

UNIVERSITY OF BEOGRAD
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY CENTRE
FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES

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CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE INTERNATIONAL
DES SCIENCES SOCIALES

**SOCIALISM
IN YUGOSLAV THEORY AND
PRACTICE**

**LE SOCIALISME
DANS LA THEORIE ET LA PRATIQUE
YUGOSLAVES**

— COLLECTION OF CONFERENCES —

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INTRODUCTION

C'est le deuxième livre que le Centre universitaire international des sciences sociales de l'Université de Belgrade fait paraître à l'intention de l'opinion scientifique et autre de l'étranger. A la différence du premier livre, qui représente une sélection des conférences tenues au cours des dix premières sessions du Centre, le livre que vous avez sous vos yeux comprend toutes les conférences données au cours de la session d'automne, organisée par le Centre en septembre 1969. Le Centre a l'intention de rédiger désormais un recueil des conférences présentées au cours d'une seule session, afin de les rendre accessibles à un plus large cercle de lecteurs intéressés et non pas seulement aux participants aux sessions du Centre. Le Centre universitaire international s'efforcera de faire paraître ce recueil aussitôt après chaque session. Ceci est justifié notamment par ce que les thèmes et les conférenciers se succèdent dans le cadre du thème général du Séminaire — **LE SOCIALISME DANS LA THEORIE ET LA PRATIQUE YUGOSLAVES**. De cette façon, les sessions traitent toujours des questions et problèmes les plus actuels dans le système yougoslave et dans la théorie et la pratique de l'édification de la société socialiste en Yougoslavie. Cette procédure permet aussi de prendre connaissance des diverses façons d'approcher ces thèmes d'actualité. Il ne fait pas de doute, ayant en vue tout ce qui précède, que le présent ouvrage servira utilement à tous ceux qui désirent connaître de plus près et de façon compétente les problèmes de la théorie et de la pratique yougoslaves dans l'édification du socialisme.

Ce deuxième livre contient quinze conférences, tenues au cours de la XI^e session du Centre, en septembre 1969. A côté de la conférence d'introduction (*La Yougoslavie: Vers un Socialisme autogéré* — Jovan Đorđević), il y a eu trois conférences du domaine des sciences économiques (*Relationship between Self-Management and Management in the Enterprise* — Dušan Bilandžić; *Development of the Economy and the System of Workers Self-Management in Yugoslavia* — Branislav Šoškic; *The Yugoslav Economy and the International Division of Labour* — Ljubiša Adamović)*, sept conférences du domaine des sciences politiques et du droit (*La question nationale et les rapports entre les nationalités en Yougoslavie* — Dragoslav Jovanović; *La politique de non-alignement et la Yougoslavie* — Milan Šahović; *La propriété sociale et le travail en tant que source des droits de propriété* — Živomir Đorđević; *The Legal Position of Enterprises and Institutional Changes in its Structure* — Nikola Balog; *L'autogestion des entreprises en Yougoslavie* — Vladimir Jovanović; *Yugoslav Social Structure and the*

Formation of Public Opinion — Radomir Lukić; Socialism and Modernization of Politics — Najdan Pašić), ainsi que quatre conférences du domaine de la sociologie et de la philosophie (Humanism and Self-Management in our Time — Veljko Korać; The Charaterological Path of Socialist Revolution — Svetozar Stojanović; Socialism and Culture — Miladin Životić; Social Conditions and Social Conflicts in Socialism — Mihailo Popović).

Ce Séminaire, comme vous le saviez peut-être, est organisé chaque automne par le Centre des sciences sociales de l'Université de Belgrade à l'intention de jeunes chercheurs universitaires et autres travailleurs scientifiques, ainsi qu'à l'intention de tous ceux qui s'intéressent aux problèmes du socialisme dans le contexte de la théorie et de la pratique yougoslaves. Le programme présenté dans le cadre de ce thème général a pour but d'informer les auditeurs du système socio-économique et politique de la Yougoslavie, de la pensée scientifique yougoslave dans le domaine des sciences sociales, ainsi que de permettre aux auditeurs de s'informer sur place de la pratique du développement de la société socialiste yougoslave. Outre les conférences et les discussions, données et animées par d'éminents professeurs d'université et de représentants de la vie scientifique, le Centre organise également des panel-discussions, consacrées aux problèmes de l'heure, ainsi que des visites dans les organisations économiques et autres institutions (organes d'Etat, facultés, instituts scientifiques, etc.), qui donnent lieu à des réunions et des conversations avec les représentants des organes de l'autogestion et d'autres travailleurs et experts.

Belgrade, juillet 1971

*Le Président du Conseil du Centre,
Prof. Dr BRANISLAV ŠOŠKIC*

*Le Directeur du Centre,
Prof. Dr PAVLE NIKOLIC*

* La conférence du Prof. Ivan Maksimović (Yugoslav Workers' Self-management) a été publiée entre-temps aux Pays-Bas dans le livre — Yugoslav Workers' Self-management, D. Reidel Publishing Company.

CONFERENCES

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Dr. Jovan ĐORĐEVIĆ
Professeur à la Faculté de Droit à Beograd

LA YUGOSLAVIE: VERS UN SOCIALISME AUTOGERE

I

1. Chaque système politique des pays socialistes se fonde sur une conception de socialisme. Cette conception est élaborée par les constitutions et les documents ou écrits politiques, en particulier par le Programme du parti régnant. Elle est aussi, plus ou moins fidèlement, mise en pratique.

Le socialisme domine la science sociale et la pensée politique depuis plus d'un siècle, depuis les révolutions de 1848. D'autre part, il est devenu, il y a un demi-siècle, la déterminante de l'histoire, un des facteurs essentiels pour tout le monde.

Le socialisme est conçu et défini de diverses manières. On part souvent de critères purement formels et techniques; le socialisme est alors entendu comme un collectivisme dans la production, plus l'économie planifiée. Parfois on donne la priorité aux formes purement politiques affirmant que le socialisme est un système fondé sur la propriété d'Etat et l'administration de l'économie par l'Etat, lui-même dirigé par le Parti, avant-garde de la classe ouvrière. C'est cette conception qui détermine l'édifice du socialisme dans presque tous les pays socialistes, non seulement de ceux liés au bloc soviétique, mais aussi bien en Chine. On connaît tout autant les systèmes doctrinaux qui voient ou cherchent dans le socialisme la réalisation de la justice sociale, de la liberté, de la démocratie, de l'égalité; ou la consécration de nouvelles valeurs éthiques, d'une morale humaine nouvelle.

Pour la science marxiste, le socialisme est un système social historique déterminé; il est dans sens un système de rapports entre les hommes, qui repose sur leurs nouvelles relations dans la production et la répartition du revenu, dans un régime où le travail social et individuel se libère. Plus que cela, il est un changement radical de la vie des hommes, la structure nouvelle de la vie sociale et individuelle des hommes. Gorki avait dit, il y a déjà 50 ans, que la signification historique de Lénine se trouve dans le fait qu'il sut, comme personne auparavant, empêcher les gens de continuer à vivre de la manière habituelle. Cela est une définition simple mais profonde du socialisme.

Partant de cette conception, c'est le statut de l'homme dans les rapports fondamentaux de la société qui sert à définir le socialisme. En Yougoslavie, la Constitution de 1963 statue que le système socialiste «a pour base les rapports entre les hommes, producteurs et créateurs libres et égaux, dont le travail sert exclusivement à la satisfaction des besoins individuels et communs». L'essence du socialisme réside dans la condition et le rôle de l'homme au travail; dans les conditions du travail libéré, ce dernier devient, dans son sens le plus large, l'ensemble des activités sociales où l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme a été abolie. Ce socialisme partant de l'homme est le fruit du travail et de la participation de celui-ci à la satisfaction de tous les besoins sociaux, non par un simple retour de l'aliénation humaine, mais dans une conquête permanente de cette «aliénation» par le travail et l'activité commune d'hommes qui, s'appartenant de plus en plus, sont, de ce fait même, libres.

Le socialisme doit émaner de la nouvelle condition économique du travailleur, de sa nouvelle condition «inviolable», dont les prémisses doivent être non seulement matérielles, mais aussi sociales, politiques et morales, mais avant tout:

(1) la propriété sociale des moyens de production;

(2) la libération du travail conçue non seulement comme acte de libération sociale et politique de la classe ouvrière, mais aussi comme un long processus de dépassement des inégalités socio-économiques, connues ou à venir et historiquement conditionnées, et de la dépendance des hommes dans le travail;

(3) le droit de l'homme à jouir des fruits de son travail et du progrès matériel de la communauté sociale suivant le principe socialiste: «De chacun selon ses capacités, à chacun selon son travail»;

(4) l'autogestion des travailleurs au sein de l'organisation de travail, des associations et des communautés sociopolitiques; et la planification comme un acte de rationalisation et de projection et non pas une loi suprême de la gestion et du savoir étatique.

2. Cette condition de l'homme règle aussi ses rapports avec le «système». Il ne se situe pas hors du système auquel il s'opposerait pour réaliser sa liberté économique et personnelle, comme le recommandaient la théorie économique et la philosophie politique libérales. Mais l'homme n'est pas non plus «sous» le système; il n'est pas une création du système ou de l'État, comme le prévoient ou le réalisent directement ou indirectement (dans l'intérêt des groupes de domination) toutes les formes de primitivisme, d'étatisme, de bureaucratisme et de technocratisme, passées ou actuelles. L'homme est «dans» le système, parce que celui-ci est son «expression générale», sa création dans laquelle il se réalise et se «reproduit» en même temps. La Constitution qui procède de cette conception du socialisme dispose qu'en Yougoslavie «le système social et politique dérive de cette condition de l'homme; il est au service de celui-ci et de l'accroissement de son rôle dans la société». Cette forme (ce degré) de socialisme, qui apparaît réellement non comme le socialisme en devenir, mais comme le socialisme en acte, n'est aujourd'hui assurée nulle part, sans «dangers» et sans «déformations» possibles. Ces déformations revêtent plusieurs formes apparemment différentes, mais identiques dans leur essence. Il est évi-

dent que toute forme de gestion de la production et de la répartition du revenu fondée sur l'arbitraire bureaucratique et les privilèges attachés à la position monopolistique de certains groupes des gestionnaires, de même que toute forme de production et de répartition du revenu qui laisse le champ libre à l'égoïsme du propriétaire privé et au particularisme, sont opposées et contraires à la condition inviolable de l'homme et même au système social, économique et politique qui est à son service.

3. La propriété sociale n'est pas seulement une forme de propriété qui, fruit de toute une évolution, apparaîtrait à côté de formes historiques et contemporaines de la propriété, telles que la propriété privée et du caractère des rapports économiques dominants. La propriété La propriété privée elle-même diffère selon les formations économiques de classe (celle de la société esclavagiste ne ressemble pas à celle des féodaux, et moins encore à celle du capitalisme). En outre, elle dépend du stade de développement de la société, des techniques de production et du caractère des rapports économiques dominants. La propriété privée de l'artisan qui travaille avec ses propres moyens de production et la propriété privée du capital ne sont pas identiques, ni par leur fonction économique, ni par leur nature sociale et juridique. La propriété privée dans le capitalisme comporte un système développé d'interventionnisme, c'est-à-dire d'ingérence de l'Etat dans les rapports économiques et les rapports de propriété privée. Ces divergences ont également été mises en relief par certains historiens avant et après Marx. Elles n'ont pas échappé non plus à certains civilistes (Demogue, Ripert, Carbonnier en France).

Mais toutes ces formes ont le même substrat sociologique, constitué par les rapports de domination et d'exploitation; ils sont la conséquence de la division sociale du travail entre ceux qui dirigent et ceux qui exécutent, d'une division fondée sur la puissance sociale qui devient, en règle générale, un droit de disposer du travail et du produit du labeur des autres, qui deviennent ainsi une main d'oeuvre libre, mais non libérée. C'est ainsi qu'il faut comprendre la célèbre affirmation selon laquelle la forme première de la propriété, est le pouvoir du père de famille sur sa femme et ses enfants. Dans son sens général, la propriété a toujours été une appropriation du travail de l'homme sous ses divers aspects; elle est donc la possession et le statut des conditions et des moyens de travail. L'expression «propriété sociale» s'appuie sur cette notion générale. Elle n'est plus le terme de l'évolution de la propriété a toujours été une appropriation du travail de l'homme sous ses au contraire, une notion évolutive engagée dans un processus permanent à la fois des points de vue structurel et historique. Par ailleurs, elle est la conséquence de l'évolution économique, sociale et politique et des changements qu'exigent la socialisation plus directe des moyens de production, les conditions vitales du développement de la société et la satisfaction des besoins matériels et moraux des hommes. Tout cela implique objectivement le dépassement des rapports de domination et d'exploitation, et la prise de conscience de cette nécessité gagne de plus en plus les travailleurs.

Il existe, par conséquent, des différences conceptuelles et essentielles entre la propriété sociale et toutes les autres formes de propriété.

Alors que ces dernières traduisent la contradiction entre possédants et non-possédants, entre ceux qui disposent de moyens de production et ceux qui n'en ont pas et qui sont obligés, en travaillant, de vendre leur force de travail et d'aliéner ainsi leur personnalité, la propriété sociale tranche cette contradiction, et ceux qui travaillent avec les moyens sociaux de production les possèdent et en usent à la fois comme moyens du travail personnel et du travail associé, et comme moyens de réaliser leur personnalité humaine. La propriété sociale est l'expression d'un rapport solidaire et unique dans la production et la répartition du revenu. Elle reflète la nouvelle forme historique des rapports de production.

La propriété sociale traduit la nouvelle fonction des moyens de production, qui cessent d'être une source et un moyen d'exploitation et d'aliénation des capacités de travail et de la personnalité du travailleur. Les moyens de production ne sont plus un pouvoir, ni la source ni l'essence du pouvoir politique et de constitution. La propriété sociale est certes aussi la base du système politique, mais d'un système qui se fonde désormais sur l'autogestion sociale. C'est pourquoi elle est le fondement et la garantie de l'autogestion, la condition et la base, non seulement de la désétatisation économique et sociale, mais aussi du nouveau système socio-politique, dans lequel le pouvoir et l'étatisme se scindent et se réduisent tout en se socialisant sous forme de démocratie socialiste.

Ce qui caractérise essentiellement la propriété sociale des moyens de production, c'est qu'elle n'est plus un droit de propriété et qu'elle nie en soi les droits particuliers de propriété. La signification de l'abolition de l'exploitation et, en outre, l'essence du socialisme ne résident pas — comme Marx l'a du reste souligné — dans la suppression de la propriété, mais dans la négation de la propriété de classe, des droits de certains sujets particuliers ou collectifs (propriété privée, publique, collective ou d'Etat) susceptibles de créer les conditions de l'exploitation. L'abolition de la propriété de classe est inévitable avec cette socialisation des moyens de production impliquant que le droit de propriété appartient à tous et à personne. Mais l'essence historiquement nouvelle de la propriété sociale n'est pas dans l'instauration, au profit de la société et encore moins de l'Etat, d'une « nouvelle propriété » en tant que catégorie juridique abstraite (derrière laquelle se dissimule toujours un monopole du pouvoir de disposer et de gouverner), mais à créer une propriété sociale qui est en même temps individuelle ou, plus exactement, la condition primordiale du travail collectif et du travail personnel libre et, par suite, de l'appropriation du produit du travail par les ouvriers.

D'un point de vue négatif, elle est l'expression la plus poussée du principe de dépassement du « capitalisme d'Etat » contenu dans la propriété sociale des moyens de production qui demeure une catégorie contradictoire (entre les intérêts généraux et communs, la production et la consommation) au stade du passage du capitalisme au socialisme. Elle est, à ce jour, la négation la plus radicale du fondement socio-économique du monopole économique et politique, même dans les cas où les moyens de production sont étatisés ou relativement socialisés.

La propriété sociale est une « propriété individuelle » dans la mesure où elle « rend » aux travailleurs la mainmise socio-économique sur les moyens et les conditions de travail, dont ils étaient autrefois dépossédés.

Elle n'est plus un droit, parce qu'elle libère le travail et ne s'oppose plus au travailleur qui ne peut agir sur la gestion et la répartition du revenu. Elle dépasse ainsi la contradiction inhérente à tout droit de propriété sur les moyens de production. Loin de conférer un monopole à qui que ce soit et de priver les autres de la propriété, elle suppose un droit d'appropriation identique pour tous les producteurs, pour tous les travailleurs. N'appartenant à personne en exclusivité, la propriété est le droit de tous. Cette propriété est individuelle parce que commune, et commune parce qu'individuelle. C'est une propriété qui n'enlève pas à l'homme les moyens de production et les résultats du travail. Elle est au contraire la base et la condition du retour à l'homme non seulement des moyens de production aliénés, mais aussi de sa puissance, des produits de son travail et de la gestion de la production, de la répartition du revenu et de la satisfaction des autres besoins sociaux.

La propriété sociale n'est pas une catégorie statique et achevée du type de la propriété de la société capitaliste, car — elle n'est plus un droit de propriété. Dans le socialisme, la propriété sociale est, au sens économique, sociologique et juridique, un processus de transformation. Elle devient d'autant plus sociale qu'elle s'individualise, et d'autant moins propriété qu'elle devient un rapport entre l'homme et la nature qu'il domine et une condition de travail acquise ou dont il prend possession au sens exact du terme. Dans la société yougoslave, la propriété sociale a subi une évolution dont les phases sont: la propriété d'Etat soumise au contrôle de l'Etat, expression politique du pouvoir de la classe ouvrière (1945—1950); l'autogestion ouvrière dans les entreprises économiques d'Etat, c'est-à-dire dans le cadre de lois essentiellement «administratives» et de la planification d'Etat (cette période va depuis la promulgation de la loi sur la gestion des entreprises économiques d'Etat jusqu'en 1952 ou plus exactement jusqu'à la promulgation de la loi constitutionnelle de 1953); l'autogestion ouvrière sans participation vraiment effective des travailleurs à la répartition du revenu, où existaient encore de nombreux éléments du salariat (cette période a duré approximativement jusqu'en 1956-57); l'autogestion portant sur la production et la répartition d'une certaine fraction de la valeur du produit social réalisé dans le cadre de l'entreprise (depuis 1957 jusqu'à la promulgation de la constitution de 1963).

La constitution consacre et assure une nouvelle phase de ce processus de réalisation de la propriété sociale, en particulier par le nouveau régime de répartition du produit du travail social et, plus spécialement encore, par le nouveau régime constitutionnel de reproduction sociale. Moyens collectifs de la société, les moyens de la reproduction sociale deviennent propriété sociale selon la constitution, dans la mesure où ils sont utilisés conformément au principe de la répartition du revenu selon le travail fourni et dans le cadre de l'autogestion sociale, et non plus sous forme de fonds centralisés et autonomes qui demeurent, en dernière analyse, étatisés. Le système constitutionnel de répartition du produit social marque une phase nouvelle du dépassement de la propriété d'Etat dans la structure de la propriété sociale des moyens de production et, en conséquence, une phase également nouvelle du processus de réalisation dialectique de la propriété sociale et de la nature socialiste des rapports socio-économiques en général.

4. Compte tenu de tout cela, on ne saurait trop souligner l'importance du contenu matériel de la propriété sociale ou du volume des moyens de production socialisés.

Elle englobe:

a) tous les moyens de production (à l'exception des terres et outils servant à la production artisanale, qui sont déterminés par la constitution et qui sont ou peuvent être propriété privée des agriculteurs ou artisans);

b) tous les moyens de production servant au travail social (c'est-à-dire au travail associé ou à l'activité des organismes de travail ou autres organisations);

c) toutes les richesses minières et autres ressources naturelles.

Par moyens de production on entend aussi, évidemment, tous les moyens de transport et de communication, y compris les moyens de ce que l'on appelle les communications de masse. Par là on entend les cours d'eau, canaux, routes, etc.

5. A côté de la propriété sociale, qui est la base et le contenu essentiel de la structure de la propriété en Yougoslavie, la constitution consacre l'existence et assure la protection des rapports juridiques nés de la propriété ou de certains droits attachés à la propriété. Ce n'est pas seulement le caractère, mais encore l'aspect de ces rapports juridiques de propriété qui déterminent le système socio-économique; ils révèlent certaines de ses contradictions internes, la conformité de son développement aux conditions matérielles, sociales et culturelles de la société socialiste yougoslave. La constitution fixe deux formes principales pour les rapports juridiques de la propriété et deux catégories dans le droit de propriété des citoyens.

Bien qu'il y ait une certaine ressemblance étymologique entre les expressions: droit »individuel« et droit »privé« de propriété, ces formes ne sont pas identiques. Lorsqu'il concerne la propriété, le terme »privé« exprime une qualité socio-économique historique liée à cette propriété. Dans ce sens, la propriété privée est l'antithèse historique et logique de la propriété sociale et, sous certains aspects, elle diffère de la propriété d'Etat, de la propriété collective ou de la propriété publique. L'essence de la notion de »propriété privée« réside dans l'antithèse par rapport à la propriété publique ou sociale. Cette antithèse n'existe pas entre la propriété sociale et la propriété individuelle, car, en dernière analyse, elles constituent une entité dialectique déterminée. En effet, la propriété sociale qui dépérit en tant que propriété et devient sociale dans le vrai sens du terme, est à la fois commune et individuelle. La propriété individuelle est logiquement et pratiquement, avant, tout, une qualité de la personnalité, de sa réalisation ou de son affirmation dans la mesure où cela se situe dans le domaine des intérêts et besoins individuels de l'homme, c'est-à-dire dans la mesure où toute possibilité d'enrichissement socialement illégitime et surtout toute possibilité d'exploitation du travail d'autrui sont exclues. La propriété privée est une survivance de la société de classe et du sous-développement social et économique. Quant à la propriété individuelle, elle est une institution de la société qui abolit les structures de classe, les sources d'exploitation, d'inégalité et de subordination des hommes. Dans ce sens, la propriété privée est une catégorie »historique«, tandis que la propriété individuelle est un phéno-

mène du développement actuel ou futur du socialisme. La propriété privée comporte des responsabilités toujours latentes d'exploitation et d'aliénation et des tendances susceptibles — comme le soulignait Lénine — d'engendrer même le capitalisme.

Cette différence de fonction socio-économique entre la propriété privée et la propriété individuelle trouve également son expression dans le statut et les caractéristiques juridiques de ces deux formes de propriété. Dans le système socio-économique yougoslave, la propriété privée est, par son objet, limitée. Condition de l'expression et de la satisfaction des besoins personnels, la propriété individuelle est en revanche illimitée. Toutefois, il n'est pas exclu que la propriété individuelle soit limitée, à titre provisoire ou définitif, surtout en ce qui concerne certains biens qui peuvent donner lieu à l'exploitation d'autrui. C'est le cas, par exemple, selon la nouvelle constitution, du droit de propriété individuelle sur les immeubles d'habitation et les logements. La propriété privée est un rapport juridico-économique, tandis que la propriété individuelle est un rapport juridique de propriété sur les choses. La propriété privée est un rapport social qui se situe dans le domaine de la production, alors que la propriété individuelle se situe dans celui de la consommation. La restriction de la propriété privée entraîne une limitation dans l'exercice de certains autres droits du propriétaire. Quant à elle, la propriété individuelle offre en principe des possibilités illimitées en matière d'acquisition et d'usage. Les formes de la propriété n'ont pas le même statut constitutionnel, parce qu'il existe entre elles, dans la structure du système socio-économique yougoslave, des différences importantes, voire même capitales. Il convient de souligner tout particulièrement, dans ces ordres d'idées, la différence entre la propriété privée dans l'agriculture et la propriété privée dans l'artisanat.

C'est dans l'agriculture que l'on trouve le rapport juridique de propriété fondamental et principal. Elle est encore une des principales activités productives. En effet, près de la moitié de la population yougoslave y est engagée et y travaille à satisfaire ses besoins. Grâce à l'industrialisation et aux autres changements sociaux et économiques, ce nombre est cependant bien moins élevé qu'avant la guerre. Dans l'ancienne Yougoslavie, environ 75% (et peut-être même plus) de la population travaillaient dans l'agriculture ou en vivaient. Bien que la majorité des Yougoslaves soit occupée désormais dans l'industrie, les secteurs tertiaires et les services publics, le nombre de citoyens qui sont engagés dans l'agriculture et qui en dépendent directement suffit, à lui seul, à prouver l'importance socio-économique de cette production sociale. L'industrialisation ne réduit pas l'importance économique de la production agricole, surtout lorsqu'à l'évidence l'industrialisation se heurte à des limites objectives et qu'il est nécessaire d'établir une division du travail susceptible d'éliminer les contradictions et les disproportions entre l'industrie et l'échelle mondiale et nationale.

En Yougoslavie, la terre n'a pas fait l'objet d'une mesure de nationalisation générale. C'est là une des caractéristiques de la révolution socialiste yougoslave et des rapports sociaux, économiques et politiques. Dès le début, et surtout à partir de 1954, la voie de la transformation socialiste de l'agriculture fut largement originale; et cela non seulement dans les formes par le rejet du collectivisme schématique de type kolkho-

zien, mais aussi dans son essence, par le développement de rapports économiques librement consentis et acceptés, par la voie d'une coopération multiforme conforme aux intérêts matériels de la paysannerie engagée dans la voie du socialisme. Bien qu'elle soit historiquement conditionnée, c'est-à-dire bien qu'elle corresponde à la structure économique, au niveau culturel, à l'évolution politique des masses, au rôle de la paysannerie dans les luttes sociales et autres, et à d'autres circonstances objectives et subjectives, cette voie de la refonte socialiste de l'agriculture a une portée générale pour l'attitude du socialisme envers l'agriculture, la paysannerie et le producteur agricole individuel.

A l'exception d'une courte période (1948—1951), on n'a pas procédé en Yougoslave à une collectivisation „systématique” et encore moins „politique”. Depuis la promulgation de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1953 et de la Loi sur le patrimoine foncier de 1954, on applique le principe du libre consentement lors de la fondation des coopératives agricoles et de la libre acceptation des différentes formes de collaboration et coordination des activités productives et autres entre les paysans pris individuellement, d'une part, et les coopératives et les autres organisations agricoles socialistes, d'autre part. Pour toutes ces raisons, les producteurs individuels qui mettent en valeur des terres leur appartenant en propre ou appartenant à l'exploitation familiale dont ils font partie, constituent aujourd'hui encore la grande majorité dans l'agriculture yougoslave. En l'état actuel des choses, un peu plus de 11% des surfaces arables sont propriété sociale. Il convient de souligner cependant que la productivité et le rôle économique des organisations qui travaillent les terres appartenant à la société sont bien plus grands que ne le laisserait supposer la superficie de leurs exploitations. Inversement, le rôle politico-économique effectif de la propriété privée agraire est bien inférieur à la place qui lui est faite dans la structure de la propriété foncière en général.

Partant de cet état des rapports socio-économiques dans l'agriculture et sans le modifier, la constitution prévoit le droit de propriété privée sur les terres arables. Toutefois le propriétaire ne peut posséder plus de 10 hectares. Ce droit est garanti aux agriculteurs ou plus généralement aux citoyens qui mettent en valeur leur exploitation par leur propre travail et réalisent ainsi un revenu destiné à satisfaire leurs propres besoins et ceux de leur famille.

L'agencement socio-économique des moyens sociaux de travail et leur coopération avec les détenteurs de propriétés foncières au niveau de la production, influent notablement sur la fonction et l'usage du „droit de propriété” des terres arables. Dans un tel rapport, la propriété privée n'est pas abolie; mais elle perd ses caractères de „petite propriété” au profit des formes coopératives, sociales et progressistes. Le sens et les cadres sociaux de ce rapport, de même que l'importance et le rôle de la coopération économique sont expressément prévus dans la constitution qui dispose que la communauté sociale assure les conditions matérielles et autres, nécessaires à la création et au développement des organisations agricoles de travail sur la base de la propriété sociale du sol et du travail social et à la collaboration des agriculteurs avec les organisations coopératives et autres organisations de travail (article 21, premier alinéa).

La constitution prévoit également le droit de propriété sur les moyens et les locaux nécessaires à l'exercice des services et des activités artisanales, et autres analogues. Elle souligne que ces formes de propriété doivent permettre aux citoyens d'exercer, par leur travail personnel et en vue de se procurer des revenus, des activités artisanales, de fournir des services et de s'adonner à d'autres activités dans les limites et aux conditions déterminées par la loi. Le principe constitutionnel général que toutes les activités agricoles et artisanales, les services et autres activités semblables, doivent se situer dans le domaine des rapports de propriété, d'où il faut exclure le salariat et l'exploitation. En conséquence, la constitution pose l'interdiction du principe d'utiliser le travail d'autrui pour se procurer des revenus, dans ces secteurs (article 22, troisième alinéa). En même temps, elle prévoit une exception dont la portée sera fixée par une loi. Elle porte sur l'emploi du travail d'autrui, qui peut alors être toléré dans les secteurs où est prévu le droit de propriété en vue de fournir des services et d'exercer des activités agricoles, artisanales ou autres du même genre.

La constitution définit explicitement et garantit le droit de propriété individuelle des citoyens sur les objets servant:

- a) à la consommation individuelle,
- b) à l'usage personnel,
- c) à la satisfaction des besoins culturels et autres besoins particuliers.

Ce droit est illimité en soi; il l'est aussi par les objets sur lesquels il porte et qui sont du domaine, très vaste, de la satisfaction des besoins de l'homme et de la réalisation de ses intérêts. Il est la conséquence et la garantie du principe constitutionnel de la répartition du revenu selon le travail fourni; sa source se trouve principalement dans la propriété sociale des moyens de production et dans l'exercice des autres droits de propriété. Ce droit est confirmé et complété en matière de droit de succession garanti par la constitution. Le droit de succession s'étend aux autres moyens et éléments que les citoyens peuvent posséder et dont on peut (en règle générale) hériter dans des proportions fixées par le droit de la propriété. Le volume et la variété des objets auxquels s'attache le droit de propriété individuelle dépendent du développement matériel et culturel de la société, de l'élévation de la productivité du travail et de la prospérité générale de la communauté sociale. Ces droits sont une caractéristique durable des rapports socio-économiques propres au socialisme et au système social yougoslave.

