Special Edition!

Elections '84

WHAT NOW?

By AARON ALPERN

As this issue of Progressive Israel goes to press, there are definite indications that the call for a National Unity Government is more than a mere political ploy by the major parties.

At first this seemingly impossible task was seen as a "staying" tactic in coalition checkmating until Israeli President Haim Herzog decided upon whom he would bestow the right to form the new government -- Shimon Peres or Yitzhak Shamir. As such, Mapam publicly gave Peres the green light to begin negotiations, on the private assumption that they would never get under way, certainly not in earnest or with the hope of succeeding.

In recent days, however, the political winds have shifted, and all bets are off. Negotiations between Alignment and Likud leaders are being carried out in earnest -- on the surface, at least -- and there is a cascading public groundswell for national unity.

Even within Mapam voices have been heard — albeit an insignificant, if vocal, minority — arguing in favor of paying heed to popular will and retreating from our vigorous opposition to sitting around the same government table with the likes of Ariel Sharon.

To date, Mapam's leaders remain steadfast. Party elder statesman Ya'akov Hazan recently said that if the Labour Party decides to form a unity government with the Likud, "I will stand at the head of the line demanding dissolution of the Alignment...It is better to be in the opposition with your head held high, than to be in the government on your knees."

And Mapam general-secretary, Victor Shemtov, has referred to national unity on numerous occassions as a "false prophecy" which is doomed to fail because of the unbridgeable chasm between the political and social values of the Alignment and the Likud.

Al HaMishmar decreed in its lead editorial the morning after the election: "If it is the Alignment's fate to remain in opposition for the time being, it should take advantage of this period for the inevitable internal reshuffling and soulsearching...But it is absolutely forbidden to join a coalition with Herut."

Still, such political currents have a synamic of their own. So Mapam may yet meet its "moment of destiny" in the current coalition-building process -- for if the Alignment and the Likud do manage to bridge the gaps between them, then the question of who leads a National Unity Government will depend on whether or not Mapam maintains its resolute opposition to such an eventuality. Time will tell...

World Union of M

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THE KIBBUTZ VOTES ITS MIND

-- This brief interview with "Jumas", secretary of the Kibbutz Artzi Federation, appeared in the July 29 issue of "This Week," the weekly bulletin of the kibbutz movement. In the interview he relates to the vote within the kibbutzim and its implications for the movement.

Jumas: It is significant that within the Kibbutz Artzi some 12 per cent of the members voted for parties outside the Alignment. My analysis is composed of several elements:

This was no doubt a protest vote against the Alignment, against Mapam and against the composition of Mapam's list of candidates (to the Knesset). And kibbutz members protested their inability to blend into the Alignment's propaganda campaign through this vote.

It did not express a rejection of any particular activity of the Alignment or Mapam, but of the general course of the labour movement in recent years.

Considering the pre-election polls and optimism, a situation arose in which it appeared to people that despite the fateful character of the whole campaign, we could afford to take risks in our own backyard. In fact, the assumption was that there was really no danger at all.

An additional component was the issue of collective ideology in the political framework of Kibbutz Artzi. This concept is seen by some members as being of lessening importance, and they were prepared, in this instance, to disregard it in favor of fulfilling their "right" to strengtehn a political position which they perceived as clearer, more forthright and more expressive of their views.

- Q. Can you place this solely within the political/ ideological field, or is it part of an overall challenge to the spirit of collectivism among members of Kibbutz Artzi?
- A. It is, without doubt, a component in a broader story. Without relating this personally to members who voted one way or another, I see this as part of a process which accepts things as they are, or more so of a desire to mold a new reality which allows for maintaining the Kibbutz Artzi Federation at a reduced level of collectivity. On the other hand, such a strong protest component in this vote lends an aspect to the problem which allows a continued struggle for collectivism in Kibbutz Artzi without dwelling on the election results.

One must remember that this voting pattern has already been seen in Kibbutz Artzi, in the 1977 elections. This is a minute difference in percentages and then there was definitely an element of party rejection. I don't mean to suggest that there is no problem here, but the fact that such a protest vote already occurred in the past allows us to view it in relation to what happened in the whole election campaign. We would be making a mistake if we took this out of context. Before the campaign the Kibbutz Artzi was not neutral and we thought that there is significance to the way one votes, butmost of our efforts were in the external struggle to bring down the Likud. We were not concerned with the vote inside the kibbutzim. Now, as well, we must remember this and see things in their proper perspective.

