work as technical apparatus, subordinating him directly to the secretary.

(30) The provincial committee leads all the works of the

provincial organisation in the intervals between provincial organisation of the party in relations with other organisations and institutions, organises various provincial party institutions and guides their activity, appoints the editors of the provincial newspapers, confirms the secretary and editors of district organs, distributes the forces and funds of the provincial organisation and has charge of the provincial treasury.

(31) With the aim of strengthening proper leadership of the local organisations and ensuring a more thorough checkup on the fulfilment of decisions, the provincial committee has the right to send representatives and instructors to the localities.

#### (V) THE TOWN AND LOCAL ORGANISATIONS

(32) In the town and village talukas (for several village communities), town (or local) party organisations are formed with the confirmation of the provincial committee. The highest organ of the town (or local) party organisation is the town or local conference. The town (or local) party conference is called by the town or local committee, if possible every six months. Extraordinary conferences are called on the decision of the town or local committee, or at the demand of one-third of the total number of members in the town or local organisation. The town or local conference discusses and confirms the report of the town (or local) committee, elects the town or local committee of the five members and two candidates, and delegates to the provincial party conference.

(33) The town or local committee elects a secretary (to be confirmed by the provincial committee,) organises and confirms cells and fractions in mass organisations, organises the collection of membership dues, organises various party institutions and commissions within the limits of the town (locality) and guides their activity, appoints the editor of the town (locality) party organ to be confirmed by the provincial committee, guides the works of the cells and fractions in lower ranks of the mass organisations, distributes the forces and funds of the party within the limits of the town (locality), and has charge of the local funds.

(34) In order better to carry out the task which faces the town or local committee, the members of the town or local committee are attached to definite cells and fractions in mass



organisations as representative or instructors of the committee, and also distribute among themselves the chief functions of the apparatus of the town or local committees such as:-

- (a) The editor of the town (or local) organ.
- (b) The leader of the town or local technical apparatus and the distribution of literature.
- (c) The treasurer.
- (d) The head of the work of the fractions in mass.
- (e) The head of the special work.

*Note:* According to the concrete conditions of the work, the town or local committee may combine several of these functions in one person from new functions etc. The special work has to be entirely separated from the general party work.

- (f) The town or local committee will give regular reports on its work to the provincial committee on the dates and in the forms which are fixed every time by the provincial committee.

#### (VI) THE SECTION COMMITTEE IN THE BIG CITIES

(35) In the big towns, with the permission of the C.C., section organisations are formed under the control of the town committees, and work under its direction. The section organisations of big towns will work according to the rules for the town organisations.

#### (VII) CELLS

(36) The basis of the party is the factory cell. These cells are formed in factories, mills, big farms, units, institutions, etc. if there are not less than three party members. Besides the factory cells in the mills, chawl and street cells are organised from among the party members who cannot be in factory cells—like small handicraftsmen and traders, housewives etc. In the villages, village cells are organised. Special cells act on the basis of special instructions of the central committee. The cells are confirmed by the local or town committees.

*Note:* Each group of class conscious workers, poor peasants, and other toilers can on their own initiative organise a party cell and begin communist work among the masses. Such party cells which are organised on the initiative of non-party class conscious workers can be accepted into the party by the town or local

party committee according to the statutes after a careful personal investigation of the membership both in respect to political views and in respect to honesty and loyalty to the cause of the revolution.

(37) In big factories, in order to adopt the conditions of underground existence, separate department cells are organised and through cells organised form a joint unit.

(38) The cell links up the workers, peasants, and others with the leading organs of the party. Its tasks are:—

1. Agitational and organisational work among the masses for the party and decisions.
2. The attraction of sympathisers and new members and political education.
3. The publication of factory paper.
4. Assistance to the town or local committee in its every day organisational and agitational work.
5. Active participation as a party unit in the economic and political life of their factory and city and also of the whole country, active participation in the discussion and solution of all general party questions.

(39) In order to carry on the current work, the cell elects a secretary, who is confirmed by the town or local committee. The members of the cell distribute among themselves various duties in the factory:

1. Collection of membership dues; 2. publication and distributions of the factory party paper; 3. leadership of the fractions of the factory mass organisations (trade unions, sport, cultural, educational, etc.); 4. active work among the toiling masses and recruiting new members; 5. actively carry out the decisions of the cell and higher party organisations.

## (VIII) FRACTIONS IN MASS ORGANISATIONS

(40) At all congresses, meetings, and in the elected organs of the mass organisations outside the party-trade unions, factory committees, peasant organisations, etc.—where there are not less than three party members, party fractions are organised which must function in an organised way, strengthen party discipline, work to increase the influence of the party, carry party policy among non-party masses. For current work, the fraction elects a secretary.

(41) The fraction is completely controlled by the corresponding party committee (C.C., provincial committees, town or local committees or nucleus), and on all questions must strictly and without vacillation carry out the decisions of the party organisations which lead them. The fractions of the higher bodies of mass organisations, by agreement with the corresponding party committee, may send directives to the fraction of lower bodies of the same mass organisations and the latter must carry them out without fail as directives from a higher party organ.

#### (IX) INNER PARTY DEMOCRACY AND PARTY DISCIPLINE

(42) The free and businesslike discussion of party policy in the various organisations or in the party as a whole is the inalienable right of every member of the party, arising from inner party democracy. Only on the basis of inner party democracy can Bolshevik self-criticism be developed and party discipline strengthened, as the latter should be conscious and not mechanical. But a discussion on questions of party policy must be developed in such a way that it should not lead to party organisations or party workers exposed to the police terror or to attempts on the part of an insignificant minority to force their views on the vast majority of the party members and to attempts to form fractional groups which will break the unity of the party, which will lead to splitting the working class. Therefore, a wide inner party discussion can be recognised as necessary only if:—

- (a) this necessity is recognised by at least several big provincial organisations.
- (b) if inside the C.C. there is not a sufficiently firm majority on the chief questions of party policy.
- (c) if despite the existence of a firm majority in the C.C. for a certain point of view the C.C. nevertheless considers it necessary to verify the correctness of its policy by discussion in the party. Only if these conditions are carried out and secrecy is ensured, can the party be guaranteed against the misuse of inner party democracy by anti-party elements. Only on these conditions can we reckon on inner party democracy being useful for the cause and not being utilised to damage the party and the working

class. Discussion must take place under the strong leadership of the C.C., and in the localities under the leadership of the provincial town or local committees.

(43) The preservation of the unity of the party, a merciless struggle against the slightest attempts at fractional struggle and splits, the strictest party discipline are the first duties of all members of the party and all party organisations. In order to bring about the strictest discipline inside the party and secure the greatest unity while removing all fractions, the C.C. has the right to apply all party penalties to the point of expulsion from the party in case of violations of discipline or the existence of fractions.

(44) The decisions of the leading party organs must be carried out exactly and rapidly. Failure to carry out the decisions of higher organisations and other actions which are recognised as crimes against the party will be dealt with as follows: For a local organisation:-  
censure and general registration (disbanding the organisation); for individual party members; various forms of censure (public rebuke, reprimand etc.) public censure, temporary removal from responsible work, expulsion from the party.

All party organisations from the cell upward have the right to inflict party penalties. In order to carry on a preliminary investigation of the activity of party members, party committees may set up in individual cases if it be necessary, temporary investigation committees, whose conclusions later must be confirmed by the party committee.

## (X) THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES OF THE PARTY

(45) The financial resources of the party and its organisation are comprised of membership dues, income from party undertakings and other incomes.

(46) The monthly membership dues for party members are as follows...unemployed members of the party are exempt from the payment of membership dues.

(47) On entering the party an entrance fee of..... must be paid.

(48) The C.C. decides what proportion of the membership dues will remain at the disposal of the cell and how much will be put at the disposal of the town or local committee.

## Plan of Work

*COMMUNIST PLOT AGAINST THE C. S. P.*  
(A Document Published by M. R. Masani in 1938)

"The Communist Plot Against The C.S.P." is a detailed plan for utilizing the United Front of the Communists and the Socialists for disrupting the Socialist Party. The Document gives detailed instructions to the members of the C.P.I. to enter the Socialist Party and wreck it from within. It asks the members to demand joint agitation and joint action with the C.P.I. and at the same time try to indoctrinate the C.S.P. ranks and try to win them to the fold of the Communist Party.

In view of the changed situation inside the C.S.P., the attitude of the C.S.P. leadership and our tasks of working for socialist unity, the following plan of work is adopted:-

1. The composition and character of the All India Contact Committee should be changed. It should consist of five members from each side. This would be a purely political committee and must meet every three months; it would take a review of the political situation and endeavour to evolve through its deliberations a united lead on the major issues facing the movement. These agreed decisions would become the basis not only of joint agitation and work but also be considered the official line of the two organisations unless they are overruled by the executive of either organisation. This committee would endeavour to come to agreement on whatever political issues it is possible to do so. The two organisations would throw in their entire weight, both separately and jointly to implement these agreed decisions. If there are any complaints against the units of either organisation they would be referred to the Secretariat concerned and the results of such investigations and decision will be communicated to the other Secretariat in due

course. Complaints against individuals or lower units cannot be made a cause, in normal circumstances, for breaking up united front relations nor should these interfere with the work of this committee.

We expect the C.S.P. leadership to circularise to all its units to develop united action with us on as many occasions and as many fronts as possible. We expect that the differences on some issues or even conflicts on some occasions will not be considered as a sufficient cause for stopping joint action on other occasions, or other issues, etc. The general directive should be to continue U.F. relations on whatever terms possible.

We have already circularised to our ranks and are repeating these instructions.

We hope such an All India Committee would become one of the transitional forms of achieving a United Executive and the deliberations of this body would lead in growing measure to the ideological political unification of the socialist movement and give concrete guidance to the national movement.

2. In Bombay, Calcutta and Cawnpore, where our differences are the most acute we should take the initiative to form contact committees which should not be of less than three comrades from either side. The functions of this committee would not be only political but it will take initiative to propose and carry out joint actions on whatever terms are possible and over issues on which the C.S.P. agree and our delegation would be responsible to see that our part of the agreement is implemented.

3. We would not suggest any rigid organisational forms for our other provincial and district committees. The existing contacts must be made to function and the necessary changes in composition etc. introduced to make them function more regularly, efficiently and smoothly. The main point is to get U.F. work going through whatever mechanism is possible.

4. As the most suitable mechanism to give an organisational form to our U.F. work and to supply it the necessary driving force we should seriously endeavour to form informed Activists' Group. These should consist of all the active elements from our C.S.P., T.U., and Congress ranks who are easily available at the place of their work or residence. These *ad hoc* groups through their periodical meetings should take the responsibility for carrying through joint actions *e.g.* organising a demonstration, helping or guiding strikes, running mass campaigns. This

would not only be mobilisation of larger number of cadres for day to day work but these Activists' Groups become through their own experience of working with us the rank and file of the united front movement and who would be also a guarantee that united front work instead of being sabotaged is really developed more and more. It is the way we work these Activists' Groups and demonstrate our own work inside them that we will not only build a U.F. movement but also create socialist cadres who would also struggle along with us, for the achievement of socialist unity.

5. To inspire confidence in the C.S.P. leadership to keep the unity of the C.S.P., to be able to enlarge it, we would not, from outside for the time being press the demand "All Socialists inside the C.S.P." We would tell the C.S.P. leadership who is scared away by this slogan, that since you yet mistrust us and lack confidence in our *bona fides* and construe our attempt in working for socialist unity to be a partisan move to capture your organisation, we do not advocate a slogan which is being resisted by a section of the C.S.P. and which even threatens to split the C.S.P. and with it the unity already achieved. If this slogan is accepted we would endeavour to win your confidence and establish our *bona fides* and take you seriously at your own word and expect you to implement the slogan of "Joint Action with the C.S.P." and thereby create the preconditions of closer unity.

Our comrades within the C.S.P. would continue to popularise the slogan and use every achievement of joint action and every attempt to sabotage it to vigorously pursue the unity policy. In those localities and provinces where it is possible to include all socialists inside the C.S.P. it should be done without fail and without making much noise about it.

It is in this way that the elements working for socialist unity within and without the C.S.P. can be strengthened.

6. Our work inside the C.S.P. must be guided by the considerations that we are conscious builders of socialist unity, it is our task to keep up the unity of the C.S.P. The anti-unity (*sic*) elements inside the C.S.P. would seize every opportunity to throw us and our supporters out of the C.S.P. to maintain and guarantee their own organisational domination over the C.S.P. We can achieve the above tasks and defeat the moves of the disrupters only by making a sharp turn in our attitude

towards and inside the C.S.P. (on the lines indicated in other documents.)

The exact nature of our work inside the C.S.P. depends upon our present position inside the C.S.P. units.

In those provinces and places where we are in a majority: Here we must immediately begin to work in the new way and interpret and act upon the Faizpur thesis, on the lines of Zaheer-Batliwalla-Dinkar thesis without giving any chance for technical breaches of discipline. We should defend this as being the logical working out of the Faizpur thesis. On the basis of our practical work and ideological campaign we should be able to win over the whole C.S.P. to accept this draft thesis and recognise us as the best C.S.P.ers. Systematic efforts must be made to recruit the advanced elements of the C.S.P. who begin to accept our line into our own organisation. We should take particular care not to let other C.S.P. members be landed into a group against us or create the impression that we are rushing the C.S.P. or exploiting our majority in any other cause except in strengthening the C.S.P. itself.

In the majority provinces the Provincial District Executive should discuss both the draft thesis which were put forward at the Lahore A.I.C.S.P. conference and should forward their opinion to our C.S.P. committee. In day to day work they should begin to take as their guidance the generalisations and directives given in the thesis of Zaheer etc. with special reference to the proletarianisation of the Party (*sic*) and rapidly increasing its membership.

The C.S.P. Committee should on the basis of these discussions in the provinces and districts work out a series of articles for the C.S. work drawing out main conclusions of the thesis on the basis of the experience of these places and their needs, without referring to the thesis itself, without using its terminology. The main point is to drive home the conclusion that the growth of the mass basis of the C.S.P. arises inevitably out of experiences of the growing of the C.S.P. itself and the tasks it has undertaken.

In places where we are in a minority great vigilance and elasticity in day to day work is needed. We should endeavour to get as many of our new and unmarked comrades or sympathisers as possible inside the C.S.P. promptly undertake to liquidate all sectarian mistakes and silently work towards a majority.



It is only through our work that we will earn the right to be inside the C.S.P. in the eyes of all honest C.S.P.ers, not let ourselves be isolated and make our expulsion impossible.

7. The specific tasks in the provinces where we are a majority are the following:

ANDHRA. Membership 480. Entirely under our influence. No rival group. Provincial C.S.P. headquarters and District Executives function effectively. Our entire might and best of our district cadres should be thrown into the task of organising the local units of the C.S.P. far more effectively and link them up with provincial headquarters. Along with this organisational consolidation must proceed a serious effort to enlarge the membership still further by admitting into the C.S.P. every honest rank and file who is sympathetic to socialism and is active on any of the mass fronts. Congress, peasants, T.U. (*sic*), Youth or Students. Andhra can and must become a model C.S.P. Unit.

TAMIL NAD. Membership 220. Entirely under our influence. Leadership united. No rival group. Madras city and Provincial headquarters function as living units, in the other districts only agitational influence. Ideological level very low; the weekly must not be used only for raising ideological level of the C.S.P.ers but by giving them practical guidance re. mass front problems lead to the organisational consolidation of the C.S.P.

MADRAS. Membership 200. Entirely under our influence and no rival group. Very widespread agitational influence on all fronts. Congress (majority in P.C.C.) peasant and T.U. movements entirely under their influence. The C.S.P. as an organisation is lagging behind its agitational achievements. The comrades have failed to give up Congress methods of organisation and agitation. Individuals function for units.

The foremost task of the leadership is to make the district branches function and during the course of this organisational drive itself double the membership on the basis of a special recruitment campaign from the active workers and peasants. They have recently started a weekly of their own and this should be of inestimable service in fulfilling these tasks.

ORISSA. Membership 40 (forty). Majority of members with

us, an assured majority in the Provincial Executive. Naba Chowdhury who follows J.P.'s lead is the only other element and is considered as a reactionary by our comrades. The membership must be doubled in the course of the next three months by drawing upon students and kisan cadres. Sectarian attitude towards Chowdhury must be immediately liquidated and the danger of his being used as agent by Masani is circumvented. Efforts must be made not to let any rival group to be consolidated inside the C.S.P. and draw N. Chowdhury nearer and nearer.

**BENGAL.** Membership 250. Though we are a majority inside the Party we are not a majority inside the Executive (8 ours and 9 Centre and Right) owing to our inability to afford to send all our delegates to the Provincial conference. There are Right and Centre elements and both have begun to function as a united fraction against us. Through our day to day work and intense ideological campaign we should break up rival fractions and wean away the Centre from the Right on the basis of the unity of the C.S.P. itself.

Our contact is not forthcoming at all satisfactorily nor is the provincial leadership boldly carrying out our C.S.P. policy, nor has the sectarian resistance in our district organisations to work inside the C.S.P. successfully broken. All this must immediately change.

The labour party should be made to speed up unity with the C.S.P. With our strong position inside the Provincial Executive of C.S.P. and with the relative competence of our cadres' unity on terms which may not appear to us as reasonable would be an unqualified advance. It will shift the balance in our favour inside the C.S.P., remove lot of confusion and strengthen the unity elements inside the C.S.P.

If the C.S.P. agrees to have effective membership of 30-40 of the LP we should have unity and dissolve the LP. If the C.S.P. refuses to accept the proposal we should continue to activise (*sic*) the LP, work out United Front with the C.S.P. without any half-heartedness or dilatoriness on our part with a view to bring about unity on the above minimum conditions as soon as possible.

LP is not an alternative to C.S.P. nor do we look upon it as a permanent organisation. We retain and activise it only to be able to achieve socialist unity and as a transitional measure.

The slogan of the I.P. as a necessary political Party of the working class and also the slogan of the All India Workers' Party separate from the C.S.P. is categorically rejected by us.

The activation of the I.P. does not mean that it should be extended to the District. It should remain confined to Calcutta and be looked upon as our own political platform till unity with the C.S.P. is achieved. Again, as many new comrades as can enter the C.S.P. in Calcutta should continue to do so. Inside our own ranks all old prejudice against the I.P. must be cast aside.

Anushilan is joining the C.S.P. and likely to join the Right and Centre fraction in opposition to us and take initiative to start local C.S.P.s. We should not oppose their entry into the C.S.P. but endeavour to work with them to strengthen the C.S.P. itself.

PUNJAB. Membership 700. Though it would be correct to say that our policy would commend an overwhelming majority yet this majority is not stable because of acute faction fights among the socialists as a whole. The biggest (*sic*) problem so far has been the non-understanding and non-acceptance by our own comrades of our policy towards the C.S.P. This coupled with their own fractional attitude and the fact that the other faction was identified with the C.S.P. had led them to commit a whole series of sectarian and opportunist mistakes. A big forward step has however been taken with the liquidation of the Socialist Party and the unification of all socialists under the C.S.P. This organisational unity of the socialists can be immediately made to yield serious political results only if sectarianism and factionalism are rooted out from our ranks in the Punjab. The proletarian movement is rising in the Punjab, headed by the socialists themselves and the rapid proletarianisation of the party can alone lead to a permanent solution of the Punjab problems which have so far defied solution.

The two groups within the C.S.P.—Kirti and the Nawajawan Bharat Sabha—are grovelling among themselves. They are likely to seek our support for factional ends. It is our task not to ally with any faction, keep the unity of the C.S.P. and develop it as a homogeneous party.

Within the Congress the P.S.P. must function as a unit and not ally with either of the Congress factions.

The provinces where we are in a minority are the following:-

**BOMBAY:** Has problems of its own. Membership 200. Leadership Right. We are rigidly excluded. The local units of the C.S.P. do not function. Immediate steps should be, for us, to send as many unmarked comrades as possible inside the C.S.P. and they should take the initiative to form local units and press for united action from within. Our joint work and contract is not functioning satisfactorily. Despite difficulties from the other sides the necessary amount of enthusiasm and the needed initiative is not forthcoming on our part. This must immediately change. Joint work must become a regular feature of our day to day work and begin with a series of campaigns e.g. Sholapur Prisoners' Release, Recognition of GKU, the Bombay Labour Bill etc.

C.P. The C.S.P. was in our hands but was dissolved, the passivity of our responsible comrades and their inability to build up a C.S.P. was used by Masani and others not only to dislodge us by dissolving the Party but also to attack our political *bona fides*.

Later on, our comrades started a Radical Workers' League. The C.S.P. again being reorganised.

All comrades who were formerly in the C.S.P. must demand admission into the C.S.P. as a matter of right. We should dissolve the Radical Workers' League and ask its members to join the C.S.P.

Constant contact with the new C.S.P. members must be kept and all steps taken to influence them. The danger of Masani using the C.S.P. in C.P. as his closed preserve must be tactfully circumvented.

We should intensify our Congress work in Nagpur and work to activate the Town Congress Committee along with the C.S.P. comrades and thus win the confidence of the local C.S.P.

**MAHARASHTRA.** Membership 200. The locals do not function at all, nor provincial headquarters. The leadership is definitely hostile.

We must get our comrades to make the locals function, enrol as many members as possible and establish new locals. These steps must be carefully camouflaged.

Only those of our comrades should remain out of the C.S.P. who are not taken inside it. Leading elements from among them can serve as our contact and take the initiative to launch joint

work. It is very necessary in Maharashtra to make a sharp turn in our attitude towards the C.S.P. and implement the above directives immediately.

U.P. Nominal membership 450. Majority of organised membership with us. All functioning locals ours. The leadership is Centrist and at present suspicious and hostile. Except at Cawnpore all our comrades are inside the C.S.P.

Our immediate tasks are rapid improvement in our local work, start C.S.P. locals where they do not exist, seriously carrying on joint work at Cawnpore. Our top must keep constant touch with the C.S.P. leaders and endeavour to influence them politically.

KARNATAK. Membership 200. Bogus. Our isolated contacts must be asked to join the C.S.P. and form locals. The existing C.S.P. leadership would be unable to prevent this.

As soon as possible a meeting of all our contacts should be called and work for them planned out.

SINDH. The C.S.P. was disbanded. A complete report should be demanded from our comrades and steps taken to find out the exact position of the C.S.P. and investigate about Bachar's corrupt opportunism.

GUJARAT. 100. We were in majority. A part of the leadership had come over to us, but they lost it owing to their own inactivity. The other group has gone over to Masani. In Ahmedabad we are a majority. Our group is the very opposite of Andhra comrades—their growing inactivity has completely paralysed and demoralised them.

Today they have to begin all over again, from the most elementary stage. All the advanced workers in the Mill Kamdar Union must be taken inside the C.S.P. and the Ahmedabad C.S.P. made a functioning body. It is only by improving Ahmedabad work that the situation in Gujarat can be tackled.

BEHAR. 200. Solidly with J.P. Provincial headquarters function, but no district units. They supply cadres and political leadership to the Kisan Sabhas but function as a loose group of individual agitators. The party is not built through Kisan

work, not attempted to draw in new cadres. If we could send a good organiser a first-rate C.S.P. could be organised but we cannot afford to send any. We have contacts with some recently released Andaman prisoners and they are working inside the C.S.P.

DELHI. Membership 7. Torn with factionalism. The Left section is with us but they are really nothing more than Left C.S.P.ers. Some advanced workers who had previously been in contact with us in other towns and are very good elements, have joined the C.S.P. and the Congress but are dissatisfied with both sections of the C.S.P. leadership. Since we cannot afford to send a whole-time organiser there, comrades on their way to and from Punjab should drop down at Delhi.

N. W. FRONTIER. Punjab C.S.P.ers have contact with them and they go along with them. They are generally Left. Our C.S.P. comrades should get in direct touch with them through the Punjab comrades.

AJMER. There are ex-terrorists, Left Congressmen working among the states people and some advanced workers and with them all a good local C.S.P. can be formed. The BBCI Union comrades should get in touch with all these contacts in Ajmer and help to organise a C.S.P.

## **Message of Greetings between Mao Tse-tung and B. T. Ranadive**

Ranadive in his greetings to Mao Tse-tung on his victory of the Communist Party in China says: "The toiling masses of India feel jubilant over this great victory. They know it hastens their own liberation." Even after independence the C.P.I. did not consider India to be free. In his reply Mao Tse-tung says: "I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators." Pandit Nehru is branded as the collaborator of imperialism and this when India had recognised Communist China and was advocating its entry into the United Nations.

### **B. T. RANADIVE'S MESSAGE TO MAO TSE-TUNG**

Following is the text of the message of greetings sent by Comrade B. T. Ranadive to Comrade Mao Tse-tung on October 12, 1949.

"Dear Comrade Mao Tse-tung,

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India I send you and through you to the people of China, our warmest greetings on the occasion of the formation of the People's Government of China. The formation of the People's Government signalises the final victory of the Chinese people against the enemies and enslavers of China—the American imperialists and the clique of Kuomintang reactionaries. This great and historic victory seals the doom of foreign imperialism and its national agents on the continent of Asia, and opens the prospects of immediate liberation of the peoples of Asia. It changes the balance of forces on a worldscale and constitutes a decisive

turning point in the world struggle for peace, democracy and Socialism. In liberating themselves the people of China have inflicted a decisive defeat on the common enemy of the peoples of the world—American imperialism—and have advanced the cause of world liberation.

The toiling masses of India feel jubilant over this great victory. They know it hastens their own liberation. They are inspired by it to fight more determinedly and courageously their battle for ending the present regime and establishing the rule of People's Democracy.

I wish to assure you and through you the people of China that the Nehru Government, which pursues a policy of hostility to the Chinese people and still continues its recognition of the bankrupt Kuomintang Government, does not represent the wishes and the will of the people of India. The over-whelming majority of the Indian people decisively stand for friendship and co-operation with the great Chinese people. The Nehru Government on the other hand follows the dictates of the Anglo-American imperialists who wish to build India as a bastion of reaction against China. The Anglo-American imperialists carry on their nefarious conspiracies in Nepal and Tibet under the cover offered by the Nehru Government. Thus the Nehru Government is directly advancing the game of the enemies of the Chinese people.

I wish to assure you and through you to the people of China that the Communist Party of India will unmask all the anti-Chinese intrigues that the Nehru Government might hatch under the dictates of the American imperialists and rally the people to defeat them.

The Central Committee of our Party has asked me to convey their special tribute and greetings to Comrade Chu Teh and the members of the Chinese Liberation Army who have upset all imperialist plans by their quick military victories. The great military skill of Comrade Chu Teh and his associates and the valour, courage and self-sacrificing spirit of the members of the Liberation Army confounded the American advisers of Kuomintang and shattered all hopes of prolonged resistance of Kuomintang forces.

The Central Committee of our Party salutes the great Communist Party of China and its leader Mao Tse-tung on the occasion of its historic and world-shaking victory. The victory



scored by the Communist Party of China is the victory of Marxism-Leninism, of the Stalinist Line. The Communist Party of China and its great leader Mao Tse-tung have demonstrated once more the invincible power of Marxism-Leninism.

And finally allow me, Comrade Mao Tse-tung, to congratulate you on the occasion of your election as the President of the People's Republic of China!

Long Live Comrade Mao Tse-tung

Long Live the Communist Party of China!

Long Live the Fighting Unity of the Chinese and Indian People!

B. T. RANADIVE

General Secretary. Communist Party of India

#### MAO TSE-TUNG'S REPLY TO B. T. RANADIVE

Chairman Mao Tse-tung, on October 19, 1949 sent the following telegram to B. T. Ranadive, General Secretary of the Communist Party of India:

"Dear Comrade Ranadive,

I have received your telegram of greetings dated October 12. I thank you very much for your warm greetings to the People's Republic of China and the Communist Party of China. The people throughout China feel glad and proud to read in your telegram the fraternal friendship of the revolutionary Indian people. The Indian people is one of the great Asian people with a long history and a vast population; her fate in the past and her path to the future are similar to those of China in many points. I firmly believe that relying on the brave Communist Party of India and the unity and struggle of all Indian patriots, India will certainly not remain long under the yoke of imperialism and its collaborators. Like free China, a free India will one day emerge in the Socialist and People's Democratic family; that day will end the imperialist reactionary rule in the history of mankind.

Best wishes for the victory of the unity and struggle of the patriotic people of India.

Long live the fraternal unity between the Indian and Chinese people.

(SD) MAO TSE-TUNG

Chairman of the Central Committee  
of the Communist Party of China.

## **Statement of the Editorial Board of 'Communist' on L.P.P.D. Article**

The Cominform Journal *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy* published in its issue dated January 27, 1950 an editorial article about the strategy and tactics to be pursued by the Indian Communist Party. It was a sequel to the controversy that was going on in India between the Politbureau led by Ranadive and the Andhra Communist Party. The Andhra Communist Party Secretariat had, in a thesis, maintained that the Chinese methods were best suited for capturing power in India and that the Indian Communist Party had to learn a good deal from Mao Tse-tung. The Politbureau disagreed with the thesis and rejected it saying that the C.P.I. did not consider anyone other than Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as authoritative.

The Cominform journal, however, upheld the line suggested in the Andhra Thesis and severely reprimanded Ranadive. It said that the Indian Communist Party had to learn a lot from the Chinese communists.

The Indian Communist Party had no other alternative but to accept the new line that was propounded by the Cominform journal. The statement of the editorial board of *Communist*, the monthly theoretical magazine of the Indian Communist Party, published in the February-March 1950 issue of the journal declares the adherence of the Party to the new line. The statement said that the editorial was "a sharp reminder to the Indian Communist Party" and "a brilliant contribution to the Indian people's struggle for national independence and people's democracy."

The Editorial article on "Mighty Advance of the National Liberation Movement in the Colonies and Dependent Countries" published in the organ of the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties, *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy*, No. 4 (64) dated January 27, 1950, is a brilliant contribution to the Indian people's struggle for national independence and People's Democracy.

It is a correct lead to the Communist Party of India and a timely reminder that in its actual achievements it is *lagging behind* the immense possibilities of the rising tempo and sweep of the revolutionary struggles which the Indian people are waging against Anglo-American imperialists and their Indian collaborators for national liberation and against colonial slavery.

"One of the outstanding features of the present international situation," states the Editorial article, "is the unprecedented scope of the revolutionary struggle of the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, which in many countries is of an armed nature with hundreds of millions of working people of the countries of the East taking part in it."

This mighty advance of the postwar revolutionary liberation struggle of the colonies and semi-colonies which has shaken the entire system of world imperialism to its very foundations, has been opened up, as the Editorial article points out, by the following major factors:

1. The Great October Socialist Revolution, the victory of Socialism in the USSR, and the Lenin-Stalin national policy which turned the former oppressed peoples into equal Socialist nations.

2. Victorious people's liberation war led by the USSR against fascism, the defeat of German and Japanese imperialism, and the weakening of such colonial powers as Britain, France, Italy, Holland and Belgium.

3. The establishment of People's Democratic power in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

4. The resolute struggle of the democratic camp headed by the USSR against British and American imperialism—the main oppressors of the freedom of the colonial peoples.

5. The world-historic victory of the Chinese people over the combined forces of the reactionary Kuomintang and American imperialism.

All these factors have weakened the entire system of imperia-

lism and have created favourable conditions for the struggle and for the victory of the national liberation movements in the colonial and dependent countries.

The Editorial article is thus a sharp reminder to the Communist Party in India and in Pakistan of the great lag that exists between the mighty advancing forces in the entire colonial world led by their Communist Parties and the Indian people's liberation movement led by the Communist Party of India.

A tremendous responsibility rests upon the Communist Party of India to make up this lag. This is all the more urgent at the present moment when the British and American imperialists, with the active support of the Indian big bourgeoisie and other reactionaries, are desperately seeking to tighten their grip on our country, crushing the national independence and freedom of the peoples both in India and Pakistan, monopolising their vast material resources, to convert the entire country into a military base, to crush the national liberation struggles in the countries of South-East Asia, in Malaya, Burma, Viet Nam and Indonesia and to unleash a war against the Soviet Union, People's Democratic China and the People's Democracies of Central and South-Eastern Europe.

"The victory of the revolution in China and the advance of the national liberation struggles in the colonies," warns the Editorial article, "have thrown the imperialists, who are desperately trying to retain their grip on the colonies, into a fury. It would be a mistake to underestimate this feverish activity of the imperialists, who are suffering defeat."

The resolute struggles which the working class, peasantry and other progressive forces such as the students, democratic youth and women are waging under the leadership of the Communist Party in the Indian Union and in Pakistan against the reactionary bloc of the imperialists, the big bourgeoisie, the feudal princes and the landlords; the fact that these struggles are assuming new and higher forms in many cities and districts—all these indicate that the Indian proletariat and the Communist Party are rising to the level of the leader of the national liberation struggle of the Indian people, and that conditions for the victory of this struggle, for the rout of the Anglo-American imperialists and their Indian collaborators, are maturing fast.

These developments point out that the lags that exist are not inevitable, that they can and must be removed. They can and

must be removed by correctly applying the Lenin-Stalin teaching concerning the strategy and tactics of the Communist Parties heading the national liberation struggles, which have registered a signal triumph in the world-historic victory of the Chinese people's liberation revolution.

In this respect, the Editorial article has drawn the pointed attention of the Communist Party of India to the rich experience of the People's Democratic Revolution in China which was led by the Communist Party of China and its leader Mao Tse-tung to its final and irrevocable victory. The Editorial article has emphasised that "the path taken by the Chinese people. . . . is the path that should be taken by the people of many colonial and dependent countries in their struggle for national independence and People's Democracy."

The Editorial article has sharply underlined two main lessons which the experience of the victorious national liberation struggle of the Chinese people teaches us:

1. "The working class must unite with all classes, parties, groups, and organisations willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings and to form a broad, nationwide front headed by the working class and its vanguard the Communist Party, the Party equipped with the theory of Marxism-Leninism; the Party that has mastered the art of revolutionary strategy and tactics; that breathes the spirit of revolutionary irreconcilability to enemies of the people, the spirit of proletarian organisation and discipline in the mass movement of the peoples."
2. "A decisive condition for the victorious outcome of the national liberation struggle is the formation, when the necessary internal conditions allow for it, of people's liberation armies under the leadership of the Communist Party."

The Party leadership shall re-examine all its resolutions, including the Report on Strategy and Tactics, in the light of these lessons.

The Second Congress of the Communist Party of India was a great step in the life of the Indian Communist Party. The Political Thesis adopted by the Congress laid down the basic programme and strategy and tactics of the People's Democratic Revolution in India. The Political Thesis advanced as the most important task in the new stage, the struggle for the consolidation by all means of the People's Democratic Front which must be

the embodiment of the alliance of the working class, the peasantry, and the urban petty-bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class.

The Congress became the starting point and a tremendous step forward in unleashing the forces of people's liberation struggles in the Indian Union and Pakistan and for the strengthening of proletarian hegemony in the same.

The Report on Strategy and Tactics correctly applied on many points the line of the Political Thesis and combated reformist influence inside the Party, which was a hindrance in giving a bold leadership to the struggles of the workers and the toiling masses. This is testified by the fact that in the course of the last one year the working class and the Communist Party have registered considerable success in developing and heading struggles of workers, peasants and of the oppressed petty-bourgeoisie, in many parts of the country in which tens of thousands have been mobilised.

But the Communist Party cannot rest satisfied with rousing and leading tens of thousands at a time when under the stress of the deepening economic crisis, and when the anger and the disillusionment of the people against the bourgeois servitors of imperialism is rising ever higher, the objective possibility exists of mobilising tens of millions of people belonging to all classes, parties and groups and organisations, willing to fight the imperialists and their hirelings, and uniting them in the revolutionary struggle for people's power.

This lag is explained by the fact that while fighting reformism, which acted as a brake on the unleashing and the bold leadership of the struggles of the workers and the toiling masses, the Party Centre committed certain errors in dogmatist and sectarian directions, which restricted the scope of those struggles and prevented the mobilisation of the broadest masses in the same.

In combating the reformists who were retreating before repression and resiling from revolutionary struggle, the various resolutions of the Party Centre, particularly the Report on Strategy and Tactics, correctly emphasised that the countrywide offensive launched by the Congress Government against the Communist Party and the democratic forces is a measure not of the strength of the reactionary camp but of its crisis, of its growing weakness and a sign of its impending collapse. The Party Centre correctly pointed out the growing crisis

of the capitalist order and underlined the revolutionary tempo and sweep which the struggles of the masses were assuming under the leadership of the proletariat and called for the unwavering and resolute leadership of these struggles by the Communists. But in doing so the Party Centre failed to bring out sharply the fact that the grant of fictitious independence in the form of Dominion Status has not changed the colonial character of the Indian economy in which the key positions still remain in the hands of foreign imperialists. As a result of this faulty understanding the main stress was not laid on the fact that the character of the struggle still remained in the main anti-imperialist, anti-feudal and national liberationist. The task of dislodging the national bourgeoisie from the leadership of the movement and its isolation which constitutes one of the most important conditions for the hegemony of the working class in the national liberation struggle cannot be effectively carried out unless this basic fact is kept firmly in view.

In combating the reformists, who maintained that nothing had changed as a result of the Mountbatten Award, the resolution of the Party Centre correctly pointed out that the Nehru-Patel Government representing the interests of capitalists and landlords has gone over to imperialism, but we failed to underline the fact that in this sham independence, which we correctly unmasked, the interests of British imperialism remained "sacred and inviolable" and that "the Mountbattens had departed but British imperialism remains and octopus-like grips India in its bloody tentacles." This led to two serious errors:

*First*, we described the national bourgeoisie as the leading force (most active fighting partner) in the "imperialist-bourgeois-feudal combine" whereas the imperialists constitute the leading force in the bloc composed of the imperialists and their Indian satellites. The Nehru-Patel Government is carrying out the dictates of the Anglo-American imperialists.

*Secondly*, the Report on Strategy and Tactics failed to distinguish between the Indian big bourgeoisie and other sections of the bourgeoisie, to point out that it is the big bourgeoisie that is placed in the seat of power and collaborating with imperialists as their satellites.

In combating the reformist position which advocated abjuration of struggle against the bourgeoisie of the less developed nationalities, the resolutions of the Party Centre

correctly maintained that one of the essential conditions of victory of the Indian revolution is ruthless struggle against all shades of bourgeois nationalism, establishment of the unity of the workers and the toiling masses belonging to all nationalities in a common people's revolutionary front in the struggle against imperialism and its collaborators. But the Party Centre failed to point out that various sections of the bourgeoisie, mainly belonging to undeveloped nationalities, can still at one time or other play the role of "fellow-travellers" in the national liberation struggle, that the working class can enter into temporary agreements on national democratic issues with those sections of the bourgeoisie for common struggle against imperialism, feudalism and the national big bourgeoisie representing predominantly the Gujerati and Marwari capitalists. At the same time we must bear in mind that under the present conditions of the extreme accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism, when a specially sharp polarisation of class forces is taking place both on an international scale and within the bounds of every capitalist country individually, these oppositional strata of the Indian bourgeoisie ought not to be regarded in any way as reliable or stable members of the anti-imperialist camp.

In combating the reformist elements who had been undermining the struggle of the agricultural workers and poor peasants in the interest of the rich peasants and refusing to tear off the former from the political influence of the latter, the resolution on the Agrarian Question and similar other documents correctly laid stress on the supreme importance of firmly relying on agricultural workers and the mass of the peasantry. It is as a result of this strategy that mighty agrarian struggles have developed under the leadership of the Communist Party in a number of provinces and districts. The aforementioned resolution, instead of emphasising the anti-feudal character of the workers' and peasants' alliance wrongly lumps the rich peasants with the landlords, describing the former as the spearhead of bourgeois-feudal reaction in the rural area. The resolution failed to point out that the main slogans of the present stage of the Indian revolution — abolition of landlordism without compensation and land to the tillers — correspond to the interests of the entire peasantry.

The aforementioned article of the organ of the Information Bureau has corrected this serious mistake by pointing out that,



“In these conditions the task of the Indian Communists drawing on the experience of the national liberation movement in China and other countries, is naturally to strengthen the alliance of the working class with *all* the peasantry, to fight for the introduction of the urgently needed agrarian reforms. . . .” (emphasis ours)

No doubt political influence of the rich peasants in the village must be fought, peasant masses weaned away from them and proletarian leadership and discipline established in the mass peasant movement. But in the interest of rallying the entire peasantry for the struggle for the abolition of landlordism without compensation and for securing land to the tillers, which constitute the urgently needed agrarian reform, and in the interest of strengthening the alliance of the working class and all the peasantry, such reforms as nationalisation of all land must not be advocated as an immediate demand, and the slogan of expropriation of rich peasants must not be advanced, the trade union movement must actively lend its support to the peasant movement. The Communist Party must organise the peasant masses into action for general as well as the partial democratic demands of the peasantry.

In applying the correct slogan of alliance of the working class and all the peasantry, reformists will distort its true meaning by preaching abjuration of partial struggles of the agricultural workers and share-croppers on the ground that they endanger the interests of the rich peasants; such distortion must be combated in order to establish leadership of the working class over the peasant movement and to lend it a revolutionary character. Reformists will further distort the slogan to hinder the mass struggles of the peasantry on the ground that they will alienate the rich peasants. It is by fighting such deviations that peasant struggles have advanced and will advance.

The ideological root of the sectarian deviation on the Agrarian Question arises out of this: While development of capitalist relations in agriculture in India and the consequent class differentiation of the peasantry have been rightly pointed out, there has been a failure to see feudal landlordism as the dominant form of exploitation in the agrarian economy. It further arises out of the failure to understand the anti-imperialist and national liberationist character of the Indian peasant movement.

The understanding of the development of the capitalist relations

in agriculture, growing within the framework of feudal property relations, and of the consequent growth of class differentiation in the ranks of the Indian peasantry, enabled the Party to recognise the very important role which the agricultural workers must play in developing the agrarian revolution and in drawing the broad masses of the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle for the abolition of landlordism. It enabled the Party to come out of the grooves of reformism and to swing the peasant movement towards militant struggles of the peasant masses for land and agricultural workers' strike struggles for higher wages, etc. But the failure to understand feudal landlordism as the dominant form of exploitation and the colonial character of Indian economy or in other words the failure to understand that the fight against imperialism and feudal landlordism constitute the basis of the community of interest of the entire peasantry have led to restricting the scope and sweep of peasant struggles on a countrywide scale.

The Editorial article of the organ of the Information Bureau has correctly formulated our important task in the following words:

“On the basis of the common struggle for freedom and national independence of the country, against the Anglo-American imperialists oppressing it and against the reactionary big bourgeoisie and feudal princes collaborating with them to unite all classes, parties, groups and organisations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India”.

The programme of People's Democratic Front set forth in the Political Thesis of the Second Party Congress constitutes the basis of this broad joint front. Such a joint front must be obviously under the leadership of the working class and an ally of the international democratic anti-imperialist front led by the USSR.

In order to draw the broadest sections of the masses in the revolutionary struggles and to build the People's Democratic Front capable of ending the rule of the imperialists and its Indian collaborators, we must emphasise the importance of the following cardinal tasks:

1. The peace movement which has already begun with a broad-based character must be developed throughout the country along the line laid down in the resolution of the Information

Bureau on the "Defence of Peace and the Struggle Against Warmongers". It must become the pivot of the entire activity of the Party and the mass organisations. It is our duty to merge the struggle for national liberation with that for peace, tirelessly exposing the anti-national and treacherous policy of the Congress and League Governments which have become direct lieutenants of the British and American imperialists and are seeking to make India a base of war against the USSR, the People's Democracies and the liberation struggles of the peoples of Asia.

2. Ceaseless efforts must be made to unite the ranks of the working class by systematic exposure of the splitters like the leaderships of the INTUC and the Socialist Party, by persistently explaining to the rank and file workers under reformist influence the significance of the cause of working class unity, by bringing the unorganised workers into the fold of the unions affiliated to the AITUC, organising joint strike committees with all unions in defence of working class rights and interests, and by setting up broad-based rank and file mill committees, factory committees, etc. The Communist Party and the militant unions led by it must be in the forefront of all in mobilising the broadest masses of workers to fight for their immediate and most easily understood demands and thus help to establish permanent unity in the ranks of the proletariat. Unity of the working class is essential not only for the successful defence of its day-to-day interests but also for consolidating its leading and organising role in the people's liberation struggle.

3. Systematic efforts must be made to develop the struggle of the agricultural workers for wages and land and to organise independent agricultural workers' unions. At the same time it is of the utmost importance to remove the lag in giving a broad-based and all-India character to the struggles of the peasants against the oppression of the feudal landlords and the police and for land, which are developing under the revolutionary leadership of agricultural workers and proletarianised peasants and which are rising to the level of higher forms in many parts of the country. Drawing the broadest masses of the peasantry in the revolutionary struggle for land, for the abolition of landlordism will be possible only by resolutely fighting against the Congress and Socialist leaders, the *purveyors of the stupefying influence of Gandhism*, who are seeking to draw away the peasant masses from revolutionary struggle and to disrupt the

growing worker-peasant alliance in the countryside. The building of mass agricultural workers' unions, and of mass kisan sabhas, their co-ordination and guidance on an all-India plane, the isolation and exposure of the parallel kisan organisations that are sought to be formed by the Congress and Socialist leaders are the most important tasks closely bound up with the developing revolutionary struggles of the peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party.

4. It is of the utmost importance to develop a broad-based struggle against the fascist repressive policy of the congress rulers, the trampling of all democratic rights and liberties by them which is arousing anger and disillusionment among the wide sections of the people. For this purpose we must broaden the movement for the defence of civil liberties by bringing within its fold all parties, groups, organisations and individuals who are prepared to defend the civil liberties and democratic rights of the people.

The resolutions of the Party Centre, correctly repudiating both reformist restriction of mass struggles into the confines of peaceful constitutionalism as well as petty-bourgeois revolutionism advocating so-called "militant" actions without the participation of the masses, have rightly stressed the supreme importance of combining all forms of struggle taking into account the unequal development of the movement of the masses in different parts of the country. These directives summoned up the essence of the experience of the countrywide struggles led by the Communist Party in different forms on different issues. Emphasising the essence of the experience of the Chinese revolution and the national liberation struggle of other colonial countries, the Editorial article has correctly pointed out that,

"A decisive condition for the victorious outcome of the national liberation struggle is the formation, when the necessary internal conditions allow for it, of people's liberation armies."

The immense significance of the Editorial article of the organ of the Information Bureau must be properly understood. The Anglo-American imperialists are preparing for war with feverish haste, to drown in blood the national liberation of the Asian peoples. The Communist Party of India must play its historic role by mobilising millions of people against imperialism for national independence and People's Democracy.

The hatred and indignation of the people are rising high against the Congress Government selling national independence to the imperialists and brutally suppressing the people at the order of their imperialist masters. People's struggles against their oppressors are reaching higher forms and levels in many parts of the country. The base of the imperialists is tottering.

By correct application of the Tactical Line contained in the Editorial article, the Communist Party shall be able to be at the head of a nationwide struggle for real national independence and People's Democracy.

By daily exposing the colonising plans of the imperialists at every step, by weaning away the masses from the influence of the Congress and the Socialist leadership acting as the stooges of Anglo-American imperialists, by combining all forms of struggle and by mobilising all democratic forces, we will be able to remove the gap that exists between the national liberation struggle of the Indian people and that of the other South-East Asian countries. The patriotic call for national independence, peace and democracy has such a wide appeal that it is possible for the Communist Party to mobilise millions of working people and other democratic forces in India against the anti-national reactionary bloc led by the Anglo-American imperialists.

The Congress Government is delivering cruel blows on the people's movement, on the working class and on the Communist Party to save the crumbling colonial order of the imperialist colonisers. But as the Editorial article points out,

“when a people resolutely goes into struggle and when the Communist Parties are capable of heading this struggle, no forces of internal counter-revolution and of the foreign imperialists can crush the people's masses who have taken to revolution.”

The Editorial article of the Information Bureau organ is a great contribution to the unification of Party ranks. Since the Second Party Congress, the stubborn fight against Reformism carried on by the entire Party has played a great role in unifying the ranks and putting the Party at the head of the fighting people. The Editorial article of the Information Bureau strengthens that fight and at the same time corrects our sectarian deviation from the path of Marxism-Leninism. Armed with this weapon based upon the correct application of Lenin's and Stalin's teachings to fight all alien trends, we must unify the entire Party as a granite rock against imperialism and its Indian allies.

## **Questions to and answers** **by R. P. Dutt**

During Ranadive's regime there was a bitter controversy inside the Communist Party over the methods to be adopted for the capture of power in this country. This controversy could not be resolved satisfactorily and therefore some of the members of the CPI sought the help of Rajani Palme Dutt to get the CPI out of this rut.

Palme Dutt in his interview with the two members of the CPI sharply rebuked Ranadive and accused him of pursuing a Titoite line.

Dismissing Ranadive's analysis of the Indian situation that there was a "white terror" let loose on the Indian people, Palme Dutt says: "People who talk about white terror in India do not know what white terror is. I do not know the exact situation but I can see *Crossroads* being printed in thousands of copies and circulated throughout India. Also Soviet literature and other left books and pamphlets circulated everywhere in India. Also public meetings for peace and on other issues being allowed to be held. All this cannot happen in conditions of white terror. It is obvious that considerable legal opportunities exist in India and it should be our task to use them fully and try to win still greater legality. On the contrary it seems to me that there are not only minimising of legal opportunities but almost a desire for more and more illegality."

Dilating on the Peace Movement Palme Dutt said: 'It is clear that the Peace Movement presents the Party with one of the most important weapons for building a broad front of all sections of the Indian people. The recent experience after the warfare in Korea shows the

immense possibilities that exist in India for building this front. If we recognise that building of the national Democratic Front is the key task for national struggle then it should be obvious that leaving the main activity of the Party — the broad front that will emerge out of the Peace Movement may lay the basis for the formation of the National Front for national liberation.’

He characterises Nehru Government as one “representing the interests of monopolist big bourgeoisie. There need be no illusions about this.”

Mr. Palme Dutt does not attribute Nehru’s friendship for China to any innate desire on his part for peace. He feels it is the result of his fear that “war with China might mean their (Nehru’s and his collaborators’) doom. They are conscious of the fact that China is rapidly emerging as the leader of Asia. This leads to their adopting a foreign policy which is not always in agreement with the policies of the Anglo-American imperialists.”

He accuses Dange of Titoism. “It appears”, he says, “that some leading comrades who were mainly responsible for carrying Titoite political and ideological concepts into the CPI have not even made a formal admission of the fact. Comrade Dange, who appears to me to be one of the main vehicles for Titoite political influence, has not made adequate self-criticism.”

TALKS WITH COMRADE R. PALME DUTT AND OTHER IMPRESSIONS GAINED ABROAD BY DEVEN AND BAL KRISHNA. (JANUARY-MARCH 1951).

*Note:* The Report of our conversation with RPD that we give below must be read, bearing a number of limitations in mind. RPD had made it quite clear in the beginning that the conversation was of an informal nature and that not knowing the exact situation in India, he might be making mistakes.

We could not take any Notes during the meeting and the report has been written solely from memory. As a result it is quite

possible that some of the statements attributed to RPD may have been wrongly reported. We have taken the liberty of submitting a report, despite the informal nature of the conversation only because of the extreme eagerness of all comrades to know RPD's views on many questions and also to obviate the danger of completely wrong or distorted versions of our conversations being spread.

We once again urge on the reader to read this report, bearing in mind the important limitations of it mentioned above.

BALKRISHNA  
DEVEN

*Report:*

QUESTION: Did you wish that the CPGB letter be circulated to the ranks of India?

ANSWER: Yes, we did. Whenever a Party makes fraternal criticism of a brother Party it always addresses the Central Committee of the Party concerned. That is what we did. But, knowing the depth of crisis, we had hoped that the documents would be circulated and discussed widely. That would have shown the seriousness, urgency and also honesty of the leadership.

Q. What do you think about the CC's formulation about "armed struggle as the main form of struggle", "Civil War" and "White terror"?

A. Regarding "Civil War" it seems to me just a case of misuse of words, perhaps wilful. Before defining the term, please think of concrete example of countries in which "civil war" took place — Spain, Greece, China etc. You will soon see that "Civil War" is not just a degree of repression. It is the people who wage war, also. The people set up a people's Government in the full sense of the term, however, weak and small (embryonic) it might be at a given time, people fight with arms to defend and extend it.

Coming to "White terror" people who talk about 'White terror' in India do not know what 'white terror' is. I do not know the exact situation in India, but I can see *Crossroads* being printed in thousands of copies and circulated throughout India. Also Soviet literature and other left books and pamphlets circulated everywhere in India. Also public meetings for peace and on other issues being allowed to be held. All these cannot happen in conditions of White Terror. It is obvious that considerable legal opportunities exist in India and it should be our task to



use them fully and try to win still greater legality. On the contrary, it seems to me that there is not only minimising of the legal opportunities but almost a desire for more and more illegality. Regarding 'armed struggle', as we have stated in our letter, we do not deny that ultimately the revolution in India will and must take the form of armed struggle. It is hardly to be debated. (What Comrade RPD said further is covered in the CPGB letter.) Referring to Andhra, he said that not knowing the exact situation in Andhra he cannot say what would be the proper form of struggle in Andhra. But if it were true that the Andhra Party adopted correct forms of struggle during the post-Second Congress period, then obviously the Party should have strengthened itself in that Province and the Party organisation there should not have suffered from any disruption at all. But from the report that we possess, this does not seem to be true, when on top of this, the so-called experience of Andhra is applied mechanically all over India, where the conditions of present organisations and the strength of the Party were much weaker than in Andhra, the results cannot but be disastrous.

Armed struggle which is the higher form of struggle, must bear a mass character. Any resort to armed action by individuals or small groups is only terrorism.

Q. Would you make the definite statement that armed struggle should not be resorted to in any area until the active support of the majority of the people in that area is assured? Are there any pre-requisites?

A. The question is posed too formally. It might raise some silly questions like "How are you going to know that the majority will participate? Are you going to take a poll about it?" The point to bear in mind is the mass character of armed struggle; of course there are pre-requisites to armed struggle. Armed struggle is a higher state of the mass movement which, therefore, becomes the pre-requisite.

Q. Do you think that the Peace movement should become the pivot of all the activities of our Party? How is that related to the national liberation movement?

A. It is clear that the Peace movement presents the party with one of the most important weapons for building a broad front of all sections of the Indian people. The recent experience after the war in Korea shows what immense possibilities exist in India for building this front. If we recognise that the building of the

national Democratic Front is the key task for the national liberation struggle, then it should be obvious, that leaving the main activity of the Party – the broad front that will emerge out of the Peace movement may lay the basis for the formation of the National Front for national liberation.

Q. What is your estimation of the role of the Nehru Government in this connection?

A. The Nehru Government represents the interests of the monopolist big bourgeoisie. There need be no illusions about this. However, this does not mean that the interests of the big bourgeoisie are always identical with those of American imperialism. India is a country bordering on China, and at least, sections of the Indian big bourgeoisie realise that a war with China might mean their doom. They are conscious of the fact that China is rapidly emerging as the leader of Asia. This leads to their adopting a foreign policy, which is not always in agreement with the policies of the Anglo-American imperialists.

It may be that Patel represents (this was before Patel's death) the trend in the big bourgeoisie which leans more heavily on the Anglo-American imperialists, while Nehru represents the other trend described above. These different trends explain the vacillating policy of the Nehru Government and it is the task of the Communist Party to skilfully utilise the stand of Nehru Government on questions like Korea, Atom Bomb etc. To give an example from the British situation, it is, of course, known that the Labour Party and the Conservative Party pursue basically identical lines. This does not mean that the Labour Party on some occasions does not take a stand which is different and in the interests of the people in a broad sense, e.g. the Labour Party stand on the Schuman Plan. When this happens, the CPGB does not make it its main business to expose the game of the Labour leaders behind these policies or statements but on the contrary, utilises them in order to mobilise greater popular pressure to get the policies implemented. The CPGB utilises even the differences in the Conservative Party whenever possible. This may be seen, for example in the reaction to Truman's notorious statement about Atom Bomb and Korea. Large sections of the Conservative Party protested. The *Daily Worker* posed it as a part of the national protest.

Q. What is your evaluation of the statement "India must adopt the China way?"

A. After the slanderous attack on Com. Mao Tse-tung, the refusal to recognise the difference between the Russia and the China way and the great lesson of the Chinese Revolution for India, it is correct and necessary to break with this past and assert that India must adopt the China way. This is a part of the recognition of the past crimes and the path of putting the movement in India on the right rails.

But having once recognised this, we should guard against drawing mechanical parallel with China and try to evolve a correct policy for India on the basis of the concrete situation in India, bearing in mind the broad lessons of China. The Indian situation presents some essential differences from China. The document of Com. Ghosh etc. makes some good points in this connection. There is need for such closer and detailed study of the peculiarities and the history of the movement in India. Only then can we evolve the correct forms of struggle.

Q. What is your evaluation of the period 1942-47 in the history of the CPI and about the role of P. C. Joshi?

A. I will take the period from 1935-47. 1942 does not represent any definite turning point in the history of the CPI. It is perhaps the Congress which might take 1942 as a land mark. Also 1935 was the period of Joshi's secretaryship.

The decision of 7th Congress were attempted to be applied to India in a document prepared by Bradley and myself which was essentially an application of the United Front tactics to the Indian situation. The Communists in India at that time were split up into quarrelling groups. It was decided to put up Joshi as the General Secretary as a representative of the younger comrades, who were outside the functional groupings. The main task of the Party were (1) to evolve a collective unified all-India Party and (2) to put the United Front tactics into practice.

There is no question that Joshi did his job well in this connection.

Looking at the period 1935-47 as a whole, the measure of the success of the policy is to be seen in the increased strength of the Party and the mass organisations during the period. Starting from a handful in 1935, the Party membership developed to 6,000 in 1939; 30,000 in 1943; to over 90,000 at the time of the Second Congress. We had a united AITUC with a million members; a powerful kisan organisation with 6,50,000 members. The Party was emerging on a national scale as a

Party of considerable influence. This was a remarkable achievement.

All this, we are now told was reformism. Of course, reformist mistakes were committed during this period. Almost all Parties committed reformist mistakes during the period of United Front tactics. If you get into water you are bound to get wet. But to exaggerate these mistakes into a complete repudiation of the achievements of the whole period is nothing but complete distortion of the Party history.

In this connection the document *Report on Right Reformism* of Ranadive is very important. I feel that it is almost as significant as the Thesis itself. But in the various reports and discussions of the recent months I do not see any attempt to challenge the wrong formulations in that document. Of course, I do not mean that every formulation in it was wrong.

The result is that you have repudiated Ranadive's policy, but not his distorted version of your Party's history. Unless you do it, you will never understand what reformism really is and will never succeed in evolving a correct policy today which is free from both reformism and left-sectarianism. To give one instance, the formulation about 'supple tactics after Stalingrad' seems to me to be dangerous. No party thought of changing its tactics after Stalingrad. Stalingrad only further cemented the unity of the Anti-fascist front and all parties intensified their struggle for the speediest destruction of fascism.

The Second Party Congress corrected the basically wrong analysis of the Mountbatten settlement made before by the Party and has positive achievements to its credit. But it seems to me that it was conducted in a factional manner. The structure of the collective leadership built up inside the Party collapsed after the Second Party Congress and the removal of P. C. Joshi.

Q. What have you to say about the penetration of Titoite agents inside the Party?

A. The matter needs detailed and proper investigation. The terms of reference given to the Commission appointed by the CC in this connection concentrate on minor and unimportant points, leaving aside the basic questions and this might lead to sidetracking of the whole issue and fail to unmask Titoism. The basic question is the political influence of Titoite theories on the policies of the Communist Party of India, the adoption of Kardelji's book as the basic document and pursuance of policies

in line with Titoism. It is necessary to unmask the roots of these and responsibilities of individuals in bringing about this state of affairs.

It appears that some leading comrades who were mainly responsible for carrying Titoite political and ideological concepts into the CPI have not even made a formal admission of this fact.

Comrade Dange, who appears to me to be one of the main vehicles for Titoite political influence, has not made adequate self-criticism. I emphasise that I mean only 'political and ideological' influence when I say this. For instance, anti-internationalism is the starting point of Titoism. Can some of these comrades, who are today making a broadly correct criticism of the CC line honestly say that they were not also a Party to developing the 'anti-international trend' inside the CPI?

Even if some comrades committed such grave crimes and slandered brother Parties, they need not be condemned forever, provided they make honest self-criticism. It will only strengthen their hands in the fight for a correct policy. This is as far as the general influence of Titoism is concerned.

Regarding actual imperialist agents, they can only be found out by a properly Constituted Commission, enjoying the confidence of rank and file members and with their constant vigilance and help.

Q. What is your evaluation of the document prepared by Coms AKG, Dange and Ghate.

A. As an alternative political document before the ranks and one which in my opinion is much closer to the correct line, it is very welcome. The criticism of the CC line is generally on correct lines. But having seen its essentially positive value, one has also to see its shortcomings. It seems to me that the authors of the document still suffer from a fear of being dubbed as reformists and hence make concessions to left-sectarianism. While correctly criticising the CC for refusing to make a concrete analysis of the situation in the country, the document itself fails to make the analysis of and concretise the immediate perspective.

A clear understanding of the rapidly developing and complex international situation, particularly after the events in Korea is lacking. Therefore, on such vital questions as Korea, the role of the Nehru government, and the importance of Peace movement, the lead given by the document is not basically different

from investigation into the penetration of Titoism inside the Party which is being carried out by the CC.

Q. What is your estimation of P. C. Joshi's 'Views'?

A. I have not studied the book carefully and it is not possible for me to make a critical analysis of the positive line advanced therein or his present politics.

So far as the criticism of the old CC line is concerned, it was remarkable that he made many correct points before the Cominform Editorial. With regard to the publication of such a book, it is impermissible for a Communist to go to the public press for publishing inner-Party matters. But if there is a Trotskyite-Titoite leadership in power in the Party, which is leading the Party on the path of complete destruction and there is no other method left, you then go to the public press for help take the Party out of this situation. then it is not only permissible, but also necessary to do so.

Q. What in your opinion should be done about the expelled members?

A. The question of expelled members must be tackled immediately. All expelled members should not necessarily be taken back immediately without investigation, but the question of their readmission should be judged by Commissions of rank and file, members primarily made up of comrades who have put up some opposition to the Trotskyite-Titoite policies.

### OTHER IMPRESSIONS

Several comrades have been abroad recently. They naturally used the opportunity to discuss the situation in India with comrades of other countries.

We found that there is a tremendous interest among all these comrades in the developments inside our Party, particularly since the June CC meeting. They also expressed their deep anxiety at the continued crisis resulting in a virtual paralysis of Party activity, precisely when India was assuming an important role in the struggle for Peace.

We got the definite impression that responsible comrades of CPGB and other important Parties were devoting a great deal of their time and energy, studying the situation inside our Party. We also think that they discuss the developments from time to time.

At a time when they are doing all in their power to help us

out of the present difficulties, the paramount need of the hour is to keep them well-informed and supply them with every important document, fact etc. We do not know what documents have been sent and to which Parties.

But as far as our brother Party in Great Britain is concerned, we felt that it did not get many documents officially from the leadership here *e.g.* the CC Minutes and self-critical reports were received through channels other than the official. However, a large number of comrades from almost all provinces have been sending things on their own. The result is that the CPGB is very well informed of the situation.