Afin d'assurer la satisfaction des besoins et intérêts de l'homme et de sa famille et pour des raisons économiques et culturelles générales, la constitution garantit spécialement le droit individuel des citoyens sur les maisons d'habitation et les logements. Conformément à son principe fondamental qui veut que le droit de propriété ne peut être une source ou un moyen d'exploitation d'autrui, elle fixe les limites générales de ce droit. Les maisons d'habitation et les logements appartenant en propre aux citoyens doivent servir à la satisfaction de leurs besoins personnels et familiaux. La constitution élargit ce critère en disposant que le droit de propriété peut porter également sur les locaux dont les citoyens se servent pour »exercer diverses activités, à titre personnel, en conformité

avec le droit qui leur est garanti par la constitution et aux conditions prévues par la loi».

6. L'autogestion est un nouveau rapport social qui constitue le fondement de la propriété sociale des moyens de production. Cela signifie aussi que le système d'autogestion repose sur le statut des travailleurs dans le domaine du travail libre et associé, effectué avec les moyens sociaux de production dans le cadre de l'organisation de travail.

Pour le moment, l'autogestion existe et se réalise intégralement et très largement, au sein de l'organisation de travail. La constitution étend la notion d'organisation de travail; elle va des organisations économiques (entreprises et autres organisations de production directe, de transport et d'échanges) et des organisations formées sur la base du travail associé et avec les moyens sociaux, dans presque tous les secteurs d'activité d'intérêt public. Actuellement, ce sont les institutions et établissements éducatifs, scientifiques et culturels en général, de la santé publique, de la prévoyance et de la sécurité sociales, des assurances et plus généralement des domaines où existaient autrefois des »services sociaux«.

Comme la propriété sociale, l'autogestion sociale est un processus dépendant du développement matériel, social, politique et culturel de la société, de son degré d'industrialisation et du type d'organisation économique interne. L'autogestion est à la fois un processus contradictoire et qui ne se développe pas de façon uniforme. Le contenu et la forme de l'autogestion ne peuvent être les mêmes dans une économie sous-développée et dans les systèmes économiques des pays industrialisés et hautement développés. Ils sont dépendants, et continueront à l'être, de la taille de l'organisation, du degré d'intégration économique et culturelle; par ailleurs, ils sont soumis à l'action de divers facteurs, tels que la division internationale du travail, le processus d'intégration mondiale, la place et le rôle des Etats, la taille et le statut des communautés socio-politiques et la conscience sociale, la solidarité des hommes et la satisfaction de leurs besoins matériels et moraux.

L'autogestion dans l'organisation de travail comporte notamment, au stade actuel, des droits et devoirs suivants:

a) de gérer l'organisation de travail directement ou par le moyen des organes que les travailleurs élisent et révoquent eux-mêmes; c'est l'autogestion ouvrière, à la fois indépendante et autonome, sans propriétaires, tuteurs ou gérants, dirigeants et intermédiaires nommés du dehors;

b) d'organiser la production ou toute autre activité sociale, de veiller au développement de l'organisation de travail et d'élaborer les plans et programmes de travail et de développement;

c) de statuer sur les échanges de produits et de services et sur toutes les autres questions intéressant la marche de l'organisation de travail;

d) de décider de l'usage et de la disposition des moyens sociaux et de les utiliser de façon économiquement rationnelle pour donner un effet maximum à l'organisation de travail, aux travailleurs et à la communauté sociale dans son ensemble;

e) de répartir le revenu de l'organisation de travail et d'assurer le développement de la base matérielle de son activité, y compris la répartition du revenu entre les travailleurs; d'assurer la responsabilité d'exécution des obligations qu'a l'organisation de travail envers la communauté sociale;

f) de statuer sur les rapports de travail mutuels, en particulier sur l'admission des travailleurs à l'organisation de travail et la cessation de leur emploi; de fixer la durée du travail au sein de l'organisation en conformité avec les conditions générales du travail; de réglementer et d'améliorer celles-ci; d'organiser la sécurité technique et les congés payés, de créer les conditions nécessaires à leur éducation et à l'élévation du niveau de vie individuel et social; de régler les autres relations mutuelles et les questions d'intérêt commun;

g) d'assurer le contrôle interne sur la gestion et l'utilisation des moyens sociaux, la publicité et l'information sur les travaux et l'activité générale de l'organisation.

L'autogestion est un droit inaliénable et commun pour les travailleurs, quelle que soit l'activité de leur organisation. Mais l'exercice de ce droit n'est pas et ne peut pas être identique partout. Il dépend à la fois de la dimension de l'organisation et de l'importance sociale de son activité. C'est ainsi que, exception faite de certains secteurs sociaux particuliers, les citoyens intéressés et les représentants des autres organisations concernées et de la collectivité sociale elle-même participent à la gestion des organisations de travail (écoles, instituts scientifiques, banques, établissements culturels, hôpitaux, etc). Cela est dû au caractère social de la gestion, qui est toujours foncièrement directe. Etant l'autogestion ouvrière, elle n'est jamais étatique au sens politico-administratif du terme.

La particularité de l'autogestion dans les communautés de travail est d'être un droit constitutionnel. La constitution ne se contente pas de le formuler, elle le garantit. Tout acte portant atteinte au droit d'autogestion des travailleurs est anti-constitutionnel. Cela vaut non seulement pour les actes individuels, mais aussi pour les lois et autres textes et pour les actes généraux.

7. L'autogestion est un droit social, une nouvelle synthèse du droit public et du droit individuel. Elle dépasse le droit patrimonial, car elle est exempte d'éléments d'exploitation et de domination. Ce droit permet à ceux qui travaillent et créent des valeurs matérielles et intellectuelles d'être en même temps ceux qui gèrent les moyens sociaux de production et de travail, devenus instruments et conditions de ce travail; ils les gèrent comme s'ils leur appartenaient (bien qu'ils n'en soient pas propriétaires).

L'autogestion n'est pas non plus une gestion au sens administratif du terme. Autogérer n'est pas administrer une organisation de travail. Ce n'est pas, enfin, une simple fonction d'organisation économique, relevant banalement de la conduite des affaires.

Expression des rapports de base de la société, l'autogestion sociale est une nouvelle catégorie historique, qui entre, en tant que telle, dans le domaine du droit constitutionnel. C'est sur la base de la propriété et de l'autogestion sociale que s'accomplit et que doit se faire inévitablement la désintégration du »droit civil« classique et que se développent

simultanément les nouvelles branches juridiques qui répondent au système socialiste, où il n'y a plus de droit privé, ni d'opposition entre le droit privé et le droit public, entre la politique et l'économie, entre le pouvoir et l'autogestion. Dans l'organisation de travail, l'autogestion est sociale. Cela vient du caractère de la propriété sociale des moyens de production et de l'essence des rapports sociaux, tels qu'ils se présentent au stade actuel du développement du socialisme. Dans certaines études théoriques et dans la pratique, l'autogestion ouvrière était conçue autrefois comme un droit collectif ressemblant au droit de propriété de type ou de caractère patrimonial. Or, par son origine et par son essence, l'autogestion ouvrière est un droit social.

Dans l'organisation de travail, l'autogestion est à la fois un droit et un devoir. De même, dans la réalisation de l'autogestion, les travailleurs sont responsables de leur activité, conformément à la constitution, à la loi et aux statuts de leur organisation. Bien que le droit d'autogestion soit protégé par la Cour constitutionnelle, son exercice doit respecter la constitution, les lois, les plans sociaux et les autres actes obligatoires et normatifs des communautés socio-politiques. Mais il convient de faire remarquer que tous ces actes sont, eux aussi, élaborés d'après la constitution.

Le développement »vertical« de ce principe a une grande importance pour la limitation relative et l'orientation sociale de l'autogestion dans l'organisation de travail et dans les autres communautés de travail. Les travailleurs exercent l'autogestion dans un système unique, qui caractérise leur situation socio-économique dans le travail et la gestion au sein de l'organisation de travail. L'autogestion ne s'oppose pas à cette unité, comme le ferait un pouvoir politique central et extérieur détenteur du droit de propriété et s'arrogeant la prérogative d'exprimer et représenter les intérêts généraux conçus comme »intérêts supérieurs«, dont la manifestation serait impossible hors de nouvelles formes centralisatrices.

Pratiquant l'autogestion, les travailleurs prennent les décisions directement ou par leurs délégués, non seulement dans l'organisation de travail, mais aussi dans les communautés socio-politiques. Dans ces communautés, ils statuent sur des questions et des rapports dont dépend finalement la valeur matérielle, sociale et politique de l'autogestion elle-même, fondement de la société. Ces questions sont celles de l'orientation du développement économique et social, de la répartition du produit social et d'intérêt commun.

8. L'autogestion sociale — surtout sous sa forme essentielle d'autogestion dans les cellules humaines, dans les cellules élémentaires du travail dans la société — a été et demeure un des problèmes cruciaux et toujours actuels du socialisme, de Fourier à Marx, des premières expériences des colonies communistes à la société socialiste contemporaine. C'est dans ce problème et autour de lui que sont posées, élaborées, réexaminées ou abandonnées la philosophie fondamentale et, aussi, la pratique du socialisme, l'idée de base de l'éthique du socialisme, sa mission historique et son action quotidienne. L'autogestion est une idée essentielle et, dans un certain sens, le pivot de tout système et de tout mouvement socialistes. L'autogestion sociale n'est pas uniquement un principe d'organisation et de gouvernement, ni une simple

caractéristique ou une nouvelle modalité du système socio-économique, bien qu'elle soit un fond, une nouvelle forme de rapports socio-économiques et qu'elle consacre le statut du travailleur dans la production, dans la répartition du revenu et, finalement, dans la société. C'est dans l'autogestion sociale que s'amorcent et s'effectuent la désaliénation de l'homme et l'évolution à laquelle s'opposent les velléités de maintien et d'extension de l'aliénation qui, même dans une société socialiste, peuvent trouver des conditions favorables. C'est dans l'autogestion sociale que se pose et se règle le véritable problème de la liberté de l'homme, car il n'y a pas d'autogestion sans une libération du travail abolissant les rapports fétichistes faisant du travail, non pas une force aveugle opprimant la personne humaine, mais une condition d'existence de l'individu et une condition d'humanisation du milieu, de la personnalité et de sa liberté véritable.

Sa dénomination et son essence l'attestent, l'autogestion est l'idée centrale et l'aspiration fondamentale du marxisme. On la trouve déjà dans le *Manifeste du Parti communiste*, où Marx parle de la »Selbsttätigkeit«, de l'autodétermination historique de la classe ouvrière, qui est l'unique assurance de l'aboutissement du mouvement libérateur des ouvriers. Après avoir souligné que le socialisme ne peut se passer d'un acte politique qui transforme et abolit l'ancien pouvoir et les limites imposées par la propriété, qui entravent le développement des forces productives et des rapports sociaux. Marx écrit: »Mais là où commence son activité d'organisation, là où s'expriment son objectif propre et son âme, le socialisme se dépouille de sa gangue politique«. Cette même idée prend corps dans le projet de *Programme d'Erfurt* (1891), qui comporte un passage approuvé et rédigé par Engels (il est vrai qu'il a été omis dans le texte définitif du Programme, vraisemblablement pour ne pas provoquer un conflit avec les partisans de Lassalle). Ce passage dit textuellement: »Le Parti social-démocrate n'a rien de commun avec le socialisme d'Etat mentionné ci-dessus, qui est un système d'étatisation à des fins fiscales et qui met l'Etat à la place de l'entrepreneur privé, concentrant ainsi dans une même main le pouvoir de l'exploitation économique et de l'opposition politique des ouvriers«.

Toutes les grandes théories sur la société se situent au niveau de la société »globale« (de la société considérée comme un tout et dans son ensemble) et parlent de »structures« générales et centrales (propriété, classes, pouvoir, parlement, gouvernement, partis, leaders, etc.). Cette tradition philosophique commence avec Platon et se poursuit avec Hegel. Elle est également à la base de l'abstraction, de l'idéologisme et de l'aliénation dans les principaux courants des sciences sociales contemporaines, y compris ceux qui s'inspirent de la philosophie marxiste.

En tout état de cause, à notre époque, la principale »idée-force« des mouvements progressistes et la pensée sociale radicale et, jusqu'à un certain point, de la pratique, est celle des »Conseils«. Cette idée exprime la nécessité et la possibilité de transformer les rapports sociaux et de favoriser de plus en plus l'instauration du socialisme, surtout dans les cellules élémentaires du travail et de la production: l'entreprise, les institutions, les coopératives.

II

1. L'autogestion n'est pas une parole magique ni une clé universelle pour tous les problèmes du socialisme. Une fois instaurée, elle doit être continuellement instaurée et dépassée. Elle cherche une idée nouvelle dans la lutte contre le conservatisme social et intellectuel.

L'autogestion n'est pas un but mais un moyen. Le but de l'autogestion est celui du socialisme — l'émancipation de la société de la domination et de la servitude de l'homme à l'homme et à «sa» nature aliénée. Elle est un processus qui se développe, s'étend et change. C'est un processus contradictoire et, de ce fait, aléatoire. L'autogestion est un processus aussi parce qu'elle dépasse et change les institutions, alors même qu'elle s'affirme et exprime inévitablement à l'aide de ces dernières.

L'autogestion est un «système» de plusieurs formes, valeurs et significations différentes. Son modèle «parfait» est *contradictio in adjecto*. Elle est une forme de cellule de travail de la société, en même temps que le «tissu conjonctif» de sa structure. Elle unit la forme et la structure d'un système socio-politique, et elle est un système dans une mesure plus grande que les autres systèmes nouveaux. Elle embrasse la désintégration et le pluralisme du pouvoir et des décisions, afin d'assurer l'intégration d'*en bas*, avec un minimum de médiation et d'aliénation. L'unité et l'intégration non seulement *verticalement*, mais aussi horizontalement, non seulement dans leur ensemble, mais aussi dans leurs parties. Il n'y a pas d'autogestion si la partie ne se voit pas et ne se manifeste pas dans le tout et, inversement, si le tout ne se manifeste pas dans la partie. Pour y arriver, il est nécessaire de lutter pour la croissance et le progrès économiques, pour les valeurs et objectifs communs, et pour le droit d'option. L'autogestion et la démocratie sont inséparables. L'une est dans l'autre, l'une n'existe pas sans l'autre — si le socialisme est devenu un système social propre, mûr et, au fond, assuré.

Dans sa manifestation initiale et extérieure, l'autogestion est, au sein de l'organisation de travail, l'acte de suppression de la «monarchie» ou de la tutelle de l'Etat dans les organisations de base du travail associé. Elle est non seulement un principe politique, mais aussi un rapport social. Elle se définit inévitablement par rapport à la propriété. Une «autogestion» déterminée («cogestion» ou «codécision») n'est pas exclue sur la base de la propriété privée et celle de l'Etat. La propriété et l'autogestion de cette catégorie agissent en se limitant réciproquement. Ce rapport conduit ordinairement à l'affaiblissement d'une des forces «limitatives», c'est-à-dire au renforcement de la force supérieure de limitation. Cette forme d'«autogestion» ne change pas le système socio-économique et politique existant. Elle intègre la classe ouvrière dans l'ordre, le système existant (capitaliste, étatiste), avec la possibilité de sa démocratisation et d'une efficacité accrue. De par sa logique, l'autogestion est en même temps *ouvrière et sociale*; elle exige l'abolition du monopole ou du pouvoir par rapport aux moyens de travail et, par cela même, l'abolition des propriétaires et de leur domination sur la classe ouvrière — ce qui veut dire qu'elle suppose la pro-

priété dite sociale. Son essence réside dans le dépassement des rapports du pouvoir et de propriété matérielle et juridique.

Les rapports entre la réalité empirique, entre l'autogestion concrète et la théorie de l'autogestion, peuvent être différents, si bien que l'autogestion devient un paravent servant à dissimuler le monopolisme ancien ou nouveau, la bureaucratie et l'aliénation. Or, théoriquement, l'autogestion dans les conditions de la propriété sociale n'est pas exclusivement, ni en premier lieu, un rapport envers les choses et une forme de gestion, mais un rapport entre les hommes qui travaillent. Elle n'est pas non plus seulement la conscience de l'établissement d'un tel rapport. La conscience générale est la condition préalable nécessaire de ces rapports, mais elle obtient son importance et sa force comme conséquence des rapports entre les hommes, créés comme rapports d'autogestion. Dans les conditions concrètes, l'autogestion ne saurait être ramenée à l'existence d'une telle conscience (parmi les hommes les plus conscients), mais une telle conscience ne sera pas agissante si un rapport nouveau — «non hiérarchique» — n'est pas établi entre les hommes. Sans l'autogestion en tant que réalité «sociologique» (et humaniste), il n'y a pas non plus de conscience réelle, mais plutôt «la conscience de la conscience» et «la fausse conscience». Nous trouvons tous ces aspects et contradictions dans la réalité empirique de l'autogestion en Yougoslavie.

Pour le socialisme et l'émancipation de l'homme, la fonction fondamentale et véritable de l'autogestion réside dans le changement et le dépassement du système politique — dans l'établissement d'un nouvel état de *gestion démocratique et de sociabilité*. Chacun des systèmes politiques jusqu'à nos jours a été et demeure, plus ou moins, la domination organisée des hommes les uns sur les autres — le système de domination. La domination est caractérisée par un *double pouvoir*: le pouvoir de «l'Etat» sur l'homme et le citoyen, et le pouvoir des propriétaires ou des gérants des moyens de production sur les hommes privés desdits moyens et obligés de travailler pour pouvoir vivre. Les deux pouvoirs constituent l'essence du pouvoir politique en tant que fondement de la domination.

Le changement radical de la domination est le sens et la justification du socialisme et de son slogan de «transformation de la domination sur les hommes dans la gestion des choses». Grâce à l'autogestion, ce slogan est actuellement plus réel et plus riche, car, de par sa fonction historique, elle est la condition et la forme fondamentale («découverte» jusqu'à présent) d'abolition successive du double pouvoir et, de ce fait, de transformation du pouvoir politique dans une domination nonantagoniste, domination qui, sans être privée de la contrainte mais en libérant le travail du salariat, perd ses éléments oppressifs et manipulatifs. Faute de conscience de cette fonction et de sa réalisation, l'autogestion devient un mécanisme plus ou moins efficace ou réel d'administration et d'éligibilité, s'inclue finalement dans le système existant renouvelé de domination sur les hommes, indépendamment du fait par qui la domination est exercée — par la classe dominante ou ses représentants, sous forme de la technocratie et de la bureaucratie, du militarisme ou de la personnalité «historique» du «leader». L'autogestion devient un «slogan de propagande vide de sens» et la pratique d'une idéologie.

La réalisation de cette fonction de l'autogestion et, par cela même, son sens historique, supposent et exigent l'autogestion comme principe fondamental radicalement nouveau de constitution du système social et politique («système socio-politique»). Il s'agit d'un système socio-politique «fondé» sur l'autogestion, mais qui s'édifie aussi sur la base de celle-ci, en établissant des rapports non hiérarchiques, mais autonomes et responsables entre les différents niveaux dans la sphère de l'autonomie.

Si l'autogestion et le système socio-politique ne sont pas conçus et édifiés dans ce sens, tout reste comme par le passé. Le plan politique de l'histoire s'établit avec toutes ses conséquences, souvent aggravant la domination, le double pouvoir, la lutte pour le pouvoir, les inégalités, les oppressions et l'anticulture. La propriété sociale, l'autogestion, la démocratie et l'homme deviennent des abstractions — d'autant plus inacceptables et monstrueuses si les conditions se trouvaient réunies pour les changements sociaux réels, pour les premiers pays sur le chemin menant vers le «royaume de la liberté», ou bien si les hommes en avaient pleinement pris conscience.

Tout ceci nécessite des conditions préalables et déterminantes matérielles, sociales, politiques, internationales, spirituelles et, en général, culturelles. Tout ceci dicte aussi une révision fondamentale de nos idées et conceptions et de notre mentalité, ainsi qu'une opinion radicale et critique. L'opinion «contre», mais aussi «pour»; l'opinion toujours moins idéologique et de plus en plus scientifique; l'opinion qui ne cesse de douter et de contester, mais qui, en revanche, offre une base de la conviction et de l'accord des hommes, qui mène à une création continue elle doit se manifester par des institutions et «formes» radicalement nouvelles. Ce n'est qu'alors que la spontanéité nécessaire de l'opinion et des actions et états collectifs ne sera pas transformée en désorganisation, nihilisme et caricature de la pensée et de la pratique.

L'autogestion est le produit d'une des *nouvelles* contradictions entre le besoin de stabilité, d'équilibre et de codification, et le besoin de la société et de l'homme d'innovations, de changements, de création. Si elle n'exprime pas cette double nature, elle devient une forme ou une expérience empirique pure et simple.

2. L'autogestion a atteint en Yougoslavie le tournant entre la végétation et les premières formes qui commencent à être stationnaires, et les solutions frayant le chemin de sa réalisation, pour devenir la force fondamentale de la société et de l'homme. De la négative, elle doit devenir positive: la machine de lutte contre l'étatisme et la bureaucratie doit se transformer en forme propre de réalité sociale et politique, et plus que cela. Des formes partielles et du morcellement excessif de l'économie et de la société dans son ensemble, elle doit mener vers l'association et l'intégration des forces, des institutions, de la volonté, des intérêts et des actions sociales. De l'autogestion dans l'organisation — en organisation des rapports et actions autonomes; et de l'autogestion au sein de l'entreprise et des entreprises en général — en autonomie et autogestion au sens large. Une telle autogestion doit nous libérer du mélange de la propriété collective et étatiste, qui est le «substratum» effectif de la «propriété sociale» actuelle.

Les principales difficultés et faiblesses actuelles en pratique (voire en pensée) se reflètent dans la disharmonie et même le conflit entre l'autogestion et le système politique. Cet état même est contraire à l'organisation et à la logique de l'autogestion. Le système politique est par trop dirigeant et indépendant, et l'action et la pratique d'autogestion trop passives et subordonnées. Le système politique (le parti et les centres des décisions idéologico-politiques) »façonne« l'autogestion plutôt qu'à s'adapter à celle-ci. C'est ce qui affaiblit le système politique et oblige les cellules d'autogestion à faire une sorte de »guerrilla«. C'est sur cette base qu'apparaissent des faiblesses et doutes actuels, et la responsabilité se perd, tandis que les cas de lutte pour le pouvoir, les conspirations, la démagogie, l'attente d'une »tierce solution« et le piétinement dans le cercle vicieux se multiplient. Cet état de choses contient des germes de l'autoritarisme et du nihilisme, qui constituent les tendances traditionnelles d'une société arriérée.

La question du caractère, du statut et du rôle des organisations politiques (notamment de la LCY et de l'ASPRTY) est, à cet égard aussi, beaucoup plus actuelle et plus importante qu'on ne le pense généralement. Les tentatives faites jusqu'ici pour trouver de nouvelles solutions sont souvent chargées d'anciennes conceptions et de conservatisme. Les rapports de pouvoir et de contrainte sont plus forts que les rapports de coopération, de recherche et de persuasion. Il existe une hésitation entre la distance séparant la LC et les décisions générales et son ingérence et direction visible et invisible; entre l'attente et la nervosité panique de faire quelque chose en cas de »crise«. C'est sous ces influences que ne cessent de se compliquer, au lieu d'être réglées, les relations entre la Fédération et les républiques, entre l'autogestion et le pouvoir, entre l'homme et ses représentants; dans leur mode de travail, les assemblées ne trouvent pas leur véritable place, encore moins les organes exécutifs et administratifs qui, à mesure qu'ils changent, demeurent toujours plus anciens.

Tout ceci contribue à entretenir les anciennes formes et modèles des décisions et du travail, aidant le conservatisme à mener le jeu et le traditionalisme à obscurcir toute tentative faite pour trouver et établir quelque chose de plus nouveau, plus hardi et plus actif. Ces situations aggravent davantage encore les rapports entre les générations, influent sur les jeunes pour sombrer dans le conformisme ou perdre toute perspective, et sur les âgés pour former le complexe de défense de l'ancien et de »l'acquis« au nom de la révolution et de leurs mérites parfois justifiés.

Tout ceci n'est pas seulement la conséquence du »réflexe conditionnel« de chaque régime politique de se maintenir et reproduire comme ancien et selon les méthodes anciennes. Les forces mêmes de l'autogestion (une partie des travailleurs, des intellectuels et d'autres groupes de travail — surtout intermédiaires) ne sont incluses dans l'autogestion, ni nettement ni en totalité, et elles ne se voient pas définitivement dans cette dernière. L'autogestion ne se développe pas en idéalisant une telle pratique, bien qu'on considère que toutes les forces, qui sont autonomes de par leur statut sociologique, le sont effectivement, dans la pratique, dans l'action, la conscience et l'option spirituelle et morale. La démagogie »autonome« va de pair avec l'affaiblissement et les défauts de l'auto-

gestion, et avec le renforcement de la bureaucratie ou du nouveau complexe de domination et de manipulation des hommes et des choses.

L'autogestion doit devenir le fondement et l'inspiration du système politique et de sa mutation continuelle par la transformation du complexe de pouvoir et de domination, ou bien il n'y a pas d'autogestion dans le véritable sens historique. Tout ceci exige l'édification d'un système compliqué de fonctions, d'institutions, de niveaux des décisions et de la pratique de la communauté autogérée. Celle-ci ne sera pas en-Dans ce système sont indispensables de nouvelles définitions de leur structure, de leur rôle, du rapport de leurs méthodes de travail et de leur influence. Hardiesse, imagination créatrice, autocritique, autodétermination, responsabilité, réalisme ouvert à l'utopisme et utopisme consolidé par le réalisme — tels doivent être les éléments de l'opinion et de la pratique de la communauté autogérée. Celle-ci ne sera pas engendrée par les principes, elle sera créée par les acteurs enthousiastes, courageux et actifs du socialisme, ou bien elle ne fera pas son apparition.

Les tâches d'actualité immédiate sur le plan de la réalisation de l'autogestion en Yougoslavie résident dans le domaine de la recherche et de l'élimination des excès et de l'imperfection des institutions et des relations. La planification démocratique, la coordination et le contrôle social sont les instruments indispensables de l'autogestion et du système établi sur la base et à son avantage. Ici, nous hésitons entre l'indication légère et le centralisme »le seul salutaire«, entre l'autoéconomisme »intuitif« des entreprises et l'étatisme. De même, le besoin se fait sentir de plus en plus d'instituer des centres socio-scientifiques (institutions) qui s'occuperaient de la comptabilité *sociale* (nationale) et du contrôle de la rationalité économique et de la discipline economico-juridique dans le secteur de la réalisation de l'activité des organisations autonomes. L'approbation des bilans est insuffisante, superficielle et inefficace.

Ces contradictions se compliquent encore davantage et font naître de nouveaux obstacles entravant les solutions radicales si l'autogestion est la forme d'une organisation socio-économique morcelée et parcelée, dans laquelle règne le particularisme »autonome« de l'entreprise économique et des autres »unités de travail«. Un tel état existe en Yougoslavie et il n'a pas encore créé les forces et une véritable conscience qui donneraient l'impulsion à des changements globaux et structurels de la société et de la politique. Aussi longtemps que ce fait ne sera compris et réalisé, il ne suffit pas de se référer à l'autogestion des organisations de travail, à plus forte raison qu'elle se transforme en chasse gardée privée dangereuse des prétendus autogestionnaires. Il est du devoir des sciences d'analyser tous ces faits et de prévenir toute déformation et illusion.

Le pouvoir politique dans la société contemporaine, assumant diverses fonctions de gestion de la vie sociale, s'élève au-dessus de la société et abandonne celle-ci. Il est »aliéné«, mais il s'aliène lui-même. C'est au sommet de sa puissance qu'il montre sa plus grande faiblesse. La raison en est, en premier lieu, qu'il crée partout autour de lui et au sein de la société le vide, l'ennui et la léthargie — au moment même où la société a la plus grande possibilité et le désir de se manifester.

Ce «paradoxe» sera réalisé notamment par le pouvoir qui monopolise la domination et l'influence (qui possède le triple monopole: politique, économique et idéologique).

A l'heure actuelle sont recherchées (non seulement en Yougoslavie et non seulement dans le socialisme) de nouvelles formes et voies, afin de mettre un terme à cette séparation particulière et à la contradiction entre la «société bourgeoise» et la société politique, ce qui fut noté, en principe, déjà par Marx. L'Etat, comme le souligne Marx, prend l'aspect d'une communauté politique qui est, comme telle, plus qu'un assemblage de citoyens. Plus que cela, en tant que structure monopolistico-bureaucratique — ce qui est généralement le cas aujourd'hui — il perd tout aspect de la communauté et devient un appareil isolé et effrayé du pouvoir.

La participation et notamment l'autogestion représentent une tentative faite pour constituer la société politique comme «bourgeoise» et politique à la fois. L'autogestion devrait combler les lacunes tragiques créées par le pouvoir monopolistique, «absolu» de l'Etat — par chaque pouvoir moderne. Rien ne change essentiellement dans la société pour la classe ouvrière et le travailleur, tandis que les nuages d'aliénation et de mécontentement s'accumulent si l'autogestion n'est qu'une forme de gestion, si elle est le pouvoir «local» décentralisé, formé et contrôlé par l'appareil politique central de la société. Seule l'autogestion qui constitue le fondement et le principe non pas de la réforme mais de la reconstruction de la société, tant politique que «bourgeoise», est en mesure de libérer la «communauté» et l'homme de la domination, du vide, de l'isolement, de l'inertie, de la fausse force et puissance, de la végétation aliénée et des souffrances morales.

3. Le rapport mutuel entre l'autogestion et la démocratie fait l'objet de la pensée progressiste et des sciences sociales. En principe, l'autogestion est une idée de démocratie, et la démocratie une forme d'autogestion. En fait, ce sont deux côtés d'un même principe. L'autogestion est la définition la plus complète de la démocratie. C'est l'opinion des plus grands penseurs démocratiques. Pour Rousseau «la démocratie est directe ou il n'y en a pas», tandis que d'après Marx, elle est «l'auto-détermination des peuples».

L'autogestion, en tant que forme de gestion, suppose les intérêts communs et tous les membres de la communauté à coparticiper à la prise des décisions. En tant que gestion au sein de la communauté de travail dans le socialisme, c'est-à-dire sur la base de la propriété sociale des moyens de travail, elle est une forme de conquête de la souveraineté économique et du rapprochement du citoyen en tant que personne abstraite du travailleur, prise comme personne concrète. Elle crée à la démocratie de nouvelles dimensions et de nouvelles limites.

Les confusions et les dangers apparaissent quand on évalue, à la lumière de ces points de contact de principe, la situation concrète de la démocratie dans une société donnée (par exemple en Yougoslavie). L'autogestion n'engendre pas automatiquement la démocratie, tout comme l'autogestion et la démocratie ne proviennent pas d'elles-mêmes du socialisme. Comme partout ailleurs, ici aussi le déterminisme unilatéral est scientifiquement erroné, et politiquement — anti-démocratique.