On our agenda today are all the national, ideological and political implications of what happened on July 23, and we should not distort the importance of different issues, their urgency or how we deal with them.

HOW THEY VOTED

Party	Votes	
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ALIGNMENT	19,557	85.2%
RATZ	2,251	9.8%
LOVA ELIAV*	502	2.2%
SHINUI	168	0.7%
OTHERS	(%	2.1%

*Eliav is a former general-secretary of the Labour Party who ran in these elections on an independent list. He was not elected to the Knesset.

... To Our Readers

Because of military obligations, in other words, army reserve duty, and a trip overseas in the fall, this will be the last issue of PROGRESSIVE ISRAEL until November. Until then...the editor...

Alignment and Realignment

By ERIC LEE

Who won the Israeli elections of 1984? Note carefully: I am not asking who gets to form the governing coalition. The two issues are not identical. The Israeli media seemed to give the victory to the Likud, and foreign journalists agreed with them. But is that really the case?

I will make the case that the 1984 elections brought about a minor realignment in Israeli politics. There were changes in all three major voting blocs, right, left and religious. A study of the three blocs will indicate that far from winning, the right lost badly in these elections.

And not only the right. The religious parties allied with the Likud government also took a beating. In fact, every party associated with the governing coalition with the sole exception of Tehiya suffered losses.

Taken in the context of Israeli political history, in the history of recent elections, there is good news on every front.

Let's start with the right itself. The Likud coalition, like its forerunners going back to the 1949 election, had never suffered reverses. It marched from election to election ever confident of gains. In recent years the trend was especially marked in this direction. The 1973 election following the Yom Kippur War brought the Likud to the very brink of power, winning them 39 seats. In 1977, with only 4 new seats added, they had won enough to form the government. In the 1981 elections in which the Alignment won gains of more than 200,000 new votes, the Likud also picked up seats, bringing them up to 48 seats in the Knesset.

Now, forget the optimistic polls for a moment. Forget the pollsters and prophets who spoke of a Likud with only 37 or 38 Knesset seats in 1984. The reality is that for the first time in Israeli political history the Likud vote fell -- and fell by more than 57,000 votes. The Likud wound up with only 41 Knesset seats, fewer than at any time since the 1973 elections.

Add to that the more than 30,000 votes won by Moshe Dayan's Telem party in 1981, votes which disappeared in 1984, and the massive losses of the religious parties, and we can begin to see the scope of the government's defeat.

Not only the Likud, but the right as a whole took a beating. In spite of the addition of 2 more seats (and some 38,000 new votes) to Tehiya, and the election of Rabbi Meir Kahane (with about 25,000 new votes), the overall bloc of rightist seats declined from 51 in 1981 to 47 in 1984.

The religious partners in the Likud's government suffered major losses. Tami lost some 13,000 votes and fell to only 1 Knesset seat. The National Religious Party lost 25,000 votes. The NRP is, in fact, steadily disappearing from the Israeli political map. In 1977 it won twelve seats, or fully 10 per cent of the vote. By 1981 it had fallen to 6 seats. In 1984 its leaders were content, indeed overjoyed, that the party was able to hold on to 4 Knesset seats. The biggest loss for a government coalition partner was that suffered by the non-Zionist Agudat Yisrael party -- which fell to only 2 Knesset seats and lost no less than 37,000 votes.

The religious parties as a whole are suffering a historic crisis. In the 1973 elections they received 15 seats, divided among 2 parties. In 1977, a slight gain to 17 seats, but now there were 3 parties. In 1981 they fell to 13 seats, divided among 3 religious parties. And now, though holding on to the 13 seats, they are divided among no fewer than five religious parties.

The news on the left was, on the whole, good. It is true that the Alignment wanted and expected more votes. The Alignment managed to gain only about 16,000 new votes over 1981, and therefore suffered a loss of 3 Knesset seats (the size of the electorate has grown). But the group of parties which the Alignment heads, which could be called the "peace camp," has been growing steadily.

In 1977, these parties (I include the Alignment, Shinui, Citizens Rights, Communists, Sheli and the Progressives) won 41 seats. By 1981 that had grown to 54 seats. This time, 56 seats. With only four more seats, a Likud-led government would have been impossible.