We feel that leaderships of other important parties are also keeping track of the developments here.

As a leading British comrade remarked, it is impossible to get a correct idea of the situation inside the CP through the official statements and documents only. Therefore, it is very necessary that they receive all opposition documents and even more important rank and file documents (*e.g.* PHQ GB resolutions were found very useful to them).

The comrades there are shocked that even nine months after the LPPD Editorial, attempts were being made to cheat and mislead the international movement as in the case of the Midnapore 'Peace' report. They were, therefore, very happy to receive the resolution of the Midnapore DC which was passed unanimously on the said report. The resolution sharply condemns the report as a fabricated lie and describes it as to discredit the Cominform in the eyes of the Indian people.

Comrades abroad have felt for a long time that they were being kept in the dark about the real situation in Telengana, especially after the police action. Therefore, R. Narayan Reddy's and Ella Reddy's documents disclosed certain hitherto **unknown** facts to them. They want more facts about Telengana, and less demagoguery.

Some comrades of other countries whom we could contact during the Peace Congress were completely unaware of the state of things inside our Party and were shocked when we told them about it.

Some of our comrades have had the opportunity to visit China recently. They have gathered a great deal of rich and valuable experience, which we hope will be made available to the party ranks as soon as possible.

## **Tactical Line (1953)**

This highly secret document was circulated to members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party at the time of the third Congress of the Party held in Madurai in December 1953. It was withheld from the delegates as well as rank and file members. It was published by the Democratic Research Service in January 1954 and was later included in its publication *Communist Conspiracy at Madurai*.

The document was hatched in Moscow when a commission consisting of S. A. Dange, A. K. Ghosh, Rajeshwar Rao and Basava Purniah were called there in order to settle the differences that had arisen in the party. The Policy Statement adopted by the Madurai Congress was entirely on the lines of this document received from Moscow.

The central thesis of the document is that in India imperialism and feudalism constitute the common enemies of all classes of people except the feudal landlords. To liquidate these enemies it is essential that "a broad-based nationwide united front of all anti-imperialist classes (including the national bourgeoisie)" should be evolved. The existing State is characterised as "upholding the imperialist feudal order" and has to be replaced by a People's Democratic State.

In the present situation in India, the document says, hatred against the present government is growing and everywhere crisis is maturing very fast. It is therefore necessary to mobilise the masses to fight for the liberation of the country. For this the key task is to build the alliance of the working class and the peasantry with



the former playing the role of leadership.” It is absolutely essential to combine two basic factors: the partisan war of the peasants and workers “uprising in the cities.”

Regarding the form of the struggle to be followed the document lays down that “all forms of struggle” should be resorted to including “armed revolution”. However, the discussion on the question of how the armed struggle is to be conducted should not be carried out openly, says the document, “as it would reveal all our plans”. Similarly “while utilising all legal possibilities, the existing illegal apparatus of the Party also be strengthened enormously”.

The peace movement also has to be utilised for mobilising “all elements who for various reasons are opposed to war in the battle against Anglo-American warmongers”. The peace movement is not a pacific movement. On the contrary, “it must fight against all attempts to sow hostility against Chinese People’s Republic” and “must wage a determined battle against slanderers of the Soviet Union”.

#### I. NOT PEACEFUL BUT REVOLUTIONARY PATH

1. The immediate main objectives set forth in the Draft Programme of the Communist Party of India are the complete liquidation of feudalism, the distribution of all land held by feudal owners among the peasants and agricultural workers, and achievement of full national independence and freedom. These objectives cannot be realised by a peaceful, parliamentary way. These objectives can be realised only through a revolution, through the overthrow of the present Indian State and its replacement by a People’s Democratic State. For this the Communist Party shall strive to rouse the entire peasantry and the working class against the feudal exploiters, strengthen the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, a broad

nationwide United Front of all anti-imperialist classes (including the national bourgeoisie) sections, groups, parties and elements willing to fight for democracy and for freedom and independence of India.

2. While resorting to all forms of struggle, including the most elementary forms and while utilising all legal possibilities for mobilising the masses and taking them forward in the struggle for freedom and democracy, the Communist Party has always held that in the present colonial set-up in India and in view of the absence of genuine democratic liberties, legal and parliamentary possibilities are restricted and that therefore the replacement of the present State upholding the imperialist feudal order by a People's Democratic State is possible through an armed revolution of the people. The concrete experience of the last three years in India, after the so-called transfer of power, has only confirmed this thesis.

#### II. COMBINATIONS OF PARTISAN WAR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND WORKERS' RISING IN THE CITIES

3. Nevertheless, wrong and distorted ideas have prevailed in our Party ranks about the exact character of this armed struggle and the exact form it will have to take in order to ensure victory. For a period after the 2nd Party Congress the dominant tendency inside the Party leadership was to forget the colonial nature of India's economy, to refuse to draw lessons from the experience of the revolutionary movement in China and other colonial countries, to minimise the immense importance of peasant struggles and to put forward the thesis that political general strike in the cities and in industrial areas is the main weapon of our revolution, that such a strike will itself unleash countrywide insurrection and lead to overthrow of the present State.

Afterwards, on the basis of wrong understanding of the experience of the Chinese Revolution, the thesis was put forward that the Indian revolution would develop exactly in the same way as the revolution in China and that partisan war would be the main or almost the only weapon to ensure its victory.

While the former thesis minimised the importance of the peasant masses and their struggles, the latter thesis minimised the importance of the working class and its action. Both tactical lines were the result of ignoring the specific situation in

India and of the tendency to draw mechanical parallels with *other countries*.

In theory, as well as in the practice, both tactical lines amounted to repudiation of the key task of building the alliance of the working class and the peasantry, repudiation, therefore, of the task of building the united national front of which this alliance alone could be the firm basis, repudiation of the leadership of the working class in the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution.

4. In order to evolve a correct tactical line it is necessary to discard both the erroneous theses given above and to take into account all the factors of the Indian situation. India is a vast country, with a backward and basically colonial economy and with 80% of its people dependent on agriculture. In such a country partisan warfare, as the experience of China has shown, is one of the most powerful weapons in the armoury of the revolutionary movement and the weapon will have to be wielded by the Communist Party in their fight for national liberation. At the same time it must be realised that there are other specific factors of the Indian situation which are such that this weapon alone cannot lead to victory. In China, the split in the united national front in 1927 simultaneously split the armed forces also and the Communist Party had an army of 30,000 to start with. Moreover, because of the sparse development of railways and other means of transport, the enemy found it difficult to rapidly concentrate his forces against the areas held by Communists. Despite these advantages enjoyed by the revolutionary forces, they were repeatedly encircled by the enemy. Time and again they had to break away from this encirclement and threat of annihilation and migrate to new areas to rebuild again. It was only when they made their way into Manchuria and found the firm rear of the Soviet Union that the threat of encirclement and threat of annihilation came to an end and they were able to launch that great offensive which finally led to the liberation of China. It was thus the support given by the existence of a mighty and firm Soviet rear that was of decisive importance in ensuring victory to the tactic of peasant partisan warfare in the countryside in China.

5. In these respects the situation in India is different. We have no army to start with, it has to be created. The transport system in India is far more developed than in China, enab-

ling the Government to swiftly concentrate big forces against partisan areas. And above all, the geographical position of India is such that we cannot expect to have a friendly neighbouring State which can serve as a firm and powerful rear. All these do not mean that partisan warfare has no place in India. On the contrary because of the factors given earlier, partisan war must be one of the major weapons in our armoury as in the case of all colonial countries. But this weapon alone cannot ensure victory. It has to be combined with the other major weapons, that of strikes of the working class, general strike and uprising in the cities led by armed detachment of the working class. Therefore, in order to win victory of the popular democratic revolution, it is absolutely essential to combine two basic factors—the partisan war of the peasants and workers' uprising in the cities.

6. Partisan areas will inevitably arise in various parts of the country as the crisis deepens and as the mass peasant movement rises to the level of revolutionary seizure of land and foodgrains, paralysing and wiping out of local forces of the enemy. These areas and the revolutionary forces operating in them, however, continually face the danger of encirclement and annihilation at the hand of the enemy. Even coming into existence of liberated territories with their own armed forces in several parts of the country will not eliminate this danger because these areas will themselves be surrounded by hostile forces from all sides. Therefore, partisan war alone, no matter how widely extended, cannot ensure victory over the enemy in concrete situation prevailing in India. When the maturing crisis gives rise to partisan struggles on a wide scale, when the partisan forces in several areas are battering against the enemy, the workers in the cities in vital industries and especially in the transport system will have to play a decisive role. The onslaught of the enemy against the partisan forces, against liberated areas will have to be hampered and paralysed by mass strike actions. With hundreds of streams of partisan struggles merging with the general strikes and uprising of the workers in the cities, the enemy will find it impossible to concentrate his forces anywhere and defeat the revolutionary forces but will himself face defeat and annihilation. Even inside the armed forces of the Government the crisis will grow and big sections will join the forces of revolution.

7. Such a perspective demands the closest alliance between the working class and the peasantry and the realisation of the working class leadership in this alliance. This alliance will be built in action, by the bold championship of the working class of the demands of the peasantry, by the direct support given by the working class in the form of demonstrations and strikes to the struggles waged by the peasantry. Leadership of the working class will be realised not merely through the leadership of the Communist Party but above all through the direct mass action of the working class itself in support of the demands and struggles of the peasantry. Of all classes, the working class is looked upon by the peasants as their most closest friend and ally. Many workers come from the rural areas and are connected with the peasants by a thousand and one ties. Actions by the working class help not merely the existing struggles but also, as the history of our national movement shows, inspires the peasants in the neighbouring areas, radicalises them in developing new peasant struggles. In the present situation in India when all classes, all sections, except the exploiting are facing starvation and when hatred against the present government is growing, strike actions of the working class on such issues as food, ration cuts can be most powerful weapons to inspire the entire people, to give concrete forms to their discontent, to build their unity in action and to raise the popular movement to a higher level. By fighting not merely for its own demands but the demands of all discontented sections and classes, especially the peasantry, by acting as the foremost champion of the interests of the general democratic movement, the working class will come forward as the leader of the revolutionary people and build their revolutionary unity.

8. It is of the utmost importance therefore that the Party creates political consciousness in the working class, makes it conscious of its role of hegemony, overcomes the present disunity of the working class, wins over the majority of the workers in the vital industries and builds a powerful underground movement with factory and workshop committees as its nucleus. The best and most advanced elements must be recruited in the Party. All this demands intensive political agitation in the working class, patient day to day work, leadership of immediate struggles

for the winning of the concrete demands and the building up of a strong trade union movement. Only a united working class and a working class conscious of its rôle of hegemony can build national unity.

#### IV. PARTISAN WAR OF PEASANTS

9. In the rural areas the party has to rouse all sections of the peasants, including the rich peasants against feudal exploitation and build their unity basing itself firmly on the agricultural workers and poor peasantry who together form the overwhelming majority of the population. While the liquidation of feudalism and the distribution of land to the peasants must remain the key slogans of the agrarian revolution for the entire period, it is necessary to formulate immediate specific demands for each province and each area, like reduction of rent, fair price for agricultural products, abolition of feudal levies and forced labour, living wage for agricultural workers, etc., and lead actions for the realisation of these demands. The agrarian crisis is maturing rapidly and the peasant masses are seething with discontent against the present Government which rose to power on the basis of their support and afterwards betrayed them. Despite however this widespread discontent and despite the numerous peasant actions that have taken place in many parts of the country the peasant movement in the country as a whole remains weak and large sections of peasants have not yet been drawn in active struggles because of absence of organisation and firm leadership. It is our task to overcome this weakness by intensive popularisation of our agrarian programme, by formulation of such concrete and easily understood demands as can become the basis of the broadest mass action, by patient day to day work and correct leadership of struggles to realise these demands, and by building in the course of these struggles a network of peasant and agricultural workers' organisations with underground units in villages as their leading and guiding centres. Volunteer squads of the most militant and conscious sections of the peasant have to be formed to defend the peasant movement against the attack of the enemy squads; that will form nuclei of the partisan squads as the movement will develop and reaches the stage of seizure of land and partisan warfare.

10. As the crisis matures, as the unity, consciousness and

organisation of the masses grows, as strength and influence of the party develops and as the enemy resorts to more and more ruthless measures to crush the agrarian movement, the question of when, where and how to resort to arms, will be more and more forced on the agenda. As the question is of immense practical importance it is absolutely necessary that the party will be able to give an all-clear and unambiguous answer to it.

It must be realised that because of the vast area of India, because of the uneven level of mass consciousness and mass movement in different parts of the country, uneven acuteness of the agrarian crisis and uneven strength and influence of the Party itself, the peasant movement cannot develop at the same tempo everywhere. Premature uprising and adventurist actions of every type must be undoubtedly eschewed, at the same time it will be wrong to lay down that the armed actions in the form of partisan warfare should be resorted to in every specific area only when the movement in all parts of the country rises to the level of uprisings. On the contrary in the course of development of the movement a situation will arise in several areas which would demand armed struggle in the form of partisan warfare. For example, in a big and topographically suitable area where the peasant movement has risen to the level of seizure of land, the question of how to effect that seizure and how to defend the land will become a burning and live question. The Party is of opinion that partisan warfare in such a situation, undertaken on the basis of a genuine mass peasant movement and the firm unity, under the leadership of the peasant masses, especially the most oppressed and exploited strata, combined with other forms of struggle, such as social boycott of landlords, mass no-rent struggles, agricultural workers' strikes can, if correctly constructed and led, have a rousing and galvanising effect on the peasant masses in all areas and rise their own struggle to a higher level.

Wherever such partisan struggles develop they must also be combined with mass actions of the working class, especially in the neighbouring areas, in the form of strikes and demonstrations. Undertaken on the basis of most careful participation and assessment of all factors the partisan struggles must be conducted with the utmost boldness and tenacity defending the gains of the movement by every means at our disposal. At the same time the party has to act with the utmost flexibility when overwhelming forces of the enemy are concentrated against

the partisan areas and partisan forces run into the danger of defeat and total annihilation.

#### V. PARTISAN STRUGGLE AND INDIVIDUAL TERRORISM

11. In spite of the offensive nature of the partisan struggle it is necessary to emphasise in our agitation and propaganda in the initial nature the defensive nature of partisan struggle, saying that the objective of partisan struggle is above all to defend the peasants from the attack of the government and its punitive organs. In doing so, special attention should be paid to the demands for which the peasants are fighting and the atrocities of the government which force the peasants to take arms. It is necessary at the same time, to point out that it is the government that is responsible for violence and bloodshed. Partisan struggles are frequently confused with individual terrorism, it is asserted that individual terrorism is part of partisan struggle and not only a part, but even a basis of partisan struggle. This is absolutely wrong. What is more individual terrorism contradicts the spirit and objective of partisan struggle and it is absolutely incompatible with partisan struggle. In the first place the objective of individual terrorism is to destroy particular individuals while not pursuing the aims of not destroying the regime of feudal exploitation and subjugation of the people, whereas the objective of the partisan struggle is not to destroy particular individuals, but to destroy the hated regime in a prolonged struggle of the popular masses. In the second place, individual terrorism is carried out by individuals—terrorists—or by small squads of terrorists acting apart from the masses, and without any link with the struggle of the masses, whereas the partisan struggle is carried out by popular masses and not by individuals, is carried in close contact with the struggle of the masses against the existing regime.

Since individual terrorism is carried out not by the masses but by individual terrorists acting apart from the masses, individual terrorism leads to the undue minimisation of the role of the mass movement and to equally undue exaggeration of the role of the terrorists who are alleged to be capable of securing the liberation of the people by their own forces independent of the growth of the mass partisan movement. It is clear that such a feeling created by individual terrorism can only cultivate



passivity among the popular masses and thereby undermine the development of partisan struggles. Therein lies the second main harm done by individual terrorism to the revolutionary movement.

To sum up: Individual terrorism undermines the possibility of unleashing partisan struggle of the masses and should be rejected as harmful and dangerous.

#### VI. IT IS NECESSARY TO STRENGTHEN THE PARTY

Despite the tremendous radicalisation that has taken place among the masses during the last three years and despite the many mass action that have taken place and are taking place, it would be gross exaggeration to assert that India is already on the verge of armed insurrection or revolution, that a civil war is already raging in the country, that the Government, its leaders and agents are already completely isolated and so on and so forth. Such exaggeration leads to the ignoring of the concrete tasks facing the party, the organising and advocacy of adventurist actions, and the issuing of futile calls for action and pompous slogans which bear no relation either to the existing level of mass consciousness or to the actual maturity of the situation. In practice, it results in the self-isolation of the party, making it easy for the enemy to destroy it. It results in handing over the masses to the Socialists and other disruptors.

Equally wrong are they who through their reformism see only the weakness and disunity of the popular movement, the offensive of the enemy and advocate a policy of retreat and "lying low," a policy of regrouping of forces, eschewing all militant actions in the cities and countryside for the present. Tactics based on such an understanding of the situation will result in the worst type of reformism and make the Party trail behind the masses instead of leading them.

13. Reality of the situation is that the crisis is maturing fast. Under its impact the masses are getting fast radicalised and a period of big battles lies ahead. The Government's failure to carry out a single pledge that it gave to the people, its failure to tackle a single problem, especially the problem of agrarian reform and food for the people, all these are fast shattering the illusions. Already the majority of the people look upon the present government as a government of exploiting classes, as a

government of landlords and capitalists. Most of them still believe that this government can be changed and a real popular government take its place without resort to armed revolution and by means of general elections; nevertheless in their struggle for their day to day demands — adequate wages, fair price for agricultural products, restoration of ration cuts, etc., hundreds and thousands are coming out in action in all parts of the country. The growth of the popular movement still lags behind the growth of popular discontent, only a small fraction of the people have as yet been drawn into the actual struggle against the government. This lag is due not merely to the repressive measures of the government but primarily and, above all, to the weakness of the Party and the existing disunity of the progressive forces. It is one of the key tasks of the Party to forge the unity of the working class to unite the popular forces on the basis of the concrete programme and to grow into a mass party so as to be able to supply the leadership which alone can unify and extend the mass movement to raise it to a higher level.

The Party has to give the slogan that the present government has to go and be replaced by a popular government, representing the unity of the democratic forces, a government that will break with the British empire and carry out the programme of the agrarian reforms and democracy. It has to utilise the coming general elections for the most extensive popularisation of its programme, for mobilising and unifying the democratic forces, for exposing the policies and methods of the present government. It has to lead them in their day to day struggle and take them forward step by step so that the people through their own experience, come to realise the necessity and inevitability of armed revolution.

The Party must not preach the inevitability of fascism but utilise the enormous volume of the democratic opinion in the country to unite the people to halt the growing drive towards fascism on the part of the present government. Through patient and systematic day to day work, through the bold championship of the demands of the people, through correct leadership of the concrete struggle of all sections of the people, the Party will grow and be able to fulfil its role as organiser and leader of the people's democratic movement.

14. It is necessary therefore to put an end to the interminable discussion that has been going on in our party on the question

of the Chinese path, on the question of how armed struggle is to be conducted. Such discussions disorganise the party, dissipates its strength, and leaves the mass leaderless, precisely when they need the leadership of the Party most urgently. Discussions of such matters, carried out almost openly as they have been till now, reveal all our plans and make it difficult to carry them out in practice.

The fact is that if the crisis bursts out in the near future, the Party in its present and disorganised and weak state will not be able to fully utilise it to lead the people to revolution. It is not yet prepared to shoulder the gigantic responsibilities that such a situation will place on it. It is necessary therefore that the present weaknesses are overcome with the utmost rapidity, the ranks of the party are unified and steps are taken to extend the mass bases of the party and strengthen it. While recruiting the best elements from the working class and other fighting classes into the Party and developing into a mass party, it is necessary at the same time to exercise the utmost vigilance against the swamping of the Party with elements that cannot yet be considered fully tested and trustworthy. The system of candidate membership must be introduced for this purpose. It is also necessary that while utilising all legal possibilities, the existing illegal apparatus of the Party is strengthened enormously.

#### VII. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE

15. One of the most important tasks facing our Party in our country is the task of mobilising the Indian people in the struggle for the defence of peace. Being one of the largest and most populous countries of the world, and occupying a key position in South-East Asia, India has a tremendous role to play in the battle against the Anglo-American warmongers and for the preservation of peace. It is the job of the Communist Party to ensure that India plays that role.

The forces of peace in our country are potentially growing. Love and admiration for the Soviet Union are widespread in all sections, including the middle class intelligentsia. The liberation of China and her emergence as a great power, the manner in which the People's Government in China is successfully tackling the problems of food, famine, floods and diseases have profoundly influenced our people. Especially powerful is the senti-

ment against American aggression in Korea, so widespread the sympathy for the Korean People that even the most reactionary news papers have had to criticise the American Aggressors. This powerful mass sentiment as well as the other factors have compelled even the Nehru Government to take a stand against the most blatant acts of the American imperialists (the threat to use the atom bombs, the branding of People's China as an aggressor, etc.).

The Party, however, has yet not succeeded in transforming the widespread peace sentiment into a powerful peace movement, because as on other issues, our approach to the issue of peace was extremely sectarian. The peace movement, in the main, remained the movement confined to the existing mass following of the Party and the trade unions and peasants organisations under our influence. The peace platform was utilised for abstract denunciation of the Government on all conceivable issues and to popularise struggles that only the Party waged. It inevitably was the result of restriction of sweep of the mass movement and a failure to win over as peace partisans all the genuine lovers of peace. It is only recently that these harmful methods are abandoned.

Another manifestation of sectarianism is the failure to link the issues of peace with the live issues of the people, the failure to show the connection between the drive towards war and mounting war budget of the Nehru Government with the rise in prices of the necessities of life, the reduction of government expenses on education, the neglecting of housing accommodation, growing attack on civil liberties, etc.

It is of the utmost importance to abandon all sectarianism to develop a real broad based peace movement. The growing and the strengthening of the national movement helps the cause of peace. The strengthening of the peace movement also facilitates the growth of the national liberation movement. These two movements therefore must develop in close relation with each other, each strengthening the other. Nevertheless, they are not identical. The platform of peace is a broader platform. It can and must include all supporters of peace, all elements who for various reasons are opposed to war and are prepared to take their stand against all measures calculated to extend and unleash war.

17. It is necessary for the peace movement to correctly ap-

praise the foreign policy of the Nehru Government in relation to peace and to adopt a correct attitude towards all specific manifestations of that policy.

While the peace movement must support all these specific acts of the Government which hampers the plans of the warmongers, e.g. Nehru's declaration against atom bomb and the vote against the American proposal to denounce people's China in the UNO, must also simultaneously point out the half-hearted and vacillating nature of the Government's policy and wage a determined battle to mobilise a mass opinion in favour of a consistent peace policy.

As a matter of fact the Nehru Government's policy cannot be called a policy of peace. It is essentially a policy of manoeuvring between the main enemy of peace, the United States of America, and its junior partner, Britain, on the one hand and the peace loving countries on the other. Nehru fears the consequence of world war and therefore advocates a policy of "moderation" of not going "too far". At the same time the Indian government continues to be an active member of the British commonwealth which is a partner of the American imperialists in aggressive wars. The Indian Government has neither condemned the American war of aggression in Korea nor repudiated its support to the illegal resolution of the UNO sanctioning that aggression. It has not condemned the British imperialists who are waging war in Malaya—but on the contrary permitted them to recruit Gorkha soldiers against the Malayan people. It has not denounced the French aggression in Viet Nam and continues to give facilities to the French imperialists for the transport of troops and war materials.

Therefore, in addition to mobilising the people against the threat of the atom bomb, for support of the Stockholm and Warsaw appeals, one of the specific tasks of the peace movement in India is to rally the people against these policies of the present Government which abet and aid the colonial wars waged by the American, British and French imperialists against the peoples of South-East Asia. The peace movement is not a pacific movement, not a movement merely for recording abstract support to peace. It is a fighting movement for concrete action in defence for peace and against the imperialist warmongers including those waging colonial wars.

18. The peace movement must fight against all attempts to

sow hostility against the Chinese People's Republic. It must explain to our people how the liberation of Tibet is not a threat to peace but a decisive blow against the instigators of war. It must uphold the heroic actions of the Chinese volunteers who by smashing the plans of American warmongers who enslaved the Korean and Chinese peoples strengthened the cause of world peace.

19. We must also fight against all warmongering propaganda against Pakistan, pointing out how the growing tension between Pakistan and India is the result of imperialist manoeuvres and how it helps the enemies of the peoples of both states. We must demand a drastic reduction in the military budget and a policy of friendship and close alliance between India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

20. The peace movement must wage a determined battle against slanders of the Soviet Union, against all those who strive to depict the consistent peace policy of the Soviet Union as a policy of war and aggression. Basing ourselves on the lucid and clear cut statement of Comrade Stalin in reply to a *Pravda* correspondent, we must concretely expose the real instigators of war and uphold the shining example of the Soviet Union which is devoting its energies and resources to further improving the condition of the people and leading the entire progressive humanity in the struggle for the preservation of peace. Firm friendship between the peace loving people of all countries must save the world from the menace of war and the people of India have to play a big role in establishing this friendship—this fact must be made a part of the consciousness of the entire people.

## **Andhra Thesis (1953)**

The liquidation of imperialists and of feudalists were accepted as the two chief objectives of the party. But the question arose as to who are the imperialists to be liquidated.

“Andhra Thesis” submitted by a group of delegates from Andhra to the Madurai Congress of the Party formulates the point of view of a section of the party which could not totally accept the official view that Moscow’s enemy, America, was inevitably India’s chief enemy. It admits that it is the “revolutionary duty” of the Communist Party as “a part of the world working class” to fight against American Imperialism which is “the spearhead of world reaction”. But under the present conditions in India the chief enemy of national freedom is, according to the thesis, British imperialism. It is the national enemy while America is the international enemy. The two struggles are not irreconcilable but the CPI should concentrate its fire on British imperialism and should regard it as “the chief and immediate enemy”. To talk of Anglo-American imperialism in a general way is “to reduce ourselves to the position of tall talkers”, and amounts to “fighting the battles of English imperialists against America.” The document was first published in the Democratic Research Service publication *Communist Conspiracy in Madurai*.

What is the precise nature of our revolution? Regarding this there were a number of arguments and different view-points that had appeared in the course of our discussions. Some comrades had contended that the nature of our revolution is anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. Some others argued that it is not

only anti-feudal and anti-imperialist, but also anti-capitalist. Now it has been made clear that it is totally wrong to characterise it as "anti-capitalist" also, but it is only anti-feudal and anti-imperialist. In this connection we have to admit that those who argued that it is only anti-feudal and anti-imperialist revolution also had not been able to draw the full conclusions from it and many erroneous conceptions prevailed as a result of which many wrong and ultra-leftist slogans and programmes of action have come out. What are these erroneous conceptions and how to correct them? Let us first see what we mean by anti-imperialist revolution.

In the programme it has been stated that we have to fight against British Imperialism for our complete national independence. I hear that some comrades who have not fully grasped this point have run into some amazing conclusions and have gone to the extent of saying that the present programme must have been written by Dulles because American Imperialism, *the chief enemy of the world proletariat* is not brought out in the programme as *the Chief Enemy of our national Independence*. It is quite natural to get such wild reactions in the background of run-riot inter-Party discussion and the wrong education and erroneous political understanding so far prevailed on this issue.

Some time after the Second Party Congress we altogether forgot about the role of imperialism as a force that is gripping our national economy and enslaving it, barring all our national progress. In our agitation and propaganda the fire against Imperialism was almost absent. When it was brought by some comrades to the notice of the then existing PB, it, instead of correcting it, had advanced another totally wrong formula that "freedom means not from this or that imperialism only but imperialism in general, that is world imperialism, etc.," thereby submerging the specific in the general, blurring the vision and direction of the entire force of attack. After the LPPD editorial and subsequent discussions, when imperialism has again been brought into the picture as the enemy of our national independence, the pattern has become to talk of Anglo-American Imperialism, that is both imperialisms clubbed together as the enemies of our national independence and enslavers of our people.

The present discussions reveal that this view is also defective and wrong. You will naturally ask me why it is so. It is so because (a) it is unreal and factually incorrect to talk of Ame-



rican imperialism as the American capital does not form more than 3-4% of foreign capital investments in India; (b) it is so because it is British imperialism that has directly ruled over us for the last 200 years and is still keeping us in its grip (i.e. economically direct and politically indirect even today;) more than 80% of the foreign capital in India belongs to the British; (c) it is so since that when we are demanding complete national independence, we are demanding secession from the British Commonwealth of which our country has been forced to be a member and not from the United States of America; (d) it is also wrong to talk of general anti-imperialist fight without specifying the particular imperialism that is dominating over our country as this outlook, if logically extended, leads us on the verge of erroneous conclusions of the Trotskyite school of thought which advocate world revolution against world imperialism, i.e. the theory of permanent revolution; (e) it is totally wrong to talk of general anti-imperialism because this view-point refuses to take note of the advancement of the revolution.

We know that the present Anglo-American contradictions are the chief inner imperialist contradictions of the day. This contradiction manifests itself not only in the international arena in general but has also its specific expression in our own country. America is trying to elbow out the British from their dominant position in the market. Britain and the native interests that are closely allied with her are vitally interested in opposing all such attempts in their own way. That is how the Anglo-American contradiction is expressing itself in our country. Instead of utilising this contradiction for the benefit of the advancement of the revolutionary movement, if we club both imperialists together and declare both of them simultaneously and equally our national enemies to be fought out and liquidated, it not only becomes unreal but also lands us in the stand of "fight all the enemies of the Proletariat at one stroke" instead of fighting them one after another in its own turn. It also conjectively amounts, at this stage, to fighting the battles of English imperialists against America.

All this brings before us one salient point, namely that British imperialism is the chief enemy of our national progress and therefore of our national independence.' It is British imperialism that has allied itself with the native feudal interests and is defending the feudal order, barring all roads to prosperity and

advancement; it is British imperialism that has allied itself with a section of the national bourgeoisie and defends the rotten colonial order; it is British capital that grips our national economy and impedes our national industries and bars national progress; it is British imperialism that has drawn to its side a section of the national big bourgeoisie and with their help tied us to the chariot of the British Commonwealth. So when we talk of anti-imperialist revolution it specifically means, in the present set-up a fight against British imperialism for national independence and freedom, but not against Anglo-American imperialism or world imperialism in general.

Now, comrades raise the questions: Is not American imperialism the spearhead of reaction and the chief enemy of the Soviet Union, People's China and other People's Democratic States? Is not American imperialism hatching conspiracies against communist parties throughout the world, our party being no exception? Is not American imperialism trying to penetrate into our country and exploit and enslave us? When such are the facts are we not to fight American imperialism as well? These are all very pertinent questions and we have to answer them correctly. Our party, as the vanguard detachment of the Indian working class which is a part of the world working class has to fight against American imperialism. This is our inviolable international obligation or rather a revolutionary duty on our part. We, as a party of the working class, as a part of the world working class have our national and international duties to discharge. Internationally speaking, America is the spearhead of world reaction as the main enemy of Peace and Freedom for all the people. We, situated as we are in a country under a particular State, have some concrete tasks to perform. The chief enemy of our national freedom today is British imperialism. When we have to fight for the complete freedom of our own territory the fight will be against British imperialism. It is our national enemy. America figures as our international enemy. We should neither forget our task of fighting British imperialism nor absolve ourselves of our international responsibilities of exposing and isolating American imperialism. It will be also wrong to deduce syllogisms of formal logic, asserting that:—

our international enemy is also our national enemy,  
the chief international enemy is American imperialism,  
therefore our fight for freedom is against American imperialism.

This does not take us anywhere near the truth or the success of our fight for freedom.

American imperialism has to be thoroughly exposed and all its reactionary ideological propaganda has to be constantly laid before the people and rouse them to the consciousness of fighting these conspiracies, the war manoeuvres of American imperialism and thus prevent our country from being drawn into the whirlpool of war on behalf of the American imperialism against the world peoples' camp.

If we forget the concrete question of British imperialism and the concrete task of fighting it for our national freedom and only indulge in general talk of fighting Anglo-American imperialism we reduce ourselves to the position of tall-talkers and fail to mobilise the people for the struggle for complete national independence from British imperialism.

If we ignore the task of exposing and isolating American imperialism as the chief enemy of the world people and world peace and confine ourselves to the narrow shell of our fight against British imperialism, we again reduce ourselves to the position of bourgeois nationalists.

We have one national enemy and a separate international enemy. The struggle against one particular national enemy for our national freedom is not in contradiction with the fight against another international enemy though the nature of the fight varies. Bourgeois nationalism and bourgeois internationalism are two irreconcilable conceptions because of the very inherent contradictory nature of the bourgeois class and their interests. The bourgeois class, in the final analysis, never considers either nationalism or internationalism as sacrosanct. For them everything is subserving to their class domination and class exploitation.

For the proletariat it is not so. The proletariat can afford to be the real defender of itself, that is of its national interest, as well as of the international interest of the people because it stands against all exploitation.

Earlier, when we had to face a similar situation *i.e.* of facing one international enemy in the form of German Fascists and another separate national enemy in the form of British imperialism, we could not co-ordinate the struggle against both correctly. For some time we argued that the main question for us was our national freedom and therefore we could not bother about the

international enemy. Later, when we realised and woke up to the danger of the international enemy, we had almost neglected, ignored and sidetracked our fight against the national enemy. I am referring here to the period of the anti-fascist war. The present correction not only restores us the clear perspective of the nature of our anti-imperialist struggle at the present state, but also goes a long way in correcting our very erroneous outlook on the problem which has been persisting since a very long time. Lastly, before I conclude, let me remind you of the inner imperialist contradictions and how they were utilised by the CPSU (B) and the CPC. Take for instance the Treaty of Brest Litovsk and the non-aggression pact of the USSR (1939) etc. Similarly our Chinese comrades had also applied the Marxist theory of inner imperialist contradictions to their struggle for freedom and national independence. They concentrated against the chief imperialist enemy of their freedom which was for some-time the Anglo-French bloc, later Japanese imperialism and subsequently now American imperialism. As a matter of fact, even though Britain has the territory of Hongkong under its control, they (China) now do not talk of liquidating British imperialism along with American imperialism etc. If today British imperialism feels that the Chinese Republic is soft toward them and therefore it is time to make use of the Chinese difficulties for its own ends and slackens its attack on Chinese Republic, it is all for the good because in the long run it is not British imperialism that is going to gain by the present Chinese attitude towards it, but on the contrary, after eliminating the present menace of American imperialism the Chinese Republic will eventually direct its attention against British imperialist positions. In our case also, if American imperialism thinks that our Party and our class is not so much hostile to their penetration into India and we are not concentrating fire on American plans swallowing British interests, let them think so and our revolution is not at all going to suffer thereby. At present it remains as an Anglo-American conflict. It is none of our business to take sides. It is also none of our business to encourage either. If in the course of these Anglo-American conflicts and contradictions America elbows out the British from India and becomes dominant and if in the meanwhile we would not be able to achieve full independence and if America then remains our chief national enemy, it will be our task to concentrate our main

fight against American imperialism. This understanding is nothing new to Marxism-Leninism though we are learning it for the first time in all its implications. As a matter of fact, Lenin's thesis on imperialism is the basic document where this point of view has been dealt with at length. It is basing on this thesis that the revolutionary movements have been working out their tactics and strategy. *Let us imbibe this and never again derail and deviate from this.* Now it will be clear for you all why in our programme we concentrate fire on British imperialism and figure it as the chief and immediate enemy of our national freedom and stop talking of Anglo-American imperialism in a general way, as we have been doing till now.

## **Draft Political Resolution (1953)**

After surveying the national and international situations the Resolution sets out to lay down the tasks before the CPI. In international sphere the Resolution notes “the increasingly rapacious demands made by American imperialists” and the “rapid penetration of American imperialism” in Asia and particularly in the economic and political life of India. Therefore the most important task before the CPI is to “expose the manoeuvres of the American war-mongers, to rouse the people against them to bring about the broadest unity of popular forces . . . . . to defend the cause of democracy, freedom and peace.”

Regarding the foreign policy of the Nehru Government the Resolution asserts: “The Governmental policies do not follow consistently a policy of peace and democracy” and they are “subject to the influences of the British or American circles”. The same, according to the Resolution, is true of the Government of India which is “controlled by landlords and monopolists collaborating with imperialism . . . . . In every sphere the government continues the reactionary policies of the past”.

The Resolution notes the growing economic and political crisis in India which has resulted in “the growing urge for united action and united organisation”. The task therefore is to build a United Front” from place to place and from issue to issue” which can grow into a common struggle “for the replacement of the present Government by a Government of Democratic Unity.”

The document was first published by the Democratic Research Service in its publication: *Communist Conspiracy at Madurai*.

## DRAFT POLITICAL RESOLUTION

1. The signing of the Armistice in Korea on July 27, 1953, was a mighty victory for the heroic Korean and Chinese people, for the forces of world peace, a great success for the peaceful policy of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and other Democratic States and a heavy blow against the aggressive imperialists led by America and their plans for world domination.

2. The American imperialists, when launching the war of intervention against the Korean people, had expected quick victory, which, they hoped, would facilitate extension of the war against the People's Republic of China. They had hoped that the demonstration of their military might would consolidate the aggressive alliance they had forged, cow down opponents, shatter the patriotic resistance of the freedom-loving peoples and compel the vacillators to line up behind them, thus making possible the undertaking of new military ventures against peace-loving and democratic States as well as against colonial peoples struggling for independence.

These hopes were shattered by the heroic peoples of Korea and their allies, the Chinese People's Volunteers. Their success has exploded the myth of American invincibility, caused panic and confusion in the imperialist camp and heightened the courage and confidence of the freedom-loving peoples. It has been rightly hailed as a great victory for peace forces in every country. Truce in Korea, concretely demonstrating the possibility of defeating the plans of the war-mongers, has given a powerful impetus to the world peace movement.

3. The liquidation of the American-Fascist uprising in Berlin, the immense advance made by the USSR in the field of atomic and hydrogen weapons, combined with its powerful call to ban all weapons of mass destruction, the growing might of all Socialist and Democratic countries, have further strengthened the cause of peace.

4. The world peace movement has derived tremendous strength from all these. The Appeal of the World Peace Council that all disputes should be settled by negotiations and peaceful means is being endorsed by vast numbers of people in every country. The demand for the cessation of the war in Viet Nam, the demand for the abandonment of measures to rearm German

imperialism and for peaceful re-unification of Germany on a democratic basis, the demand that the Chinese People's Republic should be accorded its rightful place in the Council of nations, above all, the demand that the Great Powers should meet and resolve all differences peacefully—these are becoming the demands of vast masses in every country.

5. As a result of these developments, as well as the increasingly rapacious demands made by American imperialists who, because of the fiasco of their policies and the growing crisis of their economy, are resorting to more and more desperate and provocative tactics, conflicts and contradictions are sharpening inside the imperialist camp and in the relation between the imperialist Powers and dependent countries. The American move to form the so-called European Defence Community with a re-armed Germany as its core, the attempt to convert the UNO into a docile instrument of its aggressive policy, the blatant support to the gangster-methods of its henchman, Syngman Rhee, the effort to sabotage the Korean peace negotiations, the exclusion of neutral Asian nations like India from the Political Conference on Korea—are meeting the resistance not only from the mass of people but even from a number of bourgeois Governments. In defiance of the American ban, a number of Governments have established trade relations with the USSR and with other democratic countries.

6. Significant in these respects is also the role played by the Indian Government on a number of important international issues in the recent period—a role appreciated by the peace-loving masses and States. The Indian Government's denunciation of the atom bomb, its help in ending the hostilities in Korea, its condemnation of the tactics of Syngman Rhee, its opposition to the American move to transform Pakistan into a war base are factors helping the cause of peace.

The cause of peace has been further strengthened by the growing bond of friendship and of cultural relation between the people of India on the one hand and the USSR and Chinese People's Republic on the other. The conclusion of the recent trade agreement between India and the USSR on mutually advantageous terms, carries forward this process and can also help to reduce India's dependence on imperialist Powers.

7. While there has been in recent months a certain amount of relaxation of international tension and considerable extension



of the possibility of maintenance of peace, it would be a dangerous mistake to believe that the policies of the warmongers have been totally defeated or that the war plans have been abandoned even temporarily. The fact is that efforts to sabotage the Korean peace negotiations have intensified; the re-arming of Germany is being speeded up, creating a centre of aggression in the very heart of Europe; the policy of atomic blackmail is being continued. Further, foiled in Korea, the American imperialists have redoubled efforts in other parts of Asia, as seen in the military coup in Iran and in the increased support to the French imperialists against the Viet Nameese people. Above all, the intrigues in Kashmir, and the proposed military alliance with Pakistan have brought the war danger to the very threshold of India.

8. Rightly resented by all sections of people in India including Congressmen, the alliance has far-reaching reactionary aims directed against the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic, as well as against India. Entrenching themselves in Pakistan with the help of its reactionary and corrupt leaders, building military bases there and securing control over its armed forces, its man-power and resources, the American imperialists want to bring pressure on the Indian Government to compel her to line up with them and give them similar concessions in India also. The success of American attempts in this sphere would inevitably mean India's sovereignty and freedom being reduced to a fiction, colossal war burdens on the Indian people, ruthless attack on the forces of democracy and peace in India. American moves in Pakistan, therefore, constitute a grave menace to the Indian people, a menace against which the entire country must be mobilised.

9. A most important task before the Communist Party and before every patriotic party, organisation and individual today is to expose the manoeuvres of the American warmongers, to rouse the people against them to bring about the broadest unity of popular forces on this issue and on its basis develop a powerful campaign to defeat American intrigues against the Asian peoples, to defend the cause of freedom, democracy and peace. Mass organisations, especially organisations of workers and peasants, have to play a big role in this task. For, it is the active participation of broad masses on which will depend the strength and sweep of the movement. While conducting this

campaign it is necessary to guard against the danger of reactionary elements utilising the situation for sowing hostility against the people of Pakistan and giving such slogans as trade-war against Pakistan. It must be emphasised again and again that it is not the people of Pakistan that are responsible for the Military Pact, that, on the contrary, they will have to bear heavy burdens as the result of the Pact, that democratic forces and elements in Pakistan are opposing the Pact and their own reactionary leaders who are leading them into it, that, therefore, the task of the Indian people is to develop their own campaign in such a way as strengthens the forces of freedom and democracy in both countries and thus defeat the plans of the American imperialists.

10. The rapid penetration of American imperialism that is taking place in various spheres of our economy and political life also constitutes a grave danger. The American imperialists are not merely seeking to exert pressure on India by creating a base in Pakistan; they are also linking themselves up with extreme reactionary elements both inside and outside the Congress and with Right-wing Socialist leaders. They are buying over corrupt politicians, securing control over a number of newspapers, poisoning the cultural life with decadent literature and films. They are carrying on a virulent campaign of lies and slanders against the USSR and China and People's Democratic countries through agencies like the "Democratic Research Service" and "Freedom of Asia Societies". They are also penetrating into some vital sectors of Indian economy and are trying to get a foothold in strategic industries. The importation of a large number of American "Specialists" in India, although there is no dearth of suitable Indians for the work, the granting of diplomatic immunity to them, enhances the danger. Exposure of all this and rallying of people against them have to be undertaken as part of the struggle to defend peace and freedom.

11. Another menace to India comes from the continuation of foreign territories on Indian soil, some of which, especially Goa, are being fast built up as war bases. Here again can be seen the hand of the aggressive imperialists of America, who, as part of their aim to secure world domination by means of threat, blackmail and war, are striving to secure a foothold in every part of the world and transform it into a base of aggression against the freedom-loving peoples.

12. All these developments bring out sharply the vital significance of the struggle for peace for the people of our country, the imperative need to broaden, extend and strengthen the peace movement, the paramount necessity of India playing a positive role in the effort to end wars in all parts of the globe and create conditions of peace by a pact of peace between the Great Powers, by prohibition of atomic weapons, by settling of all international disputes by means of negotiations, by liquidation of aggressive military bases maintained in a foreign country by any Power and by recognition of the right of every nation to full freedom. It is evident today that in view of the aggressive aims and policies pursued by the imperialists, who are trying to secure mastery of the world, no country can preserve its freedom or prevent aggression by mere declaration of a policy of neutrality and non-involvement in wars. This lesson must be brought home to our entire people. It must also be pointed out that freedom cannot be defended by relying on British imperialism against American imperialism.

13. Certain acts and declarations of the Nehru Government in the recent period, particularly since the defeat of the Americans in the Korean war, have been helpful to peace and all peace-loving people have appreciated and supported these acts and sentiments. Yet, the situation does not warrant that democratic forces should uncritically and unconditionally give general overall support to the Government policies even in the international sphere. It is because the Government policies do not follow consistently a policy of peace and democracy. The foreign policy of the Government is subject to the influences of the British or American circles and is not averse to making concessions to them in practice, even where in words the Government expresses disagreement with them, as in the case of the Korean war-prisoners. On certain matters, it even goes further. It rebukes those who openly denounce American intrigues in Kashmir. Arch warmongers like Dulles and Nixon are allowed under the plea of diplomatic usages, to broadcast their message of hatred against the Soviet and Chinese peoples. Above all, the Government of India says little about the colonial wars that are being waged by the British imperialists in Malaya and Africa, about the military dictatorship established in Guiana by the British in violation of the Constitution framed by themselves, about the war against the Viet Nameese people. It

*continues to give transit facilities to the Gurkhas who are being recruited by the British for suppression of the valiant Malayan people. Also, at a time when due to American intrigues in Pakistan, the threat to India has assumed menacing proportions and has to be defeated by broad mass mobilisation, the Working Committee of the National Congress issues directives to Congressmen not to take part in the peace movement, a movement which with its aim of prevention of war, has been gathering support from all parties and elements who love peace and freedom and whose further development is absolutely essential if the game of imperialist war-mongers is to be defeated. Therefore, the necessity, while supporting all the positive measures, to intensify pressure on the Indian Government in order to make it pursue a consistent policy of peace remains and even acquires greater importance than before.*

14. It must be further realised that the defence of India's freedom and sovereignty and the prevention of imperialist efforts to drag India into war cannot be effected by mere denunciation of American imperialism and its intrigues. The example of Korea shows the immense strength that even a small country can acquire in a short time, on the basis of abolition of imperialist rule and feudalism, a strength against which all the power of the warmongers proves of no avail. If, today, more than seven years after the transfer of power, India, a country with vast resources and man-power is being made the object of American pressure and blackmail, that to a great extent is due to the fact that the American imperialists hope to achieve success by taking advantage of the backwardness of India's economy, the serious crisis in her agriculture and industry, the utter dependence of India on foreign Powers for her defence requirements and capital goods. Also they want to use as their tools, the feudal elements—traditional traitors to India's freedom—who still occupy important positions in the economy, political life and military apparatus of India. The question of defeating the war plans of American imperialists, the defence of India's freedom from the American threat are, therefore, closely linked with the question of India's winning freedom, liquidating feudalism and overcoming her backwardness in the shortest period. This demands a break with the British Empire, removal of British Officers from India's armed forces, breaking of British stranglehold on India's economy by the confiscation of British capital

and the intensification of struggle for the complete liquidation of landlordism through which alone conditions will be created for rapid economic, political and military strengthening of India. A fully independent and powerful India will be a mighty bulwark of freedom, peace and democracy. Also the serious weakening of aggressive British imperialism, the chief partner of America and oppressor of the colonial peoples, the building up of a fully free India outside the Commonwealth and outside all imperialist influence will cause a great factor for world peace and the freedom of all Asian and colonial peoples. Hence the necessity to intensify the fight against British imperialism, for quitting the Commonwealth and for the confiscation of British capital, necessity of opposition to every manifestation of subservience to British imperialism like participation in economic, political and military conferences under its aegis, mobilisation of people against British atrocities against the colonial people and the creation of a mass demand that the Indian Government must openly condemn them. Any slackening of this struggle, any failure to conduct it with vigour and determination will mean weakening the movement for freedom and peace.

15. Linked with Britain and America our country has already felt the impact of the growing crisis in the economies of these countries. There can be no doubt that the effect will be all the more disastrous as that crisis deepens.

Despite every effort made by imperialist Powers headed by America to avert the crisis of their economy by means of militarisation, the artificial boom produced by the Korean War has definitely ended. Stocks are accumulating in America, where the decline in production is no longer confined to consumer's goods alone but has also affected some of the heavy industries. International trade shows symptoms of stagnation and decline. Already, a number of bourgeois economists and political leaders are making gloomy forecasts about impending depression.

With the deepening of the world capitalist crisis and the shrinking of the capitalist world market, the exploitation of colonial and dependent countries by imperialists has been intensified and they have become arenas of sharp conflicts among the imperialist Powers, above all, between Britain and America. India, where British imperialism continues to hold a dominant

position and where American imperialism is effecting fast penetration, is one of the main arenas of this conflict.

16. As a result of India's trade and economy being linked with imperialist Powers who are interested in keeping her backward and dependent, India is ruthlessly robbed and plundered. Through British investment in key sectors of India's economy, through British Exchange Banks, Insurance and Shipping Companies, through imperial preference and India's membership of the Sterling Bloc, Britain continues to drain away the wealth of India. The weapon of unequal trade is wielded both by Britain and America to further impoverish the Indian people, deny them capital goods and ruin even their few established industries. Our export market of raw materials being totally under the mercy of the British and American monopolists, they play havoc with it by manipulation of prices and stocks to suit their interests and the consequent ruin falls mainly on the shoulders of our peasant producers who are the worst victims of the imperialist manipulations as was seen in the April 1952 crisis. Huge quantities of raw materials have to be exported at ruinous prices to meet the interest and profit charges of British capital in India, to pay for the goods imported from America, to pay for military equipment, rolling stock and other goods which India has to buy. This is leading to an ever-widening gap between exports and imports, squandering of the Sterling resources and increasing dependence on foreign Powers.

17. The crisis manifests itself in practically every industry, especially industries producing consumer's goods, which constitute the bulk of our national industries. All these years, the Government of India, controlled by landlords and monopolists collaborating with imperialism, argued that the crisis of India's economy was a crisis of *under-production*, that there was scarcity because there were not enough goods, that the way to India's prosperity lay through "harder work", that what was needed was not basic social changes but more sustained labour. "Produce or Perish" was their slogan. All these myths are being exploded by hard reality.

As is admitted by both Government and employers, production went on the up-grade surpassing all expectations and even the targets of the Five Year Plan. But the result was not abundance of goods for the consumers but accumulation of

stocks of unsold goods. Every consumer industry like the textiles and sugar, even others like engineering, soap, edible oils, etc. faced a crisis of the market, despite millions being in want of these goods. A crisis of "over-production" in the midst of poverty has come. As a result, mass unemployment has become the characteristic feature in all industrial centres affecting not only the industrial workers but also the middle-classes.

18. Instead of forcing the monopolists and large-scale industries to reduce prices and take less profits in order that the consumer may buy goods, and the factories may be able to keep production and unemployment going, the Government permitted the monopolists to cut workers' wages, reduce employment, carry out rationalisation and closures. While Big Business got relief in the form of reduction of export duties, the consumer was left at the mercy of the market. Even the small fall in the prices of their goods was done away with by the abolition of food subsidies, causing price rises in the market and starvation to many. The Government has not even shown courage to take measures to prevent foreign monopolists who have invested capital in India from competing with and killing Indian industries. It has permitted free flow of foreign goods which are ruining many Indian industries—not only small-scale and cottage industries, but also several large-scale industries. All this further deepens and intensifies the crisis.

19. At the root of the crisis of "over-production" lies the catastrophic crisis in our agrarian economy. The production of foodgrains per acre has sharply declined, according to the Report of the Planning Commission itself. Famine conditions have become chronic in many parts of the country. Scarcity conditions prevail in vast areas. With the fall in prices of commercial crops added to the ruin of subsidiary industries like handlooms, the distress of the peasant masses has intensified. Indebtedness of the peasants has increased to colossal proportions. Tens of thousands of peasants have sold away and are selling away their land, their cattle and all their belongings at incredibly low prices due to scarcity and famine conditions. Their properties are passing into the hands of rapacious landlords and moneylenders. On top of this, the Government in many States resorts to coercive measures and sells away by

auction the lands of peasants who are unable to pay arrears of land revenue and debts.

20. All over the country, the ferocious eviction offensive of the landlords continues, resulting in enormous concentration of land in their hands, dispossessing the peasants of lands and swelling the rank of agricultural workers. The Government which pretends to be the protector of peasants and whose Ministers give their blessings to "bhoodan", refuses to take adequate steps to stop the eviction offensive. Unemployment among agricultural labourers has increased to colossal proportions and it has led to depression of the wage levels of agricultural labourers in the countryside and pressure on the employed workers in the towns. The demand for land for cultivation has also increased tremendously. All this has given the landlords greater opportunity to exploit the tenants and agricultural workers, thus accelerating the process of pauperisation of the rural masses.

The crisis in agriculture is also seen in the huge accumulation of stocks of fertilisers with the State and Central Governments because the pauperised peasant masses are unable to buy and use them. This is leading to further stagnation and decline of agriculture.

All this has meant a rapid shrinking of the home market and the complete collapse of the market in many areas. The fact that food prices continue to remain high due to shortage of production, the fact that the mass of the people have to spend the bulk of their income to purchase food, the fact that the prices of manufactured articles are kept at high level—all these further intensify the crisis.

21. The agrarian crisis has grown into a national crisis. It has meant shortage of food for the nation, shortage of raw materials for the industries, widening gap between exports and imports, increased dependence on foreign Powers and increased threat to our national freedom and sovereignty. It has facilitated the penetration of aggressive imperialist Powers into our country.

22. The ruling classes in India had hoped that by means of the Five Year Plan prepared in collaboration with imperialism, they would be able to solve the crisis at the cost of the people, stabilise their economy as well as strengthen their political position. While the foreign and Indian monopolists have



reaped colossal profits as the result of the operation of the plan, their basic aim has not been realised. The failure of the plan is evident to all today including the framers of the Plan who now announce that it will have to be "revised". Abandonment of projects earlier undertaken, deficit budgets in most States, mounting volume of unemployment all over the country signalise the fiasco of the attempt to strengthen or even stabilise the economy of the country, within the framework of the imperialist-feudal system.

23. It is obvious today that fundamental democratic transformations in land relations by freeing the vast peasant masses of our country from the terrific onslaught of the landlord and the usurious money-lender alone will smash the fetters on our agricultural production and release the creative energies of India's millions of peasants. That alone will assure for the national industries a vast expanding market and ensure capital formation on an ascending scale. Abolition of landlordism and handing over of land to peasants and agricultural workers are thus the pre-requisite not only for the development of our agriculture, but also for the industrialisation of the country.

The confiscation of British capital not only frees our economy from the grip of British imperialists and ensures the possibility of effective control over the entire economy and thereby secures the possibility of successful planned development.

A democratic State alone will be able to unleash the immense creative energies of the millions of our peasants, workers and the intelligentsia, and utilise the economic power and resources of the public sector obtained by the confiscation of British capital for a planned development in the interest of the entire people. The experience of the last three years has fully demonstrated that the pre-requisites of planned development of our economy in the interest of the people are smashing up of feudal relations in our agriculture, confiscation of British capital and the establishment of a democratic State.

24. It is, however, precisely these basic economic and political changes, that the Nehru Government, dominated as it is by monopolists and landlords, refuses to undertake. It tinkers with the problems confronting the people, imposes heavier and heavier burdens on the masses and abandons, when confronted with opposition of vested interests, even such moderate measures as fixation of ceiling on existing land holdings. All this leads

to intensification of the misery of the people, intensification of the crisis.

25. In every sphere the Government continues the reactionary policies of the past. It refuses to abolish the princely States and reconstitute the provinces on a linguistic basis on the false plea that this will lead to the break up of the unity of the country. It refuses to concede the demand of Part 'C' States for responsible Government. It increases the cost of education, compelling many students to discontinue their studies and making it impossible for the poor classes to receive education. Medical and public services are severely neglected. Expenditure on Social Insurance Schemes is being cut down. It permits foreign concerns in India to discriminate against Indian personnel and treat them as inferiors in relations to Whites. It refuses to undertake or shelve the enactment of social reform legislation. It spends colossal sums for the military and police and gives repeated concessions to Big Business but has no money for the upliftment of the people. It imposes new burdens on the people on the plea of financing its plans and projects. It re-enacts the security measures in the teeth of popular opposition and wants to set up, as in Bengal, special tribunals to try political cases. It resorts to ruthless terror to suppress the people whenever all other methods fail and the masses refuse to take the new burdens lying down.

26. Against these policies of the Government, against the growing offensive of the landlords and monopolists, mass resistance has grown rapidly during the last two years. With the living conditions sharply deteriorating as the result of the growing crisis of Indian economy and with the weakening of the political influence of the Congress, people throughout the country have been coming out in struggles against every attempt to impose new burdens on them. The new phase that has opened in the people's opposition to the reactionary policies of the Government and the offensive of the feudals and monopolists has certain specific features which should be noted.

(a) The struggles are mainly taking place on issues affecting the day-to-day life of the people, such as taxes, food subsidy, wages bonus, retrenchment, evictions, rent, famine relief, etc., and are motivated by concrete economic demands against the State, the landlords and the monopolists.

(b) These struggles are taking place not only in Provinces

and areas which are politically advanced and where the Congress is weak, but embrace areas and Provinces which have been the traditional stronghold of the Congress and areas which had seldom before come out in big struggles against the Congress Government. The Anti-Sales Tax struggle in Saurashtra, the struggle in Rajasthan against Octroi Tax, the students' struggle in U. P. are examples.

(c) Not only does this new wave of mass struggle embrace new areas hitherto untouched by the mass movement, but they have drawn new classes and sections of the people as well, such as teachers, traders, Government servants, etc.

(d) The struggles even when they embrace only one section of the people evoke the sympathy of other sections and some times, especially against repression, entire people of the area move into action, as was seen in the Lucknow University students' struggles, thus transforming it into a militant anti-Government struggle.

(e) The Congress masses do not remain unaffected by these mass struggles. Even sections of Congress break away temporarily from the leadership under pressure of the people to join the struggle. The continued failure of the Congress Government to solve people's problems, the growth of mass unemployment and distress in the life of the people, the repression and attacks on the working class, peasantry and other sections of the people, the failure to implement a land policy in the interest of the peasants, etc., are all leading to a critical examination of the policies of the leadership by rank and file Congressmen, which makes possible wide mobilisation and struggles on concrete issues.

(f) The new wave of struggles is remarkable for the urge for unity among all sections of the people. Anti-Communism is no longer able to divide the masses where the issue is understood by all, is concrete and is well-justified, and where the Party is able to take correct steps to forge the unity of the people.

In spite of the split in the trade union and student movements, in spite of the fact that large masses of peasants are outside the AIKS, workers, peasants and students are uniting among themselves in factories, villages and educational institutions, regardless of their political affiliation.

The growing urge for united action and united organisation is making even disruptionist leaders and groups move in the

*direction of unity in the trade unions, kisan sabhas and united Committees on specific issues. All this was seen in the glorious struggles of the working class (Defence workers, Burnpur, Assam Tea Gardens, etc.), in the struggle of the Saurashtra people, in the Anti-Sales Tax struggle in Bombay, in the Anti-Tramfare enhancement and food struggles of Calcutta and Bengal.*

(g) The working class plays an increasingly important part in the new struggle wave. The struggles of the working class have been the most numerous in the country as a whole. Province-wide and even country-wide struggles of different sections of workers have begun to take place, as in the case of all sections of workers for the Puja Bonus in West Bengal and of the Defence workers. Doggedly fought struggles have been conducted by workers in small industries also. On several occasions, the working class has also gone into action on general issues affecting all classes but this has not yet become a general feature.

(h) Although, as yet, the struggles are mainly taking place on immediate day-to-day demands of the people, struggles for political demands have also developed and are developing. This is particularly so on the issue of Linguistic Provinces. The victory of the Andhra people has not only given impetus to the movement for Linguistic Provinces but has led to many Congressmen coming out openly against the policies of the Congress Government and leadership.

(i) These struggles are being reflected and carried into the chambers of the Legislatures also. Determined opposition to the reactionary policies of the Government put up by the central core of democratic opposition inside the Parliament and Legislatures, when backed up by the struggle of the masses outside, often is compelling sections of Congress Legislators to support demands and sentiments of the fighting people. This has often led to situations in which struggles outside have had their inevitable impact on the Legislatures and sometimes led to Ministerial crisis. Rajaji's Government in Madras being compelled to give up many of the taxation measures it proposed in 1952, the veritable revolt that threatened to break out inside the Congress Legislature Party in Bombay over the issue of Surcharge on Land Revenue in 1952; the differences in the West Bengal Cabinet that came out openly over the issue of

the policy to be adopted towards the agitation against the enhancement of tramfare are but some of the examples of the tremendous impact of the struggles of the masses on the Legislatures and the ruling party.

(j) The Communist Party has played an important part in leading these struggles, which has resulted in the growth of the influence and prestige of the Party.

27. All these make it unmistakably clear that what we are witnessing today is not merely the maturing of an economic crisis, but along with it, the initial stages of the development of a political crisis. The results of the general elections were not merely an expression of the loss of faith of the people in the present Government, of the process of people starting to consider it their enemy and of its being returned as a minority party in some Legislatures, but also contained the possibility of the growth of a political crisis, a possibility that is growing into a reality as the result of the deepening of the economic crisis, the failure of the Government's economic and political policies and the growth of the wave of mass struggles.

28. Faced with the situation, sections in the leadership of the Congress strive for Coalition with such a Party as the Praja-Socialist Party but as yet these moves have not succeeded.

The attempts made by Nehru to strengthen the Government by forming a Coalition with the Praja-Socialist Party have met with a fiasco because the PSP leadership is finding it more and more difficult to carry through its reactionary policies in the face of the growing opposition of the rank and file, and even sections of middle leadership as a result of the growing struggles of the people and their growing urge for unity with the democratic forces. In these conditions, the persistence by the leadership of the PSP in its policies of disrupting the democratic movement, its manoeuvres to bring support to the Congress rule as against the unity of the democratic parties is bound to lead to the PSP as a party meeting with further fiasco.

The development of the mass democratic movement has meant also a weakening of the influence of the reactionary communal parties. In Kashmir they suffered a serious defeat. In the Punjab and PEPSU, the strengthening of the democratic movement has led to a split in the Akali Party, an influential group having broken away is co-operating with the democratic forces on democratic issues.

29. *It will be wrong, however, to think that the Congress is already a spent force, or that it is no longer capable of sowing illusion among the people. In particular, we should not ignore the considerable strength that Pandit Nehru's role brings to that organisation. Note also should be taken of the fact that although the internal policy of the Government is getting rapidly exposed among the people as an anti-people policy, through its foreign policy it is still able to gather considerable support. Moreover the powerful influence that Gandhian ideology is still able to exercise over masses of people, including sections of the working class, an influence which expresses itself in various ways such as belief among some sections in the efficacy of " bhoodan ", resort to Satyagraha forms of struggle as a substitute for mass action, act as a fetter to slow down the process of mass awakening, restrict struggles and dissipate energy.*

The PSP leadership also is still able to create illusions among sections of the people disillusioned with the Congress. It tries to stem the tide of growing struggles and their urge for unity by launching struggles as in Pardi and Azamgarh, but by restricting it to the Satyagraha form.