L'autogestion exige des rapports démocratiques actifs et toujours meilleurs, en son sein et dans l'ensemble du système politique. Sans une telle démocratie, il n'y a pas d'autogestion. C'est, au fond, la démocratie politique. Sans la démocratie politique, il n'y a pas d'autogestion dans la société socialiste non plus. C'est au sujet de cette question que l'on prend actuellement de nouvelles orientations dans le socialisme et de nouvelles positions dans le cadre du mouvement ouvrier (et communiste), notamment en Italie, en France et dans certains autres pays de l'Europe occidentale.

Il ne fait guère de doute que sans l'éligibilité et la révocabilité des équipes au pouvoir, sans libertés personnelles, politiques et socio-économiques, et sans droits des citoyens, il n'y a point de démocratie. Or, la démocratie politique est définie ces derniers temps, dans le cadre des courants révolutionnaires à l'Occident aussi, comme pluralisme politique, et cela comme système de pluralité de partis, avec ou sans le pluralisme dupouvoir. Il est impossible de contester — dans des situations déterminées — la nécessité et le bien-fondé de cette «voie vers le socialisme» ni d'un tel «modèle du socialisme»¹ tout comme il est certain qu'un tel système politique est toujours fondé davantage sur la domination que sur la socialisation autonome du pouvoir. Si le socialisme est une communauté assurée, acceptée et, au fond, solidaire, le système politique cherche ses forces et méthodes qui dépassent le pluralisme du parti et du pouvoir. Un tel «système» est, en réalité, la voie de la démocratie et de l'autogestion qui est réaliste et acceptable pour la plupart des pays socialistes. C'est ce que confirment les événements de Hongrie de 1956 et l'expérience tchécoslovaque de 1968.

Cependant, la réalisation de l'autogestion est impossible sans l'adoption et l'application de nouvelles méthodes démocratiques radicales, sans l'établissement et le perfectionnement d'un climat démocratique. Plus qu'un pluralisme classique, une telle société doit être aussi une communauté «transparente». Une communauté où règne la liberté d'opinion et de création, la possibilité d'alternatives socialistes et de formation de diverses options publiques. Communauté où nul ne tient dans ses mains le savoir et le pouvoir, mais qui a adopté pour chacun l'attribution de chercher, d'examiner, d'opter, où règne seulement le pouvoir du savoir et l'autodétermination dans le savoir et la responsabilité. Dans une telle communauté est reconnu le droit aux expériences et aux erreurs; le droit de corriger les erreurs et le principe de responsabilité de certaines d'entre elles. Une telle communauté est impossible sans la confrontation; sans la sécurité, quant aux conséquences, pour ceux qui ne sont pas d'accord; dans la critique et l'opinion responsable de tout. Dans cette communauté, rien n'est sacré ni tabou, y compris la vérité elle-même, qui n'est pas découverte à jamais ni définitive.

Une telle démocratie, non seulement dans les sphères indirectes de l'autogestion, mais aussi dans le système socio-politique pris dans son ensemble, doit être de plus en plus directe, fondée sur la délégation et la recherche, constamment définie et dépassée. Les formules statiques de l'éligibilité indirecte et directe de la délégation, de la pluralité de

¹ V. R. Garaudy, Pour un modèle français du socialisme, Gallimard, 1968.

partis, de la majorité et de la minorité — ne répondent pas à cette démocratie autonome dans un socialisme assuré et plus mûr, et dans la liberté.

Malgré leur valeur historique et démocratique conditionnée, ces instruments de la politique bourgeoise libérale classique visent à assurer le fonctionnement du pouvoir en faveur des intérêts des groupements dominants en quête d'un soutien. Ces intérêts sont donnés, et ils sont seulement sanctionnés par les suffrages de la «majorité» (électorale, c'est-à-dire artificielle). La «minorité» est condamnée d'être un observateur et d'attendre des temps meilleurs — pour devenir une majorité. En fait, toutes les dispositions sont prises pour que la majorité effective ne soit pas le groupement dominant.

La fonction de la démocratie socialiste autonome est, quant à sa tendance, essentiellement différente. C'est en son sein que doivent être recherchées et prises les décisions — le socialisme est un système en cours de formation — et cela, avec la participation effective du plus grand nombre possible de tous. L'«unanimité consciente» est le principe de cette démocratie, en premier lieu des structures autonomes. La majorité est l'ultime moyen et le «mal nécessaire». Si les options et valeurs fondamentales sont librement acceptées — et c'est là la condition et l'essence du socialisme — la minorité doit être incluse et respectée comme groupe actif dans la nouvelle prise des décisions et leur exécution, alors même que cette dernière n'est pas d'accord et garde son opinion divergente. Une majorité raisonnable attend d'une majorité encore plus raisonnable de nouvelles forces pour l'épanouissement du socialisme et l'affirmation de l'autogestion.

Ces idées sont mal connues et encore moins appliquées en Yougoslavie — de l'entreprise aux assemblées, de la politique aux sciences. L'état actuel de la société, de la pensée et de la pratique — au fond conservateur et enclin à imiter les anciens modèles — limite la démocratie et politise l'autogestion. Il fait toujours naître des projets et expressions qui reproduisent les rapports du pouvoir politique ou des idées qui contestent chaque principe de décision hors du plébiscite dirigé ou de la mimique de la «spontanéité» absolue. En réalité, les deux «projets» sont contraires à l'autogestion. Alors que celle-ci est un processus de participation sociale et collective et la confirmation des intérêts, le contexte du pouvoir et la démocratie plébiscitaire sont des idéologies de l'individualisme et des groupements différents, de la bourgeoisie permanente et du «sansculottisme».² Cela ne veut pas dire que, dans des moments révolutionnaires déterminés, la démocratie directe n'embrasse pas la confirmation exacte, quoique frénétique, des tendances communes et des intérêts historiques des masses. Pour ne pas être une somme d'opinions des particuliers et une source de triomphe de certains groupements, l'autogestion nécessite le relèvement du savoir, de la culture et de la conscience, et avant tout l'intégration des sciences dans le processus de recherche et de décision. Les sciences doivent servir de fondement objectif contre le subjectivisme, les actes arbitraires, la démagogie, la manipulation et tous les autres mécanismes dans lesquels vit le système de politique et de démocratie représentative, pluraliste et «majoritaire».

² D. Richet et F. Furet, *La Révolution*, Hachette, 1967, p. 295.

L'autogestion ne doit prendre place ni «à droite» ni «à gauche» de tous les systèmes politiques existants et jusqu'ici «les plus» démocratiques. Elle doit être au-dessus et devant ceux-ci. C'est dans la recherche de cette voie que se vérifient et affirment la pensée et la pratique marxistes et révolutionnaires authentiques, qui unifient le réalisme et le possibilisme, la création et la signification, la rationalité et la spontanéité. Cette voie nous dirige vers l'avenir et «l'utopie», et quiconque n'est pas à même de l'apprécier et rechercher constamment est perdu dans le présent et prépare «un lendemain qui pleure».

Sur le chemin de cette recherche, il existe partout, de même qu'en Yougoslavie, des issues et pièges variés. En effet, ils sont en cours de préparation. D'une part, le maintien de l'ancienne société, du bureaucratisme, de la domination, de l'exploitation, du pseudo-rationalisme, et de la manipulation et de la mystification rationalisées; de l'autre, comme leur négation absolue, «l'antisociété», entièrement libre et spontanément autonome, émancipée de toutes les médiations et valeurs, permettant au particulier de se réaliser lui-même en dehors de toutes les institutions, contraintes et aliénations. Le premier chemin mène vers la solitude sociale et culturelle, car le pouvoir (bureaucratique) libéré anéantit aujourd'hui tout autour de lui, l'autre, vers la stagnation, parce que l'homme peut tout, mais dans la mesure où il peut, il ne peut finalement rien faire lui-même. Le premier s'oppose à l'autogestion, le second diffère du premier, mais différer ne signifie pas s'opposer effectivement.

L'autogestion ne sera pas à même de surmonter ces contradictions si elle n'est pas établie comme communauté fondamentale rationnelle, démocratique, humaine et scientifique, dans laquelle se résolvent consciemment toutes les contradictions et commencent à nier l'ancien mode de vie et le rapport de l'homme à son égard.

Dr JOVAN ĐORĐEVIĆ

Dr Jovan Đorđević, professeur à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Beograd et juge à la Cour Constitutionnelle de Yougoslavie, est né le 10 mars 1908 à Beograd. Promu au grade de docteur ès sciences à Paris en 1933, il fut nommé de cours à la Faculté de Droit en 1936. Pendant la guerre, il quitta son service pour prendre part à la lutte de libération. Depuis 1945, il est professeur titulaire à la chaire des sciences politiques et du droit constitutionnel.

Il est membre de plusieurs académies internationales et sociétés scientifiques, vice-président de l'Association internationale pour les sciences politiques et membre de toutes les académies de sciences yougoslaves. Il a fait des conférences à de nombreuses Facultés étrangères. Membre actif de l'Institut international pour la philosophie politique et de l'Académie internationale pour les sciences politiques et le droit constitutionnel, professeur adjoint à la Faculté de Droit de Paris, docteur honoris causa de l'Université de Paris et de l'Université de Strasbourg. De 1961 à 1964, le professeur Đorđević fut vice-président de l'Association internationale pour les sciences politiques.

Dans le domaine des sciences politiques, une haute estime est accordée par les milieux scientifiques et par la critique aux oeuvres capitales suivantes du professeur Đorđević: *La Yougoslavie démocratie socialiste* (1957), *Le droit*

constitutionnel et le système politique (1961 et 1962), Le socialisme et la démocratie (1961), Le système politique (1967), Le droit constitutionnel (1967).

En soulevant des questions de base relatives à l'édification du socialisme et à ses perspectives en Yougoslavie et dans le monde, le professeur Đorđević a développé et appliqué systématiquement le concept marxiste de la politique dans la conception et l'analyse de la démocratie socialiste dans les conditions actuelles.

L'activité publique actuelle du professeur Đorđević comprend aussi d'autres obligations, parmi lesquelles il y a lieu de mentionner particulièrement sa fonction de rédacteur en chef de la revue »Archives pour la jurisprudence et les sciences sociales« et celle de président de l'Association yougoslave pour les sciences politiques. Le professeur Đorđević s'est distingué également comme participant et organisateur de maintes réuniens scientifiques dans le pays et à l'étranger. En 1967, il fut élu juge à la Cour constitutionnelle de Yougoslavie.



Dragoslav JANKOVIĆ

Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Beograd

LA QUESTION NATIONALE ET LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES NATIONALITES EN YOUGOSLAVIE

Pour qu'on puisse comprendre l'essence de la question nationale dans la Yougoslavie socialiste plurinationale d'aujourd'hui et pour qu'on puisse se rendre compte de l'importance de cette question, il est indispensable, en premier lieu, de connaître sa naissance et son développement dans le passé. En effet, il est nécessaire de connaître: quels étaient les courants du développement des peuples yougoslaves au Moyen âge, comment et quand les peuples yougoslaves se sont formés en nations séparées et pourquoi est née chez eux l'idée de vivre dans un Etat commun; ensuite, comment s'est formé le premier Etat commun des peuples yougoslaves au cours de la Première guerre mondiale et quels étaient les rapports entre les nationalités dans cet Etat; enfin, comment au cours de la Guerre de la libération nationale et de la Révolution socialiste a été résolue en même temps la question nationale yougoslave sur les bases nouvelles socialistes.

I. Voies particulières du développement des peuples yougoslaves au Moyen âge

Les peuples qui, aujourd'hui, forment le gros de la population de la Yougoslavie socialiste (Serbes, Croates, Slovènes, Macédoniens, Monténégrins) se sont établis sur le territoire actuel (byzantin à cette époque) vers la fin du VI^{ème} siècle et dans les premières décennies du VII^{ème} siècle; à cette époque ils étaient rattachés entre eux par des ententes.

Aux premiers temps du Moyen âge, ces peuples ont formé, en poursuivant la lutte contre Byzance et les peuples voisins, leurs organisations d'Etat féodal primitif. Les *Slovènes* ont formé vers le milieu du VII^{ème} siècle l'Etat la Carinthie, qui s'est maintenu jusqu'en 820, quand les comtes francs ont remplacé les princes slovènes et quand les Slovènes sont devenus les serfs de la classe des seigneurs féodaux francs. Ainsi les Slovènes, en perdant leur organisation d'Etat et la noblesse féodale nationale, ont perdu en même temps la possibilité de former leur noblesse féodale nationale et leur Etat autonome, de sorte que, depuis l'année 820, ils sont restés pendant une longue période de temps sous la domination allemande. — Au début du IX^e siècle, les *Croates* ont réussi à former leur Etat avec leurs souverains nationaux. A cette époque l'Etat franc

devait faire face à certaines difficultés intérieures. Vers le milieu du XI^e siècle, l'Etat croate avait atteint le point culminant de sa puissance, mais dès l'année 1102 il a cessé d'exister comme Etat autonome. Quoique cet Etat n'a eu qu'une durée éphémère, néanmoins il a contribué à la formation du peuple croate en tant que peuple autonome et il l'a aidé de s'opposer à la germanisation, c'est-à-dire qu'il ne soit pas absorbé dans la première et la plus dangereuse poussée des conquérants germaniques. — Les *Macédoniens*, en se libérant de la domination byzantine et bulgare, ont formé leur Etat au X^eme siècle (l'empire de Samuel), que l'empire de Byzance a de nouveau conquis au début du XI^eme siècle. Quoique Byzance, avec son organisation féodale, a accéléré le développement du système féodal en Macédoine, elle a en même temps, en procédant d'une manière analogue à celle des autorités allemandes en Slovénie, tout en transformant les habitants — paysans macédoniens en serfs et en favorisant les seigneurs, empêché pour une longue période le développement national, social et politique libre de la Macédoine. — Dans les régions centrales de la Péninsule balkanique apparaissent au IX^eme siècle deux petits Etats serbes: la Rascie et la Duklja (plus tard: Zéta, ensuite Monténégro).

Au XII^eme siècle, la Rascie (Serbie), sous le souverain Nemanja, a commencé à développer le système féodal, et son évolution étatico-juridique a été à l'apogée au milieu du XIV^eme siècle sous le règne de l'empereur Douchan. Sous l'invasion des Turcs, la Serbie a cessé d'exister comme Etat vers le milieu du XV^eme siècle. — En Bosnie s'était formé également au Moyen âge un Etat féodal qui, à la fin du XV^eme siècle, comme la Serbie, est tombé sous la domination turque.

Du XVI^eme au XVIII^eme siècle, tous les peuples yougoslaves se trouvaient sous la domination étrangère: la plus grande partie des pays yougoslaves était sous l'occupation des Turcs (la Serbie jusqu'en 1804 et juridiquement jusqu'en 1878, quand elle a obtenu l'indépendance, de même que le Monténégro; la Bosnie-Herzégovine a été sous la domination turque jusqu'en 1878, époque à laquelle celle-ci fut remplacée par la domination autrichienne; la Macédoine est restée sous la domination turque jusqu'en 1912); la monarchie des Habsbourg a étendu son pouvoir sur la Croatie et la Slovénie, et la République vénitienne sur la Dalmatie; il n'y a que la petite République de Dubrovnik qui a réussi à conserver l'autonomie réelle, quoiqu'elle fût un Etat vassal. Les luttes entre la monarchie des Habsbourg et les Turcs, du XVI^eme au XVIII^eme siècle, se poursuivaient surtout sur le territoire des pays yougoslaves et, de ce fait, les conditions de vie des peuples yougoslaves étaient devenues très difficiles et ralentissaient et freinaient leur développement.

Par conséquent, on pourrait tirer les conclusions suivantes: a) Les peuples yougoslaves, depuis le commencement, depuis leur établissement dans la Péninsule balkanique, se développaient dans des conditions très différentes et qu'ils poursuivaient constamment la lutte pour le maintien de leur existence. Leur développement inégal et discontinu dans les premiers temps de la féodalité et plus tard, à l'époque de la féodalité avancée, était un obstacle à leur fusion ethnique. b) La domination étrangère, du XVI^eme au XVIII^eme siècle, entravait non seulement le développement économique et social des peuples yougoslaves et les tenait à l'écart du développement européen, mais aussi elle les avait divisés en trois

Etats et en trois religions (orthodoxe, catholique et islamique), en empêchant par là ou en rendant sensiblement plus difficile le processus du rapprochement ethnique des peuples yougoslaves.

II. *Formaiton des nations yougoslaves et de l'idée yougoslave*

La formation des diverses nations yougoslaves, c'est-à-dire le réveil national des peuples de la Yougoslavie, avait eu lieu, comme chez les autres peuples, à l'époque du passage de la féodalité au capitalisme, ce qui signifie que ce phénomène se rattache surtout au XIX^{ème} siècle. La nouvelle classe sociale — la bourgeoisie — était aussi ici (dans les pays yougoslaves) le porteur de la conscience nationale et du réveil national. Mais, à ce propos, il faut souligner deux faits, à savoir: (1) L'idée nationale et la conscience nationale n'étaient pas directement liées au développement du commerce et de l'industrie dans les pays yougoslaves, elles ne se sont pas manifestées comme résultat direct des intérêts déterminés de la nouvelle classe, que la, féodalité et la domination étrangère mettaient en péril; le processus de la naissance de la conscience nationale était beaucoup plus complexe et indépendant des nombreuses circonstances particulières politiques et culturelles, ainsi que des autres circonstances héritées du développement antérieur. (2) Eu égard au développement différent et inégal socio-économique et politique des peuples yougoslaves au Moyen âge, la formation des nations yougoslaves suivait de même des voies différentes et dans des conditions différentes. Le mouvement national serbe a commencé dès le XVIII^{ème} siècle dans la province économiquement la plus développée, la Voïvodine, tandis qu'en Serbie il se rattache tout d'abord aux insurrections contre les Turcs (1804—1813 et 1815), à sa révolution bourgeoise démocratique qui, en détruisant le gouvernement turc et les rapports féodaux turcs, a frayé la voie au développement de la classe bourgeoise et de l'Etat bourgeois en Serbie. Le mouvement national croate est lié surtout au mouvement ill-yrien (1835—1848) qui, outre l'idée nationale yougoslave, a posé aussi les fondements de la conscience nationale croate particulière dans la lutte contre le nationalisme hongrois. Le réveil national slovène commence dans la deuxième moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle et il se poursuit durant la première moitié du XIX^{ème} siècle; le mouvement national des Slovènes avait surtout le caractère de la renaissance nationale, et dans la plupart des cas c'est le clergé qui se trouvait à sa tête. Le réveil national des Macédoniens, qui était longtemps empêché et entravé par les circonstances particulièrement défavorables en Macédoine au XIX^{ème} siècle, ne se transformera en mouvement national qu'à la fin du XIX^{ème} et au début du XX^{ème} siècle. De même, le peuple monténégrin se formera comme nation avec retard; l'individualité nationale monténégrine et la manifestation de la conscience nationale monténégrine particulière trouvent leur expression surtout dans les guerres de libération aux XIX^{ème} et XX^{ème} siècles.

En même temps que le réveil de la conscience nationale, surtout chez les Croates et les Serbes, apparaît de même, dans un certain sens comme la suite ou le complément de la conscience nationale et du réveil national, la pensée yougoslave (ou l'idée yougoslave).

L'idée yougoslave apparaît dès la deuxième moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle, quoique à cette époque elle ne fut que sporadique, à savoir en tant que conception de l'unité ethnique, culturelle et nationale de ces peuples. Les protagonistes de cette idée dans les premiers temps étaient les personnages de marque — les poètes, les hommes de lettres, les savants. Ainsi, par exemple, chez les Serbes Dositej Obradović a mis en relief, dès la deuxième moitié du XVIII^{ème} siècle, l'unité des langues yougoslaves, en soulignant à ce propos que le moment religieux, les différences de confessions, n'est pas un élément essentiel. L'historien Jovan Rajić avait accentué dans sa première histoire des peuples yougoslaves, qui a paru à la même époque, l'unité de tous les Slaves du Sud. La première insurrection en Serbie, en tant que guerre de libération nationale et en tant que révolution bourgeoise démocratique en son genre, avait une importance considérable non seulement pour la formation de la nation serbe, mais aussi parce qu'elle a eu des répercussions positives dans les pays yougoslaves. Chez les Yougoslaves occidentaux, le mouvement illyrien avait acquis le caractère d'un large mouvement, qui avait pour but l'intégration linguistique et culturelle des Slaves du Sud. Le chef de ce mouvement Ljudevit Gaj (1809—1872) appelait les Slaves du Sud par le nom commun d'Illyriens et leur langue la langue illyrienne; il avait concentré son activité en premier lieu sur l'unification culturelle (linguistique) des Serbes et des Croates, après l'abolition de la symbiose d'Etat des Croates avec les Hongrois.

Pendant la révolution de 1848/49, les Croates et les Serbes s'allient dans la lutte contre les Hongrois. Plus tard, pendant la période de l'absolutisme (1849—1859), l'idée yougoslave a été refoulée pour réapparaître chez l'évêque Štrossmayer (1815—1905) et Franjo Rački (1828—1894), qui ont concentré leur activité sur le réveil de la conscience nationale par la voie du développement et de l'avancement de l'instruction publique et de la science (fondation de l'Académie yougoslave des sciences et des arts, 1860); ils croyaient que les Serbes et les Croates étaient un seul peuple portant deux noms. Dans les deux dernières décennies du XIX^{ème} siècle, l'idée yougoslave était en stagnation ou en régression; en Serbie le roi Milan avait lié et subordonné sa politique étrangère à la politique de l'Autriche—Hongrie, tandis qu'en Croatie les gouvernements de Vienne et de Budapest attisaient l'antagonisme entre les Croates et les Serbes (surtout des Serbes de Croatie).

Au début du XX^{ème} siècle, ou plus précisément en 1903 (année qui, en Serbie, marqua la liquidation de la dynastie des Obrenović et de sa politique austrophile, et en Croatie le commencement de la politique dite du nouveau cours, basée sur la coopération serbo-croate), commence une action plus concrète pour le rapprochement des peuples yougoslaves; on passe, du domaine de l'idéologie et des déclarations, de plus en plus sur le terrain des actions de caractère yougoslave. La jeunesse yougoslave s'intègre à la vie politique active, dont le mouvement a pris naissance en tant que réaction à la politique nationale opportuniste de la bourgeoisie; au lieu des méthodes pratiquées jusqu'à cette époque de l'action culturelle pacifique, la jeunesse a recours aux méthodes révolutionnaires dans son activité nationale. C'est l'époque du renforcement brusqué et de l'expansion de la pensée yougoslave, dont les caracté-

ristiques sont les nombreuses actions politiques et culturelles ayant pour but le rapprochement des peuples yougoslaves, en établissant des relations plus étroites surtout entre les hommes politiques et les travailleurs aux oeuvres culturelles de Croatie et de Serbie. Les guerres balkaniques (1912—1913) avaient produit particulièrement des effets très puissants et positifs sur les Yougoslaves d'Autriche—Hongrie, non seulement parmi la jeunesse et les intellectuels, mais bien plus largement parmi les paysans et les ouvriers; ces guerres ont beaucoup contribué à raffermir la conscience sur la communauté des intérêts et de l'avenir des peuples yougoslaves.

III. *La formation du premier Etat commun des peuples yougoslaves (1914—1918)*

Dès le déclenchement de la Première guerre mondiale, en 1914, la question yougoslave, en tant que question de la libération et de l'unification des peuples yougoslaves, est devenue actuelle et elle est entrée dans la phase brûlante de sa réalisation. Le fait même que l'Autriche-Hongrie a attaqué la Serbie avec sa force armée dans le but de l'anéantir en tant qu'Etat indépendant attrayant pour les peuples yougoslaves qui se trouvaient sous sa domination (austro-hongroise), a créé une telle situation dont on pouvait attendre, dans les nouveaux rapports de forces, que l'Autriche-Hongrie sera mise en pièces, et, en conséquence, que les peuples yougoslaves seront libérés et qu'ils auront la possibilité de s'unifier.

Dans de telles circonstances, le gouvernement serbe a pris l'initiative dès la première année de la guerre (en 1914) pour trouver une solution à la question yougoslave, conformément à ses intérêts et à ses conceptions. Partiellement, en raison de la pression exercée par les puissances de l'Entente sur la Serbie de céder certaines parties du territoire yougoslave à ses voisins: la Bulgarie, la Roumanie et, plus tard, l'Italie, pour les faire entrer en guerre contre les puissances centrales, le gouvernement serbe a rendu publics, dès le mois de décembre 1914, ses buts de guerre: la formation d'un grand Etat des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes. Le gouvernement a fait une déclaration devant l'Assemblée nationale serbe à Niš, en proclamant que »au moment où la guerre a commencé, elle est devenue en même temps la lutte pour la libération et l'unification de tous nos frères Serbes, Croates et Slovènes qui ne sont pas libres«.

Vu que les cercles politiques des pays yougoslaves d'Autriche-Hongrie, dans les conditions de guerre, n'ont pas osé ou n'ont pas voulu se déclarer pour une communauté d'Etat avec la Serbie, un comité s'était formé dans l'émigration, et il a pris la direction de la politique yougoslave. Ce comité était composé d'émigrés politiques croates (pour la plupart de Dalmatie), slovènes et serbes. Fondé en 1915 sur l'initiative du gouvernement serbe, ce comité, Comité yougoslave à Londres au cours des deux premières années de son existence, travaillait de concert et sous l'influence du gouvernement serbe, quoique intimement il n'était pas d'accord avec sa conception de l'unification. Après la chute du régime tsariste en Russie (mars 1917), sur la politique duquel le

gouvernement serbe s'appuyait très fortement, et après l'entrée en guerre des Etats-Unis d'Amérique (avril 1917), le Comité yougoslave a eu plus de possibilité de s'émanciper du gouvernement serbe et, en même temps, de renforcer et élargir son champ d'action. Il s'efforçait de plus en plus d'agir en tant que partenaire égal en droits du gouvernement serbe et de spécifier avec celui-ci les conditions et les modalités de l'unification après la guerre des provinces yougoslaves d'Autriche-Hongrie avec le Royaume de Serbie.

En sentant que la situation avait changé, le gouvernement serbe, en raison de ce nouvel état de choses, a organisé en juin et juillet 1917 à Corfou (où il se trouvait en émigration) une conférence avec le Comité yougoslave, qui a eu pour conséquence une déclaration commune sur l'unification. La déclaration de Corfou a mis en lumière la revendication de former un Etat *commun* des peuples yougoslaves (et non point la Serbie élargie, c'est-à-dire la Grande Serbie), en dehors des frontières de l'Autriche-Hongrie (et non point au sein de ses frontières, comme le réclamaient, en mai 1917, de nombreux hommes politiques en Autriche-Hongrie). Ce qui est caractéristique et important dans la déclaration de Corfou, c'est qu'elle mentionne «un peuple portant trois noms», un peuple qui a trois noms nationaux: les Serbes, les Croates et les Slovènes (donc, elle a adopté la conception de la nationalité yougoslave intégrale); cependant, dans cette Déclaration il n'est absolument pas question des Macédoniens et des Monténégrins. L'Etat commun serait une *monarchie* constitutionnelle et parlementaire, et son organisation, selon toutes les apparences (quoique cela n'était pas formulé expressément), serait unitariste avec des autonomies locales.

La déclaration de Corfou, cependant, n'a pas rayé de l'ordre du jour les désaccords et les dissentiments entre le Comité et le gouvernement serbe; le manque de confiance du Comité à l'égard du gouvernement s'est maintenu toujours, et les différends entre eux sont devenus de plus en plus fréquents. Les représentants gouvernants de la bourgeoisie serbe s'efforçaient de conserver à tout prix leur prédominance politique par rapport à la bourgeoisie croate et slovène, qui était économiquement plus forte; d'autre part, les hommes politiques bourgeois croates et slovènes se méfiaient de la prédominance politique et de l'hégémonie de la bourgeoisie serbe dans le futur Etat commun. A ce propos, il ne faut pas oublier que la libération nationale et l'unité des peuples yougoslaves furent effectuées avec un retard sensible, dans la période de l'impérialisme et à une époque de revirements révolutionnaires sociaux et d'un processus révolutionnaire, qui a commencé avec la Révolution d'octobre en Russie. Dans de telles conditions, dans la crainte des masses populaires, qui commençaient de plus en plus à réclamer la vraie démocratie et la liberté, la bourgeoisie des pays yougoslaves — tout aussi bien celle qui était représentée dans le gouvernement serbe que celle que représentait le Comité yougoslave — s'appuyait de plus en plus, et exclusivement au cours de la guerre, sur les grandes puissances de l'Entente, en demandant et en espérant de leur victoire dans la guerre la réalisation du programme national yougoslave. Les puissances de l'Entente, cependant, chacune pour ses propres raisons et intérêts, s'étaient opposées longtemps à la liquidation de l'Autriche-Hongrie (ce qui signifie qu'elles s'opposaient à la formation d'un Etat

yougoslave indépendant); ce n'est qu'au cours de l'été 1918 qu'elles avaient enfin pris la décision définitive d'anéantir la Monarchie et de former à sa place de nouveaux Etats nationaux. En même temps, dans le différend entre le Comité et les représentants de la Serbie relatif à la conception de l'unification, l'Entente a pris position au fond pour le gouvernement serbe.