Within the peace camp, the votes of the parties which are more dovish than the Alignment rose dramatically. Of some 92,500 new votes gained by the peace camp in the 1984 elections, only 10,000 were gained by the Alignment and the Communists. The rest -- fully 82,500 votes, or the equivalent of five Knesset seats -- went to three non-Communist, dovish parties: Citizens Rights, Shinui and the Progressive Peace List. The rise of opposition parties which are more dovish than the Alignment should be sending a loud and clear message to Mapam. Those parties grew from 8 seats in 1977 to 12 in 1984; the non-Communist parties among them growing from 3 seats in 1977 and 1981 to eight seats in 1984.

The shift to the left occurred in three critical areas. In the cities there was a shift toward the Alignment, including a critically important victory in Tel Aviv, for the first time ever. There were

continued on next page -

NO MORE TAIL WAGGING

By RUBIK ROSENTHAL

Once again the kibbutz movement went out to labour on election day, and returned with a sheaf of thorns. "The conception" of the Alignment high priests determined that the kibbutz is not marketable. So, the kibbutznikim were tread upon in the nominating process and afterwards in the election campaign.

The kibbutznikim reacted in three ways:

- --Despite everything, they continued to work and lost themselves in the campaign.
- --They accepted the message of face value, and went to sleep.
- --Or the strongest reaction, they turned to the smaller parties (Citizens Rights and Shinui).

It is high time to say loud and clear to the clic of generals running the Labour Party: A political party which attempts to be nothing more than an efficient governing instrument, and not an influential movement with social value, is doomed to wither on the vine.

The Likud survived despite its awful mistakes because it is the only major movement which offers its many supporters a political home, a sense of belonging and identity. On the left, only the small parties fill this role. The Labour Party does not. It does not fit into "the conception."

Labour operates on the basis of manipulations, it tries to capture the government through political maneuvers, bland propaganda, public-opinion polls, defections by other parties' Knesset members, and, in the end, "the conception." None of this works, it hasn't in the past, and it didn't in the '84 election, which was the labour movement's golden opportunity to return to power. It doesn't work because of "the conception," at the heart of which was the well-planned camouflage of the kibbutzim.

We must tell Mssrs. Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin, Mordechai Gur, Haim Bar-Lev, and, to my dismay, Yossi Sarid, that this will never work. If the kibbutznikim don't work with all their heart, there will not be an election campaign. And if the people seek out the kibbutznikim, rather than lying in wait for them, and they sense that the Alignment is hiding that which characterizes it more than anything else — they won't vote Labour.

On that sad evening at the Palace Hotel in Tel Aviv (Alignment campaign headquarters), Mota Gur praised the kibbutznikim. That was kind, but the timing was not coincidental. Gur withdrew the kibbutz movement from its hiding place when he thought

the time was right. It was only a few hours later that he heard about the thousands of votes which went to the small parties in the kibbutzim. He already knew about the damage which "the conception" had caused to their work in the field -- if he wanted to know.

Perhaps he realized, and others with him, that sooner or later the kibbutz movement will cease to be the Labour Party's mistreated mistress.

(The author is editor of Al HaMishmar's weekend magazine -- Hotam.)

Alignment ~ continued from page 3

also major gains for the Alignment in Haifa and other cities. In the kibbutz movement there were major gains for Citizens Rights; in a few kibbutzim more dovish parties actually polled more votes than the Alignment though the average was a high 12 per cent throughout the movement. Finally, the Arab vote swung left, with some 37,500 votes going from the Alignment and the Communits to the Progressive Peace List.

To sum up, Israeli politics has realigned once more. That realignment, though partially at the expense of the traditional dominant party (Labor) is, on the whole, positive from the point of view of the left and peace movements. The right suffered major losses not compensated for by the gains by the extremists of Kahane or Tehiya. The religious parties are more divided than ever before, sharing a tenth of the electorate among five separate factions. The National Religious Party, formerly the dominant force in the religious bloc, holds less than a third of the religious votes. Finally, the left and particularly the bloc of dovish parties outside of the Alignment -- Communists, Progressives, Citizens Rights and Shinui -- showed gains in all sectors.

Who won the Israeli elections of 1984? History will decide that for us. If the largest and most powerful faction to the left of the Labour Party, Mapam, learns the lessons of the 1984 elections and applies those lessons, this vote will have been but a prelude for sweeping changes in the Israeli political scene.

(The author is a member of Kibbutz Ein Dor and edits the democratic socialist quarterly, The New International Review.)