Equally wrong will it be to think that communal forces have become a spent force. By raising communal slogans, as on the question of Indo-Pak relations and the question of full accession of Kashmir to India, they were able to utilise the discontent of the masses against the policies of the Congress and divert the masses from the democratic movement. Similar attempts will be continued and it will be a mistake to underestimate their danger.

In Tamil Nad, the leadership of the Dravida Kazhagam and Dravida Munnetre Kazhagam, basing itself on communal and anti-North Slogans, helps to divert the masses of the people from the issues of the democratic movement, weakens the unity of the democratic movement in Tamil Nad and disrupts the unity of the mass peasant, working class and other movements with the all India movement.

The leadership of the Scheduled Caste Federation similarly does everything to divid the toiling masses on a caste basis and follows anti-national and anti-democratic policies.

30. Nonetheless, the objective conditions are such, the crisis is so deep today, that these retarding influences can be overcome by the Communist Party playing its role correctly as the bold

leader of mass struggles, as the champion and defender of the rights of the people, the unifier of the democratic forces in the country.

Already the Party has played the most important role in the last general elections and emerged as the spearhead of the democratic opposition to the Congress rule. By putting forward and working for the unity of the trade union, peasant, student and other movements, by its role in the struggles that have developed in every State since the elections, by the determined and consistent opposition that its members have put up in the Legislatures, the Party has influenced considerably the course of development since the last Party Conference in October, 1951. In the crisis that has developed in Travancore-Cochin State, leading to the dissolution of the Legislature, in the crisis that has developed in Hyderabad, PEPSU and many other States, the role of the Communist Party and the struggles that its members have led outside the Legislatures have been of decisive importance.

31. In order that the Party can play its role in the developing situation it is necessary that there is a clear understanding of the perspective and direction of the movement. In every struggle, even though the demand might be a simple economic demand affecting the day-to-day life of the people, such as evictions, rent, wage, bonus, rationalisation and retrenchment, the masses engaged in the struggle see by their own direct experience that the struggle has got to be carried on against the determined opposition of the Government which comes out as the defender of the existing social order.

Not only do the people fight for their immediate day-to-day demands, but they are also coming out in struggle against high taxes, prices, etc. i.e. on demands that are directly addressed to to the Government.

With the development of the crisis and the struggle of the masses against the attempts to shift the burdens of the crisis on to the masses, the Congress Governments are more and more resorting to heavy repression, as was seen in Calcutta during the struggle against tramfare increase, in the agrarian struggles throughout the country. Democratic and civil liberties are being more and more attacked. The Congress does not flinch from even establishment of President's rule, dissolution of Legislatures and crushing whatever democratic rights the people

had won. Events in PEPSU and Travancore-Cochin are clear pointers of the determination of the Congress to maintain itself in power by every means at its disposal including attack on democratic forces. There can be no doubt that as the crisis deepens and the difficulties facing the Congress increase, the tendency to resort to such methods will also increase.

In these conditions, the struggles for day-to-day demands, the struggle against taxation and high prices, against mass unemployment, the struggle for the preservation and extension of civil liberties and democratic rights, all get more and more interlinked and can grow into the common struggle for the replacement of the present Government by a Government of Democratic Unity. Already in States like Travancore-Cochin and in Andhra, it is possible for us to raise that as a practical slogan. It is this perspective that has to guide our activity. Achievement of a Government of Democratic Unity is the objective to which all struggles of masses have to lead.

32. It must be remembered that the slogan of a Government of Democratic Unity is a slogan which demands organisation and unleashing of mass struggles on the widest scale. It will be realised only in the course and as the result of a determined struggle to defeat the economic and political policies of the ruling classes and by repelling their attack on the standard of life, rights and liberties of the people. Hence the most important task today is to unfold such a movement on the basis of the struggle for the immediate, concrete demands of the workers, peasants, students and other classes and sections and build powerful mass organisations and the party. It is through these struggles, as the history of the last two years proves, that the strength will be generated and the unity will be forged which alone can be a guarantee of victory. Then only, even the conflicts in the Congress can be utilised to the advantage of the masses. Failure to see this will lead to the giving of abstract slogans, diverting mass attention from immediate tasks, reliance on top negotiations and manoeuvres and weakening of the mass movement.

33. The three inseparable tasks on the carrying out of which will depend the success of the democratic movement are the building of the Party, the building of the mass organisations and the building of the Democratic Front. In the measure that these tasks are carried out in an integrated and co-ordinated manner,



the attempts of the Government and the ruling classes to shift the burdens of the crisis on the people will be defeated, the mass movement will get strengthened, grow and achieve its aim.

34. The growing burdens on the people, the worsening conditions of their lives, the increasingly anti-popular policies of the Government as well as the growing threat to the freedom of India demand that all democratic forces are united. The possibilities of such unity are immense and are growing and a key task of the Communist Party is to progressively forge this unity. For this, it is necessary to attain clarity on the nature of the unity that has to be forged and the method of forging it.

35. The democratic front is the united front of all classes and elements whose interest can be effectively furthered only by the elimination of imperialism and feudalism. It can be built only by developing the broadest mass movement on the basis of struggles for immediate economic and political issues confronting the people. It is obvious that at a time when the masses are under the influence of different political parties, when even the working class is split, a united front agreement between parties and organisations regarding demands and slogans of struggle on each issue is a powerful factor in drawing people into common action. Such a united front helps in bringing even masses following the Congress into the common struggle. Hence, it is necessary for the Communist Party to continue and intensify efforts for such agreements on each issue.

36. Experience has also shown that the formation of united Committees for the specific purpose of conducting such united struggles, Committees whose constituents are the various parties and organisations, and where decisions are taken by common consent, help the strengthening and further unfolding of the mass movement. It also helps the building and growth of united mass organisations of workers, peasants and others. It is this coming together from issue to issue and jointly leading the mass struggles and the working in common mass organisations that will create conditions for closer united front between the parties.

37. It will be wrong, at this stage at least, to form a United Front having a programme, organisation and discipline of its own. Such an attempt will narrow the scope of this United Front movement. Since the United Front will contain such

widely different classes as the working class and the national bourgeoisie, as also various strata of peasantry, the programme of the Front as a common measure of agreement among all these classes will not cover many vital problems which may affect the most advanced class in the Front, that is, the working class. Moreover, principles of organisation, discipline and action of the working class and its political party have different content, edge or intensity from that of the other classes. To limit the action of the most advanced class by the United Front of all classes would weaken the Front itself because the degree of the effectiveness of the Front depends on the strength, maturity and action of the working class on its own independent class platform and class organisations. Hence, any United Front that does not leave to its most advanced sectors their own independent action and platform, while acting unitedly in the United Front platform on agreed questions, will prevent the growth of the Front and the masses acting under its inspiration. A united front that circumscribes the independent role of the Communist Party and of the working class and working people and tries to confine the mass movement only within the fold of the limited scope of the Front will be the very negation of its own objective which is to organise the masses for a united common struggle.

Hence the United Front that the Party must strive to build today is a United Front from place to place and from issue to issue, a United Front for unfolding mass activity, while retaining complete freedom for each party in the Front. Such a United Front alone will help the building of the mass movement and the progressively coming together of democratic parties, groups and elements.

At the same time, all sectarian methods and sectarian outlook—in relation to slogans, in relation to attitude towards non-Party elements, in relation to method of running mass and democratic organisations—must be abandoned. The very fact that the Communist Party has acquired a key position in the political life of the country, the very fact that it is looked upon as the powerful force in opposition to the Congress, demands that the Party acts as the unifier of the people, gives expression to their deep urge that all democratic forces must come together and fight unitedly in defence of their rights and demands.

38. Further, the development of the United Front move-

ment demands the drawing into struggles and common activity large mass of Congressmen, PSP followers and progressive individuals. The tendency to look upon all Congressmen and all PSP members as reactionary, because of the reactionary policy of the Congress leadership and disruptive policy of the PSP leadership must be combatted. With the growth of the crisis, with the growth of mass struggles and growing disillusionment of the masses about the policies of the Congress and PSP leaderships, possibilities already exist for drawing disillusioned Congressmen and PSP followers into struggles and common activity and these possibilities will develop in future.

39. The development of the United Front and unity through the widening of the mass movement is often hampered because of the abstractness of our agitation, the habit of substituting concrete exposure by general denunciation, the indulgence, quite often in stereotyped speeches in Assemblies, Parliament and from public platform, stereotyped writings in our papers and above all, the failure to distinguish between the platform of the Front and the Party forum. Too often we speak only for those who are already convinced that the present Government is a reactionary Government. Too often we fail to make use of existing legislations—Tenancy Legislation, Social Security Act, Payment of Wages Act, etc.,—to ameliorate the conditions of the masses and secure for them concessions, forgetting that these legislations have been enacted as the result of mass struggles and are a weapon in the hands of the people. Too often the tendency is to narrate only the hardships that the people are suffering and to ignore the successes that their struggles have won in the mistaken belief that reference to such successes will breed “reformist illusions”, while the reality is that, in order to inculcate confidence in the masses, confidence that unity and struggle can win demands, it is essential that each success won by the people, no matter how small, is widely publicised and made the basis for further advance. There is also the tendency to pay scant attention to such work as adult literacy, cultural and sports activities, co-operatives, medical relief, etc., work which is absolutely essential, work which can mobilise vast sections and enable the Party and mass organisations to forge close links with the people.

40. In areas where famine conditions prevail not only is it necessary to demand relief from the Government and organise

relief on the basis of unity of democratic organisations, but it is also necessary to mobilise the people for such work as deepening of wells, repair of tanks etc.

It is necessary for every Provincial Committee to undertake a critical examination of the plans and projects undertaken by the Government in the Province, make a factual assessment of their effects in consultation with the people directly covered by them and put forward the demand for their correct implementation or replacement as will help the people and mobilise the masses for their implementation.

It must be noted that, despite the various laws that have been enacted, the untouchable masses are in practice denied equal rights even now. It is necessary not merely to agitate for more comprehensive laws against untouchability, but also to wage a concrete battle against all forms of discrimination and utilise all the existing laws.

41. Struggles for the immediate demands of the people through all forms corresponding to the consciousness of the masses—petitions, signatures, strikes, hartals, demonstrations, marches, mass civil disobedience etc., struggles against the attacks of the Government, landlords and monopolists are the most important task facing the mass movement and constitute the most effective weapon for building the Democratic Front. Through these struggles are to be built the mass organisations with their unity embedded in the people. In these struggles will be trained and steeled cadres coming from the masses.

Instead of endeavouring to transform the Satyagraha struggles into mass struggles, where this form is resorted to by others because of the backwardness of masses, there has been a tendency among party comrades themselves to limit the struggle only to Satyagraha as an alternative to mass struggles. This tendency if not corrected, will lead to harm both to the Party and the masses.

42. The rapidly deteriorating situation on the agrarian front demands that utmost attention is paid by every Provincial Committee to the task of strengthening the Kisan Sabha organisation and forming agricultural workers' associations wherever necessary. Broad peasant unity has to be built in action against evictions, against unjust taxes, for deduction of rent, for moratorium on debts, for adequate wages, for relief against famine and drought and similar demands. The Provincial Committees must

immediately undertake a concrete study of the question of distribution of land held by landowners above ceiling and put forward concrete demands.

It is necessary to emphasise that in Tenancy Legislations, to allow any discriminations between peasants under big landlords and small landlords over questions of rent and occupancy rights, will disrupt the unity of the basic classes—agricultural workers and poor peasants—which is the foundation for the broader unity of the peasant movement.

43. In order to save their profits being affected by the crisis of their landlord-capitalist economy, the big monopolists have launched an attack on the wages and working conditions of the workers. With the help of the Government they are thwarting the gains of social security legislation reaching the workers. With the help of ILO experts and foreign advisers, they are introducing rationalisation methods to increase the work-load and reduce the total earnings of the workers. With the help of Tribunals, they are freezing the payment of bonuses and wage-increases despite rising living costs. They hope to break the resistance of the workers by using the pressure of the unemployed rushing to the towns from the countryside. They hope to use the divisions in the trade union organisations to disrupt the workers' struggles. When everything fails, they use terror and violence.

Under such conditions, the unity of the trade union movement, unity in conducting struggles to defend the workers must be worked for and achieved at all costs. The struggle for Trade Union unity is hampered on our part by the remnants of sectarian understanding. Though trade union unity is accepted in principle, it is looked upon as a temporary tactic and not a fundamental principle of the trade union movement, without whose realisation the working class is disarmed before its enemies.

Formal acceptance of the principle of unity and continuation of sectarian understanding results in characterising the unions of the INTUC and the HMS, even where they are mass unions, as gangsters' unions, and just agencies of the employers. It is not realised that many of the leaders of the INTUC and HMS are often compelled to take up positions of struggle, because of the pressure from their own following, whose most elementary demands the leadership are not able to satisfy. This attitude has even led to our comrades remaining indifferent to the strug-

gles called by the INTUC and HMS leaders in certain instances and has affected the merger and unity of trade unions even where genuine feelings for unity have been expressed in common mass actions.

A firm struggle against sectarianism must be carried on, and work in all unions wherever the masses are, must become the regular feature. The tendency to undertake such work with a view to 'expose' the leadership as the primary objective, must be combatted, as it leads to disruption of the trade union. Instead, our comrades working in all mass unions must ceaselessly strive to activate the mass of workers around their immediate demands. Failure to so activate the mass of workers, failure to bring even minimum of trade union consciousness to every worker by enrolling him in a union and mere concentration on verbal 'exposure' of the leadership often leads to our comrades demanding the formation of rival trade unions and keeping the unions as closed groups. There is the most harmful tendency to think that building of the Party and realising the Party Programme require separate trade unions, directly functioning under Party members, who make the policies of the unions according to their own fraction decisions, irrespective of the will of the majority in the unions. Such an understanding has led to unions being reduced to Party groups, absence of democratic functioning and ultimately loss of mass basis. All these manifestations of sectarianism must be firmly combatted.

The setting up and functioning of united Factory Committees is part of our work for the development of trade union unity. The existing united Factory Committees must be strengthened, and such Factory Committees must be organised wherever possible, in the setting up of which even the works councils should be utilised. In the struggles that are breaking out more and more, the question of united resistance to the offensive of the Government and employers will come to the fore, and must be fully utilised by the setting up of joint elected Committees for the conduct of struggles and negotiations. The question of recognition of unions, in present conditions, ceases to be merely the question of the working class. With the States forces interfering in strikes, meetings and demonstrations, the struggle for the right to strike and recognition of unions becomes a vital part of the struggle for democratic rights of the people as a whole. The struggle develops into one of combating reactionary Govern-

ment laws such as the Industrial Relations Act in Bombay, Madhya Bharat and Madhya Pradesh. The development of a wide movement against the Acts in these States in particular and in the country generally is a major task of the working class front and in the discharge of that task the working class not only defends itself but leads in the defence of the whole people against all reactionary laws, for their rights and living.

44. Working class struggles, especially struggles in major industries, against the offensive of the monopolists, acquire increased significance in the present situation. Vigorous defence by the working class of its rights, vigorous struggle by the working class against retrenchment, wage-cut and other forms of attack encourage all classes and sections to wage their own battles. Also mass action by the working class gives form and direction to the growing radicalisation of the people as already seen in several Provinces.

With the development of the crisis, the monopolists and the Government resist to the utmost the conceding of even the most elementary demands of the working class. The struggle for the demands of the workers requires, therefore, that these struggles must be mass struggles, struggles of the people in the sense that large sections of the people understand and support them. The mobilisation of the support of other sections of the people for working class struggles is of great importance for the success of these struggles. That this is possible has been demonstrated in recent months where whole cities and towns came out in hartal in support of the resistance of workers to retrenchment.

In order to make this possible, it is equally necessary that trade unions take up the demands of other sections—of peasants, middle-class, merchants, etc.—who are hit by the offensive of the landlords, monopolists and the Government. They must struggle along with the population and be in the forefront of the struggle against the attempts of the imperialists, who threaten the cause of peace, of national freedom and sovereignty. The working class must be out for the protection of national industries against competition by imperialists.

All this requires intense political agitation among the workers and enabling them to see that their own problems, the attack on their wages and living standards, mass unemployment etc., are inseparable from the larger problems facing the entire people caused by the feudal-colonial social order, the working class

must be imbued with the consciousness that there can be no stable improvement in their own living standard and working conditions unless this colonial-feudal set up is broken up and freedom and democracy for all people are ensured.

There is a widespread tendency to neglect important and vital industries and industrial areas and to concentrate on small and diffused industries. This tendency must be given up and Party units must immediately undertake planned work in major and important industries.

The problem of combating mass unemployment has become a key problem before the working class. The development of a wide movement by mass rallies and conferences, marches and demonstrations, hartals and strikes is the most important task. United committees for fighting retrenchment and unemployment must be organised. Such a wide movement cannot unfold itself fully, unless the organised working class employed in factories are brought into the movement. Apart from mobilisation, it is of utmost importance that relief and solidarity campaigns are organised.

45. The powerful movement for the formation of Linguistic Provinces which gathered further momentum after the formation of the Andhra Province has now resulted in the appointment of a Commission by the Government of India to "examine the question of reorganisation of States". This undoubtedly is a popular victory and it demands further strengthening of the struggle for the constitution of Linguistic Provinces by the abolition of princely States, the disintegration of multi-national provinces and the redrawing of provincial boundaries.

While conducting this movement it is imperative to guard against the danger of disruption of the unity of the working and toiling masses of various nationalities. All tendencies of bourgeois nationalism, tendencies of whipping up national hatred and animosity, tendencies of concentrating on the so-called disputed areas in order to build up a case for the incorporation in one's own "homeland", must be resolutely combatted. There can be no doubt that in the coming months such tendencies will intensify and the ruling classes will utilise them to disrupt the struggles of the masses. Hence the fight against all such tendencies, the fight to uphold the banner of proletarian internationalism, is a key task.

46. Each struggle, each campaign, each mass action must be



used not only to popularise slogans but also and, above all, to build organisations of workers, peasants, students, youth, women. It must be remembered that one of the main reasons why the growth of the mass movement is lagging behind the growth of mass discontent is that such organisations are still weak and in many places non-existent.

In the past a key weakness of organisations of workers, peasants and other classes has been the weakness of the basic units like Factory Committees, primary kisan sabhas. The organisations depend not only on their total membership but on the manner in which this membership is organised—above all, on the firmness and organised functioning of the basic units. Without them, neither the mass base of the organisation can be expanded nor even the existing base activated. Hence the necessity to focus attention on this work and draw into organisational work rank and file workers, peasants, and agricultural labourers.

Further, the waging of struggles and the conducting of campaigns have to be co-ordinated with the work of increasing the circulation of Party journals and sale of literature. At present at all levels and in all units of the Party, there is total under-estimation of the importance of this work—an under-estimation which springs from idealisation of spontaneity, from minimisation of the role of consciousness. This expresses itself in the tendency to look upon the work of sale of journals and literature as not the work of the Party as a whole and of all its units, but only of comrades specifically entrusted with that work. When such is the case with Party literature, there is no wonder that journals of trade unions and kisan sabhas also suffer from total neglect. This tendency must be sharply combatted.

47. The work of our comrades in the State Legislatures and the Parliament has strengthened the mass movement. Nevertheless, it has suffered for lack of co-ordination with the mass movement and struggles outside. This weakness must be rapidly eradicated by our comrades inside the Legislatures by bringing to the fore the issues of the mass movement in such a way that our legislation work is a reflection of and a direct aid to the mass movement outside. For this purpose, it is necessary not only to undertake concrete exposure of the policies and legislative and executive measures of the Government, but also ourselves initiate legislation on the burning problems of the

people. The introduction of such Bills can and must become the rallying point of a wide mass movement in support of them.

Our comrades have been returned in large numbers to many Municipalities, Local Boards and Panchayats. A correct understanding of our tasks in the municipal and local bodies is even more urgent than the legislatures. The Municipalities are positive centres of some amount of power directly in the hands of the people's representatives, unlike the Legislatures where the Legislative and Executive functions being separated and the organs of the Executive being totally outside the pressure of the people's representatives, no positive tasks of execution as such can be done by the Legislators. It is not so in the municipal and local bodies. By their limited spheres of action, the proximity to the very people who elect them, the day-to-day constant contact with the executive machinery which is not like the hardened bureaucracy of the State machine, the municipal and local bodies can be used for the direct benefit of the people by our representatives. During the days of our anti-British struggle, the independence of the municipal centres from Government executive control was a matter of principle and was fought for. The British rulers also, in order to buy over the liberal bourgeoisie and to give a safety valve called these institutions as one of "Local Self-Government". As a result, the municipal and local bodies have come to possess some amount of importance and power in the local life of the people.

The people expect us to use these limited powers to give them some amenities of health and hygiene, roads and water supplies, elementary education and such other things as lie within the purview of these bodies. The bourgeois-landlord leadership of the Congress wants these bodies to put additional taxation on the peasantry to pay for these benefits and even the proceeds of this small taxation are mulcted by the local exploiters. It is our duty to see and we can see to it that this game is defeated and that these local centres of municipal authority wherever they are under our guidance are rid of corruption and graft, that the harrassment of the peasantry is stopped and that the dues realised are used for rendering real municipal aid to the people.

The people expect us to do the needful for them. However poor and meagre be the powers, these small centres are centres of power, power to do good to the life of the people. Our representatives must learn the art of running them properly.

They are surely not speech-broadcasting houses only. Local Self-Government must become the platform of strengthening the people's solidarity through the partial services that are within the framework of even the existing legislation.

Hence we have to see that our approach in these bodies is even more positive than in the Legislatures and that our cadres in these bodies do get serious education in the running of these bodies. The Provincial Committees must help in the drawing up of programmes for whose implementation our comrades must fight.

48. Despite the growth of the general influence of the Party, our effective organised influence is confined, in almost all States, to a few areas and districts. Without a countrywide Party, without a wide Kisan Sabha, without a firm base in the most important working class areas, it is not possible to grow into a country-wide national-political force. While strengthening our position in the areas where we are already a force, it has become urgently necessary to spread to new areas and sectors. Provincial units must carefully and urgently plan out and execute this task.

It is necessary to create mass political literature and transform our newspapers into national-political journals, reporting not merely struggles in their own provinces, but in other provinces as well.

The fulfilment of all these tasks demand the rapid strengthening of the Party and the undertaking of political education as a key political task. For, the development of the Party is the key factor in determining the growth of the mass movement. It is of utmost importance that the entire Party be armed with the prospect of the fast maturing of a profound economic and political crisis, of the struggles that are looming large and of the prospect of co-ordinating them into the political struggle for the replacement of the present Government by a Government of Democratic Unity. The Party must acquire a correct understanding of the direction in which things are moving, a sense of urgency, revolutionary zeal and passion and give up all complacency and sense of self-satisfaction.

The Party must become the decisive national force politically, geographically and in a class sense i.e. by Party units in each area and State acting as the leader and organiser of the people, by the Party spreading to new areas, and by its

basing itself and drawing its main strength from the working class and the toiling peasants. Advance is to be measured no longer, as in the past, in terms of the "general political influence" nor even in terms of mass mobilisation on specific issues only but in terms of the growth of organisation in general and growth of the Party in particular, in terms of circulation of literature and newspapers, in terms of collection of funds, in terms of the strengthening of mass organisations and the Party itself.

It is only through such all round growth that the Party will be able to discharge its duties and responsibilities to the people.

### CORRECTION TO DRAFT POLITICAL RESOLUTION

DELETE paras 1 and 2 of Point 37 and INSERT the following in their place :

"The experience of United Fronts as permanent organisations formed even on an agreed common programme has shown that they have tended to become alternate political organisations with their own separate discipline, undermining the independent role of the Communist Party though it is also laid down that decisions have to be taken only by agreement between the constituent parties or groups and that each constituent party or group is free to take its own independent stand on any issue where it disagreed.

"United Front Committees, instead of being co-ordinating committees or ad-hoc bodies, leading the masses on specific issues and thus capable of drawing in wider sections, basing on the nature of issue affecting the people, are sought to be developed as another political organisation with its own programme and discipline. Thus it prevents the wider mobilisation of parties, groups and sections of the people, who may not be subscribing to this common programme but who are prepared to join on any particular issue.

"Further this conception of United Front as an organisation, instead of bringing together the existing political parties or groups, will lead to their further estrangement. Because, different political parties or groups with their own specific ideologies, and political and organisational conceptions, with sharp and fundamental differences on national and international policies are finding in actual day-to-day practice, at loggerheads

in the interpretation of and in the tactics to be pursued in the implementation of an agreed minimum programme even when one is there. That is why insisting on the acceptance of our minimum programme or the programme of any other party or group is not conducive to the bringing together of all democratic parties, groups and individuals.

“While the Communist Party strives its best to develop joint activity for building U.D.F., it has also to carry out its own task and duties in relation to the people through independent mobilisation of the masses on every political, economic and social issues, even where it has been able to achieve agreement with other parties and cooperates with them.

“Hence, the United Front that the Party must strive to build today is the United Front from place to place and from issue to issue, bringing together various parties, groups and individuals, to lead the masses in their day-to-day struggles. As a result of the coming together and leading the struggles of the masses common understanding grows between the parties, which helps in the process of the crystallisation of the common programme. It is only with this kind of united functioning and building the United Democratic Committees for the specific purposes that will lead ultimately to a stronger united democratic front.

Similarly, in the legislatures, the Communist Party while striving its best to develop common action by all opposition parties or groups on the floor of the legislatures and for this purposes form co-ordinating Committees, must function in its own name with its own spokesman or leader; it must not submerge itself in U.D.F. Legislatures, Party or bloc.”

## **Review Report Of The PB (1953)**

This document which is a report presented to the Madurai Congress of the party reviews the national situation since the last party Conference, held in 1951, in the light of the results of the first General Elections in India. Regarding the outcome of the General Elections the Report asserts that "the Communist Party and the UF have not merely emerged as the strongest opposition to the Congress but all their successes have created a qualitatively new situation in Indian politics." The conclusion of the election, the Report asserts, showed leftward swing of the masses, as a result of which political crisis is developing in the country. But inspite of this, the Report warns, the ruling classes are still strong because of the traditional hold of the Congress and that of the Gandhian ideology among the mass of the people.

But the mass of the people and even the Left Parties have now become more conscious of the need for united front than before. Therefore, the Report states, the question of correct united front tactics, correct tactics for building democratic unity of the people has become an urgent one. It discusses the various UF tactics adopted by the CPI heretofore and lays down the basic principles which should guide these tactics.

In the end the Report reviews various shortcomings in the working of the Party organisation and the work of the various Communist fronts.

The document was published by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Conspiracy at Madurai*.

## I. INTRODUCTORY

The All India Party Conference held in October, 1951, inspite of its limitations, was a turning point in the history of our Party; it paved the way for a solution of the very serious crisis in which the Party had found itself for over a year.

The Conference adopted, with certain amendments, the Programme and Statement of Policy which had been issued by the Central Committee and subjected to intense discussion in the entire Party. The Conference revealed that, in spite of unclarity on certain specific points, there was a general agreement on the broad lines worked out in the Programme and Statement of Policy. This proved to be a sufficient basis for the clearing up of political doubts, difficulties and differences which had led to the inter-Party crisis, not only during the previous year and a half but even earlier still.

This political basis for the solution of the inter-Party crisis was supplemented by the fact that, in the field of *organisation*, the All India Conference elected a new Central Committee and a new Control Commission. Despite the various limitations of the Provincial Conference held before the All-India Conference, the fact that delegates sent by Provinces unanimously elected a new Central Committee helped in removing the uncertainties which had continued to exist for over a year. For, here was a Central Committee which, to the extent to which it was possible under the circumstances, enjoyed the general confidence of the Party. This made it possible that, provided this newly-elected Central Committee was able to respond to the needs and requirements of the Party in the coming months, the Party could get unified around this Central Committee.

The third important step taken by the Conference was its decision to throw all the resources of the Party into the impending general elections, which were correctly assessed by the Conference as the biggest mass political action which will help quicken the process of uniting the people around a democratic programme. The Conference called upon every Party member, every sympathiser of the Party, to sink all differences and give his all in order to give a smashing blow to the Congress.

It was on the strength of these three major decisions of the

1951 All India Conference that the Party was able to register the advance during the General Elections. That, on the basis of these three major decisions, the Party could come out as the major force of the Democratic Opposition in the country was an indication of the fact that, despite the undoubtedly serious damage done by the wrong policy and wrong organisational methods pursued by the leadership, the Party was dear to the common people of our country because of its bold championship of their cause.

After the elections too, the Party has been able to register big advances. The role which it played in several important struggles, including some of the biggest like the struggle for the Andhra Province, Saurashtra struggle and the anti-Tramfare-increase struggle in Calcutta, has once again shown that the Party is increasingly becoming the leader of popular struggles.

In the course of leading these struggles, the Party has had to overcome various difficulties and solve difficult problems. It is through solving these problems that the Party has grown during the elections and in the post-election period. And it is to the extent to which the party has failed to solve these problems that its growth has lagged behind the big possibilities opened out in the post-election period. It will therefore be of the utmost importance for the Party as a whole to generalise the experience of all those activities undertaken by the Party during this period.

The Central Committee, however, is not yet in a position to do this, since such a review can be undertaken only after preliminary reviews have been made by the Provincial and District Committees. It was for this reason that the CC had decided that there should be an interval of at least two months between the Party Congress: the last Provincial Conference and that of the All India Party Congress: the proper study and assimilation of the Provincial reports would have enabled the Central Committee to undertake such an All-India review.

Since, however, several Provincial Conferences have been held as late as only a week before the All-India Congress, the CC can attempt nothing more than a general review of certain very broad problems which the CC itself has had to tackle. This is what is attempted in the following pages.



## II. GENERAL ELECTIONS—BEGINNINGS OF A POLITICAL CRISIS

When the General Elections were over and the Congress won the majority of seats in Parliament and in most of the State Assemblies, it was hailed by the supporters of the Congress as a great victory. Congress propagandists pointed out that, though the Congress had reduced majorities in the Parliament and in the State Assemblies, it nevertheless remained the biggest single political party. It was therefore taken for granted that Congress would remain supreme at least for the next five years; nothing but the next General Elections would put the Congress in danger of losing its dominant position in the political life of the country.

While this was the position immediately after the elections, it was all the more so after the Congress was able to manoeuvre itself back into power in the two States where it was challenged by the Democratic Opposition, in Travancore-Cochin and in Madras. The winning over of the TTNC in Travancore-Cochin, and certain elements of the Opposition in Madras, created the impression that the Congress had been able to smash the opposition and secure a firm basis for its own rule.

It was, however, not only the leaders, sympathisers and supporters of the Congress who made this assessment of the strength of the Congress in the post-election period. Elements of the Opposition were also demoralised by the apparent success of the Congress during the elections and in the post-election months. It was to this sense of frustration among the opposition elements that the Socialist leader, Asoka Mehta, gave expression in his "Report to the Panchmarhi Convention".

"The recent elections have undoubtedly imparted strength to the Congress Party. Over four crores of voters have voted for it and its lease of power has been renewed with popular sanction. The Congress has regained, to no small extent, its self-confidence, and it has a great opportunity before it. Youth that looked at the Congress in the past will change its attitude. Disintegration of the Congress Party is unlikely in the near future."

It was only the Communist Party that refused to accept this

assessment of Congress strength. As early as March, 1952, the Central Committee stated in its Report that,

“the real loss in the influence of the Congress is far greater than that indicated by the voting figures. *The Congress has suffered the biggest political and moral defeat in its entire history . . . Its mass base is cracking up and cracking up rapidly all over the country.* (Emphasis added)

The CC combated the idea, entertained by people belonging to all parties and partly shared by sections of the Party itself, that the reason for moral and political defeat of the Congress was not the growing strength of the democratic movement particularly that of the Communist Party, but such international and national factors as the phenomenal advance made by the Socialist and People's Democratic countries in the world and the aggravation of the food crisis in the years after the transfer of power. The CC pointed out that “the general national and international factors which include the food crisis operated *in all parts of the country and played a big role in weakening and disintegrating the Congress everywhere.* The very fact, however, that the democratic forces succeeded most in specific areas shows the need to examine the specific factors that led to their victories”. (Emphasis original).

As for the “theory” of food shortage being the reason for Congress defeats, the CC pointed out: “If this ‘theory’ were correct, then the worst famine-affected Province of Bihar would not have returned the Congress Party to power with such a majority. If this theory were correct, then the Congress would not have lost heavily in the Krishna, Guntur, East Godavari and West Godavari Districts of Andhra, in the Tanjore District of Tamilnad—all of which are surplus districts—and done comparatively better in other districts in the same province where the food situation is far worse.”

The CC drew the following lessons from the results of the General Elections:

“Study of the election results shows that the most impressive victories were won by the Democratic forces—

- (1) “Where the Party boldly led mass struggles in face of terror and repression, where it established its claim to be the leader of the people by determined championship of the cause of the masses, unflinching

- courage, utter devotion to the cause of the people, self-sacrifice and heroism;
- (2) "Where the Party had developed a broad peasant movement uniting the entire peasant masses and on the firm foundation of unity of agricultural workers and toiling peasants. Also where the Party had built a powerful trade union movement;
  - (3) "Where flexible United Front tactics were adopted, the Communist Party coming before the people as the party of unity, as the party giving concrete expression to the popular urge for unity, as the party subordinating everything to the supreme task of defeating the Congress;
  - (4) "Where the election campaign could be developed into a broad popular movement with the slogan of an alternative Government as the key slogan;
  - (5) "Where Provincial units of the Party brought out their own Manifestoes based on the Central Manifesto, where agitation was positive and concrete and such concrete factors as the *national* factor, the factor of unification of the nationality into linguistic Provinces, were effectively utilised (the contrast between Andhra and Kerala on the one hand and Maharashtra and the others is striking);
  - (6) "Where the weakness of organisation was overcome by developing mass initiative, rank and file initiative to the utmost extent, drawing the masses into the electoral battle as active participants in its election of candidates, in planning work through broad-based United Front Committees at all levels;
  - (7) "Where the Party was strongest; where the Party was unified and went into the struggle as a team."

The CC pointed out that "these lessons that the elections teach are valuable not merely for 'future elections.' They are valuable for every struggle, for the entire democratic movement. . . . These lessons must guide us in all our future work."

It is true that other parties, including even the Congress also admitted that the success of the Democratic Opposition headed by the Communist Party in such States as Travancore-Cochin, Madras and Hyderabad had created serious difficulties for the

Congress. They, however, looked upon these difficulties in no other sense than the fact that, from the constitutional point of view, the Congress was in an extremely weakened position. The success or failure of the Congress in overcoming these difficulties lay, according to them, on the clever manoeuvres which its leadership is able to resort to. That was why Rajaji of Madras was called upon to "save" the State from the "Chaos" into which it was sinking as a result of the serious blow which the Congress received at the hands of the electorate.

The Communist Party, however, had a totally different assessment of the political situation. Analysing the figures of voting in the various States, the Central Committee came to the conclusion, "that the Communist Party and the United Front have not merely emerged as the strongest opposition to the Congress but also that their successes have created a *qualitatively new* situation in Indian politics. (Emphasis added). They have created a serious *crisis* for the ruling classes, have created possibilities for the *defeat* of the Congress in several States, have shattered the myth of the invincibility of the Congress and destroyed the monopoly position which the Congress enjoyed in the political life of the country. All this is bound to exercise a profound influence on the masses even in areas where the Congress has won the overwhelming majority of seats, and draw them towards struggle, towards unity and thus undermine the position of the Congress throughout the country.

"Already the eyes of the masses of all States are focussed on the South—on Hyderabad, on Travancore-Cochin, on Madras.

*"The instability that has developed in these states is not just GOVERNMENTAL instability, which occurs when rival parties of the ruling classes are evenly balanced. It is POLITICAL instability caused by changed correlation of class forces—the emergence of the party of the working class as a major force. It may mark the beginning of a political crisis for the ruling classes. Therein lies the reason of their panic."*

Subsequent developments have shown how fallacious were the calculations of the Congress leaders when they resorted to various manoeuvres—both political manoeuvres like the weaning of certain elements of the Opposition in Travancore-Cochin and Madras, seeking an alliance with the PSP with a view to form Congress-PSP coalition Governments at the Centre and in the States, etc., as well as economic manoeuvres summed up

in the Revised Version of the Five Year Plan. For, the last twenty-two months have shown that the reduction in the size of the Congress' strength in the Legislatures was nothing more than a partial indication of the very rapid loss of people's faith in the Congress, a loss of people's faith which creates increasing difficulties for the Congress in implementing its anti-people policy even if it is constitutionally strong enough to carry the Legislatures with it. Far more important than the reduction in the size of the Congress strength in the Legislatures is the fact that the people have acquired a new confidence in themselves, a confidence that they can defeat the Congress, a confidence with which they are increasingly coming out against Congress policies. This is clearly seen in the fact that though tens of thousands of people rallied behind the Congress during the General Elections and thus made it possible for it to be returned in majorities in most of the States as well as at the Centre, big chunks of these very masses did, in the post-election months, come out against Congress policies regarding taxation, food, civil liberties, formation of Linguistic States etc., etc.

Of great significance in this connection are also the results of the Municipal elections in Uttar Pradesh, Nehru's home province and a stronghold of the Congress where the ruling party failed to secure more than 30% of the votes polled.

The rapid decline in the prestige and authority of the Congress is today so obvious that even supporters of the present regime can no longer deny it. Here, for example, is what the Eastern Economist wrote in its "Independence Day Number" in August, 1953, as to how the Congress is now going through the most serious crisis in its history.

"After six years of independence, the Congress is seen by many slowly but not less surely, on the way out. This was not the structure of public opinion soon after the General Elections. . . . . The pronounced victory of the Congress Party which is the most moderate of the larger parties was read in 1952, and even at the beginning of 1953, as a vote for consolidation. The structure of Indian public opinion certainly warranted the belief, upto three months ago, that the Indian people, are prepared to be patient. The political significance of recent expressions of public opinion is to suggest that in the public mind the period of consolidation has

ended..... The age of impatience has just begun . . . . So far as time is concerned, the age of impatience has only been in operation now for three months ; so far as space is concerned, it only covers at the present some leading cities, with Calcutta notably ahead of all the rest. Nevertheless, these are the largest new developments in the Indian scene. Discontent tends to pass from towns to countryside. What is today a local and temporary problem, if unrelieved, can become an unsettling national calamity. . . . The fortunate legatees of this mode of impatience are the leftist political parties.”

### III. GROWING DIFFICULTIES OF THE RULING CLASSES

While the results of the general elections undoubtedly played a big role in giving confidence to the masses and galvanising them, it would be a mistake to consider that this was the sole or even the main reason for the big struggles that broke out in the post-election period. The fact is that the conclusion of the elections which showed heavy loss in prestige of Congress and left-ward swing of the masses coincided with another factor of far-reaching significance, the beginning of the economic slump—which sharply accentuated the distress of the masses. It was the combination of these two factors—political and economic—that made possible the immense wave of mass struggles that have upset all calculations of the Congress and created immense possibilities.

Some of the most important features of the new wave of mass struggles are as follows :

*Firstly* : It is greater in sweep and momentum than at any time since the transfer of power in August, 1947.

*Secondly* : The majority of struggles are on concrete issues facing the lives of people—taxes, food subsidy, levies, wages and bonus, evictions etc. but there have also been immense mass actions on such political issues as civil liberties, Linguistic Province.

*Thirdly* : While there is still great unevenness of the movement, areas which in the past seldom saw struggles against the Congress Government, now became scenes of big actions. This includes politically backward areas like Rajasthan, Saurashtra,

Vindhya Pradesh etc. on one hand and strongholds of Congress like UP on the other.

*Fourthly* : The new wave of mass struggles embraces new classes and sections also—teachers, patwaris and other Government Employees. Even sections of the big bourgeoisie voice opposition against certain policies of the Government—like refusal to protect Indian industries against foreign competition.

*Fifthly* : An immensely important role is played by the working class. In repelling the attack of the bourgeoisie the working class displayed a high degree of unity—forged in action, class-solidarity, militancy and initiative which sometime makes even INTUC Unions participate in struggles. Working class struggles encourage all classes and sections to wage struggles for their own demands. Also, on several occasions the working class has come out in action on issues affecting the entire people, although this is far from being the general feature yet.

*Sixthly* : Struggles of one section or class evoke spontaneous popular sympathy and sometimes especially when the Government launches severe repression, the entire people of the area go into action, as happened at Lucknow recently. Followers of all parties, including masses following the Congress take part in the struggle. Especially when an issue affecting all classes and sections is taken up, when mass campaign on its basis is conducted, even though the issue itself is an immediate economic issue, the struggle rapidly assumes the form of a mass political struggle against the Government and broadest popular unity gets forged. . . . Saurashtra, Rajasthan, above all, Calcutta where the struggle against the increase in tramfare imposed by the British-owned company is the biggest mass struggle since August 1947.

*Seventhly* : The presence of Communist and other democratic parties and elements in the Legislatures helps to strengthen the struggles and focus attention on the demands.

*Eighthly* : Due to the unity and militancy of the people and the weakening position of the monopolists, landlords and Government, many of the struggles succeed in winning concessions—concessions which, though not big by themselves, heighten confidence of the masses in their own strength and further weakens the Government.

*Ninthly* : The struggles increasingly assume a political content because of the intervention of the Government on the

side of the exploiters and because of the growing realisation on the part of the people that the solution of their immediate problems is linked with the general problem of replacement of the present Government by a democratic Government.

*Tenthly* : The Communist Party plays an increasingly important role in the struggles, which increases the prestige and influence of the Party and draws the masses towards it.

*Eleventhly* : and finally: As the result of all this, as the result of the growing fiasco of the Government policies, as the result of increasing strength of the mass movement, contradictions sharpen in the Congress, Congress organisations get increasingly split into warring factions, conflict develops between Congress Committees and Ministries each blaming the other for the growing isolation of the Congress—conflict develops inside the Congress Legislative Party, conflict develops between the Congress and its allies leading, in provinces where the Congress is especially weak, to Governmental instability and ministerial crisis.

The one argument with which the Congress had been opposing the formation of non-Congress Coalition Governments in those States in which the Congress was reduced to a minority in the Legislature was that non-Congress Governments would be unstable ; since the Congress is the biggest single party in any Legislature, the Congress alone could give stable governments. It was on this ground that both in Travancore-Cochin and in Madras, Congress was allowed to form its minority governments. It has to be admitted that many honest elements were taken in by this argument.

This argument has now been proved to be entirely groundless not only in the case of those States in which the Congress had been reduced to minority in the Legislature, but even in those States where it has an overwhelming majority in the Legislature. For, one of the indications of the political crisis that is developing today is the fact that, even in such States, the Congress is unable to give stable governments because of the very deep internal dissensions in its own ranks—dissensions which are a product of the utter fiasco of policies of the Congress and the decadence and rottenness of the whole system it is trying to preserve. With uncertainty about the future of the Congress regime itself becoming widespread, occupants of ministerial office use their position for making money, for



distributing jobs and contracts and rouse the jealousy of their less fortunate colleagues. The result is the hurling of vile charges against one another, intensification of factional rivalries and intrigues, grouping and regroupings.

State after State has, in the last twenty-two months, witnessed Ministerial crisis after Ministerial crisis, not because the Opposition has been powerful enough to defeat the Ministry but because rival groups inside the Party itself fought against one another and demanded reconstitution of Ministries. This has happened not only in such States as Hyderabad and Orissa where the Congress majority is rather small but also in such States as Mysore, Rajasthan, Delhi, Punjab, U.P., Bengal etc. where the Congress majority is very big.

The length to which instability of the Congress Ministries arising out of internal dissensions in the Congress has gone can be seen from the example of Residuary Madras State. This is a State which after the separation of Andhra should have a very stable Ministry because, after the separation of Andhra, the Congress is in a quite comfortable majority in the Legislature. But the very fact that a substantial section of the Democratic Opposition was removed following the separation of Andhra accentuated the internal crisis in the Congress: the comparatively favourable position of the Congress in the Legislature was taken advantage of by the anti-Rajaji faction to try to oust Rajaji from power. A majority of Congress Legislators came out with a demand that he should be replaced by somebody from the rival faction. This was countered by the Rajaji faction as follows :

“If, unfortunately, Mr. Rajagopalachari is made to quit, there will be a scramble for office and Madras State may have a series of unstable Ministries. In view of this prospect, the Chief Minister may even advise the Governor to dissolve the Assembly and order fresh elections.” (Hindusthan Times, Nov. 12.)

It has thus become clear that the overwhelming majority enjoyed by the Congress in the majority of States is no guarantee for stability in the political system. For, however strong the Congress may be from a constitutional point of view, it is unable to implement its policies in a situation in which the entire people are getting more and more disillusioned and are coming out in

opposition to Congress policies. What is important today is not the constitutional strength of the Congress inside the Legislatures, but the fact that it is getting more and more isolated from the people. It is this growing political isolation of the Congress among the people that is, on the one hand, leading to the development of new progressive democratic trends among the followers of the Congress and, on the other hand, making it possible for factional elements in the Congress to take advantage of popular discontent in their struggles against the Ministerialists.

In the face of the new wave of struggles as well as growing conflicts in its own ranks the Congress is finding it increasingly difficult to implement its policies in the manner in which it would like to do. It is significant in this connection that, while most State Budgets prepared immediately after the General Elections contained various proposals for new taxation, many of these proposals had to be dropped by the time the 1953-54 budgets had been prepared. The reason for this is to be traced in the heroic struggles fought by the people in the various States, as for example, the Saurashtra struggle, the anti-taxation struggle in Bombay, Kisan struggles against water rates, betterment levy, etc., the united demand in Bombay for the dropping of Surcharge on Land Revenue, the combination of Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary forms of struggle against the four taxation measures of the Rajaji Government in Madras etc., etc. Apart from this question of new taxation, on several other issues also, the Government had to bow to the people's demands, as in the case of the formation of Andhra Province the appointment of a Boundary Commission to go into the question of the formation of other Linguistic States. etc.

One reason why the Congress Government has been forced to bow to the will of the people in all these respects is the fact that opposition to Congress policies is no longer confined only to the non-Congress parties and groups: the large mass of Congressmen themselves do not remain unaffected by the intense political shifts which are taking place in the country. Mention should, in this connection, be made of the fact that, on such issues as the formation of Linguistic Provinces, abolition of differences between Part A, Part B and Part C States, the abolition of the institution of Rajpramukh, etc., Congress itself as a whole in several States has come out against the official policy of the

Congress. It is also significant that on questions involving agrarian policy (Stoppage of evictions, fixation of upper limit to land holdings etc.) the official organ of the All-India Congress Committee (*Economic Review*) is printing articles which come into conflict with the policies pursued by most State Governments (The General Secretary of the AICC, Mr. S. N. Agarwall, himself came out with a very sharp criticism of the decision taken by the Conference of Central and States Ministers of Agriculture against the policy of fixing upper limit to land holdings).

It will be wrong of course to see only this side of the picture. Though very much weakened and disintegrating, the ruling classes have still at their command vast reserves with which they can, temporarily at least, arrest the tide of the people's struggles. These resources of the ruling classes may be roughly catalogued as follows :

The *traditional hold of the Congress* which is still continuing among the mass of the people, particularly the faith which the personality of the Prime Minister evokes among large sections of the people. Mention should, in this connection, be made of the fact that, though the internal policy of the Government is getting rapidly exposed among the people as an anti-people policy, its foreign policy still commands general support. It would, therefore, be totally incorrect to look upon the Congress and its Government under Nehru's leadership as a spent force. It must also be remembered that the Congress has still immense manoeuvring capacity which may assume the form of coalition with the Praja Socialist Party, certain modifications in its policy etc.

Far more serious than the direct organisational hold of the Congress or of Nehru, however, is the *hold of the Gandhian ideology*, which is still powerful among the mass of the people. This directly affects the manner in which people's resistance to Congress policies is developing. It should be particularly borne in mind that the more than three decades of Gandhian leadership in the national democratic movement has created a tradition of particular forms of struggle which has affected large masses of workers, peasants and middle-classes. It is remarkable, for example, how even inside the working class, there is sometimes a tendency to resist the employer and Government offensive not with the proletarian weapon of strike and other forms of *collective class action*, but with the non-proletarian forms of action,

*not excluding such individual action like Satyagraha and hunger strike.*

*The manoeuvres of certain parties of the opposition, particularly those of the leadership of the PSP on the one hand, and of the Jan Sangh and other communal organisations on the other, are another source of strength for the ruling classes. For, giving expression to people's discontent in certain respects, taking a pose of opposition to the Congress, these parties of the Opposition are seeking to divert the growing discontent of the people towards channels which are 'safe' from the point of view of the ruling classes or disruptive from the point of view of the masses and hence help the ruling classes.*

The Jan Sangh and other communal organisations are, for example, seeking to consolidate the spontaneous indignation of the people against Congress policies into a movement ostensibly in the interests of the Hindu masses, while, as a matter of fact they are bringing grist to the mill of the most reactionary parasitical classes in the country. Their slogan of full integration of Kashmir with India has already caused tremendous damage to the unity of the democratic movement of India and Kashmir. Their slogan of "Economic sanctions against Pakistan" has served the purpose of alienating the democratic people of Pakistan from the people of India; so too, are they serving the purpose of disrupting the growing unity in our country of the common people against their exploiters by seeking to organise the Hindu masses in opposition to the Muslim masses.

As for the leadership of the PSP, it is doing its best to see that the militant opposition of the people against Congress policies is directed along the path of constitutional opposition. Furthermore, it is doing its best to divide and disrupt the growing people's movement through its notorious policy of anti-Communism.

*Ideological confusion, political opportunism and organisational rivalry among other opposition parties—among parties that are known as 'left' Parties, or as parties that call themselves Marxist, declare their faith in militant mass action in order to defeat the Government — is another source of strength for the ruling classes. For a few months after the general elections most of these parties took up an anti-Communist stand, joined hands with the PSP and even communal organisations behind the slogan "Sanctions against Pakistan". They thought thereby they could*

'isolate' the CP. Some of them, like the League of Socialist Youth in Hyderabad, while they did not take this anti-communist stand, did develop differences with the CPI, which led to the weakening of the PDF in Hyderabad. The failure of the democratic opposition to capitalise and consolidate the gains of anti-Congress victories in the elections was seen in the Municipal elections in Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin State and in several bye-elections.

All these factors should be noted for without that no sober estimation of the situation is possible. At the same time it must be realised that Congress is losing support even in its stronger bases, as in UP, that faith in the efficiency of Satyagraha is not growing but becoming less and that on a number of occasions, even Satyagraha forms of struggle unleashed mass struggles, that as the result of experience and mass pressure, the 'Left' parties have now become more conscious of the need for united front than before.

The PSP is in a state of deep crisis and its ranks and sometimes even its provincial leaderships get drawn into common struggle and united front agreement with the Communist Party due to mass pressure and the logic of events. Such a situation developed in Calcutta during the anti-Tramfare increase struggle. In Travancore-Cochin the PSP leadership declared its readiness to enter into agreement with the UFL to avoid triangular contest.

While the strength of the reserve of the ruling classes should not be underestimated, the fact that must be emphasised is that those reserves are not growing but dwindling; the general picture is not one of the ruling classes succeeding in disrupting and weakening the popular movement but the popular movement overcoming the obstacles and disunity and advancing. It is this which constitutes the dominant feature of the present situation.

#### IV. ORGANISATIONAL FORM OF THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT

The growth of the mass movement, one of whose characteristic feature is that masses following different parties come together in common action, has brought the question of correct united front tactics, correct tactics for building democratic unity of the people, to the forefront. It is urgent and imperative that basing itself on the actual experience of the mass movement the Party

evolves firm and correct united front tactics and puts an end to the controversies that have been going on for over two years on the form and content of the democratic front, on its basic character, on the slogan of Left Unity, etc.

One of the main consequences of the general elections—a consequence that was as significant as the actual electoral reverses suffered by the Congress—was the fact that the general idea of building Democratic Front was given concrete shape in the form of various United Fronts that were built up during the elections.

Such United Fronts had already emerged before the elections in Hyderabad, in Travancore-Cochin, in Malabar, in Bombay, Maharashtra and other provinces and areas. While some of these (like the PDF in Hyderabad and the UFL in Travancore-Cochin) were fronts which united the Communist Party and certain other parties and groups on the basis of a definite programme, in others, the Front itself as an organisation set up candidates and conducted the election campaign. There were electoral agreements between the Party and other groups in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Bombay, Maharashtra, etc. In Tamilnad too, the Communist Party was supported in some constituencies by the Dravida Kazhagam and it supported independents in some constituencies. In Malabar, though there was only an electoral alliance between the Communist Party and the KMPP, this electoral alliance itself was supplemented by an agreement on some broad lines of policy.

While this was the position before the elections, the very fact that such United Fronts had been formed before and during the elections, as a result of which the Congress was defeated in several areas made the idea of United Fronts extremely popular after the elections. It was this that made it possible in Madras for the formation of the UDF inside the Legislature. It was again this that was sought to be made of by the Akalis who virtually took over the name as well as the minimum programme of the Madras UDF. Efforts at the formation of such UDFs inside the legislature were also made by various elements of the Opposition (most of them reactionaries) in other States like Orissa, Mysore, Rajasthan, etc.

Although various parties in the country, and politically minded masses talked about the necessity of united front, there was lack of clarity about the nature and form of this United Front. To

a very large number of people who in the past had followed the Congress but who now were supporting one democratic party or the other, it appears that what was needed was 'another Congress' i.e. a mass political organisation having individual mass membership as well as collective affiliation of Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas etc. with its units in every area. The desire was widespread that the Communist Party, as the leading opposition party in the country, should take the initiative in this matter, should bring together all the left parties in the country and unite them for the purpose of forming such an organisation. It was felt by many that this was the only way by which the democratic forces could be firmly welded together, masses roused and drawn into the democratic movement and the Congress dislodged from power.

Closely related with this was the belief that now that democratic elements constituted a substantial force in the Parliament and in several Assemblies, they should, in every legislature, act unitedly on all issues and for this purpose form a bloc which could function as the opposition to the Government in a United and disciplined manner under a single leader for all practical purposes as *a single opposition party*. This, it was argued, would give a big impetus to the process of mass unification and thus help the growth of a united mass movement.

It became necessary therefore for the General Committee when it met in March 1952 to thoroughly discuss the problems of organising the Democratic Front. At the end of these discussions, the Committee adopted two resolutions, one on "The Organisational Form of the Democratic Front" and the other on "The relations of the Communist Party with other parties, groups and individuals in the Legislatures." In these two resolutions, the Committee laid down the basic principles which should guide the party in its efforts at building the United Front as follows :—

*Firstly, Democratic Front should not be considered as a new political party in which the separate identities of the constituent political parties are submerged.* The Front, on the other hand, should be found "on the basis of the agreement between different parties, groups, mass organisations and individuals constituting it". As for the Communist Party's relation with other parties and groups inside the Legislatures, "under no circumstances can we agree to such a form of the Parliamentary Front, bloc, or

Party, as well restrict Party from expressing its views through the forum of the Legislature. The presence of the Party as the defender of the people and the Communist Legislator as its spokesman in the Legislature must be felt by the people. . . . . while giving expression to agreed programme, the independent expression of our views, where all parties do not agree to a common view, is not restricted. Similarly, the Party should enter a Front or Bloc as a *Party* or group and our members must not lose their identity and become merely individual member dissolving their identity into any new parliamentary party as such”.

*Secondly*, flowing from the above conception of United Front being based on the agreement between parties, groups, mass organisations and individuals “*there cannot be any individual primary membership for the Democratic Front. . . . Middle-class elements who want to build a mass political organisation of the type of the Congress should be convinced of the necessity of building mass organisations of workers, peasants, youths, students and others on whose basis alone a powerful mass movement can be developed. Units of the Democratic Front, however, should at all levels, include such individuals whose presence in the Democratic Front would make it more effective and representative. . . . Democratic Front Committees have to be formed wherever other progressive parties, groups and individuals are made to feel the necessity of them. But, it is wrong to waste our energies in forming and functioning such Committees consisting of our Party, of mass organisations under our influence and our sympathisers alone*”.

*Thirdly*, “*mass organisations can be brought into the Democratic Front on the condition that their unity is not disrupted by such a measure or where such affiliation may become a hindrance to develop united mass organisations.*”

In other words, building the United Front should not be considered as a substitute for building the Communist Party or for its independent activities. Nor should it be considered as a substitute for the building of united mass organisations. For, it is only the existence of a strong and well-organised Communist Party, together with the existence of powerful mass organisations of workers, peasants and other democratic classes and sections of the people that will be in a position to deal crushing blows to the ruling classes. Any attempt to form Democratic Fronts at



the expense of the further expansion and strengthening of the Communist Party as of forging the unity of the trade unions, Kisan Sabhas and other mass organisations will defeat the very purpose for which United Fronts are sought to be built up.

There have, however, emerged serious difficulties in the way of translating these principles into actual practice. For, there was a very strong trend inside the Party which looked upon United Front in isolation from the independent existence of the Party as well as from the building and strengthening of united mass organisations. This trend made its appearance in various Legislatures and in work outside the Legislatures.

The Central Committee had approved the formation of the UDF in Madras with Mr. Prakasam as its leader, only under exceptional circumstances. These circumstances were that the formation of such a UDF with a leader will enable the opposition to fulfil the requirements of the Constitution to demand of the Governor that they should be called upon to form the Government. "In the absence", the CC added, "of such a Government, when the UDF is in opposition, the Committee of the UDF should function as a co-ordinating Committee of all UDF parties on agreed matters, but allowing each to function independently as a party on the floor of the House. The UDF will not have a separate discipline, rules, etc. as a party or front when in opposition. But if it ceases to be an Opposition and becomes a Coalition Government bloc, then other rules of collective responsibility will apply."

The Central Committee, however, added that, these exceptional circumstances being absent in other places, this should not be applied elsewhere. The Committee made specific reference to the Central Parliament where "the Communist Party will adopt a programme on the basis of which it will be prepared to form a bloc with other democratic parties to form a united democratic opposition to the Congress Party on the floor of the House. In this bloc, the Communist Party and other Parties will retain their separate identities with their own special viewpoints and programme where they do not agree but debate, consult and vote together where they agree". The Committee also made specific reference to Bengal where "the task of the Party is to stand forth as the defender of the people in the Legislature on its own platform and to seek allies on given issues from time to time where agreement is possible."

There were, however, comrades in Bengal and elsewhere, who disagreed with this point of view. They demanded that what was done in Madras should be done in Bengal as well. In Parliament too, they demanded the formation of a UDF composed of the Communist Party, KMPP and other elements; they proposed that if it becomes necessary for agreement to be arrived at for the formation of such a UDF in Parliament, its leadership should be given to a non-Party man. Even with regard to work outside the Legislatures, some comrades in Bengal suggested that we should agree to the demand made by other left parties in Calcutta that there should be a United Front Committee (Famine Resistance Committee) which should function not on the basis of agreement of all the constituent units of the United Front but on the basis of majority decision taken by the Committee in which, obviously, a combination of very small groups can outvote the biggest political party i.e., the C.P.I.

This, however, was not a trend confined to Bengal or to the Central Parliament. This was a trend which made its appearance in various forms in various places, the Central Committee itself at times was so overwhelmed by it that it either failed to fight this trend or sometimes even gave in to it. Subsequent developments, however, have shown how wrong this trend is and how necessary it is to emphasise the independent role of the Party as well as the necessity of building united mass organisation. It was these developments that enabled the Central Committee recently to intervene effectively in Travancore-Cochin and in Hyderabad at a later stage.

The first occasion on which the Central Committee had to face this trend and on which the PB gave in to this wrong trend was when the Madras Communist Legislature Party unanimously asked the PB to revise the March Resolution of the CC with regard to Madras. According to that decision, the UDF was not to have a separate discipline, rules, etc. as of a party when in Opposition, it was only for purposes of fulfilling the requirements of the Constitution in order to take over the Government that the CC had approved the proposal of the UDF having a leader and if necessary, other prerequisites of recognition as a party. But the Madras Legislature comrades argued that, even though in Opposition, it would facilitate the work of the UDF if it is made to work as under the same

conditions under which it was to work if it were to form a Government. Since this proposal was unanimously made by the Madras comrades, the General Secretary in consultation with the available members of the PB agreed to this. It is now clear that this was a wrong decision. Subsequent to this, the whole UDF got disrupted because of the defection of the KMPP and certain other elements. Although it is true that the Party did not get submerged in the UDF and it boldly championed the cause of the people on the floor of the House, the continuance of the UDF of Mr. Prakasam and others, when they began to secede. As a result, the Party was unable to remove the confusion among the people.

Far more serious were the developments in Hyderabad. According to the CC resolution, the PDF in Hyderabad was to 'continue to function in its present form in the Legislature' because it had come into existence on the eve of the elections under conditions of the illegality of the Party in Hyderabad, on the basis of an agreed programme." The functioning of the PDF, however, began to meet increasing difficulties because the other components of the PDF had the same conception of United Front as that against which the Central Committee had warned in the March Resolution. Dr. Jaisoorya and Govind Shroff were demanding of our comrades in Hyderabad that they should be function the PDF as virtually to submerge the Communist Party into the PDF. They urge that the independent functioning of the Communist Party is weakening the PDF and therefore proposed that on all the issues on which the various constituent units of the PDF are agreed, the Communist should not come out in public as an independent party but only on behalf of the PDF. They demanded that PDF COMMITTEES should so formed not only on All-Hyderabad scale, not only in districts but at all levels from the All-Hyderabad to the village level, even if in a particular place there is no other constituent unit of the PDF than the CPI.

Another demand which Dr. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff made was that the PDF should have its own mass organisations, Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas, student organisations, etc. affiliated to the PDF and that these mass organisations while they could have autonomy in respect of economic questions, should be subordinated to the PDF in all political questions. They rejected the stand taken by the Communist Party that the overwhelming

consideration that should guide us in building mass organisations is the necessity for the unity of class and mass organisations and that no mass organisations should be affiliated to the United Front if such affiliation is likely to endanger the unity of the mass organisations.

There were differences inside the Party in Hyderabad itself on these issues: some comrades argued that, though a bit exaggerated, the demands made by Dr. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff were correct and should be accepted; there were others who opposed this. The Central Committee therefore had to discuss these differences, along with other differences in the Telangana Party at its meeting in November 1952. Since, however, the Central Committee could not arrive at firm and final conclusions on the extent to which the demands made by Dr. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff were disrupting the unity of the mass organisations and hampering the independent activity of the Communist Party, it could not at that meeting give its unequivocal decision on it.

Subsequently, Dr. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff themselves wrote a letter to the Central Committee setting forth their objections against the manner in which the Communist Party is functioning in the PDF. Com. Ramamurti on behalf of the CC attended a meeting of the PDF Council at their invitation and had thorough discussion with them on the letter. The stand of Dr. Jaisoorya and Shroff was unacceptable. This letter was placed before the November 1953 meeting of the CC which found that the acceptance of the stand taken by Dr. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff would destroy the independent existence of the Party as well as the unity of the mass organisations. In the light of these discussions in the CC. Com. Ramamurti wrote a letter to them setting forth in clear terms where the Party stands.

“Communist Party’s conception of united front is basically a front of classes. Our party has placed a programme before the people with its edge directed against the landlord and against the British Imperialists. Our programme demands land to the peasants and of freeing our economy from the shackles of *British Imperialism*. We believe that the fulfilment of such a programme is in the interest of all classes who may have mutually conflicting interests, nonetheless the fact remains that imperialism and feudalism constitute the common enemies of all and

constitute the biggest obstacle standing in the way of our country's progress. Our concept of United Front arises from this common interest between these various classes.