A l'époque de l'effondrement de l'Autriche-Hongrie, en automne 1918, un Conseil national des Slovènes, Croates et Serbes s'était formé à Zagreb, au commencement comme représentation politique des peuples yougoslaves et à partir du 29 octobre 1918 comme organe suprême du nouvel Etat des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes, qui s'est formé à la suite du démembrement de l'Autriche-Hongrie. Depuis les premiers moments de sa formation, ce nouveau pouvoir s'est heurté à des difficultés politiques internes considérables: dans les masses populaires, les masses paysannes, s'était produite une véritable éruption d'attaques spontanées et de vengeances des paysans, dirigées contre les grands propriétaires, les organes du pouvoir et les biens et qui partageaient les terres des grands propriétaires. C'est pourquoi Conseil national de Zagreb a très vite perdu la bataille contre la bourgeoisie serbe, car il n'a pas osé, de même que le Comité yougoslave, chercher un appui pour ses revendications justifiées au sujet de son unification avec la Serbie, égale en droits, l'organisation fédérative etc., dans les masses paysannes et les autres masses de travailleurs, parce que ces masses s'étaient dressées ouvertement à cette époque non seulement contre les grands propriétaires, mais aussi contre la bourgeoisie. Il faut, noter aussi la situation spéciale dans laquelle se trouvaient alors les parties du Littoral adriatique que les Italiens avaient injustement occupées. Tout ceci avait influé sur la bourgeoisie des pays yougoslaves de l'ancienne monarchie habsbourgeoise de demander l'aide militaire de l'armée serbe et de mettre fin à ses hésitations concernant l'unification avec la Serbie, à laquelle avaient adhéré en ce moment la Voïvodine et le Monténégro. C'est ainsi qu'à la fin du mois de novembre le Conseil national de Zagreb a pris la décision d'envoyer une délégation à Belgrade aux fins de l'unification, et le 1-er décembre 1918 le régent de Serbie proclama à Belgrade »l'unification de la Serbie avec les pays de l'Etat indépendant des Slovènes, Croates et Serbes dans le Royaume uni des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes«.

Brièvement, à cause des intérêts de classe différents de la bourgeoisie des nations yougoslaves, les travaux préparatoires de la formation d'un Etat yougoslave commun se développaient lentement et péniblement au cours de la guerre; c'était une période de marchandages interminables, de méfiance permanente et de différends fréquents (ce qui a continué même après le 1-er décembre 1918). La bourgeoisie serbe, qui se trouvait dans une situation économique plus faible, avait formellement renoncé à Corfou, en 1917, à l'idée d'une Serbie élargie, mais c'est pourquoi elle avait insisté opiniâtement sur l'unitarisme et le centralisme, qui devaient lui assurer la prédominance politique et, par suite, la prédominance économique. Pour la même raison elle avait insisté aussi sur le maintien de la monarchie et de la dynastie serbe en tant que force centralisatrice. En 1918, elle a réussi à atteindre ce but avec l'aide des fractions de la bourgeoisie des autres pays yougoslaves.

IV. L'idée yougoslave dans la période d'entre les deux guerres

Par l'acte du premier décembre 1918 on avait effectivement posé les fondements de l'inégalité en droit des nationalités dans la première communauté des Yougoslaves. La première constitution de cet Etat, adoptée en juin 1921, a été rigoureusement unitariste. Du reste, dans le texte constitutionnel il était question de *trois* peuples et de *trois* noms d'une même nation, comme dans la déclaration de Corfou, mais en réalité la Constitution reposait sur la conception nationale unitariste; elle ne reconnaissait pas la spécificité nationale des Serbes, Croates et Slovènes et elle n'en tenait pas compte. La Constitution a établi le pouvoir d'Etat central, avec la dynastie serbe en tête, l'unité de la citoyenneté et du territoire. Les autonomies régionales étaient prévues pour les territoires peuplés de 800.000 habitants au maximum, afin que, par cette autonomie bourgeoise limitée, on ne puisse englober certains peuples yougoslaves, surtout les peuples qui sont les plus nombreux.

Une partie de la bourgeoisie serbe avait établi dès le début son hégémonie dans la vie politique du pays en s'emparant de toutes les positions clefs dans l'administration de l'Etat, tant dans le centre que, en grande partie, dans les provinces. Elle tirait parti de ces positions et parfois elle en abusait, sous prétexte que c'est elle qui a le plus de mérite pour l'oeuvre de la libération et de l'unification des peuples yougoslaves (quoique ce n'est pas elle qui a fait des sacrifices pour la réalisation de cette oeuvre, car en réalité c'étaient les masses populaires serbes). La politique unitariste et centraliste était appliquée le plus fortement et avec un esprit de conséquence par le parti radical, et les autres partis bourgeois (le parti paysan croate, la parti populaire slovène, le parti démocrate yougoslave, l'organisation musulmane yougoslave et autres) l'ont suivi dans cette voie et ont prêté leur appui tant au parti radical qu'à la couronne dans leur politique unitariste avec une réelle hégémonie serbe.

En établissant le régime dictatorial, avec le concours des milieux militaires, en janvier 1929, le roi Alexandre avait proclamé en même temps qu'en Yougoslavie, au lieu des nations réellement existantes, il n'y a qu'une seule nation, qui en réalité n'existait pas: la nation «yougoslave». Au fond, sous son régime dictatorial, qui a aboli la constitution et le parlement et qui a interdit les partis politiques, l'hégémonie serbe a continué à se maintenir, avec l'aide de certains hommes politiques des autres nations yougoslaves.

La question nationale n'était pas supprimée de l'ordre du jour même après la proclamation de la nouvelle constitution octroyée en 1931; au contraire, elle était toujours restée le problème central de la vie politique intérieure, en ébranlant constamment les fondements sur lesquels reposait le Yougoslavie en tant que communauté des peuples yougoslaves. La plus pressante et la plus âpre était la question croate, c'est-à-dire la question de l'égalité en droits du peuple croate avec le peuple serbe. Après plusieurs tentatives de résoudre cette question, le président du plus fort parti bourgeois croate — le parti paysan croate — Maček a conclu un accord en 1939 avec le président du conseil à cette époque Cvetković, accord d'après lequel a été formée la banovine croate avec une autonomie interne assez large. Cependant, cet

accord entre les représentants de la bourgeoisie croate et de la bourgeoisie serbe n'a pas réglé et ne pouvait pas régler la question nationale yougoslave; en réalité, il n'a pas été conclu dans l'intérêt et au profit des masses populaires croates; en outre, il n'a pas réglé la situation de la nation slovène; quant aux nations macédonienne et monténégrine, il n'en a même pas été question.

En ce qui concerne le parti communiste de Yougoslavie, représentant politique de la classe ouvrière lui aussi, à ses débuts, c'est-à-dire de 1919 à 1923, sous l'influence des erreurs de la période précédente, s'était prononcé en faveur de l'unité nationale des Yougoslaves, en considérant les Yougoslaves comme une nation qui se trouve dans le processus de formation. Depuis 1924, cependant, en se rendant compte de l'oppression nationale en Yougoslavie, le parti communiste a incliné dans son programme la lutte pour la réalisation du droit des nations à l'autodétermination et à la sécession. Néanmoins, conformément à la position et aux décisions prises par le Komintern, dont il était membre, le parti communiste de Yougoslavie soutenait pendant un certain temps l'opinion que le droit à l'autodétermination des peuples yougoslaves doit être réalisé par la sécession de la Croatie, de la Slovénie et de la Macédoine de l'Etat yougoslave et la formation de leurs républiques autonomes dans le cadre de la fédération des républiques ouvrières et paysannes dans les Balkans. Depuis 1934, le parti communiste de Yougoslavie, instruit par de nombreuses expériences tirées du développement politique de la Yougoslavie, prend conscience que la question nationale de la Yougoslavie peut et doit être résolue dans le cadre de l'Etat yougoslave et, ce qui est encore plus important, qu'il faut chercher cette solution dans le rattachement de la lutte des nations opprimées à la lutte de classes du prolétariat. Le rattachement de la question nationale à la lutte de classe du prolétariat de Yougoslavie assurera un grand succès au parti communiste, il l'éclaircira, lui donnera un caractère de masse et renforcera les rangs du parti, il lui permettra en même temps de poursuivre une lutte efficace, tant en ce qui concerne le renversement du gouvernement de la bourgeoisie qu'au sujet de la résolution de la question nationale yougoslave sur la base de la reconnaissance de toutes les nationalités yougoslaves et sur la base de leur égalité et de leur égalité en droits.

V. La question nationale yougoslave dans la guerre de libération nationale

L'insurrection contre les forces occupantes fascistes en Yougoslavie, que l'ennemi avait conquise, s'est déclenchée en 1941 parmi tous ses peuples, dans toutes ses contrées, mais d'une manière irrégulière et au début séparément dans chacune des nations yougoslaves. Au sujet de la question nationale, le déclenchement de l'insurrection nationale en 1941 a fait ressortir, entre autres: (1) que les masses populaires de la nation serbe, au nom desquelles l'oppression nationale était effectuée avant la guerre, n'avaient en réalité rien de commun avec la bourgeoisie gouvernante réactionnaire, car ces masses (les masses paysannes et ouvrières serbes) furent les premières à adhérer en grand nombre au mouvement de résistance des partisans, à la tête duquel étaient les communistes; (2)

que tous les peuples de Yougoslavie ont senti qu'ils doivent combattre l'ennemi fasciste, en abandonnant vite la voie des luttes mutuelles et de l'extermination, sur laquelle ils étaient poussés par les forces occupantes et les traîtres du pays; (3) que tous les peuples ont très vite compris que, sans la communauté et la vie en commun avec les autres peuples yougoslaves, ne peut être assurée ni la défense efficace ni l'existence aux divers peuples yougoslaves; (4) que le parti communiste yougoslave est la seule force politique générale yougoslave, qui a dès le commencement proclamé la fraternité et l'unité des peuples yougoslaves, qu'elle était seule capable de faire échouer les plans des forces occupantes et d'unifier de nouveau toutes les nations yougoslaves sur de nouvelles bases démocratiques.

Le parti communiste de Yougoslavie a compris dès le début que la guerre de libération populaire, qu'il dirigeait, n'est pas et ne peut pas être seulement la guerre contre les forces occupantes fascistes, et qu'elle doit être en même temps la lutte pour une nouvelle Yougoslavie démocratique, qui serait libérée, entre autres, de l'hégémonie serbe. »Notre lutte pour la libération nationale — écrivait Tito en 1942 — ne serait pas si opiniâtre et si efficace, si les peuples ne voyaient pas en elle, outre la victoire sur le fascisme, de même la victoire sur tous ceux qui oppriment et qui ont la tendance de continuer à opprimer les peuples yougoslaves. L'expression *la lutte pour la libération nationale* ne serait qu'une simple phrase et même une fourberie, si elle ne contenait pas aussi, outre le sens général yougoslave, le sens national pour chaque peuple séparément, c'est-à-dire si, outre la libération de la Yougoslavie, elle ne signifiait pas en même temps la libération des Croates, des Slovènes, des Serbes, des Macédoniens, des Albanais, des Musulmans etc., si la lutte pour la libération nationale n'avait pas ce contenu qu'elle apporte en réalité la liberté, l'égalité en droits et la fraternité aux peuples de Yougoslavie«.

Conformément à son programme d'avant-guerre et à sa politique concernant la question nationale, le parti communiste de Yougoslavie a abordé encore au cours de la guerre, dès que les circonstances l'ont permis, le problème de la question nationale yougoslave, auquel il a cherché une solution concrète. Immédiatement après la formation du Conseil antifasciste de la libération nationale de Yougoslavie (1942, à Bihać), on avait entrepris l'édification fédérative du pays, dont les premiers embryons pouvaient être aperçus dès le commencement de la lutte pour la libération nationale (formation des directions militaires et politiques correspondant aux différents pays, c'est-à-dire aux unités fédérales ultérieures); ainsi, au cours de l'année 1943 ont été formés les Conseils antifascistes de la libération nationale de Croatie, de Bosnie-Herzégovine, de Monténégro. Lors de la deuxième session du Conseil antifasciste de la libération nationale de Yougoslavie, en novembre 1943 à Jajce, fut prise la décision que la Yougoslavie devait être organisée sur la base fédérative. Dans l'introduction de cette décision ont été exposés sous forme de préceptes: le principe du droit de chaque peuple à l'autodétermination, la volonté des peuples de vivre en commun en Yougoslavie manifestée dans la lutte pour la libération nationale commune et la fraternité indissoluble des peuples de Yougoslavie en tant que fondements du nouvel Etat; ensuite, il fut souligné que „la Yougoslavie s'édifie et qu'elle sera édiflée sur le

principe fédératif, qui assurera l'entière égalité en droits des Serbes, Croates, Slovènes, Macédoniens et Monténégrins, c'est-à-dire des peuples de Serbie, Croatie, Slovénie, Macédoine, Monténégro et Bosnie-Herzégovine". Par l'édification ultérieure du pouvoir populaire, la Yougoslavie s'est formée encore au cours de la guerre en tant que communauté d'Etat fédérative sur la base de l'égalité et de l'égalité en droits des peuples qui l'habitent.

VI. *Les rapports actuels entre les nationalités en Yougoslavie*

Dans la nouvelle Yougoslavie socialiste la question nationale est rayée de l'ordre du jour en tant que problème d'hégémonie nationale et d'oppression des peuples. En tant qu'Etat fédéral des peuples égaux en droits et souverains, telle qu'elle est sortie de la guerre de libération nationale et de la révolution socialiste, la nouvelle Yougoslavie a dès le début de son existence dirigé sa politique de l'unité et continue à la diriger sur la base du développement national libre et de l'entière égalité en droits des Serbes, Croates, Slovènes, Macédoniens et Monténégrins, ainsi que des minorités nationales. Les droits des peuples de Yougoslavie au développement libre et à l'égalité en droits sont déterminés et garantis par la constitution et par une série d'institutions étatico-juridiques.

Pendant, eu égard au sous-développement économique historiquement conditionné de certaines parties de la Yougoslavie, il est compréhensible que l'égalité en droits politique et juridique des peuples de Yougoslavie ne serait que formelle si elle n'était pas effectivement complétée par l'égalité en droits économique, et c'est pourquoi on s'efforce d'accélérer le développement économique des régions sous-développées. Bien entendu, ce processus de l'égalisation économique n'est ni facile ni simple, et il ne peut pas donner des résultats définitifs en peu de temps. „Seul le développement économique conforme — constate-t-on dans le programme de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie en 1958 — de toutes les républiques populaires et de toutes les régions de la Yougoslavie, qui se manifesterà dans les résultats les plus favorables de l'économie yougoslave toute entière, peut servir de fondement solide à la réalisation de la politique socialiste véritable dans la question nationale". En d'autres termes: il n'y aurait pas d'égalité et d'égalité en droits réelles si on ne réglait pas en commun les problèmes économiques et si on n'assurait pas en commun les mêmes conditions de l'édification économique et culturelle de tous les hommes laborieux.

Les contradictions matérielles que la Yougoslavie socialiste a hérité du passé ont pour conséquence parfois des manifestations de nationalisme; plus précisément: certains éléments essaient de tirer parti et même d'abuser de ces manifestations pour attiser le chauvinisme et l'égoïsme nationaliste. Pour autant que les protagonistes d'un tel chauvinisme occupent des postes qui leur permettent d'influer sur l'adoption des décisions politiques, alors nous avons l'aspect le plus dangereux du nationalisme: le nationalisme étaticobureaucratique. Il apparaît le plus souvent sous forme d'encroûtement bureaucratique de la république fédérée que l'on favorise, d'entrave aux initiatives des organisations de travail de s'intégrer aux organisations des autres républiques fédérées, en

tant qu'encouragement aux programmes d'investissements mégalomanes dans une république fédérée, en tant que tentative de retour aux temps passés du nationalisme „yougoslave intégral”, etc. . . La deuxième forme du nationalisme se reflète dans certains cercles peu nombreux d'intellectuels et dans les milieux de petits bourgeois; il s'exprime sous formes de nationalisme ancien, traditionnel, romanitique, en tant que souci de conserver l'autonomie de sa langue, en insistant sur les célébrités historiques de son peuple tout en niant ou mésestimant l'histoire des autres peuples, enfin la crainte que sa nation se trouve menacée de la part des autres nations, etc.

Il paraît que les changements socio-économiques effectués au cours des dernières années — en comprenant sous cette expression la réforme économique et le renforcement des rapports de self-government — ont provoqué certains changements dans les rapports entre les nationalités; au premier coup d'oeil, il semble qu'ils ont renforcé et élargi les phénomènes de nationalisme; en réalité, ils ont surtout dévoilé et mis en évidence les problèmes dans les rapports entre les nationalités qui existaient déjà auparavant et qui, selon toute apparence, sont inévitables même dans la société socialiste. Le dernier, Neuvième congrès la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie, qui a eu lieu au mois de mars 1969, a examiné, entre autres, ces problèmes des rapports entre les nationalités. Le Congrès a conclu, au sujet de ces problèmes, que la réalisation de la réforme et la déétatisation des rapports sociaux créent des conditions pour le développement ultérieur positif des rapports entre les nationalités sur la base de l'égalité en droits, car la vraie liberté et l'égalité en droits des nations sont fondées sur la position économique et sociale de l'homme laborieux. „L'autogestion et la répartition d'après les résultats du travail — souligne-t-on dans la résolution du Neuvième congrès de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie relative au développement socialiste en Yougoslavie sur les bases de l'autogestion —, sur lesquelles sont basés et se développent les rapports entre les nationalités dans la Yougoslavie socialiste, garantissent aussi les intérêts économiques particuliers des communautés et l'unité de l'économie yougoslave, du système socio-économique et politique, ainsi que l'intégration de plus en plus profonde et la coordination des efforts de tous les peuples et nationalités de la communauté yougoslave en vue de contribuer au développement des bases matérielles du travail social. Les communautés nationales, c'est-à-dire les républiques fédérées, deviennent des communautés de self-government autonomes qui réalisent leurs intérêts communs en conformité avec la Constitution, les décisions des corps représentatifs et des autres organes de la fédération, c'est-à-dire par des accords directs, sur la base de l'égalité en droits de tous les peuples et nationalités, leur respect mutuel et la solidarité socialiste”. En même temps, le Congrès a signalé que les contradictions mentionnées plus haut doivent être même ultérieurement dirigées et réglées par des moyens économiques et autres. De même, c'est ainsi que doit continuer la lutte, surtout de la part des communistes en tant que partie la plus ardente de la classe ouvrière, contre le nationalisme sous n'importe quel aspect qu'il se présente, car il est évident qu'il peut avoir de sérieuses conséquences négatives pour la fraternité et l'unité des peuples et des nationalités, sur lesquelles repose la nouvelle Yougoslavie. Il s'est avéré tout particulièrement nécessaire

d'engager la lutte idéologique active contre toutes les manifestations nationalistes dans la vie culturelle.

En ce qui concerne les minorités nationales, au cours des dernières années on a obtenu d'importants progrès dans la réalisation de leurs droits constitutionnels de développer librement leur individualité nationale et leur esprit créateur culturel. Par ailleurs, de très bons résultats ont été obtenus dans la mise en application et le respect, réalisés de manière conséquente, de l'égalité en droits des langues des nations et des minorités dans les communautés, dont la structure nationale est mixte.

Dr DRAGOSLAV JANKOVIC

Professeur titulaire à la Faculté de Droit à Belgrade. Né à Leskovac le 21 décembre 1911. Après avoir terminé le lycée à Belgrade, il obtint sa licence de droit en 1936 et fut promu au grade de docteur ès sciences historiques en 1941. Il enseigne à la Faculté de Droit depuis 1940, sauf pendant la guerre, d'abord comme assistant et ensuite comme maître de conférences. Actuellement, professeur de l'Histoire des Etats et des droits des peuples de Yougoslavie et chef de la chaire de l'Histoire du droit.

Son travail scientifique porte sur l'histoire nationale et, spécialement, sur le droit et la politique des XIX et XXe siècles. Il a étudié plus particulièrement les problèmes étatiques et juridiques de la première insurrection serbe, les monuments juridiques serbes, les institutions politiques et les problèmes d'autogestion locale. Au cours des dix dernières années, il s'occupe surtout du problème de la création du premier Etat yougoslave.

Travaux importants: «Les partis politiques en Serbie au XIXe siècle» (thèse de doctorat), Belgrade 1950; «L'institution du Pravitelstvovouchtchi soviet», *Istorijski glasnik* 1—2/1954; «La Conférence de Genève sur la création de la communauté yougoslave en 1918», *Histoire du XXe siècle, Zbornik V/1964*; «La question yougoslave et la Déclaration de Corfou en 1917. Belgrade 1967». Collaborateur à l'édition des documents historiques (avec B. Krizman): «Documents relatifs à la création de l'Etat yougoslave», 1. I — 20. XII 1918, I—II, Belgrade 1964. Auteur de plusieurs manuels de l'histoire du droit national.

1. The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that this is crucial for the company's financial health and for providing reliable information to stakeholders.

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4. The fourth part of the document concludes by summarizing the key points discussed and reiterating the commitment to transparency and accuracy in all financial reporting. It expresses confidence in the company's ability to meet its financial obligations and to continue to grow and prosper.

Dr. Milan SAHOVIC

*Directeur du Département de droit international à l'Institut
de politique et d'économie internationales, de Beograd*

LA POLITIQUE DE NON-ALIGNEMENT ET LA YUGOSLAVIE

Déjà depuis des longues années la politique de non-alignement représente l'orientation générale de la politique extérieure de la Yougoslavie. Dès les premières actions initiées en vue de la formulation d'un programme d'action des pays non-alignés, la Yougoslavie se trouve parmi les membres les plus actifs de ce groupe. Par conséquent, il est normal de poser — quand on parle de la politique extérieure de la Yougoslavie — la question des raisons qui l'ont poussée dans cette direction.

On a répondu plusieurs fois à cette question dans la théorie et la pratique de la politique internationale. Dans toutes ces réponses on avait insisté presque régulièrement sur deux éléments qui expliquent au fond les motifs de la politique yougoslave de non-alignement:

— Le premier est celui qui souligne que la politique de non-alignement permet à la Yougoslavie de maintenir sa position internationale indépendante, ainsi que de développer librement son système politique interne, son socialisme démocratique d'autogestion, en partant des conditions qui existent dans le pays;

— Le deuxième élément est notre conviction que la politique de non-alignement reflète de la meilleure façon les besoins de la grande majorité des pays membres de la communauté internationale contemporaine; de plus, il nous semble qu'elle correspond le mieux au besoin de la lutte pour le socialisme et le progrès social en général dans toutes les parties du monde.

Je n'ai pas l'intention d'analyser en détail ces motifs qui se trouvent à la base de la politique yougoslave de non-alignement, ni de citer les déclarations du gouvernement et des hommes d'Etat yougoslaves à propos de la politique de non-alignement. Je parlerai devant vous de la politique de non-alignement en partant des questions actuelles, de ces questions qui préoccupent les politiciens et les diplomates, ainsi que les publicistes, lorsqu'on discute de non-alignement en tant que phénomène de la vie internationale contemporaine.

La question fondamentale qui se pose en ce moment dans ce débat concerne le rôle, la place que la politique de non-alignement doit avoir dans la lutte de forces qui se développe sur le plan international. Cette

question est posée toujours de nouveau après la Conférence au sommet des chefs d'Etat et de gouvernements, tenue au Caire en 1964, et surtout au cours des conflits et des crises internationales qui ont éclaté ces derniers temps dans les diverses parties du monde. Dans tous ces cas on a parlé de l'inefficacité de l'action des pays non-alignés, de leur impossibilité d'agir en commun en faveur de solutions justes et pacifiques des conflits en question. Et, il faut le dire ouvertement, on a tiré souvent, en posant la question de justification de la politique de non-alignement, la conclusion que cette politique est dépassée et ne correspond plus aux circonstances actuelles.

Cependant, si l'on veut répondre à cette question, il ne faut pas analyser la politique de non-alignement comme un phénomène isolé, mais l'étudier dans le cadre des tendances générales du développement des rapports internationaux après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Car la création de la politique de non-alignement est en premier lieu une des conséquences de la naissance d'un grand nombre de nouveaux pays indépendants au cours du processus de décolonisation, dont la culmination a eu lieu au début des années soixante de notre siècle. Et ce n'est qu'en manifestant ouvertement le vœu de rester à l'écart de la lutte entre les grandes puissances, et surtout entre les deux super-puissances, les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique et leurs blocs, et de participer sur le pied d'égalité avec eux dans la réglementation des problèmes internationaux, que ces pays ont posé la base de la politique de non-alignement qui ne représente que la continuation générale de la politique de sauvegarde des intérêts des petits et moyens Etats, manifestée dans le passé sous des formes très diverses.

Il me semble que dans la demande des pays non-alignés de figurer comme une des parties dans les négociations qui se déroulent entre les grandes puissances et leurs blocs, se trouve la caractéristique principale de la politique de non-alignement. En partant de ce vœu, les pays non-alignés ont en vue en premier lieu les problèmes internationaux universels, tels que: le désarmement, le développement économique et le renforcement de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de tous les Etats, et plus particulièrement des petits et moyens Etats qui se sentent, en principe, les plus menacés. Ils pensent, en même temps, à la liquidation de toutes les formes de colonialisme, d'impérialisme et d'hégémonie, et à la lutte contre le néocolonialisme. Leur but est de voir que tous les conflits soient résolus par des moyens pacifiques et d'aboutir à la réalisation d'une coopération internationale sans distinction quant à la grandeur des Etats, à leurs niveaux économiques, à l'appartenance aux blocs et à leurs systèmes politiques internes. Par conséquent, on peut conclure de ce que j'ai dit à propos de ces buts que la politique de non-alignement n'est pas orientée vers la négation du rôle et de la responsabilité que les grandes puissances et les autres pays industrialisés doivent avoir dans la vie internationale. Tout au contraire, en se déclarant pour l'affirmation et la réalisation de la politique de coexistence pacifique et active, en tant que vocation universelle, la pratique du non-alignement reconnaît la nécessité que tous les pays, grands et petits, appartenant aux blocs ou non, prennent une part active dans la recherche des solutions pour les grands problèmes internationaux.

En partant de ces principes de base, et indépendamment des effets concrets de la politique de non-alignement, on peut constater dès maintenant que cette politique a exercé une certaine influence sur le développement des rapports internationaux contemporains. Mais, ayant en vue la complexité de leur nature, il ne faut pas s'attendre à ce que la plate-forme de la politique de non-alignement soit réalisée dans un bref délai. Les rapports internationaux contemporains ne sont que la continuation de tout ce qui s'est déroulé dans le passé dans la communauté internationale, non seulement avant la deuxième guerre mondiale, mais aussi avant la première guerre mondiale, la continuation d'une situation dans laquelle les grandes puissances et les autres pays industrialisés tenaient dans leurs mains, grâce à leur force, le monopole de la réglementation des problèmes internationaux.

Après la deuxième guerre mondiale, avec la création de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, on a ouvert un peu — je parle ayant en vue la perspective historique — la porte à la démocratisation des rapports internationaux. Cependant, le rapport existant des forces, les grandes différences dans le niveau du développement économique et la tendance des grands de garder leur position privilégiée, nous obligent à constater que nous ne nous trouvons encore qu'au début de la réalisation de la participation égale, dans la vie internationale, des petits et moyens Etats, parallèlement et en commun avec les grandes puissances et les autres pays développés.

Si l'on ajoute la pression que la lutte entre les blocs des puissances, fait sur les rapports internationaux et plus particulièrement sur la position internationale des petits et moyens Etats et sur les travaux des organisations internationales, on peut voir dans cette pression aussi une des causes fondamentales du manque d'efficacité de la politique de non-alignement.

Il s'agit ici d'un phénomène qui mérite d'être souligné au cours de l'étape actuelle de l'évolution de la politique de non-alignement. Une crise de plus en plus aigüe caractérise l'état des rapports internationaux contemporains. Cette crise se manifeste ces derniers temps dans la longue durée de l'intervention des Etats-Unis au Vietnam et du conflit au Proche-Orient, ainsi que dans l'impossibilité de trouver des solutions aux problèmes politiques et économiques fondamentaux relatifs à la position des régions sous-développées, au désarmement, etc. Cette crise s'est manifestée aussi dans l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie et l'aggravation permanente des rapports entre l'Union soviétique et la Chine populaire.

Cette situation permet de comprendre pourquoi on trouve que la plate-forme et les buts de la politique de non-alignement représentent aujourd'hui, en premier lieu, un idéal, une tâche difficile pour tous ceux qui sont prêts à lutter pour son application, une tâche qui ne peut pas être réalisée tout de suite et dans une courte période de temps.

De l'état des rapports internationaux existant depuis la fin de la deuxième guerre mondiale on peut dégager un élément distinct très important pour la compréhension de la politique de non-alignement. C'est l'aggravation de plus en plus grande des contradictions entre les inté-

rêts des petits et moyens Etats, d'une part, et des grands puissances, d'autre part. Cette aggravation se manifeste de plus en plus à cause de la tendance manifestée surtout dans les rapports entre les deux super-puissances, qui insistent sur leur rôle prépondérant dans la solution des problèmes internationaux et qui ne sont pas prêtes de tenir compte des intérêts des autres pays. Les manifestations principales du rapport des forces envers les problèmes internationaux et des conflits qui en découlent, sont, d'une part, le recours à la politique de force et de pression (condamné pourtant du point de vue de droit international et de la Charte des Nations Unies) toutes les fois qu'elle peut servir à leurs intérêts et, d'autre part, la recherche et la poursuite, soutenues par la politique de force et de pression, des négociations mutuelles au détriment des intérêts des autres pays.

Comme première manifestation de cette politique des super-puissances peut être citée leur volonté de jouer le rôle principal dans la recherche des solutions concrètes. Elles ne nient pas le rôle des pays intéressés, mais elles ne sont pas trop favorables à l'action de l'ONU comme représentant de la communauté internationale des Etats. Un autre exemple se présente dans le domaine du désarmement, où l'on peut voir que les accords ne sont conclus qu'en rapport aux questions pour lesquelles les super-puissances sont intéressées plus particulièrement du point de vue politique, stratégique et technique. C'est le cas des accords sur l'interdiction partielle des expérimentations nucléaires, sur la non-prolifération des armes nucléaires et sur l'utilisation pacifique de l'espace cosmique. Tout ces accords peuvent avoir, peut-être, de l'importance pour la conclusion de l'accord sur le désarmement général et complet. Cependant, ils représentent aussi l'expression des intérêts des super-puissances. Enfin, on peut remarquer, dans le cadre de la politique des super-puissances, le voeu de voir la perpétuation de la politique de blocs en tant qu'instrument de la division du monde et leur solution commune des problèmes mondiaux. Il est intéressant de noter, en parlant de ce phénomène, que les Etats-Unis ont réagi très calmement au premier moment après l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie et que cet événement a été suivi d'efforts bien intenses des deux super-puissances dans le but de renforcer la cohésion entre les Etats membres de leurs blocs, du Pacte d'Atlantique du Nord et du Pacte de Varsovie. C'était, en fait, l'antithèse au développement positif de la politique de la détente, qui a eu lieu en Europe au cours des années qui ont précédé l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie.