A Social Diagnos

By Dr. AVRAHAM ROZENKIER

The percentage of voters in Israeli elections is among the highest in the deocratic world. And there was a high percentage in this election also --78 per cent of registered voters. Israeli society is finely attuned to the cataclysmic shifts in the political mood, and conspicuous in this election was political polarization -- 15 factions will be represented in the 11th Knesset.

The votes which drifted from the major blocs to the fringes of the political map gave great bargaining power to the small parties—Yahad (Weizman), Tami, Ometz and the religious parties. The Alignment won 724,000 votes in 1984, as compared to 708,00 in 1981. While the Likud fell from 718,000 votes in 1981 to 662,000 in 1984—a loss of nearly 8 per cent in voter appeal. The Alignment won 44 Knesset seats and 34.9 per cent of the popular vote, and the Likud won 41 seats and 31.9 per cent.

It seems, than, that the Alignment's campaign strategy, which blurred over its stances and prevented sharpening the differences between Labour and the Likud, didn't challenge the Likud's hardcore and didn't set in motion a drift to the Alignment (despite the extreme optimism of the polltakers). Moreover, votes shifted to Ratz and Shinui. In a word, many voters disenchanted with the Likud didn't find their way to Labour, while many Labour supporters abandoned ship.

This is the price which the Alignment paid for three years of shallow opposition and a propaganda campaign which has been characterized as "ideological and political disarmament" by Victor Shemtov, Mapam general-secretary.

No third force arose to exploit the barren ground between the two major camps, which simply eroded. And the Alignment learned that you cannot rely on the force of gravity to attract voters -- without on-going political work or resolute struggle, the Labour Party's historic decline will continue

True, the wave which the Likud rode to power in 1977 finally broke, but on the other hand it firmed its grasp on a large segment of the public, despite the Lebanon War, 400% inflation and Menachem Begin's self-imposed political exile. No doubt, the Likud has a secure social base and a faithful public because for years it succeeded in imparting a sense of belonging and identity.

RULE OF THE SMALL PARTIES

Neither major party received a mandate to form a government to its own liking—on the contrary, whoever forms a government will have to pay dearly to its many junior partners. Despite the fact that the Alignment became the largest Knesset faction, the political stalemate resulting from the election is liable to discredit the democratic system and intensify the desire for a "strong man."

In any event, a national unity government is a false magic which can only prolong the political deadlock. Those who expect to obtain legitimacy by virtue of their connection with the Likud only bear witness to the disintegration process at work within the Labour Party, which seeks power to justify its existence rather than as a goal. It is incumbent upon Mapam — in the event of a national unity government — to leave the Alignment and become a battling opposition which draws to it the dovish and socialist forces.

THE ETHNIC FACTOR WEAKENED BUT DIDN'T DISAPPEAR

Thirty-ome Jews of Oriental origin will serve in the 11th Knesset (see Table), 82 of Ashkenazy origin and 7 Arabs. Most of the Sephardim in the Knesset are from the two major parties. Also, Separdi representation has constantly risen -- 22 Sephardi members in the 9th Knesset and 27 in the 10th Knesset.

	Ashkenazy	Sephardi	Arabs
ALIGNMENT	32	10	2
LIKUD	30	10	1
NAT'L RELIGIOUS	2	2	
SEPHARDI TORAH		1	
GUARDIANS (SHASS))	4	
TAMI		1	
TEHIYA	4	1 0	
YAHAD (WEIZMAN)	. 1	2	
COMMUNISTS	1	1 1	2
PROGRESSIVES	1		1
SHINUI	2		1

Despite these statistics the Alignment has not rid itself of the "Ashkenazy establishment" stigma which has haunted it since 1977. The general impression

Diagnosis - continued

is that the Likud offers a better deal to the Sephardim. And, in fact, the socio-economic profile of voters for both major parties has not changed since 1981. Alignment voters remain more educated, at higher income levels, older and primarily Ashkenazy. The picture for Likud voters is the opposite, they tend to be educated only to the high school level, at lower income levels, younger and of Oriental origin.

More than 70 per cent of Alignment voters were of European origin, while about 60 per cent of Likud voters were Oriental Jews (compared to 70 per cent in 1981). Forty per cent of the registered voters are native-born Israelis -- 60 per cent of the Sabras from European background voted for the Alignment, while 60 per cent of the Sabras from Sephardi origins gave their vote to the Likud.