"In our country today different democratic political parties or groups exist, some countrywide, some confined to some provinces alone, who have following among these various classes—to some extent in some classes and to a greater extent in others. These parties have their own ideologies, their own political and organisational conceptions. It will not help us to discuss here which party represents which class most or which ideology or practice is more correct. We have to take this reality of the existence of these parties and groups. Wishing them away will not do.

"You demand that all these parties should agree to a common programme and propagate this under the auspices of the United Democratic Front *alone*, while each party has the freedom to express its differences from its own platform.

"In other words, the independent activities of these parties and groups will be reduced to that of a propaganda group whereas practically all the activities connected with the mass movement must be conducted only by the United Democratic Front. That means the different political parties will have no right to function independently on the day-to-day issues of the mass movement.

"Such a demand will not help in bringing together the existing parties. You will realise that under the existing conditions it is difficult even for the existing democratic parties and groups to agree on a common programme for a long period at the present stage of our struggle. To give only one instance, even parties who profess Marxism like the R.S.P., Forward Bloc (Marxist), the Peasants and Workers' Party, disagree on many essential matters—both national and international. Naturally, with this disagreement on some of the fundamental problems affecting national and international policies, in actual practice we will have many differences in day-to-day practice.

"Apart from these parties it is absolutely necessary to bring together the P.S.P. and many other groups and even many Congressmen who are getting disillusioned with the policies of the Congress leadership. In fact, it was because of the failure to see this necessity of bringing together all the democratic elements that the PDF in Hyderabad refused to come to an agree-

ment with the P.W.P. even to avoid triangular contest in the last general elections. We know the consequences.

“Insisting on the acceptance of our minimum programme or the programme of any other party or group will certainly not be conducive to the bringing together of the democratic parties, groups and individuals.

“Under the existing conditions, therefore, it is only the coming together of the various groups, parties and individuals on whatever issues and in whatever places they can and leading the masses in their day-to-day struggles that will help in the process of the development of the united front. As a result of the coming together and leading the struggles of the masses, common understanding grows between the parties which helps in the process of the crystallisation of the common programme. The agreement on such a programme itself will become wider and wider as a result of struggling together and leading the masses in their struggles.

“We judge everything on this basis, whatever helps in the development of the united struggle of the masses helps the development of the united front. Whatever hinders the development of the struggles of the masses also hinders the development of the United Front.

“Your demand that mass organisations should be autonomous as far as their economic problems are concerned but that they should be politically economic in the United Front as the common political expression is basically a wrong proposition. Mass organisations are the embodiment of the unity of the class. It cannot surrender its right to any other organisations.

“Secondly, the acceptance of such a position would lead to the disruption of the mass organisation. Certain Congressmen and Socialists have set up their own Trade Unions and other mass organisations. This path has led to the disruption of the unity of the mass organisations.

“The working class and other people are realising to a greater and greater extent during the last five years that disunity in their class organisations weakens them in their struggle against the exploiters, and the urge for unity is growing rapidly among them. To follow the discredited path of those who have attempted to disrupt the unity of the mass organisations will be wrong. Such a course, instead of helping the masses to conduct their struggles, would help the exploiters to succeed in their attacks

on the masses. Therefore, this course today would lead to the undermining of the very foundation of the development of the U.D.F. viz., struggles of the masses.

“We feel that today, in the conditions prevailing in the country, where the unity of the Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas and other mass organisations has got to be fought for and immediately achieved, no mass organisation can be affiliated to the Democratic Front in any part of our country. Once you make it a condition that the mass organisation, either Trade Union or Kisan Sabha or any other, should be affiliated to a political party be in the Congress, the PSP or the UDF—no united mass organisation can be built. The Communist Party has never accepted and can never accept the theory of mass organisations being subordinated to a political party. It has always advocated for united mass organisations where its members are free to hold any political view but submit to the democratic decision of the majority of the workers.”

In Travancore-Cochin too, difficulties of a more or less similar nature arose with regard to our relationship with the UFL. As soon as the General Elections were over, the other two components of the UFL—the RSP and KSP started an anti-Communist barrage. In the Municipal elections and Panchayat Board Elections which took place in the latter half of 1952 and in 1953, they refused to have united front with us in several places, in some places they even formed what they called “Socialist Front”—a front composed of the PSP, KSP and RSP. It was therefore natural that differences should arise inside the Party on the tactics to be adopted towards the UFL. There were some comrades who felt that the differences within the UFL should be settled at any cost (even if that would involve compromises on the basic principle of the independent functioning of the Communist Party); there were others who opposed this; among these latter were some who, though not explicitly but in reality thought in terms of the break-up of the UFL. It was under these circumstances that the Travancore-Cochin legislature was dissolved and a fresh election was forced on the State. The Central Committee at its November meeting discussed the situation in Travancore-Cochin and deputed Coms. E. M. S. Namboodripad, S. A. Dange and A. K. Gopalan to go to the State and help the State Committee to work out their election strategy, keeping in view the broad principles of

retaining the independent work of the Party as well as of the broadening of the existing united front in order to include the PSP, dissident Congressmen and other democratic elements. This was done after the CC meeting and was subsequently accepted by the State Conference held at Quilon from December 9 to 13th.

While these developments were taking place in Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin, efforts were being made at the Centre also with a view to bring together democratic parties and elements in a united front. Talks were conducted to this end with the leaders of three parties—R.S.P., Peasants' and Workers' Party, and the Forward Block (Marxists). These talks culminated in the signing of a Provincial Agreement to form a Provisional Co-ordinating Committee with a view to the function of a United Marxist Front. The Provisional Agreement, however, did not go further because of the opposition voiced by the R.S.P. to the formation of a United Front with the Communists Party, so long as it takes a positive attitude to Nehru's foreign policy.

Subsequent to the signature of this provisional agreement, the Central Committee thoroughly discussed it and came to the conclusion that it was a wrong step. For, it was a concession to the demand made by the other parties, that the United Front should be developed as virtually a distinct political party. The CC came to the conclusion that, in the present stage of the development of the Democratic movement, the ideas of the formation of a United Marxist Front is both sectarian and opportunist; sectarian in the sense that it confines itself to those parties and elements which accept Marxism, and thus hampers the development of a real democratic front; opportunist because, firstly it is likely to lead to a weakening, if not abandonment of the struggle against the petty-bourgeois theories masquerading behind the Marxism of these left parties; and secondly, because it threatens the independent political activities of the Communist Parties.

These developments have made it all the more clearer that the Central Committee in its March 1952 Resolution was entirely correct in emphasizing the two prerequisites for the building of the Democratic Front, the independent activity of the Communist Party and the unity and strength of the mass organisations. The few concessions given in the exceptional cases of Hyderabad and Travancore-Cochin have been found to have



created difficulties. The few concessions that were made in these cases were taken advantage of by those who wanted the Communist Party to efface itself from the scene and to subordinate the mass organisations to the amorphous United Front. It has now become clear that this trend has to be firmly combated.

#### GOVERNMENT OF DEMOCRATIC UNITY—THE KEY SLOGAN.

One of the characteristic features of the present political crisis in our country, as that of all political crises in any country, is the fact that behind every economic and political problem posed before the country, behind every popular movement calculated to realise the people's desires, lies the question of power. No problem, economic or political, can today be considered in isolation from the question as to who wields political power.

This is quite obvious in the case of all electoral struggles whether they be General Elections or bye-elections, whether they be elections to Central Parliament or to State Assemblies, or even to local self-government institutions. The decisive question posed at all these elections is : shall the ruling party be allowed to have its way, or shall its authority and power be challenged and the forces of the Opposition strengthened?

Less obviously, but nonetheless surely, the question is posed in the case of other movements and problems. The workers and peasants, the salaried employees, the small and medium size traders and industrialists, all of them are finding from their own experience that their efforts to improve their living or business come up against all manner of obstacles placed before them by the Government. Honest and progressive citizens from all classes and walks of life find that there is no use thinking of and planning the reconstruction of national life in its social, economic and cultural field so long as the bribery, corruption and nepotism typical of the existing Congress regime are allowed to continue.

All this was true as far back as in 1951 when our Party adopted its new Programme, in the course of which it stated : "The people of India are gradually realising the meaning of this state of affairs and are coming to realise the necessity to change this Government of landlords and princes, this Government of financial sharks and speculators, this Government hanging on

to the wheel of the British Commonwealth.....The mass of the people openly voice their discontent and revolt in several provinces against the inhuman regime of the present Government and is seeking out ways to substitute this Government by a new People's Government...Our Party regards as quite mature the task of replacing the present anti-democratic and anti-popular Government by a new Government of People's Democracy created on the basis of a coalition of all democratic, anti-feudal and anti-imperialists forces in the country."

The Party was quite clear that the new People's Government which will replace the present Government of princes and landlords should be one which brings about fundamental democratic transformations outlined in the Programme. "It (the Party) will never cease to explain to the people", our Central Committee stated in the Election Manifesto "that without such transformations there can be no real improvement in their conditions, no real advance for the country." The Party, however, realised that the essential prerequisite for such fundamental democratic transformations is the capacity of the people to take political power in their own hands: the extent to which they will be able to carry out fundamental democratic transformations does itself depend on their capacity to replace the existing Government by a new People's Government. The Central Committee, therefore, added :

"At the same time, the Communist Party declares that to begin with it will strive for the realisation of those items in the above Programme which will immediately relieve the distress of the people even to a limited extent and for such demands as....." Giving a list of such demands as are calculated to immediately relieve the distress of the people even to a limited extent, the Central Committee went on : "It will cooperate with other democratic parties in building a powerful mass movement for the realisation of these demands. And, if a Government is formed by a United Front of genuine democratic parties, the Communist Party will support the Government in so far as it implements such a programme."

This perspective of developing such a powerful mass movement for the realisation of the immediate demand of the people as will put on the agenda the replacement of the Congress Government by a Government "formed by a United Front of genuine democratic parties" became much more real during and

after the elections than when it was first formulated by the Central Committee in the Election Manifesto. For, the first few days of polling in Travancore-Cochin and in Madras made it clear that it was not an idle dream to proceed on the expectation of inflicting such a defeat on the Congress as to make it possible for the formation of a Government of Democratic Unity. The Party, therefore, had to further concretise and enrich the conception originally worked out in its barest outlines in the Election Manifesto.

This was done first in the State of Madras where, though the Communist Party and its electoral allies came out with flying colours in the election, they were not strong enough to challenge the right of the Congress to form its own Government: only the combination of several Opposition parties and elements would be in a position to give concrete form to the desire of the people and demand that that Congress should give place to an alliance of democratic parties, groups and individuals. It was thus that the Madras U.D.F. was formed, composed of the Communist Party, the K.M.P. Party, Tamil Nad Toilers' Party, Commonwealth Party and independents, and pledged to a genuine effort for the formation of a non-Congress Government in order to realise a minimum programme.

In Travancore-Cochin too, the United Front of Leftists was not strong enough to take power alone; it could attempt to do so only if it is able to secure the collaboration of the TTNC, the Socialist Party and independents. The Communist Party in Travancore-Cochin declared without hesitation that it was its objective to realise the formation of such a Coalition of Opposition forces in order to prevent the restoration of Congress to power.

In the struggle for the realisation of this objective, the Party had, of course, to meet the opposition of the other two constituents of the UFL, the RSP and KSP which argued that it would be nothing but "opportunism" and "betrayal of the electorate" to collaborate with such a "non-left" political organisation as the TTNC and with opportunistic elements like the independents. The Party, however, refused to yield to its allies on this issue, since it was a question of defending the interests of the common people; ultimately it was able to make them also see the wisdom of seeking to replace the Congress by a Government of Democratic Unity so that, subsequently, on the occasion of

moving a no-confidence motion against the Ministry as well as in the recent crisis, the whole UFL was agreed on the line originally advanced by us.

This line for the two States of Madras and Travancore-Cochin chalked out by the Polit Bureau and Provincial Committees concerned was subsequently endorsed after thorough discussion by the Central Committee at its March 1952 meeting. The Committee came to the following conclusions :

“Due to the victories won by the Party and democratic forces in the States of Madras and Travancore-Cochin and the serious reverses suffered by the Congress, a new situation has developed there and new possibilities have opened up. In these two States, especially in the State of Madras, the possibility has arisen of the formation of a Government of the United Democratic Front.

“The specific features of the situation in these States are:

(1) A big majority of people have taken up a position in opposition to the Congress which is in a minority even in the Legislature (Madras 152 in a House of 375, Travancore-Cochin 44 in a House of 108.).

(2) The opposition on the whole is a democratic opposition.

(3) Communist Party is the single biggest force in the opposition.

“The formation of a Government of the United Democratic Front in Madras and in Travancore-Cochin would be a gigantic step forward. Such Governments would press for the formation of linguistic provinces, undertake measures to give relief to the peasantry, the agricultural labourers and the workers as well as to the middle-classes, combat black-marketeering and corruption, restore full civil liberties and would thus help the people in their struggle for a better life. Such a government would be a Government of struggle against the monopolists and the feudals and a champion of the common people.

“Was it then premature for the Party to make efforts to form a Government of the UDF?

“Not in the least. When the possibility of forming an alternative Government arose, it was the duty and the responsibility of the Party to make every effort to translate this possibility into reality. The masses want an alternative Government. They want the non-Congress parties and individuals for whom they voted to form such a Government. Only by giving expression to

this mass urge, only by taking steps for its materialisation, the Party could unite the masses and develop the mass movement. If a Government of the UDF comes about, it will be a great step forward. If, for any reason, it does not come about, the masses will have known whom they can trust and whom they cannot. They will know whom to hold responsible for the reimposition of the Congress rule over them.

“Petty-bourgeois ‘Lefts’ may shout about ‘opportunism’, betrayal of revolution and ‘watering down of programme’. The ruling classes know better. Hence their desperate efforts to form coalition, to buy over independents, to work up anti-Communist hysteria—to do everything to prevent the formation of a Government of the United Democratic Front.”

The Central Committee, however, was clear that such efforts at forming Governments of Democratic Unity can be made only under certain circumstances, chief of which is that the Communist Party and other genuinely democratic elements should be in a dominant position within the Opposition. It therefore projected the line of applying the tactics adopted in Madras and Travancore-Cochin to the State of Pepsu “where, too, the Congress is in a minority but where the main force opposed to the Congress is represented by the Akali Party, a party of feudal and communal reaction and the Communist Party is not a major force. Nor does such a situation exist in Orissa, where, too, the main opposition consists of the Ganatantra Parishad—a Party formed and led by princes. Hence, there can be no UDF Governments in these States at present.”

In other words, the Central Committee looked upon the question of the formation of Governments of Democratic Unity as a question inseparable from the struggles of the common people for the realisation of their immediate demands. It is only if and when the workers, peasants and other sections of the working people are organised and powerful enough to make their will felt through their struggles outside the Legislatures and when this strength of the people’s movement is reflected inside the Legislature in the person of a strong contingent of Communist legislators as well as legislators belonging to other genuinely democratic parties and groups, that the question of replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity will arise. In a State where there is a strong opposition to the Congress in the legislature but that Opposi-

tion is not a Democratic Opposition but one voiced by certain sections of the ruling classes themselves; or where there is no powerful mass movement outside the Legislature to give form and shape to whatever Democratic Opposition exists inside the Legislature, it would be idle to think of replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity.

Since the Central Committee worked out this line of seeking to replace the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity in all those States where this has become possible because of the strength of the Democratic Opposition inside and outside the Legislature, there has been a certain amount of discussion inside the Party on the correctness of this line. Criticism was made that, in having given the slogan of the Government of Democratic Unity, the Central Committee had underestimated the strength of the Congress and other reactionary parties. They point out that, both in Madras as well as in Travancore-Cochin, our efforts at the formation of Governments of Democratic Unity were thwarted by the manoeuvres of the Congress and by the betrayals of certain sections of the Opposition. They concluded, from this experience, that it was wrong from the beginning to have given the masses the hope that the Congress Government can be replaced by a coalition of the Communist Party and such of its allies as have come to the United Front immediately after the elections.

Subsequent developments have shown that these criticisms are based on an incorrect appreciation of the nature and degree of the political crisis that is developing in the country. For, it has now become clear that, while the Congress was, of course, successful in Madras and Travancore-Cochin in manoeuvring itself back into power, it has had to encounter innumerable difficulties even in those States in which it has an overwhelming majority in the Legislature. As we have seen in the last chapter, the ever-recurring conflicts inside the Congress Legislature Party and the consequent Ministerial crises have become the normal features in several States. These internal conflicts inside the Congress, together with the presence of more or less strong Oppositions inside the Legislature, have very often led to situations in which the fate of the Congress Ministry was temporarily hanging in the balance. As for the States of Madras and Travancore-Cochin themselves, it has now been proved that the successful manoeuvres of the Congress had no more than

temporary value : the very TTNC with whose collaboration the Congress manoeuvred itself back into power subsequently broke with the Congress, thus creating a fresh crisis. In Madras too, as has been mentioned earlier the fate of the Ministry headed by the "saviour of the State" is now hanging in the balance. Furthermore, both in Travancore-Cochin and in Hyderabad, the Communist Party was successful more than once in bringing together and along with it all the parties and groups of the Opposition including the most rabid anti-Communist among them—the PSP.

This has once again brought to the forefront the question of replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity. It has already become a question of immediate practical importance in Travancore-Cochin ; it may do so any day in Andhra where the alignment of forces inside the Legislature is so delicate that the position of the Congress is extremely unstable ; in Hyderabad too, the growing revolt inside the Congress Legislature Party may any day break into a fresh crisis and may put the question of governmental power on the agenda; even in Pepsu where during the past elections the Akalis were the dominant force in the Opposition, the question of power has already come to the forefront and the Democratic Opposition has been strengthened to a far greater degree than two years ago. Above all, it should be borne in mind that the tremendous advance registered recently by the democratic movement in Calcutta has led to such a critical situation for the West Bengal Government, though from the constitutional point of view that Government is still very powerful; the tramfare resistance struggle in July and the Bonus struggle in September-October were so powerful that they further accentuated the conflicts inside the State Congress Legislature Party.

All these show how wrong were those comrades who based themselves in criticising the CC Resolution on the apparent success of Congress manoeuvres in Madras and Travancore-Cochin. They show that, though its specific applicability as a slogan of immediate action varies from State to State and from stage to stage, there is no doubt that the slogan of the Government of Democratic Unity sums up all the struggles of the present period.

It is only by keeping this as the general slogan for all the struggles that are today breaking out that the Party will

be able to bring to the forefront the central question of the whole stage of our revolution—the question of power. Furthermore, it is only by giving appropriate, concrete shape to the slogan in the varying conditions of the various States, that the Party will be able to unite all the forces of the Opposition, as well as those forces inside the Congress which are more and more coming out against the official policies of the Congress. Failure to realise this will completely disarm the Party in the face of the attacks launched by the ruling classes against the Communist Party and other democratic elements with a view to keep them away from power.

If this is the situation in the State Legislature, it is all the more so in Local Self-Government institutions. Nobody would deny that, at least in this field, the Communist Party and other democratic elements have been actually able to defeat the Congress and themselves assume the reins of office. It is true that, as compared to the State Governments, Municipalities, Panchayat Boards and other Local Self-government institutions are powerless. Nevertheless, the fact that it has been possible to put genuine representatives of the people in power in these institutions, and that, in many of them, these genuine representatives of the people have been able to serve the people shows how important it is to take a positive attitude to the question of power.

It should, at the same time, be borne in mind that the mere securing of majorities and presidentships in these Local Self-government institutions will not enable us or our allies to fulfil the aspirations with which the people have sent us to these positions of power : only if our activities inside these Local Self-government institutions are combined with a very powerful mass movement outside, only if the concrete measures of relief to the people that are worked out by our representatives inside are made the basis of a powerful campaign outside, will it be possible to make the Municipalities, Panchayat Boards, etc., the forums through which the common people are able to get immediate relief at the cost of their exploiters.

This is far more applicable to our work inside the Legislature than to the work inside the Local Self-government institutions. For, unlike in the latter where we have already come to occupy official positions in several cases and where it is a question of retaining these positions and using them to the best interests



of the people, the very securing of majorities and positions of power at State levels requires prolonged and determined mass action. For, as is clear from the various stratagems resorted to by the ruling classes, no effort will be left unmade to prevent the genuine representatives of the common people from assuming the reins of office at State level. Only if the millions upon millions of the common people are made to realise that it is not enough to give expression to their discontent against the Congress by voting against it, but it is necessary to force sanctions to support their desire to drive the Congress out of power, only if the workers in every factory, plantation, and mine, peasants and other sections of the rural poor in the villages, all sections of the urban poor, all progressive democratic elements in all classes and walks of life are mobilised in the struggle for the assertion of the common people's right to have the government which they like, will it be possible to beat down the determined efforts made by the Congress to perpetuate itself in power. Failure to realise this supreme importance of mass mobilisation and mass movement in support of the slogan of Government of Democratic Unity will lead us to the line of manoeuvring, and counter-manoeuving, in which we would naturally be outnumbered by the ruling classes.

It is this relation between the slogan of the formation of a Government of Democratic Unity and the militant struggles of the common people—the fact that the slogan of Government of Democratic Unity is a powerful weapon in mobilising millions upon millions of common people in the anti-imperialist, anti-feudal struggle, as well as the fact that this slogan will become realisable only on the basis of such a wide mobilisation of the people—is something that has to be fully grasped by the entire Party. For, it is this that enables it to so work out its day-to-day activities as to weaken the enemy to the utmost and to strengthen its own class and its allies in the struggle for People's Democracy.

#### PARTY IN THE FOREFRONT OF PEOPLE'S STRUGGLES

Despite the inadequate appreciation of the relation between United Front, unity of the mass organisations and the independent functioning of the Party, mentioned in the earlier pages, it should be stated that the Party as a whole has, in the post-

election period, undertaken the task of leading mass struggles, building mass organisations and reorganising and strengthening the Party. These efforts undertaken by the various Party units to strengthen and build mass organisations, to lead mass struggles and to build the Party have met with considerable success in several cases.

To get a proper and correct picture of the successes attained in these respects, one should go back to the time of the last All-India Conference. Emerging as we were then from a long period of inner-Party struggle and confusion, there was very little of Party organisation as such at the time. The CC, PCs, DCs, and other Party units were all facing immense difficulties arising out of the fact that the sense of unity and comradeship, which is absolutely necessary for the proper functioning of every Party unit, had received the rudest shock in the course of the inner-Party struggles. It was with every difficulty that Local, District and Provincial Conferences were held before the All India Conference and Local, District and Provincial Committees set up. Even after these Conferences were over and new Committees were set up, comrades were extremely diffident regarding the proper functioning of these Committees and the unified activity of the entire Party. As for the mass organisations, the total repression that they had to face for over three years, together with the disorganisation of the Party itself, had made them virtually non-functioning.

It was the great merit of the All India Conference, and the subsequent election campaign into which the entire Party plunged after the All India Conference, that they laid the basis for putting an end to this state of affairs. It appeared as nothing short of a miracle to other parties that, so soon after such a serious inner-Party crisis which led to such total confusion and chaos in the Party, the Party could get unified on the basis of the Programme and Statement of Policy and go out as a unified team and campaign among the people on the basis of the new Election Manifesto. The tremendous success attained by the Party in the election itself gave new confidence to Party units at all levels that the Party can be strengthened and reorganised. Furthermore, the very fact that the Party could during the elections secure the solid support of such large mass of people created in them the confidence that the Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas and other mass organisations can be revived, further

strengthened and developed as the organs of mass struggle. The entire Party therefore undertook, in the post-election period, the two tasks of re-organisations.

Unfortunately, however, the Central Committee is not at present in a position to draw lessons from these activities undertaken by the entire Party and point out the main achievements and shortcomings of Party work in this respect. This can be done, as was stated in the beginning of this Report, only on the basis of a detailed study of the Provincial Reports which are not yet to hand. What is therefore possible is only to state what was done by the Central Committee itself and point out the main achievements and shortcomings of this work.

When the Central Committee met in March 1952, it had outlined the main tasks facing the Party as follows ;

“(1) Revive the Trade Union and Kisan Sabhas as united organisations by not merely uniting the existing organisations but also by drawing into them workers of the Forward Bloc, KMPP, Socialists and rank and file Congressmen.

“(2) Develop a broadbased mass movement for civil liberties, for withdrawal of warrants, release of detenus and lifting the ban on the Party in Hyderabad; for release of detenus and withdrawal of warrants in Bengal, Punjab, Bombay, Tripura; for defence of accused in Hyderabad, Madras State, Travancore-Cochin and Uttar Pradesh (Bellia); for repeal of the Detention Act, for full freedom of the press, for TU rights.

“(3) Intensify the movement for linguistic provinces in Andhra and Kerala and draw all elements including Congressmen into the movement. Develop similar movement in Maharashtra and Karnatak. Demand ending of Commissioner's rule in Tripura and other Part 'C' States and conferring of the right of Legislative Assembly on the Electoral College.

“(4) Develop a mass movement for Peace, for a Five Power Peace Pact, for solidarity with colonial peoples fighting for freedom, for friendship with Soviet Union, China and other democratic countries, for close economic relation with them, against germ war in Korea, against suppression of Indians in South Africa, for withdrawal of the Kashmir issue from UNO.

“(5) Build a united movement for help to the people in the famine-stricken areas, force Government to give relief, mobilise people for adequate rations and against the rise in prices of foodstuffs.

“(6) Place all these movements on the firm foundation of united organisations and united committees. Form UDF Committees wherever necessary in order to broaden the movement. Develop a passion for organisation and overcome lag between movement and organisation.

“(7) Wage determined struggle against parties of feudal and communal reaction while drawing masses under this influence into united mass organisations.

“(8) Transform our newspapers into powerful instruments of mass education, mass agitation and mass mobilisation. (All comrades must study Chapter Five of the *History of the CPSU (B)* which describes what a Bolshevik mass newspaper must be); create mass literature in the form of cheaply priced pamphlets on current national and international subjects.

“(9) Undertake education of Party cadres and draw cadres into the Party (first as candidates) so as to build a mass Party which alone can fulfil the task of the mass movement.

“(10) Overcome all dissensions that still exist inside the Party in certain areas, fully unify the Party and tighten up discipline.”

It also decided that with a view to revive the trade union and kisan movements, meetings of leading TU and Kisan Sabha comrades should be held soon. As for the task of strengthening the Party organisation, it decided to improve the work of the Centre by setting up a functional Central Headquarters with two PB Members working whole time and two others part-time at the Centre. It was expected that this Centre together with the functioning of the trade union and kisan fractions would help the Party to undertake the minimum tasks which it was possible and necessary to fulfil them.

It was on the basis of these decisions that the CC worked between the March 1952 meeting of the CC and the August meeting of the PB. In this period, the Central Headquarters was set up at Madras where the *Cross Roads* also was transferred. Arrangements were also made to bring out a political monthly whose first issue appeared after the August, 1952 meeting of the PB. While the functioning of the Central Office registered a slight improvement, the hope that a proper Party Centre would be set up at Madras did not materialise. The reason was that out of four members of the PB who could be

available at Madras, two were leaders of their respective provincial Centres and had also other heavy responsibilities.

In pursuance of the March decision of the CC, a meeting of important functionaries of the Party on the Trade Union movement were called at Calcutta in May together with the meeting of the AITUC which was also held at Calcutta. This meeting of Party functionaries on the trade union movement helped in drawing the Party's attention to the trade union movement in general: Com. Dange's Report on this meeting helped to clear certain doubts and confusions on questions of trade union movement. One obvious shortcoming of this meeting was that it could not go into the specific problems of various industries and thus give concrete guidance to the comrades working in them. A decision was therefore taken that separate meetings, industry-wise, should be held in order to tackle these problems.

As far as the Kisan movement was concerned initiative was taken to convene a meeting of the Central Kisan Council which was held at Patna in June. This meeting helped the Kisan Sabha to evolve its policy on certain new problems that were cropping up—like food de-control—and also to start the work of reviving the Kisan Sabha units on an all-India scale. One of the questions discussed at this CKC meeting was unity talks between the AIKS and the UKS. Subsequent to this meeting of the CKC, a meeting of the Party functionaries working on the Kisan front was held at Madras in August. While this meeting helped the Party in that the reports made at this meeting gave a far clearer picture of the problems of Agrarian policy and of the peasant movements, it had the very serious shortcoming that many of the vital problems posed at the meeting were not solved: comrades could not go back from the meeting with a common understanding of such important issues as the significance of Congress Agrarian Legislations, organisation of Agricultural Labour Associations as distinct from the Kisan Sabhas, etc. Since it was felt that the differences on such issues are of a serious character, it was decided that the discussion should continue and, to this end, a detailed questionnaire was issued by the PB to which PCs were asked to send their replies.

Though no decision had been taken at the March CC meeting with regard to Party work among the students and women, comrades working on these fronts drew the attention of the PB to

some of their problems and demanded PB's help in those respects. The PB therefore agreed to hold a meeting of leading Party functionaries on the Student front which was done in June. This was quite useful in that it cleared many doubts and points of dispute. It was on the basis of these discussions that our comrades working on the AISF were able to work out a new policy statement for the AISF—a Policy Statement which was calculated to unite all sections of students including Congress-minded students. On the problems of the Women's movement too, the PB held preliminary discussions with a few leading Party functionaries on this front and on the basis of these discussions.

One important development which took place between the March meeting of the CC and the August meeting of the PB was the organisation of the Parliamentary Fraction at Delhi. The broad lines on which this was to be organised has been decided upon at the March meeting of the CC itself. However, when the Fraction had actually got organised and its activities started, it was found that the Fraction had had to tackle such important problems as require the constant personal attention of the PB. A remarkable example of such problems was the negotiations between the Government of India and Kashmir which took place while the Central Headquarters was in Madras. The importance of these negotiations and the necessity for direct personal guidance from the PB made it necessary for the General Secretary to go to Delhi and help the comrades of the Parliamentary Fraction at Delhi and of the Central Headquarters at Madras also proved that a large number of problems of the country's economic and political life of a basic nature are posed before the Parliamentary Fraction. These were problems which cannot be tackled by the Parliamentary Fraction alone; nor can the CC afford to ignore these problems when evolving the broad policies on the basis of which the entire Party has to carry on its work.

This experience made the PB realise that the original decision to shift the Headquarters to Madras had been incorrect and that the shifting should have taken place to Delhi. It was thus that the August PB meeting decided to shift the Headquarters to Delhi.

Apart from this organisational decision, the August meeting of the PB had to tackle a number of political problems. These related mainly to the correctness or otherwise of the slogan of

the Government of the UDF, the organisational forms of the United Front, etc., which have been dealt with in the earlier chapters. Together with these problems, however, the PB had to answer a question posed by the movement in several provinces—the question regarding the forms of struggle. The answer which the PB gave was as follows :—

“In evolving forms of struggle, we have to get rid of all dogmatic and preconceived notions. The aim of each specific partial struggle must be, above all, the winning of specific immediate demands and the building of broadest popular unity for these demands. For this the people must use not merely the weapon of mass strikes and demonstrations but also the traditional forms of peaceful mass action developed by our own national movement. To sneer at these forms, to dub them as ‘reformist’ would take us nowhere. Where, in any specific condition, a movement results in mass mobilisation and mass action, such a movement must be endorsed, led and even initiated by the Party even if it assumes the form of civil disobedience. The criterion in each case should not be whether a particular form of struggle is ‘revolutionary’ or ‘reformist’ but whether by resorting to it the people get unified, give expression to their discontent, get drawn into the struggle against the Government and the reactionary vested interests and crush it.

“Formulation of concrete and realisable demands, extensive agitation among all classes in their favour, emphasising the popular democratic and just nature of the demands, forging the broadest unity for their realisation and organisation of such action as is participated in and supported by the largest number—such must be the broad lines on which the struggles of today are fought. Also all existing legislation must be studied and fully utilised to enable the people to improve their condition even to the slightest extent.”

It was as the result of experience of popular struggles in Calcutta and Maharashtra that the PB had come to the above conclusion on the correctness of the tactic of civil disobedience under certain circumstances—provided it led to “mass mobilisation and mass action”. It is obvious today, however, that a sharp warning should have been also given against making satyagraha a substitute for mass action. It should have been pointed out that such forms of struggle are, by their very nature, dissipative of mass energy and should be resorted to only

in exceptional circumstances and as a step towards mass action when absolutely necessary.

The PB also stated :

“While developing various forms of struggle for the defence of the immediate interest of the masses, while conducting mass political agitation on every issue confronting our people, while fighting constitutionalist illusions by emphasising the need for mass struggle and by popularising the concept of People’s Democratic Government as a new form of State power, we must get rid of the idea that the Party can become a mass Party by remaining, as it is today, merely a Party of ‘campaigners’, of the idea that mass organisations can grow and develop if they remain merely organisations for conducting strikes and similar struggles. The masses expect the Party today not merely to tell them what will happen *after* a People’s Democratic Government has been established, *after* British capital has been confiscated, *after* land has been transferred to the tiller. The masses expect the Party and their organisations today not merely to hold meetings, organise demonstrations and lead battles but also to help them immediately to find ways and means to relieve the distress in famine and flood areas, to organise education for their children, to organise medical relief, to provide for educational, cultural, sport facilities and similar things. While intensifying the agitation for social security, for maternity benefit, for unemployment relief, for housing provisions, etc., the Party and the mass organisations must also make full use of existing legislations. Also they must organise on their own and with the help of patriotic elements, all that can be done immediately in the way of providing for the needs of the people. It is only by multiplying our links with the people through diverse forms of activities, it is only by attending to their day-to-day needs in all spheres, that the Party will win the confidence of the masses and be able to lead them.”

Above all, the PB in the August Resolution took up the question of Party organisation, and pointed out that the question of organisation was not a formal-technical question but that it is a key political question. “The biggest single factor”, it pointed out, “that is preventing the development of the movement is organisational weakness of the Communist Party itself, its weakness among the basic masses of the people—the working class and the peasantry in many areas—the weak-



ness of the mass organisations. More than ever before, organisation has become a major political factor in the situation. It determines the tempo of the development of the mass movement itself." It warned against "all tendencies to undermine the organisational discipline of the Party", called for "immediate restoration of Party forms in every Province and area, restoration of discipline inside the Party on the basis of the principle of Democratic Centralism and submission of the minority to the majority." It also pointed out that the strengthening of the Party is needed today "precisely because the Party has grown in influence, precisely because it has acquired a national-political status, it is confronted with new tasks, new responsibilities, tasks and responsibilities which can be discharged only by rapid change in our style and method of work, by adopting a policy of bold promotion of cadres and entrusting them with responsibilities, by rapidly drawing new cadres into the Party, by undertaking educational work on a big scale in every area by making full use of the specific talents and capacities of each comrade," and thus called for a struggle against all manifestations of frustration and demoralisation which arose out of the difficulties which the Party is facing—difficulties which, the PB pointed out, are connected with the growth of the mass movement, with the growth and expansion of the influence of the Party.

It was the ideas underlying this resolution that were later elaborated and explained in the General Secretary's article, "Some of Our Main Weaknesses".

The work of the Central Committee and the Central Headquarters registered improvement after the Headquarters was shifted to Delhi. The Headquarters started issuing, more regularly than before, Circulars, Information Documents and Inner-CC documents; the bringing out of *Party Letters* also became a feature of the Centre's activities. Close contact with the Parliamentary Fraction Office enabled the Central Headquarters to pose itself with economic and political developments of national importance and thus be in a position to improve the contents of the Central organs.

One of the very serious shortcomings on the functioning of Central between the March meeting of the CC and the shifting of the Headquarters to Delhi was the absence of collective functioning of the CC and PB. It may be mentioned that, during

the whole of this period, no meeting of the CC was held and the PB met only once in August. Whatever was done during this period was done by the PBMs who were at the Centre, sometimes in consultation with some other PBMs as well. Even such a vital decision (which, as has been mentioned earlier, was a wrong decision) to allow the Madras comrades to function the UDF against the line laid down in the March CC Resolution was taken not by the CC, not by the full meeting of the PB, but by those PBMs who were then available at the Centre.

An effort was made to rectify this position after the August PB meeting and after shifting of Headquarters to Delhi CC meetings have since then become more regular; the meetings of the CC were held in October-November, 1952, December, 1952, January 1953 (this latter was in connection with the Extended Plenum held at Calcutta, in March, July, November and December, 1953. PB meetings, however, did not register much improvement; it was only the PBMs who are permanently at the Headquarters, with occasional additions of one or two, that have taken decisions on behalf of the PB.

Even since the August PB meeting which came to the conclusion that Party organisation has become a factor of key political importance, it has been increasingly realised that, within the Party organisation itself, the setting up of a collectively-functioning CC and PB is a key factor. It had become obvious that the work of the Central organisations of the Party cannot improve unless more PB Members are available for work at the Centre and these comrades functioned collectively as a team in order to prepare for CC meetings and to deal with current questions in between CC meetings. Ways and means of thus strengthening the Central organisations of the Party had been an item of discussion at all CC meetings. The PB had to face the difficulty that, in the case of those comrades whom it wanted to be relieved of Provincial work and to come and work at the Centre, either the Provincial Committees concerned or the comrades themselves, or both, were unwilling to allow to come and work at the Centre. This difficulty was overcome in the case of Com. Ramamurti in the beginning of 1953 but has not been overcome in the case of other comrades. This continues to be a great difficulty even now; it should be made perfectly clear that the PB will not be able to discharge its res-

possibilities to the CC, and the Party as a whole, unless it is so constituted as collectively to be able to study, assimilate and generalise the experience of the Party's activities throughout the country ; only such a PB will be in a position to properly prepare for CC meetings and thus help the CC to come to correct and timely decisions on all important questions.

Another serious difficulty which the Central organisations of the Party are facing is the extreme paucity of reports from Provinces. Not only is there no regular report from the Provinces but even the circulars of the PB are invariably unattended to. It is worthy of mention that, though dozens of circulars have been issued in the course of 1952-53, only two of these—those containing Kisan Questionnaire and Questionnaire on organisation—have received answers from all or almost all the PCs. It should also be stated that, though almost every Provincial Committee and Provincial Conference had detailed discussions on some of the PB and CC documents—August Resolution of the PB, "some of Our Main Weakness", and above all, the March Resolution of the CC—very few of the PCs have sent their criticisms or amendments to the CC; even out of those who have sent them, many have done so in their own languages, which for obvious reasons, are thus remaining in the file. The result of this can be seen in the character of the *Third Congress Bulletin*. Not only are the number of contributions extremely meagre when compared to the intensity of discussions that has actually taken place, but, even of those contributions that have appeared, a majority has come from individual members or units below the level of the DCs.

It is, of course, true that, even if the PCs and regular reports on the political and organisational problems that they have to face and on the manner in which they are tackling them, the PB and CC will not be able to fully utilise them so long as the present weak position of the Central Organisation continues to remain. At the same time, it is also true that even if the PB and CC are strengthened numerically and in the quality of personnel available for work at the Centre, the content of the PB and CC work cannot register much improvement unless the practice of regular reports from the PCs to the CC is enforced.

The absence of these two pre-requisites for an effectively functioning PB and CC — strengthening of the PB and regular reports from the Provinces—has made it impossible for the Centre

to do anything more than functioning as a technical Centre, keeping in touch with those units and Party members who write to the Centre for some reason or other, evolve some very general slogans on some very general all-India issues and prepare for the Congress, however unsatisfactory that preparation is. The main job which is required of the PB and CC in these days of great mass struggles and very rapid shifts in the political situation in State after State—close and constant study of economic trends and political developments in all parts of the country with a view to the working out of appropriate slogans of action, for every class and section of the people—has been impossible for the CC. Let us, for example, take the main fields of mass activity and struggle as well as the main tasks of Party building and see what the Centre has been able to do in these fields and compare it with what is required of the CC :

*In the Trade Union Field*, this has been a period of development of decisive importance. For the living conditions of the working class have become far worse owing to the increase in unemployment, the employers' efforts at enforcing retrenchment, rise in the cost of living, etc. This has given a great fillip to the urge for united working class actions. As a matter of fact, innumerable actions have taken place all over the country in the course of which workers belonging to various Trade Union organisations have come together and defended their interests; wherever such united actions have taken place a major part of the responsibility for these struggles have invariably gone to the units and individual members and sympathisers of our Party in the factories and localities concerned. The task of the Party under these circumstances was not only to participate in and lead these united struggles on a factory or local basis; the Party should have tried to develop these united actions into the biggest possible mass mobilisation of the majority of the workers of the District, Provincial or even all-India basis; the Party, at the same time, should have given concrete shape to the growing urge for unity of the working class by strengthening the trade union organisations affiliated to the AITUC, as well as by setting up such forms of united organisation as are acceptable to the mass of workers belonging to other trade union organisations.

This requires on the part of the Central Committee a deep study of the concrete problems posed in every industry and in every Province and on the basis of this giving concrete

guidance to the PCs and DCs. This was to a certain extent attempted by the PB which, in pursuance of the decisions of the May 1952 meeting of leading TU functionaries of the Party, held a series of industry-wise meetings of Party functionaries on the trade union movement. The result of these meetings was that in certain industries, the Party worked out the concrete line of its struggle for unity of the Trade Union movement. The big possibilities that will open out if this is further carried forward were seen in the fact that, in certain industries, united trade union organisations composed of workers and functionaries owing allegiance to all the national trade union centres have been formed; the glorious one-day strike of the defence workers on June 30 was the direct effect of this unity.

In May 1953, the PB called a meeting of the All-India T.U. Fraction, which was attended by leading TU comrades from all Provinces. After thorough discussion lasting for a week, the meeting came to unanimous conclusions on the most important and urgent problems facing the Trade Union movement—problems of Trade Union unity, attitude to the INTUC, struggle against unemployment, etc. The meeting gave a completely new orientation to our work on the Trade Union Front and played a big role in the subsequent development on the T.U. Front. The understanding of the meeting was embodied in Party Letter No. 7.

The PB also took initiative in farther concretising the struggle for the unity of all the existing trade union centres. This resulted in the running of an all-India School for trade union functionaries by the AITUC at which, among other important problems of the trade union movement, the problem of unity of all the existing trade union centres was also posed. This helped our trade functionaries, along with non-Party functionaries of the AITUC unions to have a clearer grasp of the implications of trade union unity and helped to rid themselves of sectarian understanding of the INTUC.

Efforts were also made to bring about organisational merger between the AITUC and the UTUC, though this proved of no avail for the time being because of the intense opposition on the part of some political groups working in the UTUC.

At least this much could be done on the Trade Union field because the Centre has been able to secure the services of a team of comrades working on these problems under the PB. But

the very experience of this work shows how enormous is the task, of studying the day-to-day developments in industry, and in the trade union movement and how ill-equipped the Centre is to do this job. For, the PB is yet in no position to make a review of the big and small struggles which have taken place in every industry and in every Province and draw the necessary conclusions from such a review. Nor is the PB able to find out the various concrete forms which the resistance to the line of building trade union unity is taking place in different industries and in different Provinces.

*On the Peasant Front* too, developments of great national importance have taken place. The Agrarian Reform measures which different State Governments have adopted have each of them its own specific features, though all of them follow the general pattern set by the Planning Commission. It is only when we study each of these measures that the Party will be able to come to correct conclusions even on the questions of generally estimating the effects of Congress policy on the peasants and agricultural labourers. Similarly, the concrete manner in which the life of peasants, agricultural labourers, artisans and other sections of the rural poor is affected by such official or semi-official movements as Community Projects, Bhoodan, co-operative movement, Panchayat Boards, etc. has to be studied if the Party should be able to familiarise itself with the shifts that are taking place in the economic and political set-up in rural areas. Above all, the innumerable local and partial struggles against evictions, against the new taxation measures introduced by the various State Governments, etc. require close study in order that the Party can come to correct conclusions with regard to the ways and means of developing and further strengthening the present movement.

In the absence of such a province-wise and district-wise study of concrete problems of changes in the agrarian structure and of developments in the peasant movement, the discussions which took place originally at the Madras meeting of leading Kisan Sabha functionaries of the Party, and later at a meeting of the Kisan Sub-Committee of the CC (February 1953), took on the character of an abstract discussion on the development of capitalism or the continuance of feudalism under the Congress regime. Subsequently, however, this mistaken approach to the main problems of the peasant movement was partly corrected

as a result of which a certain amount of agreement was arrived at on the general attitude to be taken towards the Congress Agrarian Legislations. This helped the CKC Fraction to work out the lines on which a broader kisan movement is to be built.

The extent of intervention by the PB and CC on the peasant field has been still less than that on the T.U. field. For, apart from the general guidance given to the CKC Fraction in working out the Statement of Policy of the AIKS and the document placed before the CKC Fraction which was nothing more than general guidance on some general problems, the PB has not been able to give any guidance and leadership to the PCs. This is, of course, partly inevitable because, unlike on the industrial front, the problems of the agrarian question are so varied and complicated in character that it will be impossible for an all-India Centre to post itself with information on all these problems and on the basis of such information to give concrete guidance. This, however, is only partly true. Because, apart from questions of land tenure which undoubtedly are varied and complicated, there are hosts of problems like taxation, prices of crops, eviction offensive of the landlords, rural indebtedness, etc. which follow a more or less general pattern. Above all, there are problems of organisation and struggle which, though certainly related to the type of problems many of which are undoubtedly varied, are of a character that they can and should be studied by the Central leadership of the Party in order that it may be able to draw correct lessons from their experience. The inability to do this part of the work is due to the defective way in which the functioning of the Kisan Fraction and of the PB is organised.

How serious this inability of the PB and CC to study the concrete problems of the present movement is, can be seen from the fact that though innumerable struggles against eviction, new taxation, etc., have taken place in several provinces, the Party has been so far unable to generalise the experiences of these struggles and draw conclusions from them on an all-India scale.

What is true of the trade union and peasant movements is also generally true of students, women and youths. For, it is clear that the growing political crisis in the country has led to a great upsurge of activity and struggle among these sections of the people. The big possibilities of the student movement were seen in the recent U.P. struggles. Women and the youth

are also coming out in large numbers and are manifesting a growing desire to develop their organisations and struggles. It is obvious that the development of these movements and organisations has a great role to play in the development of the democratic movement generally, and in the development of the trade union and peasant movements in particular. The PB, therefore, did whatever it could to help the leading Party functionaries working on these fronts. It, however, could not do much primarily because, unlike on the trade union and peasant fronts, there is very little activity on these fronts in the Provinces, Districts and localities. This feature of the student, women and youth movements makes it obvious that the PB and CC will not be able to do much unless actively functioning mass organisations of the students, women and youth grow in the provinces.

The above is all the more true of the cultural activities. As a matter of fact, while it is possible on the student women, and youth fronts for the CC to work out an all-India line provided there is active and living movement in the Provinces, it is still less possible in the field of cultur which, after all, has national peculiarities varying from Province to Province. It has actually been found that discussions in the cultural Commission set up in the April 1952 meeting of the Party's cultural workers, as well as in the meeting of the PWA Fraction, certain burning problems of culture in one nationality—(Hindustani-speaking nationality) are posed and discussed in detail while the comrades coming from other nationalities are unable even to follow the discussions, much less participate in them. This has made it clear to the CC that the original idea of having an all-India-Cultural Commission with all-India fractions of PWA and IPTA, 'if not of other fields of culture,' was an unrealistic proposal. Only if the PCs take up the job of concretely guiding the activities of cultural workers in their respective areas and thus develop a broad cultural movement in which the Party's own cultural workers will be playing an effective leading role, will it be possible for the Centre to seek to co-ordinate—and even then, only to *co-ordinate* and nothing more—these activities undertaken by the PCs. It should, at the same time, be stated that this is a very important job since by doing it not only will the PCs be able to rally all the progressive cultural workers in their respective provinces in the struggle against



reactionary culture; it will also help the trade union and peasant movements themselves by raising the general cultural level of the mass of workers and peasants.

Noteworthy progress has also been registered by our comrades working in close co-operation with non-party people, including Congressmen, in the peace movement and in the movements for Indo-Soviet and India-China Friendship. It is at the same time being increasingly realised that these movements cannot become real nationwide mass movements so long as the trade unions, kisan sabhas and other organisations are not drawn in their active functioning. Only such a movement for peace and Indo-Soviet and India-China Friendship alone will enable the people to fight the warmongers and reactionaries who want to prevent the growth of friendship between the peoples of India on the one hand and the peoples of the Soviet Union and China on the other.

The above description of the PB's and CC's activities in building mass organisations and leading mass struggles shows that, though serious efforts have been made to discharge the Party's responsibilities in these fields, they are totally inadequate to the requirements of the present situation. It also makes clear that the main weakness in all these fields is the serious lack of active contact of the Party Centre with the living problems of the actual movements.

This lack of living touch with the growing people's movement is reflected in the fact that the Party Centre is unable even to keep living touch with the Party organisation itself. As a matter of fact, the Party Centre knows very little about what is happening in the districts and localities, as regards the large mass of militants and sympathisers who are daily being drawn towards the Party but have not been drawn into the Party. The PB and CC, therefore, are as unable to give concrete and timely leadership on the problems of Party building as it is unable to give guidance on the problems of the mass movement. It is this inability of the Party Centre to guide the PCs and DCs on the problems of Party building that has led to the paradoxical situation that though the Party's general influence and prestige among the people has grown several-fold since the Second Party Congress, its organisational strength has not grown accordingly. We polled over 6 million votes during the general elections. Today our influence is even more

extensive. But the membership of the Party is still very low—not more than 60,000 or so. It is obvious that with such a small organised strength it is not possible for the Party to discharge its growing responsibilities. At the same time, it is obvious that the question of rapid expansion of the Party is linked with the question of proper organisation of the Party and of Party education. This itself demands the establishment of a strong and effective Party Centre.

The concrete question that this raises will have to be decided at the Party Congress. In the opinion of the CC, organisation, Party organisation, especially organisation of the leading Committees, CC and PCs is today a task without carrying out which it is not possible to solve the manifold problems of the mass movement and take it rapidly forward.

The Party Congress, therefore, has a two-fold task. It has to evolve the correct policy by pursuing which alone the people's movement can advance. It has also to create organisational guarantees to ensure the effective carrying out of that policy.

Despite the serious weakness and shortcomings in its work, the Party has been able to register considerable progress in the period under review. It has been in the forefront of most of the mass struggles and has come to be looked upon as the vanguard of the democratic forces. Its prestige stands higher than ever before in its history. Mass organisations where our comrades work have grown in strength and influence. Our work in the Parliament and Assemblies also has improved. Above all, there has been considerable improvement in the inner-Party situation and also in the functioning of Party Committees recently.

While every comrade is conscious of the fact that, taking into account the needs and possibilities of the situation, our progress in all these matters has been extremely slow and inadequate, yet when one contrasts the situation today with what it was two years or even a year ago, one sees the big improvement that has been registered. This shows how much can be done if the main difficulties are overcome.

Tasks of immense magnitude lie ahead. Due to the position that our Party has won in the political life of the country, not merely hundreds of thousands but millions look to it for guidance, for leadership. Moreover, the position that our

country occupies today in world policies, as the biggest semi-colonial country yet to win freedom, as a most vital territory in the world-wide battles for freedom, democracy and peace, demands the abandonment of all complacency and the intensification of efforts to remove the weaknesses which prevents us from discharging our duties. Conscious of all this, conscious of the responsibilities that face it, the Third Congress of our Party has to examine the problems confronting the Party in the political and organisational spheres and take steps to solve them so that the movement of the Indian people for full freedom, for democracy, for the establishment of peace may gather irresistible strength and win victory.

## **Ramamurthy's Letter to N. M. Jaisoorya and G. M. Shroff (1953)**

In their letter to the C.C. of the C.P.I., Dr. Jaisoorya and Mr. G. M. Shroff of the People's Democratic Front in Hyderabad had raised many important issues regarding the character, form and method of building the United Front movement. In its reply the CC outlines its conception of UF as "basically a front of classes". Although the various classes may have mutually conflicting interests, nonetheless they have a common interest in liquidating their common enemies—imperialism and feudalism. The concept of UF, the letter explains, arises from this common interest between the various classes.

Dismissing the view that the UF "must have direct basis and loyalty of mass organisations" as erroneous, the CC replies that "under the existing conditions, the UF can only be a front of political parties, groups and individuals and cannot be a mass political organisation." Similarly no mass organisation can be affiliated to the UDF in any part of the country as it would lead to the disruption of the mass organisation and undermine the very foundations of the development of the UF.

Regarding the functioning of the UF in legislature and Parliament the letter states: "No party will be allowed to impose its will on others and independence of each party will be fully guaranteed and each party can function on its own name while on all agreed issues all parties, either in their name or in the name of the UF, can present a united front."

Dealing with the charges that "the CPI does not recognise any other party than itself as the working class

party "and that the CPI attempts to "impose its leadership on every Front at all strategic levels" or the charges regarding its "extra-territorial loyalties" the letter simply dismisses them either as baseless, or as "usual anti-communist slanders" or puts forth the counter-claim that "we have functioned more democratically than any other party in the country." The letter was published for the first time by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Conspiracy at Madurai*.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

5C/54 Rohtak Road,  
New Delhi 5.  
November 16, 1953.

To

Dr. N. M. Jaisooriya, M.P., and  
Shri G. M. Shroff,  
Hyderabad (Deccan)

Dear friends,

We have had to wait so long after our talks at Hyderabad before we could reply to your letters because we wanted to discuss them in our Central Committee and give you a considered reply. This was so because of the importance of the issues you have raised, viz., the character, the form and the method of building the United Front movement in India in general and in Hyderabad in particular. We hope you will understand the delay.

It is natural and correct for the democratic parties to seek clarification of the views and understandings of other parties. We certainly welcome the opportunity for friendly discussion with you on some of the fundamental problems facing the Democratic Movement in India. But we are sorry to find in your letter that you have not only raised questions of United Front, but, in doing so have resorted to baseless accusations and the exploded slanders that are the usual stock-in-trade of anti-communists.

It is the Communist Party of India that first put forward the very concept of a united front of all democratic forces in India. We have been advocating and we continue to work for the realisation of a United Democratic Front. This is so because we firmly believe that only the coming together of all demo-

cratic parties, groups and even individuals will enable the democratic forces to defeat the reactionary Congress regime—the regime that safeguards the interests of landlords, the British imperialists and the monopolists collaborating with them.

We are equally convinced that what India needs today is not a single party government but a government based on a coalition of all democratic forces. Only such a Government replacing the existing Congress government and implementing a democratic programme will be able to solve the present problems of our people, build our national economy and ensure the well-being of our people.

It is this firm faith that has enabled the Communist Party to strive its hardest in Travancore-Cochin, in Hyderabad, in Madras, in Bengal, in U.P.—in fact in every part of the country to build the United Front despite many ups and downs. The recent struggles that were conducted in Bengal are but the latest examples of the strenuous efforts that the Communist Party puts up in order to build the United Front for safeguarding and defending interests of the people.

Before we proceed further, it is necessary to state that we are not in agreement with your conception of the United Democratic Front. We are convinced that your conception, far from bringing together the existing political parties, will lead to their further estrangement. Far from helping to build the unity of the classes and their united mass organisations, your conception will lead to further disruption of the mass organisations and of whatever unity has already been achieved in them. It will thus lead to the weakening of the Democratic movement itself and negate the very objective of the United Democratic Front viz. the unity of democratic forces.

You advocate that the United Democratic Front today “must have direct basis and loyalty of mass organisations”: that it must be an organisation “formulating and executing its programme and policy democratically and within its own right” and “with its own discipline”. You further state: “Today the United Front of parties would not be an effective or countrywide proposition. If the main basis be of an united political front of mass organisations, then the United Front should be of countrywide and uniform character.”

You further advocate that the political parties “should be represented at all levels of the united front organisations but

the representation of parties should not outweigh the representation of mass organisations.”

You want that “the mass organisations should be autonomous as far as their economic problems are concerned; but should be united politically with the united front as the common political expression. They should have major representation at all levels of the united front.”

It will thus be seen that your conception is one of another political party, a super party or a political organisation “formulating and executing its programme and policies and in its own right and with its own discipline.” Such a concept is not a concept of the united front at all. The very basis of the concept of the united front is the independence of the various parties, groups and individuals but they get together on the basis of agreement with regard to different issues or for a common programme.

The Communist Party’s conception of United Front is basically a front of classes. Our party has placed a programme before the people with its edge directed against the landlords and against the British imperialists. Our programme demands land to the peasant and of freeing our economy from the shackles of *British imperialism*. We believe that the fulfilment of such a programme is in the interest of all classes of our people except the feudal landlords. Although these classes may have mutually conflicting interests, nonetheless the fact remains that imperialism and feudalism constitute the common enemies of all and constitute the biggest obstacle standing in the way of our country’s progress. Our concept of United Front arises from this common interest between these various classes.

In our country today, different democratic political parties or groups exist, some countrywide, some confined to some provinces alone who have following among these various classes—to some extent in some classes and to a great extent in others. These parties have their own ideologies, their own political and organisational conceptions. It will not help us to discuss here which party represents which class most or which ideology or practice is more correct. We have to take this reality of the existence of these parties and groups. Wishing them away will not do.

You demand that all these parties should agree “to a common

programme and propagate this under the auspices of the United Democratic Front alone, while each party has the freedom to express its differences from its own platform”.

In other words the independent activities of these parties and groups will be reduced to that of a propaganda group whereas practically all the activities connected with the mass movement must be conducted only by the United Democratic Front. That means the different political parties will have no right to function independently on the day-to-day issues of the mass movement.

Such a demand will not help in bringing together the existing parties. You will realise that under the existing conditions, it is difficult even for the existing democratic parties and groups to agree on a common programme for a whole period at the present stage of our struggle. To give only one instance, even parties who profess Marxism like the R.S.P., Forward Bloc (Marxist), the Peasant and Workers Party disagree on many essential matters—both national and international. Naturally with this disagreement on some of the fundamental problems affecting national and international policies, in actual practice we will have many differences in day-to-day practice.

Apart from those parties it is absolutely necessary to bring together the PSP, and many other groups and even many Congressmen who are getting disillusioned with the policies of the Congress leadership. In fact, it was because of the failure to see this necessity of bringing together all the democratic elements that the P.D.F. in Hyderabad refused to come to an agreement with P.W.P. even to avoid triangular contest in the last general elections. We know the consequences.

Insisting on the acceptance of our minimum programme or the programme of any other party or group will certainly not be conducive to the bringing together of all the democratic parties, groups and individuals.

Under the existing conditions therefore it is only the coming together of the various groups, parties and individuals on whatever issues and in whatever places they can and leading the masses in their day-to-day struggles that will help in the process of the development of the united front. As a result of the coming together and leading the struggle of the masses common understanding grows between the parties which helps in the process of the crystallisation of the common programme. The



agreement on such a programme itself will become wider and wider as a result of struggling together and leading the masses in their struggles.

We judge everything on this basis. Whatever helps in the development of the united struggle of the masses helps the development of the united front, whatever hinders the development of the united front.

It will be clear therefore that the building up of the United Front is a process which takes into account the existing concrete realities. It is no use bemoaning the fact that there are Parties and Groups which are not of an all-India character. It is not enough if we build a sort of Left unity. The task is to build a broad front of democratic parties, groups and individuals.

We must be prepared to have agreement even on a local scale on issues and demands and act together with whatever political party or groups or even prominent individuals who are prepared to join hands with us. As we have pointed out earlier the agreement may be on one issue or on a number of issues. It is with only this kind of united functioning and building the united democratic committees for the specific purposes that will lead to greater and greater understanding among the various elements, draw them closer and will lead ultimately to a stronger and cohesive united democratic front organisation.

#### UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT AND MASS ORGANISATION

We feel that at the present stage and under the existing conditions, the UDF can only be a front of political parties, groups and individuals arriving at agreements from place to place and time to time, ever widening the scope of these agreements and it cannot be a mass political organisation to begin with even on a local or provincial scale, leave alone an all-India scale.

Your demand that "mass organisations should be autonomous as for their economic problems are concerned but that they should be politically in the United Front as the common political expression" is basically a wrong proposition. Mass organisations are the embodiment of the unity of the class. It cannot surrender its rights to any other organisation.

Secondly, the acceptance of such a proposition would lead

to the disruption of the mass organisation. Certain Congressmen and Socialists have set up their own Trade Unions and other mass organisations. This path has led to the disruption of the unity of the mass organisations.

Working class and other people are realising to a greater and greater extent during the last five years that disunity in their class organisations weakens them in their struggle against the exploiters, and the urge for unity is growing rapidly among them. To follow the discredited path of those who have attempted to disrupt the unity of the mass organisations will be wrong. Such a course, instead of helping the masses to conduct their struggles, would help the exploiters to succeed in their attacks on the masses. Therefore this course today would lead to the undermining of the very foundation of the development of the U.D.F., viz., the struggles of the masses.

We feel that today, in the conditions prevailing in the country, where the unity of the Trade Unions, Kisan Sabhas and other mass organisations has got to be fought for and immediately achieved, no mass organisation can be affiliated to the Democratic Front in any part of our country. Once you make it a condition that the mass organisation—either Trade Union or Kisan Sabha or any other—should be affiliated to a political party—be it the Congress, the P.S.P., or the U.D.F.—no united mass organisation can be built. The Communist Party has never accepted and can never accept the theory of mass organisations being subordinated to a political party. It has always advocated for united mass organisations where its members are free to hold any political view but submit to the democratic decision of the majority of the workers.

#### U.D.F. IN ASSEMBLIES AND PARLIAMENT

You have objected to our functioning in the Parliament in the name of our own Party. On top of it you also allege that Com. Ajoy had admitted it to be a tactical blunder.

We deny this allegation against our General Secretary as entirely baseless. Our Central Committee resolution of March 1952 was very categorical and laid down the course we should follow in the Parliament. That resolution was openly published and in a meeting of Parliament Members, which was attended

by Dr. Jaisoorya himself, Com. Dange explained that resolution. It was not objected to by anyone then.

In pursuance of that resolution we have been attempting to form a co-ordinating committee of different political parties, groups and individuals in Parliament. We have made it clear that each party can function on its own name while on all agreed issues all parties, either in their name or in the name of the United Front, can present a united opposition. It is because of this, we have been able to preserve a large measure of unity and agreement so far. Many a time members belonging to the U.S.O., P.D.F., and K.S.P. have made statements and allegations which we would never have allowed to go on behalf of the U.D.F. without then and there repudiating them.

From all these it will be clear that our approach to this problem of building and consolidating the United Front is not based on the Communist Party's desire to impose its will on other parties and groups. We do not insist on their acceptance of our programme or demand that they merge into the U.D.F., but seek to cooperate with them on the basis of that to which a particular group or party or individual agrees.

It will equally be clear that we believe that the only way to build U.D.F. on countrywide scale is by way of various democratic parties and groups and individuals coming together on whatever issues and in whatever places they can agree to work and lead the masses in their day-to-day struggles and get their demands and building the various mass organisations as united organs of struggle. As the struggles develop, understanding among the parties will grow, leading and producing the agreement between them. Thus alone it will be possible to set up a countrywide United Front Organisation, without sacrificing the independence of particular parties or groups.

The stark reality has to be faced that different parties and groups have not come together on the basis of a joint and united struggle of the masses over a long period. Only in the recent past they are being drawn together in a number of struggles over wide areas of our country.