Il s'agit, dans tous ces cas que j'ai cités, d'une même tendance dont la base est la conviction que la paix mondiale dépend exclusivement de l'accord entre les super-puissances. Ne niant pas la grande importance ou, si vous voulez, l'importance décisive que les rapports pacifiques entre les super-puissances peuvent avoir pour la solution des grands problèmes contemporains, il me semble que leur orientation politique doit être considérée aujourd'hui seulement comme un des aspects de la vie internationale. La composition de la communauté internationale est en ce moment si diversifiée qu'on doit tenir compte des intérêts de tous les Etats. Mais je ne crois pas que les intérêts globaux des super-puissances peuvent refléter aussi les intérêts des autres Etats. Enfin, notons que les super-puissances regardent presque

toujours avec une certaine méfiance les actions internationales indépendantes entreprises par les autres Etats, appartenant ou non à leurs blocs. On peut même dire qu'elles se montrent surtout susceptibles lorsque les petits et moyens Etats cherchent à résoudre des problèmes internationaux sur une base universelle et en dehors des blocs. Et puisque les pays non-alignés insistent toujours sur ces principes, en agissant comme force indépendante qui s'oppose à la division du monde entre les blocs des puissances, on peut comprendre facilement pourquoi leur activité internationale n'est pas soutenue avec enthousiasme par les grandes puissances.

Les reflets de cette orientation des grandes puissances se font sentir sur l'action des pays non-alignés, et en premier lieu sur la possibilité de réalisation des conclusions des conférences de Belgrade et du Caire dans le cadre l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU, au cours des conférences mondiales pour le commerce et le développement, etc. En effet, les demandes de ces pays sont négligées. D'autre part, on insiste toujours que les travaux des organisations internationales soient reliés à l'action des grandes puissances et les questions qui les intéressent le plus. Cette tendance est présente dans le domaine du désarmement, dans les débats qu'on a mené chaque année dans l'Assemblée générale sur la base du rapport du Comité des 18 pays de Genève, qui s'occupe des problèmes du désarmement et rédige des projets d'accords relatifs aux divers aspects de ces problèmes. En même temps, on peut voir qu'un bon nombre de petits et moyens Etats se sentent menacés, car ils ont l'impression que les possibilités de protection de la part de l'Organisation des Nations Unies et les autres organisations internationales sont très faibles. Dans la pratique, la Charte n'est pas respectée suffisamment. La collecte des fonds financiers qui devraient faciliter l'activité des organismes économiques se fait très lentement. Il existe un grand nombre d'organisations et d'organismes qui n'ont pas pu être mis en fonction à cause du manque de moyens financiers. Mais ces moyens doivent être reçus de ceux qui sont les plus développés et qui cependant soutiennent des vues politiques auxquelles ne convient pas l'action effective de tous les pays dans recherche de la solution des problèmes internationaux économiques et autres. Nous sommes témoins, de jour en jour, d'une activité dont le but est de transformer l'Organisation des Nations Unies en un instrument pur et simple de la politique des grandes puissances. Malgré les grands efforts déployés pour améliorer les travaux de l'ONU après l'augmentation du nombre de ses membres, on n'a pas réussi beaucoup dans ce sens. De même, nous ne pouvons pas être satisfaits de l'évolution d'un certain nombre d'autres questions internationales. Les questions coloniales ne sont plus résolues dans ces derniers temps. Elles se trouvent à l'ordre du jour de divers organes, on adopte chaque année de nouveaux rapports, on fait des études nouvelles, on crée de nouvelles commissions et on envoie des missions spéciales en Afrique ou en Asie, mais, en même temps, nous sommes obligés de reconnaître que l'effet de toute cette activité est bien faible.

Pourtant, les racines de cet état insatisfaisant de l'activité des petits et moyens Etats ne se trouve pas seulement dans la résistance des grandes puissances et des autres pays développés. La situation qui règne dans un bon nombre de ces pays non-développés, surtout en Afrique, en Asie et en

Amérique Latine, qui montre les grandes difficultés politiques et économiques auxquelles ils se heurtent, son avant tout le résultat du niveau de leur développement économique et politique très bas. Ce niveau n'est que la conséquence de la subordination et l'exploitation dont ces pays ont été l'objet grâce à la division impérialiste et colonialiste du monde. Toutefois, il s'agit ici d'un élément supplémentaire. L'impossibilité du développement d'une activité plus grande d'un certain nombre de pays non-alignés est avant tout le reflet d'un climat international déterminé et de l'action de ceux qui influencent directement la vie internationale.

Tout ce que j'ai mentionné ne diminue pas, d'après mon opinion, l'importance de la politique de non-alignement et le rôle historique de son programme. Au contraire, il me semble que l'analyse que j'ai faite confirme sa valeur et indique les sources dans lesquelles elle peut puiser sa force. De plus, il semble que ce sont surtout l'existence des blocs, l'impossibilité de ralentir la course de l'armement et la politique de compréhension mutuelle des super-puissances qui ont contribué à renforcer la conviction que la politique de non-alignement est la seule alternative qui correspond au besoin actuel d'initier une action très large de toutes les forces pacifiques dans le but contribuer à la consolidation des rapports internationaux en général. C'est une remarque qui peut être faite aujourd'hui, grâce à l'évolution de la conception du non-alignement qui a eu lieu au cours des dernières années et qui découle du processus de la désintégration des blocs, mentionné déjà en 1963 dans le discours du président Tito devant l'Assemblée générale. De plus, on peut dire que le nombre des Etats qui adoptent la politique de non-alignement a augmenté, indépendamment des continents sur lesquels ils se trouvent, de la nature de leurs systèmes politiques ou de l'idéologie qu'ils professent.

En effet, on comprend aujourd'hui de plus en plus la politique de non-alignement comme expression du droit de libre option dans la détermination de la politique intérieure et extérieure des Etats et non pas seulement, comme c'était le cas au début de sa cristallisation, comme expression du voeu de rester en dehors de la lutte entre les blocs. L'approbation de cette politique peut être prouvée en indiquant le nombre des pays qui ont pris part aux conférences au sommet à Belgrade et au Caire. A la conférence de Belgrade ont participé 25 Etats de plein droit et 3 observateurs. La conférence du Caire a eu 47 participants et 10 observateurs — au total 57. Il est encore plus intéressant de constater que l'idée du non-alignement s'est manifestée ces dernières années spécialement en Europe, bien entendu sous des formes qui correspondent le mieux aux conditions existant sur ce continent et non pas de la même manière qu'en Afrique ou en Asie. Pourtant, les manifestations de la politique de non-alignement en Europe sont très importantes, et l'on est obligé de tenir compte d'elles en parlant aujourd'hui de la politique de non-alignement. Car toutes les manifestations différentes de la politique de non-alignement ont un même but: elles démontrent le voeu de la majorité de petits et moyens Etats de prendre part à la réglementation des problèmes internationaux sur le pied d'égalité avec d'autres Etats du monde et de contribuer ainsi à la détente dans la vie internationale en général.

En parlant de l'application de l'idée du non-alignement en Europe, je voudrais vous rappeler qu'avant l'intervention en Tchécoslovaquie a

eu lieu la création du „groupe des neuf” — après l’adoption, en 1965, de la résolution de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU relative à l’amélioration des rapports en Europe, qui a eu une importance particulière. Le „groupe des neuf” a été constitué de telle manière qu’il comprenait les représentants des pays, socialistes, des pays occidentaux et aussi des pays européens non-alignés. Ce groupe a commencé ses travaux en étudiant un certain nombre de questions actuelles concernant l’adoption des mesures de détente et de repression des conséquences négatives de la division de l’Europe en blocs. Ce groupe a continué à s’élargir et ce sont les Pays-Bas qui se sont déclarés prêts à participer dans ses travaux. Après cette déclaration des Pays-Bas on a commencé de parler de l’existence du „groupe des dix” en Europe. En même temps, on a fait un grand nombre d’études sur les rapports européens, et j’ai remarqué, en assistant moi-même à plusieurs colloques internationaux, que toutes ces réunions ont reconnu l’existence d’une tendance d’élargissement de la politique de non-alignement en Europe. Même le Conseil d’Europe de Strasbourg a pris part à ces études par l’intermédiaire de l’Institute for Peace Research d’Oslo. Cette institution a organisé une enquête et préparé un rapport, dont un des principaux résultats est, d’après mon opinion, l’adoption d’une nouvelle classification des pays européens qui, contrairement à celle de la période antérieure, constate que, parallèlement avec les pays du Pacte atlantique et du pacte de Varsovie, on peut parler aussi du groupe de six pays non-alignés en Europe, dont les membres sont la Finlande, l’Irlande, la Suède, l’Autriche, la Suisse et la Yougoslavie.

En parlant du non-alignement en Europe il faut noter que, sauf la Yougoslavie, les pays non-alignés européens n’entretiennent pas des rapports spéciaux avec les pays traditionnels non-alignés d’Afrique et d’Asie. Leurs rapports mutuels se développent sur la base de la Charte et dans le cadre de l’Organisation des Nations Unies. Mais, tout en admettant ceci, il ne faut pas sous-estimer ce qui se passe en Europe. Enfin, on peut constater que l’intervention en Tchécoslovaquie n’a pas pu mettre fin à la lutte pour la participation de tous les pays dans la solution des problèmes européens. Même ceux qui ont entrepris cette intervention se sont prononcés plusieurs mois après, dans le cadre de l’Appel de Budapest, pour une conférence européenne générale et même, sous des conditions déterminées, pour la liquidation des blocs en Europe. L’activité générale qui a suivi l’approbation de cet Appel a contribué à la naissance d’un certain nombre de nouvelles initiatives pour le rassemblement des pays européens: celle de la Finlande, des pays scandinaves et de Pietro Nenni, ancien ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Italie. Toutes ces initiatives insistent sur la participation égale de tous les Etats européens, membres ou non des groupements militaires et politiques.

Il est encore trop tôt de parler de l’avenir de toutes ces initiatives, mais nous pouvons conclure qu’elles sont l’expression de la nécessité de chercher de nouvelles voies et méthodes pour la solution des problèmes européens. La condition préalable de leur réalisation consiste dans le respect strict, dans la pratique, des principes de l’égalité souveraine, du non-recours à la force et du droit des peuples à l’autodétermination, ainsi que d’autres principes de la Charte de l’ONU dans les rapports entre tous les pays européens. Ce n’est qu’en appliquant une telle politique

qu'on peut s'attendre à ce que la détente et la coopération s'affirment en Europe.

Cependant, parallèlement avec ce développement spécifique en Europe, qui contribue à la propagation de l'idée du non-alignement dans le monde, on peut constater que certains Etats d'Afrique et d'Asie ne sont plus prêts à prendre une part active dans les actions concrètes du groupe traditionnel des pays non-alignés. Cela s'est produit surtout au cours des conflits internationaux et de la réglementation des problèmes qui intéressent plutôt les grandes puissances, et particulièrement les super-puissances. Mais, il y a des pays non-alignés qui ne veulent pas adopter une attitude même dans le cas de conflits entre les pays non-alignés. Cette situation s'explique par diverses raisons. Il me semble que la raison principale d'un tel comportement est, d'une part, la crainte des réactions négatives de grandes puissances, inspirées par l'opposition manifestée envers leur politique et, d'autre part, le désir de garder à tout prix une position neutre, non seulement en vue d'éviter l'hostilité des parties en conflit, mais pour garder la liberté d'action. Dans tous ces cas on interprète le non-alignement comme tendance de rester en dehors des conflits, ce qui est indubitablement une position qui peut être utile à un certain moment, mais qui ne peut pas être satisfaisante si l'on veut contribuer activement à la lutte pour la réalisation de la politique de la coexistence pacifique et active dans le monde.

Ce deuxième phénomène que j'ai mentionné a une grande importance pour l'appréciation des possibilités d'action des pays non-alignés. Il est le résultat de l'évaluation subjective de leurs propres intérêts de la part d'un nombre de ces pays, mais il est aussi la manifestation du manque d'expérience dans les relations internationales. Il ne faut pas oublier que ces Etats ont été pendant longtemps l'objet de la politique extérieure des pays développés. Il faut savoir que la plupart des pays non-alignés se trouvent en ce moment dans la période où ils apprennent les méthodes de politique internationale et intérieure indépendantes et qu'il s'agit là d'une école que les pays européens ont terminée depuis longtemps.

Pourtant, tout en reconnaissant que la politique de non-alignement n'a pas été trop efficace, on peut noter, au cours des dernières années, plusieurs actions positives des pays non-alignés. Mentionnons d'abord leur activité à la Conférence des pays non dotés d'armes nucléaires en 1967 à Genève. Cette conférence a réussi à formuler les positions de tous les Etats qui, non dotés d'armes nucléaires, ne considèrent pas qu'ils ne sont pas qualifiés de prendre part dans les négociations qui se déroulent entre les puissances nucléaires. Le groupe des pays non-alignés a été très actif au cours de cette conférence et a réussi d'élargir la base de son activité commune avec d'autres pays prêts à collaborer avec eux dans le domaine du désarmement. Un effet semblable a eu ces derniers temps l'activité du groupe des pays non-alignés dans le Comité de 18 pays pour le désarmement, parmi lesquels se trouvent, aux côtés de l'Éthiopie, de l'Inde et de la République Arabe Unie, la Suède et le Brésil. C'est surtout lors de la rédaction du projet d'accord sur la non-prolifération d'armes nucléaires que cette collaboration s'est manifestée plus clairement. La même importance peut être attribuée à la coopération qui a commencé à se manifester entre les pays en voie de développement

et un nombre de petits et moyens pays pendant la deuxième Conférence mondiale pour le commerce et le développement. Enfin, il faut souligner spécialement les résultats de la Conférence consultative des pays non-alignés qui a eu lieu à Belgrade du 8 au 12 juillet 1969. Tout ce qui s'est passé au cours de cette conférence, terminée par l'adoption d'un communiqué dans lequel 51 participants ont insisté sur la valeur durable de la politique de non-alignement, démontre que l'idée de leur rassemblement, exprimée un an auparavant, n'était pas sans fondement. Tout en laissant à côté la question des possibilités des pays non-alignés d'influencer plus efficacement le développement des rapports internationaux, on peut conclure en tout cas que les pays non-alignés n'ont pas renoncé au besoin du renouvellement de leur activité, ni à l'idée de tenir une conférence au sommet au moment le plus propice.

En parlant de la politique de non-alignement, j'ai tâché d'expliquer les conditions dans lesquelles elle s'est développée, ainsi que les tendances générales de son évolution. De cette analyse on peut déduire que la politique de non-alignement est restée, malgré toutes les difficultés et faiblesses, l'orientation générale d'un grand nombre de petits et moyens Etats. Cependant, je voudrais vous parler encore un peu des différences qui existent entre les pays non-alignés quant à la direction générale de l'application de leur politique commune. C'est une question qui mérite une attention particulière. Mais je dirais aussi que cette question n'est pas nouvelle. En se tournant vers le passé, je voudrais vous rappeler l'attitude prise par Soukarno, ancien président de l'Indonésie, à la Conférence du Caire en 1964. Soukarno a insisté alors sur une ligne de conduite spécifique, qui n'a pas été approuvée par la grande majorité des chefs d'Etats et de gouvernements qui ont assisté à cette conférence. Soukarno a proposé la création de soi-disantes forces nouvelles, qui auraient pour but la lutte contre les pays développés du monde en vue d'une amélioration de la position des pays exploités. Cette proposition a été interprétée comme négation de la politique de coexistence et, comme telle, elle a été repoussée par la Conférence du Caire. La Déclaration adoptée par cette conférence insiste, au contraire, sur la politique de coexistence pacifique et active et sur son application d'après la Charte de l'ONU, sur le règlement pacifique des différends et sur une action internationale en faveur des pays en voie de développement.

Nous n'avons plus aujourd'hui des manifestations ouvertes de cette conception défendue par Soukarno. Pourtant, au cours des consultations qui ont eu lieu lors des préparatifs pour la réunion consultative à Belgrade et pendant cette conférence même, certaines délégations ont insisté sur le fait que les conditions ne sont pas mûres pour un nouveau rassemblement des pays non-alignés et surtout pour une nouvelle conférence au sommet. C'était surtout la délégation d'Algérie qui a déclaré qu'il fallait, avant la convocation de la conférence au sommet, aboutir à un accord général de tous les pays non-alignés sur tous les points de leur programme d'action et sur une ligne bien déterminée pour la réalisation de ces points. En défendant cette position, dont l'adoption a pu mener à une réduction sensible du nombre des pays se déclarant en faveur du non-alignement, la

délégation algérienne s'est désolidarisée dans une certaine mesure de la ligne générale de la politique de non-alignement adoptée déjà à Belgrade en 1961.

Tout en insistant sur la nécessité de faire augmenter le nombre d'Etats non-alignés, je voudrais souligner qu'il est évident que la réalisation de ce but dépend, peut-être, avant tout, du contenu actuel de leur programme d'action. Sur ce plan, il me semble que le but principal doit être l'adoption d'un programme plus développé que celui qui a été adopté au Caire et qui correspondrait davantage aux conditions et besoins actuels. Tout le monde est d'accord que le programme du Caire est dépassé. Sur ce point nous avons eu un débat très intéressant au cours d'un colloque international, organisé par l'Institut de politique et d'économie internationales de Belgrade au début de cette année. Dans ce débat, nous avons dû écouter une critique exprimée par nos collègues des pays occidentaux, qui ont souligné que les pays non-alignés avaient insisté jusqu'ici plus qu'il ne fallait sur l'organisation d'actions spectaculaires et de manifestations politiques générales. D'autre part, on a demandé que le nouveau programme des pays non-alignés prévoit des voies et des méthodes nouvelles qui permettraient l'établissement des liens plus concrets entre les régions développées et sous-développées du monde. Bref, le débat que nous avons eu pendant ce colloque a souligné qu'en ce moment la chose principale est d'aboutir à des conclusions communes des pays non-alignés au sujet de toutes les questions internationales actuelles. Ce n'est que de telle façon que les pays non-alignés peuvent compter que leur demande de prendre une part plus active dans la réglementation des problèmes généraux internationaux qui intéressent l'humanité, aurait plus de succès. Par conséquent, il faut faire de son mieux pour déterminer les principes généraux de la politique de non-alignement et les recommandations concrètes relatives à la solution des problèmes internationaux contemporains.

En terminant, je voudrais souligner que, malgré ses faiblesses et les difficultés auxquelles elle s'est heurtée dans le passé, la politique de non-alignement doit être reconnue aujourd'hui comme conception qui inspire la politique extérieure du plus grand nombre des petits et moyens Etats du monde contemporain et que, de ce fait, elle mérite l'attention particulière de la doctrine des relations internationales.

Dr MILAN SAHOVIC

Collaborateur scientifique supérieur, directeur du Département du droit international à l'Institut pour la politique et l'économie internationales, à Beograd.

Spécialité: le droit international.

Né à Beograd en 1924; a pris part au Mouvement de libération nationale; licencié à la Faculté de Droit de Beograd en septembre 1949; depuis

1948 collaborateur de l'Institut pour la politique et l'économie internationales et depuis 1959 directeur du Département du droit international du même Institut; dirige la section internationale de l'enseignement du 3-ème degré à la Faculté des sciences politiques, de Beograd; représentant de la Yougoslavie dans divers organes juridiques de l'Organisation des Nations unies et membre de plusieurs sociétés scientifiques yougoslaves et étrangères.

Auteur de maints articles et études traitant des questions théoriques et pratiques d'actualité relatives au droit international.

Ouvrages publiés: »Questions générales de la codification du droit international« (1958), »L'énergie nucléaire et le droit international« (1964) et »Les voies du développement actuel du droit international« (1969).



Dr. Živomir ĐORĐEVIĆ
Professeur à la Faculté de Droit à Beograd

LA PROPRIÉTÉ SOCIALE ET LE TRAVAIL EN TANT QUE SOURCE DES DROITS DE PROPRIÉTÉ

1. Du point de vue socio-économique, la source principale des droits de propriété des sujets concernant les valeurs d'usage (les biens), dans la société socialiste yougoslave, sont la propriété sociale et le travail. Cela signifie qu'en Yougoslavie, en tant que pays socialiste, les biens qui servent à la satisfaction des différents besoins sont acquis en principe par le travail personnel et, en premier lieu, par le travail avec les moyens de production dans la propriété sociale, et non point par l'exploitation du travail d'autrui avec les moyens dans la propriété privée, comme c'est le cas, en principe, dans les autres systèmes socio-économiques. Même dans les cas où il s'agit des moyens de production dans la propriété des particuliers, la source des droits de propriété n'est pas en principe, l'exploitation du travail d'autrui, mais le travail personnel du propriétaire de ces moyens et des membres de sa famille. C'est pourquoi on peut qu'en Yougoslavie la propriété sociale et le travail sont la source principale des droits de propriété.

Mais, avant de passer à l'exposé de la question quels sont les droits de propriété qui découlent de la propriété sociale et du travail personnel, il est nécessaire de consacrer quelques mots à la propriété sociale et au travail.

2. La propriété sociale est la forme fondamentale de la propriété en Yougoslavie. Elle est, avec le pouvoir de la classe ouvrière et des hommes laborieux en général, avec les personnes morales socialistes, avec l'autogestion et l'idéologie marxiste de la Ligue des communistes de Yougoslavie, l'un des appuis du système socialiste yougoslave.

La propriété sociale tire son origine de la propriété socialiste d'Etat. Et la propriété socialiste d'Etat a commencé à se former encore au cours de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, c'est-à-dire au cours de la lutte des peuples yougoslaves pour la libération et la révolution populaire. Sa formation a continué intensivement après la fin de la Deuxième guerre mondiale, c'est-à-dire quand la Yougoslavie s'est formée en tant que pays socialiste.

La procédé fondamental de la formation de la propriété socialiste d'Etat était l'expropriation de la propriété des catégories déterminées de propriétaires privés, en premier lieu des capitalistes¹. Il en a résulté la dépossession de la bourgeoisie dans le domaine de l'économie et de la possession des biens matériels en général. De cette manière s'est formée la base pour l'édification du mode socialiste de l'activité économique, de la société socialiste et des rapports sociaux socialistes en général.

¹ Les actes législatifs en vertu desquels a été effectuée l'expropriation sont les suivants: a) Les prescriptions adoptées en février 1942, dans la petite ville de Foča, connues sous le nom: »Les prescriptions de Foča«. En vertu de ces prescriptions, on a procédé à la confiscation de la propriété des ennemis du peuple: les oustachis, les traîtres, les espions et autres. b) La Loi relative à la confiscation des bénéfices de guerre acquis pendant l'occupation ennemie, loi adoptée en 1946 (Journal officiel de la République Fédérative Populaire de Yougoslavie, No. 52). En vertu de cette Loi ont été confisqués, au profit de l'Etat, les bénéfices acquis par des personnes physiques et morales pendant l'occupation par des moyens économiques ou par toute autre spéculation. c) La loi sur le transfert dans la propriété de l'Etat des biens de l'ennemi et sur la séquestration des biens des personnes absentes, adoptés en 1946. (Journal officiel de la R. F. P. de Yougoslavie, No. 63). Considéré dans l'ensemble, en vertu des trois actes législatifs mentionnés ci-dessus, une partie importante des biens qui se trouvaient dans la propriété privée a passé dans la propriété de l'Etat: ainsi, par exemple, 55% de l'industrie a passé en entier dans la propriété de l'Etat, et encore 27% de l'industrie ont passé dans la gestion de l'Etat. d) La Loi sur la nationalisation des entreprises économiques privées, adoptée en 1946 (Journal officiel de la R. F. P. de Yougoslavie, No. 98). En vertu de cette Loi, les entreprises économiques de 42 branches de l'économie ont passé dans la propriété de l'Etat. e) La Loi relative aux modifications et compléments de la Loi sur la nationalisation des entreprises économiques privées, adoptée, en 1948 (Journal officiel de la R. F. P. de Yougoslavie, No. 35). Par cette Loi a été complétée la nationalisation effectuée en 1946 par la nationalisation dans les domaines de vie qui n'étaient pas compris par la Loi précédente sur la nationalisation. En vertu des lois sus-mentionnées sur la nationalisation des entreprises économiques privées, les 45% restants de l'industrie ont passé dans la propriété de l'Etat. f) La Loi sur la réforme agraire et la colonisation, adoptée en 1945 (Journal officiel de la Yougoslavie Démocratique Fédérative, No. 64) et les lois sur la réforme agraire et la colonisation, adoptées par les républiques fédérées qui constituent la Yougoslavie (la Yougoslavie est composée de six républiques fédérées). Par ces lois, la propriété de la terre des agriculteurs a été réduite à 45 hectares de la surface totale ou à 20 jusqu'à 35 hectares de la surface cultivable, tandis que la propriété de la terre des non-agriculteurs a été réduite à 3 jusqu'à 5 hectares de la surface cultivable; toutes les autres terres ont été expropriées. Une partie des terres expropriées a été attribuée aux intéressés agraires, c'est-à-dire aux agriculteurs qui ne possédaient pas de terre ou dont la propriété n'était pas suffisante, et l'autre partie est restée dans la propriété de l'Etat. g) La Loi sur le fonds foncier agricole de la propriété du peuple tout entier et sur l'attribution de la terre aux organisations agricoles, adoptée en 1953 (Journal Officiel de la R. F. P. de Yougoslavie, No. 22). Par cette Loi a été effectuée la nouvelle réforme agraire et le maximum de la terre cultivable pouvant être dans la propriété privée d'un ménage agricole a été fixé à 10 hectares. h) La Loi sur la nationalisation des maisons de rapport et des terrains à bâtir, adoptée en 1958. (Journal Officiel de la R. F. P. de Yougoslavie, No 52).

Les années mentionnées des divers actes indiquent l'année quand a été adopté pour la première fois le texte épuré de l'acte. Un grand nombre d'actes mentionnés ont subi de nombreuses modifications et des compléments; par conséquent, ce fait doit être pris en considération si l'on veut connaître, dans tous les détails, les solutions législatives des diverses questions.

Dans la propriété de l'Etat, c'est-à-dire aujourd'hui dans la propriété sociale, se trouvent les choses et les biens suivants: a) les moyens de production et les conditions de travail dans l'exploitation des mines et dans l'industrie extractive en général, donc toutes les entreprises dans le domaine de l'exploitation des mines et de l'industrie extractive, ainsi que toutes les richesses minières et minérales, soit qu'elles sont exploitées ou non, soit qu'elles se trouvent sur le terrain qui est dans la propriété sociale ou sur le terrain qui n'est pas dans la propriété sociale; b) les moyens de production de l'industrie lourde, moyenne et légère, c'est-à-dire toutes les entreprises dans le domaine de l'industrie en général; c) les sources énergétiques (les sources de l'énergie électrique, de l'énergie atomique et des autres énergies, par exemple les centrales électriques et atomiques), ainsi que les entreprises dans ce domaine; d) les moyens de transport urbain et interurbain de grande importance, c'est-à-dire les entreprises de transport par tramways, trolleybus, autobus et camions, ainsi que les chemins de fer et leurs entreprises; e) les moyens de transport aérien et de transport maritime et fluvial de grande importance, bref tous les moyens de transport aérien, maritime et fluvial, ainsi que les établissements y afférents; f) les moyens pour l'exercice des services de communication et d'information, c'est-à-dire le service postal, les moyens de communication télégraphiques et téléphoniques, ainsi que leurs entreprises, les institutions et les moyens de radiodiffusion et de télévision, les entreprises pour l'édition et la distribution de la presse et des publications; g) les institutions bancaires et toutes les institutions financières et leur moyens, ainsi que les assurances; h) les moyens pour l'exercice des activités culturelles et de l'instruction publique et de la protection sanitaire; cela signifie les musées, les bibliothèques, les théâtres, les cinémas, les écoles, les entreprises d'édition et d'imprimerie, les entreprises de film et l'industrie de film en général, les hôpitaux, les cliniques, les sanatoriums et les autres institutions culturelles, scolaires et sanitaires; i) les biens publics, à savoir: les lacs, les fleuves, les canaux, les routes et les objectifs similaires, et les entreprises qui exploitent ces biens ou qui sont chargées d'en prendre soin; ensuite, les rues, les places, les parcs publics, les monuments culturels et historiques; j) les moyens de l'armement militaire, les fortifications militaires et d'autres inventaires militaires, ainsi que les entreprises de l'armement militaire et de l'équipement militaire en général; k) les moyens des entreprises et des coopératives de construction, et les moyens de grande importance dans l'industrie du bâtiment en général; l) les établissements hôteliers et touristiques, ainsi que les entreprises qui s'occupent de l'industrie hôtelière et du tourisme (seuls les établissements de moindre importance peuvent être dans la propriété des particuliers; m) les maisons d'habitation (les maisons d'habitation de moindre importance peuvent être dans la propriété des particuliers); n) les maisons et les locaux destinés aux activités économiques (les maisons et les locaux de moindre importance destinés aux activités économiques peuvent être dans la propriété des particuliers); o) les moyens des organisations agricoles, des coopératives et des autres organisations de travail dans le domaine de l'agriculture (la terre, les machines, le bétail et les autres moyens); p) les forêts et les terrains forestiers (à l'exception des complexes qui peuvent être dans la propriété des particuliers ou dans la propriété des églises et des monastères),

ainsi que les entreprises et organisations qui sont chargées de leur garde et de leur exploitation (par exemple, les scieries, les exploitations forestières et autres); q) le commerce et les entreprises commerciales; r) le gibier dans les forêts, les poissons dans les eaux et les oiseaux dans la nature, ainsi que les organisations de travail dont les activités ont trait à ces choses (par exemple, les entreprises et coopératives poissonnières); s) les moyens des entreprises et de diverses entreprises de service, des bureaux et des coopératives; t) tous les moyens monétaires et tous les biens (produits) réalisés dans les entreprises et les organisations de travail en général dans n'importe quel domaine de la vie.

Exprimée en pourcentage, la propriété sociale en Yougoslavie comprend aujourd'hui: 100% d'objets dans les exploitations minières et dans l'industrie extractive en général; dans l'industrie en général (lourde, moyenne et légère); dans les établissements bancaires et dans le domaine de financement en général; dans les assurances; dans le commerce en gros; dans le commerce extérieur; dans le domaine de l'énergétique (électrique, atomique, etc.); dans le domaine des services de communication et d'information; dans le domaine de la protection sanitaire; dans le domaine de l'activité culturelle organisée; dans le domaine du réseau routier et ferroviaire et des autres réseaux de transport; dans le domaine de l'équipement militaire et de l'armement, y compris les moyens pour leur production; 100% d'établissements de grande importance dans l'hôtellerie et le tourisme et une partie notable d'établissements de moindre importance; les maisons d'habitation de grande importance, pour l'exercice des activités économiques, les terrains à bâtir urbains; presque 100% de moyens de transport (seuls les moyens des services de taxi dans les villes et du transport par camions se trouvent, dans des proportions insignifiantes et limitées, dans la propriété des particuliers); le commerce de détail; 45% de forêts et de terrains forestiers; environ 20% de la terre cultivable et environ 4% de moyens dans l'artisanat.