The ethnic polarization, which reached its peak in 1981, weakened somewhat but the social <u>status</u> factor remained. While two-thirds of Sabras from Oriental families, who only have a high school education, voted Likud in 1984, support for the Likud among Oriental Sabras with a university education fell to one-third!

The relationship between ethnic identity and voting patterns was particularly noticeable in 1981 in the development towns, which are primarily populated by Sephardim. Alignment support there was 29.5 per cent, whereas 49 per cent of the residents voted Likud. In the current campaign this trend continued, even if there was a slight increase in the Alignment vote.

It is evident, therefore, that in this campaign the Alignment reached its natural electoral potential among Ashkenazy voters, but needs to expand its appeal to the Sephardim if it ever wants to obtain an electoral majority.

THE YOUNG LEAN TO THE RIGHT

Young people voting for the first time in their lives divided their vote almost evenly between the major parties -- 39 per cent to the Likud and 36 per cent to the Alignment. However, 9 per cent voted Tehiya--which received 4 per cent of the overall vote and won 5 Knesset seats as compared to 3 seats in 1981. Therefore, the right-wing continues to be more attractive to the Jewish youth. This should not be surprising. A new generation has come of age in "the Greater Israel," and under a Likud government, its settlement policies and national chauvinism. For this generation, governing a foreign people has become matter-of-fact.

No wonder, then, that young, poorly educated Israelis are prone to embrace extreme nationalism. Only a prolonged educational/ideological effort will enable the Labour movement to approach the youth. Lacking this, expected demographic developments -- more Sephardi youth -- will be a stumbling block to the Alignment's return to power.

Evidence to this affect can be seen in the soldiers'

vote, where Meir Kahane's "Kach" -- the racist demon which sprang from the well of this election -- received 2.5 per cent of the vote (as compared to 1.2 per cent of the overall vote.) Among soldiers serving in Lebanon Kahane's vote rises to 5 per cent. Moreover, 50 per cent of the soldiers supported right-wing parties, while only 40 per cent voted Alignment, Citizens Rights or Shinui. These right-wing tendencies among the youth are a clarion call to the Alignment demanding a re-evaluation of purposes and suggesting the pumping of financial and human resources into education, youth study groups, etc.

We have now come to realize that in certain circumstances fanaticism does not frighten or deter, particularly in our present situation with fundamentalist, religious fanatics striving to "liberate" all of the land of Israel. This mission can serve as a focal point for those who adore power and charismatic leadership.

SURPRISE IN THE ARAB SECTOR

The Progressive Peace List, headed by Arab lawyer Muhammad Miari and Mati Peled (formerly of Sheli), made an impressive first showing in the Arab sector, garnering 18 per cent of the vote and winning two Knesset seats. This occurred because:

- a) The Arab voting percentage rose from 68 per cent in 1981 to 76 per cent in 1984 -- in essence, meaning greater participation by the Arabs in the political process.
- b) Some 20,000 votes which went in 1981 to two independent Arab lists affiliated with the Alignment transformed the Progressive List into the third strongest force in the Arab sector in 1984 -- after the Communists and the Alignment. This, of course, was at the expense of the Alignment's electoral potential in the Arab sector.

This is perhaps only a "half" failure for the Alignment, which increased its electoral strength among Arabs by only 6-7,000 votes, rather than the anticipated 30,000; and actually fell in its percentage of the Arab vote from 27 to 23 per cent. The bitter truth is that the failure is much greater when the votes of the independent lists from 1981 are added to the equation -- the Alignment's decline among Arab voters now reaches 17 per cent from 1981 to 1984.

Israeli Arabs gave a clear signal to the Alignment that they will no longer blindly vote Labour so long as the Alignment continues to drift to the right in search of the "undecided vote."

And for the first time in the history of the State, the Arab vote for the Zionist parties was a minority
-- 52 per cent of the Arabs voted for the Communists and the Progressive Peace List. It seems, that a solution to the Palestinian problem and the overall Middle East conflict has become their top priority.

KAHANE: NAT'L DISGRACE

The problem is not merely Meir Kahane, the main problem is the reaction to Kahane and Kahanism. From within the entire Likud bloc only a lone voice is heard against Kahane — the coarse voice of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, who discounts the possibility of including Kahane in any governing coalition. But where is Yitzhak Shamir? Where are such Likud luminaries as Yigal Cohen-Orgad, Yoram Aridor or Roni Milo? Why are they silent? The silence of the moderate right paved the way for the victory of Nazism. The silence of "the national camp" today grants legitimacy to Kahane.