In spite of the fact that political unity on a programmatic basis has not been achieved between different political parties and groups, immense possibilities are opening up for the coming together on various issues affecting our people and together leading the struggles of the masses on an unprecedented scale.

When an agreement is reached on any issue and a United Front is formed, the Communist Party is anxious and will do everything in its power to develop common activity under the auspices of the United Front. This is exactly what we do--for example, in the recent struggles at Calcutta and elsewhere.

But it must be clearly understood that the development of such joint activity is not dependent on the Communist Party alone. Other parties and groups also must agree to it. The Communist Party cannot impose its will on the other parties and groups. It can only argue and persuade.

But where the other parties or groups do not agree to such joint activity the Communist Party cannot sit quiet with folded hands. It cannot ask the masses to wait till there is agreement between the various parties.

The Party has a duty by the masses and it will mobilise them on every political, economical and social issue irrespective of the fact that it has not been able to achieve agreements with other parties. At the same time, the Communist Party does not stand in the way of other parties doing likewise.

It is that which the Central Committee resolution of March 1953, which you have quoted, emphasises.

The United Front does not grow and get consolidated by the Communist Party or other parties giving up such mobilisation, but on the other hand, such mobilisation facilitates the coming together and joint activity of Democratic Parties and groups.

Our approach to the whole problem is based on two factors that are of fundamental importance. Firstly no party will be allowed to impose its will on others and independence of each Party will be fully guaranteed. Secondly, different parties functioning in the U.D.F. and developing the united mass movement, instead of weakening the component parties will only strengthen themselves. We also believe that the stronger the political parties, stronger will be the U.D.F. movement.

It is because of all these considerations that U.D.F. Committees at various levels will have to be a front of parties, groups and influential individuals and function as coordinating bodies and cannot become alternative political organisations. No mass organisation should be affiliated to the U.D.F. Committees at the present stage.

It is not for us now to speculate when the U.D.F. organisation will develop on a countrywide scale in future, what organisa-

tional structure it will assume, whether mass organisations will be represented by means of collective affiliation along with political parties or will have individual membership, etc.

#### UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT IN HYDERABAD

All this applies to the P.D.F., in Hyderabad.

Here we have to make one point very clear. In your letter you say "evidence supports the conclusion that in Hyderabad people have thought in terms of the P.D.F., rather than in terms of constituent parties of the P.D.F. It matters little to them whether it is a party or a United Front". The reality in Hyderabad and especially in Telengana is the other way round.

We would also take this opportunity of clearing the misunderstanding which you seem to have developed as is evident from your statement that "after one year's consideration and hesitation, reserving the unfettered right of the party, they have permitted the P.D.F., some organisational structure and executive function similar to the one adopted by the P.D.F. Council as an interim agreement in June, 1952". We did consent to the setting up of P.D.F. Committees up to Taluka level in Telangana : but we were very clear then as we are today, that no P.D.F. Committee can be formed either at Taluka or Town or any level unless there are other political parties or influential individuals who are prepared to come into a united front committee along with the Communist Party.

You yourself have stated in your letter that "it would be better to have straightaway a co-ordinating front with no day-to-day executive function".

We agree with you that in the present stage of development, the P.D.F. in Hyderabad should function as a co-ordinating body, which shall meet and discuss various issues and come to agreement between the parties, groups and individuals for the development of common mass campaign and struggle.

It is not that we are denying the P.D.F. Committee's daily functions. But in fact we want every local Committee to ever widen its daily functions day by day, ever widen the common understanding on a larger number of issues and draw into its activities larger number of groups and individuals.

It is obvious that decisions in this committee can only be taken on the basis of unanimity. And where no unanimity is reached,

each party is free to take its own course of action. We are not prepared to accept your decision that in local PDF Committees decisions can be taken by two-third majority, unless all the representatives of a political party unanimously vote against the particular decision.

Our approach is a democratic approach. From our experience at Calcutta, in Hyderabad, in Madras and elsewhere we know what happens. When U.D.F. Committees are formed we give equal representation to every small group or individual along with mass parties. When a mass party disagrees with the particular issue and refuses to give up its stand, the overwhelming majority present can accuse the party as not accepting the "overwhelming" democratic vote or decision. It is clear that this democratic vote does not represent the overwhelming majority of the people mobilised behind all these parties. But if the same party should insist that these P.D.F. Committees be formed on the basis of their respective strength, then it will be a very difficult position for the smaller parties and groups. The mass party would be accused of trying to swamp others. On this basis there would never be a united front committee.

It is just because of this we insist that the U.D.F. Committees take decisions by agreement on the issues that face them.

As far as the Legislature of Hyderabad is concerned, the parties and groups and individuals in the PDF should, we think, function as a front on the various questions that come up in the Legislature on the basis of agreement. Where no agreement is reached, each party must be free to take its own stand.

It should be clearly understood that the Front inside the Assembly is there only for the purpose of legislative activities. They can have a common programme which they should endeavour to fight for inside the Assembly and campaign for outside unitedly, thus helping the building of united mass campaigns and struggles.

#### QUESTION OF WORKING CLASS LEADERSHIP

We are amazed at your statement:—

"So far the Indian proletariat as such has neither led the struggle of the peasants and other working people, nor has it developed to any tangible extent, that social and revolutionary consciousness as the Russian proletariat in 1918. The working

class leadership therefore in practice means C.P.I. leadership and in our experience they have always attempted to equate leadership with C.P.I. leadership, since the C.P.I. does not recognise any other party than itself as the working class party. We may be mistaken, but this is the impression we have gained from the actions and behaviour of their lesser lights with Petty Commissar Mentality, but, all things considered, the C.P.I. has failed to establish itself in national leadership in the past. It is also admitted that it has passed through and has not yet completed passing through, a series of serious sectarian periods. *In such a background the slogan takes a shape in practice to somehow impose this leadership on every Front at all strategic levels. "This somehow" includes even undemocratic methods and intrigues. That leads to undemocratic functioning and a gulf between the CPI and the other constituents of the Front.* It must also be pointed out that this call is not merely local but from the Centre and probably forms a basic principle."

We cannot write here a history of Indian working class movement and its role in the national struggle for freedom, without which we despair to convince you of the fantastic formulations made in the above quotation. It is the working class that gave the national movement one of the most effective form of struggle, the mass general strike, which the bourgeoisie tried its best to discourage by placing before the people its own specific "satyagraha" form of struggle. The glorious part the working class has played by means of its struggles not only on the economic plane but on the political plane as well, as was evidenced in 1946 during the days of the RIN mutiny, need not be repeated here.

It is also necessary to point out that it is the working class struggles that had inspired the organisation of the Kisan Sabha and other class organisations.

We never stated that by shouting at the top of our voice Working class leadership, it would be established. The role and the leadership of the working class will be accepted as it wages struggles in support of the various other classes in support of their struggles and demands.

We are convinced to the extent that the working class in alliance with the peasantry builds a revolutionary movement, to that extent sections of the middle classes, intelligentsia and later even the national bourgeoisie will rally in the U.D.F. We

will certainly approach the intelligentsia and the middle class positively and patiently explain to them the undeniable fact that their interests as well as the future of the Indian people lie in their joining the front of the working class and peasantry and not that of the landlords and the monopolists. We can never accept the theory that the basis of the Indian revolutionary movement is the middle class and the intelligentsia. Your interpretation of Chinese history, we must point out, is totally wrong. Instead of depending on stray quotations from people like Jack Beldon, we would request you to study the writings of the authoritative leaders of Chinese revolution such as Com. Mao and Com. Liu Shao-chi.

The three-three-three system that the Chinese comrades have adopted came not when they started building the united democratic movement but at an advanced stage of the revolution, when the United Front had grown in struggles, and when they elected Peoples Government Councils in liberated areas. It was in these councils that they adopted this system.

It is no use quoting that example here when the United Front movement is in the beginning stages.

We do not think it necessary to answer here your insinuations of "undemocratic methods and intrigues", "lesser lights with Petty-Commissar mentality", etc. Suffice it for us to point out that we have functioned more democratically than any other party in the country.

In this connection, we must point out that in spite of our anxieties to continue PDF, it was Sri Dange, one of your members, under the advice of Sri Jaisoorya that had joined the "Democratic Party" in the Council of States, a party which consists of Maharajahs and even ex-Razakar Minister Sri B. S. Venkatrao.

The path of our Party is not a series of sectarian periods. We certainly do not claim to have been infallible. Nonetheless our policies have been far more correct than that of any other political party in the country. Our past has been one of heroic suffering and self-sacrifice while leading unflinchingly the struggle of our people. That is why the people have been turning to us more and more. We do not deny that we have made sometimes serious mistakes. But it is also an undeniable fact that we have woken up to them by our own experience and corrected them. Our whole party literature is a proof of this.

It is true that the Communist Party has to go a long way before



its guidance will be accepted by the overwhelming majority of the working class and other masses of our country as correct. We have still to go a long way before we secure the full confidence of the overwhelming majority of our people. But that is no reason why we should give up our understanding of the political situation and our policies and struggles in the interest of the people when they are convinced that they are correct.

#### CARRY FORWARD NATIONAL TRADITIONS

You repeat the usual anti-communist slanders that the CPI does not find "it advisable to recognise and assimilate the national movement, the best traditions and following of the country and its people."

We are proud of our country and our people's past achievements and struggles. In fact the working class and peasants of our country have laid down glorious traditions under the leadership of the Party. We are doing our best to carry forward the best traditions of the national movement in the present conditions, discarding all that is dead and obsolete. It is because of this that the vast majority of the old revolutionaries from the Ghadra Babas, Babbar akalis, Bhagat Sing's colleagues, Bengal revolutionaries and numberless patriots drawn from the Congress movements have already joined our Party, and more and more are turning towards us all over the country.

#### EXTRA-TERRITORIAL LOYALTIES

It is no wonder after thus repeating the above-mentioned slanders you have taken up this one of all our policies being determined by "Moscow or Comintern or Cominform", in other words "by extra-territorial loyalties". The imperialists and feudal landlords and the monopolists who collaborate with the imperialists have been repeating this slander. The development of our Party and the growing support of our people prove that they did not succeed in confusing the people by this myth.

Our loyalty is to our own country, which means to the mass of our people. We have stood and fought for the freedom of India and its people and its unity. We have always exposed the feudal landlords and monopolists, their parties and their leadership, how they have been betraying our national interests,

the cause of India's freedom and Indian unity in the interests of foreign imperialists, especially the British imperialists. And we will continue to do it. In fact, our Programme is the only programme which can guarantee freedom and independence of our country and the unfettered sovereignty of its people and we will fight for it doggedly.

Our theory of nationality and self-determination never meant separation of different nationalities in India leading to disruption of Indian unity and partition of India. We have concretised this in very unambiguous terms, in the demand for linguistic states and provincial autonomy in the United Democratic Peoples Republic of India.

#### ATTITUDE TO RELIEF WORK

You accuse the Communist Party of India that "it considers all constructive work as reformism". You then go on to enunciate your profound theory, "relief is the real and immediate thing while revolution is a *distant necessity*."

No comment on this is required. We have made our position very clear, how Party workers must utilise every relief measure and see that it actually benefits the people. In fact, in Rayalaseema, in Maharashtra, in Tamilnad and in various other States which are in the grip of famine, it is the workers of the Communist Party that were in the forefront of the relief work. In Bengal, it is the Communist Party that stood in the forefront in mobilising people for the demand for relief against distress.

But we do not think that the people's miseries will be substantially relieved by the existing government. Nor do we consider that revolution is a *distant necessity*. Unfortunately for us though the revolution is a crying necessity today, we are not in a position to carry it through as soon as we desire or as the crying necessity demands.

#### VIOLENCE AND NON-VIOLENCE

You also accuse us of believing in violence or "armed struggle" and demand that we "eschew it unreservedly".

We have to remind you of the answer to this bogey of violence that the PDF of Hyderabad gave less than two years ago on

its Election Manifesto. This is what you yourself had stated in that document:

“It is obvious that all those who are pledged to the mighty reconstruction of the life of the down-trodden masses, to the regeneration of a new culture of all people, are pledged to stand for democratic methods and can have no love for violence, bloodshed or civil war. It is the attitude and practice of the exploiters of the people, who are determined to protect their interests by total suppression of the people and at any cost, that drive the masses to the different methods of struggle and for self-defence. It is, therefore, wrongful to indulge in loose talk about violence and non-violence in dealing with basic problems of life of the people. In fact, it is being today used by the vested interests to side-track the real issues and perpetuate their tyranny.”

We cannot but ask you why you are raising this question to us now? One would have expected you to have raised this with the Government of Hyderabad, with the landlords there who are indulging in loot and murder and have let loose armed gangs on the peasants. The devastation caused by these armed gangs to the villagers in Telangana are too well-known to be recounted here.

This letter, we hope, will clear any misunderstanding. It should help us to work together in developing the mass movement and conducting growing mass campaign and struggles on the various economic and political issues that face our people. By taking up such issues and developing mass campaign and struggles jointly we will be really helping in the development of a firm Democratic Front. We can and should have faith in our people and their genius to evolve the form of the Front in the course of the development of democratic movement.

Yours fraternally,

P. RAMAMURTHY,

for Central Committee, Communist Party of India

## **Resolution of the CC to the Party Congress (1954)**

This Resolution submitted by the CC to the Party Congress at Palghat clarifies the CC's stand on various aspects of policy and organisational work. The first part rejects the idea of National Platform for Peace and Freedom put forth by Ramamurti in his article in the *New Age* as incorrect. It also disapproves the PB circular regarding the celebration of occasions like August 15. The Resolution states that "the spirit of struggle against the Government, struggle for its replacement by a Government of Democratic Unity—this should be the crux of the writings and speeches of the Party on such occasions."

The second part deals with the note submitted by ten members of the UPPC developing their idea of a National Platform of peace, democracy and freedom based on Ramamurti's article mentioned above and another note submitted by eleven members of the UPPC disagreeing with the first note. The CC rejects the idea of the National Platform as a totally wrong approach to the question and points out that "the Question of a National Platform embracing the Congress cannot arise because representing as it does the landlords and monopoly capitalists collaborating with British imperialism, the Congress is the major political force which blocks India's march to full freedom and democracy."

The third and the fourth parts include directives regarding the conduct of student movement and peace movement respectively. The main task with regard to the students is to develop a "broad based mass

organisation of the students” and to “draw the best of them into the Party”. It also exhorts that “communist students should attempt to become good students. . . . in order to win the respect of the mass of students”.

This document was first published in the Democratic Research Service publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

## I

### ON THE WORK OF THE PB

Having reviewed some of the work of the Polit Bureau since the last meeting of the Central Committee and having discussed some of the articles written by PB Members in the Party Press, the Central Committee comes to the following conclusions:

1. The concept of National Platform for Peace and Freedom given currency to through the article written by Com. Ramamurti and published in the *New Age Weekly* dated July 18, is totally incorrect. It is correct for the Party to give the slogan of building a broad platform for peace and to call for joint action with Congressmen in order to popularise the five principles contained in the Nehru-Chou Joint Statement, but it is wrong to make such a joint campaign for the popularisation of the five principles synonymous with a National Platform for Peace and Freedom. The CC wants to make it clear that even the acceptance by the Nehru Government of the five principles does not make the foreign policy of the Nehru Government a consistent policy of peace. The Party does not think that the Congress organisation as such stands consistently for peace and freedom, and the question of a National Platform does not arise.

2. It was incorrect on the part of the PB in its July meeting to have decided to issue a Circular on August 15 in the form in which it was issued. If the PB had thought that there was a likelihood of the Party in any Province doing something which would lead the Party to clashes with the Congress' celebration of August 15, or simple denunciation of August 15, it should have issued clear instructions as to what should be done and what should not be done. The circular as it stood, with the

absence of such instructions created confusion in the Party in the various Provinces and prevented the Party from mobilising all its forces for meetings, rallies and other means of propaganda through which the Party's stand with regard to August 15 is to be explained to the people. That circular was particularly wrong in that it posed as if there are some questions connected with the freedom won on August 15 which the CC should consider and decide. The CC wants to make it clear that the Programme adopted in 1951 gives an understanding on the character of freedom won on August 15 in terms that are clear; the Political Resolution adopted at the Madurai Congress has also made this point clear enough. Basing itself in these Party documents the PB should have issued instructions as to how to take this understanding to the people on August 15 in a way which will not lead the Party into conflict with the Congress masses. Nor does the Party think that the Congress organisation as such, dominated by landlords and monopolists collaborating with British imperialism, can consistently stand for peace. The question of a national platform with the Congress on the issue of freedom does not arise.

Hence the question of Party units, members, M.P.s, and State legislators participating in the official celebrations of 15th August and 26th January does not arise. Nor is it right for Party Units and Party members to join in the All-Party Committees which the Provincial Governments sometimes set up for the celebrations of these days.

3. The Editorials of the *New Age Weekly* and *Monthly* and other articles which appeared in the August 15 Number of *New Age Weekly* have failed to fulfil the central task to be fulfilled by the Party Press on such an occasion like August 15. The Central Committee is of opinion that on occasions like August 15 and January 26, the Party Press should not confine itself to certain current developments and problems or to certain aspects of the Government policy. These are occasions on which the Party's stand with regard to the whole Government policy should be explained to the people in the Party Press and in rallies under the Party flag. This is particularly necessary at the present time when the Party has necessarily to tell the people that certain aspects of the Government's foreign policy are helpful to the cause of peace: occasions like August 15 should be used not in dealing with such aspects of Government policy or to

pure economic questions but to explain to the people how, in spite of certain steps taken by Government which are helpful to the cause of peace, Government policy as a whole is inconsistent on questions of peace in the world and anti-people at home. The spirit of struggle against the Government, struggle for its replacement by a Government of Democratic Unity—this should be the crux of the writings and speeches of the Party on such occasions. The articles referred to above suffer very seriously in this respect.

4. It was wrong on the part of the PB to have suggested to the Communist MPs (though this suggestion was subsequently withdrawn in the light of opposition voiced by MPs) that they should give a token contribution of Rs. 100/- to the National Loan. Far from enabling them to effectively intervene against the coercive activities of the bureaucrats in making people subscribe to the National Loan, as the PB had thought this token contribution will do, it would be used by the bureaucrats to carry on their coercion: the fact that the most well-known leaders of the Communist Party have themselves subscribed to the Loan will be broadcast through all the means of propaganda available in the hands of the Government and utilised to put all sorts of pressure on the people.

5. Noting that the Polit Bureau has acknowledged these mistakes on its part, the Central Committee calls upon it to take the lessons of these mistakes and plan its future work on the basis of the understanding evolved at this CC meeting.

## II

### ON U.P. DOCUMENTS

1. The Central Committee has carefully considered the note submitted to it by 10 members of the U.P. Provincial Committee including among others, a Central Committee member, Comrade S.S. Yusuf, entitled "Some Points on Comrade Ramamurti's article: Need for a National Platform." The note "Welcomes Comrade Ramamurti's Article for a National Platform because it denotes a clear and positive attitude towards the growing progressive direction in the foreign policy of the Indian Government." It, however, considers this inadequate and demands of the Central Committee that the concept of National Platform

should be "carefully and correctly developed into a full-fledged tactical line for the Party." The essence of this new tactical line should, according to them, be that the Party should "rapidly bring about such a shift in the alignment of political forces as to lead to the establishment of a Government of Peace, Independence and Democracy which will symbolise the unity of all peace-loving, patriotic and democratic forces against the pro-imperialist, pro-feudal reactionary elements and become in the given conditions the practical realisation of Government of Democratic Unity, our central political slogan advanced at the Madurai Party Congress." Finally, the note "requests the Central Committee that the subject be thrown open for inner-Party discussion in suitable forms."

2. The Central Committee has also considered the note submitted to it by 11 members of the U.P.P.C., including, among others, a CC and PB Member, Comrade Z. A. Ahmed. This note considers the understanding given in the other note "as a gross reformist and Right-opportunist understanding, which seeks, in the name of tactical reorientation, to bring about a reversal of the Party Programme and policy, taking the Party in the direction of lining up behind Nehru and Indian big bourgeoisie." At the same time, it criticises Comrade Ramanurti's article, since, "in spite of the inconsistencies that it has shown in Nehru's foreign policy, it virtually calls upon Nehru to take over the leadership of the struggle for peace and defence of freedom in India. It gives the AICC almost the status of a national forum. It, therefore, tends to suffer from a Right-deviationist understanding." The note further demands "that important articles which give such a major policy slogan as the formation of a National Platform should not be published in Party organs without having been previously discussed by the PB or the CC."

3. The Central Committee is of opinion that the demand for the working out of a new tactical line based on a National Platform for Peace, Freedom and Democracy made by the 10 U.P.P.C. members, is a demand for giving up the struggle for replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity in favour of a Government of Coalition between the Communists and the Nehru Government. This demand is made by them purely because certain developments have taken place in the international situation: "The new welcome idea of building a National Platform has emerged out of a rapidly developing



international situation and the effective and positive role played by Indian foreign policy and the important developments taking place inside the country." Though reference is made to "important developments taking place inside the country", no explanation is offered as to what these internal developments are. On the other hand, the note tacitly admits that no shift has taken place in the home policy of the Nehru Government when it says that "the key element in the Indian situation is the gross contradiction between the foreign and the internal policies of the Indian Government." The note goes on to add in justification of the demand for the working out of a new tactical line: "This contradiction cannot remain at a standstill for any length of time. Either the progressive forces must utilise the present progressive direction of the foreign policy to reverse the reactionary internal policy, or the reactionary forces will use the weakness of the situation to get the foreign policy reversed."

4. The Central Committee considers that this is a totally wrong approach to the question of what the central political slogan of the Party should be. When the Madurai Congress arrived at the slogan of replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity, it did so on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the relation of class forces in the country in the background of the relation of international forces. The resolution based itself on the understanding that the country is going through a serious economic crisis and is in the initial stages of a political crisis. The main feature of the political crisis even in its initial stages is the fact that an increasing number of working people are coming out against the economic and political policies of the Congress Government and that these struggles of the working people are increasingly finding their reflection even inside the ruling party. This political crisis can be resolved only by replacing the present Congress Government by a Government which will totally reverse the economic and political policies pursued by this Government and will adopt new policies in defence of the interests of the common people. The question of a National Platform embracing the Congress (as the 10 members of the UPPC are suggesting) cannot arise because, representing as it does the landlords and monopoly capitalists collaborating with British imperialism, the Congress is the major political force which blocks India's march to full freedom and democracy.

5. The Central Committee is of opinion that the so-called "contradiction between the foreign and internal policies of the Indian Government" is a contradiction only to those who look upon the Indian Government from a non-class point of view. The basic fact that has to be borne in mind when we try to assess the foreign as well as internal policy of the present Indian Government is that it is a Government of the landlords and monopoly capitalists collaborating with British imperialism and that all its policies—foreign or internal—are essentially designed to protect the interests of these classes as against the interests of the common people. The few conflicts that have recently broken out between the Governments of India and Great Britain are also based on the real conflicts between the Indian and British ruling classes. While these conflicts with American and British imperialism enable the Indian ruling classes on occasions to take certain steps that are helpful to the cause of peace, its primary task is to preserve, protect and further advance the interests of Indian landlords and monopoly capitalists as against the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Indian people. It is impermissible for any Marxist who looks upon the present Congress Government as a Government of Indian landlords and monopolists collaborating with British imperialism to consider that the conflicts between this Government and the American as well as British war-mongers provide a sufficient basis for the hope that its whole policy can be reversed if only a National Platform is built, by which is meant a Platform including the Congress.

6. The Central Committee desires further to point out that, even with regard to those aspects of the present Congress Government policy which help the cause of peace, no basic shift has taken place since the Madurai Congress. The Madurai resolution had characterised "the role played by the Indian Government on a number of important international issues in the recent period," as "factors helping the cause of peace." It, however, added, as is pointed out in the note submitted to the Central Committee by the 11 members of the UPPC, that "the situation does not warrant that democratic forces should give general overall support to Governmental policies even in the international sphere. This is because the Indian Government does not consistently follow a policy of peace and democracy." All that has happened since the Madurai Congress—the Indian

Government's demand for the suspension of Hydrogen Bomb tests; its rejection of Eisenhower's offer of military aid to India on the same terms as to Pakistan; its efforts for the bringing about of a cease-fire in Indo-China; its rejection of the SEATO proposal; its signature of the India-China agreement on Tibet; its acceptance, in the Nehru-Chou Joint Statement, of the five principles, etc. are, of course, further steps in the same direction of the Indian Government's efforts for peace. They, however, do not make India less tied to British imperialism nor does it make the Congress Government a Government which adopts progressive policies on internal questions. It is these ties with British imperialism and these reactionary internal policies that have, for the last seven years, prevented India from following a consistent policy of peace. It is, therefore, wrong to characterise the Government of India's foreign policy as a whole progressive, and to talk of "contradiction" between "progressive" foreign policy and reactionary home policy. The task of the Party and all other democratic forces is to fight for a consistent policy of peace, by building a strong peace movement and by fighting against its alliance and collaboration with British imperialism, as well as its internal policy in support of landlords and monopoly capitalists.

7. The concept of National Platform for peace and freedom, given currency through the article of P. Ramamurti in *New Age* of July 18, on which the 10 UPPC comrades seek to develop their thesis for a platform of peace, democracy and freedom, is, as has been pointed out in another resolution of the CC, incorrect.

8. The Central Committee rejects the understanding contained in the note of the 10 UPPC members as an understanding contrary to the Political Resolution of the Third Party Congress. It calls upon all Party members and Party units, not only in U.P. but everywhere, to arm themselves with this correct understanding of the struggle against the Government of India's foreign and home policies. Such a correct understanding alone will enable them boldly to build mass unity in action on the stand that has already been taken by the Indian Government as well as to organise struggle against the basic foreign and internal policies of the Government of India.

9. Since this question has been thoroughly discussed in the Party, both before and after the Third Party Congress, and

since the overwhelming majority of the Party today is against any weakening of the struggle for the replacement of the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity, the Central Committee rejects the demand for throwing open for discussion a question which has already been decided. It calls upon the UPPC to put an end to these discussions and earnestly to take up the task of building the mass organisations of the common people in struggling against rationalisation, evictions, irrigation and other new taxes, etc.

### III ON THE STUDENT MOVEMENT

1. After having considered the P.B. Note on Student Movement (P.B. Circular No. 19/54) dated 25th June 1954 and the reports of the discussion held thereon in various Party Units, the CC decides that work among students should be carried on broadly on the following lines:

2. The Communist Party should keep before itself the following four tasks in relation to the students:

- (i) Draw them into the democratic movement, the movement for peace, national freedom, democracy and social reform.
- (ii) Inculcate in them the scientific spirit and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism in order to fight the attempts to implant pro-imperialist influences among them and also struggle against Gandhian ideology and other decadent thoughts particularly the communal reactionary outlook.
- (iii) Draw the best of them into the Party—train them as good workers through whom Marxist-Leninist ideology is taken to the working class and peasant masses; remould their own world outlook through living contact with militant organisations and struggles of the working class and the peasantry; develop in them a healthy respect for the proletarian movement and its allies; inculcate in them a spirit of selfless service to the common people; steel them through active participation in the day-to-day lives and struggles of the common people.
- (iv) Develop a powerful students' movement and build strong broad-based mass organisations of the students.

3. These tasks have to be carried out through certain specific forms of activities and they are:

- (a) Struggle for specific demands of the students—hostel accommodation, free education, more facilities for sports, laboratories and libraries, the right to form and democratically function College Unions as well as societies and associations for separate departments, such as history, science, literature etc.
- (b) Participation in campaigns and struggles on democratic political issues like the release of political prisoners, linguistic provinces, civil liberties, peace movement etc.
- (c) Ideological work: organisation of debates reading of papers, seminars etc., with a view to help the mass of students understand the various points of view on important problems and in this process see that reactionary points of view and anti-Communist and anti-Soviet slanders are effectively combatted and consistently democratic and Marxist-Leninist point of view is effectively established.
- (d) Various forms of relief, self-help and cultural activities among the students: organisation of co-operatives for the cheap supply of books and stationery, collection of old books and organisation of free tuition for the benefit of poor students, organisation of groups for extra-curricular studies of subjects, organisation of medical relief, etc., which help to create a spirit of solidarity among students.
- (e) Extra-mural activity like social or economic survey of an area, relief work in flood, famine and epidemics, volunteering for helping the Trade Unions and Kisan Sabhas whenever they require such help (occasions like conferences etc.) work in Trade Union and Kisan Sabha Offices during vacations and spare hours, adult literacy campaigns in working class and peasant areas, tuitions for working class and peasant students, etc., thus strengthening the bond between students on one hand and the broad democratic masses on the other. Such activity as medical aid, literacy, tuition for working class and peasant students, conducted through Trade Unions and Kisan Sabhas, will be of great help to these organisations to develop their work and will also train students to become cadres for mass work.

All the above five forms of activities are important. They should be carried out, and none of them should be ignored.

4. The last seven years have shown that, on such issues as the release of political prisoners in Bengal, the Linguistic Province movement in Andhra, the Tramfare and Teachers' struggles in Calcutta, the first wave of Travancore peoples' struggles against the Congress Ministry (1948) etc., the mass of students were brought into political action on a Provincial scale. These mass political actions of students are one of the indications of the political crisis which, according to the Political Resolution of the Third Party Congress is in its 'initial stages'. As the crises deepens more and more, such direct political actions of the mass of students are bound to take place. The Communist students should therefore organise themselves in such a way that, when the mass of students resort to such direct political action, their struggles are successfully led.

5. Regarding students' struggles for the specific educational demands, the Party should have no hesitation in organising and leading such struggles. It should be borne in mind that the bankruptcy of the Congress Government's Five-Year Plan is resulting in attacks on the people not merely in purely economic matters but in the educational field as well. It is against such attacks on the educational rights of the people that such united struggles as in Orissa and in Gwalior in 1951, in Saurashtra in 1952, in U.P. in 1953, the recent struggles as in PEPSU and Indore took place. These are struggles which have united not only students belonging to various political parties as well as non-Party students; they also united the broad masses of the common people around the legitimate demands of the students. It is the task of the Communist students to so work among the students as to be able to lead the mass of students in such struggles.

6. It is of importance for Communist students to undertake planned and constructive activity such as strengthens solidarity among students, strengthens the bond between students and non-student democratic masses, heightens political consciousness among students and combats reactionary and decadent ideologies.

7. It should be realised by the Communists that such multiple activities and struggles can be carried on successfully by means of developing the Students' Federation as a powerful

democratic mass organisation of students. Attempts should be made to draw into the Federation all students who are prepared to fight for the rights and demands of the student community in the educational field as well as on general democratic demands.

8. While doing so, it is necessary that a correct attitude should be adopted towards College Unions which have come into existence in many places and which are becoming important centres of students' activities. All forms of sectarianism towards College Unions should be abandoned and the best elements from amongst the mass of students should be bound together on a programme of activating the College Unions with a view to drawing the majority of students into cultural and democratic activity.

9. Finally Communist students should attempt to become good students and should distinguish themselves in studies, sports, debates etc., in order to win the respect of the mass of students.

#### IV

### ON THE WORK OF THE PARTY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

Having considered the work of the Party in the struggle for peace, the CC is of opinion that certain defects, both political and organisational, are seriously hampering the development of a broad and strong Peace Movement in our country. Such a development is quite possible today in the concrete conditions inside our country, provided these defects are removed.

The CC considers that a struggle should be launched throughout the Party to remove these defects and for this purpose considers the following steps as essential. (a) The entire Party should be made to realise that Peace is not one of the "fronts" in which a few individual comrades have to work but an issue on which the entire Party is to be mobilised. In other words, the struggle for peace is a *political task which every Party member, every democrat, should fulfil* as an integral part of the struggle for full freedom and democracy. The popularisation of the Party's stand on all international issues is of paramount importance in inculcating proletarian interna-

tionalism in the working class, on which depends the sweep of the Peace Movement.

(b) Every Party Committee should discuss regularly the major developments in the international field in order that the people are educated on them. Both in the regular meetings of the CC, PCs and lower Committees, as well as at special meetings held to consider important international developments (like the conclusion of the Geneva Conference), Party Committees should discuss these developments in order to evolve their line of agitation on them; the leading team of the Committee (Polit Bureau and Secretaries) should prepare properly for such meetings and help the Committee to work out a practical plan of agitation and action.

(c) The leading teams of Party Committees, in consultation with Comrades working in the Peace Movement and mass organisations, should plan out the political and organisational slogans of the Party's peace campaigns.

(d) The Party should finally organise a campaign of so remoulding the character of day-to-day agitation carried on by Party members and allies of the Party that questions of peace and war are brought before the people at all those conferences, meetings etc., wherever and to the extent to which it is possible.

The CC directs all Party Committees and units to seriously implement the above directives.



## **Draft Resolution for the Emergency Session of the CC (1954)**

The background to this highly interesting document is provided in the Report submitted by the CC to the Party Congress at Palghat. That Report mentions the article of R. Palme Dutt, in *For Lasting Peace and People's Democracy*, which "threw the PB into a state of panic." It further tells that "with total disregard to all principles which should guide the relation between brother parties, it (PB) hastily summoned an urgent meeting of the CC, placing before it a resolution rejecting the article. The CC rightly refused to endorse that resolution." The following is the text of the resolution mentioned above. The meeting of the CC was held in October 1954. This document was first published by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

1. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India has considered the article which Com. Palme Dutt has written in the Organ, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, dated October 8 under the title, "New Features in National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent Peoples."

2. Pointing out the intensified offensive of American imperialism since the Second World War, against the Western European Powers and their colonies and particularly against the "largest remaining world Empire" of the British, Com. RPD states the "important conclusions that follow in the struggle for national independence" in this situation.

The first of these conclusions is that

"The struggle for national independence in the countries in the sphere of British imperialism is no longer only against British imperialism, but, first of all, against the *direct rule*

of British and the growing penetration of American imperialism." (emphasis added)

Com. RPD warns against the dangers of "failure to recognise this new stage of the struggle."

What does this new stage mean for the struggle for national independence of the countries in the sphere of British imperialism? Com. RPD says "...the battle for national independence of the peoples in the countries of the British Empire is a *combined battle* against the immediate domination and oppression of the British imperialists and against the penetration of the American imperialists." (emphasis added)

It is an accepted position in the article of RPD that India is not under the direct rule of British imperialists since the transfer of power. Our Party Programme also holds the same view. If the above conclusion regarding the new feature of struggle for national independence expressly refers to the countries of "direct rule" of British imperialism, is the same thing applicable to India which is not under the "direct rule" and "immediate domination and oppression" of British imperialism?

While the article does not seem to be explicit on this question, the reference to Israel showing "how a foreign colony of British imperialism has in practice become a colony of American imperialism" and the reference that "in Pakistan a similar menace develops" points to the conclusion that for such countries, where direct rule does not prevail, the struggle for independence is equally and simultaneously against two imperialisms—namely, against the British who are indirectly dominating and against the Americans who are newly entering or have entered.

From this it will follow that in countries like India, the struggle for independence is not *mainly* against the British. It is against *two imperialisms simultaneously and equally*.

This conclusion is contrary to our Party Programme where our struggle for national independence is defined as a struggle against British imperialism in the main, while noting the fact that the policies of the Government of India threaten us with "added slavery to American capital."

Com. RPD no doubt correctly warns against the danger of a leadership of a national liberation struggle falling into the trap of "regarding the American imperialists as the rivals and enemies of the British imperialists—their own enemy and oppressors" and hence as friends in the anti-British struggle.

These points have been thoroughly discussed in the Party Congress which came to the conclusion that the Party and the entire democratic movement in India should be warned against two dangers and not only one as Com. Dutt does. These two dangers were very clearly and sharply formulated in the article which our General Secretary, Comrade Ajoy Ghosh wrote in the February 5th number of the journal *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!*

The first of these two dangers or rather opportunist views, on the issues of peace and national freedom, consisted in the understanding that "American imperialism was certainly the main enemy of world peace, but it could not yet be considered an immediate and serious menace to India's freedom." "The line emerging from this understanding", Comrade Ghosh explained, "would have weakened the peace movement, relegated it to a position of minor importance and also disarmed the Indian masses in the face of the American threat—which is not merely a threat to the cause of peace but also to India's freedom."

The second danger or rather, opportunist view—a danger which is not at all referred to in Com. Dutt's article—was one of "over-estimating the grip which American imperialism has already acquired over the economy of India and tending to minimise the significance of the fact that India's struggle for full freedom is a struggle directed, above all, against British imperialism and its ally—the present Indian Government, that it is primarily on the success of this struggle that the well-being of the people depends". "The line emerging from such an understanding," Com. Ghosh further explained, "would have increasingly become a line of full support of the Nehru Government, of lining up behind it on the plea of defence of national freedom. This would have weakened the movement for full freedom, weakened the economic and political struggles of the masses directed against their exploiters and their representative—the present Government, would have strengthened illusions about the Government and thus weakened the independent mass movement for the defence of peace.

3. Com. Dutt's second conclusion is stated as follows: "The fight for national independence of the peoples within the sphere of British imperialism has become a common fight of all the peoples, including Britain, Canada and Australia as well as of India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the direct colonial territories."

While the first formulation spoke of the struggle for national independence of countries in the sphere of British imperialism being a struggle against "the *direct rule* of the British and the growing penetration of American imperialism," this second conclusion speaks of the struggle for national independence of the peoples of India and Britain and other countries of the empire being "a common fight." If this is interpreted to mean **that in** the national liberation movement of a country like India, where there is no *direct rule* of the British, the struggle is to be directed (in common with the British people) against the American imperialism *mainly*, then such a conclusion goes contrary to the understanding of the Party Programme and the III Party Congress.

It is obvious that the fight for national independence of the people of Britain cannot have *the same common content* as the fight for the national independence of the Indian people, if the understanding given in the Programme of our Party and in the Programme of the British Party continues to be valued. For, while the *British Road to Socialism* makes it incumbent on the Communist Party of Great Britain to mobilise the British people against the gradual transformation of an independent country to a semi-colony dependent on American imperialism, our Programme calls upon us to fight for the ending of our already existing semi-colonial status dependent on British imperialism, and achieving full national independence from "the British imperialists who from behind the scene and their collaborators hamper the development of our industries and thus perpetuate our poverty."

4. The third conclusion which, according to Com. Dutt, follows from the American offensive is "the fight for peace against the war drive of the imperialist camp led by American imperialism is closely linked with the fight for national independence.... There can be no separation of the fight for national independence from the fight for peace."

While it is true that some people may regard the struggle for peace and the struggle for national independence as totally unrelated and separate them from each other, it is also true that some may be inclined to make them totally identical. This question was discussed at our Party Congress whose conclusions were:

"The Congress showed the close relationship that exists between

the struggle for peace and the struggle for freedom—struggles, though they are not identical, help and strengthen each other. It emphasised the necessity of conducting both struggles simultaneously and with equal vigour, for both of them are equally important.”

5. The CC considers it necessary to point out that on the whole, the main conclusions of Com. RPD's article which have a bearing on India's struggle for full freedom do not agree with the following conclusion of the III Party Congress and are at variance with it:

“15. Thus the question of defeating the war plans of the American imperialists and India's struggle for peace are closely linked with the question of India's struggle for full and unfettered national struggle, which means, first and foremost, freedom from control of the British who continue to be the dominant imperialist power and of liquidating feudalism. This demands a break with the British Empire, removal of British officers from India's armed forces, breaking of the British stranglehold on India's economy by the confiscation of British capital and the intensification of the struggle for the complete liquidation of landlordism—through which alone conditions will be created for the rapid economic, political and military strengthening of India. A fully independent and powerful India will be a mighty bulwark of freedom, peace and democracy. Also the serious weakening of aggressive British imperialism, the partner of America and oppressor of the colonial peoples, the building up of fully free India outside the Commonwealth and outside all imperialist influence, will be a great factor for world peace and the freedom of all Asian and colonial peoples. Hence the necessity to intensify the fight against British imperialism, for quitting the Commonwealth and for the confiscation of British capital. Hence the necessity of opposition to every manifestation of subservience to British imperialism like participation in economic, political and military conferences under its aegis: hence the necessity of mobilization of people against British atrocities against the colonial people and the creation of a mass demand that the Indian Government must openly condemn them. Any slackening of the struggle, any failure to conduct it with

vigour and determination will mean weakening the movement for freedom and peace."

6. In section III of his article, Com. RPD mentions the way shown by the Chinese People's Revolution "to build the united national front of the working class, the peasantry, the intellectuals and the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie, for the victory of the democratic, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution, and for the establishment of the new type of State of People's Democracy upon this basis."

He also mentions the programme of our Party and that of Indonesia and Iran who have had formulated "this perspective of people's democracy." Com. RPD also mentions the possibility of forming "People's Government of Democratic Unity, based on a broad democratic front" "*as a transitional stage*, on the road to full national liberation and the establishment of people's democracy." (emphasis added)

This, so far as it goes, is no doubt in conformity with the Party Programme and the VII Party Congress conclusion. But if the reference to the path of development of a broad democratic *national* front coupled with the reference to the experience to mean that the situation calls for a united national front, which obviously in Indian conditions, means a front with the Congress, such a conclusion would be against the conclusion of the III Party Congress and the last CC meeting.

While Com. RPD refers to the People's Government of Democratic Unity and the experience in India, there is no explicit mention whether such a Government is by a coalition or otherwise. This omission is likely to strengthen the opportunist understanding that is prevalent among some Party comrades—an understanding which after thorough discussion, the Central Committee rejected at the last meeting that the slogan of replacing the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity should now be given up in favour of the formation of a Government of United National Front of Peace, Freedom and Democracy.

The Party Congress in arriving at the central political slogan of forming a Government of Democratic Unity said: "The struggle for day-to-day demands, the struggle against taxation and high prices, the struggle for the preservation and extension of civil liberties and democratic rights, the struggle for defence of freedom and sovereignty—all get more and more interlinked

and can grow into the common struggle for the *replacement of the present Government by a Government of Democratic Unity, i.e.* Government formed by a coalition of different democratic parties and groups on the basis of a common minimum programme to be decided according to the circumstances which will give immediate relief to the people.

The Government of Democratic Unity envisaged by the Party Congress, therefore, is a Government which emerges out of the struggle of our common people in defence of their daily interests—struggles directed against the ruling party, which it replaces.

To the extent that the conclusions of Com. RPD's article are at variance with the Party Programme and the decisions of the III Party Congress, as pointed out above, the CC disagrees with them. The CC calls upon all Party members and units to carry on work in terms of the Party Programme and the Resolutions of the Party Congress.

## **CC Resolution on Com. R. P. Dutt's Article (1954)**

The discussion by the CC on the article "New Features in National Liberation Struggle of Colonial and Dependent People" written by Com. R. P. Dutt in the LPPD has revealed differences of an important nature in the CC. The CC is of the opinion that more time and thought are required to resolve the differences and bring clarity on the problems discussed. The CC decides, therefore, to discuss these problems in the next session of the CC along with the assessment of the national and international developments which have taken place during the last few months.

The CC takes its firm stand by the Madurai Resolution and it calls upon the party to carry on the work in accordance with the understanding given therein.



## **CC Resolution on Andhra Elections (1955)**

This Resolution of the CC is the *post mortem* examination of the elections in the Andhra State, where the Communists were utterly routed. The strength of the Party in the Andhra Legislature was consequently reduced from 48 in a house of 140 to 15 in a house of 196. The results were a shattering blow to their boastful prediction that the CPI would secure about 110 seats and form a Government. The Resolution traces the cause of the rout to the failure to assess the situation objectively and to adopt the strategy of United Front with other anti-Congress parties. "The anti-Congress Sentiment" the Resolution admits, "of the mass of the people was a reflection of their desire to have an alternate Government with the CP and other parties, groups and individuals, but not a Communist bloc Government."

This document was published by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

1. The Andhra General Election has been one of the biggest political battles the Communist Party has fought in recent years. In this battle the urges of the democratic masses not only in Andhra, but in the whole of India found enthusiastic expression. The 27 lakh votes polled for the Communist Party, the mass mobilisation in meetings and rallies, the expression of fighting solidarity in the shape of financial support by the democratic masses in other Provinces, the selfless and untiring activity of the Party members and sympathisers in Andhra itself—all these testify to the great significance of this political battle. The fact that 21.5 lakh voters cast their votes for the Communist Party braving the pressure of the ruling class as against 35.4 voters that polled for the United Congress Front is in itself an evidence of the strength of the democratic movement in Andhra

and also of the powerful place that the Party occupies in the life of the people. If the elections were held on the basis of proportional representation which our Party Programme upholds, our Party with its 31% poll would have got 59 seats. Even reactionary forces have accepted these facts of the political life in Andhra.

2. Nevertheless, the results of the Andhra elections constituted a big political defeat for the Party for, despite the increased overall poll for the Party, the strength of the Party in the Andhra legislature has been reduced from 48 in a house of 140 to 15 in a house of 196. This should be viewed in the background of the confident predictions made by the Party leadership that the Party would succeed in getting about 110 seats and be in a position to form a Government.

It is not only a defeat for the Communist Party but a serious setback for democratic movement in the whole country. The defeat and more especially the boastful predictions made by the Party leadership even after the poll had gone against it to shake the confidence of the Party members and sympathisers in the Party leadership and has generally lowered the prestige of the Party. This will make the task of repairing the damage more difficult.

It is necessary to draw lessons from the defeat in Andhra, to analyse the political mistakes of the Party leadership, which were primarily responsible for the estimates of victory in Andhra and the tactics pursued in the election. The responsibility for this was that of the PB and CC.

3. The Party contested 169 seats on the Communist Party Bloc itself and with no electoral alliance with any other group or Party. Under the circumstances, the slogan of Government of Democratic Unity in practice was reduced to one of the Communist Bloc.

The position in the last legislature was that out of 140 members, the Party had (including those independents who were prepared to accept and implement the Communist Party programme) a strength of 48. However, of these 48, only 19 were those returned with absolute majorities, the rest having been returned in triangular or quadrangular contests.

The basis of the estimate made by the Andhra PC and accepted in toto by PB was the assumption that the last three years have brought about such a big shift in the public opinion of Andhra that a majority of the people have turned away from the

Congress and towards the Party and also that the economic and political situation in the country as a whole was such as to warrant such a conclusion. That estimate also assumed that a large chunk of people who had voted for the KMP, KLP, PSP and independents in 1952 had shifted from their allegiance to those parties and accepted our party as the Leader. For on no other assumption could the Party hope to secure 100 to 110 seats in straight contests with the possibility of the Congress, KLP and KMP uniting together.

These assumptions were completely unjustified. Although the Congress Ministry was discredited and finally overthrown, although the Party had participated in and even led a number of mass struggles, including the one for the formation of the Andhra State, still the magnitude and sweep of the mass movement and the work of the party in unifying the democratic elements had not yet reached the stage when the Party could expect that it had won the majority of the people.

4. Not only did the Party fail to make such an objective assessment of the situation and find out the extent of the shift taking place among the people, but it was completely misled by the huge mass mobilisation against Congress policies during the last three years. Ever since the 1952 General Elections, a new sense of confidence had arisen among the people in Andhra who came out in their lakhs against the policies pursued by the Congress Government in United Madras before the formation of Andhra and in the newly created Andhra State. Party members inside the legislature as well as outside had played a very important role in organising these campaigns, demonstrations and struggles against Congress policies such as on the issues of Andhra State, increase of taxation, irrigation projects, distribution of *banjar* lands and prohibition. These campaigns and struggles contributed immensely towards the discrediting of the Prakasam-Sanjeeva Reddi Ministry and ultimately defeat in a no-confidence vote. Naturally, therefore, there was a sense of relief among the people after the adoption of the No-Confidence motion, and they in their thousands expressed their joy and demonstrated their desire for the formation of an alternative Government.

Moreover, the Party did not make an objective assessment of the anti-Congress Government sentiments among the people in order to find out what exactly the people wanted. It failed to

realise that the anti-Congress sentiments of the mass of the people was a reflection of their desire to have an alternate Government with the Communist Party and other parties, groups and individuals but not a Communist Bloc Government. This realisation would have led to the adoption of a strategy for fighting for unity with other non-Congress parties even though the leaders of these parties may spurn the call for unity repeatedly.

The voting figures revealed that despite the opportunist behaviour of their leaders, the bulk of the followers of the Congress, KLP, Praja Party, and the PSP remained loyal to them and the Communist Party could not swing the wavering neutrals in its favour in a big way.

It was, however, right on our part to have given and gone into the election battle with the slogan of Government of Democratic Unity in which the Communist Party plays an important role because it corresponded to the desire of a large mass of the Andhra people. Without giving such a slogan and fighting the election, there could be no taking the people forward in the struggle for achieving a Government of Democratic Unity.

5. These initial mistakes made in the course of estimating the situation, were not only not corrected, but led to further and further mistakes. At the time of the dissolution of the legislature, the KLP, the Praja Party, the PSP and the independents were manoeuvring among themselves and with the Congress in order to strengthen their position in the General Elections. Although there were even then talks of unity of some of these groups with the Congress, these talks had not advanced very far; parallel to such talks, there were also talks among many of these parties and some talk between some of them and ourselves. A correct assessment of the situation would have led us to adopt a strategy of seeking united front, or at least electoral adjustments, with as many of these groups or individuals as possible. We would have contested far less number of seats than we did. Not only were no such efforts made but, when in the very course of the election campaign, the united front of the Congress, the KLP and the Praja Party was brought about, the Party once again indulged in the wishful thinking that the very unity of these parties would so disgust their rank and file, and masses following them, that they would come over in support of the Party. With this understanding, the Party went on campaigning and in the process so frightened the middle elements that "the

unity of all against the Communists" became a powerful slogan in the hands of the Congress.

6. In this situation, the choice that faced the electorate was "Either a Government of the Congress or a Communist dominated Government." The Congress and its allies took the fullest advantage of this situation. All the issues that divide the non-Party democratic mass from the Congress and unite them with the Communist Party—issues of immediate relief and other democratic issues—were thrown into the background. They raised the bogey of totalitarianism, violence, religion being in danger, etc. They carried on a powerful campaign not only in Andhra but throughout the country that allegedly the issue at stake was "democracy." By all these means, they succeeded in misleading a considerable section of the electorate.

Our campaign also suffered from some serious mistakes. The issue of peace was placed in the Election Manifesto in an incorrect manner. The failure of the Party to take to the people the positive role that India was playing in the issue of world peace and emphasise the important part that the Party had played bringing about this development enabled the Congress to claim the entire credit for this to itself.

All these took place in the background of a situation when the Congress while pursuing anti-people policies, was also adopting a series of measures to strengthen its links with the people especially the middle strata. The position which India had been acquiring in the international arena during the last few years, the increase in the fall in food prices and removal of controls, the inauguration of the irrigation and other projects, the talk about industrialisation, the recent resolution of the Congress on Socialist Pattern of Society—all these were giving a fresh tone to Congress propaganda.

The sum total of all these had the effect of swinging large sections in middle class elements in towns, the majority of the rich and middle peasants, and the rural intelligentsia in the countryside, in favour of the Congress. The result was that the cadres of the Congress were acquiring a new sense of confidence and thus able to effectively campaign against the Communist Party.

With all these, the Congress was not confident of success. They therefore resorted to a slander and smear campaign on a vast scale. And finally, in order to strike terror in those sections where they could not win over by any other means, they resort-

ed to the weapons of social and economic pressure and intimidation by landlords. Threats of dismissals of farm servants, talk of the non-secret character of the vote ("we will be able to know from the number of your ballot paper for whom you voted"), forcible prevention of poor peasants and agricultural labourers from going to the polling booths, buying of votes, use of hundreds of lorries and route buses to bring voters—these and other methods of pressure were utilised on an unprecedented scale throughout Andhra. *Goondalism* on a large scale was organised in order to prevent voters sympathetic to the Communist Party from freely exercising their vote. All these played an important part in the ultimate result.

7. Despite all these odds, the people marched in their lakhs and voted for the Communist Party. This is a demonstration of their political consciousness, their love for the Party and, above all, their firm determination to replace the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity. It is a tribute to the self-sacrificing loyal service rendered by thousands of Party members and sympathisers that, despite the mistakes committed by the leadership in working out the election strategy, they organised themselves in such a magnificent way as to bring over 21.5 lakhs of voters to the polling booths and getting them to vote for the Communist Party. Every Party member and friend of the Party all over India will be proud of this solid achievement registered by our Party in Andhra.

8. However, these solid achievements of the Party in Andhra cannot obscure the reality that neither the Party in Andhra nor in the rest of the country can go forward unless the mistakes revealed in this election strategy are very rapidly corrected. Further discussion within the Party in Andhra will, of course, be required to make an exact appraisal of all the mistakes committed and to indicate the exact way forward. It is, at the same time, possible to indicate in broad outline what the elections have shown.

The experience of the Andhra elections have, in broad outlines, emphasised the supreme urgency of uniting all sections of the people on the basis of common struggles, of winning in particular, the middle strata while firmly relying on our basic masses. Without this a united front cannot be forged in order to defeat reaction and replace the Congress Government by a Government of Democratic Unity. But this struggle for unity

is a protracted one and it would require vigorous ideological struggle on the part of the Party against the Congress propaganda offensive. The Andhra Elections have shown that even large sections of the agricultural labourers and poor peasants can be politically weaned away from the democratic movement unless they are steeled through struggles and ideologically moulded. The Andhra Elections have also emphasised the necessity for further strengthening our bonds with the basic masses and constantly raising their political consciousness.

While carrying on this struggle to win over the middleclass elements, the Party should strengthen its links with the basic masses.

In this struggle for further strengthening its links with the basic masses and expanding its base among the middle class elements, the most important element is the skilful combination of the three inseparable tasks laid down by the Party Congress at Madurai—the tasks of building the Party, building the mass organisations and building United Front. Any neglect towards any of these tasks, any emphasis on one of them to the exclusion of the other two, would lead the Party to disaster.

9. Party members and sympathisers in Andhra have to face difficult times. Having once again formed the Government, the Congress will use its power to disrupt the unity of that working class, peasants, agricultural labourers and sections of the middle classes which was demonstrated in the 21.5 lakh voters who boldly faced the pressure of the ruling classes and voted for the Communist Party. Demagogic propaganda, big ideological drive to confuse the masses and finally even terror—all these will be used in order to break that unity. Any attitude of complacency in our part that the 21.5 lakhs of voters who voted for us will continue to remain under our influence will lead the Party to disaster.

Conditions exist for beating back this offensive of the Congress to disrupt the ranks of those who supported us in the recent elections and also for winning over larger and larger elements from the middle and rich peasants, rural and urban intelligentsia, traders and industrialists, professional elements and salaried employees etc. For, the large mass of people who have voted for the Congress are by no means people who are convinced of the correctness of the policies pursued by the Congress. The future depends upon the way in which our Party fights in

the coming period not only in order to counteract the Congress offensive into the ranks of those who voted for us, but undertakes seriously the task of winning over the ranks of those who voted for the Congress. To do this we must carry out two main tasks:

- (a) While the Party should never cease to fight for the demands of the poor peasants and agricultural labourers, while therefore there is no question of giving up the slogan of ceiling on landholdings or the struggle for adequate wages and living conditions for the agricultural labourers, the Party should see to it that questions which affect the middle and rich peasants, the rural and urban middle classes, the traders and industrialists, are all taken up and fought for; furthermore, the Party should carry on an unceasing campaign of popularising the demands of the poor peasants and agricultural labourers among the poor peasants and agricultural labourers. Finally, on common issues facing the democratic masses, political, economic, national and international, united mass movement should be developed. Thus alone can the unity of the democratic classes be brought about.
- (b) In this task of bringing about the unity of the democratic classes, a very important role should be assigned to the ideological-political campaign of the Party. Systematically combating bourgeois, feudal and other reactionary ideologies, the Party will have to undertake a campaign of mass popularisation of the ideas of socialism and democracy.



## **Report to the Party Congress (1956)**

This report was submitted by the CC to the Party Congress at Palghat held in April 1956. It surveys the world situation since the Madurai Conference and draws its usual conclusions. These are : mighty advance of the forces of peace, democracy, freedom and socialism on a world scale; emergence of socialism as a world system ; and capitalist system represented by the aggressive imperialist camp headed by the USA being in the grip of an ever-deepening crisis. The new factor in the situation is that the "Soviet leaders were reinforcing the tie of friendship the tie of economic relations and the tie of peace with the Asian peoples" and especially with India.

The Report states, unlike at Madurai that India has become independent; "we were till recently a part of the colonial and semi-colonial world". Similarly, "despite the vascillations and inconsistencies that still persist to some extent, it (India's foreign policy) is essentially an independent policy" that is, the policy of peace.

Report calls upon party members to wage a determined struggle against the policies of the Government. "Only the triumph of People's Democratic Revolution can complete these tasks." To carry out these tasks the Report advocates the building of a united front of the people including the national bourgeoisie. "The struggle to build the democratic front involves a policy of simultaneous unity with and the struggle against the bourgeoisie."

One of the ways of carrying out these tasks is "by determined struggles inside all parties—Congress, PSP

and Socialist Party for progressive policies and in favour of unity." The Congress Party is "the political party of the bourgeoisie" having landlords in its folds, but has among its members, "a vast number of democratic elements." Therefore "our approach should be such as do not repel the honest Congressmen, but draws them towards unity." PSP and Socialist Party are described as "parties of democratic movement." The CPI will have no truck with the Communal parties, but "it will strive to draw masses and elements following these parties into common activity".

The Avadi resolution of the Congress Party adopting socialistic pattern of society as its aim has been characterised as "an attempt by the bourgeoisie to camouflage the real character of its policies, mislead the masses and use their radical sentiments for consolidation of its own class rule".

The Report also discusses the serious inner-party situation which had been fast deteriorating since the Madurai Conference. It emphasises in the end that it is essential to popularise the great role of the USSR and China in defence of peace.

The document was published in full for the first time by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

Comrades,

Events and developments of great importance have taken place in our country since the Third Congress of the Party which met at Madurai in December 1953. The task facing us at this Congress is to assess these events and developments, assess our own role in them, assess our achievements and failures. The task is to generalise the rich experience of this period, of the struggles, campaigns and activities conducted by the Party and the democratic forces, draw correct lessons from them and arm the entire

Party with these lessons so as to enable it to discharge the tremendous duties and responsibilities that confront it today.

The deliberations of this Congress acquire special significance in view of the situation prevailing inside the Party. The discussions that have preceded the Congress have brought to the surface the sharp differences that exist inside the Party on vital issues. The differences have to be resolved and the party unified – not merely on the basis of certain formulations related to the controversies that have arisen, but also, and above all, on the basis of a unified understanding of *the happenings of this period* and their lessons, on the basis of a unified understanding of the *practical tasks* facing the Party in the sphere of mass activity and of Party organisation.

Such are the tasks confronting the Fourth Congress of our Party which is a major event in the life of our country, our class and people.

But we have to realise at the outset that the circumstances under which the Congress is meeting made it impossible for us to carry out these tasks satisfactorily. Very few Provincial Committees reviewed the struggles, campaigns and activities conducted by them during the last two years. And even in cases when they did so, most of the reports have not been received by the Party Centre. Secondly, the Party Congress meets only a few weeks after the provincial conferences which makes it impossible for the Central Committee to study and assimilate their reports. These, however, are not the only or even the main reasons. The most important single reason is that the Central Committee itself has not, during the last two years, carried out its tasks in relation to the activities of the Party—review them, draw lessons from them. The reasons are known to all comrades—inner CC differences which paralysed its work and prevented it from discharging its responsibilities.

The inability of the Party Congress to carry out the tasks which a Party Congress is expected to carry out is thus, above all, a direct result of the situation that prevails in the Central Committee and in the leading units of the Party. It is a product and reflection of the present inner-Party situation. The Congress has to examine how this situation developed, why it could not be remedied. This is a task of major importance.

But the Party Congress cannot confine itself to this task alone.

It has to review, in a broad and general way, the main developments of this period and our role in them.

## II MAIN FEATURES OF THE PERIOD SINCE THE MADURAI CONGRESS

### *Advance of the Forces of Peace, Freedom, Democracy And Socialism*

Recent years have witnessed a mighty advance of the forces of peace, democracy, freedom and socialism on a world scale.

The emergence of socialism as a world system, its massive achievements, the powerful attraction of the ideas of socialism among the working people and progressive elements in all classes; the bold measures taken by the USSR, People's Republic of China and other Socialist countries in furthering the cause of peace; the demonstration of the incontestable superiority of Socialism over the capitalist system which is in the grip of an ever-deepening crisis; the disintegration of the colonial system, the formation of independent States in vast areas of Asia and Africa and the resolute struggle in defence of freedom and peace waged by India and a number of former colonial countries; the creation of a vast zone of peace embracing the Socialist and a large number of non-Socialist countries; the growing friendship and closer relation between the Socialist world and the liberated peoples of the East; the consolidation and strengthening of Communist Parties which are rallying increasingly larger sections of the people under their banner; the ever-widening sweep of the movement for peace—all these have radically altered the balance of world forces and have created a firm foundation for further advance.

The slogans of the democratic camp, the slogans of the organised peace movement—that the Head of the Great Powers must meet, that disputes between states must be solved by methods of negotiation, that weapons of mass destruction must be banned, that the People's Republic of China must be accorded its rightful place in the United Nations—these have become the slogans of the masses of the people of all countries and all political views. The aggressive imperialist camp headed by the USA faces a situation of growing moral and political isola-

*tion, of increasing fiasco of their policies. The lessening of international tension, an objective for which peace-loving humanity strove, an objective which at one time seemed to many to be unrealisable, has become a fact, a palpable reality.*

The great principle enunciated by Lenin – the principle of peaceful co-existence and of friendship between nations has achieved historic victories. The possibility has been created for preservation of peace and prevention of war.

Two years ago, we met at Madurai in the shadow of a grave menace—the menace represented in the Pak-U.S. Pact. It was a threat to peace in Asia. It was a threat to Indian sovereignty and freedom. It showed that the American drive for world domination was directed not merely against the USSR and China but against the freedom of every country. It gave a big blow to the illusion that if India kept out of the cold war and avoided the “taking of sides,” her sovereignty would not be threatened. It thus brought out the inseparable relation between peace and national freedom.

In the period that has passed since then, this inseparability has steadily grown not merely in our country but everywhere especially in all countries of Asia. In every country of Asia where the ruling classes have succumbed to the pressure of the Anglo-American imperialists and joined them in their war drive, the cause of national freedom and democracy has suffered a serious setback. The finalisation of the Pak-U.S. Pact which reduced Pakistan to an American war base was followed by suppression of democracy in East Pakistan and the imposition of new burdens on the people. On the other hand, every country which has resisted the war drive, every country where the people and the Government have unitedly opposed the attempts of the imperialists to draw them into their war alliances—every such country has not merely defended but simultaneously strengthened its national freedom, built relations of friendship with other Asian countries, with the Socialist world and has been able to take certain steps towards the strengthening of its national economy.

The process of the conclusion of the forces of peace, democracy and freedom, has been carried forward to a new stage by the growth of relations of friendship between the three greatest countries of the world—India, China and USSR.

The visit of Chou En-lai to India, the visit of Nehru to China

and the USSR, the visit of N.A. Bulganin and N.S. Khrushchev to India—these were no ordinary events. They struck heavy blows against the lies and slanders by which the imperialists had sought to poison the mind of our people. They showed to India who are her friends and who her enemies. They symbolised the coming together of more than half of mankind for a common purpose—defence of peace. They proved that differences in political and social systems constitute no barrier to the establishment of fraternal relations between countries. They proclaimed the triumph of the ideas of the historic Five Principles.