Comme on voit, la propriété sociale ne prédomine pas seulement dans le domaine de la sylviculture, de l'agriculture et de l'artisanat. Cependant, le rôle réel de la propriété sociale et du secteur social de l'économie dans la sylviculture, l'agriculture et l'artisanat est d'une bien plus grande importance qu'on ne pourrait conclure d'après le pourcentage qui appartient à la propriété sociale.

Si l'on désire faire une comparaison entre la propriété sociale et une autre forme de propriété, alors la propriété sociale en Yougoslavie pourrait être comparée, dans un certain sens, à la propriété d'Etat dans les autres pays socialistes, quoiqu'elle ne soit pas identique à elle. Par ailleurs, la propriété sociale en Yougoslavie a pris naissance par la transformation de la propriété socialiste d'Etat. Cette transformation a commencé en 1950 par l'introduction de la gestion ouvrière dans l'économie, par la désétatisation des entreprises économiques et des institutions et leur transformation en organisations de travail autonomes, par l'abandon de la planification centralisée rigide, l'abandon de la liaison administrative des organisations économiques et le passage au système de leur action libre dans les cadres déterminés par la loi et la liaison par l'intermédiaire du marché sur la base de l'action des régularités du marché. La transformation de la propriété socialiste d'Etat est, selon la con-

ception dominante, terminée par l'adoption de la nouvelle Constitution de 1963. Cependant, à notre avis, avec la transformation de cette propriété dans la société on s'est arrêté à mi-chemin. En effet, la conception de la propriété d'Etat a été abandonnée, mais dans la compréhension de la propriété sociale dans la partie dominante de la théorie, de la législation et de la pratique, est accentué le moment qui rattache cette propriété à la société en tant qu'un tout, ce qui, au fond, ne signifie rien d'autre que le rattachement à l'Etat, vu que la société socialiste contemporaine est toujours organisée comme Etat. Notamment, la propriété sociale n'a pas obtenu dans la Constitution de 1963 une expression juridique claire et adéquate. En effet, dans la Constitution il est question, d'une part, de la propriété sociale en tant que propriété de la société et, d'autre part, de la formulation qui s'y trouve il découle que la propriété sociale n'appartient à personne, qu'elle n'a pas de sujet (de titulaire). Cela a donné lieu à la naissance de nombreuses théories se rapportant à la propriété sociale dans le but d'expliquer son essence, sa nature juridique et son appartenance. Ces questions ne se posaient pas tant que la propriété sociale avait le caractère de propriété d'Etat, propriété de l'Etat socialiste yougoslave.

A l'époque de la transformation de la propriété socialiste d'Etat en propriété sociale, est apparue la théorie selon laquelle la propriété sociale est le droit de propriété dont le titulaire (propriétaire) est l'Etat en tant que représentant de la société. D'après cette théorie, par conséquent, il n'y a pas eu de grands changements par suite de la transformation de la propriété d'Etat en propriété sociale. C'est surtout le nom qui a changé et, seulement en apparence, le sujet. En effet, le nom de propriété d'Etat est substitué par le nom de propriété sociale, et comme titulaire (propriétaire) c'est la société qui est désignée au lieu de l'Etat. Cependant, vu que la société est personnifiée dans l'Etat, en réalité c'est l'Etat qui apparaît comme titulaire de la propriété sociale; par conséquent, le même sujet comme lorsque la propriété sociale s'appelait la propriété d'Etat. Cette théorie est généralement abandonnée. A ses partisans on reprochait surtout qu'ils n'étaient pas à même de comprendre les nouveaux rapports sociaux qui se sont formés par l'introduction de l'autogestion dans les organisations de travail, par la désétatisation des entreprises économiques, la reprise de l'économie marchandise-monnaie et l'introduction du marché en tant que mécanisme de relations et de rattachement des organisations économiques, mais qu'ils sont restés sous le poids de l'étatisme.

Quand la théorie de la propriété sociale a pris naissance en tant que théorie dont le titulaire est l'Etat, est apparue la théorie selon laquelle le titulaire de la propriété sociale est la société qui vit et travaille dans le cadre de la Yougoslavie. On reprochait à cette théorie qu'elle n'a pas déterminé avec plus de précision la notion de la société. Si l'on aborde cette question, alors on arrive à la conclusion qu'au niveau actuel du développement il n'y a pas que la société qui est organisée comme Etat. Par conséquent, disent les critiques, il en résulte que l'Etat est le sujet de la propriété sociale.

Au sujet de la propriété sociale est apparue aussi la théorie selon laquelle tous les sujets en Yougoslavie, toutes les personnes physiques et morales, sont titulaires de la propriété sociale en tant que copropriétaires; à chaque sujet appartient la part idéale correspondante. Cette con-

ception ne pouvait pas se maintenir longtemps, car elle n'était pas conforme à la réalité. En effet, de nombreux sujets, en premier lieu les citoyens, n'ont aucun droit par rapport aux objets dans la propriété sociale; ces droits appartiennent tout d'abord aux organisations constituées en tant que personnes morales socialistes.

Il y a aussi une théorie selon laquelle la propriété sociale appartient à chacun et à personne, c'est-à-dire que, dans un certain sens, elle appartient à chaque sujet en Yougoslavie, car tout sujet tire d'elle un certain profit et cependant si l'on examine l'ensemble, personne n'est le titulaire de la propriété sociale. Cette théorie est généralement rejetée, car, d'une part, la propriété désigne l'appartenance directe et non point le profit des choses et, d'autre part, chaque sujet en Yougoslavie ne tire pas le même profit des choses dans la propriété sociale; certains sujets ont un profit direct, et certains autres plutôt un profit symbolique qu'un profit réel, et même sans profit symbolique.

Dans la science du droit civil (patrimonial) a pris naissance la théorie de la propriété sociale en tant que propriété divisée. D'après cette théorie, la propriété sociale est une sorte de propriété collective par rapport à laquelle aucun sujet ne possède intégralement le droit de propriété, mais à propos des mêmes choses, plusieurs sujets ont des pouvoirs différents. Par conséquent, les pouvoirs qui se rapportent à la propriété sociale sont répartis entre divers sujets. Certains de ces pouvoirs sont de nature de droit civil (patrimonial), et d'autres de nature de droit public, de sorte qu'il existe deux composantes de la propriété sociale: de droit civil (patrimonial) et de droit public. Cette théorie s'appuie sur certaines prescriptions de droit positif qui, en relation avec les choses se trouvant dans la propriété sociale (par exemple, les maisons d'habitation), donnent des pouvoirs juridiques différents à des sujets différents. Néanmoins, la propriété sociale ne peut pas être qualifiée comme une sorte de propriété collective. Pour la propriété collective il est caractéristique qu'elle appartient à tous les membres (sujets) d'une communauté (collectivité) déterminée; qu'elle n'est pas répartie ni réellement ni idéalement entre les sujets; que tous les sujets ont le droit d'usage des choses dans la propriété collective. La propriété sociale n'a pas ces qualités. Certaines solutions de droit positif, qui infèrent qu'il s'agit de la propriété sociale en tant que propriété collective, représentent des exceptions et non point un principe, une règle.

Au sujet de la propriété sociale il y a aussi une théorie selon laquelle elle n'est pas le droit de propriété, car aucun sujet n'exerce ce droit exclusivement dans son intérêt, comme le font les propriétaires. Les pouvoirs découlant de la propriété sociale sont répartis entre différents sujets: la société, l'organisation de travail et l'homme laborieux; chacun de ces sujets et tous ensemble exercent les pouvoirs qui leur sont attribués, non seulement dans leur intérêt, mais aussi dans l'intérêt de la société, aussi bien de la société existant aujourd'hui que de la société future. Les pouvoirs juridiques que possèdent les divers sujets ne sont pas leurs droits subjectifs, mais ce sont des compétences, des fonctions. Cette théorie représente en réalité la combinaison de deux autres théories: la théorie de la propriété sociale en tant que propriété divisée et la théorie de Duguit sur la propriété et les droits subjectifs en général en tant que fonction sociale.

Au sujet de la propriété sociale il y a également des théories selon lesquelles cette propriété n'est pas une institution juridique, mais plutôt économique, ou sociologique. Ces théories ont de nombreuses variantes, et elles s'appuient sur certaines doctrines des classiques du marxisme concernant la propriété. On peut dire que ces théories sont fausses dans la partie où elles contestent à la propriété son caractère juridique; la société contemporaine est organisée comme un ordre étatique, si bien que toute propriété, même la propriété sociale, représente une institution juridique.

Il faut dire aussi qu'après l'adoption de la Constitution de 1963, dans le cadre de la théorie du droit constitutionnel, il y a eu une opinion d'après laquelle la propriété sociale serait une catégorie du droit constitutionnel et non une catégorie du droit civil (du droit patrimonial), qu'elle n'est pas le droit de propriété dans le sens du droit subjectif, qui aurait un titulaire déterminé, car selon la Constitution, la propriété sociale n'appartient à personne. Divers sujets, avant tout les organisations de travail, ne possèdent sur les objets de la propriété sociale que les pouvoirs juridiques (les droits) fixés par la loi; leurs formes et leurs contenus sont souvent différents, ce qui, d'une part, dépend de la nature des objets que le sujet possède et, d'autre part, de la nature du sujet qui possède les objets en question. Les droits dont disposent les divers sujets, en ce qui concerne les objets dans la propriété sociale, ne sont pas les droits découlant du droit de propriété sociale, car ce droit n'existe pas, mais ce sont leurs droits originaires. Cette opinion est prédominante; elle a trouvé son expression et son appui dans la Constitution également. Cependant, elle a de graves défauts. Tout d'abord, la propriété sociale ne peut pas être une catégorie constitutionnelle sans être en même temps une catégorie du droit civil (du droit patrimonial); on peut dire que la propriété en général, et la propriété sociale également, est essentiellement une catégorie du droit civil (du droit patrimonial). D'autre part, la prescription de la Constitution, en vertu de laquelle la propriété sociale n'appartient à personne, et les opinions fondées sur cette prescription représentent une fiction, car toute propriété, et même la propriété sociale, représente le rapport social entre les personnes (les sujets) par rapport aux choses. En effet, il y a toujours un sujet auquel la propriété appartient et des sujets dont le devoir est de respecter cette propriété. On peut en déduire que les prescriptions de la Constitution concernant la propriété sociale et la théorie du droit constitutionnel qui est basée sur ces prescriptions ne donnent pas de réponses aux questions fondamentales qui se posent au sujet de la propriété sociale. Elles restent hésitantes entre le désir de désétatiser la propriété sociale et de la rattacher en même temps par son concept à la société en tant qu'élément universel de liaison — mais en réalité elles n'y arrivent pas, car la société contemporaine de caractère socialiste est organisée comme un Etat, et entre le désir que les organisations de travail et les personnes morales socialistes en général soient les titulaires des droits originaires de propriété par rapport aux objets dans la propriété sociale et non les titulaires des droits qui découleraient de la propriété sociale en tant que concept juridique plus large, en tant que droit qui appartiendrait à la société ou à l'Etat. Cependant, ces désirs sont contradictoires; ils démontrent que, dans l'expression juridique de la propriété sociale, on s'était arrêté à mi-

-chemin, c'est-à-dire que l'expression de la propriété sociale n'est pas adéquate aux rapports socio-économiques décentralisés et désétatisés qui règnent en Yougoslavie.

L'expression juridique et théorique adéquate de la propriété sociale n'est possible que si l'on considère attentivement la situation réelle par rapport à la propriété en question ou, autrement dit, si l'expression juridique et l'explication théorique soient en accord avec les rapports existants réellement et qui doivent être réalisés en ce qui concerne la propriété sociale. Or, la situation réelle qui, à ce point de vue, existe à l'époque actuelle dans la société yougoslave est la suivante: les objets dans la propriété sociale sont partagés entre divers sujets: les personnes morales socialistes (entreprises, établissements, coopératives et organisations de travail et, en partie, également les organes d'Etat); les sujets en tant que possesseurs de certaines parties des objets dans la propriété sociale sont indépendants les uns des autres et autonomes; chaque sujet, en ce qui concerne la partie des objets qu'il possède, dispose du droit absolu de garder ces objets, d'en user et d'en disposer dans les limites établies par la loi; ce droit des personnes morales socialistes se comporte en tout comme le droit de propriété, mais il est nommé par la loi le droit d'usage, d'où provient l'illogisme et la contradiction que voici: quand la personne morale socialiste fait cession des objets qu'elle possède à un citoyen ou à une personne morale privée, elle lui fait cession du droit de propriété bien qu'elle ne possède que le droit d'usage, ce qui veut dire qu'elle transfère plus de droit qu'elle ne possède réellement; les entreprises, les établissements, les coopératives et les organisations de travail ne représentent pas les parties de l'appareil d'Etat comme autrefois, mais ils sont des organisations de travail fondées d'une façon autonome et ayant le caractère de la personne morale socialiste; l'Etat en tant qu'autorité n'exerce aucun pouvoir concernant le droit de propriété, l'Etat en tant que pouvoir souverain fixe les limites législatives dans lesquelles les sujets peuvent réaliser leurs droits, le droit de propriété y compris; les sujets économiques, en tant qu'organisations de travail fondées d'une façon autonome, entretiennent des relations mutuelles par l'intermédiaire du marché; l'Etat n'exerce aucune fonction opérative économique, comme c'était le cas autrefois. Il en résulte que, dans la phase actuelle du développement de la Yougoslavie, la propriété sociale et l'économie sont désétatisées et décentralisées. Dans cette situation, il ne faut pas rattacher la propriété sociale à un élément de liaison (la société c'est-à-dire l'Etat), car ce n'est pas nécessaire ni justifié, et cet état de choses ne correspondrait pas à la situation actuelle. Il en était autrement à l'époque où les entreprises et les établissements représentaient les parties intégrantes de l'Etat et où l'Etat était la plus grande puissance économique. A cette époque-là, l'Etat était vraiment un élément opératif de liaison en tant que propriétaire et puissance économique, ce qui, au point de vue juridique, se reflétait dans la planification centralisée, dans la gestion économique et opérative et dans la propriété appartenant à l'Etat. Donc, à l'économie centralisée et étatisée correspondait la forme de la propriété centralisée et étatisée dont l'exemple était la propriété socialiste d'Etat. Par contre, à l'économie et à la vie sociale décentralisées et désétatisées, comme c'est le cas de l'économie et de la vie sociale yougoslaves contemporaines, correspond la forme de

la propriété décentralisée et désétatisée, et c'est la propriété qui n'appartient pas à l'Etat, c'est-à-dire à la société en tant qu'élément universel de liaison, mais elle appartient aux personnes morales socialistes décentralisées et désétatisées en tant que pivot central et porteur de la vie économique socialiste et du système socialiste tout entier. L'Etat, c'est-à-dire la société en tant qu'élément universel de liaison, existe nécessairement pour d'autres manifestations de la vie sociale (par. ex. pour l'activité législative, pour l'exercice du pouvoir opératif dans les domaines déterminés de la vie), mais il n'existe pas pour servir à l'unification de la propriété sociale. Si l'on accordait aux personnes morales socialistes le droit de propriété sur les objets qu'elles possèdent, ce qui est un problème juridique ayant trait à la forme et non à l'essence, tenant compte du fait que le droit d'usage dont disposent ces personnes se comporte comme le droit de propriété, on pourrait éviter la contradiction logique et juridique qui existe à l'époque actuelle et qui, comme on vient de le dire, consiste dans le fait que ces personnes, en faisant cession du droit de propriété sur les objets qu'elles possèdent aux divers sujets, transfèrent plus de droits qu'elles ne possèdent réellement. Cependant, l'attribution du droit de propriété aux personnes morales socialistes sur les objets qu'elles possèdent n'est pas exclusivement une question de forme. C'est une question ayant également un certain poids social et une importance essentielle. En rattachant la propriété sociale à la société en tant que concept universel et moteur, les lois et la théorie sociales et juridiques, fondées sur cette base, donnent la possibilité aux organes dirigeants et aux personnes qui en font partie de parler au nom de la société en ce qui concerne la propriété sociale et de défendre non seulement les intérêts de la société, mais également leurs propres intérêts, qui sont contraires aux intérêts plus larges de la société. C'est justement ce que l'on ne voudrait pas permettre en Yougoslavie, parce que c'est absolument contraire au système démocratique et socialiste très humain que l'on est en train d'édifier en Yougoslavie et qui, entre autres choses, se distingue justement par les limites bien claires et les compétences fixées par la loi de la sphère d'action de chaque organe et de chaque individu. Dans ce cas, il faut conformer la conception de la propriété sociale à l'économie et à la vie sociale décentralisés et désétatisés, c'est-à-dire il faut la centraliser et désétatiser, elle aussi. Donc, la propriété sociale ne doit pas être un concept juridique lié à la société ou à l'Etat, mais la propriété liée aux personnes morales socialistes, qui a un caractère social, socialiste. Ce caractère doit être déterminé et motivé par la théorie socio-juridique. Il en résulte que seule la propriété est un concept juridique, tandis que le qualificatif social n'est pas un concept juridique, mais théorique, de même que par ex. le qualificatif privé, capitaliste, féodal ou celui qui est typique pour le régime d'esclavage. On peut se demander s'il y a suffisamment d'éléments qui peuvent servir pour que la propriété des personnes morales socialistes soit qualifiée comme propriété sociale et socialiste. Nous considérons qu'il y en a suffisamment. Il suffit de citer que les personnes morales socialistes sont des sujets spécifiques seulement de la société socialiste. On ne peut pas imaginer l'existence de cette société sans l'existence des personnes morales socialistes. Ces personnes représentent l'expression socio-juridique de l'association socio-économique et de l'activité socialiste de la classe

ouvrière et des travailleurs en général, à savoir du potentiel humain, qui est le porteur et le pivot central du système social socialiste; elles sont pour la société socialiste ce que les capitalistes sont pour la société bourgeoise, les grands seigneurs pour la société féodale, les maîtres d'esclaves pour le régime d'esclavage. Cependant, à l'époque actuelle, il paraît que les forces dirigeantes de la société ne sont pas prêtes à accorder aux personnes morales socialistes le droit de propriété sur les objets qu'elles possèdent et qui sont considérés comme la propriété sociale. Les raisons de cette attitude sont multiples. Tout d'abord, dans la théorie marxiste et socialiste en général, la propriété sociale et socialiste se rattache en tant que concept général à la société ou à l'Etat et non aux personnes morales socialistes. Deuxièmement, le rôle et l'importance des personnes morales socialistes ne sont pas suffisamment mis en vue, car l'existence des personnes morales socialistes est un phénomène relativement récent. En effet, à l'époque de la formation de la pensée socialiste classique, leur existence, leur rôle et leur importance n'ont pas pu être prévus, tandis qu'à l'époque de l'existence de la propriété socialiste d'Etat, de la planification centralisée et de la gestion administrative de l'économie et de la vie sociale, le rôle et l'importance des personnes morales socialistes étaient submergés et cachés par le rôle et l'importance de l'Etat socialiste, d'autant plus qu'elles représentaient avant tout les parties de l'appareil d'Etat. En troisième lieu, il existe une certaine crainte, injustifiée à notre avis, de l'attribution du droit de propriété aux personnes morales socialistes. En effet, on considère que cela permettrait aux personnes morales socialistes de disposer tout à fait librement des objets qu'elles possèdent. On oublie que le droit de propriété, comme tout autre droit, est un pouvoir dont les limites sont déterminées par la société ou par l'Etat. Les limites déterminées par l'Etat ne dépendent pas du genre du droit et de son appellation, mais des rapports entre les forces sociales qui représentent une société déterminée et des besoins du moment. Quatrièmement, il y a une habitude invétérée de considérer la propriété sociale comme la propriété de la société. Il n'est pas facile de la combattre, même avec beaucoup de volonté. On voit bien qu'il faudrait surmonter plusieurs obstacles pour que la propriété sociale acquière sa véritable expression, qui correspond à la situation socio-économique en Yougoslavie, pour qu'elle devienne la propriété des personnes morales socialistes. Si cela était fait, on passerait la deuxième moitié du chemin où l'on s'était arrêté, c'est-à-dire la propriété sociale serait décentralisée et désétatisée au point de vue juridique, aussi bien qu'au point de vue socio-économique. En même temps, elle serait démystifiée et elle n'apparaîtrait plus comme un problème complexe, embrouillé, plein de contradictions au point de vue juridique, et assez mystique. Mais il paraît que dans ce cas également, il faudrait appliquer la vieille règle que les plus grands efforts sont nécessaires pour les solutions les plus simples.

3. Le travail dans la société socialiste et dans la société yougoslave joue un rôle très important. En effet, la société socialiste désire créer et elle crée déjà les conditions dans lesquelles les hommes vivent de leur travail, des biens qu'ils acquièrent par leur travail ou par les moyens matériels qu'ils gagnent par leur travail également. Ce postulat est valable pour tous les membres de la société socialiste. Sa tendance

est de devenir une règle sans exceptions. Cependant, cela ne veut pas dire que tous les hommes en Yougoslavie vivent à l'époque actuelle exclusivement de leur travail. On pourrait dire que la plupart des citoyens yougoslaves vivent seulement de leur travail, mais il y en a toujours qui arrivent à bien vivre sans travailler ou à travailler moins qu'il ne faut pour leur train de vie. Pourtant, on peut dire qu'on a réalisé le principe d'après lequel chacun vit de son travail. Ce n'est pas le cas des autres systèmes socio-économiques, dans lesquels les membres de la classe dirigeante ne vivent pas, en principe, de leur travail, mais jouissent de leurs biens et des fruits de l'exploitation du travail d'autrui — du travail des classes exploitées.

Dans la société socialiste, tout travail est respecté s'il est utile pour la société, qu'il soit manuel ou intellectuel. Dans les autres systèmes socio-économiques, la valeur sociale du travail n'est pas reconnue, bien que toute société soit fondée sur le travail de ses membres. En effet, le régime d'esclavage méprisait le travail manuel, bien qu'il dépendait du travail des esclaves, tandis que la société bourgeoise apprécie beaucoup plus le travail intellectuel que le travail manuel.

Dans la société socialiste yougoslave, le travail est effectué par les moyens de travail dans la propriété sociale ou par les moyens de travail dans la propriété privée. La plupart des biens matériels qui servent aux besoins de la société et de ses membres sont créés par le travail, à l'aide des moyens dans la propriété sociale. Un homme seul peut posséder seulement une catégorie et un volume déterminés des moyens de travail; il ne peut pas posséder une fabrique, une entreprise ou autres moyens importants de travail. Il peut utiliser les moyens qu'il possède pour l'activité personnelle ou le travail avec les membres de sa famille. Il ne peut engager la main-d'oeuvre que dans une mesure limitée.

Dans la société socialiste yougoslave, le travail est rémunéré d'après les résultats obtenus. Ce principe est appliqué dans la sphère du travail manuel, aussi bien que dans celle du travail intellectuel. Il y a des difficultés qui apparaissent surtout dans la sphère du travail intellectuel, par. ex. dans le domaine de l'instruction publique et dans celui de l'activité scientifique. Cependant, dans ces domaines également, on essaie de trouver des instruments qui permettraient que les travailleurs soient rémunérés d'après les résultats de leur travail.

4. La propriété sociale et le travail en tant que sources des droits de propriété ne sont pas d'une importance égale. Le travail est une source plus large et plus importante des droits de propriété. Il est la source non seulement des droits de propriété sur les biens acquis par le travail de l'individu, soit à l'aide des moyens de production dans la propriété sociale, soit à l'aide des moyens de production appartenant à un homme seul, mais aussi la source de l'augmentation du volume de la propriété sociale. En effet, en travaillant avec les moyens dans la propriété sociale, les travailleurs laissent une partie importante des revenus acquis par le travail à l'organisation de travail à laquelle ils appartiennent et à l'Etat en tant que communauté sociale. Cet argent sert, entre autre, pour les nouveaux investissements et pour la reconstruction des ateliers déjà existants, ce qui augmente le volume et la capacité productrice des moyens dans la propriété sociale.

En conclusion, le travail est avant tout la source de l'augmentation de la propriété sociale en tant que forme la plus importante de la propriété en Yougoslavie et institution fondamentale du droit patrimonial.

Cependant, le travail est la source et la base de l'existence d'une autre forme très importante de propriété — droit de propriété d'un individu. Mais il n'est pas seulement la source et la base de l'existence de cette propriété. Il l'est, soit avec la propriété sociale des moyens de production, soit avec la propriété des moyens de production appartenant à un individu.

Le travail effectué à l'aide des moyens de production dans la propriété sociale représente la source et la base de l'existence de la propriété personnelle d'un individu ou de la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit, tandis que le travail effectué à l'aide des moyens de production dans la propriété d'un individu représente la source et la base de la justification de la propriété privée d'un individu ou de la propriété de travail, c'est-à-dire de la propriété personnelle d'un individu dans un sens plus large.

La propriété personnelle, c'est-à-dire la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit peut être possédée seulement par des individus, des citoyens — des personnes physiques. Elle comprend les objets »servant à la consommation personnelle, à l'usage personnel ou à la satisfaction... des besoins culturels ou autres« des citoyens (la Constitution de 1963, Introduction, Principes fondamentaux, III, al. 10). Donc, la propriété personnelle, c'est-à-dire la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit, en tant que forme de propriété, se distingue par deux caractéristiques: primo, elle se rapporte aux objets qui servent à la consommation personnelle, à l'usage personnel ou à la satisfaction des besoins personnels de l'homme en général, et secundo, elle est la conséquence du travail personnel (individuel) à l'aide des moyens de production dans la propriété sociale.

Dans la propriété personnelle, c'est-à-dire dans la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit, peuvent se trouver divers objets qui servent à la consommation personnelle, à l'usage personnel ou à la satisfaction des besoins personnels les plus divers comme: aliments, vêtements, chaussures, objets servant à l'hygiène, ornements et bijoux, mobilier, etc., mais cela peut être également la maison d'habitation ou l'appartement et la voiture particulière ou servant à toute la famille. Dans la société socialiste yougoslave il n'y a pas de restrictions en ce qui concerne les objets dans la propriété personnelle et qui servent à la consommation, à l'usage et à la satisfaction des besoins personnels de l'homme. La société socialiste yougoslave aide à l'augmentation du volume de la propriété personnelle, car le degré du développement de la propriété personnelle reflète le niveau de vie.

La propriété personnelle d'un individu, c'est-à-dire la propriété personnelle de travail ou la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus large, comprend les moyens de production dans la propriété d'un individu et les biens créés par ces moyens: ces biens ont surtout le caractère des objets dont on se sert ou qui servent à l'acquisition des moyens pour la consommation personnelle, pour l'usage et pour la satisfaction des besoins du propriétaire des moyens de production et des membres de sa famille. Un homme seul, en tant que propriétaire des moyens de

production, travaille en règle générale en utilisant ces moyens, de sorte que cette propriété possède en principe un caractère particulier qui n'est pas celui de l'exploitation, et c'est pourquoi on l'appelle souvent la propriété personnelle de travail. Cependant, cette propriété permet l'utilisation de la main-d'oeuvre, mais son volume est limité par la loi, qui fixe également les conditions de son emploi.

La propriété personnelle de l'individu en Yougoslavie n'existe que dans certains domaines de la vie, et son volume est assez restreint. Elle existe dans le domaine de l'agriculture et de la sylviculture, dans celui de l'artisanat, dans le domaine des services, en ce qui concerne les maisons d'habitation et les appartements, les immeubles et les locaux destinés aux activités économiques.

Dans le domaine de l'agriculture, l'agriculteur et son ménage peuvent posséder 10 hectares de surface cultivable au maximum. Si par l'acte juridique (par ex. sous forme d'achat ou de cadeau) il acquiert des terrains qui dépassent le volume autorisé, le surplus est pris sans indemnité. Cependant, s'il hérite d'un terrain qui dépasse le volume autorisé de surface cultivable, il a le droit de choisir entre la terre qu'il possède et le terrain hérité, 10 hectares de surface cultivable qu'il peut garder, et le reste sera exproprié, mais l'indemnité sera accordée.

Les personnes qui ne sont pas des agriculteurs peuvent posséder 3 à 5 hectares de surface cultivable. L'agriculteur et son ménage peuvent posséder entre 5 et 30 hectares de surface non cultivable et de terrain boisé (dans la République de Monténégro, ce maximum est un peu plus grand). Les personnes qui ne sont pas des agriculteurs peuvent posséder 5 hectares au maximum de surface cultivable et de terrain boisé, mais seulement s'il s'agit des personnes qui ne sont pas des agriculteurs et qui vivent dans les régions boisées où il n'y a pas de terre cultivable; dans les autres régions ils peuvent posséder jusqu'à 3 ou 5 hectares de ce terrain qui fait partie du total des terres cultivables qu'ils peuvent posséder.

En réalité, les propriétés de terre non cultivable et de terrains boisés appartenant aux agriculteurs et aux autres personnes sont d'habitude très petites pour plusieurs raisons: premièrement, après la mise en oeuvre de la loi sur la réforme agraire et sur la colonisation, dans la propriété privée sont restées seulement des propriétés relativement petites, surtout celles composées de terres non cultivables et de terrains boisés: deuxièmement, les partages fréquents des propriétés ont réduit en petites parcelles les terres cultivables aussi bien que les terres non cultivables et les terrains boisés; troisièmement, beaucoup de personnes parmi les non agriculteurs, lors de la formation des coopératives à la campagne, leur avaient donné toutes leurs terres; quatrièmement, beaucoup de non agriculteurs et même beaucoup d'agriculteurs possédant de grandes propriétés de terre dans les limites du maximum autorisé, avaient vendu une partie importante de leurs terres et surtout de terrains boisés. Cependant, la Constitution de 1963 permet la prise des terres couvertes de forêts et d'autres que possèdent les agriculteurs, ainsi que la prise des terres cultivables et autres que possèdent les non-agriculteurs (Art. 21, al. 3 et 4).

L'agriculteur et son ménage peuvent posséder des machines agricoles, même les tracteurs, les moissonneuses, etc. Le volume de la pos-

session du bétail n'est pas limité, mais il est limité en pratique par le volume de la possession de terre et par la possibilité d'élevage de ce bétail.