Kahane and his thugs run amok in Jerusalem and no one staunds up to them. His "brigades" number a few hundred, and there should be no problem stopping them by force -- brute force. Today, Kahane is still not a Knesset member, so there is no immunity on his violent and vicious acts. He seeks to provoke, but his provocations can be a boomerang if armed and vigorous "defenders of democracy" stand up against him. There must not be a public mood which allows Kahane to demonstrate without fear, without immediate reaction and without defense of every place to which he turns. He must fear, just as the neo-Nazis are afraid in Germany or the U.S.

Contrary to the silence from the Likud and the withering of democracy, Kahane receives wide coverage in the news media. This coverage only encourages him, and causes inconsequential persons in our society to seek him out. The editors committee must decide that his words, deeds and countenance will not be reported in the media, that there will be total media blackout of Meir Kahane until he is put where he belongs -- in a courtroom.

"Not a single word on Kahane" is the way a free press can defend against the threat of fascism, which also threatens the principles of liberty. Firebreathing editorials will not help, a boycott will. Kahane's "news value" will be damaged, but this "so-called" damage pales in comparison to the damage caused by all the attention heaped upon him. Such a decision must be common to all, and must be strictly enforced.

The destructiveness of Kahanism demands total cooperation. All the democratic parties must commit themselves to immediate passage of a law against racism, which removes Kahane from the Knesset and guarantees that racism has no immunity. The defense minister must declare Kahane's movement illegal --

an early declaration to this effect will block Kahane's entering the Knesset, for he will immediately be arrested for criminal activity. National unity for this purpose is of the highest moral order, especially considering the soldiers' vote, which gave Kahane shocking support.

Democratic Zionism must use all the means at its disposal, which are numerous, to suppress Kahanism at its infancy. Otherwise, it will rear its head, and tomorrow may be too late.

(Al HaMishmar editorial -- July 27,1984)

OTHERS REACT

MAPAM

"We will see to it that the 11th Knesset will expeditiously pass the Law Against Racism proposed by MK Muhammad Watad (in the previous Knesset), and we will constantly demand the lifting of (Knesset) immunity for this racist, nationalist (Kahane), after every one of his illegal acts."

-- Victor Shemtov, Mapam general-secretary

KIBBUTZ ARTZI

"We have learned from the experience of developments in the West Bank which led to a tearing down of all limitations to law and order. The activities of the (Jewish) underground, the disaster which could have occurred had it not been aborted at birth, compells a responsible position, both aggressive and forthright, against the phenomenon of the racist incitement and chauvinism of the Rabbi Kahane type."

-- secretariat, Kibbutz Artzi Federation

FINAL RESULTS

Party	Votes	%	Seats
ALIGNMENT	724,074	34.9%	44
LIKUD	661,302	31.9%	41
TEHIYA	83,037	4.0%	5
MAFDAL (National Religion	73,530 us Party)	3.5%	4
COMMUNISTS	69,815	3.3%	4
SHASS (Sephardi Torah G	63,605 uardians)	3.1%	4
SHINUI	54,747	2.6%	3
RATZ (Citizens' Rights	49,698 Movement)	2.4%	3
YAHAD (Ezer Weizman)	46,302	2.2%	3
PROGRESSIVE LIST FOR PEACE	38,012	1.8%	2
AGUDAT-ISRAEL	36,079	1.7%	2
MORASHA	33,287	1.6%	2
TAMI	31,103	1.5%	1
KACH (Meir Kahane)	25,907	1.2%	- 1
OMETZ	23,845	1.2%	1

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How It Will Look



MAPAM:

Not With The Likud

- 1. MAPAM is convinced that the State of Israel urgently needs a stable and united government which can lead the nation and its people towards a solution of the severe problems which seven years of Likud rule have created.
- 2. MAPAM calls for the formation of a broadbased government headed by the Alignment, on the basis of the Alignment's social, economic, political and security principles as set forth in the platform for the 11th Knesset elections. MAPAM calls on the Alignment's candidate for prime minister--Shimon Peres--to open negotiations toward the formation of such a government.
- 3. It is MAPAM's opinion that it will be impossible to fulfill these terms in a government which includes the Likud, and therefore, MAPAM will not take part in negotiations to that end.