The memorable scenes that India witnessed on the occasion of the visit of the Soviet leaders, scenes that are still fresh in the memory of all of us, are a striking demonstration of the gigantic sweep that the movement inspired by these ideas and principles has attained.

The imperialists at first sought to minimise the significance of the visit of the Soviet leaders to India and the tumultuous reception they received from the mass of the people. But their scepticism soon gave way to panic. The facts are too obvious, too glaring. That precisely in the month when the imperialist rulers of Britain backed by America were forging the Baghdad Pact by which Asian unity was being sought to be disrupted and a military threat against Asian people was being mounted—precisely in the same month, the Soviet leaders were reinforcing a different kind of tie with the Asian peoples, the tie of friendship, the tie of economic relations, the tie of peace—this fact was one whose significance no amount of lies could hide. That the Soviet pronouncement about Goa was followed by the arrogant declaration by Dulles which underwrote Portugal's "right" to maintain the colonial fascist regime in Goa—the significance of this was too patent to be blurred by diplomatic sophistry. The contrast between the two worlds stood out sharp and clear.

The joint communique issued by the leaders of Soviet and Indian Governments, the economic agreement signed between the two countries is an event of great importance for the whole world. It is a great victory for the cause of peace.

All these victories have created the conditions for still greater victories. Vast possibilities have opened out—possibilities of defeating the plans of the war-mongers, possibilities of ensuring

national freedom and its defence, possibilities of a life of happiness and prosperity for all peoples through mutual co-operation and friendship.

This does not, of course, mean that these possibilities have already been realised. It does not mean that the imperialists have already been forced to abandon their aggressive aims and designs.

On the contrary, in this very period, the attempt to maintain the colonial system, the attempt to draw the Asian countries into war alliances, the attempt to transform them into satellites and war bases—these attempts have also been stepped up. The last two years have witnessed an intensification of the war drive especially in Asia. This is seen in the finalisation of the Pak.-U.S. Pact in defiance of Asian opinion, in suppression of democracy in East Pakistan and in terrorist methods against patriotic forces in Iran, in the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact.

But this drive encounters increasing resistance. Of great importance for us, in this connection, are the developments in the colonial and semi-colonial world. Not merely because we were, till recently, a part of this world, not merely because developments there have great impact on our own movements but also because the countries and the peoples of the world are playing a role which is of decisive significance for the whole of humanity. Gone are the days when the Asian and African peoples constituting over 60 per cent of humanity could be compelled to act as hewers of wood and drawers of water for their colonial masters. Gone are the days also when they could be treated as cannon-fodder. The national liberation movement in Asia and Africa has reached heights never attained before.

In India and throughout Asia, the struggle for peace is getting more and more closely linked with the struggle for forging Asian solidarity—a struggle that expresses the hatred of the Asian people against the colonial Powers and their urge for defence and the strengthening of national freedom. The movement has drawn hundreds of millions of people in its sweep. It reflects the new spirit in Asia and in the whole of the colonial world.

What are the specific features of this movement at this stage? What is their significance and their direction? These for us are extremely important questions.

One of the most important of these features in the strengthening and extension of the struggles in the direct colonies, the assump-

tion by these struggles of the character of wars of national liberation—North African colonies of France, Malaya, East Africa and above all, the historic victory of Dien Bien Phu, its world-wide repercussions.

This feature is self-evident. Also its importance in relation to the colonial people, in relation to the position of imperialism.

But this is not the only aspect of the colonial liberation movement at the present stage. There are other aspects too. And these aspects are also of great importance. Inside our Party there has been a strong tendency not to see these other aspects as part of the national liberation movement of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples but to view them in isolation. This has led to mistakes in tactics. These aspects are:

Increasing assertion of national freedom by several countries that in the post-war period won State sovereignty—above all India, Indonesia and Burma—and by several other countries like Afghanistan and Egypt. Their increasingly firm stand not only against the U.S.A. but against colonial powers as a whole. Measures taken by some of these countries to strengthen national economy with the help of the Socialist world.

—The coming together of Asian and African countries, the powerful growth of the sentiment of Asian unity, as symbolised at Bandung.

—The establishment of close political, cultural and economic relations of these Asian and African countries (Egypt) with the Socialist world.

—The growing opposition by the people and even sections of the upper classes to the corrupt and oppressive governments that have sold themselves to the Anglo-American imperialists and placed their resources and manpower at their disposal—the election results in East Pakistan, the popular demonstrations in Jordan.

—The increasing influence of China in Asian and world affairs despite the American refusal to permit her entry into the UNO. Complete fiasco of US attempts to isolate China.

—The growing prestige and role of India as a great world force for peace—its powerful impact on the colonial world as a whole and in the Middle East in particular.

—The growth of the sentiments of neutrality in a number of Asian countries such as Saudi Arabia, a sentiment which expres-



ses the urge even of ruling elements to demarcate themselves from the war camp.

—The growth of Communist Parties and of Socialist ideas.

Each one of these and all these together are manifestations of the new spirit in Asia and Africa. Each one of these and all of them together are part of the developing movement of the peoples of the colonial world for full freedom, for advance along the path of independence. They are a continuation and a carrying forward of the national liberation struggle of the colonial peoples.

These developments in the former colonial world, in their totality, signify the disintegration and growing collapse of the entire colonial system. This, in its turn, deepens the crisis of world imperialism, narrows further the area of unrestricted imperialist exploitation, sharpens the contradiction between the imperialist States, between various sections of the ruling classes inside each imperialist State, seriously weakens imperialism and gives tremendous impetus to the world peace movement.

*India's great role in the battle for peace and the growing sweep of the struggle for defence and strengthening of national freedom.*

This period has seen an immense growth of the forces of peace, freedom and democracy in our country. It has seen increasing assertion of independence by India and the sharpening of the conflict between the entire Indian people, including the government on the one hand and the imperialist camp on the other. It has seen increasing assertion of freedom by India, increasingly important role played by India in world affairs, a role that has earned India the respect of all peace-loving people. It has seen the establishment of close relations between India, USSR and China. It has seen the liberation of the French pockets on Indian soil and the mighty growth of the movement for the liberation of Goa and other territories dominated by Portuguese imperialists.

In the period before the Madurai Congress also India had taken a number of steps on important international issues that helped the cause of peace. This we noted at Madurai. We welcomed the "growing bond of friendship and of cultural relations between the people of India on the one hand and the USSR and Chinese People's Republic on the other." We declared that "the conclusion of the recent trade agreement between

India and USSR on mutually advantageous terms carries forward this process and can also help to reduce India's dependence on imperialist powers."

Not merely has this process been continued and carried forward but beginning with the Pak-U.S. Pact which directly threatened India's sovereignty and independence, the foreign policy of the Indian Government has steadily undergone a radical change—a change of far-reaching significance. Earlier, despite its demarcation from and opposition to the imperialists on several issues, it was essentially a policy influenced by British imperialism. Today, despite the vacillations and inconsistencies that still persist to some extent, it is essentially an independent policy, a policy of peace. This is an orientation for which the democratic forces and the Communist Party had been consistently fighting and they rejoice in it as a great victory for the people.

This orientation in the foreign policy has important economic significance also.

The imperialists not merely threaten India's independence. They also strive to keep her backward and dependent. They deny us the capital goods we need for our development, while forcing us to buy at exorbitant prices the goods they want to dispose off. As against this, the Socialist States have established relations of trade on terms that help to strengthen our national economy. The Soviet proposal for erecting a steel plant in India which has been accepted by the Indian Government, the Soviet offer for the sharing of experience, the economic agreement concluded during the visit of the Soviet leaders to India—such are the practical results of the economic relations with the Socialist world.

### *Struggle for Peace — An Essential Aspect of the Struggle for Full Freedom*

Life has settled, once and for all, the old controversy that has gone on in our Party for a long time, the controversy over the relation between freedom and peace. For that, we must approach the old controversy in a new way.

Peace is indispensable for our country which after centuries of foreign rule has won freedom and is striving to rebuild its economy. Defence of peace is a task as vitally important for our country as for any other.

The basic struggle in our country is the struggle for the completion of our national liberation. This task will be completed

with the confiscation of British capital, the liquidation of feudalism and the establishment of a democratic State led by the working class.

But, our national liberation struggle, in the present historic situation, can be confined to the struggle for the confiscation of British capital and abolition of feudalism. That would be a narrow, restricted concept of the national liberation struggle—a concept that takes into no account the vast changes that are taking place in the world arena and in our own country.

The task of defence of national freedom threatened by the aggressive war drive, the struggle against military blocs, is itself a vital constituent of the national liberation movement. Further, every measure that strengthens our national freedom is also a national liberation struggle.

Hence it is that the policy of peace is simultaneously an anti-imperialist policy, a national liberationist policy.

A policy of peace is a policy that sharpens the conflict with the whole imperialist camp, and develops national resistance to imperialism. It leads to the building of Asian unity which is a mighty weapon against the whole colonial regime. It creates conditions for close political, economic and cultural relations with USSR, China and the Socialist world in general, which strengthens national freedom and national economy, and advances the cause of national culture. It brings on a common platform all patriotic forces irrespective of party loyalties, and thus helps to build national unity. It gives a big impetus to the democratic movement whose strengthening is essential for the victory of revolution.

Further, the growing prestige of India in the world heightens the national pride of the people, strengthens the urge for industrialisation and for national advance in all spheres—facilitating the task of bringing to the forefront measures of internal reforms in the realm of economy and culture, education, status of women etc. The growing relations of friendship with the Socialist countries enable our people to know these countries better, to use their experience. They help to defeat the slanderous campaigns conducted by imperialists. They help to combat the poison of anti-Communism by which reactionaries strive to divide the national forces.

The emergence of India as a great world power, the role played by her in defence of peace and her efforts to strengthen

economy have incurred the wrath and hatred of the imperialist powers. They are continuing their efforts to reverse our foreign policy and drag us into military alliance. They aid the Portuguese fascists to continue their colonial rule in Goa, suppress the liberation struggle of the people and develop Goa into an arm and base. They threaten our freedom through the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact—creating armed bases on our frontiers. They are utilizing the extreme reactionary elements among the ruling circles of Pakistan to work up tension on our border and involve us in a ruinous arms race that would retard our industrial development. In this situation, the struggle against military blocs, the struggle for friendly relation with Pakistan, the struggle for strengthening our relations of friendship with the Socialist and peace-loving States, acquires enormous significance.

The policy of peace is therefore a genuine national policy, a truly patriotic policy, a policy that strengthens national freedom, national unity and national economy.

The masses have played a great role in the battle for peace. The campaign that grew against the Pak-U.S. Pact bringing on a common platform people of all parties including the Congress, the wave of enthusiasm that swept over the country during Chou En-lai's visit, the support to the five principles, the indignant protests against the transit of French troops to Viet Nam that led to measures by the Government, the opposition to the H. Bomb explosions in the Pacific which inflicted injuries on the Japanese people, the mass mobilisation during the Conference of Asian countries, the vast gathering that cheered the Soviet leaders wherever they visited — such were some of the most striking manifestations of the growing strength of the mass movement for peace, for Asian unity, for friendship with the help of Socialist States.

Great have been the victories achieved by the democratic movement in the sphere of foreign policy. Of immense importance has been the radical change in the policy of the Government. But the struggle is not yet over. It continues and will have to be continued with still greater vigour than before, as long as India's present economic and political relationship with the British imperialists, the suppressor of colonial peoples, the partner of America in the aggressive military alliances — NATO, SEATO and Baghdad Pact — remains, as long as reactionary

elements remain in a leading position in our political and economic life and in the military and administrative set-up.

This of course does not mean that the struggle for peace can set before itself the task of liquidation of imperialism. But it does mean that the defence of peace is a task that cannot be left in the hands of the Government alone. The mass of the people have to play a still greater role than they have played till now in order to strengthen the present direction in the Government's foreign policy.

The continued transit of Gurkha troops through Indian territory in their mission of murder against the freedom fighters in Malaya, the significant silence of the Indian Government over the regime of terror established by the British in many of their colonies, the retreat on the issue of Goa, all these are sharp reminders of the tasks that the people of India have yet to carry out.

In this connection it is necessary to restate the view of our Party on the slogan of direct action by the Government to liberate Goa.

The argument has been advanced by the Indian Government that consistent with its adherence to the Five Principles and its policy of settlement of disputes between two countries, India cannot take direct action for the liberation of Goa. This argument the Communist Party and the democratic movement cannot accept. Goa is an integral part of India occupied by the Portuguese fascists who with the help of American imperialists are building it up as a war base. The liberation of Goa is thus an essential part of the Indian people's struggle for the completion of national freedom, for the defence of national sovereignty, for the furtherance of the cause of peace. Not merely does positive action by the Government for the liberation of Goa and other Portuguese territories on Indian soil not constitute a violation of Five Principles and of the policy of peace, but such action is fully consistent with these principles and with that policy.

Hence it was that the struggle for the liberation of Goa developed into the mightiest campaign that India has witnessed since 1947. It achieved a degree of unity never seen before. It brought together in a common united front for a common national task and under a common flag members and masses of all political parties and organisations. The death-defying

courage of the satyagrahis who unarmed marched straight into the very jaws of death, holding aloft the banner of the Indian Republic, whose honour they defended to the last drop of their blood was one of the most heroic episodes in the Indian people's battle for freedom.

It stirred to their very depths all the people. It led to demonstrations reminiscent of the great INA and RIN days. It showed the unconquerable spirit of the people of India, their indomitable will to wipe out the last pockets of foreign rule on Indian soil. It revealed that the people while acclaiming and supporting every measure of the Indian Government which strengthens the cause of peace and national freedom would, as part of the very struggle for freedom and peace, oppose with equal vigour every concession to the imperialists, every indication of half-heartedness and vacillation.

Our Party has played a proud and leading role in this battle—a role that is a fitting reply to the enemies and slanderers of the Party, to those who charge us with lack of patriotism.

From the tribune of this Congress, we pay our homage to the martyrs who have laid down their lives in the struggles. We pay our tribute to those who have suffered and sacrificed. We assure the peoples of Goa and of other Portuguese occupied territories, groaning under the iron heel of fascism and struggling to be free, that their cause is the cause of the entire Indian people who will not rest till their liberation has been achieved.

Our Party will intensify the struggle for the liberation of Goa. It will continue to demand that the Government of India should take all steps including direct action to achieve this liberation.

At the same time it is necessary to warn against two tendencies on this issue:

Firstly:—The sectarian tendency of not recognising that on this question there is great confusion among our people. Many honest democrats, many partisans of peace consider the Government's position correct. Hence the vital importance of methods of fraternal persuasion, methods of patient argument and convincing of these elements.

Secondly:—The opportunist tendency of not sharply demarcating ourselves from the other parties who, from the common platform, use the issue of Goa to denounce the general foreign

policy of the Nehru Government, to ridicule the slogan of co-existence itself.

What are the main slogans of the Party in relation to the struggle for Peace at this stage? They are:

(a) Strengthen the bonds of friendship and co-operation with the USSR and China in all fields—economic, cultural and on international issues, on the basis of Panch Shila.

(b) Economic and cultural agreements with the countries of People's Democracy of Eastern Europe.

(c) Struggles against the Military Pacts such as SEATO, Baghdad Pact, etc.

(d) Strengthen Asian solidarity, strive for a Pact of Asian security.

(e) Strive to secure India's rightful place in the Security Council as a Great Power.

(f) Full diplomatic and moral support to the colonial people's struggle against imperialism.

(g) Effective measures for the liberation of Goa.

(h) Support to the Government's proposal for a no-war declaration with Pakistan and campaign for Indo-Pak friendship.

In the course of the last two years the struggle for peace has made significant advance. The campaign against the Pak-U.S. Pact brought on a common platform members and masses of all political parties. This was carried forward through several campaigns. The linking of the struggle for peace with the struggle for Asian solidarity has given the peace movement broader sweep than ever before. An increasingly larger number of people have been taking part in the movement. Mass organisations have been more active in the struggle than in earlier years.

Firstly:—The extent to which sectarianism is eschewed and all classes, parties, groups and individuals are drawn into the movement by convincing them of the inseparable relation between the struggle for peace and of national security and national advance, by convincing them that the peace movement pursues no narrow aims, is genuinely democratic and affords the fullest scope to all lovers of peace, irrespective of their political views and position in life to make their contribution in the common cause. Eschewing of sectarianism does not mean merely adopting a correct attitude towards leaders and members of political parties and drawing them into the movement. It

demands that a serious effort be made to draw in those people in walks of life who are in no political party—artists, literateurs, teachers and professors, doctors, lawyers, businessmen and others, through some form of activity which interests them. It also demands that the work is so organised that the participation of non-party people become not formal but real and effective.

Secondly:—The extent to which unity is forged on specific slogans, related to the struggle for peace and campaign developed through numerous forms of activity.

Thirdly:—The extent to which the working class, peasantry and toiling people are drawn into the movement and in each campaign through the initiative of their own mass organisations and the Communist Party. The toiling masses under the independent leadership of the Party while fully supporting the progressive steps of the Government, while building unity with all on the basis of the common slogans of the peace movement, have to go further in the direction of a consistent struggle for peace, have to put forward demands and slogans that take the whole movement forward, have to organise such forms of activity as demonstrations and actions on occasions like the visit of Dulles. This will have its impact on the organised peace movement also, will help the movement to advance. But this will be achieved only if we ensure that the slogans and demands put forward even from the independent platform of the party are not too much in advance of the slogans of the organised peace movement, that they follow logically from the previous steps and stages of the movement, that while criticising the Government, the big advance that the Government has made in the direction of struggle for peace is kept in mind and therefore the criticism takes the form of demand for consistent application of the principles which the Government itself has accepted.

### *Economic Developments in Recent Years*

The most important task facing our country in the realm of internal affairs is the liquidation of our colonial heritage, the strengthening of our national economy, the industrialisation of the country. As long as this task is not carried out, our freedom will not be secure, the threat to freedom will remain and free-



dom itself will not be complete and real in terms of national economy, in terms of national prosperity and national advance in every sphere.

To what extent has this task been carried out? To what extent have we advanced in this direction?

### *Features of Economy*

As on the issue of peace, on this issue also dogmatic concepts have prevailed in our Party, concepts that have hampered the waging of a concrete struggle for the strengthening of national economy and for the defence of the interest of the masses as part of this very struggle.

The economic situation today, in several important respects, is different from the situation that prevailed when we met at Madurai:

—Substantial increases in agricultural production which, in a country like ours is a factor of major economic and also political importance (monsoons and also governmental measures to some extent). This leads to a temporary expansion of the market, though this gets offset soon by the fall in prices. Abolition of rationing of food and procurement of grains gives relief in towns and villages.

—Acceleration of tempo of the construction and expenditure under the First Five Year Plan not merely builds certain projects but also helps to expand the market.

—Reduction of dependence on imperialists in respect of foodgrains and improvement in balance of payments position.

—Increase in industrial production, greater utilisation of productive capacity than before and also more production in certain new industries—Sindri, Chittaranjan etc.

—All these indicate a certain amount of strengthening of national economy, which is a national gain. They indicate that the specific crisis which manifested itself in the immediate post-war years in the form of absolute shortage of goods, rising prices, crisis in the balance of payments position—that specific crisis has been to a great extent overcome. Further, in recent periods certain significant steps have been taken for the building of industries—steel plant agreement with USSR, the economic agreement of December, 1955.

But equally necessary it is to see that the crisis of semi-

colonial economy continues. This is due to (i) the position of British capital in our economy, (ii) the persistence of feudal survivals, despite the half-hearted agrarian measures of the Government, (iii) the policy of reliance on the profit-motive of monopoly capital for strengthening of economy. This crisis of semi-colonial economy is seen in

- Stagnant condition of the internal market
- Slow rate of capital formation despite huge profits
- Despite greater utilisation than before, inability of industries even now to utilise their full productive capacity.
- Stagnation and decline of small industries on which millions depend for livelihood.
- inability of government to acquire and spend the expected finances despite heavy taxation.
- Growth of mass unemployment in urban as well as rural areas.

Increase in food production was followed shortly afterwards by steep fall in prices. Parity index (agricultural prices to manufactured goods) decline in 1954-55 by 20%, a loss of 1000 crores of rupees to the agricultural sector. Burden of taxes and debts mount. Eviction drive continues. All this, together with decline of rural industries, creates serious situation for the peasantry. Growth of rural unemployment.

Congress agrarian reforms. Some curbing of landlordism but also compromise with it. Main beneficiaries rich peasants (Reply by Mr. Charan Singh, Revenue Minister, in U.P. Assembly on September 25, 1955: "33% of the cultivated area in State held by Bhumidars. Half of them belong to the old class of zamindars having their own sirs. Others had acquired bhumidari rights by paying ten times compensation." — *National Herald*, 26/9/1955). Some concessions to other peasants also—occupancy rights to certain categories, lowering of rents in some places, curbing of certain feudal forms of exploitation, especially in backward areas—but the fall in prices, growth of taxes, debts, eviction, etc. in their totality, intensify distress, especially of the poorest strata. At the same time, the concessions given to the rich peasantry, an extremely important section in rural areas, helps Congress to strengthen its base in the countryside.

Increase in production by over 40 per cent but increase in employment only by 6 per cent. Increase in productivity by

38% over 1939 but wages, though they increase through struggles, still far below increase in productivity. (Only 1939 level reached in major industries, in other industries much lower.) Increase in work-load. Rationalisation drive. Share of working class in income generated in factories decline.

— Main direction of the economic policies of the Government, development of capitalist economy.

— Actual result hitherto. Some development in certain spheres. British hold on vital sectors of economy continues. Strengthening of the position of monopoly capital in national economy. Their profits higher than even before. Their share in national income greater after seven years of freedom. Government measures have helped this process.

### *State of National Economy*

— A certain amount of strengthening as compared to earlier years.

— but this rests on insecure foundations.

— main benefit has gone to upper classes, above all to monopolists.

— As regards key sectors of economy, machine-building, heavy industries, very little advance has been made.

The limited nature of the improvement and the insecurity of its foundations is seen most strikingly in the stagnation of the internal market which has been a marked feature of our economy for several years. It is seen in the actual effects of the measures adopted by the Government to solve this problem, on our economy and on the mass of the people.

On October 12, 1953, Mr. Gulzarilal Nanda, Planning Minister, made the following statement:

“On one hand was the complaint that the country did not produce enough consumption goods. But when they increased production and took credit for it, they were suddenly faced with accumulation of stocks.”

We noted this phenomenon in December, 1953 at Madurai:

“As is admitted by both the Government and the employers, production went on the upgrade and in textiles and sugar reached the targets of the Five Year Plan, issued in September 1954, commented:

“Despite the general rise, production in most industries was

still much below capacity, due in most cases, to lack of demand at current prices in the internal and external market.”

In January, 1955, the Quarterly Bulletin of the *Eastern Economist* in an editorial expressing grave concern over the market situation wrote:

“There are apprehensions that the saturation point has been reached in regard to production by certain consumers goods industries. For, despite the known need, there is not enough demand to absorb the increased output. It is no longer a question of goods not being there, it is one of lack of purchasing power.”

The remedy suggested was:

“..... pump more money into the system or make a bolder bid for deficit financing than has been done so far.”

Same was the advice given by Mr. B. M. Birla in his Presidential address at the annual session of the FICCI held in March, 1955. For a solution of the market problem, he stressed:

“... It is imperative to speed up the expenditure programme of the government.”

The phenomenon of the stagnation of the market was significant. Also the dates on which the pronouncements were made. Above all, the remedy suggested—not radical agrarian reforms and the scaling down of debts, not increase in wages, not even reduction in prices. But vast amount of deficit-financing and governmental expenditure on its basis. In other words, resort to methods of inflation—indirect methods of taxation on the common people.

The apprehended “setback” did not come. On the contrary, the market situation has steadily “improved” during the last few months. How has this been effected? Here is the answer given by the *Quarterly Report* of the Indian Institute of Public Opinion, in August, 1955:

“Few people realise the shot in the arm that has come to the whole economy from the spurt in money supplied in the last 12 months. The volume of money supply has risen from Rs. 1,764 crores in August, 1954 to well over 2,000 crores at the present time.... an all-time record in Indian financial history with the single exception of seven months in 1953-54”

The significant phrase “shot in the arm” defines with scientific precision the actual truth behind the present boom. It is a truth that has ominous meaning for the mass of our people as

well as for national economy—especially in view of the proposal to resort to deficit financing to the extent of 1,200 crores of rupees in the 2nd Plan.

That already with deficit financing to an extent which the Government considered moderate, the prices have started advancing—this very fact lays bare the precarious foundation on which our economy rests.

This is being realised even by bourgeois economists.

“The essence of the economic history of 1955” wrote the *Hindustan Times* in a special article on December 1955, “is the arrival of reflation.” It asked “the question is: how thin is the dividing line between reflation and inflation?” It noted that “since early June, 1955,” there has been a “general and continuous advance in the price level” of “primary products and manufactures as a whole” and commented:

“These measures (the measures under the 1st Five Year Plan) have not helped to raise the country to the plane of fully active and self-confident economic life. Hence it is that with the very first impact of deficit-financing, an economy whose unutilised resources are theoretically put forward as so many potential defences against inflation has readily sported signs of reflation which may easily develop into something much less desirable.”

This contradiction between the theoretical premises of the bourgeois economists and the actual results is nothing new. It has revealed itself again and again.

In essence the economic policies of the Government have been one of striving to strengthen national economy by compromise with and protection of foreign capital, by a limited curbing of and alliance with landlordism and by reliance on the profit motive of capitalists, primarily monopoly capital. Inevitably this has meant throwing of more and more burdens on the people, mounting expenditure on the police in every State and the resort to repression on a massive scale.

But it has not been on occasions of mass struggle only that the arbitrary powers of the police have been used.

One of the most detestable features of British rule in India was the sweeping powers of the police and the bureaucracy who behaved not as servants but as masters of the people. Even when crimes were committed, people even dared not go to the police because police investigations came to be associated with corruption, arbitrary arrests and even torture.

Freedom, as understood by the people, meant not only freedom from British rule and economic wants, but also freedom from the arbitrary powers of the police.

These hopes remain unfulfilled. Basically relations between the people and the police remain as before. Even Congress M.L.A.s in last year's sessions of the U.P. Assembly complained bitterly about the behaviour of the police.

In the days of the struggle against the British, great emphasis was laid on extending the power of popularly elected bodies. Promises were made that under Swaraj, Panchayats and similar bodies would ensure popular participation in Government. In the main little has been done in this direction. All power continues to be exercised by bureaucrats appointed from above. The panchayats in many areas are becoming bodies to impose new taxes on the people.

The reactionary policies of the Government have not been confined to these aspects alone. For long it stubbornly refused to concede the demand for linguistic States—a demand raised by the Congress itself while it was fighting imperialism. It advanced the spurious argument that the conceding of this demand would mean the disruption of the unity of India. And even when forced to make concessions on this issue, it has not accepted the popular demand in its entirety. (Punjab, Maharashtra.)

The Government refused to concede the legitimate demands of the Maharashtrian people for Samyukta Maharashtra including Bombay City. It first sought to create a bi-lingual State where the Maharashtrians and Gujeratis yoked together would be perpetually at loggerheads. The final solution which reduces Bombay to the status of a Centrally-administered area is not only a violation of all democratic principles but an indication of the strength of Big Business on the Indian State.

What has been the result of all this?

While the situation demanded the forging of the broadest national unity to carry out the national task of overcoming the heritage of the colonial order, the taking of resolute measures for the industrialisation of the country through which alone Indian freedom could be placed on a firm and secure basis, the assuring of a steady improvement in the condition of the people—the actual policies of the Government have meant enrichment

of the few at the cost of many, repeated deadlock in production (as in Kanpur), intensification of strife and disunity.

Therefore, it is that the crisis of the semi-colonial economy persists. It manifests itself in various forms—impoverishment of the peasantry and the growing pressure on land, the weak state of industries especially heavy industries, starvation wages for workers, growth of mass unemployment in rural and urban areas, decline of small industries, slow rate of capital formation, stagnation of the market and the inability of industries to utilise their existing productive capacity, inability of the Government to raise and spend the necessary finances for its plans despite heavy taxation.

It is the semi-colonial features of our economy and the reactionary aspects of the policies of the Government which hamper speedy liquidation of these features, and hamper the strengthening of the forces of democracy—it is these that are still the dominant characteristics of our economic and political life. If we do not see this, if we tend to minimise the significance of this, serious mistakes in tactics will follow.

No reason exists, therefore, for the belief that all-sided improvement has taken place in our economic and political life and conditions have been created for all-round advance. These conditions have yet to be created.

To wage a determined and concrete struggle against these features and their effects on the people, against the policies that result in their continuation, against the basic causes of our poverty and backwardness, the position of British capital in our economy and feudal survivals, and to build the democratic unity of the people and wage this struggle—these remain the tasks before the democratic movement, tasks enjoined in the historic Programme of the Communist Party of India. Only the triumph of People's Democratic Revolution can complete these tasks.

But the struggle for the carrying out of these very tasks requires a correct appraisal of the significance of the new features that have appeared in the economy and in the policies of the Government. If we fail to do that, we shall fail to build the democratic front, we shall fail even to wage a concrete battle against the anti-popular policies of the Government and effectively defend the immediate interests of the masses.

These new features are seen in such measures and proposals of the Government as:

- Nationalisation of the Imperial Bank, though with heavy compensation
- Fourth Amendment to the Constitution;
- Economic agreement with the USSR
- Emphasis on heavy industries and on the extension of the public sector in the Second Five-Year Plan.

These features are not accidental. They are a product of the mighty events in the international arena and their impact on our people and on the government. They are a product of the growing radicalisation of our masses and their urge for industrialisation and reforms. They are a product of the growing aspirations of the bourgeoisie to utilise these developments to advance the country on the path of independent capitalist development.

These developments create big new possibilities—for the extension and strengthening of the mass movement.

What are these possibilities and how are they to be realised? What are the slogans and policies through which the democratic front of the Indian people is to be built here and how? What are the tactics to be adopted and what forms of activity are to be organised in order to take the mass movement forward? These are questions which the Party Congress has to consider.

### *State of the Democratic Movement*

These questions cannot be answered on the basis of the formulations in the Party Programme alone. Nor can they be answered only on the basis of an examination of the features of our national economy — those that are still dominant and those that are growing. While taking these factors into consideration, the specific questions posed above have to be answered primarily on the basis of a correct appraisal of the actual correlation of forces in our country which expresses itself, above all, in the existing state of the mass movement. We have to assess the impact of the features of our economy and of the concrete measures of the Government in the realm of foreign and internal affairs as well as its ideological-political offensive on the life and the conditions of the masses, on their struggles, on their mood, on their organisations. We have to assess the significance of the new features in relation to our political life. And on the basis of all this, we have to work out a mass line which streng-



thens the forces of democracy and builds their unity, a line which will take the people in the direction of fulfilment of the tasks set forth in our Programme.

"The slogans of the immediate imminent struggle," taught Lenin "cannot simply and directly be deduced from the general slogan of the definite programme. It is necessary to take stock of the concrete historical situation; it is logical of course of the revolution and to derive our tasks not only from the principles of the programme but from the previous steps and stages of the movement." (From the Report delivered by O. Kusinen at the 12th Plenum the ECCI, Sept. 1932.)

This Leninist method of working out slogans and tactics, it is necessary to remember, was stressed in September, 1932, at a time when world capitalism was in the grip of the most profound economic crisis in its history, when big struggles were bursting out everywhere and when the struggle for power had come on the agenda in a number of countries.

Why is this teaching of Lenin of such decisive importance for every Communist Party in all situations? Because of the decisive importance of the subjective factor in every country and in every situation. The features of economy and their impact on the people are the basis of our activity. The principles of the Programme indicate the direction in which these activities have to lead. But what kind of activity will achieve the purpose in a particular situation, what slogans, what forms of action and struggles will rouse, mobilise and unite the masses and take them forward in the direction of the aim of the Programme and through what stages — this is to be determined, above all, through a correct assessment of the state of the movement, state of organisation, state of mood among the masses inside the country, their unity, their preparedness.

Many a time it must be admitted, Comrades, in the course of the history of our Party and especially during the last two years, we have violated this Leninist principle of working out slogans and tactics. Many a time, the tendency has been to shut our eyes to the direction in which events were moving, both in the realm of foreign policy and in the realm of internal affairs. Many a time the concrete historical situation, not from a study of the whole movement, not from previous steps and

stages of the movement, but directly from the principles of the slogans.

Such methods are always harmful. But they would be especially harmful today in view of the immense complexity of the situation as well as of the great opportunities it creates.

All the more necessary, therefore, it is for us to be guided by Leninist methods for working out concrete tasks.

This demands, above all, examination of the present state of the mass movement. It demands examination of the advance that has already been registered. It demands appraisal of the urges, aspirations and sentiments that have grown in our people and the specific form in which they manifest themselves.

The process of mass radicalisation has continued during the last two years. There has been a powerful growth of the ideas of Socialism and democracy. India's great role in world affairs has not only evoked national pride among our peoples but also intensified the urge for resolute measures to ensure national advance. Along with this has grown the urge for struggle, for resistance to the anti-popular policies and measures of the government.

This is reflected in—

1) Considerable growth of working class movement in all parts of the country, the improvement in organisation, (growth of political consciousness in the working class,) the establishment of unity of action between workers following different trade unions, solidarity reactions and major struggles winning a number of concessions. Strengthening of the position of trade unions and of the Communist Party in many working class areas. Leading role played by the working class in the demonstration (on Goa and in the struggle for Samyukta Maharashtra.)

2) Growth of Struggles on Economic as well as general democratic issues: Teachers' struggle in Calcutta which grew into a united struggle of the people. The countrywide support for the demands of the bank employees, the powerful solidarity campaign in the working class for Kanpur and the general support it won from the democratic public (press, shopkeepers' hartal). The Amritsar strike and working class peasant unity in action, struggle for a democratic set up in Trichur and Manipur, countrywide campaign on Goa, a number of student struggles that received support from the public, struggle for civil liberties in Bihar after the Patna firing, agricultural workers' strike

in T.C. State and the struggles after eviction, increase in water taxes, etc. increased vote for the Party in Andhra, mass collections for the Party in certain Provinces, the struggle for linguistic State and against merger of Bengal and Bihar.

3) Growth of anti-imperialist and peace sentiment among the people—big campaign against the Pak-US Pact, Asian solidarity sentiment, urge for friendship with China and USSR which found powerful expression during the visit of Chou En-lai and the Soviet leaders and the great ovation that greeted Nehru on his return from the USSR.

4) Weakening of the position of parties of feudal and communal reaction in the greater part of the country.

5) A number of victories and concessions won by the popular forces — SRS proposals and the Congress Working Committee resolution on it, Bank Award, wage increase in several industries, judicial inquiry in Bihar, Bombay, Agrarian reforms etc.

6) Growth of radical and Socialist sentiments inside the Congress. Growing urge for industrialisation, agrarian reforms, for extension of democracy, for linguistic States. Beginning of conflicts over policies inside the Congress. (Influence exerted by China's advance in industrialisation and agrarian reforms over all classes and sections, including the radical intelligentsia.) Avadi resolution on socialistic pattern of society which was on the one hand a recognition of and concession to the growth of radical sentiments among Congressmen and masses following the Congress; on the other, an attempt to utilise these radical sentiments for strengthening the position of the Congress and confine these sentiments within the constitutional framework.

7) Appearance of new features in the government's economic policies, pointed out earlier, have to be viewed in this background. To a great extent, it is a product of this background.

What do all these things indicate? How are we to assess them in their totality?

They indicate immense sharpening of the contradiction between the entire people (Indian) on the one hand and the imperialist-feudal exploiters on the other. They also indicate the sharpening of the specific contradiction between the Indian bourgeoisie and imperialism, a contradiction which is not confined to the realm of foreign affairs but has appeared in the sphere of internal economy too. They indicate growing contradiction between feudal survivals and the needs of bourgeois

development. Above all, they indicate that the process of mass radicalisation continues. The forces of democracy have grown stronger and not weakened.

But equally important it is to grasp that the strengthening of forces of democracy in our political life and the growth of mass radicalisation do not manifest themselves in the same form as before.

In the period of severe food crisis, of acute shortage of the necessities of life, of rapidly rising prices — which hit all classes of people, partial struggles spread spontaneously and won popular support. Today such is not the general phenomenon. Today it becomes necessary to spread the struggles consciously and build popular unity.

Such struggles do not immediately assume the character of a political struggle where the slogan of removal of the Government from power finds general support even from all sections of the participants.

Growth of radicalisation inside the Congress does not lead to break away from the Congress as in the years before the general elections and for sometime afterwards, but to growth of conflicts over specific measures and policies and the urge that the Government should carry out measures in defence of the interests of the people.

Mass radicalisation does not automatically bring strength to the left parties as in the past.

General denunciation of the Government, general condemnation that the Government is doing nothing and can do nothing, that no improvement is possible without a new Government — such denunciation and condemnation does not evoke the same response as before. At the same time, concrete and constructive criticism is appreciated, revealing the depth of popular discontent and popular urge for reforms, revealing the possibilities of democratic unity for struggles, for correct policies and measures.

It is evident that the consolidation that the Congress has been able to achieve is of an extremely partial and uneven character. It rests on a shaky foundation.

All these factors have to be kept in mind when working out concrete tactics.

In the numerous struggles that have taken place in the country our Party has played an important and leading role. It has

been in the forefront in defence of the interests of the working class, the peasantry, the students and the toiling people in general. It has been in the forefront in the struggle for linguistic States, putting forward the democratic and honest principles whose acceptance by the Government would have prevented the growth of provincial animosities and strengthened the unity of the country. It has headed the struggle for the liberation of the French territories on Indian soil. It has covered itself with glory in the campaign for the liberation of Goa. It has conducted numerous campaigns bringing on a common platform people of all parties, sections and groups. It has advocated the cause of the people from legislatures and the Parliament and served them through its work in municipalities, district boards and panchayats. Our cadres have displayed staunchness and courage and made sacrifices of which any Party could be proud.

Heavy blows have inevitably fallen on us. Against us has been concentrated the main fire of the Government.

Our Party is proud of the part it has played in the struggles of the people. It is proud of its cadres who have stood up to terror. It is proud that it has earned the hatred of the landlords, capitalists and of the Government defending their interests.

Many of the slogans which the Party gave have been proved to be correct and have come to be accepted by the entire democratic movement. All can see today the correctness of the policies which we advocated in the realm of international affairs. All can see that we were right in stressing the need for industrialisation, for radical agrarian reforms, for curbing of monopoly. This is getting reflected even in the policies of the Government — though in a half-hearted and halting way.

This role played by the Party has led to its strengthening in many areas, the growth of the influence — especially in the working class and among the most oppressed sections of the people.

At the same time, we must recognise that the progress registered in every sphere is far less than what it could have been. The struggles, by and large, have remained on a local and partial plane and have not been coordinated and developed into a powerful mass democratic movement. Mass organisations, though stronger than before, have not attained such strength as was both necessary and possible. Above all, the

Communist Party on whose strengthening depends the strengthening of the democratic movement has not registered appreciable progress in membership, in ideological level, in the circulation of its newspapers and strengthening of its financial position. The effective strength of the Party still remains confined to certain provinces and among certain classes and sections. Above all, inner-Party differences have accentuated and the inner-Party situation is extremely serious.

It will not be correct for us, comrades, to argue that all this is due or even mainly, to objective features of these situation. Undoubtedly those features in several respects were different from the past. Undoubtedly they rendered it difficult to rally the people directly under the slogan of removal of the Government from power. Undoubtedly true it is also that the massive propaganda drive launched by the Government on the basis of a limited improvement of economy, was far more effective than before, and gave rise to hopes among many sections weakening their resistance.

All this is true. At the same time, it is also true that the policies advocated by the Party have won major victories in this very period. The growth of democratic and radical sentiments among the people have continued. Dissatisfaction with the policies of the Government and desire to change them has not only continued but extended.

The objective situation was not favourable for a bid to replace the Government. But it was extremely favourable for extension and strengthening of the organised democratic movement, of the mass organisations of the Party. This has not happened. What is this due to? Above all to the inability of the Central Committee and the Polit Bureau to discharge their duties and responsibilities as the collective leadership of the Party—political and organisational.

The members of the Central Committee and the Polit Bureau, in their capacity as leaders of Provincial Committees and mass organisations, in their capacity as editors of Party journals, have been extremely active. They have helped to build the mass organisations. They have led the Party groups in the Legislatures and Parliament. But the Central Committee and Polit Bureau as collective bodies have hardly functioned. They have not carried out the responsibilities laid down in the Organisational Resolution. They have not acted as a national-political

leader, evolving slogans and tactics in a fast developing situation, reviewing actual events, giving concrete guidance, helping Party Committees to solve the political and organisational problems confronting them. Instead of acting as such collective bodies, the Central Committee and the Polit Bureau got sharply divided on political issues which virtually paralysed them. They could not resolve their differences.

It is this failure of the Central Leadership of the Party that is mainly responsible for the present weakness of the Party and of the mass movement.

This today is self-evident. But such a general assessment is not enough. The solution of the difficulties that have prevented the Party from playing an effective role in a period of historic advance of the forces of Socialism, democracy and peace all over the world, in a period of great possibilities in our own country, demands a resolute struggle against a certain deep-rooted understanding, certain wrong approaches to problems, certain methods. Such a task cannot be completed in a day. It requires a prolonged struggle. But a beginning has to be made at this Party Congress itself.

#### *Assessment of the Madurai Congress*

For doing this, first of all, it is necessary to have a correct assessment of the Madurai Congress.

In several important respects the understanding at Madurai was in advance on the understanding that had prevailed earlier.

The Congress warned the people against the menace represented by the Pak-U.S. Pact. It decisively rejected the thesis that American imperialism was not a serious enemy of India's freedom and stated that the struggle for peace called upon the Party to strive to build the broadest unity of all forces against the new menace. It noted that the American drive for war was meeting resistance not merely from the mass of people but even from a number of bourgeois governments. It pointed out that the Indian Government had played a significant role on a number of important issues and a role appreciated by peace-loving masses and States in recent years. Welcoming the growing bond of friendship and of cultural relations between the people of India on the one hand and the USSR and the Chinese People's Republic on the other, it stressed that

the trade between the Government of India and the USSR could help to reduce India's dependence on imperialist powers.

The period preceding Madurai had been a period of growing crisis in our economy and of rising wave of mass struggles. These struggles taking place all over the country drew lakhs of people into their orbit and had a powerful political impact. The swinging away of the masses that had been noted in the general elections continued. It was admitted by bourgeois newspapers (*Eastern Economist* editorial of 15th August, 1953) as well as by the utterances of Congress leaders like Mr. S. K. Patil. This process was reflected in a number of elections, to the legislatures (by-election to the Parliament in Calcutta) municipalities, (as in U.P.) and Panchayats.

Analysing the main features of the struggles that were growing, the Party Congress characterised the period as one of "the maturing of the economic crisis and the initial stages of a political crisis."

While holding forth the establishment of a Government of Democratic Unity as the objective towards which the mass struggles have to be led, the Congress also pointed out that the immediate task was the strengthening of the mass struggles for the concrete demands of the workers, peasants and other classes, the building up of their organisations and the strengthening of the Party.

The Congress stated—

"The development of the united front and unity through the widening of the mass movement is often hampered because of the abstractness of our agitation, the habit of substituting concrete exposure by general denunciation, the indulgence, quite often, in stereotyped speeches in Assemblies, Parliament, and from public platforms, stereotyped writings in our papers, and above all the failure to distinguish between the platform of the Front and the Party forum. Too often we speak only for those who are already convinced that the present Government is a reactionary Government. Too often we fail to make use of existing legislation — Tenancy Legislation, the Social Security Act, the Payment of Wages Act, etc. — to ameliorate the conditions of the masses and secure concessions for them, forgetting that this legislation has been enacted as the result of the mass struggles and is a weapon in the hands of the people. Too often the tendency is to narrate only the hard-



ships that the people are suffering and to ignore the successes that their struggles have won in the mistaken belief that references to such successes will breed "reformist illusions", while the reality is that, in order to inculcate confidence in the masses, confidence that unity and struggle can win demands, it is essential that each success won by the people, no matter how small, is widely publicised and made the basis for further advance. There is also the tendency to pay scant attention to such work as adult literacy, cultural and sports activities, co-operatives, medical relief, etc.—work which is absolutely essential work which can mobilise vast sections and enable the Party and mass organisations to forge close links with the people.

"In the areas where famine conditions prevail, not only is it necessary to demand relief from the Government and organise relief on the basis of unity of democratic organisations, but it is also necessary to mobilise the people for such work as deepening of wells, repair of tanks, etc.

"It is necessary for every Provincial Committee to undertake a critical examination of the plans and projects undertaken by the Government in the Province, make a factual assessment of their effects in consultation with the people directly covered by them and put forward the demand for their correct implementation or amendment or replacement as will help the people and mobilise the masses for their implementation."

(Paras 41 & 42 of the *Political Resolution* adopted at 3rd Congress of the CPI at Madurai)

The Congress stressed the importance of utilising the limited powers of municipalities, district boards and panchayats to give the people amenities of health and hygiene, roads and water supply, elementary education and such other things.

While recognising the importance of agreement between left parties for the unleashing of mass activity and while stressing the need to continue and intensify efforts for such agreements, the Congress also stated:

"United front does not mean merely the united front of the Communist Party and of left parties, but above all, united front of the masses, including the masses still under the influence of the Congress. Hence the development of the United Front movement demands the drawing into common struggles and common activity of the large mass of Congressmen, Praja Socialists and progressive intellectuals."

On the question of working class unity, the Congress stated: "The struggle for trade union unity is hampered on our part by the remnants of sectarian understanding. Though trade union unity is accepted in principle, it is looked upon as a temporary tactic and not as a fundamental principle."

The actual manifestations of this deviation were pointed out and the Party called upon to wage a resolute struggle for trade union unity. (Para 45 of the *Political Resolution*)

The Congress laid down the principles which must guide the Party in the struggle for linguistic states, sharply nailing down bourgeois nationalist deviations on this issue. (*On the Work of the Third Congress of the C.P.I.* p-17.)

Thus it can be seen that many of the practical tasks laid down by the Madura Congress were essentially on correct lines.

At the same time, the basic understanding was sectarian. This must be recognised.

(1) The Congress correctly warned against the threat represented by the U.S.-Pak Pact, correctly asked the Party to join in the campaign against this menace. But it failed to work out such practical slogans to meet the threat as Asian unity with Sino-Indian unity as its core, closer relations with the USSR etc. On the contrary, the Madura Congress linked the question of struggle against the new threat directly with such basic slogans of the Party as "Quit Commonwealth, Confiscate British Capital, Abolish landlordism," etc.

(2) It noted the measures taken by the Indian Government in defence of peace and rightly criticised their inconsistencies. But it refused to note the direction in which the Government's foreign policy was moving and the possibilities this created in view of the menace of the Pak-U.S. Pact and the Indian Government's opposition to it.

(3) It noted the specific features of the economic crisis but assumed that the crisis of the colonial economy and the crisis of the world capitalist economy with which our country was linked were already so deep and had reached such a stage that nothing but carrying out of the fundamental tasks of the Party—confiscation of British capital, abolition of landlordism and the establishment of a democratic State—could mitigate the crisis in any way. It noted the initial stages of the political crisis but did not see that certain improvements in certain aspects of the economy were possible which would arrest the growth of the

political crisis itself. The entire understanding about crisis—economic as well as political—was an oversimplified and mechanical understanding which took no account of the possibilities of limited improvement, which underestimated the manoeuvring capacity of the ruling classes, which assumed that the crisis would go on continuously deepening.

(4) It grossly underestimated the importance of the subjective factors—(i) weakness of the peasant movement which in our country is a factor of decisive importance; (ii) weak state of unity of the working class; and (iii) the weakness of the Communist Party—when holding out the perspective of the establishment of the Government of Democratic Unity, not merely in States like Andhra and Travancore-Cochin but as a general perspective. The statement “with the strengthening of the mass movement, with the maturing of the crisis in different ways in different States and different areas, situations will arise when this can be raised as an immediate slogan in State after State”—this was nothing but subjectivism of the grossest type in view of the actual state of the movement.

Moreover, the General Secretary in his speech explaining the resolution virtually equated the Government of the Democratic Unity with a People's Democratic Government.

(5) Finally and above all, the Madurai resolution lacked a national-political approach to the problems facing the country.

Ours was the Communist Party of a semi-colonial country which had freed itself from the direct rule of Britain only a few years ago. Our freedom rested on insecure foundations. It was being menaced by aggressive imperialists. In terms of economic advance, in terms of liquidation of colonial backwardness, in terms of prosperity for the people, real freedom had yet to be won. This was a part of the consciousness of our entire people.

We had to overcome our backwardness and develop India into a strong and powerful country.

In this situation, the Communist Party had to come before the people as the builder of national unity for the defence and strengthening of national economy. The struggle for the defence of the interests of the workers, peasants and other classes, the struggle for democratic reforms and civil liberties, the struggle for peace against the war drive of the imperialists and for friendship with the USSR and China—all these struggles had to be waged as integral parts of a genuinely national and patriotic

policy of consolidation of national freedom, strengthening of national economy, strengthening of democracy, improving the condition of the people in every sphere.

This is how the whole task facing the Party had to be posed and understood. Thus only could the policies of the Government be effectively fought, partial struggles integrated and developed into a mass democratic movement, patriotic masses under Congress influence drawn into the movement on a bigger and bigger scale.

Our people had forged a glorious unity in the struggle against British rule. Government policies since 1947 had disrupted that unity, had kept India backward and economically dependent. The Party had to come before the people with alternative policies—industrialisation of the country with special emphasis on heavy industries, raising the resources for that by mainly taking taxes from the rich, establishing economic co-operation with the Socialist world, reduction of the burden on the peasants for expanding the market and for increasing agricultural production, living wage and trade union rights for workers for ensuring expansion of production, civil liberties.

It was correct to strive for the formation of alternative governments in the States where it is possible to bring this about, where the masses themselves considered it to be a practical possibility in view of the relationship of forces. But this could not be made a general slogan for the whole country, especially when we ourselves noted that the struggles that were taking place were “mainly on issues affecting the day-to-day life of the people such as taxes, food subsidy, wages, bonus, retrenchment and victimisation, evictions, rent, famine relief, etc., and motivated by concrete demands against the State, landlords and the monopolists” and the subjective factors were too weak in most States. What was needed was the evolving of national political slogans on all these issues, of linking these slogans with the general national task of strengthening national freedom and national economy and developing a mass campaign on their basis in every part of the country. The perspective of the formation of alternative governments, governments of democratic unity in specific States itself had to be placed in this context and as a part of this policy.

It is in relation to the immediate tasks of strengthening of national freedom, of heightening of India's world status, build-

ing of national economy and of ensuring a life of prosperity for the masses of the people—it is in relation to this task that the Party had to work out slogans and tactics on every issue in the realm of foreign as well as internal affairs. It is in relation to this task that all problems had to be approached. Thus only the Party could make a decisive bid to win over the majority of the people, broaden popular unity in this very process, progressively build the national force.

Despite its many correct points, the mistakes of the Madurai Resolution lay, therefore, not merely in formulations and assessments. The approach itself was sectarian.

### *Causes of the inner-Party differences and the responsibilities of the Central Committee*

From the foregoing it can be seen that the Madurai understanding was, in several vital respects, seriously defective. A number of comrades had not voted for the Resolution. But that did not mean that they had a more correct understanding than others. On the contrary, the understanding on the basis of which they considered the Resolution defective was even more wrong than the understanding of the majority of the delegates. In the main, the understanding arrived at Madurai was the common understanding of the entire Party Congress. It would not be correct, however, to argue that because of this, all that happened subsequently was inevitable.

Such an explanation would amount to holding the whole Party Congress and even the entire Party which during the discussion stage had broadly approved the Draft Resolution responsible for the present state of affairs. The specific responsibility of the Central Committee would get minimised.

Also, such an explanation has dangerous implications. It would mean that if the decisions taken by the present Congress are, in some important respects, defective, then after a short while another Party crisis would be inevitable.

The task of the Central Committee, it is necessary to grasp, is not merely to interpret and apply Party Congress directives but also to understand changes, developments. The formulations made by the Party Congress necessarily carry weight. They should not be lightly treated. But the understanding given at the Party Congress must be enriched, and carried for-

ward and also, where defective, corrected. This is one of the most important tasks of the Central Committee and a Central Committee which fails to carry out this task, a Central Committee which doggedly adheres to formulations which, it is obvious to all, have become outmoded—such a Central Committee fails to discharge its responsibilities towards the Party and the masses.

The Madurai Resolution did not bring out the inseparable relation between the struggles of peace and freedom, did not see the direction in which the Government's foreign policy was moving and the new possibilities that were arising. It made an exaggerated assessment of the situation. It failed to work out immediate slogans of mass mobilisation. It had, as already pointed out, other defects. Above all, the approach was sectarian.

At the same time, the Resolution did stress that the struggle for peace defends national freedom. It did note the steps taken by the Government of India in defence of peace. It did stress the importance of the struggle for immediate demands, of multiple forms of activities in every sphere.

Why could not the defects in the Madurai Resolution be corrected and the strong points elaborated and carried forward? Why could not the Central Committee resolve the differences that arose inside it and reunify itself? The reasons were complex. But it is essential to focus attention on the main causes. Inability to do that would mean inability to overcome the weaknesses. The task today is not to "bury the past", not to say "we were all wrong and let us now work out a correct line." That would mean refusal to lay bare weaknesses, refusal to correct them. That would not even unify the Party. Divergent assessments of the achievements and mistakes of specific periods which prevail in our Party is one of the most serious obstacles in the way of real Party unification.

It is essential, therefore, to point out the main failures of the Central Committee in the period since the Madurai Congress, failures due to which it could not discharge its tasks and responsibilities.

They were:

*First and foremost:* Failures to assess shifts and changes in the situation. Dogged refusal on the part of the majority of

comrades in the CC even to admit any shift, any change, for a long time and to make any serious effort to understand it.

This was revealed, above all, in not seeing the growing conflict between the Indian Government and the whole imperialist bloc and increasing assertion of independence by India. Also, the impact of the improvement in the food situation and certain aspects of economy in the mood of the people.

*Secondly:* and closely connected with the above, rigid and mechanical adherence to the formulations in the Party Programme and in the Madurai Resolution—admitting no change unless it fitted in with those formulations.

The crassest example of this was seen in the assessment of India's foreign policy and India's status. Formulations that the foreign policy is a policy of "play" and that it was "essentially British", formulation that India is not free—these formulations for some comrades acquired the sanctity of dogmas which could not be violated in any case. Any departure from these formulations was looked upon as repudiation of Marxism.

*Thirdly,* inability of the Central Committee to wage a firm and principled struggle against right and left deviations inside the Party and therefore, inability also to wage ideological struggle among the masses against the powerful ideological offensive of the Government. Attempt to fight right deviation (document of 10 U.P. comrades) by sinking in the mire of left-sectarianism. Attempt to counter the ideological offensive of the Congress by repetition of the basic slogans of the Party, by general denunciations of the Government on the basis of these slogans, by emphasising only the inconsistencies in the foreign policy, by stressing that nothing could change as long as the Government was not removed.

No ideological battle can ever be effective if it is not concrete, if it ignores realities, if it denies changes which are evident to the masses. On the other hand, how effective it can be if changes are not merely admitted, but boldly welcomed and the Party's role brought out—this was seen in the reaction to the *Communist answer to Nehru*.

*Fourthly:* Failure to study mass movement, review mass struggles and campaigns and draw their lessons. This was done only once—at the April 1954, CC meeting.

*Fifthly:* Failure to take firm steps to implement the Organisational Resolution of the Party. The Resolution was adopted

in April 1954. It was decided that three days were to be spent by each P.C. to discuss the Resolution and strengthen its organisation on its basis. But even the P.B. did not attempt to re-organise its own work on the basis of the principles and directions given in it. The Resolution remained on paper.

It might be argued that these two tasks—the reviewing of the mass movements and the strengthening of Party organisation—could not be undertaken unless the political differences on the basic issues were resolved. Such argument is incorrect. It has dangerous implications. These are tasks which must be carried out in all situations. Only a serious attempt to review actual developments can narrow down differences and even gradually correct wrong political understanding. Only adherence to correct organisational methods and practices can prevent political differences from tending to assume the form of factions inside the Party. Due to the very nature of the period we are passing through, a period of swift and sharp changes, differences inside the Party and inside the Central Committee are bound to arise even in the future. If as soon as such differences arise—on tactical or even on basic issues—such tasks as reviewing of struggles and campaigns, such tasks as implementation of organisational responsibilities are to be relegated to the background until and unless the political differences are resolved, then no advance is possible.

The unity of the Communist Party is the most important single factor in the task of building the democratic front. This unity is not something formal, something to be achieved once and for all. It is a continuous process. Even if a Party Congress works out a hundred per cent correct tactical line, even if complete unity is achieved on the basis of that line—even then unification of the Party does not become complete. The party has also to be unified continuously on the base of unified understanding of current developments, unified understanding of the lesson of struggles, campaigns and activities, movements and their problems. If such unified understanding of current developments is not achieved, then these developments tend to be understood by different comrades in different ways. And even the unity achieved on the tactical line gets disrupted.

Such unification is the task of all Party Committees. But above all of the Central Committee which has to give lead on national—political issues. Inability of the Central Committee



to understand national political developments and give correct lead therefore not only weakens the mass movement, also it weakens the unity of the Party.

Such were the main failures of the Central Committee in the political and organisational spheres.

### *Growth of Controversies in the Central Committee:*

It should not be thought, however, that no efforts at all were made since the Madurai Congress to improve the functioning of the Central Committee and to make corrections in understanding. How these efforts were made, why they did not succeed, these are matters of importance for us; it is necessary to review, in some detail, the actual developments inside the Central Committee.

We are undertaking this task, comrades, not in order to apportion blame, not in order to hold individual comrades responsible for the present situation inside the Party, but in order to draw the necessary lessons for the future.

Some efforts in the right direction were made in the period between the Madurai Congress and the April, 1954 CC meeting, and at the April CC meeting itself. During this period, the functioning of the PB registered marked improvement. The PB was able to give concrete guidance in relation to the work of our comrades during the Bengal Teachers' strike and correct the left-sectarian mistakes and in Tripura, guidance which helped the comrades conducting the struggles.

The Bengal Committee, in its review of the struggle, reached the same conclusions as the PB. The CC endorsed the view of the PB in April 1954.

It should be noted that the Bengal Teachers' strike started within 5 weeks after the Madurai Congress. The mistakes of the Congress have been already dealt with as regards assessment of the general political situation and minimisation of the subjective factor. Yet, this did not prevent the PB and the CC or the WBPC from correctly guiding the struggle, correctly nailing down the mistakes. This very fact shows how if serious efforts are made to evaluate each concrete development and struggle, these can help the Party not only to draw correct lessons from the specific struggle but also eventually correct its mistakes with regard to the situation itself.

This is also seen in the attempt that was made for a correct appreciation of the growing trend in India's foreign policy.

In the period after Madurai the Indian Government came out more and more sharply against the war-moves of American imperialists. The demand for the withdrawal of U.N. observers from Kashmir was a significant event in this process—an event which a statement of the PB described as a positive step in the direction of frustrating the war-moves of imperialists.

These developments were discussed at the April 1954 meeting of the CC and the sectarianism prevailing in the Party on the issue of struggle for peace was sought to be combatted. The CC when welcoming the recent declarations of the Indian Government did not immediately qualify this by "ifs" and "buts". It noted the big campaign that had developed in the country against the war-moves of imperialism and simultaneously noted that this campaign had not become as strong as it could be.

"It is obvious," the CC stated "that actual mobilisation in the struggle for peace is far less than it can and should be."

What were the reasons for this? The reply given by the CC was:

"An important reason for this, the Central Committee concluded, is the prevalence of sectarian concepts. There is, in our party, the tendency to think that when the Nehru Government makes a statement or proposal which, in some measure helps the cause of peace, the Communist Party has merely to express formal support to it and point out its inadequacies."

"Due to this tendency, the task of building mass unity in action on the stand that has already been taken by the Indian Government is considerably neglected, for example, the demand for the withdrawal of the American observers in Kashmir and its proposals on the Hydrogen Bomb.

"In effect, it is a tendency which weakens the struggle for peace by looking upon declarations of the Government as a substitute for mass mobilisation.

"The Central Committee pointed out that this is a wrong tendency. It stressed that, while fighting resolutely for a consistent policy of peace, while combating the false propaganda about "two power blocs striving to destroy each other," a propaganda line often indulged in even by Nehru, the Communist Party has to do something more also.

"It has to lay the most emphasis on the task of building unity

in action on the basis of the declarations already made by the government itself, in fact, without such mobilisation and unity in action on the basis of the declaration already made, the task of combating the false propaganda of two power blocs and of fighting for a consistent peace policy itself cannot be fulfilled.”

With regard to the internal economic situation the Central Committee noted the “undoubted increase (34 per cent above the 1946 level) in the overall general index of industrial production”, but it failed to note that agricultural production also had increased to a considerable extent and that this was an important economic and political factor in the situation.

Nevertheless, the Central Committee stressed that it is not enough to expose the hollowness of the Government’s plans but also “that the Party shows concretely the alternative path by which the country can march to happiness and prosperity.”

The Committee called upon the workers to resist the rationalisation offensive of the monopolists. At the same time, it concretely combatted the propaganda by which rationalisation is justified, indicating the real path to industrialisation.

The Central Committee in its April meeting finalised the Resolutions on Party Organisations.

It adopted the Agrarian Resolution which resolved many controversies and helped work among the peasants.

It gave concrete proposals with regard to the Reorganisation of States.

Also, the April CC meeting gave immediate organisational slogans:

°Enrol into the Party all those who had been in the category of militants and sympathisers for a year or more, if they had actively participated in mass and other work conducted by the Party and if they fulfil the conditions laid down in the Party Constitution. It directed that concrete steps should be taken to make all Party members literate and to start night schools for adult literacy in order to raise the cultural level of those among whom the Party had been working. It was pointed out that without raising the general level of culture among Party members, it would be impossible to realise inner-Party democracy and make criticism from below effective.

On the whole this period is marked by distinct improvement in the work of the Party Centre.

Nevertheless, the PB and CC did not get away from secta-

rian rails. This was seen most clearly in the assessment of the T. C. state elections and the decision on united front with the PSP. While correctly criticising the T.C. comrades' mistakes, the CC committed serious sectarian deviations.

Basing itself on the betrayal of the dominant leadership of the PSP in relation to the formation of ministry in TC State, it issued general directives in relation to the PSP which were of such a type that united front with the PSP was virtually ruled out.

The line laid down in relation to the PSP was not merely unreal. It was mechanical. It practically said that only if any section of the top leadership of the PSP accepted the position of the Communist Party, United Front with it would be possible. It even banned appeals to PSP ranks to bring pressure on their leaders.

This attitude towards the PSP led to seriously wrong tactics in the Andhra elections.

In relation to the specific issue of the PSP, the April CC decisions were decidedly more sectarian at Madurai. But in relation to other general issues, it marked a significant advance towards a more correct understanding.