La propriété privée en ce qui concerne la terre est limitée dans la société yougoslave non seulement dans son volume, mais également dans la manière de son exploitation. Il est prévu par la loi que le terrain cultivable doit être exploité pour la production agricole, sauf si le plan d'urbanisation prévoit ce terrain pour la construction des bâtiments; que le propriétaire privé de la terre cultivable doit utiliser la terre pour l'usage des techniques agraires et des mesures servant à l'amélioration de la terre, qui sont prescrites par les organes d'Etat compétents, sous peine de mise de la terre sous la gestion forcée; que le propriétaire privé de la terre doit entreprendre des mesures nécessaires pour la protection de la terre contre l'érosion et les eaux; que le propriétaire privé de la terre doit prendre part à la mise en oeuvre du système d'amélioration si sa terre est comprise dans ce système; que le propriétaire privé de la terre doit, s'il désire vendre ou donner à bail sa terre, faire la première proposition à l'organisation agricole qui se trouve sur le territoire de la commune où se trouve la terre en question, et seulement si cette organisation refuse la proposition, il peut la vendre ou donner à bail. En dehors les restrictions citées, il y a encore de nombreuses restriction concernant la terre cultivable dans la propriété privée, dans la propriété d'un individu. Cependant, les restrictions existent aussi en ce qui concerne les forêts et les terrains boisés. Le propriétaire privé ne peut pas couper le bois de sa propre volonté, mais seulement avec la permission de l'organe compétent; la permission pour la coupe du bois est donnée seulement dans le cas où elle est utile à la croissance et à l'existence de la forêt (on permet la coupe de vieux troncs d'arbres, des arbres desséchés, des troncs tordus et qui ne conviennent pas à la construction, la coupe qui éclaircit la forêt trop épaisse et qui permet une meilleure croissance aux arbres qui restent).

Dans le domaine de l'artisanat, l'artisan peut avoir dans la propriété privée les moyens lui servant à exercer son activité professionnelle ainsi que le bâtiment ou les locaux pour y exercer cette activité, enregistrés comme atelier de l'artisan.

L'artisan peut exercer son activité en utilisant la main-d'oeuvre, mais il ne peut employer que 5 ouvriers. L'artisan peut organiser avec d'autres artisans une atelier commun sur la base du contrat d'association; 6 artisans au maximum peuvent s'associer, mais à condition que le nombre total des ouvriers ne peut pas dépasser six personnes. En conclusion, dans un atelier d'artisan de n'importe quel type, 6 personnes au maximum peuvent exercer leur activité; les apprentis ne sont pas compris dans ce nombre.

L'atelier de l'artisan n'est pas obligé de travailler seulement sur commande; il peut travailler aussi pour le marché, et il peut vendre ses produits dans ses locaux ou ailleurs.

La propriété privée peut exister dans le domaine des services, dans l'hôtellerie, dans le domaine des diverses activités économiques de volume assez restreint (par ex. transport des bagages, nettoyage des planchers, des vitrines, cirage des chaussures), dans le domaine du transport des personnes et des bagages (services de taxis et transport

routier), dans le domaine de l'organisation des distractions (par ex. tirs forains, manèges), etc. Dans tous les domaines des services où nous rencontrons la propriété privée des individus, il s'agit en général des moyens d'un volume assez restreint. Les services sont rendus par le travail personnel du propriétaire et des membres de sa famille, exceptionnellement avec l'emploi de la main-d'oeuvre, sous les conditions déterminées par la loi. Dans une hôtellerie privée, 3 ouvriers au maximum peuvent être employés, sans compter les membres de la famille du propriétaire privé. Il peut posséder un bâtiment ou des locaux pour exercer son activité, ainsi que l'inventaire nécessaire à cette activité. Dans les autres domaines des services, la propriété privée peut comprendre les objets qui servent au propriétaire pour exercer son activité (par ex. une automobile pour le service de taxis, un camion pour le transport des marchandises, un manège, un local pour le cirage des chaussures, une machine pour le rabotage du parquet, etc.).

Dans la propriété privée, en ce qui concerne les maisons d'habitation et les appartements, un individu peut avoir en principe une maison d'habitation familiale. C'est une maison avec deux appartements, sans tenir compte de la grandeur des appartements, ou une maison avec trois petits appartements (un petit appartement est un appartement comprenant deux chambres et les pièces secondaires). Un citoyen peut avoir dans sa propriété une des maisons d'habitation citées; ou deux maisons d'habitation familiales si les deux maisons ensemble contiennent deux appartements et un petit appartement; ou une maison d'habitation familiale et un appartement à l'étage; ou deux appartements à l'étage. Un citoyen peut avoir dans sa propriété une maison d'habitation qui, en plus des deux appartements ou des trois petits appartements, contient encore un appartement secondaire (on considère comme appartement secondaire l'appartement qui, par sa destination ou par sa structure, par sa position dans la maison ou par son confort, représente la partie secondaire de la maison). Exceptionnellement, le citoyen peut avoir dans sa propriété une maison d'habitation qui, en plus d'un appartements ou de deux petits appartements, contient des bureaux qui ne dépassent pas 70 m² de surface. Le citoyen qui possède une maison d'habitation peut avoir dans sa propriété également une petite remise ou la cave qui font partie de la maison et qui lui servent à exercer une activité professionnelle. Il peut aussi avoir dans sa propriété un garage pour deux voitures seulement. Enfin, le citoyen peut avoir dans sa propriété une maison qui sert à lui et à sa famille comme le lieu de récréation temporaire (la maison pour le week-end), mais elle est comprise dans le volume de la propriété des appartements et des maisons d'habitation cités plus haut » si par les caractéristiques de sa construction et par la possibilité de son utilisation elle possède des qualités d'un appartement ou d'une maison d'habitation«.

Le terrain où se trouve la maison d'habitation ou la maison de repos et les autres locaux, qui appartiennent au citoyen comme sa propriété, peut, ainsi que le terrain autour de la maison, être dans la propriété du citoyen.

Les autres bâtiments servant à l'habitation qui n'entrent dans aucune des catégories des bâtiments cités plus haut et qui peuvent être dans la propriété des citoyens, se trouvent dans la propriété sociale.

Dans ces bâtiments, on peut avoir seulement un appartement dans la propriété privée (la propriété d'un étage); cependant, le bâtiment tout entier se trouve dans la propriété sociale.

Les locaux et les immeubles précités peuvent appartenir à tout citoyen de Yougoslavie, sans tenir compte du fait qu'il possède dans sa propriété un bâtiment ou des locaux lui servant à exercer son activité professionnelle.

En ce qui concerne les bâtiments et les locaux destinés aux activités économiques, ils peuvent se trouver dans la propriété, comme nous l'avons déjà dit, d'un agriculteur et d'un artisan ou d'une personne qui s'occupe d'un des services cités plus haut. Dans tous les cas où il s'agit de la propriété sur les bâtiments et les locaux destinés aux activités économiques, ce ne sont que des bâtiments et des locaux assez petits. S'ils sont grands, ils se trouvent tous dans la propriété sociale.

Entre la propriété individuelle dans un sens plus étroit et la propriété privée, c'est-à-dire la propriété privée de travail ou la propriété individuelle dans un sens plus large, il n'y a pas de différence sur le plan juridique, mais sur le plan socio-économique. En effet, la propriété privée représente surtout une survivance de la propriété privée de la Yougoslavie bourgeoise. Cependant, elle peut s'acquérir et elle s'acquiert également à l'époque actuelle. Dans les conditions régnant en Yougoslavie actuellement, la propriété privée possède surtout le caractère de la propriété privée de travail du propriétaire et des membres de sa famille. Elle avait déjà ce caractère dans une large mesure dans la Yougoslavie bourgeoise, surtout en ce qui concerne l'agriculture et l'artisanat. Le système socialiste en Yougoslavie n'est pas fondé sur la propriété privée, mais elle joue un rôle très important dans la société socialiste yougoslave, car une grande partie des travailleurs, surtout dans l'agriculture et dans l'artisanat, jouit du droit de propriété. Mais dans l'avenir, il faut s'attendre à la transformation de la propriété privée en propriété sociale. Cette transformation doit être effectuée pas à pas et avec l'accord des personnes intéressées. Les expériences acquises dans notre pays ont montré que le propriétaire privé veut bien faire partie du secteur socialiste de l'économie s'il y trouve un plus grand intérêt pour lui-même et pour sa famille que celui qu'il peut trouver dans l'activité privée.

Entre la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit et la propriété privée, c'est-à-dire la propriété privée de travail ou la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus large, il n'existe pas de limites bien définies. La propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit peut passer dans la propriété privée, c'est-à-dire dans la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus large. Par exemple, les moyens financiers acquis par le travail à l'aide des moyens de production dans la propriété sociale se transforment en propriété privée si l'on commence à les prêter à un certain taux d'intérêt ou si l'on les met dans une caisse d'épargne à un certain taux d'intérêt; une voiture acquise par les moyens gagnés par le travail dans le secteur social des activités, devient une propriété privée si l'on l'utilise, comme une voiture de louage, etc. A cause des rapports très étroits qui existent entre la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus étroit et la propriété privée, c'est-à-dire la propriété privée de travail ou la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus large, certains théoriciens

proposent que les deux formes de la propriété soient appelées: la propriété de l'individu.

5. En conclusion: la propriété sociale et le travail représentent en Yougoslavie la source principale des rapports socio-économiques et des droits de propriété: premièrement, le travail représente la source et la base de l'augmentation constante de la propriété sociale; deuxièmement, le travail, de commun avec les moyens sociaux de production, représente la source et la base de l'existence de la propriété individuelle dans un sens plus étroit sur les moyens servant à la consommation, à l'usage et à la satisfaction des besoins personnels des citoyens; troisièmement, le travail, de commun avec les moyens de production dans la propriété de l'individu, représente la source et la base de l'existence de la propriété personnelle de l'individu, c'est-à-dire de la propriété privée de travail ou de la propriété personnelle dans un sens plus large. Compte tenu du fait que la propriété sociale représente la forme fondamentale de la propriété en Yougoslavie, et que la propriété privée est limitée dans son volume et dans la façon de son utilisation et aussi dans le choix des domaines de la vie dans lesquels elle peut exister, et qu'elle est transformée en général en propriété de travail, nous pouvons conclure que la société socialiste yougoslavie a réalisé déjà à l'époque actuelle le principe d'après lequel chacun vit des fruits de son travail personnel.

Dr ŽIVOMIR S. DJORDJEVIĆ

Professeur à la Faculté de Droit de Beograd

Spécialité: le droit civil et, tout particulièrement, le droit d'auteur et le droit de la propriété industrielle.

Né en 1922 à Dobrača, près de Kragujevac, en Serbie (Yougoslavie). Il a terminé l'école primaire dans son village natal et le gymnase à Kragujevac. Il a obtenu sa licence à la Faculté de Droit de Beograd. Promu au grade de docteur en 1956 à la même Faculté. Il a passé 14 mois, en France (en 1953/54 et 1957/58) et 12 mois dans la République Fédérale d'Allemagne (en 1963/64) pour se perfectionner dans sa spécialité.

Ouvrages et études remarquables: »Le problème de l'équivalence dans le droit des obligations«, Beograd 1968; »Eléments du droit de famille et de propriété«, 2 éditions, Beograd 1959, »Les droits subjectifs dans la société socialiste«, Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beograd 1963; »L'autogestion et la codification du droit civil«, Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beograd 1967; »Le droit public et le droit privé dans le socialisme«, Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beograd 1957; »Le code civil en tant que reflet de nos rapports sociaux«, Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beograd 1969; »Le droit au fruit du travail et sa réalisation grâce aux institutions du droit d'obligations«, Annales de la Faculté de Droit, Beograd 1970.



Dr Dušan BILANDŽIĆ
*Director of the S. R. of Croatia Institute for the Study
of the Working Class Movement*

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-MANAGEMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE ENTERPRISE

1. The method of realization of self-management in the sphere of relations between the workers' council and other self-management bodies on the one side and manager on the other is neither practically nor theoretically settled. Or, more simply said, the relationship between self-management and management is conceived in such a way that managers (expert services) suggest and implement decision while self-management bodies make them. This concept of relations has been sought to be realized in practice. It stands to reason that regulations are chiefly based upon this concept. It is evident, however, that in practice these relations are not adequate and this hampers more rational business operation and self-management relations — consequently, the two principal directions of social development.

2. The manner in which self-management is achieved in enterprises today does not content workers, particularly those who are directly engaged in the process of production. Proofs of this allegation are extremely numerous. It has been underlined for years that producers are not sufficiently taking part in the process of management of their enterprise. Workers who have been polled most often state that they are unable to exert any influence when decisions are being made on the most vital questions of life and work in work organizations. They do not even seek to participate in discussions with the sponsors of decisions because they do not feel competent and that is why they passively and more or less mechanically vote for the proposal presented to them by the management.

Numerous symptoms exist that the engagement of workers in self-management is even ebbing. Certain investigations in Slovene enterprises (see the periodical „Modern Organization” No. 5/1968) show that the desire of workers to participate in self-management is dwindling while the request for higher personal incomes is ever more frequently expressed. Analyses of stoppages of work also confirm the thesis that workers are becoming economically minded, that they are ever more frequently bringing up before the management questions concerning the income of the enterprise.

3. But, it is not only workers that are discontent with the method of realization of self-management in the enterprise. A considerable number of leading and most competent personnel and experts, have an increasingly critical attitude towards the state of affairs. The above-mentioned investigations in Slovenia show that „... we are ever more frequently hearing from managers requests for greater influence upon events and greater professional independence”. Upon this basis it can be concluded that „the strivings of managers are complementing the strivings of workers...” and that „the strivings of either of them represent a shift from the existing normative models and get closer to non-conventional models of work organization” (ibidem page 387).

Quite a number of directors and other managers and experts, especially in medium-size and big enterprises — it is above all a question of experts and prominent business men who concurrently absolutely adopt self-management, not as an „imposed” political necessity but as the condition for the prosperity of production — underline that on account of unsettled question in relations they cannot score results adequate to the forces and means invested... They must make great efforts to shatter the resistance against more modern production, they lose their temper in shattering the mentality of craftsmen and they are most often „desperate” due to the strivings of quite a number of persons in self-management bodies who deal with details that are not vital and with peripheral problems while „averting” to embark on the settlement of vital problems of business operation.

It is extremely complicated to explain the attitude of experts in the enterprise. A real expert, if he dares, rejects a priori a discussion on his professional work except with experts equal to him or more capable than he is. It is in fact ridiculous to prove that a discussion on professional papers between the authors of the papers-experts and laymen is not advisable and that this causes friction between people. Relations become increasingly complicated because contemporary industrial production continuously increases the professional differences between men. A semi-literate worker and technologist, a locksmith and atomist, a pointer and expert in cybernetics cooperate in the work process in the enterprise and this inevitably brings about conflicts in the event that an expert is forced to prove to a layman that black is black while white is white. This results in mutual friction, waste of energy, time, nerves, etc.

4. The question of responsibility as one of the vital conditions of both democracy and efficiency of work is, under the present conditions existing between self-management and management, virtually unsolvable. This is particularly proved when a discussion begins about who is responsible for various difficulties emerging all of a sudden in the enterprise. Certain managers lay the blame on self-management bodies as they have allegedly made decisions. They frequently underline that they have not possessed the authorization to undertake what has been necessary for the implementation of decision since the workers' council had tied their hands. Naturally, it is most often stressed that the enterprise has landed in difficulties on account of difficult conditions of business operation, of bureaucracy in state bodies, of the lack of responsibility of various institutions outside the enterprise. On the other hand, self-

-management bodies lay the blame on managers saying that they managed the enterprise wrongly and incompetently, that they suggested poor solutions. The end of these discussions is well known: the managers withdraw or leave the enterprise, or everything goes on as it used to. It stands to reason that all this is accompanied by the worsening of relations between people, increased tension, increased lack of confidence, in brief, by the deterioration of the atmosphere which hinders the progress of the enterprise in the production-economic and socio-self-management respect.

The situation that enables managers to lay their responsibility on others even though they have also taken part in decision-making or vice versa, is untenable. To lay responsibility on leading teams while concurrently confining their rights to apply adequate methods for the implementation of decisions is also untenable.

5. It is evident from the above-said that the settlement of the problem cannot be found along the line of engagement of workers to discuss competently and with equal rights everything possible at sessions of collective self-management bodies.

Those who advocate this stand and insist upon the fact that members of collectives, members of the workers' council must declare themselves concerning the professional appropriateness of studies that professional services present to them, make a great mistake in relation to workers' self-management. According to them a worker would have to be a greater expert than an economist, an economist a greater expert than a technologist, a technologist a greater expert than a commercialist and vice versa, the workers' council should be more expert than the directorate, since how else could it evaluate the appropriateness of studies of expert services of the enterprise. Consequently, it would come out that we must have two managements in the enterprise, that workers' self-management has been introduced for the sake of making self-management bodies deal with professional problems and not for the sake of making workers decide on production relations this being the factual content of self-management. With such concepts and this practice workers will never master the self-management „skill". Workers' self-management is thus hurled to a wrong path, the idea is discredited, the responsibility of the leading personnel and experts is dulled, while on the other hand a possibility is created for poor experts to lay on workers the responsibility for their inability, or on workers' councils, according to the proverbial words „you, workers have made this decision and I am only an expert here". Such relations frustrate the creativeness of real experts and organizers of business operation and make for the majority in the collective and even for the workers' council, the penetration in the real sphere of factual management of the enterprise more difficult.

Politically active persons complain that workers are not active in discussions on (professional) studies and proposals presented by their managements. It appears that workers persistently refer to self-management while they are even more persistently rejecting this, even though they are extremely interested in the prosperity of their enterprise. It is evident that there is something wrong with those who offer them

this manner of engagement in the self-management process and that there is nothing wrong with workers. The worker declines to discuss studies but he is extremely interested in the volume of the income to be achieved by his work unit and the enterprise since his personal income depends upon this. It is in this phenomenon and in this attitude of workers that the real content of workers' self-management must be sought.

6. The other serious shortcoming in the development of workers' self-management consists in the fact that almost nothing has been done for making self-management modern and up-to-date. A system of information which would incessantly enable workers to have an insight into the situation and problems without which there is no efficient self-management, has not been worked out. We have no professional institutions for offering assistance to self-management bodies and the entire system of records in society, the function of socio-political organizations, especially of their forums and even more the method of work of economic factors, chambers, associations, the apparatus of state bodies, all this is still arranged in such a way as to make „lower-ranking” bodies serve „higher-ranking” ones rather than helping workers in order that they should efficiently manage.

II

1. In order to reach a more adequate solution concerning the relationship between self-management and management it is necessary to proceed from the fact that every decision is a process and not a momentary thing. Decision-making must be conceived solely in its *dynamic* complex. To isolate only part of this process, the act of voting only, is wrong and cannot bring about the settlement of the problem.

Without an analysis of all phases of the process of management it is impossible to establish the position, factual content and real role and influence of individual groups of people, the management of the enterprise, assemblage, management committee, the workers' council, meeting of workers, TU and party organizations and other factors in the self-management process. This analysis should encompass other dimensions as well, such as the technical-technological, business, socio-political and the like. This practically means that one should proceed „along” the launching of initiatives, „along” the proceedings of making, realizing and controlling the implementation of decisions. The conclusion is on possibilities and limitations in the adequacy and wanderings of self-management.

2. Let us proceed from the generally-known fact that the management of the enterprise prepares virtually all the proposals concerning self-management decision. It cannot be otherwise. Can we imagine the workers' council or the meeting of workers being convened without a proposal concerning what should be decided on. Evidently not.

The director with a group of the most responsible managers of the enterprise has, by virtue of his function, a decisive role while establishing and pursuing the business policy. This is an exceptionally important statement for the definition of self-management relations in the enterprise.

The first group of relevant factors which cause the director with the most responsible collaborators be objectively the most important factor while pursuing the business policy, is contained in the sphere of the professional division of work in the enterprise. Even a perfunctory glance and insight into the course of business operation, life and work of a modern enterprise show that the professional functions of those employed objectively place certain members of the collective into the position to make decisions, almost as if they had a monopoly, to influence the making of strategic business decisions while making other groups of people almost fully impotent, again more or less objectively, to create the business policy of the enterprise. As this statement vitally influences the realization of self-management, especially relations between the administration, directorate and in general, the most responsible managers of the enterprise led by the director on the one hand and the workers' council, the collective, the meeting of workers and any other self-management body in the enterprise on the other, it is absolutely necessary to say something more about this.

Let us think about the relations existing between the workers' council and the management of the enterprise at the time when a session of the workers' council is being held, or for example, a meeting of workers discussing some important problems of the enterprise such as the plan of production, plan of reconstruction, the proposal for integration, penetration into the market, credits to be taken from banks for reconstruction, or certain similar problems. Let us review now the position of members of the workers' council in the course of a discussion on such and similar business problems as well as the position of the leading team of the enterprise led by the director.

3. In order to understand the situations in which individuals are involved in the course of discussions concerning vital problems of the enterprise, we must repeat that this largely depends upon the professional function and kind of work of every workingman in the enterprise.

Hundreds of most varied work functions and vocations exist in a modern enterprise. We considered also leading functions to be some kind of vocation. It is known that persons with most varied professions cooperate in our modern enterprise: a half-trained and semi-literate worker and a high-ranking scientific researcher, a locksmith and atomist, pointer and expert in electronics, economist analyst and technologist, routine clerk and creator of the business policy, etc. gathered into individual narrow or broad sectors of work such as services for the investigation of markets, service for economic analysis, technical-technological development service, scientific laboratories, production plants, etc.

On the basis of the above-mentioned division of work each member of the work community continuously performs his work tasks between two self-management meetings. While, for example, a member of the workers' council — a worker by a machine — determines the object of work, during that time an analyst of the market continuously watches a series of indicators and phenomena in the market, reaches conclusions on this and submits proposals concerning important business decisions, a technologist studies the process of production, an economist plans the structure of incomes, etc.

Every member of the collective, member of the workers' council, every manager and expert attends sessions with an extremely varying structure and degree of understanding of problems, with tremendous differences regarding the understanding of facts, and this offers them varying possibilities for a competent discussion at the session of the workers' council.

What is the position of workers who have been working by a machine while they are now invited to discuss at sessions the expert studies of experts who have been engaged in the working out of proposals not for days but for months. We know in practice that almost no one will embark on a dialogue on the professional validity of the drafts presented, except those who have worked them out or those who are professionally competent in a definite sphere.

By and large, it is an extremely intricate problem to manage a modern enterprise. Such an enterprise today cannot be imagined without scientific guidance and management. One must be assured that management and business operation „at will' and the settlement of problems in an offhand way and without due consideration is far behind us in this sphere. This belongs, if this has ever been so, to the period of manufacture and not to modern industry. This method of work affects those who apply it. Today the settlement of every more important problem from the operation of the enterprise is preceded by scientific investigation, a scientific-professional analysis of conditions and relevant factors that determine business decisions. Thereby it is most often necessary to hold consultations between a whole range of scientific disciplines: technical-technological, economic, sociological, demographic, legal, etc. Today one is working in such a way that scientific projects are made as to the results which can be expected from any important operational decision. Science has entered all the processes and has become the basis and condition for rational management and guidance of the enterprise.

4. On the basis of the above-said we can conclude that the role of professional personnel and managers of the enterprise is decisive in discussions conducted on the business policy in work collectives. In all situations and on the basis of the division of work and employment, the organizer of work, experts and managers of the enterprise have always better opportunities for studying business problems more profoundly, for formulating their stands, for competently speaking about them and discussing these stands because they occupy decisive post in the process of production, work and business operation: they have access to more numerous and more extensive information, they possess greater knowledge, their general and professional understanding of problems is perceptibly greater, more extensive and more complete than that of direct executors of decisions, of the so-called simple workingmen.

Consequently, it is evident that the influence of the workers' council upon the management of material processes and operations of the enterprise is limited on the one hand because its members are chiefly workers occupying such work posts which do not permit them to have continuously an insight into numerous information upon which a decision depends, because, by virtue of their job they cannot „bear in mind" numerous scientific-technical and professional-economic problems. This

increasingly relates to a collective possessing less knowledge and information.

The management of the enterprise has the greatest opportunities for business initiatives because it is in a position, by virtue of its function, to watch everything that is taking place, possesses information, makes analyses, charts the concept of the policy and suggests concrete measures for its realization.

It is a generally known fact that the leading personnel and professional services are objectively the prime factor in the process of business operation. Experience shows that an incapable, inexperienced, inert, not business like, isolated and stagnant professional and leading personnel of an enterprise most often bears all the responsibility for business losses, for low personal incomes and empty funds. And, vice versa, under equal conditions of business operation a good, expert, capable management will bring the enterprise out of a „hopeless” situation.

III

1. If we accept as approximately true the preceding review of the professional division of work in an enterprise and of the method for the realization of self-management in work organizations, if, in fact, it is true that workers' councils and masses of workers are forced to discuss vital questions in an expert manner and if they do not hold in their hands the key relationships between production and distribution but often deal with a multitude of trifling questions, if it is true also that the professional-leading personnel are not yet adequately business-minded, etc., the question is raised: how to secure, within the framework of our social system and relations a *further step in the realization of self-management and increased efficiency in work and business operation?* The question can also be posed as follows: how, on the one hand, to develop the business-enterprising function of the management and professional services but also, at the same time, how to prevent the techno-bureaucratic tendency from prevailing in this process but make possible to a fuller extent the affirmation of self-management of the workingman?

2. In the light of the relationship between management and self-management it is evident that the settlement of this problem must be sought in a *different manner* of realization of self-management in the enterprise. *This manner stems from the very class nature of workers' self-management. As a matter of fact, workers' self-management can never set as its goal to teach all workers to discuss professional problems but to decide on social relations, to change and establish these relations, to realize their interest, to establish conditions of work, to use the results of their work. That is why any swerving of workingmen from this basic path, from the part of determination of production relations is in fact the wrong path of self-management, irrespective of the name under which this is made.* Workers' self-management must be conceived as the basic social production relationship, as the authority of associated workers over conditions and results of their work. Consequently, it is not the sphere of mastering professional questions of promotion of

production but in the sphere of the realization of personal and social interests of producers.

Proceeding from the social and technical division of work, from the character and method of business under conditions of the market economy on the one hand, and the real content and substance of self-management on the other, associated workers realize self-management through consultation in their work organizations about the basic relationships which must be such that *all workmen, irrespective of the function they perform in the enterprise, determine the settings and relationships while creating incomes — personal incomes and funds — whereby the professional-managing personnel suggests material-technical, technological-financial, organizational and other solutions as methods by means of which the common goals can be attained, along with the full responsibility for the realization of the jointly established programme and for attaining the jointly set goal.* It is superfluous to prove that this relationship places no one in the collective in an unequal position as regards the right to participate in the determination of goals and programmes of work.

3. Partially speaking, the workingman participates in self-management in such a way as to review and decide above all about the kind of socio-economic and material effects — in the sense of the rate of incomes — produced by this or that solution, this or that programme in relation to the workingman in particular, his work unit and work community and finally to the netire social community.

Workingmen and the workers' council request a definite programme of modernization and the like to be presented to them in which the *principal item of discussion is the question concerning the amount of personal incomes and funds for the development of the enterprise that the suggested programme of production secures.*

It is not excluded that the workers' council might on that occasion invite also experts outside the enterprise to help them evaluate whether the suggested programme secures the desired personal incomes and funds, or rather, according to this same logic, to help them assess whether the executed programme could have produced higher incomes. On the basis of these relations the most responsible managing and expert personnel are the first to bear responsibility for a possible unsuccessful business operation. Just as individual workers are, as a rule, punished and even dismissed due to poor work, according to this same principle various kinds of sanctions must be „determined” for irrational and inefficient management of the work process, or rather, for the lack of success of the enterprise.

Self-management decision-making presupposes a discussion on socio-economic and socio-political implications that are contained in individual professional-technical, financial-economic, organizational and other solutions of individual problems, tasks and goals. One presupposes thereby a full professional and scientific „independence” and responsibility of experts in respect to data, evaluations, proposals and argumentation he uses in this debate. It stands to reason that this presupposes team work which emerges upon the basis of the right of the director to form „his” team for the realization of the programme fixed by the collective or rather, the self-management body.

Let us see now the effect of this approach upon the self-management relations in the enterprise, the manner in which this would affect the situation of the workingmen and the businesslike character of the enterprise.

4. To begin with, one expects that a stepped up modernization, more rapid technical and technological improvement of the process of material production would be achieved. Under the present method of self-management our enterprises are frequently without a long-term plan of reconstruction and modernization. As a matter of fact the cause for this is not only in inadequate relations in the enterprise. But, were self-management, such as described here, to be achieved, this would most probably be changed. As a matter of fact, in discussions with the professional-managing team it would be proved at once that it is most often necessary to reconstruct and modernize the process of production. Conscientious professional-managing personnel will not „sign” an obligation to maximize the income unless a definite rate of accumulation for investments in the development of the enterprise is secured. Consequently, it is logical to expect this discussion necessarily to result in the conclusion on the determination of the optimum relationship between personal incomes and accumulation in enterprises, or rather, a programme of production and reconstruction which will bring about the desired income in a definite period of time.

5. How would the new relationship between self-management and management influence relations between enterprises and the so-called political factors of the social community?

It is realistic to expect that through the achievement of the relations outlined, the bodies of management, especially director (because they above all maintain „external relations” with bodies and organizations of the community) would be forced to oppose more energetically the inadequate influences of state and other bodies, or rather, that they would not glibly adopt the suggestions which result in irrational investments, autarchic „completion” of capacities, various „municipal” calculations on profitableness or division of work in the integration which does not take into account the economic and social interests of the work community.

6. When almost all attention at a self-management meeting is concentrated on the income, it stands to reason that numerous relationships must be thrashed out. A discussion concentrated on the income will prove that the principal condition for the increase of income is perhaps the consolidation of work discipline, in another enterprise this will be the change of the qualification structure of the collective, in a third the only way out will be integration etc. Seeking the realization of the highest possible income, self-management consultations must end in a self-management decision that definite problems must be settled if a higher income is desired, and in fact, everyone is desiring this.

7. Discussions concerning the manner in which the highest possible income can be achieved would most probably result also in a more accurate definition of economic relations between parts of the work organization. As a matter of fact, every analysis and discussion aimed at establishing the manner in which the greatest possible income can be achieved, will have to establish all elements of the income according

to work (economic) units, plants and the enterprise. Naturally, this must indicate the structure of the price of every product and every service, consequently, the volume of the contribution made by everyone in the work organization.