In the subsequent period, the PB tried to evolve a more positive policy – a policy that takes into account the changes and shifts in the situation. As yet, neither the PB nor any of its members had seen that a big change was coming in the situation. Yet there were certain efforts to react to the changes as can be seen from:

- (1) attitude towards National Plan Loan;
- (2) discussion on the question of student unity;
- (3) August 15th Circular;
- (4) P. Ramamurthi's article after Chou En-lai's visit.

Concrete tasks were worked out by our Party members at the AITUC Session at Calcutta and at the 12th Session of the AIKS.

The General Secretary had to leave the country at the end of July 1954 for reasons of health and was away till the last week of November 1954.

The September 1954 meeting of the CC correctly criticised the PB for the method adopted by it on the issue of student unity. The PB's own understanding on the issue of student unity had been arrived at without a concrete assessment of the

actual situation and was therefore wrong, especially in relation to organisation. It could also be argued that the PB's directive in relation to the National Plan Loan might create confusion in relation to the Party's attitude towards the actual economic measures of the Government. These certainly were subjects that the CC should have discussed and if there was any defect in the specific directions given, that should have been corrected. But the entire line taken by the September CC in relation to students' circular, the 15th August directive, Ramamurthy's article, National Plan Loan, as well as the general political tasks of the Party was a crudely sectarian line. It revealed dogged refusal to see any change in the situation, a tendency to look upon Madurai Resolution as something sacrosanct. It showed refusal to grasp the world-historic significance of the Chou En-lai Nehru declaration and its meaning in terms of the movement for Asian solidarity, in terms of the democratic movement inside our own country.

Before the September 1954 meeting of the CC the PB had placed a political-organisational report—noting several changes in the situation including improvement in the food position and trying to work out immediate national-political slogans related to the task of national reconstruction. This had been done in accordance with the decision of the April meeting of the CC itself.

There was a PB report on the organisational position of the Party and work in the Parliament. There was another note on the Trade Union position.

The Central Committee did not even discuss these documents. It was obsessed with fear of reformism. It behaved as though the one immediate task of the Central leadership was to fight the menace of reformism. It criticised the "reformist deviations" of the PB as expressed in the writings of PB members and in their directives.

The article written by Com. Ramamurthi came in for sharp criticism. In reality, there was nothing wrong with the article or even with the slogan of a broad national platform for peace and freedom." Such a slogan does not necessarily mean a call for a United Front Government. It was wrong however to state that the AICC "must take positive steps so that this momentous task is completed." Such a statement leaves the initiative to the AICC. On the other hand, there should have been a

call to the AICC to join hands with all in defence of peace and freedom.

This meeting of the Central Committee had before it a document prepared by 10 U.P. comrades. The basic approach of the document was determined by the dogma that the contradictions between a progressive foreign policy and a reactionary home policy cannot continue for long. Further, the understanding of the document as regards the prevailing international and also national situation was incorrect. It exaggerated the magnitude and imminence of the American threat to India, exaggerated the capacity of America to intervene, exaggerated the strength and influence of the American fifth columns inside India. It underestimated the strength of the democratic forces and also of the Indian Government and gave a panicky, unreal picture of the whole situation. It depicted as though something like a situation of national emergency had arisen with grave threat from outside and inside. Such an estimation of the situation has grossly reformist implications which was seen in the manner in which the question of a Government was posed.

At the same time, the document of the 10 U.P. comrades contained many correct slogans for immediate mass mobilisation. The concept about the need for a minimum programme was correct.

The CC, while rejecting the document as reformist, failed to bring out its real reformist character. On the contrary, it criticised the correct points in the document also from a sectarian understanding.

The CC, as already noted, sharply criticised the PB. Even this criticism however was not considered enough by certain Provincial Committees who thought that the PB had not been dealt with adequately.

The CC doggedly stuck to the understanding that the economic crisis was deepening and the country was in the initial stages of a political crisis—an understanding which had very little to do with the reality, an understanding for which no justification existed in September, 1954.

This meeting of the CC, (September meeting,) put a stop to the whole process of correction of the earlier sectarian understanding. It took the Party backwards. It was a meeting which in a negative sense was of decisive importance. By doggedly refusing to assess the changes that were taking place, by

doggedly refusing even to recognise that there were any changes. by obsession with the fear of reformism this meeting laid the basis for the crisis that later developed in the Party.

It might be argued that the CC was merely carrying out the Madurai Congress directives and that therefore it could not be blamed for the rigid understanding that it showed. Such an explanation totally misses the fact that the Central Committee's task is not merely to adhere to the formulations of the Party Congress, but to make serious efforts to understand current developments and on their basis make the changes that are needed in slogans and tactics. It is necessary to remember that the Madurai Congress Resolution did not prevent the April meeting of the CC from correctly and unanimously reacting to the measures taken by Nehru in relation to foreign affairs. The Central Committee had to evolve a tactical line in a changing situation and for that it had to try to understand the changes themselves. This was completely lacking. Fear gripped the CC—fear of committing reformist mistakes. Some comrades of the Central Committee even went so far as to ascribe the success of the Congress in strengthening its position to reformist mistakes committed by the Party.

From this meeting of the CC, the PB emerged divided, demoralised and panicky about reformism. It drew the conclusion that the key task was to save the Party from the danger of reformation. The article of Com. R. P. Dutt in I.PPD coming in this background threw the PB into a state of panic. With total disregard to all principles which should guide the relation between brother parties, it hastily summoned an urgent meeting of the CC, placing before it a resolution rejecting the article. The CC rightly refused to endorse that resolution.

The article by Com. RPD was a general article on the colonial liberation movement, with some reference to India also. It was right for Party members to study the article, to try to understand what it contained to see whether the formulations of the article helped to understand the situation and our tasks in the situation better. It could certainly be discussed in any Party Committee, including the PB. But there could be no question of any Party Committee, least of all the PB, accepting or rejecting the article, because every Party is guided by its own decisions, the decisions of the Party Congress and of leading Party units. If any Party member thought that the article

constituted a correction to understanding and a prepared thesis on the Indian situation, and on the task of the Communist Party of India on the basis of this understanding, if a sufficient number of CC members wanted to discuss such a thesis, then only a special meeting of the CC could have been summoned. A CC meeting also might have been held if a sufficient number of CC members or Provincial Committees had demanded a meeting to alter the line of the Party or alter its assessments of the situation. In this case, however, the PB had called the CC meeting on its own initiative demanding that the CC should reject the article. Such a procedure was disruptive of fraternal relations between Communist Parties, disruptive of the unity of our own Party.

The CC after refusing to endorse the PB Resolution, adopted the following resolution:

“The discussion by the CC on the article “New features in the national liberation struggle of colonial and dependent people” written by Com. R. P. Dutt in the LPPD has revealed differences of an important nature in the CC. The CC is of the opinion that more time and thought are required to resolve the differences and bring clarity on the problems discussed. The CC decides therefore to discuss this problem in the next session of the CC, along with the assessment of the national and international developments which have taken place during the last months.

“The CC takes firm stand by the Madurai Resolution and calls upon the Party to carry on the work in accordance with the understanding given therein.”

This was a most irresponsible and disruptive thing to do. Such a resolution, even if adopted, should have been confined to the CC. To tell the Party members that there are important differences, but not to tell them what those differences are, to assert that despite those differences, the CC as a whole takes a firm stand on the Madurai Resolution on the understanding given therein — all this can only give rise to bewilderment, cause speculations and shatter confidence.

Differences had undoubtedly arisen in the CC. But there are Party methods for dealing with such differences. The CC could have held another meeting or even an extended Plenum to discuss the points of difference. If it was felt that the differences were of a vital character and there was no firm majority



in any point of view in the CC, then an inner-Party discussion could have been organised on the basis of prepared documents clearly stating the issues and the differences. Not one of these methods was adopted.

The PB meeting together with some members of the CC which was held in December, 1954 after the General Secretary's return, recognised the meeting; however, the formulations that the foreign policy strengthened national freedom did not find general acceptance and had to be deleted. This meeting also made an effort to re-evaluate the internal situation, note the new features in the economy and its political impact. Although still inadequate, these were efforts in the right direction and the conclusions were broadly correct. Another meeting of the PB held in February, together with some CC members, made further corrections and understanding. It noted that the Madurai assessment of the situation had become obsolete. The new understanding, if consistently applied and carried forward could have helped to overcome the inner-Party controversies and reunify the Party. But the new understanding was not brought to bear on the tactics to be adopted in the Andhra elections, the most important practical issue before the PB. The Andhra Committee of the Party still adhering to the Madurai assessment of the situation, an assessment which the CC had refused to correct — and on the basis of a subjective assessment of the situation inside Andhra, had already decided to conduct the elections in a manner which was closely sectarian, which was opposed even to the directive given at the Madurai Congress. The line taken by the CC in criticising the comrades of the TC State had its impact on the election tactics in Andhra. The PB in December 1954, instead of opposing these sectarian tactics, satisfied itself with listening to an oral report made by the PB members from Andhra and endorsed the election tactics.

Despite the acute differences that prevailed in the Party, the Andhra election campaign grew into one of the biggest campaigns conducted by the Party in its entire history. Party units and cadres from all over the country threw themselves wholeheartedly into the campaign, collected the cash, sent cadres, held meetings. The campaign showed the devotion of Party comrades, the love of the masses for the Party, their willingness to sacrifice themselves for it. Inside Andhra, the base that the Party had built among agricultural workers and the poor peas-

ants on the whole stood intact and withstood the most powerful offensive from the Congress which had united most of the landlords in the Province under its banner. The votes secured by us — 31% of the total — in spite of landlord terror and unprecedented campaign of slanders and intimidation, was a powerful manifestation of the loyalty of the most exploited classes for the Party.

But it was just this devotion of the Party cadres and the loyalty of the masses that made the mistakes of the Party leadership all the more serious, all the more glaring. These mistakes lay not only within sectarian tactics worked out on the basis of that assessment, not only in failure to recognise the progressive orientation in the Government's foreign policy and the role played by the Party in bringing this about, but also in boastful declarations which were given full publicity in the Central Organ itself and in other Party journals. Inevitably the heavy defeats in terms of seats actually won shook confidence, gave rise to frustrations, dealt a blow to the whole democratic movement. Also, it had serious repercussions on friends and sympathisers of the Party and seriously affected its political prestige as well as financial position.

The actual tactics adopted in Andhra elections were, of course, blindly sectarian. But, simultaneously, the whole understanding on whose basis these tactics had been worked out was deeply reformist. The elections were not taking place in the background of a wave of mass struggles either in the country as a whole or even inside Andhra—struggles which steel the masses, bring about a decisive shift in their position and win them for the Party. Andhra was not in the grip of a political crisis. The main thing that had happened was that when the unpopular ministry was defeated, there were jubinations and big demonstrations in many areas. This was taken to mean support for the slogan of a Government consisting of or at least led by the Communist Party. In reality, there had been nothing in terms of actual mass struggles in Andhra in the period preceding the elections to warrant the assumption that a big shift had taken place or was taking place among the masses in our favour. Yet the Party assumed that it could, on the basis of its own strength, inflict an electoral defeat not only on the Congress but on the entire coalition that the Congress had forged.

In the period after the Andhra elections, the crisis of the

Central Committee deepened. The CC meeting held in March, 1955 to review the Andhra elections, after prolonged discussions, produced a resolution which most Party Committees rightly considered to be unsatisfactory. This was inevitable because inside the CC there was still no unified understanding on the prevailing situation itself.

Differences intensified inside the PB virtually splitting it. The June meeting of the CC showed that the differences had instead of narrowing down, widened and crystallized.

Several big campaigns were conducted in the subsequent period: the solidarity campaign for Kanpur; the campaign in Goa, the campaign in Bombay and Maharashtra against the SRC proposals, the campaign in Bengal against merger.

There was magnificent response by the entire Party cadres to these campaigns showing once again their loyalty to the Party, their devotion to its cause, showing that if the leadership gave a correct lead, the Party can rally the masses and move them into action on a bigger scale. The sacrifices made by the Party in the struggle for liberation of Goa won it the respect of the entire patriotic camp. It was the first time when on a big national political issue, the Party played such a leading role.

The solidarity campaign for Kanpur strike developed mainly under the initiative of the Party and Party Comrades working in trade unions. It was a big event in the history of the working class movement.

But due to the state of the Party, these campaigns could not be effectively utilised to strengthen the Party itself.

The June 1955 Central Committee Resolution did not bring about any appreciable change in the inner-Party situation and even the document on Communist Party and National Reconstruction did not become the basis for a mass campaign.

The June Resolution had been adopted after prolonged discussion in the Central Committee. By its very nature it was a compromise resolution. Due to differences inside the CC, due to the efforts to accommodate these differences, the Resolution in several respects was defective. Nevertheless, it registered an important advance in several matters.

If after its adoption by a majority after discussion, the whole Central Committee had unitedly carried out the directives given in the Resolution and further advanced and modified it in

the light of subsequent developments; if serious attempt had been made by the PB and the CC to concretise the Resolution in terms of tasks of the mass movement, the inner-Party situation could have been improved even at this stage.

But it is precisely this that was not done. Contrary to all practice that prevails in Communist Parties, the CC decided that even its own members were free to express disagreement with the Resolution in lower units of which they were members and write in the Party Forum against the CC line.

The CC further resolved that the June Resolution was not only to be discussed in all Party units and made the basis of immediate work—which was perfectly correct—but also that this very Resolution should be discussed in all Party Conferences.

The discussions that took place in the Party Forum, were of an extremely abstract nature—divorced from life, divorced from problems of the mass movement. They failed to settle issues or evenly sharply bring out the differences. The very nature of the discussion was such that the mass of Party members could not effectively participate in them.

What all this had led to is evident to everyone. It has given rise to uncertainty in relation to the Party line, it has prevented its concretisation, it has virtually paralysed the Party and intensified differences at all levels.

In all, eight meetings of the Central Committee have been held since Madurai. Except in the first meeting held in April 1954, the CC meetings have produced practically no results. The CC has functioned not as the leader of the Party but as a debating society where abstract theoretical issues are discussed.

## TASKS IN RELATION TO DEMOCRATIC FRONT

### *Basis for Advance*

Due to these failures of the central leadership, due to its inability to resolve the differences, due to its inability even to fight in a correct way to resolve the differences, serious damage has been done to the whole Party and to the democratic movement. Valuable time has been lost. The initiative which we seized with the Party programme, and which we maintained till Madurai has, to some extent, gone away from our hands. But even more serious than these losses has been the effect of this

failure on the Party—its unity, the authority of its leading bodies, the confidence of its cadres in these bodies. Hardly had the Party overcome the ravages of the mistakes of the earlier years and started strengthening its organisation when these controversies have given it a new setback.

Comrades, no effort should be made to minimise the seriousness of the damage, to minimise the intensity and the immensity of the work that lies ahead for repairing this damage.

At the same time, it would be a serious mistake to focus attention only on this. That would lead to endless controversies and mutual recrimination. It would lead to wrong tactics, wrong slogans, wrong practice. It would lead to continuation of the present state of affairs.

We must recognise that despite all that has happened, the actual conditions that prevail today are such that big progress can be made in the immediate future. These conditions relate not only to the advance of the world communist movement and the historic success achieved by the forces of world communism, but also to the situation prevailing in our own country.

The emergence of India as a world power and her role in world affairs have strengthened the urge among patriotic forces for bold and far-reaching measures in the internal sphere—measures that would liquidate the heritage of the colonial order and ensure national advance in every sphere. It has become evident to all that the menace to Indian freedom will remain as long as the country's economy remains weak. Developments in the world arena, growing contact with the socialist world, the massive achievements of socialism in the USSR and vivid demonstrations of the advance made by China are having powerful impact on the mind of our people. They are giving impetus to radical, democratic and socialist ideas. They are underlining the need for unity of democratic forces, for policies of national advance.

The main division among the democratic forces in India is the division between the democratic masses that follow the Congress on one hand and the masses that follow the democratic opposition on the other. This division manifests itself in every class in Indian society. Further, the democratic opposition itself is divided—mainly among the masses of the Socialist, Praja Socialist and Communist Parties. But in recent periods significant advance has been made in the direction of over-

coming these divisions. In the campaign against the US-Pak. Pact and the aggressive plans of imperialists, in the mighty welcome accorded to the Soviet leaders, masses of all parties came together. Among these masses of all parties the desire and urge is growing for unity, for resistance to and struggle against the offensive of vested interests and the Government, for national reconstruction, for reforms and democracy. United struggles are growing in scope and intensity.

The Congress is trying to consolidate its position by utilising the radical democratic and anti-imperialist sentiments of the people as well as their urge for national reconstruction and also by forging unity with such landlords and other reactionary elements as were opposed to it in the past. It has attained a measure of success in this. The limited gains under the First Five Year Plan, the easing of the food situation, the proposal for industrialisation under the 2nd Plan and the talks of socialism and socialist pattern of society have given rise to hopes and illusions. These, together with the prestige India has acquired as the result of her foreign policy, are being utilised by the Congress for its strengthening.

Nevertheless, as events have shown, this consolidation of the Congress is of an extremely uneven and partial character and rests on a shaky foundation. The actual practices of the Government, belying its claims in many spheres, give rise to sharp criticism. The measures of the Government, often running counter to the very sentiments that the Government strives to utilise, its deeds frustrating the very expectations that its promises raise, give rise to mass opposition and intensifies the conflict inside the Congress—sometimes forcing the Government to retreat from its earlier position.

Among the members and masses of the Congress, sentiments of peace and anti-imperialism, of friendship with the USSR and China, of democracy and socialism, the urge for radical reforms in order to carry out the task of national reconstruction, have made significant headway.

The adoption of socialism as its declared goal by the Congress has to be viewed in this context. On one hand, it is an attempt by the bourgeoisie to camouflage the real character of its policies, mislead the masses and use their radical sentiments for consolidation of its own class rule. But it is also an indication of the growing power and attraction of the ideas of socialism—

a development which the ruling class cannot ignore. Further, it has radical implications. The very declaration of socialism as the goal acts as a radicalising force. It strengthens the left-ward swing among Congressmen, Congress masses and people in general, gives impetus to the demand for reforms and for measures that bring out the disparity in incomes and help the people. While the mass of Congressmen enthusiastically support those policies of the Government that help to strengthen national freedom, national economy and benefit of the people, they are growing critical of anti-people, undemocratic policies and of the divergence between the declared aim of socialism and the actual practice. Many of the members of the Congress and the masses following them have not only opposed the anti-democratic measures and policies of the Government in words, but joined hands with parties and masses outside the Congress in common struggles. On the issue of Goa, on the issue of linguistic states, and opposition to merger proposals, on the issue of opposition to tax burdens as well as in relation to struggle for civil liberties, the country has seen powerful united campaigns in which members and masses of the Congress have played a significant role. Inside the Parliament on several issues connected with the task of national reconstruction, many Congressmen today voice the same sentiment as the parties of the democratic opposition although Party discipline prevents them from exercising their votes in the manner they would desire.

Among parties of the democratic opposition of which the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the Praja Socialist Party are the most important, consciousness of the necessity of unity has grown and had led to united action on many issues related to the defence of the interest of the people, civil liberties, liberation of Goa, linguistic provinces as well as to electoral agreements.

The former rigid barriers that divided the democratic masses and elements of different parties are slowly but steadily crumbling. Contacts have grown between the Communist Party on the one hand and the Socialist Party and the Praja Socialist Party on the other, between the democratic elements inside the Congress on one hand and the democratic forces outside the Congress on the other.

Struggles of the masses have been growing in all parts of the

country and are building popular unity in action on an increasingly broader scale. They are having powerful impact on the consciousness of the people, giving concrete expression to the growing spirit of protest and resistance against reactionary policies and measures, strengthening unity, facilitating radicalisation.

Recent periods have witnessed united struggles of the working class on a bigger scale than ever before in many parts of the country, struggles during which workers belonging to different trade unions and a vast number of unorganised workers, initiated in defence of their common interests, heroically fought for their demands against the capitalists and the repressive measures of the Government. A significant feature of these struggles was the participation of the workers following the INTUC and several INTUC Unions. These struggles evoked sympathy and support from broad democratic masses. In many cases, important concessions were won, demonstrating the power of unity. The struggles of the working class have not been confined to the economic plane alone. In the campaign for the liberation of Goa, in the fight for linguistic states, in the struggle for civil liberties, the working class in many centres played a leading role exercising influence on all classes and sections and powerfully strengthening the popular movement.

The determined struggles waged by the Kisan against evictions, against mounting tax burdens, for waste lands, the struggles of agricultural workers for adequate wages, aided by the growth of radical and democratic sentiments in the country, have not only won many victories but are having impact inside the Congress itself. This is reflected in the agrarian proposals of the 2nd Five Year Plan and in the proposals of the Land Reform Panel.

United struggles as already stressed are not confined to economic issues only. They have been steadily growing on broad political issues also.

All these are developments of immense importance for the democratic movement and open out vast possibilities. They are creating conditions for forging the broadest unity of the Indian people. This unity, in the existing situation, has to be a unity of the democratic and patriotic forces in all parties of all sections and elements. It has to be directed towards the strengthening and acceleration of the progressive aspects of the Gov-



ernment's policies and combating of the anti-people and undemocratic aspects which still predominate in the internal sphere with a view to modify and reverse them. It has to be unity for the adoption and implementation of measures and policies which are in the interest of our country and our people. It has to be unity for a move to the left.

Our Party, despite its weakness in many spheres, is in a position to play an important role in the forging of such unity. We must remember that big successes have been won for the policies advocated by the Party — the orientation in the foreign policy of the Government, emphasis on industrialisation, recognition of the importance of agrarian reforms, linguistic states, etc.

We must remember that the Party, by its determined defence of the interests of the people, by its bold championship of their cause inside and outside the legislatures, by its role in such struggles as the liberation of the French-held territories, Goa, and linguistic states has come before the people as the spearhead of the democratic opposition to the Government.

We must remember that our position in the working class, the peasantry and among the toiling masses has grown stronger in most areas — a factor of decisive importance for the building of democratic unity.

We must remember that our cadres, our most precious assets, are by far the best that any Party in our country possesses. Their loyalty to the Party, their devotion to the cause, are as great as ever.

Both objective and subjective factors are favourable for rapid advance.

## NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE & THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT

In the task of building the Democratic Front a correct attitude towards the bourgeoisie is a factor of great importance.

The bourgeoisie has its conflicts with imperialism and these conflicts are growing. The bourgeoisie is the leading force in our State. Above all, the bourgeoisie wields tremendous influence among the people—among all classes, including the working class and peasantry.

Correct tactics in relation to the bourgeoisie are, therefore, essential not only for strengthening the struggle for full free-

dom and national reconstruction but also for uniting the working class and the peasantry and for defending their cause.

In the period when Britain ruled India, the common aim of the nation was the overthrow of British rule. This was the basis of national unity which included the national bourgeoisie also. The concrete tactics of building such unity demanded support to each action by the bourgeoisie, *no matter how limited*, which roused the masses against imperialism, which moved them into action against imperialism. But we had vital differences also with the bourgeoisie. These differences were related to the *reformist forms of struggle* of the bourgeoisie. They were related to the policy of *compromise* with imperialism. They were related to the issue of *struggle for democracy* and for *vital interests of the masses*.

The bourgeoisie preached that the struggle for freedom must be confined to the sphere of satyagraha. It preached that the policy of compromise was enjoined by the special traditions of India. It preached that the struggle for democratic agrarian reforms, for a living wage, was not an essential part of the struggle for national freedom, but that on the contrary it weakened the national struggle and disrupted national unity. It preached that all these would be effected *after* freedom had been won. In other words, it equated *national unity* with *class-collaboration*.

Hence the task of building the democratic front against imperialism demanded a policy of simultaneous unity with and struggle against the bourgeoisie. Unity for the aim of national freedom and for all measures that help it. Struggle against policies and methods that weakened the national movement, restricted its scope, reduced the striking power, struggle for correct policies and methods for national independence. *Both unity and struggle were parts of the national policy of advancing the cause of national freedom*. The Communist Party carried out these tasks to a considerable extent. Hence its present position in the country. But it could not carry it out *consistently* and to adequate extent. Hence it did not become the leader of the nation.

These tasks have to be continued in a *new way* in the present situation.

Today the aim of industrialisation, of defence of peace, of independence and strengthening of freedom is the common task

before the people. These are national tasks which constitute the basis of unity with the bourgeoisie. At the same time, vital differences exist between the bourgeoisie on the one hand and the democratic masses and the Communist Party on the other, on several issues connected with the above tasks themselves. They are in the main — (1) Methods of finance with the relation of the question of *attitude towards British capital, landlordism, and monopoly interests*; (2) Defence and extension of democracy and democratic reforms — above all, agrarian reforms with which is related the immediate interests of the masses — living wage, employment, etc. (3) Relation with the imperialist world market and the Socialist world market. In the main, the bourgeoisie still relies on the imperialist world market.

Further, just as the bourgeoisie in the past preached that the struggle of the masses in the defence and for furtherance of their immediate interests disrupts national unity, today they preach that such struggles disrupt national economy, prevents national advance. Just as in the past they preached that *first* we must all unite to attain freedom and *then* improvement in the condition of the people will follow, today they preach that first we must all unite to rebuild economy and establish a Socialistic pattern of society and *then* improvement in the condition of the people will follow.

As in the past, therefore, the struggle to build the democratic front involves a policy of simultaneous unity with the struggle against the bourgeoisie. Unity for the aim of defence and strengthening of national freedom and for support to all measures that achieve this, even to a partial extent. Struggle against policies and methods that hamper these tasks and prevent rapid national advance.

These common features of our tasks in the past and in the present are not accidental. They arise from the fact that the democratic revolution has yet to be completed. They arise from the fact that our tasks, at the present stage, are national tasks.

But, for a concrete working out of tactics of the Democratic Front, it is not enough to see the *similarities* of the task in the past and in the present. We have also to grasp the *difference*. Otherwise, reformist tactics will follow.

Unity with the bourgeoisie in these days assumed the form of a *common national organisation* — the Congress — which we

strove to extend and strengthen, whose candidates in elections were, in the main, opposed by feudal reactionaries allied to imperialism and whom we supported except in constituencies which we ourselves contested.

Such is not the situation today.

*Unlike in the past*, State power is wielded today by the Indian exploiting classes at whose head stands the bourgeoisie. It is this very State Power, guided by the Congress leadership that protects British capital and compromises with it, that defends landlordism, that imposes burdens on the people and uses police force against them.

*Unlike in the past*, the landlords today are allied with the bourgeoisie. Many of them are in important positions in the State Governments and in the military, administrative and diplomatic apparatus. A vast number of them are inside the Congress.

*Unlike in the past*, a large number of democrats are today outside the Congress and have taken a position of political opposition to it.

Another factor of great importance has to be kept in mind.

While democratic urges and sentiments have grown among the people, the position of *monopoly capital* in our economy has also grown stronger. The measures of the Government have helped the process. Monopoly capital has succeeded in altering the proposals of the plan-frame in its own favour. The grip of monopoly capital is strengthening not merely on our economy but in other spheres as well. This is not strikingly seen in monopoly control over the *press*. A handful of them control the biggest newspapers in the country. A growing number of leaders of the Congress are getting linked with monopoly concerns in various ways — directorships, high salaried positions for their sons and relatives, etc.

The dominant position of monopolists in our economy and its influence in the State (which is seen not only in the economic policies of the government but also in such decisions as denial of the demand for Samyukta Maharashtra with Bombay) in the press and in other spheres not merely means economic burdens on the people, not merely does it prevent reduction of prices and rise in wages, but it constitutes a grave menace that will grow in the period that is ahead — with the very growth of the democratic movement.

It would be an over-simplification to argue that because the monopoly bourgeoisie is also a part of the national bourgeoisie and because contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism have grown, *therefore*, the strengthening of monopoly capital in our political and economic life is *also* a factor that strengthens national freedom. Such arguments will lead to incorrect tactics.

Monopoly capital in India is closely related with British capital. It is strengthening its relations with American capital also. It strives to resolve its conflicts with British capital *at the cost* of the people which does not strengthen but prevents the strengthening of national economy. It opposes an extension of the public sector in important spheres of economy. It evades income-tax in various ways and cheats the State. It does not favour radical measures against the landlords. It links itself with reactionary politicians, buys over many of them, buys over newspapers and uses them for spreading lies about the USSR and the Socialist world. A number of monopoly capitalists also finance and support parties of communal reaction whose strength, though weaker than in the past, is by no means negligible.

The democratic movement, has above all, to be directed against British capital and landlordism and against policies of compromise with them. But it cannot *confine* itself to these tasks alone. The mass movement must, therefore, strive to weaken the position of monopoly capital in our economic, political and social life, curb its power in all spheres. This is an essential and vital part of the national liberation struggle itself.

Hence also the struggle of the working class for living wage and trade unions rights, the struggles of the peasants for fair prices of which they are deprived by the operations of grain monopolists, the struggles of the small industrialists for their demands, the struggles conducted by proprietors of newspapers to maintain their independence against monopoly encroachment, the struggles inside the Congress for the extension of the public sector—all these struggles are of great importance not only from the economic but also from the *general democratic point* of view. All these struggles help to weaken the position of reaction and strengthen democracy.

If these factors are not kept in mind, the tactic of unity with and struggle against the bourgeoisie cannot be carried out in

the new situation. The tactic has to be one which not only weakens the position of British capital and landlordism but also weakens the position of monopoly capital in every sphere fighting against it. A correct attitude towards the demands of the small industrialists is, therefore, of great importance.

Unless we grasp the significance of these differences between the situation in the past and now we shall make serious reformist mistakes.

Such reformist mistakes can also result from a rigid, doctrinaire understanding of the Party Programme itself.

The Party Programme declares that our revolution at this stage is directed against imperialism and feudalism. From this perfectly correct formulation, some comrades draw the conclusion that any demand for the nationalisation of industries which are not British-owned is a violation of the Party Programme. Such conclusion is incorrect. In practice, it results in lagging behind events.

The demand for the nationalisation of the *coal industry*, the demand for nationalisation of *insurance* — these demands have been voiced by many bourgeois liberals. They are becoming part of the democratic movement itself. The Party must welcome this development and lend its support to such demands. While not rushing ahead of the consciousness of the people we must not at the same time lag behind and justify this on the plea that it does not exactly square with our previous understanding. That would mean failure to seize the initiative and lining up behind the big bourgeoisie in the name of adherence to the Party Programme.

The growth of the democratic movement, the growth of radical urges among the people have inevitably because of the present world situation, also given rise to sentiments of social justice, sentiments against monopoly capital, sentiments of a vaguely socialistic type among large masses of people. Hence the growing demand for extension of the State sector, for reducing disparities of income, for curtailing the power of big capitalists. While constantly explaining to the people what Socialism really implies, the Party cannot, at the same time, treat these sentiments and urges contemptuously.

Anti-monopoly sentiment must not be dismissed as merely an indication of petty-bourgeois radicalism or countered with the formulation that our main struggle today is against imperia-

lism and feudalism. In various forms anti-monopoly sentiment is becoming a part of the democratic consciousness which must be welcomed and strengthened while combatting such expressions as weaken the unity of the democratic movement. It must be used in such a way as to strengthen national freedom, national economy and weaken the forces of reaction.

If a determined and all-sided struggle against monopoly is not waged, in the mistaken notion that this will weaken national unity, if the position of monopoly is not assailed and its supporters in political life isolated, then even the mere extension of the State sector will achieve very little. On the contrary, the State sector itself will become another instrument in the hands of monopoly for greater exploitation of the masses.

Equally important is the struggle against the increasing bureaucratisation that is evident today – the growing tendency on the part of the Government to confer more and more powers on officials appointed from above in Panchayats, in development schemes and community projects, etc., the tendency to reduce the rights of elected bodies to one of “consultation” and of imposition of tax burdens.

This growth of bureaucratisation, together with the relation that the bureaucrats establish with Congress leaders have led to the growth of corruption on a vast scale in every sphere – the squandering of public funds, the utilisation of these funds to ensure ready and cushy jobs for friends and relatives and also for strengthening the political base of the Congress Party. Claiming to be the sole representative of the people, the Congress refused all offer of co-operation from other parties even when such calamities as flood and famine take place. On these issues, as well as on issues like construction of projects, other organisations are often ignored and popular cooperation is sought to be enlisted only through such bodies as the Bharat Sevak Samaj.

We are certainly not opposed to participation in these activities by the Bharat Sevak Samaj and the Congress Committees. On the contrary, we want their participation. But we demand the right of participation by other organisations also such as the Communist Parties, Kisan Sabhas, in order that the people as a whole can be drawn into activities related to the task of national reconstruction.

Every honest citizen regrets the growth of corruption. But

he does not see that corruption cannot be combatted only by setting up an anti-corruption department. Corruption can be combatted only by real democratisation by ensuring popular participation, through their organisations in all spheres of activities. The struggle for such participation is an essential part of the struggle for building the democratic front.

Our tasks today, as in the past, are national-political tasks. But these tasks cannot be carried out in the same way as before, nor with the same slogans. Attempt to do so would mean surrender before the bourgeoisie in the name of national unity.

### *Unity in Action*

The broad general tasks which the democratic movement faces are:

1. Defence of peace.
2. Defence and strengthening of national freedom.
3. National Reconstruction.
4. Defence of the vital interests of the people.
5. Defence and extension of democracy.

All these tasks are closely inter-related. It is by carrying out all these tasks in an integrated manner, it is by forging the broadest unity for concrete policies and measures related to each of them, that the democratic front will be built.

How is this to be done in the present situation?

— By establishment of unity of action of classes, parties and elements in defence of the immediate interests of masses and in furtherance of their immediate demands in every sphere, in defence of civil liberties.

— By building united mass organisations of workers and peasants as also of students, youths and women.

— By unity of action between all progressive forces inside the Assemblies, municipalities, panchayats, for agrarian reforms, for defence of national industries, for bettering the conditions of the people, for measures of economic reconstruction, health, education, amenities of life.

— By determined struggles inside all parties — Congress, PSP, S.P. for progressive policies and in favour of unity.

— By building unity against communal, obscurantist, reactionary ideas and institutions — caste, untouchability, oppression of women.



—By determined effort to strengthen the position of the Communist Party and the democratic opposition inside and outside the Legislature.

The unity built on each issue helps to advance the struggle not only on that issue but on all other issues. It strengthens the democratic movement as a whole.

The united action of the working class in defence of its rights and demands evokes the sympathy of democratic classes, rouses their democratic consciousness and sense of social justice, and also encourages them to fight for their own demands. At the same time, this very support from the democratic masses also strengthens the unity of the working class itself, strengthens the morale, increases pressure on the vested interests and helps the working class to win its demands. The same is true about united action of the peasantry and of every class and section.

Further, the unity built in the course of such activities and struggles as for linguistic states, defence of national industries against foreign competition, Asian solidarity and closer relation with Socialist States, cultural advance as well as constructive work in the sphere of health, education, nation-building activities and the participation of the workers and peasants in all these also furthers not merely these specific struggles and activities but strengthens the democratic front. It wins the working class and peasantry allies in other classes — thus helping the consolidation of working class unity, peasant unity and strengthening the struggles for their immediate demands also.

What has got to be seen, therefore, is the galvanising effect of unity on the movement as a whole and on each front. The building of the democratic front demands a correct attitude towards the 2nd Five Year Plan.

Our attitude towards the 2nd Five-Year Plan is a positive attitude. In important respects in relation to industries the Plan has been considerably modified in a reactionary direction as compared to the proposals of the Plan Frame. The Party will combat this modification and demand that the Plan Frame proposal about industries should be given effect to.

Nevertheless, even as they stand the targets of the 2nd Plan are an advance as compared to the 1st Plan—an advance towards the development of industries. The danger exists of still further reactionary modification, a danger which has to be

guarded against while pressing for modification in a progressive direction.

The Party must launch a campaign for immediate implementation of the proposals in relation to land reform made in the Draft Plan and by the Land Reform Panel.

At the same time, the Party has to combat the proposals of the Draft in respect of resources and taxation, in respect of wages and Trade Union rights, in respect of extension of democracy. These proposals are not only unjust and undemocratic. They will also intensify distress, prevent steady and continuous expansion of the internal market on a stable basis, prevent effective mobilisation of national resources and hamper mass participation in the work of national reconstruction. In the interest of national economy and national advance, in the interest of the declared objective of speedy industrialisation it is necessary that these proposals are modified. The campaign for this, as well as the campaign for suitable plans in each province, must become a vital part of the political activity of the entire Party.

Struggles of the people in defence of their demands and for extension of democracy is an essential part of this campaign.

Innumerable struggles have taken place and are taking place in all parts of the country. In these struggles are getting drawn masses following all parties. More such struggles will break out in future.

The task of organising mass resistance against the attacks on the people and for immediate improvement in their condition of life, solidarity actions, struggle for civil liberties and democratic rights, acquire exceptional significance. By conducting such struggles, we defend the interest of the people, consolidating those forces in the Congress that desire to develop our economy by attacking the position of British capital, landlordism and monopoly interests.

It is through these struggles as well as struggles and campaigns for democratic demands that masses of different parties come together, become conscious of the need for unity, of the power of unity and win concessions. It is through these struggles that their morale is heightened, popular support evoked and the attack of the Government and vested interests repulsed. It is through these struggles that conditions are created for the building of united organisations which are of vital importance

for the consolidation of the democratic movement and its strengthening.

It is necessary that whenever possible such mass struggles are conducted through broad united committees representing the unity of the fighting masses.

These mass struggles also bring to the forefront the question of governmental policies—agrarian, labour, civil liberties, taxation etc. They strengthen the movement against reactionary policies and forge mass unity for the adoption and implementation of progressive policies.

Nothing would be more harmful than the tendency to belittle the significance of these struggles. Such a tendency undoubtedly exists in our Party—the tendency which considers that emphasis on such struggles is an expression of *Economism*. The tendency too is especially strong in many of the new areas where the Party has extended its work in recent years, where the working class movement is weak and where the tradition of doggedly-fought battles in defence of the interest of the masses has yet to be created. But it is growing in certain old bases of the Party also and reveals itself in insufficient attention paid by the Party units to trade union and kisan sabha work in pre-occupation only with political agitation. In essence, it is a tendency which ignores the fact that the strength of the democratic movement depends to a great extent on the strength of the Party's base among the toiling masses, its ability to unite them for their immediate demands and move them into action for the realisation of the demands.

The mass organisations in general and mass organisations of workers and peasants in particular are not only the most important weapons for conducting the economic struggles of the people, struggles whose importance will grow in the coming period but they are also the organisational form of the fighting unity of the working people. Their broadening and strengthening alone enables the waging of these struggles which will be a major factor to rouse the democratic sentiment of all popular forces, defeat the attempt of the bourgeoisie to solve its conflicts with imperialism and feudalism at the cost of the people, and force changes in its policies. The strengthening of the mass organisations is, therefore, not merely one of the tasks in this period. It is a task on whose fulfilment will depend to a great extent, the measures of success of every other task.

But this very building of the mass organisations demands that the activity of the toiling masses is not restricted to the sphere of economic struggles. Into all other activities related to the task of building the democratic front—defence of peace and freedom, national reconstruction, defence and extension of democracy, rights of women, advance of culture—into all sphere, the toiling masses have to be drawn as active participants. As long as this is not done with sufficient vigour and determination, as long as the working class and peasantry are not roused to look upon all these activities as their own activities, the work in every sphere will remain weak; the democratic movement will prevent the adequate strengthening of the struggles and organisations of the working class and the peasantry themselves.

It is primarily on the basis of the activity of its own class, the working class and its immediate allies—the peasantry, the students, the working intelligentsia and the city poor—it is primarily on the basis of the activity of these classes that the communist Party can become the leader, unifier and driving force of every movement. It is on the basis of such activity that every movement can be strengthened and extended. Unless the working class comes out as the most consistent champion and fighter for every measure related to the tasks of freedom, peace and democracy, the democratic front will not get built. It will not acquire the required sweep, depth and militancy.

The problem of the democratic front, is therefore, not merely the problem of ourselves, the Party members, evolving correct tactics, acquiring a national political approach and formulating our tasks. It is the problem of instilling this approach among the toiling masses and above all in the working class and of drawing them into practical activity and political action for carrying out these tasks, of heightening their political sense and making them conscious of their historic mission and their key role.

## OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE GOVERNMENT AND TOWARDS OTHER PARTIES

It is in relation to the general tasks facing the democratic movement at this stage and on the basis of a concrete assessment of the policies and measures of the Government as they affect our freedom, our economy and the life of our people that we have to determine our attitude towards the present Government.

The Government of India is bourgeois-landlord Government in which the bourgeoisie is the leading force. Its policies are motivated by the desire to develop India along independent capitalist lines. The Government today defends the freedom against imperialist pressure, opposes the drive towards war and builds friendly relations with Socialist States. The Government strives to weaken the position of British capital in our economy. It strives to control and gradually eliminate feudal forms of exploitation, transforming feudal landlords into capitalist landlords and create a stratum of rich peasantry that can act as the social base of bourgeois rule in the countryside. It strives to extend and develop the State sector which in the existing situation is essential for the development of capitalism itself. These aims and the measures resulting therefrom inevitably bring the Government into conflict with imperialism, with feudalism and sometimes with the narrow interests of sections of the bourgeoisie as was seen in the nationalisation of life insurance. They also lead to conflict of policies, as seen in the entire controversies over the problems of industrialisation.

These conflicts have progressive significance in relation to the democratic movement. They strengthen the freedom of India and help the cause of peace. They increase the possibilities to move the Government by mass pressure and by strengthening popular unity in the direction of democratic reforms and against concessions to reactionary forces.

With the intensification of the attempt at industrialisation and in the context of the growing mass movement, these conflicts will sharpen and can lead to the adoption of several measures that weaken the position of foreign capital in our economy and the position of Indian reactionary forces in our political and economic life.

The Communist Party is vitally interested in such developments and strives to strengthen them, for they help in strengthening the democratic movement and in strengthening and extending the democratic front. Every step that is taken by the Government for strengthening national freedom and national economy, against imperialists, feudal and monopoly interests, will receive our most energetic and unstinted support.

But it would be a profound mistake to consider that the sharpening of the conflict between imperialism and the Indian Government, of the conflict between feudalism and the needs

of bourgeois development and the attempt of the bourgeoisie to strengthen its position in this conflict, have already led to or can automatically lead to the internal policies of the Government becoming popular, democratic and wholly progressive. The bourgeoisie seeks to strengthen the position not merely in relation to imperialism and feudalism, but also in relation to the popular masses. It seeks to resolve its conflict with imperialism and feudalism at the cost of the people.

Therefore, while opposing imperialism and attempting to weaken its grip over national economy, the bourgeoisie simultaneously maintains its links with British and other foreign capital and gives facilities for more influx of foreign capital. While striving to curb and weaken feudalism, it simultaneously maintains its alliance with landlords and makes concessions to them whose practical result is that the vast majority of peasants secure little benefit on account of the curbing. While striving to industrialise the country, it seeks to place the burdens of economic development mainly on the people. While extending the public sector, it simultaneously pursues policies of support to monopolists in their attack on the working people and adopts many measures which enrich the monopolists and thus help them to strengthen their position in important spheres of our economic life. While calling upon workers to increase production, it simultaneously refuses to increase their wages and denies elementary Trade Union Rights. While calling upon the people to cooperate in the task of national reconstruction, it simultaneously strengthens the bureaucratic apparatus, places main reliance on it, refuses to extend democracy and to adopt measures that weaken and shackle the very classes that are the most resolute defenders of peace and national freedom.

Due to all this, due to the divergence between the aims of industrialisation and the methods adopted by the Government to achieve these aims, the process of development of the country acquires a slow and halting character, marked by twists and turns, giving rise to sharp conflicts and profound contradictions. They retard the sweeping away of the obstacles that stand in the way of India's development. They impose colossal burdens on the people, thus providing the prevention of stable and continuous expansion of the internal market. They lead to

increasing bureaucratisation of the State machinery and suppression of the struggles of the people.

The significance of these anti-popular aspects of the Government's policies must not be minimised. In the sphere of internal policies it is these aspects that still predominate. But it is not enough to see this alone.

We have to grasp that a crisis of policy is inherent in the contradiction between the aim of the bourgeoisie (which is also a national urge) for industrialisation on the one hand and the dominant bourgeois method of realising this aim by conciliation of and compromise with imperialism, alliance with landlordism, main reliance on profit motive of monopoly capital and attack on the masses on the other.

If the democratic movement supports the aims of industrialisation as well as all progressive measures of the Government while resisting and opposing the undemocratic methods, if the struggle for improvement in the condition of masses and for progressive policies gathers strength, then the contradiction between the aim of industrialisation and the Government's methods of realising it can grow and lead to a situation which confronts the Government with sharp alternatives.

As such a situation grows, contradictions can sharpen in the Congress and inside the Government. The conflict over policies which is evident even today, though in a rudimentary form, can develop into real differentiation and even a political and governmental crisis. How such a crisis, if it comes, will develop, how it will be solved, will depend on the rapidity with which the correlation of forces are changed in favour of the forces of democracy in our country. The bringing about of such a change is an urgent necessity. Despite the advance registered by the democratic forces, there is no basis for complacency with regard to the present situation.

Forces of reaction are still very powerful. Their strength should not be minimised.

The setbacks they have suffered have not made the imperialists abandon their plans in relation to India. They are intensifying pressure through the SEATO and Baghdad Pact and by working up tension on our border through the reactionary elements in ruling circles of Pakistan.

In the administrative, diplomatic, police and military appa-

ratus, feudal and other reactionary elements hold many of the key positions.

Parties of communal reaction, though weaker than before, are still strong in many areas. A large number of their leaders and members are now inside the Congress itself. Attempt is being made to draw in others also.

Although radical sentiments have grown inside the Congress, inside the Congress hierarchy in most States, it is right-wing leaders who are dominant. They and their monopolist friends, while not averse to utilise the contradiction between the Socialist and capitalist worlds, in order to drive a hard bargain with both and while therefore supporting the main line of the present foreign policy (which conforms to the interest of the entire people, including the bourgeoisie) are simultaneously getting apprehensive about the implications of close relationship with the Socialist world, about the "dangerous" possibilities of such relation on the mood of the masses. Some of them think Nehru is going "too far." Many of them would like the opposition to America and the criticism of its policies to be toned down.

The close links of monopoly capital with British capital are well-known. Links are being forged with American capital as well. Monopoly capital opposes even half-hearted and inadequate measures which have some progressive content. It harms the growth of democracy.

With the development of the conflicts inherent in the situation, reactionary aspects of monopoly capital will more and more come in the open. It will intensify its pressure on the Government.

No ground exists therefore for the facile assumption that the period ahead is a period of relative stability, a period during which the democratic movement will be able to "gradually" bend the Government to its will, "gradually" weaken its links with British capital till they get broken, "gradually" move it in the direction of more and more determined measures against monopoly, "gradually" complete the tasks of agrarian reforms—in brief, "gradually" modify its policies in an increasingly progressive manner—without sharp changes, without mass upheavals, without crisis. On the contrary, advance will have to be made against stiff resistance through the overcoming of big obstacles, through the maturing of contradictions, through intense conflicts between the imperialist interests and the entire Indian Nation;



between the government and the masses, between the various sections and elements inside the ruling classes, inside the Government and inside the Congress; conflicts which, if resolved in favour of the people, create vast possibilities for broadening and strengthening the democratic front.

The coming period will confront the Party with rapid changes, with sharp twists and turns. Rigid concepts with regard to the line of development, giving rise to rigid tactics and slogans, will do damage irreparably. At the same time, certain important aspects of the present situation have to be kept in mind.

We must not forget that, despite the sharpening conflict between the imperialist interests and the Government, between remnants of feudalism and needs of bourgeois development, which create big possibilities, the actual method by which the Government tries to solve these conflicts hampers rapid liquidation of the colonial heritage, imposes burdens on the people, prevents strengthening of democracy.

We must not forget the partial, limited and unsuitable nature of the consolidation received by the Government. While the Government strives to utilise the democratic, radical and socialistic urges of the people for its consolidation, its actual policies very often come into conflict with those very urges. While certain measures of the Government give some concessions to sections of the people, other measures hit the mass of the people and create conditions for rousing them against these measures.

We must not forget that the fact that today mass radicalisation expresses itself not in the old but in a new way—this does not mean that this phenomenon must continue indefinitely. It is a rapidly changing situation. Tactics and slogans of the Party have to be such as do not tie us down to a rigid course of action. Mechanical concept of the growth of upsurge has seriously damaged the Party in the past. The law of irregularity, as repeatedly pointed out by leaders of the world Communist movement, applies to the growth of mass upsurge—in evenness, different manifestations in different periods, new forms, etc.

We must not forget that it is the working class—peasant unity which is the core of the democratic front, that in all phases of the movement the Party has to resolutely defend the interest of the working masses, that actual measures of the Government have to be judged, above all, by how they affect the life of the

vast majority of our people—the workers, the peasants, the toiling intelligentsia—and not by mere declarations.

We must not forget that advance has to be made on the basis of strengthening and consolidation of the gains we have already made—the prestige of the Party as a party of revolutionary struggle and its position among the toiling people. We must forge new links—especially with forces outside the Congress. Our slogans and tactics have to be such as will achieve both purposes and progressively dislodge the bourgeoisie from its dominant position in the national movement.

In such a situation, it is essential that the Communist Party, while fully supporting all the progressive policies and measures of the Government, while co-operating with the Government in all spheres where such co-operation can be of benefit to the people, retains its absolute independence as well as its character as a Party of democratic opposition in relation to the Government.

This demands not only a positive attitude towards the measures of the Government, but also a correct attitude towards the political parties in the country, especially parties with mass following.

The National Congress is the ruling party. Its policies have already been described. In the struggle against compromise with imperialist and feudal interests, in the struggle in defence of the vital interests of the people, in the struggle against the powers of the bureaucracy and the police, and for extension of democracy, it is against the policies of the Government and the Congress Party, that the people have to fight. No question arises therefore for general united front with the Congress at this stage.

From this however it should not be conceded that the democratic front will be an anti-Congress front. This is so not merely because of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks which we are faced with, but also because of the composition of the Congress.

Although the political party of the bourgeoisie which has taken many landlords in its fold, the Congress has, among its members, a vast number of democratic elements. It has an anti-imperialist and democratic tradition. Among millions it evokes deep sentiments connected with many of the heroic episodes of our national liberation movement, episodes that are

still fresh in public memory. Recent measures of the Government and its promises have helped the Congress to rehabilitate the position even among some sections that were moving away from it. Simultaneously there has been a growth of radical and democratic sentiments inside the Congress and among many masses following the Congress.

Our approach towards the Congress and the methods of criticism of its policies have to be such as will take into account all these factors. They have to be such as do not repel the honest Congressmen but draws them towards unity. They have to be such as strengthens the fight for democratic policies inside the Congress itself, strengthens the forces that, however haltingly, are taking a relatively more progressive stand. In the name of the very traditions of our national movement we have to call upon them to fight the monopolists and landlords who are strengthening their grip over the Congress—elements many of whom opposed the national liberation movement, elements who are anti-national, anti-democratic. On such issues as implementation of the proposals for agrarian reforms, implementation of laws and declarations that benefit the people, we must strive to forge united front with Congress Committees as well, appealing to the Congress and its masses to hold hands with us.

The composition and character of the Socialist Party and the Praja Socialist Party varies from State to State. Nevertheless, broadly speaking, they can be described as parties of the democratic movement. The mass support they have secured is mainly on the basis of democratic opposition to the policies of the Government and in the name of socialism. The cadres of these parties are socialist-minded.

Till recently the dominant leadership of the PSP (which included the SP also) pursued policies of violent denunciation of USSR and China, opposition to the movement for peace, of refusal to build democratic unity in the name of anti-Communism, of the attempt to secure agreement with the Congress. The errors of these policies are becoming evident to the members of the PSP & SP and has led, during the last one year, to their modification to a considerable extent in several States. On a number of issues and in several campaigns and struggles, these parties have joined hands with the Communist Party and other democratic forces. Our Party will make every endeavour to consolidate and carry forward this process.

The unity that the Communist Party strives to build is democratic unity. Such being the case, the attitude to be adopted towards communal parties, parties that divide all the masses on religious basis and thus disrupt their unity, must be an attitude of uncompromising opposition. The Jan Sangh, Hindu Maha-Sabha, Ram Rajya Parishad, Muslim League and Akali Party belong to this category. The Communist Party will have no united front with them in any elections in any form whatsoever. At the same time, it will strive to draw the masses and elements following these parties into common activity.

### IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE—A WEAPON TO BUILD THE DEMOCRATIC FRONT

In the task of building the democratic front, ideological struggle is a factor of decisive importance. It is not as though "while" building the democratic front we must "also" wage ideological struggle. On the contrary, ideological-political struggle on the basis of a patriotic approach is an essential weapon for the building of the democratic front. The importance of ideological struggle has increased immensely because of the growth of democratic and socialist sentiments amongst the masses and the attempt of the Government to utilise these very sentiments for its own consolidation.

The Government and the ruling party, no longer able to deny the need for radical reforms in our economy and social structure, preach that these reforms can be brought about without mass struggles against the vested interests. They denounce class struggle as something alien to Indian traditions, while themselves supporting the vested interests in their offensive against the people. They foster belief in changes being brought about from the top, through governmental action alone, slowly, with the "consent of all" aided by such campaigns as Bhoodan. They condemn all militant action, all popular resistance as anti-national, as disruption of national economy. They propagate about "two power blocs." While admitting the gigantic advance made by the Soviet and Chinese peoples in every sphere, they declare that all this was achieved through the "sacrifice of democracy."

They do not even want an independent peace movement to develop, because they fear that such a movement, rousing the

mass of people to activity in defence of peace, may create an "embarrassing" situation for the Government on several issues.

How devastating in effect the ideological offensive of the Congress can be was seen in the Andhra elections. But it is not merely during elections that such offensive has to be met. Every struggle today has to meet not merely repression but also a powerful ideological offensive seeking to disrupt the unity of the participants in the struggle, seeking to isolate them from the general public. There can be no doubt that this will grow in volume and intensity as the economic plans of the Government progress. Without combatting this offensive we shall not be able to unite the masses and build their movement.

This is being realised by comrades everywhere. But it is not yet sufficiently realised that our ideological struggle, in order to be effective, has to be not of a sporadic character, undertaken only during struggles and elections, carried on only through the press and platform, but by each Party member, each militant in day-to-day contact with non-Party masses. Secondly, the ideological struggle, in order to be effective has to be based on a national political approach, the approach of a patriotic party to the issues of national reconstruction and national advance in every sphere. Thirdly, the actual tactics in conducting struggles, in advancing concrete slogans, as well as day-to-day activity in the sphere of constructive work, have to be such that they convince the people, especially the non-Party democrats that the national-political approach is not just a "cover" but is seriously meant.

Without all this, the ideological struggle cannot be concrete. It cannot be effective. It cannot be a weapon to build unity.

Self-satisfied sectarianism which takes no account of the national pride of the Indian people in India's world status, which belittles India's role in the world arena, which ignores the urge of the people for national reconstruction and adopts, at best, a lukewarm attitude towards measures that can strengthen national freedom and national economy, which pays no attention towards development and problems in the realm of education, culture and science—with such an outlook and such an approach, no ideological struggle worth the name can be conducted. Sectarianism is therefore not merely an obstacle in the path of building unity. It is equally an obstacle in the path of waging an effective ideological battle.

The main plank of the Government in the sphere of ideological propaganda is the rebuilding of national economy and national progress in the realm of education, health, etc. It comes before the people as the champion of these tasks. It justifies even such measures as concessions to monopoly, concessions to landlordism on the ground of increase in national wealth—more goods, more grains, more rapid development. It tries to make out that its critics are merely interested in equitable distribution and not in increase of production. It thus seeks to isolate the struggles of the people in defence of their rights and demands.

Ideological struggle does not mean merely struggle against the ideology preached by the Congress movement. It also means ideological struggle against bourgeois nationalism which is manifesting itself with particular sharpness and in an increasingly disruptive form on the issue of linguistic States—in the tendencies to whip up provincial animosities, to focus attention on “disrupted areas”, to divert the whole movement into chauvinistic channels—tendencies which threaten the unity of the democratic movement and help vested interests to strengthen their influence on the toiling masses. In conformity with the anti-feudal tasks of the Party, it is equally incumbent on us to wage a determined struggle against the feudal, communal and obscurantist ideas propagated by extreme reactionaries on such issues of cow slaughter, marriage laws, rights of women, caste discrimination, untouchability etc. On such issues there is common ground between the Communist Party and all democrats, including progressive-minded Congressmen. Nevertheless, hitherto in many areas, the prevailing attitude is the result of a narrow, restricted concept of anti-feudal tasks. But there is also the mistaken belief that since our economic and political struggles bring us into conflict with the present Government, therefore the ideological struggle too can be restricted to issues where we are in conflict with the Government. This utterly opportunist and anti-Marxist understanding sometimes results in practice to conciliatory attitudes towards communal reaction, as was seen in the stand taken by some of our comrades on the issue of ban on cow slaughter, to unprincipled “understanding” with parties of communal reaction during elections in the name of tactics. Whatever the immediate “benefit” from such “tactic” may be in particular areas, they discredit the Party all over the country,

repel honest elements and render the task of building unity more difficult. They cannot be justified on the plea that the "Congress also" does the same, nor on the opportunist plea that we are "utilising the difference" among enemies.

Further, ideological struggle also has to combat the wrong slogans propagated by left parties, slogans which belittle the significance of the battle for peace, slogans which minimise the importance of a serious effort to win over Congressmen. Some of the left parties ridicule the principle of co-existence, some of them indulge in anti-social and disruptive activities in the course of mass struggles, glorifying these in the name of revolution.

Vitally important though all the above aspects of ideological struggle are, the ideological struggle of the Communist Party cannot be restricted to the above aspects alone. Together with these issues, there is another aspect — the mass popularisation of the ideas of socialism.

There prevails the erroneous idea in our Party that since socialism is not the immediate task, therefore popularisation of socialism also can be postponed till the present stage of our revolution has been completed. Nothing could be further from the truth. No concept would be more dangerous.

An essential condition for the growth of the democratic movement is the growth of the Communist Party into a mass Party. Without this, the movement itself will suffer in tempo, will not go beyond a limited stage. And it is only on the basis of the growth of the ideas of socialism among the toiling masses, above all, among the working class, poor peasants, agricultural workers and also radical intelligentsia, that the Party can grow into a mass Party.

It is essential to popularise the great role that the USSR is playing in defence of peace. It is essential to bring before our people the great advance registered by China. These are tasks related to the task of building friendly relations with these countries — part of the general task of building the democratic front. But the Communist Party cannot content itself with that alone. It has to show also that the consistent championship of the cause of peace by USSR, its massive achievements in every sphere, its utilisation of the atomic energy for peaceful purposes, the gigantic advance made by China in every sphere — all these are not accidental. They have resulted from the fact that these countries overthrew bourgeois-landlord rule and took

to the path of socialism. The Party has to explain the mechanism of the real democracy that prevails in these countries, the way it operates, the way it enables the people to rule themselves. Failure to do this in a sustained way and on a mass scale means disarming the people in face of the propaganda about democracy vs. dictatorship.

Ideological struggle, therefore, in the present situation has to be related to the following tasks:

- Building of mass unity in action in defence of their demands and for the policies and measures advocated by the Party, combating the ideology propagated by the bourgeoisie.
- Combating the ideas and propaganda of feudal and communal reaction.
- Combating the ideas of bourgeois nationalism.
- Combating the sectarian tactics of left Parties.
- Mass popularisation of socialism and building of a mass Communist Party.

All these aspects of ideological struggle are equally important.

## UNIFICATION OF THE PARTY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT INTO A MASS FORCE

Of all factors that will determine the course of events in the coming period, the most decisive factor will be the strength of the Communist Party itself – its unity, its political maturity, its organisational consolidation at all levels, its base in the working class, peasantry and radical intelligentsia. The grave situation that prevails in the Party today is the single biggest factor holding back the advance of the mass movement and the strengthening of the democratic front.

This problem however cannot be discussed in the Report. That task has to be undertaken separately.



## **Organisational Methods and Practices of Party Centre (1956)**

This secret report was submitted by the PB to the Palghat Congress, held in April 1956. The party leaders did not want it to see the light of the day. It was published by the DRS in 1956 and was later included in its publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

The document vividly describes the rot that had set in after the Madurai Congress of 1953, in the party organisation. In the middle of 1954, the document states, there arose political differences in the Party Centre that virtually split the PB which, as a result, ceased to function collectively. There also arose sharp differences between the PB and CC and by March 1955 these "vital defects assumed serious proportions".

The result of all this, according to this report, was that "the entire party is divided from top to bottom around the main trends" and there was the consequent loss of confidence in the party leaders by party members.

Owing to the failure of the Party leadership strictly to observe "correct organisational methods" and to "subordinate their individual activity to the needs of the provinces, says the report, came to a stand-still.

The document sums up the result of this whole situation in these words: "Sense of frustration and inactivity is growing. Sense of discipline is loosening, decisions of Party Committees remaining unimplemented. Irresponsible talk is going on on a big scale and prestige of the Party is going down."

1. The most important organisational task entrusted to the Central Committee at Madurai was the task of building of a

“strong Party Centre.” It was evident at Madurai that the absence of such a Centre had severely hampered the growth of the Party and had prevented it from discharging its tasks effectively at all levels. Broad lines on which this should be done had been laid down in the Draft Organisational Resolution which, though not finalised at the Congress, had been generally accepted in the course of the pre-Congress discussion. A PB was formed consisting of nine members of whom seven were to be available for work at the Centre.

2. These organisational decisions of the Congress, together with the general atmosphere generated at the Congress by the adoption of the Political Resolution, created a situation favourable for a great improvement in the organisational position of the Party as a whole. Yet, in a few months’ time, the inner-Party situation started rapidly deteriorating. And by March, 1955, the Party was faced with a serious crisis.

3. This crisis has reached such a state that there is no Party Centre worth the name today. The Central Party organs (weekly and monthly), the publication and sale of pamphlets and other literature, the activities of the comrades working in the all-India mass organisations and even the organisation of the work of the comrades working in the Centre—all this remains unattended to. This is breeding a sense of frustration and cynicism.

Nor is it much better in the provinces where too collective leadership is not developing. Sense of frustration and inactivity are growing. Sense of discipline is loosening, decisions of Party Committees remaining unimplemented. Irresponsible talk is going on on a big scale and prestige of the Party is going down.

4. What is this due to? The political reasons for this have been narrated in the Political Report. Events developed rapidly after Madurai. These events and the changes in the situation had to be concretely analysed, unified understanding about their significance had to be reached, and slogans and tactics had to be evolved which would take the whole movement forward.

This the central leadership could not do. Dogmatic concepts based on rigid adherence to the formulations of the Party Programme and of the Madurai Resolution prevented the CC from assessing the shifts and changes in the situation. Inevitably differences grew in the Central Committee. But the solution of

these differences and the reunification of the Central Committee itself could be achieved only if the PB functioned properly, made objective study of the situation, tried to act as a team. Not merely did this not happen but with the growth of political differences the PB itself got split. This, together with the growing non-functioning of the PB, led to CC meetings being called without preparations, which meetings more and more assumed the character of debates over abstract issues. All this, in turn, intensified the political differences, intensified the inner-Party crisis.

5. Political issues on which the differences arose are to be resolved on the basis of the Political Resolution before the Congress. But that by itself would neither fully solve the inner-Party crisis nor create a guarantee against such crisis in future. It is equally essential to correct the organisational practices and methods that have been resorted to. For that, it is necessary to focus attention on certain developments.

There was real improvement in the position and work of the Party Centre immediately after the Madurai Congress. January-April 1954 was a period in which there was a definite improvement in the *organisational* field in the sense that —

- (i) There were regular meetings of the PB in which all the members attended;
- (ii) Seven PBMs were available for the work of the Centre;
- (iii) The first efforts were made to properly organise the internal working of the PB by setting up TU, Kisan, Agit-Prop and Organisation Sub-Committees of the P.B.;
- (iv) PB went to the C.C. with a united voice and with well-prepared documents on the basis of which the April meeting was conducted, thus enabling the C.C. to come to agreed conclusions on such important questions as Party organisation, work among the peasantry and States reorganisation, (on each of which resolutions were adopted at the April meeting of the CC.) over and above a general assessment of the international and national developments between January and April;
- (v) The first step in the direction of organising Party education was taken in the form of organising a Central Party School;
- (vi) The first step was also taken towards organising pro-

per and living relations between the Centre and the Provinces through the issuing of circulars and questionnaires enabling the Centre to study the concrete situation in the Provinces better than before;

- (vii) First step was also taken towards implementing the directive of the Organisational Resolution that the PB must place before every CC meeting. The PB placed such a report before the September meeting of the CC. In the organisational part of the report, an attempt was made (a) to pose certain organisational problems, which as per the information at the disposal of the PB, had appeared in certain provinces, (b) to give a brief summary of the way in which PB had functioned between the April and September meetings of the CC including the manner in which individual PB members were functioning or failing to function, (c) to make suggestions as to how to overcome these difficulties, and (d) to make proposals with regard to better organisations and Party at all levels. The political part of the report, too, sought to pose certain problems arising out of important developments in the field of India's foreign policy, results of the First Five-Year Plan, developments in the field of internal politics, etc.

6. Improvement was also registered in the quality of the *political* work of the Centre. Signs were visible that the PB and CC were taking a relatively flexible and sober attitude towards current developments. Take, for example, the PB statement of February, 1954, hailing Nehru's speech in Parliament; this was the first statement in which certain declarations of the Government on foreign policy were supported by the Party without 'ifs' and 'buts'. This was further carried forward in the April meeting of the CC which came to the conclusion that it was necessary to build a movement on the basis of points of agreement between the Communist Party and the Government on questions of foreign policy. Subsequent articles in the Central Party press on current international developments—such as on the Colombo and Geneva (Indo-China) Conferences, Chou-Nehru declaration, etc. showed that the central leadership was groping towards an approach to questions of foreign policy which not only carries forward but modifies wherever necessary the conclusions of the Madurai Congress. Nor were these grop-

ings confined to certain policy statements and articles in the press. They reflected themselves in the practical leadership which the PB gave to the organisation of the Delhi Conference against the significant section of Congress leaders on the same platform with other activists of the peace movement on an issue of importance for world peace, as well as for the defence of India's own national independence. These gropings towards a realistic approach to current developments could be seen in the April—C.C. conclusions on changes in the economic situation in the country (where, for the first time, it was noted that industrial as well as agricultural production is increasing), as well as in the subsequent efforts of the PB to work out more realistic policies on questions of national reconstruction, in the Party's work among the students, etc. This was also done in the Draft Report presented (but not discussed) at the September CC meeting.

7. These improvements in the organisational and political work of the PB were, however, only partial. In order to systematise and improve work, the PB members had divided themselves into a number of sub-committees—T.U., Kisan, Agit-Prop, Organisational. Except the T.U. Sub-Committee, the other committees did not function. No effort was made to critically examine the reason for this and to find out where the cause of the failure lay. Above all, an attitude of liberalism prevailed in relation to each member of the P.B. and his work. There was no check up by the PB of the work done by its sub-committees or its members. At no time did the PB criticise any of its members for his failures and mistakes.

*Secondly*, while the April CC meeting called upon every PC to discuss the Organisational Resolution in relation to its own work with a view to reviewing it and rectifying mistakes in its functioning, no such thing was done by the PB in relation to its own work (this, despite the fact that it had been found already in April that the original decision to form sub-committees had not worked and despite the fact that there were several problems connected with the organisation of the P.H.Q.)

*Thirdly*, the central leadership failed to discharge its responsibility of studying the reports and letters coming from PCs and DCs and giving them help and advice on the problems posed by them, thus creating confidence in them that the slogan of a strong centre is being implemented.

Above all, absence of collective functioning manifested itself in the fact that decisions on such an important question as the issuing of the circular on "Work Among the Students" was hastily done without full discussions at a full meeting of the PB. The lectures delivered at the Central Party School also were not the result of any collective discussions in the PB or even among those PBMs who were delivering the lectures in the school; each lecturer made his own notes and delivered his lectures as he thought fit. Com. Ramamurthy's article of July 18 was also not written on the basis of any collective discussion.

8. The improvement in the political work of the Centre too was restricted by the strongly sectarian understanding which the PB and the CC as a whole had at the time. This was clearly visible in the PB and CC approach to the result of the elections in T-C State and the electoral tactics adopted by the State Committee in relation to them. What the PB and CC did in March and April, 1954 was just to give an expression to the spontaneous resentment against the betrayal of the PSP—a sentiment that was prevalent throughout Party ranks—on the basis of which to arrive at sectarian conclusions with regard to united front with the PSP.

While this sectarian assessment of the T-C State elections was shared by the entire PB and CC (barring the two CCMs from T-C State), the large majority of CCMs and a few PBMs took a sectarian stand with regard to even those questions on which the PB as a whole was groping towards a more realistic policy—attitude to National Plan Loan, work among students, August 15th, etc. It was this that led to the furore that was raised on Com. Ramamurthy's article in *New Age* of July 18 and on the August 15 circular. Together with several PCs, the majority of CCMs and a section of the PB too came to the conclusion that the PB was showing a "grossly reformist" tendency which should be fought and defeated if the Party is to be saved.

The entire PB and CC reacted in a wrong way to the document of certain UP comrades. Even when the PB and CC came to the conclusion that the document was a reformist one, it was incumbent on them to find out what was correct in it. This way they did not do.

9. It was under these circumstances that the September 1954 meeting of the CC made a sharp and on the whole wrong criticism of the PB—a criticism which the PB ultimately accept-

ed. That criticism was circulated in the entire Party. Such a thing is done only in cases of very grave mistakes.

10. Panicked by this criticism and worried by the danger of reformism the PB called the November meeting of the CC in order to express its opinion against the article by Com. RPD in *Lasting Peace*. This was a totally unjustifiable and disruptive step. For—

*Firstly*, the decision to call the meeting was taken at a time when not a single PC had demanded of the PB a discussion on the article; the PB would have been justified in calling a meeting if the publication of the article had led to serious discussions inside the Party and the emergence of differences on the issues posed in the article; a meeting to discuss this new *situation within the Party* would have been justified.

*Secondly*, the meeting was called to “reject” the article—that too with the prior decision of the PB to “reject” it.

*Thirdly*, and above all, the decision of the PB ‘rejecting’ it and the fact that the CC meeting was being called to endorse this was publicised throughout the country through openly-dispatched telegrams.

These steps taken by the PB added to the difficult situation which arose at the September meeting and after: the prestige and authority of the PB, which had already sunk very low at the September CC meeting, sank still further. This was further carried forward at the November meeting of the CC which, while rightly refusing to endorse the decision of the PB to reject the article, adopted the unheard of procedure of circulating in the entire Party a resolution stating that there were “serious differences” inside the CC without stating what those differences were.

11. In its November, 1954 meeting, the CC recognised the fact that the differences that had arisen could be resolved only by reassessing the situation that had developed since Madurai. A machinery was set up to make this reassessment—a Commission of the CC. The meeting of the PB that took place in December, 1954 and January 1955 together with some members of the Commission took important steps towards this reassessment—the shift in the foreign policy of the Government and increasing assertion of freedom; improvement in certain aspects of the economic situation and a relative strengthening of the position of the Congress; direction of the Government’s economic policy; the leading position of the big bourgeoisie in the Indian State.

12. The reassessment was still of an extremely general and partial character. It had to be concretised, elaborated and properly worked out. This the PB thought should be done after the Andhra elections.

13. The results of the Andhra elections came as a rude shock to the entire party. Despite the inner-Party situation that prevailed on the eve of the elections, the entire Party in Andhra as well as in other States, had gone into the election campaign with intense enthusiasm and with complete unity. Inevitably, therefore, the disappointment was great. But it was precisely in such a situation that the PB and the CC had to act with the utmost cool-headedness and responsibility. The PB, immediately after the election results were known, hastily summoned a meeting of the Central Committee. What should have been done was to convene a full meeting of the PB, together with—if necessary—some members of the Andhra Secretariat, and call the CC meeting only after this meeting and on the basis of a prepared draft resolution. In the absence of such preparation and with the prevalent mood, the discussions in the CC on the Andhra election assumed the character of an acrimonious debate—some CCMs criticising the Andhra comrades in an extremely sharp way while not fully recognising the incorrectness of their assessment of the political situation inside Andhra, which had formed the basis of their election tactics. The resolution that was ultimately adopted failed to satisfy anyone and was criticised by many Party units.

14. With this meeting of the CC ended whatever there was of the PB and its functioning. The differences that had appeared in the September and November meetings of the CC took clearer and sharper forms. What is worse, these differences made those who held particular views look upon those who differed from them as people who should be “fought” and “defeated”. This had the disastrous consequence of the PB and CC Commission not only failing to discharge their task of reassessing the situation, but virtually dividing itself into two or three formal meetings of the Commission, the entire Commission was virtually split up into two Drafting Commissions each of which presented their documents to the June meeting of the CC.

15. The June, 1955 meeting of the CC, after prolonged discussions for full one month, adopted by majority a Political



Resolution which sought to resolve the differences that had arisen and gave the tactical orientation to the new situation. Despite its limitations and short-comings the resolution was a big step in the right direction. It could have become the starting point for the resolving of the inner-Party crisis. But it did not. On the other hand, the very Resolution, and the discussion on it, led to the formation of three more or less well-defined groups within the Party. An intense political struggle between the supporters of the Resolution and its opponents (the latter themselves divided into two categories—those from the 'left' and from the 'right') became the main feature of inner-Party life from top to bottom. Even the current activity of the Party came to a standstill in most of the provinces. This was so serious that, even though there was no difference inside the CC on the document which it had adopted in June on the Second Five Year Plan, the positive proposals made in that document did not become the starting point of a big mass political campaign. Naturally, therefore, the June decision that the CC Resolution is a document which is to be immediately implemented though simultaneously open for discussion, was not acted upon in its true spirit.

16. What is this due to? Is it due merely to the fact that there exist serious differences inside the Party? In other words, is it natural and inevitable that the political differences that arose in the middle of 1954 should have led to such developments as did actually occur in our Party in recent months? Or, was there any method of preventing these disastrous consequences which followed the emergence of political differences within the Party?

17. These are questions which have been raised and answered before in our Party. The 1954 Organisational Resolution, for example, stated that the appearance of differences and their resolution through inner-Party struggle are nothing unnatural for the Party. It said that "such differences will arise in future because of the complexity of the problems and the rapidly developing situation will pose new differences (as was done often before the 3rd Party Congress) but by sharply formulating them and by means of principled inner-Party struggle." "But," it went on, "as our own history teaches *principled inner-Party struggle, inner-Party struggle that strengthens the Party, can take place only on the basis of observance of Party forms, proper Party behaviour and a correct comradely attitude towards those*

*from whom one differs.*" (Emphasis added.) In other words, the appearance of inner-party differences and the necessity for resolving these differences enhance, rather than reducing, the importance of the strict observance of correct organisational methods. Yet it was this basic truth that was missed by the Party leadership the moment differences started appearing.

18. It was in the September meeting of the CC that differences manifested themselves for the first time inside the PB and CC. It was in that meeting that PB members expressed their mutual differences in the CC meeting—two drafts on August 15th coming before the CC, each of them signed by 3 PBMs while two others did not subscribe to either. On certain issues too, some PBMs joined the rest of the CC in criticising the other PBMs. This was certainly a very serious situation. From this situation was drawn the conclusion that now that serious differences on political issues have arisen inside the PB, it is the job of PBMs to take these differences into the CC and to fight them out there. The result was that even the little improvement that had been registered in the functioning of the PB began to disappear.

19. It is significant in this connection that the organisational report presented by the PB before the September meeting of the CC had pointed out the defects in the then functioning of the PB in the following terms:

"(a) In spite of the decisions taken at the Party Congress with regard to the "strong centre," all the PBMs are even now not available for work at the Centre. Com. Ahmed has still to devote a great part of his time for work in U.P. So has Com. Rajeswara Rao in Hyderabad. Com. Rajeswara Rao failed even to attend three consecutive meetings of the PB—those held in the last week of April, in the middle of May and in June. Furthermore, he has requested to be relieved of his membership of the PB, which is not only opposed to it, but wants him to work at the Centre.

"(b) Even among those PBMs who are available for work at the Centre very few are in a position to pay attention to the political organisational problems of Provinces. Com. Dange is busy with the affairs of the AITUC office, or touring some provinces in connection with the AITUC work (and to a certain extent in connection with Party organisational work as well); he has very little time to study provincial Party reports and help

the PB in tackling these problems. So is Com. Sundarayya busy with the work of the Parliamentary Office. Com. Ranen Sen also is not paying attention to the problems of Party organisation; he attends to the work of the AITUC office and undertakes some tours. The result is that, apart from Com. Ajoy, there are only 3 PBMs who can be said to be in a position to pay their attention to the political organisational problems of Provinces; even among these, Com. Ramamurti has to devote a major part of his time to the *New Age* and some time for the AITUC as well.

“(c) Even if more PBMs are made available for work in connection with the study of political-organisational problems of Provinces, they will not be able to make their contributions to this task of the PB unless a method is established with which every problem posed from the Provinces is studied collectively by the PB. The present position is that most of the PBMs do not read the reports which come from the Provinces. Hence, while each PBM may be familiar with the problem of one or two Provinces, the PB as a whole has no grip over the situation in any Province. As a matter of fact, the only occasion on which the PB as a whole sits is for 2 or 3 days in a month on which some urgent political problems are discussed and decided upon and some specific organisational problems are disposed of. Such meetings do not help the process of the PB educating itself collectively on the problems of the Provinces.”

Yet the very PB which made this assessment of the inner PB situation, failed after the September CC meeting to take adequate steps to overcome these defects and put PB functioning on proper rails.

20. It has been mentioned earlier that, even in the pre-September days when there was some improvement in the functioning of the PB, there were such vital defects in functioning as an attitude of liberalism in relation to each PB member and his work, absence of check up on work done by members of sub-committees, failure to give the collective decision of the PB on important issues of policy etc. All these defects in functioning persisted in the post-September days. Furthermore, another defect was added to them at and after the September meeting of the CC. While this was evident already in September and November 1954, it assumed very serious forms in March and June, 1955. No serious efforts were made by the PB as a whole

to unify itself and then, on the basis of such a unification in the PB, to unify the CC, and if such efforts at unification leave some issues unresolved, then to have those points of differences clinched by the CC. On the other hand, the tendency was to treat whatever differences arose as the basis of struggle between different trends; what is worse, difference when it manifested itself was gradually extended to other issues and made the subject of controversy in the entire Party.

21. While differences were thus being dealt with, the actual day-to-day functioning of the PB virtually came to a stop. PB meetings were of course held between November 1954 and March 1955. These were meetings at which serious discussions took place on important problems. It was, for example, at the December meeting that important conclusions were arrived at on certain aspects of the Party's policy. It should, however, be remembered, that, even in this period, no attention was paid by the PB to the running of the Party organs, the organisation of agit-prop, etc. Furthermore, even such meetings of the PB ceased to take place after March 1955.

22. While it is true that the PB as a whole and each individual member is responsible for this state of affairs, it is necessary to point out that each individual member has his personal responsibility in a specific way (apart from his share of the general responsibility). It is, therefore, necessary to state how each member functioned as PB member during this whole period.

COM. AHMED: Functioned as Secretary of the U.P. Committee and was therefore not available for work at the Party Centre except for attending PB meetings. He attended all meetings except four. He did not function as a member of the Kisan Sub-Committee.

COM. RANEN SEN: Did help in the functioning of the TU Sub-Committee. But did not pay attention to any other aspect of the work of the Party Centre. Attended all the PB meetings except four.

COM. DANGE: Was busy with the work of the AITUC; did not take much interest in the work of the Centre.

COM. P.S: Functioned as leader of Parliamentary group and other jobs of the Centre. Relieved of Parliamentary work in September 1954 and other jobs after the Andhra elections. Did not attend three PB meetings.

COM. RAJESWAR RAO: Did not function in the Centre. Absented himself at 11 PB meetings. Did not function in the Kisan Sub-Committee.

COM. P. R. Devoted greater attention to Party organ till September 1954. Later due to preoccupation with the AITUC and other central work and also due to work in Madras Assembly, gave little time to Party Organ.

COM. SURJIT: Helped in the work of the Centre particularly the work of the Kisan sub-committee. Was sent to some places on behalf of the PB.

COM. E.M.S. Remained at the Centre most of the time. Was burdened with many jobs.

COM. AJOY: Was abroad for five months in 1954 and two months in 1955. Paid no attention to specific issues and details of organisation even while at the Centre.

23. It should be mentioned, in this connection, that there were occasions when, for several days together, there was no PB member at all at the Centre. Furthermore, even when more PBMs were there, they did not function as a collective team, but individually doing whatever they think is their job and responsibility. It has not been the practice of the PB at its meetings to assign specific jobs for each PBM and then to check up the extent to which these jobs have been done by the PBMs concerned. The result of this mode of "functioning" is that, while each PBM is supposed to be acting "on behalf of" the PB, while his instructions and directions are supposed to be the directive and instructions of the PB as a whole, those directives and instructions are really his own; very often, it so happens that the other PBMs do not know what has been done by the PBM concerned and they, therefore, give views and suggestions contrary to what has been given by him. This naturally leads to loss of confidence in the PB as a whole.

24. These defects in the functioning of the PB have had bad effects on the various aspects of work at the Party Centre.

(a) *Party Organs, Weekly and Monthly*: They are supposed to explain the policy of the party, pool the experiences of the Party and play the role of organiser and leader. They, therefore, should be run under the collective leadership of the PB as a whole in so far as they deal with important questions of policy; such policy pronouncements as the Editorial, Notes and important policy articles should be the collective responsibility

at least of those PBMs who are available at the Centre at the time when they are written. Yet they are invariably written on the basis of discussions between them and one individual member of the PB. It is therefore, not surprising that articles giving expressions to contradictory viewpoints sometimes appear in the paper resulting in confusion.

(b) *Publication and Sale of Literature*: We are now going through a period in which vast opportunities have appeared for the mass production and sale of Marxist and progressive literature in all the Indian languages. Not only has the PB not even once seriously discussed this problem; not only has it not made any effort to discuss it with the responsible comrades of various PCs in order to evolve correct policies in connection with this aspect of Party; it has even failed to tackle the problem arising out of the production and sale of literature in English and Hindi. Very important problems of policy have been raised by the comrades doing this work, but the PB has failed to deal with them.

(c) *Trade Unions*: Problems of TUs have been dealt with by the TU Sub-Committee. But the discussions in the TU Sub-Committees, or at the meetings of the TU activists, did not become the common property of the whole PB.

(d) *Kisan Sub-Committee*: Though it was formed in February 1954, it never functioned. It is true that one or two meetings were held after the April 1954 meeting, but after that neither Com. Ahmed nor Com. Rajeswar Rao took any interest in its work. It was only Com. Surjit and Com. Prasad Rao in consultation with Com. E.M.S. (who was not a member of the Sub-Committee) that did some work in connection with this field of activity. It is necessary to note, in this connection, that this was the period in which very important problems were posed before the Party connected with the Kisan movement; these were placed before the PB by Com. Prasad Rao, but the PB could not pay any attention to them.

(e) *Peace, Women and Students* were left to individual comrades. Their problems were seldom discussed in the PB. There was no check up on their work.

(f) *Finance*: Not only did the PB fail to study the financial position of Provincial Committees and to evolve slogans of putting the entire Party on a stable financial basis, its management of central finances itself was unplanned and chaotic. It was left

to one or two individual members of the PB, both to raise donations and loans, as well as to sanction expenses. There being no planning and check up by the PB, avoidable and extravagant expenditure has very often been incurred. The result is that, once during the last two years (immediately after the Andhra elections), the financial position of the Centre became serious; it was only then that the PB discussed the problem collectively and came to certain decisions. However, even after the PB took these decisions no practice was evolved of regular planning and check up of the finances of the Party Centre by the PB.

25. This does not, of course, mean that there are no positive aspects to the work of the PB. On the other hand, as has been mentioned earlier, the PB did try to bring about a shift in the policy of the Party in the period between the Madurai Congress and the September meeting of the CC. Despite the fact that this process was arrested a little at the September meeting of the CC, PB nevertheless made its contributions to (a) bringing about a more positive approach to the Nehru Government's foreign policy which resulted in the successful holding of the Asian Conference, (b) the evolution of a positive approach to the Plan-frame, (c) organisation of a mass campaign on such issues as the Andhra elections, Goa struggle and the SRC Report. No little contribution was made in the solution of concrete problems affecting the TU and Kisan movements (proposals for the Labour and Land Reforms Panels of the Planning Commission, help to the Kanpur, Amritsar and other strikes, greater help and guidance on questions of the peasant movement, etc.). Guidance was also given on some important issues facing the comrades working in Parliament. These positive achievements are undoubtedly there, but not only are they inadequate to meet the requirements of the situation, but they are not the results of the collective wisdom of the entire PB; on most of these questions the guidance that was given was the guidance of one or more individual members of the PB.

26. What is this due to? It is due not only to the fact that political differences arose in the leadership of the Party during the period. For as has been mentioned earlier, many of these defects were present even at the time when there were no political differences inside the PB—between the Madurai Congress and the September CC meeting. Nor can this state of affairs

be explained by the specific personal failings and limitations of the individual members of the PB alone; for instance, despite the innumerable failings and limitations which each of them has, they do not explain the common failing of the entire PB. This common failing is the failure of the individual PB members to subordinate their individual activity to the need of the common activity of the unity as a whole. This common weakness may be called individualism, a trait that is characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie.

It is this that has led to the evolution of a particular pattern of inner PB functioning, a pattern according to which (a) each PBM "bothers" himself about that branch of PB's work (either this or that "front" or this or that Province) with which he is "specially connected" and is sunk in that job; (b) each PBM adopts an attitude of "non-interference" in the "other's jobs"; (c) both of the above attitudes together result in the PB as a whole not "bothering itself" with the main job of collective leadership — constant and timely examination of current developments with a view to working out mass lines to be followed by the Party; studying the developments in, and rendering timely advice and instructions to, the Provincial organisations of the Party; studying such problems of Party building as education, recruitment, finance, Party Press, etc. both at the Central and lower levels with a view to evolving correct Party policies in relation to each of them etc., etc. These important jobs of leadership are left either to the General Secretary alone, or at best to him and one or two additional members of the PB. These jobs, therefore, become their "sphere of activity" in which the other PBM's do not "interfere."

27. It was, however, not only the functioning of the PB that was affected by individuals. The manner in which differences were sought to be resolved was also affected by it. For, once differences started manifesting themselves, the tendency was for some PB members to express "their" personal point of view at the CC meeting, rather than for the whole PB to try to hammer out the common point of view of the PB as the leading team of the CC. This tendency made its appearance first in the September meeting and continued in subsequent meetings. By the March and June meetings of the CC, the PB ceased to go to the CC as a unit, each PBM going as the "spokesman" of a particular "trend". This naturally had disastrous consequences



in so far as differences in CC meetings themselves were concerned.

28. If this was the situation in the PB, all the more so was it in the CC and, after the June meeting of the CC, in the Party as a whole.

This approach taken by the members of the PB and CC to the whole question of inner-Party struggle led to June decision permitting the PB and CC members to express their differences on the CC Resolution, in the lower units of which they were members, in the conferences of their Provinces and in the CC Forum. What was thus sought to be done in the name of "inner-Party Democracy" was to deny the basic principle that inner-Party discussions should be conducted under the "firm leadership of the Central Committee" and that the minority within the CC should submit to the majority. To this permission given to PB and CC members to openly express their disagreements with the CC Resolution was added the wrong manner in which inner-Party discussion was conducted through the Forum: instead of clearly stating the issues on which differences have arisen and the different points of view on each of these issues of controversy; instead of asking Party units to express themselves on these points of controversy, so that the CC or the Party Congress may come to decisions in consonance with the prevalent views of the Party as a whole on points of controversy; the whole range of Party policy on all aspects of its activity (even many of those on which there are no differences at all) was thrown open for discussion. Furthermore, the points of controversy, and even points of agreement were couched in such terms that the majority of Party members (particularly working class and peasant comrades) could not actually participate in these discussions, not because these comrades are "intellectually ill-equipped" to do so, but because discussions did not centre around vital problems of the mass movement but around certain abstract generalisations.

29. The net result of all these procedures is that the entire Party is divided from top to bottom around the main trends which expressed themselves at the level of the top leadership of the Party. This division of the entire Party, created on the basis of such wrong methods of inner-Party discussion, poses before the Party the danger of the formation of groups inside the Party. They lead to a hardening, instead of narrowing down,

of differences; to an obstinate sticking to the positions, rather than to preparedness to change one's position in the light of exchange of views; to crystallisation of groups instead of unification of the Party.

This obviously is a very serious situation. It however, can be dealt with provided the main defect that is now visible in the functioning of the Party Centre is rapidly overcome. It will, therefore, be the urgent task of the new Central Committee to draw the necessary conclusions from the developments of the last two years and the state of affairs that is today obtaining in the Party.

## **Report of Ajoy Ghosh to the Fourth Congress Of The CPI (1956)**

This is the text of the speech made by Ajoy Ghosh at a closed session of the Congress of the CPI at Palghat. It deals with the Report of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and the denegation of Stalin by the CPSU. It explains why the CPSU considered it necessary to modify the Marxist formulations with regard to the inevitability of war and cites Eastern European countries and China as concrete examples of the peaceful transition to socialism. But it adds: "Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard".

Regarding the denegation of Stalin, the Report raises three questions: What about Stalin's contribution to Socialism? What were the other leaders doing all these days? and what made it possible? As regards the first question the Report eulogises achievements of Stalin and the U.S.S.R. and contrasts it with the achievements of the Labour Party in England and Congress Party in India and other parties which "have not got achievements of even one-millionth part of those of the CPSU."

It is against the background of these achievements, the Report pleads, that the criticism against Stalin should be viewed. As regards the next two questions, Ajoy Ghosh frankly confesses "I have no satisfactory replies to give. What replies have been given have not satisfied me."

The Report admits that serious mistakes had been committed by Stalin and the CPSU, but warns against

the development of "a spirit of cynicism in relation to the USSR and the CPSU . . . . that would be fatal to our move . . . . The CPSU remains the leading party of the international communist movement."

The Report was first published by the Democratic Research Service in its publication *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*.

The 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. met in the background of very big successes and on the basis of these successes, the Congress showed the path of further advance. The Fifth Five-Year Plan had been completed much ahead of schedule and the bold targets of the Sixth Five-Year Plan are there before us. The perspective is that, not in the distant but in the near future, the Soviet Union will catch up with and outstrip the most advanced capitalist countries. On the basis of these achievements, now the decision has been taken to reduce the working-day, to raise wages, to raise the standard of life of the people. Secondly, very big successes were secured in the struggle for peace. At no time since the end of war was the international situation so free from tension as now. Both in the realm of internal and international affairs, the Congress was meeting in the background of mighty victories and, on the basis of those victories, working out a path for still greater victories. The discussions and decisions of the Congress have to be understood in this background.

The first big factor to which the Congress draws our attention is the emergence of socialism as a world system. The significance of this development is becoming more and more clear as days pass. The socialist world has not merely come into existence. It exerts ever more powerful influence on the whole course of history. It has got massive achievements in every sphere and these achievements prove the incontestable superiority of socialism over capitalism.

It was precisely the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe that suffered the most serious damage during the war. The bourgeoisie had thought that as a result of these damages, these countries would not be able to recoup for a very long period. Yet actually what has happened is that the pre-war level of production has been left far behind. And the very rapidi-

ty of this recovery, the rapidity of the advance after the serious damage caused by war, shows the contrast between the two systems. This incontestable superiority of the socialist system is having a very powerful impact on the minds of men. As was said at the Congress, in the minds of men, socialism is already stronger than capitalism.

All of you comrades know the section in the *Communist Manifesto* where it is stated that of all classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie, the proletariat alone is revolutionary, while the other classes are conservative and even reactionary. The Manifesto states that these other classes become revolutionary to the extent that they adopt the standpoint of the proletariat. This in those days was not a common phenomenon. Big changes have taken place since then.

Formerly also many other people talked of socialism. Non-communists talked of socialism in the past as they do at present. But in those days, the talk of socialism by social democrats, by bourgeois intellectuals, served only one purpose and that was to hold the masses away from the real socialist movement, hold them back from the task of real socialist transformation. Today also to some extent it serves that purpose. But today such declarations act in a different way. Social democracy has proved its bankruptcy. It has not been able to solve any problem while Marxism has achieved mighty victories. Therefore the ideas of socialism today flow more and more into the channels of Marxism-Leninism.

Another thing is that hundreds of honest elements are coming to accept socialism, though they dislike certain aspects like civil war, violence, etc. But they are not at all opportunists or enemies of socialism. Many of these elements are moved by genuine socialist ideals.

In a world situation, when capitalism was the only system, when the superiority of socialism was not definitely proved, it was easy to utilise the slogan of socialism for anti-socialist purposes. But in a world situation when socialism has proved its superiority, when capitalism is in a state of crisis, in such a world the ideas of socialism can be more easily directed to Marxism-Leninism than at any time before.

Secondly, the growing strength of socialism helps the disintegration of the colonial system which in the past was the main reserve force of world imperialism. This disintegration of the

colonial system is a very big factor in world politics. Marxism-Leninism had predicted the inevitable collapse of the colonial system. But the collapse is not proceeding everywhere in the same way as was predicted. This has got to be clearly seen. We thought that it would proceed in only one way, namely, the conquest of power by the masses led by the working class and the peasantry. This has happened in a number of countries — China, Vietnam, etc.—though there also, there have been modifications in the state forms. Nevertheless, the struggle in these countries has proceeded in a particular way, a revolutionary overthrow of imperialism by an alliance led by the working class. It is possible that it will happen in the same way in some other countries also. But this is not all. When we speak of the disintegration of the colonial system, we include in this process, the events that have developed in countries like India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon — the attainment of freedom by them. What is happening today in the Middle East? It is not merely the working class, the peasantry and the national bourgeoisie but even some elements from amongst the feudal classes are found taking a stand against the imperialists. This is an entirely new phenomenon. For example, there is the dismissal of Glubb by the King of Jordan.

The struggle for defence of peace and against military blocs that is developing in the countries of the East is an essential and vital part of these freedom struggles itself. By the waging of this struggle, these countries strengthen their national freedom.

All this is possible today because of the emergence of socialism as a world force and the growth of the anti-imperialist movement in the countries of the East. It enables these countries to wage a far more determined and firm struggle against the drive of the imperialists towards a world war than at any time before. It strengthens their independence. The former colonial countries asserting freedom find powerful support in the USSR and China.

They have established diplomatic relations and economic relations with the socialist world because it is a factor which strengthens their own freedom. It makes them less dependent on the imperialists and leads to the deepening of the crisis of the imperialist system itself.

But we should not think that it is only the socialist world that is helping the colonial world to win its freedom. This

disintegration of the colonial world is itself a factor which benefits the socialist movement and socialist world. We are helping the socialist world by what we are doing. We are playing a great and increasingly more important role in humanity's march towards socialism.

Firstly, this disintegration of the colonial system weakens imperialism and thus weakens its capacity to undertake military adventures against the socialist world, it denies its manpower and resources with which it could undertake such adventures.

Secondly, it is not merely that we gain from the economic relations with the socialist world because it helps us to rebuild our economy on the basis of development of heavy industries, but such economic relations help to strengthen their economy also.

Thirdly, and above all, the fact that a vast number of countries which were formerly a part of the imperialist world are today defending their freedom and taking a stand in opposition to the imperialists — is a factor which directly helps the consolidation of the socialist world.

What the socialist world needs, above all, is peace. But for the Second World War, the economy of the Soviet Union would have been far more advanced than today. And the fact that countries like India, Burma, Egypt and even Saudi Arabia are taking a stand against war and for preservation of peace is a factor of strength to the socialist world.

What is the effect of the disintegration of the colonial system on imperialism? That also has got to be seen. The urge for national reconstruction that has grown in these countries and which results in their establishing relations of friendship with the USSR further narrows down the area of unrestricted exploitation of the imperialists. It makes it difficult for them to solve the crisis of the market at the cost of colonial countries as they used to do in the past. Inevitably this deepens their crisis.

Secondly, this narrowing down of the area of exploitation sharpens the conflict between the imperialist powers themselves.

Thirdly, it helps the working class in the imperialist countries to expose and isolate the worst reactionaries from among them. For example, the defeat suffered by the French imperialists in Vietnam resulted in the sweeping decline of the prestige of

their political leadership and it helped the working class to isolate the worst reactionaries in France.

Fourthly, it helps the moral isolation of the imperialists. In Britain, they point out: "India which was a colony takes today an independent stand on every issue, while Britain allows the US imperialists to establish bases on its own soil."

And finally, it undermines the whole basis of social democracy and reformism in the imperialist countries. It was super-profits from the colonial countries that formed the foundation of the growth of reformism in many of the advanced imperialist countries. Sections of the working class were bought over by them. Today it is becoming more and more difficult to do that and thereby the economic basis of reformism is getting more and more weak. It results in the sharpening of the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the working class in the capitalist world.

What we have to see is that the break-up of colonialism and winning of freedom by colonial countries is of tremendous importance which strengthens the socialist world, weakens imperialism, intensifies conflict between imperialist powers, intensifies political and moral isolation of imperialists and their agents, undermines the basis of reformism.

The emergence of socialism as a world system and the disintegration of colonial system — both proceeded side by side and each process strengthened the other. Both in their totality, delivered heavy blows against the system of exploitation built up by imperialists.

New prospects in the struggle for peace have developed. The desire for peace has given rise to a vast movement embracing hundreds of millions of people. A vast zone of peace has come into existence—the zone comprising socialist as well as non-socialist countries.

In this connection, it is necessary to reassess a phenomenon of the post-war years and that is the growth of the sentiment of neutrality. The sentiment of neutrality is a sentiment which opposes alignment with all military alliances. A doctrinaire and dogmatic concept would be like this: Between forces of war and peace, there can be no neutrality and so any country which takes a neutral stand objectively helps war-mongers. Many leaders of the Communist movement suffered from this concept in the past. But, in reality, what does that sentiment of neutra-



lity express? It is a sentiment for peace, which wants to keep out of the imperialist drive for war. It may be that leaders who express these sentiments look upon both as power blocs. It may be that subjectively the desire of some of them is to condemn the Soviet Union. But which is the country today that wants to establish war bases and is going ahead towards war? It is not the Soviet Union; it is the U.K. and USA. Neutrality expresses the sentiment of the masses for maintenance of their national freedom.

Today, a vast zone of peace has come into existence comprising the socialist world as well as a number of countries which declare non-participation in military blocs as the basis of their foreign policy. India, Burma, some Arab countries and even some European countries are more and more taking to this path.

A decisive factor in the battle for peace is the growing military strength of the Soviet Union. Not merely the mass of people but powerful states headed by the USSR and China stand for peace and actively fight for peace. Their strength grows every day, making resort to war an extremely dangerous adventure for the imperialists.

All these factors, together with the growth of Communist and working-class parties, the strength of the movement for peace, brought about a situation which made the CPSU consider it necessary to modify the Marxist formulations with regard to the inevitability of war.

It was said at the same time that the economic causes of war remain, and as such the possibility of world war also remains. With the colonies going out of imperialist orbit, with the area of exploitation getting shrunk, the desire of the imperialists to launch a war against the socialist world certainly does not decrease, but increases. The law of uneven development of the capitalist system gives rise to rivalries. So both the causes of world war and inter-imperialist war operate.

At the same time, as has been pointed out, while the *danger* of war remains—it remains so long as these conditions remain—the counteracting forces are very strong and are continuously growing. In this situation it is possible to prevent war.

“Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and if they actually try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff

to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans." (Report of the 20th Congress.)

After pointing out the problem of markets, the *Report* says, "all this means, the struggle for markets is becoming sharp in the imperialist camp." Therefore, the conflicts inside the imperialist camp continue to sharpen. But that does not mean that war between them is an immediate possibility. A situation may arise in future when such a danger grows real and imminent. But by the time such a danger arises it is quite likely that those forces which are operating against war will become so strong that even if they are not able to bring about an end of the capitalist system, would be powerful enough to prevent a war from breaking out.

It must be understood that this thesis about war not being inevitable is not just an abstract formulation based on a mathematical study of factors for and against. The thesis is born out of practical experience in the struggle against war.

As you know, after the end of the war, within a year or two, once again the international situation deteriorated and tension was created. The practical steps taken by the Soviet Union, together with other factors, have brought about a radical change in the situation despite all the attempts of the imperialists to aggravate international tension. A new spirit was born out of this Conference on the basis of which further successes could be achieved. This itself was a big practical achievement. The forces working for peace today could confidently say that war is not inevitable though the danger always remains, and this thesis has a tremendous practical importance. It arms the forces of peace with confidence in victory. It helps to broaden the sweep of the peace movement.

Then the 20th Congress also made a concrete analysis of the capitalist system. That analysis is there. I do not think that it is necessary to elaborate that. But one thing that is very pointedly brought out at the 20th Congress is the contradictory processes that are at work. This had become necessary because of the over-simplified understanding of the economic crisis of the capitalist system that had grown in the past in many Communist Parties throughout the world. This had two evil effects.

In the Soviet Union many technicians and economists arguing on the basis that capitalism has declined, came to the wrong conclusion that no technological advance was possible in capi-

talist countries. But even in this period technological advance was being registered in some capitalist countries in certain spheres. The capitalists, faced with a shrinking market, were trying to meet the new situation by improving the technique of production. This was not seen by many and they did not study sufficiently the advance of technology that was being made in America. This to some extent harmed the progress of Soviet industry. Also, in capitalist countries predictions were made about the time and nature of the impending crisis which proved incorrect. Our understanding at Madurai was also based on this absolute decline of capitalist production and an over-simplified estimation of the economic crisis. In the 20th Congress it was necessary to re-examine this understanding. It is not only necessary for the Communist Party to study the crisis in general, but also the particular crisis in concrete in each country and not to minimise the contradictory processes.

At the same time, while keeping all this in mind, the Communists must also see the general direction in which capitalist economy is moving in the direction of new social and economic upheavals. Either an over-simplified understanding of the crisis or belief in capitalist prosperity is wrong. We have to study the day-to-day developments that are taking place without at the same time losing sight of the direction in which the capitalist economy is moving—new upheavals. Only then will we be not taken by surprise.

The CPSU Congress also proclaimed the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism. It held that because of the new international situation when the balance has shifted in favour of the forces of socialism in the USSR and other countries in every sphere which are having a powerful influence on the masses of the people, because of the growth of the ideas of socialism all over the world and because strong Communist Parties have come into existence in many countries—such a peaceful transition is a possibility in several countries.

The concrete examples that were given at the Congress in which peaceful transition has taken place were the Eastern European countries and China. It was stated that in these countries the transition to socialism was effected in a peaceful way. We all know what happened in the East European countries. The old state apparatus broke down during the Second World War itself under the blows of the Red Army as

well as of the patriotic forces. And after the defeat of Hitler, new coalition governments came into power. They were in the nature of People's Democratic Governments of the first stage which carried out the bourgeois-democratic tasks and which included the bourgeoisie also. In the second stage, the transition to People's Democracy of the second stage took place and it is now in essence the dictatorship of the proletariat effected without violence and bloodshed. Same things are happening in China also—prolonged civil war in the first stage, peaceful transition to socialism in the second stage.

These were the only examples before us. The question that would naturally be asked is: Is this all that is meant by what the Congress stated? If so, what is new in this?

If you take Comrade Khrushchev's report this is what he states:

"The winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of all the working people could create for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.

"In the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

*"Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without this there can be no transition to socialism."*

The question may be raised: In which countries is peaceful transition possible? In countries where capitalism is still strong and has huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will, of course, offer serious resistance. Which are these capitalist countries? Countries like France, England, Italy—in all these countries capitalism is still strong and has got a military force far more powerful than what existed before the last war. England has the biggest standing army in the world compared to the size of its population.

Here capitalism is strong and a powerful military apparatus is at its disposal. Same in France and Italy. Is it that these countries are excluded from this category? If so, which capita-

list countries are meant? If you try to understand this thing literally, then the discussion that will start will be of an abstract nature. What has got to be seen is the significance of this proposition. For that I would like to take you back a little.

You remember the proposition made by Engels in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, where he refers to universal suffrage and says that "universal suffrage is the gauge of the maturity of the working class. . . . On the day the thermometer of universal suffrage registers boiling point among the workers, both they and the capitalists will know what to do." That is, if a stage comes when this universal suffrage threatens the capitalist order itself, then capitalists and the working class will know what to do. Then prolonged struggle for power begins which inevitably takes the form of civil war or violence.

Why was the issue posed in this way? Because it was realised that the ruling classes with the state apparatus, military and police at their disposal, are not going to depart from the scene merely because they have not the backing of the majority of the people. On the contrary, they are going to use this force against the majority of the people who have declared themselves against the ruling class. That is why, universal suffrage could not enable the working class to bring about fundamental transformations.

As you know, while being in complete agreement with this proposition, Marx visualised the possibility of peaceful transformation to socialism in some countries, for example, in a country like Britain. Lenin pointed out that this was possible in those days because in Britain there did not exist a huge military and bureaucratic apparatus. So, when we talk of the impossibility of socialism being achieved except by violent means, we do not mean thereby that it is theoretically impossible for the Party of the working class to get the support of the majority of the working people. What we stressed was that even if it happens that despite the existence of bourgeoisie, bourgeois control over press etc. working class and its Party manage to get a majority of the people on its side, then the ruling class will force civil war on the people. Stalin re-emphasised this thesis. At the same time he stated that if in the remote future it so happens that capitalist encirclement is replaced by socialist encirclement, then, it is possible that in some countries trans-

formation will take place in a peaceful way. This is how Marxists looked at the matter.

Now the question is being posed anew. Here, on the question whether peaceful transformation to socialism is possible or not, there are two distinct questions involved.

The first question is: Is it possible for the working class and its Party to secure a stable parliamentary majority? To this question the 20th Party Congress replies in the affirmative. It says it is possible, for the factors already pointed out, *i.e.* the growth of ideas of socialism, disintegration of colonial system, the political and moral bankruptcy of the capitalist class, the deepening crisis of capitalism and the strength of the Communist Parties. *It is possible through a mass revolutionary movement, to achieve Parliamentary majority backed by a broad movement, to bring about such a situation when working class and its allies can come to government. Will this alone make peaceful transformation possible? If capitalism is still strong—not merely economically, but politically and morally also, if the capitalist system has got the support of big sections of people, if it retains such control over the state apparatus as to be able to use it against the parliament, then violent revolution is inevitable.*

We all know what happened in Spain. A democratic government came to power through elections but the reactionary classes not only remained powerful but also retained effective control over the armed forces. And when the government tried to introduce certain reforms they used the armed forces against it. A bloody civil war followed which ultimately led to a fascist dictatorship.

Must such civil wars necessarily take place today? No. If the working class heading the people is able to develop a powerful mass movement and secures a parliamentary majority, if the position of the reactionaries in the state apparatus is weakened through a series of measures and through extension of democratic rights for the people, if reaction is unable to secure a sufficiently broad mass base for its counter-revolutionary activity—if all this happens which is quite a possibility in the new situation—then it is quite possible that *fundamental changes will be effected in a more or less peaceful way.*

And this is a possibility not merely for France and England but which is there even in a country like India or Indonesia.

In these countries, in certain circumstances, the transition to the first stage of People's Democracy may also be effected in a peaceful way without civil war. Obviously, as has been pointed out here, "Whatever the form of transition to socialism, *the decisive and indispensable factor is the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard. Without this there can be no transition to socialism.*"

In a country like Indonesia, for example, where there is a powerful Communist Party which has won nearly one-fourth of the electorate, allied with progressive elements, it is possible for them to create conditions for going forward still further. There will be a series of mass struggles which will lead to a series of crises, but these crises need not burst out in a civil war.

One may say that this is a theoretical possibility. But where is the necessity of stating this? It is necessary because from this certain practical tasks follow. *If such transition is a possibility, then the Communist Party in every country strives to turn this into a reality.* Today when the mass of people desire socialist transformation but do not desire civil war, this is an imperative duty of the Communist Party.

But from this certain tasks follow. And one of the most important of these tasks is the struggle for the *strengthening of democracy in every sphere.* We have to fight against the arbitrary powers which the police and bureaucracy enjoy and strive to curb them. We have to fight for the democratisation of the state apparatus and the removal from it of the most reactionary elements. We have to fight for the extension of the rights and powers of the people's elected organs—Panchayats, District Boards, etc.

Here you will see how the French Communist Party in its resolution has posed the problem. It has stated that "the transition to socialism by the parliamentary path cannot, on the other hand, be envisaged except through immediate and constant struggle for the defence and enlargement of democratic liberties."

Fight for the extension of democracy, the fight for the curbing of the power of the police and bureaucracy and to increase the power and rights of the elected organs is essential for peaceful transition to socialism. *The greater the democratisation, the greater the possibility.* This is a major practical task which follows from this.

The question therefore is not: Which countries can have socialism peacefully? The question is: What conditions must be created in order to effect such a transition? The former question would lead to endless discussions of an academic nature—discussion about the difference between one country and another. The latter question would lead to practical activity which can create the necessary conditions.

How is this different from reformism? It is different from reformism in various ways. I will tell you three main things. One is: it has been stated that a parliamentary majority backed by mass revolutionary movement led by the working class—without this, it is not possible. Secondly, the leadership of the working class is essential. Thirdly, the reformists state that formal democracy—existence of the parliamentary system, universal suffrage, by which people can choose their representatives once in a few years—is alone enough to enable us to go over to socialism. Marxism states that this formal democracy is not enough. Unless there is real existence of democracy, that is, if the police and bureaucracy retain their arbitrary power, *if the armed forces are not democratized*, if the local elected organs have no power, then with all this, universal suffrage does not enable you to go forward to socialism. Reformists in the capitalist countries say that merely by the parliamentary method we shall change over to socialism.

Marxists, on the contrary, even today say that formal democracy is not enough and that real democracy is needed. *A sustained struggle for extension of democracy will have to be carried on.* On our success in this struggle will depend the possibility of peaceful transition.

*This thesis of peaceful transition to socialism is a big weapon in our hands. It enable us to heal the split in the socialist movement. It enables us to forge links with socialists who sincerely desire socialism but abhor civil war.* It enables us to fight the propaganda of the bourgeoisie. It enables us to bring to the forefront the enormous significance of the struggle for democracy.

The 20th Congress has stated that *in peaceful co-existence, socialism will win.* We are confident because socialism is superior. The statement that war is not fatalistically inevitable, that peaceful transition to socialism is possible—what does all this indicate? It shows that world socialism has advanced to



a new stage. It is born out of the tremendous confidence in the victories that we have already won. The future belongs to us.

When the 20th Congress met, the world movement for peace, for national freedom and democracy, and for socialism had advanced to a new stage. Here certain old concepts were acting as obstacles in the path of further development of the movement. The 20th Congress replaces these old concepts by new concepts that correspond to the new historic situation and enable the movement to acquire greater speed than ever before.

Now I will take up the next question—the most difficult question—the question of Comrade Stalin and the cult of the individual. This phrase, “cult of personality”, what does it exactly mean? Let us take that first.

*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* of March 29th gave the definition of the cult of the individual as “inordinately exalting individual persons, investing them with supernatural traits and qualities imputing all but miraculous powers to them and kow-towing to them.” It is an incorrect conception, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. The mistake lies not in recognising the talents of a leader but in ascribing to him supernatural powers and infallibility.

After the 20th Congress a number of questions have come to the mind of every one of you. What about the contribution of Comrade Stalin to the development of Marxism-Leninism? What about his role in building socialism and fighting against right and left deviations? Why is it that there was no reference to it in the 20th Congress? These questions came to my mind also.

Secondly, what were the other leaders doing all these days? What role did they play in fostering or combating the cult of the individual?

Thirdly, what made it possible for such things to continue for such a long time?

*I cannot answer all these questions.* There can be no dispute about the tremendous massive role of Comrade Stalin in enriching Marxism, in building socialism in the USSR, in fighting against right and left deviations, in guiding the international Communist movement. I think that if the 20th Congress Report itself had made a statement about the positive achievements of Stalin, then much of the confusion that has arisen would have

been avoided. This was subsequently done in the *Pravda* editorial.

But as regards the second and third questions, I have no satisfactory replies to give. What replies have been given have not satisfied me.

Instead of debating these issues, let us see the whole thing dispassionately.

Did the cult of personality develop in the USSR or not? I have no doubt it did develop. We also know that it was primarily in relation to Comrade Stalin.

Did Comrade Stalin himself play a role in the development of this? About this a number of instances have been given, e.g. the biography of Comrade Stalin. It is very evident that the book is permeated through and through with the cult of the individual, ascribing miraculous powers to Comrade Stalin.

While Comrade Stalin, in a general way, very often criticised exaltation of individuals as being alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the concrete form which it was taking in the Soviet Union in relation to him, in the latter period of his life, he did not combat; but, on the other hand, encouraged it. I know on an issue like this, it is very difficult to be very objective. At the same time, it is necessary to do so because, what has happened is a major event not only in the life of the CPSU, but in the life of all the Communist Parties.

I hope you have got the statement that has appeared in *New Age*, made by the Chinese Party. That document deals with the question, in a more satisfactory and in a more elaborate way than I have seen so far anywhere. All comrades should read that article.

We should understand that what is today being criticised is not merely Comrade Stalin. What is being criticised is the whole method of leadership that had evolved in the CPSU over a certain period. If Comrade Stalin is specifically mentioned, it is so because he was the leader of the CC of the CPSU. If we look at it as a mud-slinging business, then we would not be able to see any further. Let us look at the thing in a different way. We must see the criticism in its proper perspective; it is necessary to do so because today many of the bourgeois leaders say: "What did we tell you? Is this not what we told you all along?" *Some of our comrades also say that the whole moral*

*basis on which they stood is shaken and there is nothing on which to stand. But, let us see whether this is really so.*

In the years since it was born there have been mighty achievements of the Soviet Union in every sphere. From a backward country, it has been transformed in this period into one of the most advanced countries in the world, and also a country with advanced agriculture. In this very period, there has been an enormous increase in the material and cultural standards of the Soviet people. The USSR played an immense role in the transformation of socialism into a world system, in bringing about the present situation when one-third of humanity has taken to the path of socialism. But for the USSR, the disintegration of the colonial system could not have taken place. But for the USSR, victory in the anti-fascist war could not have been won. But for the USSR there would be no People's Democracies. What we have to see is, first of all, the mighty achievements of the USSR which are of profound historic significance, not only for the Soviet Union but for the whole of humanity. *The mistakes have to be judged in the background of these achievements.* It would be no exaggeration to say that *never in the history of humanity has so much been achieved in 40 years as in the USSR.* This is the first fact that has to be recognised.

When we recognise that all this could not have come of itself, then we will see that *the basic line which has been pursued all these years is a correct line.* It is not only Comrade Stalin, but the present leaders of the CPSU and the Central Committee too that have made this possible. *The CPSU has been the Party which has acted as a model for international Communist movement and Comrade Stalin was the international leader of the Communist movement.* Where was the international Communist movement thirty years ago and where it is today, we know. That also is a tribute to Comrade Stalin and to the leaders of the international movement. So the whole thing has to be viewed in the background of *victories which have no parallel in history.*

Contrast this with the achievements of other parties which throw mud at us. For example, the Labour Party in England. It came to power several times and every time, it paved the way for the victory of the Tories. Here in India, we have the Congress in power which received the support of the overwhelming majority of the people before 1947. Within three or four

years people began cursing the Congress. Did the Labour Party or the Congress ever think it necessary to come before the people and say to them that these were the mistakes they committed? Parties which have not got achievements of even one-millionth part of those of the CPSU, come and say today that the CPSU has been committing mistake after mistake. And many of our comrades also are *unfortunately taken in by that*. What we have to say is: See where the world stood 40 years ago, in 1917 and today. And this is because, first and foremost, of the October Revolution and the Soviet Union.

What we have to see is that the Soviet Union was faced with an exceptionally difficult job. In all other states, all other parties that came to power had got before them only one task—perpetuate their own rule. Here, it was a question of bringing about a transformation of a type that has never been attempted in history and together with that create the conditions for transition to a still higher form of society. There was no previous precedent by which it could be guided. A country launched on a new path, an unchartered path, beset with enemies outside and inside—it was in this situation that the Soviet Union found itself. It was inevitable that in such a situation mistakes would be committed, even mistakes of a serious character. It is inevitable because something new is being attempted: Not replacement of one class rule by another only, but simultaneously creating conditions for the total abolition of class rule itself.

It is also inevitable that wrong theories would be propounded again and again. And we have got to go forward by correcting them from time to time. But it is not enough to see this, it is necessary to realise also that these mistakes should be *as few as possible* and they should be rectified *as quickly as possible*. If we do not see this, then we would not be doing justice to the masses of our country, the proletariat of our country, to the cause of world socialism itself.

It is precisely this recognition and speedy correction of mistakes that was prevented by the cult of personality. Herein we have to see the harm done by the development of the cult of personality. That is, if powers to do miracles are ascribed to certain persons, if they are looked upon as infallible, then inevitably the tendency would be to okay everything these persons say or do and, therefore, mistakes would accentuate and get per-

petuated. That is, a speedy correction becomes difficult if the cult of personality exists.

Mistakes often get committed because of the nature of the situation, because of the complexity of the tasks, but those mistakes fail to get corrected, they pile up and lead to new mistakes if the cult of personality grows. It is in this context that the criticism has got to be understood.

The sharp criticism is not with a view to discredit Comrade Stalin. I did not meet any person in the USSR who in any way minimised the immensity of the achievements of this period and also the fact that Comrade Stalin's was the outstanding role in this. But they say that mistakes were committed and they were not speedily corrected because of the cult of personality, the belief that a particular individual is infallible, a belief which Comrade Stalin himself gradually came to foster. Collective leadership cannot come into existence only by regular meetings. No one should consider himself to be infallible—this is the pre-condition for collective functioning. Because collective leadership presupposes readiness to understand each other and correct one's own mistakes.

If the cult of personality grows, gradually inner-Party democracy comes to an end, collective functioning ceases, even regular meetings do not take place, the Party fails to assess its work objectively and learn from its mistakes.

Therefore, let us first recognise the *immensity of the achievements* and the tasks, *see that mistakes were committed in the execution of these tasks*, and that these mistakes did not get corrected because of the cult of personality, which resulted in the continuation of old and commission of new mistakes. All this did serious damage to the Party and the movement.

Comrades would like to know what kind of damage has been done due to this.

I shall not be able to deal with it in detail; but I would like to mention certain facts. For example, regarding agriculture, it has been stated that a serious situation developed in agriculture, because of certain policies, which were later rectified after Comrade Khrushchev's report made in September. You will see the rectification that was made. Then it was pointed out that mistakes were committed with regard to Yugoslavia. Further, there was lack of vigilance about the attack of Hitler's Germany.

But I want to deal with another and a more vital question. That question is the position of the security services and the question of Beria. It has been stated that the security services abused their power, that they grew into "a state within the state" and that certain excesses were done.

Class struggle as we all know leads to the overthrow of capitalism. It does not cease after the bourgeois has been overthrown. Dictatorship of the proletariat is a determined war waged by the proletariat against an enemy who has been overthrown but not yet destroyed, who is not in power but still very powerful. The question arises—what happens *after* the abolition of classes? As you know, by about 1934 in the Soviet Union hostile classes came to be eliminated. The big capitalists had been eliminated long ago and by 1934 the kulaks also had ceased to exist as a class. The question was whether there would be class struggle even after this. It was correctly pointed out by Comrade Stalin that there was the capitalist encirclement and there were elements from among hostile classes and degenerates who act as agents of imperialism outside. Therefore we cannot say that class struggle had ended. Vigilance had to be exercised so that the enemies of the working class do not take advantage of the situation. Capitalism continues to survive in the minds of men for a long period and sustained struggle had to be waged to eliminate it. But the concept that class struggle becomes *more and more intensified* as the socialist society grows stronger and stronger—this was a wrong and dangerous concept. It led to the tendency to brand as "enemies of the people" even those who are only politically wrong or who politically differed. It led to excessive reliance on security services and underestimation of the fact that the socialist society, as it grows, develops the moral power to isolate and combat harmful trends and tendencies, and educate elements from all sections.

The result was that the security forces came to acquire extraordinary powers and when a person like Beria took charge of these services, excesses were committed. Not merely enemies were made the target, but action was taken against some others and they were persecuted.

Such a theory, and the practical measures that followed, created an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust in many spheres and prevented frank criticism and self-criticism. Men like Beria

took full advantage of the situation to creep into responsible posts and use them against the interests of the socialist society.

Beria had a shady past. In the years of the civil war he was on the side of the bourgeois nationalists in Transcaucasia who wanted to overthrow the Soviet government. The organisation was directly in touch with the imperialists, financed and helped by them. Subsequently, certain persons who knew Beria in those days tried to expose him and Beria used his power in the state apparatus to liquidate them. One of the things which contributed to the growth of his power and one of the reasons for the excess—was this understanding about the intensification of class struggle under socialism.

From this it should not be taken to mean that all the trials that took place in the Soviet Union were fabricated. Many of those who were punished were guilty. But in several cases the punishment was excessive and also a number of innocent people suffered. This particular theory about class struggle and the manner in which it was applied and understood did damage to Soviet law and authority and there were violations of the rules laid down by the Soviet law.

Doctrinairism grew inside the Party and the concept grew that certain persons are to develop theory and others are merely to apply it. Initiative got stifled. This prevented the Party from working out a flexible policy on several issues.

Doctrinairism affected other parties too. In 1942 Comrade Stalin made a well known speech where he stated that the Indian bourgeoisie is split in two sections—one of which had already managed in the main to come to agreement with imperialism. For a long time, a discussion started inside our Party on this—which section? The fact is that it is an incorrect statement. It is belied by events. Yet none of us dared say it is wrong. It was assumed that it cannot be wrong because Comrade Stalin has stated it. This doctrinairism grew not in one party, but in many parties. It was thought that it is the job of particular parties and of particular leaders to develop Marxism and others were merely to apply the theories. Tendency developed to fit facts into particular theories and when they did not fit in, to deny the facts themselves.

In organisation also, with the growth of the cult of personality, methods of personal leadership came into existence and

started getting reproduced at the lower levels also. This happened in many cases.

Again this method of personal leadership is a factor which prevents correct assessment of the situation and pooling together of experience and results in serious mistakes.

So, it has been correctly pointed out that both in the realm of theory and practice, the growth of the cult of personality did serious damage. One question may be asked: Why Comrade Stalin did this? Was it that he was seeking some personal ends?

Everyone with whom I have talked was of the opinion that there was no trace of any personal interest as far as Comrade Stalin was concerned. Everything he did, very sincerely believing that that was in the best interests of socialism, of the working class and of the revolution. But, he came to believe in his infallibility and so he began to think that he alone was right. He developed the habit of distrusting others. The practice of constant consultation, of seeing his own mistakes declined. The aim he set before himself was the strengthening of socialism and the revolution; but there itself, with the growth of the cult of personality and with the belief in his own infallibility, he committed mistakes and these mistakes did damage politically and theoretically.

All this, let me repeat again, *should not be allowed to blur, in any way, the gigantic achievement of the USSR in every sphere, the immense advance registered by the world Communist movement and the outstanding role played by Comrade Stalin in all this.* To do that would mean to deny facts, to distort history.

At the same time, we must also recognise that serious mistakes were committed and but for these mistakes the achievements and the advance could have been still greater. Today, with old methods of leadership abandoned and collective functioning restored, we can confidently look forward to such advance.

The leadership of the CPSU, by boldly declaring ideological war against the cult of personality and by laying bare the damage it has done, has rendered great service to the Soviet people, to the People's Democracies and to the entire international Communist movement. Whatever criticism we may make of the specific manner in which this was done, the fact remains that the job had to be undertaken. Whatever tempo-



rary confusion it may have created, in the long run, it will be of great help to all Communist Parties.

Many of us may be critical of the way in which certain things were done. *But we must not permit a spirit of cynicism to develop in relation to the USSR and the CPSU. That would be fatal for our movement.* Let us remember what the bourgeoisie had hoped for when Stalin died. They had thought that the CPSU would go to pieces. Not only that has not happened, but the present leadership has fully demonstrated its capacity in deeds. The success which its peace policy has attained is there. The security services have been deprived of their extraordinary power. Collective leadership has been restored. Big advance has been made in raising the standard of life of the people. Marxism-Leninism has been creatively developed. *The CPSU remains the leading party of the international Communist movement* and its record shows that it is worthy of the trust reposed in it by the Soviet people.

Then in the organisational sphere, certain other principles have been laid down in the Report which are of value not only to the CPSU but to all parties.

It points out: "The main thing in the Party's work of organisation is work among the masses—to influence the masses and rally them for the accomplishment of the economic and political tasks set by the Party. We must no longer tolerate a situation when workers of the Party apparatus, instead of being daily amidst the masses, confine themselves to their offices, produce reams of resolutions, while life passes them by."

This is equally true of many other parties, particularly of our Party. Here another thing I will read out: "Unfortunately, in many Party organisations we still find the absurd juxtaposition of Party political work and economic activity. We come across Party 'leaders' who hold that Party work is one thing and economic and government work quite another. These 'leaders' even complain that they are being diverted from so-called 'pure-Party' work and are made to study economics, technology, and agronomy, to study production."

What is the significance of this for us? Every Party is faced with the same problem—not only parties in power: a kind of divergence between Party work and mass work has grown in many parties. As we know, it is there in our Party to a considerable extent.

Then, "Many Party organisations are oblivious of the Party principle, that, together with proper utilisation of old cadres, young people who have proved their mettle in practical work should be boldly promoted to leading posts." This is another vice which is found not only in the CPSU—is this not there in our Party?

Again, "despite this progress in disseminating knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the position in respect to ideological work is still unsatisfactory. The main shortcoming at present is that it is largely divorced from the practice of Communist concentration." Divorce between ideological work and practical problems is a common failing in all Communist Parties but is especially found in our Party.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU is a landmark in the history of the international Communist movement. On the basis of mighty victories it showed the way to still greater victories. Eschewing all dogmatism and doctrinairism, it tackled the current problems in a bold way, creatively developing Marxism-Leninism. It has shown what possibilities have opened out and how these can be realised for uniting all patriotic, democratic and socialist elements in every country for advance in every sphere, for new successes, for the cause of the people and the working class.



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