In this way workmen in the enterprise would learn which work unit achieves positive results, which one works with losses, which production is profitable and which is not.

It is beyond any doubt that an energetic request on the part of the work community for every greater income on the one hand, but also the personal interest of professional and managing workers on the other, would be conducive to a more rapid transcendence of numerous problems which today hinder the initiative, modernization, business operation and activity.

The struggle for a high income and high personal incomes along with „purely“ economic relations in the work organization „will force“ both leading and professional personnel to accept every rational solution and, consequently, to form the incomes at the level of work units.

8. How would the relations outlined influence the phenomenon of „equalization of wages“ in enterprises?

It is generally known that certain individual activities in the enterprise can contribute to the common income of the collective two, three, five, ten and even one hundred times more than some other individual activity. In spite of this, extremely strong pressure is exerted for everyone in the enterprise to have equal incomes. This spells most explicit and most serious contradictions in the collectives. How can this be settled? Can the request for similar or equal wages be rejected forcibly? It can evidently not be rejected. On the contrary, every worker can request, on the basis of his self-management rights, equal incomes for all members of the collective. We can oppose these requests only by means of a ratio in the distribution which will establish accurately how much each member is contributing and, on the basis of this fact, the volume of the share he may expect in distribution.

9. How would the above-mentioned self-management relations influence the selection of experts, especially of the leading personnel?

It is known that our self-management system has not yet secured the fact that only those who are the best and the most capable can be at the head (of an enterprise). The institution of competitions has failed in this respect. Who „rises“ to a position, very seldom „falls“ from that position.

Is not the very discussion concerning who must be elected an extremely suitable motive for the result of work of every leading body or individuals to be subject to an analysis? Is it not possible to request concurrently that every new candidate submit „his“ idea of the settlement of certain problems, „his“ programme and „his“ plan. The one who „offers“ a better plan and programme and who, according to an evaluation made by the electorate, offers greater guarantees for greater success, is to be elected.

The position of the leading personnel would have to be continuously „jeopardized“ on the part of better candidates.

There is absolutely no doubt that the work collective would lend full support and would invest all possible efforts for the execution of a programme which would secure the desired volume of personal incomes and funds for the development of the enterprise since this is the condition for improving the standard of all members of the collective.

These relations in self-management necessarily presuppose that individuals and groups that are the ones who draw out definite professional studies, analyses, and are sponsors of initiatives and proposals, no longer be anonymous and become publicly responsible for their proposals before the work community.

10. Such pure relations would increase everyone's responsibility and especially the personal responsibility of managers and experts for their work, for proposals and initiatives on the basis of which the work community determines its policy while they would concurrently enable individuals to obtain for their work not only material but also some kind of moral recognition on the part of the entire work collective and the broad social community.

Workers quite frequently and quite justifiably react to the small or non-existent responsibility of individual managers, self-management bodies and professional services for the lack of success of the enterprise. The practice when it is attempted after such failures to lay the blame equally on the collective, although it is almost always possible to know who is the most responsible for the success or failure is often criticized.

The review of results of the business operation of the enterprise is of extreme importance for the collective. This review is far easier and far more efficacious when the tasks and responsibilities are accurately determined and when the rate of incomes is taken as a criterion. In this job a special place is occupied by the analysis of the annual balance. If the work collective is not sufficiently sure in its evaluation as to the question whether the result could be better and higher and what are the causes of this, it would be useful to invite a professional service outside the enterprise to investigate the situation and to compare the results achieved by the collective with those achieved by allied enterprises in the country and even abroad. This discussion would always open a multitude of new problems and questions upon which the success of the enterprise will depend in the coming period of time.

11. We have mentioned only certain examples showing the manner in which workers can most efficaciously participate in self-management. We consider that it is unnecessary to list also other questions such as education, recreation, normative regulation and the like, because these problems can be approached in a similar manner as those listed here. In brief, self-management bodies would deal with the long-term policy and relationships in the enterprise. They would be responsible for the general policy while management bodies would be responsible for the routine organization of production and business operation. The adoption of the Statute, rules on the distribution of personal incomes and incomes of the enterprise, rules on work relations, organization of the enterprise, integration — all these decisions of general character pertain to the sphere of the entire collective. Self-management bodies must be freed from a whole range of operative matters and affairs more or

less of everything that pertains to the sphere of organization of the production and business operation process. (Decision on the use of cars, on prices of goods and services, the everyday market boom, control of business trips, etc). This concept presupposes far greater responsibility and rights of the managing team but it also secures the penetration of self-management into factual problems of management without dealing with various trifles.

Dr Dušan Bilandžić, born in 1924. Graduated at the Faculty of Law in Beograd and obtained a Doctorate in science of economics in Zagreb.

In his career was a professor of history of the national liberation struggle at the Higher Military Academy of the Yugoslav Army; chairman of the Group for Public Opinion Examination at the Federal Trade Union Board, and secretary of the same organization for four years; from 1966 to 1969 director of the Institute of the History of the Labor Movement of Croatia; now a member of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia, and associate professor of political system of Yugoslavia at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Zagreb; from May 1969 director of the Center for Social Research at the Chairmanship of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

Books published: *From Revolutionary Etatism to Self-management* (transformation of Yugoslav social and economic structure from 1945 to 1965, doctoral dissertation, 520 pp. in manuscript, to be published by »Kommunist«, Zagreb; *The Struggle for a Self-managing Socialism in Yugoslavia, 1945—1969*, Institute for the History of Labor Movement of Croatia, Zagreb, 1969; *Yugoslav System of self-management*, »Međunarodna politika« (International Politics), Beograd, 1969 (translated into six languages); *Social and Economic Changes in the Period of Self-management* — a contribution to the book *Twenty Years of Workers' Self-management in Yugoslavia*, »Privredni pregled« (Commercial Review), Beograd, June 1970.

Dr Nikola BALOG
President of the Legal Council of Yugoslavia

THE LEGAL POSITION OF ENTERPRISES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN ITS STRUCTURE

Yugoslav enterprises are autonomous and independent organizations. Enterprises and other economic organizations have a common generic name — *the work organization*. Our legislation uses this term because in all these organizations the workers have equal rights and, in general, the relation of the state to the said organizations is in principle the same. However there are some differences among various kinds of work organizations. These differences are not only in the aims and goals of their work and business, of their »raison d'être, but also in some special rights of the state organs to those work organizations which are deemed to be non-economic. These non-economic work organizations are usually in western countries called »nonprofit« companies. It is, of course, only a comparison to have in mind of the kind of organizations which we are, apart of enterprises, speaking of in this report. So, legislation uses several separate terms — the enterprise, the economic organization, and the institution (non profit organizations) — when the law is directly concerned with that kind of organization. Practically without any exception legislation is unanimous as regards the enterprise and the economic organization. These kinds of organizations have in general the same legal treatment. The organizations formed to deal with education, public health, culture, social welfare, etc. are called institutions and have a different legal position. But it should be made clear from the very start that they should by no means be confounded with state organizations. The work organizations (the enterprise and institution) are by no means state organs or state organisms either. That is why, even for other reasons, they are not named *state enterprises* or *state economic or work organizations*.

One should remember that as regards the general position of work organizations, and particularly as regards the relationship between the state and those organizations they are essentially different from the relationship between the state and *public* or *state enterprises*. Public enterprises — profit or non profit (this being the adopted term from comparative law for every kind of economic-business organization of nonprivate character) differ from Yugoslav work organizations (institutions and economic organizations) primarily in terms of the system of management, property relations, financial, administrative, and other relations to the state control, etc.

But, regardless of the differences mentioned above, Yugoslav enterprises can be classified under the general term of *public* establishments simply because they are not private and because they have all the characteristics of enterprises. That is why a foreign legal observer and analyst of the legal position of Yugoslav enterprises can find it hardly to be of any use to consider them in terms of the known type of »public« or »state« enterprises which exist in his country or in the world known to him. A similar comparison which has often been present in the perception of foreign scientists, businessmen or the anyone studying Yugoslav enterprises can be misleading. Yugoslav enterprises are independent economic organizations. They are under the management of the people working in them — the workers and employees (in our legal terminology — the workers); they themselves provide the material bases of their work, regardless of the possibility that other public funds can be advanced to them in the form of credit. In some cases, which represent an exception, they are not obliged to repay these credits. In their activity they have to comply with legal prescriptions and in principle are not given production or other economic or noneconomic tasks, but behave in accordance with the demand in the market. The development plan and the country's economic policy, influence the enterprise *indirectly* through the market, taxation, customs, and monetary-credit measures. Therefore, they exercise their influence through the material interests of the enterprises themselves, through the interests of the workers who are in charge of management in the enterprise, and not through the imposition of definite tasks to the enterprises.

Yugoslav enterprises fix their production and other activities in accordance with the market. They independently conclude business arrangements and negotiate contracts. No state plan is a legal obligation about type of production, capital investment, and distribution of income. The prices, in principle, are set by the enterprise itself. A certain price control exists, but with a tendency for reducing the size of intervention by the state. The enterprise itself is responsible for the distribution of total income between personal incomes and funds. Personal incomes are fixed by the enterprises themselves that is to say, by their highest body through their self-management acts.

I hope that this general survey of Yugoslav enterprises will help a foreign legal analyst to approach our enterprises without prejudices about the position of classical and known public or state enterprises.

(1) The Yugoslav enterprises are independent, integral, and self-managing organizations which deal with production and other economic activities and, consequently, have the character of legal entities. They, therefore, have both legal and business capacity in the fullest and the most accurate legal sense of the word. Organizational links with the state do not exist in any form in those enterprise.

Independence and integrity of enterprises is reflected in their constitutional right to organize their production or any other economic activity, to take care of their development, and to work out their plans and programmes of production and development, to decide on sale conditions for their products and services, to decide on the necessary funds — the way of their acquisition and on economically useful ways of

spending them thus to achieve the optimal effect for themselves and for the community as a whole, to distribute total income and to secure material bases of their activity, to distribute income between personal income and special funds, to decide on employment policy, and on all terms of their activity, to organize protection against accidents at work, to secure conditions for education, recreational activity, raising of the personal and social standard of living and to keep the public informed about their activity, of course, by observing the rules on trade secrets.

The Constitution provides that every act, including the law, violating the rights to self-management by the workers in the work organization is anti-constitutional.

As it is obvious from the above, the Constitution guarantees the invulnerability of independence and self-management of the enterprises. Of course, there is a whole series of constitutional and legal clauses regulating the essential behaviour of enterprises so that there is no absolute independence, but this independence is at a level at which it is being referred to in the world as autonomy. That degree of autonomy has by now been achieved by Yugoslav enterprises.

Yet, *work*, of all workers and employees in enterprises is the identity document for full legal right to management in the enterprises. This kind of qualification of work is a characteristic which is a special distinction of Yugoslav enterprises and other work organizations. Work is the source of all rights. Thereby the worker and the employee, on an equal footing, are the holders of all rights and obligations. Our Constitution even states that work alone and its results determine the material and social position of the individual. This kind of legal qualification of work in turn has a direct consequence to the worker, it has a bearing on him as the holder of all rights and obligations, so that the worker is in charge of the management in the enterprise where he works, this constituting the essence of self-management. It is an integral principle. The worker takes part in the management over the whole enterprise and all the results of those activities.

(2) The objective of the workers' management consists of *direct* management, which signifies that every worker takes part in management. Decision-making on some questions of vital interest (such as essential statutory reforms — merger, fusion, change of activity, etc.) should, according to law, be carried out through a referendum or through other forms of direct decision-making. But, on the other hand every enterprise, with the exception of the smallest ones, has its own organs which, as is known, execute the will of the enterprise, the will of the whole work community, the one that has authority in relation to the enterprise itself and to all other citizens and legal entities.

Every enterprise must have its own workers' council and its collective and individual executive organs. According to the new Constitutional Amendment No. 15 endorsed towards the end of 1968 decision-making on most important matters has been shifted to the workers in work communities in all forms of organization of associated work. The work organization as the legal term for work community, decides what function in the management and distribution of income will be carried out by the workers directly and what functions are going to be entrusted to the workers' council and executive organs. Under the statute of an enterprise

which must be accommodated to the Constitution and legislation, internal relations within the work organization are regulated, organs of management and executive organs are formed and other matters from the sphere of self-management are regulated. One of the presumptions of the realization to the fullest extent of all rights which have been transferred according to the Constitutional Amendment No. 15 to the workers in work organizations and organizations of associated work within their framework, consists no doubt in the passing of new statutes and other general acts.

It is therefore not, in principle, a matter for the state to provide for the competences of organs of management in enterprises, particularly executive organs, but it is a matter for the enterprise itself. Of course, executive organs are not executive only in the narrow sense of the word. They are organs which decide on various matters independently, in accordance with the rights given to them by the statute („charter" in the sense of the company law) of the enterprise concerned, but always on the basis of economic and business policy of the workers' council. According to law, in every enterprise, besides the workers' council, the managing board and the director must obligatorily exist. The managing board is being chosen by the workers' council for two years, but half the members must be elected every year. According to law, the director is chosen once in every four years, but he can be re-elected on condition that public competition is announced and that he be chosen from among the applicants. At present, it is clear that the Constitutional Amendment leaves all these matters in the hands of the enterprises to be decided in their respective statutes, covering, among other things, the rights and duties of their own organs. The constitutional Amendment took as the starting point the situation in which the work organization and organs of the enterprise should, more than so far, be effective and businesslike and suit the very structure of the enterprise itself and the concepts of the workers in it, and everything should stem from self-management.

At present statutes of the enterprises are being worked out. There are not as yet any data on these relations, on global rights and duties of the workers' council, the collective executive organs and the director. But, it can be stated by now that a variety of solutions is going to be reached, according to the needs of individual enterprises and according to the concepts of their workers and employees. Naturally, the influence of economic chambers and the trade unions will also be exercised, but in essence the rights and duties of these organs are provided for independently by the workers' collectives in the enterprises. This means that the organization of management in an enterprise and decision to that effect depend on the strength of arguments used about various possibilities.

The stress in the Constitutional Amendment has been on direct management and on the workers' councils, because the rights of executive, collective and individual organs, are derived from the workers' council's rights, that is to say, are a derivative of those rights.

(a) The workers' council is the highest elected organ in an enterprise, it is the most authoritative organ of all the working people. As such, it decides on all *general* matters, for instance, the passing of the statute, rules on the distribution of income, rules on labour relations and other general acts. It is *bound* only by its own general acts, until it changes

them in accordance with a certain fixed procedure. It is therefore not a question of an airless space but of something having its own pragmatism evolved from it independently. It cannot pass unlawful general act because they can be annulled through the federal and republican constitutional courts.

(b) The workers' council does not deal with individual matters, nor does it consider technical or technological professional matters. These are matters for expert services and the director. It has been stated that the workers' council is responsible for conducting economic and general business policy that is binding on all organs of an enterprise, but in relation to a third partner or partners every agreement is perfect and involves all court sanctions once it is approved by the director. There are certain contrast for which the law provides to rank among matters that are the responsibility of the workers' council (ratification). An agreement, for instance, on foreign investment in a Yugoslav enterprise is that kind of a contract. Or, if two or more domestic enterprises do joint operations. Therefore, every joint venture is the responsibility of the workers' council. But, only the act under which the given joint venture is instituted and its essential relations are established.

The workers' council adopts the annual financial report at the end of the year, and the plan and programme of work and development. But, the workers' council is always bound by agreements or contracts the enterprise has concluded with third parties. It cannot change it unilaterally.

(c) After a certain agreement as accepted and approved by the workers' council, that agreement with the third partner obliges the enterprise and, naturally, both the present *and all the future* workers' councils. Continuity is absolute. Agreements can, of course, be amended, but only in terms of the clauses of the agreement and not on the basis of the unilateral act of a workers' council, or through the statute or any other general act.

As for the security of a partner the signature of the director of an enterprise or its procurator or the person authorized to sign the contract except in the cases listed above when the law provides for ratification by the workers' council, is regularly sufficient.

(3) It has been stated that the enterprise is governed by persons employed in that enterprise and that work is the legal basis of management but not property. „The owner“ of funds is principally not authorized to take care of management.

Above all, there is no owner of a Yugoslav enterprise. Not even the state is the owner, since it does not absolutely execute anyone of the owner's rights. The state (or its organs) cannot take away part of the property, it cannot transfer funds from one to another enterprise, or to itself or anyone else either. Expropriation is possible against legal and equitable compensation, as in every country, regardless of private ownership, and it can be effected (for public roads, urban settlements, public buildings), according to the known expropriation procedure. The state has no right to surplus, profit, etc. The state cannot establish production plans, or plans on work, traffic, distribution, investment, etc. as *compulsory* for the enterprises. The state exercises power — *imperium*, but it does not conduct business, it does not carry out an economic or public activity of

any type. This is prohibited under the Constitution. It is considered as an impediment, and even constitutional courts are entitled to cancel laws or other regulations, according to a certain procedure, if they are anticonstitutional, as it has been effected in reality by now.

This signifies that the state is not the owner of funds earmarked for production, that is to say, property or results of activity of an enterprise, either income or profit.

The enterprise and its workers are not in turn owners either. One of the fundamental characteristics of property is that the owner *fully* disposes of his property, namely he can sell the whole property (for instance, a whole factory) and spend the countervalue in cash according to one's own will. Or, it is out of the question that the owner is allowed to sell machines, certain installations, and to use the countervalue for the purpose which he finds most convenient. To spend or divide into salaries or wages the proceeds of the sold property which belongs to the business fund cannot be done by our enterprises, or their work communities. In our country there are no shares, nor are there limited or other commercial companies. The worker is not entitled even to an ideal share of property of the enterprise, nor does he own shares.

This means that neither the worker nor the enterprise is the owner of the property of the enterprise. All rights as regards property of an enterprise are performed by the enterprise. The enterprise, therefore, administers the property, all funds, it is using them and disposing with them. It is allowed to sell land, buildings, equipment, installations, rights etc. to another enterprise, but the countervalue must be introduced into the funds of the enterprise earmarked for the same purpose. It cannot divide it in the form of wages and salaries. The enterprise disposes even of its income, that is of its profits and wage funds. The workers' council (the work community council in institutions) distributes its income into personal income and funds of the enterprise concerned. It disposes of its funds but always according to plan, safeguarding the integrity of business funds under its administration, of course, in the relative interpretation of the principle of integrity of business funds.

A Yugoslav enterprise is vested with all rights protecting its own individual property interests, both in relation to third partners and in relation to the state.

(4) Although work in an enterprise is in principle the sole legal basis of management, property is also playing a significant role. If another enterprise invests funds in an enterprise, the investor gains the right in the sphere of management provided for under the agreement. The investor participates, according to the investment agreement that is, according to the long-term business cooperation agreement, in the framing of business policy, in its implementation, in its disposal with property in its sharing, in the settlement of the question of man-power and staff. The essential thing is that this participation is achieved in accordance with the agreement which should, according to law, be approved by the workers' council. On that basis, joint bodies can be formed to be in charge of business operations and management.

Business policy of an enterprise is proposed by the executive organ (management, executive or business committee), and it is framed by the

workers' council. By the way, even with respect to the right to framing the essential business policy, it is essential to make a distinction between workers' councils and the assembly of a limited company. In the latter, it is not the responsibility of the assembly but of its board. In Yugoslav enterprises all basic and essential matters of management are being settled by the workers' council.

The very notion of business policy is very broad and comprehensive. It therefore consists of numerous components, or, as one could put it in legal terms, a series of functions which on the whole result in the business policy of a given enterprise.

Yugoslav legislation does not provide which individual functions are to be carried out by the workers' council, the managing board, or the director. This distribution of competences is a matter of the statute of the enterprise, this is an internal matter, except, as explained by now, the passing of statutes and general acts, plans, and programmes of activity and development of the enterprise, which are the functions of the workers' council (the council of the work community), that is to say, the work community as a whole.

(5) Yugoslav legislation has another significant characteristic. There is no amorphism within the enterprise. Within its framework organizations of associated work were created and are still being formed in accordance with the new Constitutional Amendment No. 15 with the degree of independence given to it under the statute of the enterprise. That independence ranges from a minimum to the possibility of having a separate legal existence. Our system provides for the legal frame insofar as the state, i. e. state organs are obliged to recognize — with respect to taxation and bookkeeping and other elements — what the enterprise establishes for its component parts, and the third partners insofar as it is known or should be known from the register, judging by the circumstances of a given case.

This means that the legislation and practice, which has been developing mostly after the Constitutional Amendment, really know of three types of organizations of associated work within the enterprise (and other work organizations). These legal levels are: (a) the organization of associated work; (b) an *independent* organization of associated work, and (c) an independent organization of associated work as a legal entity.

The first differs from the second, because an independent organization of associated work gains, establishes, and distributes income as an enterprise does, whereas the third (c) differs from a. (and b) because *within the enterprise* it has the characteristics of legal entity. Consequently, it appears even on the characteristic of legal entity. Connected with the enterprise whose part it is as its component. It is in fact a »dependent« enterprise, as is otherwise known from legislation in comparative law.

I would not deal with the so-called technical matters, that is, the modalities of its establishment, mutual relations of work communities in various aspects and forms of associated work. Laws and self-management acts, naturally, secure the property and legal unity of management and administration of the enterprise as a commodity manufacturer. Here the basic idea is essential. And that basic idea is that the individual workers should secure for themselves and their closest workers'

collective, united by the process of production or other activity, the right to self-management. In view of the complicated nature of production, techniques, and technology, the forming of these organizations of associated work is a matter for the working people within the enterprise. Law offers them aid for realizing these rights, paying attention, above all, to so-called third persons in the market, so as to avoid endangering the rights of the third partners by the internal organization of the enterprise. But the guarantee of self-management, of its effectiveness is that wherever people work their management should be as direct as possible, otherwise it might, even in a self-managing society, come to the alienation of the individual from the funds and the results of his work. And this would be contrary to the general concept of a self-managing society. Thus, the Constitutional Law provides for a groundwork of the constitutional basis so that decision as to the results of work (and elements leading to them) be not passed from the centre of the enterprise. In larger enterprises this centralistic decision-making would be at a distance from the workers as *the bearers of all rights and duties*, this being a fact in a self-managing society. The diffused management in Yugoslav enterprises is a pre-condition of direct management, a pre-condition for the power of the working class, the working people in the basic cells of work. Thereby, one should not (or one should not be allowed to) diminish the business ability of the enterprise as a whole. The unity of the whole and the independence of sections is a contradiction only at first sight. But these contradictions really lead to unity. Contradictions that really exist (regardless of the organization and »power« in an enterprise) are settled and overcome at the very source from which they stem. And, on the whole, one of the characteristics of the Yugoslav economic and social system consists of not denying the contradictions, but of offering them social, the most natural frames for settlement and overcoming. In effect, both in science and in practice, contradictions cannot be denied without endangering the social system as a whole.

In my opinion, this is the basis for establishing the sections of the enterprise with a series of limited and broad including even very broad rights. By the way, every whole is nevertheless part of another broader entirety. And, in fact, there is no absolute entirety.

(6) The existing trend of *integration* of independent enterprise (independent organizations of associated work) is equally significant for the system of the position of the enterprises. But, I even think that the *pre-condition of the integration* lies in the mentioned internal development of self-management.

Here, in this area, one should above all bear in mind the character of property, being the public one. Property does not give the legal right to management in enterprises and in other work organizations. Herewith, I am not referring to investments by other enterprises (or foreign individuals or companies that can originate significant elements of *participation* in management and distribution of income or profit from joint operations. This participation in management on the basis of the investment of capital and funds should be verified by the highest management organs but can never expropriate the worker's self-management rights, although this can be provided for under an agreement concluded between them and endorsed by the workers' council. But,

this is a *separate* theme. I wanted to call attention to integration trends which are not limited to this country only, but unfold even in relation to foreign enterprises in certain legally cogent conditions.

The Yugoslav enterprises have an open road to merger, fusion, and association of enterprises, to the formation of business associations, legal (or coercive communities, such as the Yugoslav railway directorate, the postal and telephone and telegraph services, and the electric power industry), as well as interested communities formed under a contract. Our legislation develops in the direction of offering increasingly broad legal frames to that development trend in enterprises. In Yugoslavia there are about 15.000 independent enterprises ranging from the smallest to the biggest with over 15.000 workers. All those enterprises compete mutually on the market on the one hand, but on the other hand society has a tendency to integrate them in various forms in terms of their own material interests. This road is of exceptional significance. It is not a matter for the state to merge enterprises or to perform any other business or organizational fusion of their economic activity. The principle has been adopted that enterprises should integrate *according to their own will* on the basis of material and business interests. A different attitude would be contradictory to the fundamental principle of independence and integrity of enterprises.

The creation of business communities is being achieved in reality, although the legislation does not provide for many possible forms. In Yugoslav legal theory the concept is gaining ground that the enterprise is allowed to do anything that has not been banned by either the Constitution or law (and, of course, the code of ethics). In accordance with that principle a great variety of different forms of integration have been created or is taking shape. They develop in the stated forms and in the creation of communities of common interests so that those communities are given the character of legal entities or are formed without that characteristic. Communities are being formed for general business as well as for co-ordinating business operations only in connection with certain business and other matters. In the beginning even collective agreements are being made providing for the conditions and criteria of the distribution of income, personal income, and work relations. All these are voluntary mutual agreements stemming from the principle of autonomy of the will of the enterprises and have legal sanctions agreed on by the parties to the given contract.

Yugoslav legislation even at present extends support to the creation of those communities, and possibly the future legislation will to an even fuller extent express support to the autonomy of the will in the creation of communities and other forms of integration. Moreover, the idea is to stimulate the creation of that type of communities, business associations, associations of enterprises, etc. which we, in our terminology, call business associations of enterprises. But, even the Constitution and legislation know of the antitrust clause with characteristic features for the socialist economic system. On the other hand, the creation of these business associations improves the quality and effectiveness of planning.

(7) At present a proposal is before the Parliament for the enactment of the Basic Law on Planning. The characteristics of this planning show that it is based on contracts between the enterprises and their

associations. The development planning will certainly provide for elements of determining the direction and goals as well as the relations contributing to the optimal development of the economy and of other public activities. On the basis of these tendencies the development plans will determine the guidelines of the development of all the industries and areas and will draw attention to the development which can count on support in the conditions of economic transactions. It is, however, certain that it would not contain (as was not the case with the existing plan) coercive, administrative legal elements and would not provide for legal sanctions against non-adherence to the guidelines of the plans, primarily because it is the fruit of agreement between the enterprises themselves and because the development plan cannot countermand business independence of the enterprises. The economic development plan can only be based on that independence and secure as full material interests of the enterprise by specific laws which will encourage the enactment of decisions which on the whole contribute to the attainment of planned goals and relations.

The Yugoslav development plan is not therefore the administrative determination of obligations as regards production and trade; it has not been addressed to individual enterprises. It does not provide accurately for the *legal* obligations of any one organization in the field of the economy. In that context one should remember, as has been stressed out, that our development plan counts on the market and its trends, and *indirectly* influences it through credit-monetary, customs, foreign exchange, and possibly taxation measures.

(8) The Yugoslav legislation tends to stabilize to an even greater extent the economic conditions under which business transactions are carried out, this having significant bearing not only upon planning and every kind of forecast, but also upon economic and market security of the given enterprise. Moreover, legislation expresses tendencies to further easing of fiscal burdens of enterprises because political decision have by now been taken by political organizations to that effect. This element of further alleviation of the burden forms a pre-condition of implementing the economic reform and of achieving the convertibility of the currency. Further opening of the Yugoslav economy to the world economy is a coherent element of openness of Yugoslav society as a whole, this being another declared principle of the reform in our country. Strengthening the self-management based on the entire economic system in terms of this essential characteristic of Yugoslav society, the legislation can only supplement and further elaborate the self-management system in enterprises and in all other components of social trends.

I have not dealt with problems which could have been described for this occasion as details — the founding of enterprises, their activity, firms, property rights and duties, representation, the funds of the enterprises and their purposes, the right to use them, technical details of merger, fusion, association, understandings between enterprises (collective, business, and statutory agreements), etc.

Let us choose some of those matters that may be of further interest. There is a possibility that these are only details and not the characteristics of Yugoslav enterprises, characteristics which have been known even in comparative law. Of course, there are certain original solutions,

particularly with regard to responsibility, official receivers, forcible and regular liquidation, and bankruptcy.

The last of the above mentioned items could receive some attention. Bankruptcy leads to a systematic elimination of incapable enterprises whose operations and management have been deficient, so that insolvency and a surplus of the adverse over favourable balance have been brought about. There is therefore no other way out but to establish the institution of bankruptcy, that is to say, the liquidation of management in the given specific enterprise, to appoint the official receiver and to set a date for sale of assets so as to satisfy the other self-management enterprises which here appeared in the role of creditors. If a certain organism is independent on the market, it must bear both positive and negative consequences of its behavior. Otherwise, relations which correspond to the governmentally controlled economy would have been established, the ones which are being rejected by the Yugoslav system.

Naturally, the market is not the only and very often the best and most reliable judge. But it is as »ultima ratio« in relation to an independent enterprise. However, humanism as the essential distinction of our socialist society (or rather should be socialist), imposes obligations upon the workers who either still are or who were in that enterprise, because humanism does not exist in relations to *enterprises* but in relation to the individual. Humane solutions are or should be discovered for workers from enterprise that are being liquidated, or go bankrupt. And this is being achieved through reserve public funds, through solidarity funds, by which employments are being provided for workers from such enterprises. We cannot as yet be satisfied with the results of operation of those funds, but as far as the system is concerned, it is very important that solutions — the direction — have been discovered.

By leaving out the »dark« pages of the system, even from this report one could gain the impression of automation both within the enterprises and within groups of enterprises, as autonomous and independent, connected exclusively through the market.

This impression would be a mistaken one. All enterprises in Yugoslavia are part of public property and all products of work in them are public funds. The enterprise therefore takes for its workers personal incomes and creates *public funds and assets*. The very fact of the creation of public assets reproduces socialist social relations. The autonomy of enterprises at the present level of development of production forces is a pre-condition of the existence and development of the self-management. The material concern of the workers and remuneration according to work is the chief motive force of development in every organization of associated work including the enterprises which are themselves organizations of associated work. The worker is the bearer of public interests. In his work community, so to say, twofold interests have been combined in principle. But, both the work communities and their enterprises have in turn been linked by agreements and integrational achievements. The state is not the only factor which should achieve a linkage among independent enterprises. On the contrary, that sort of rights could lead to bureaucratic practices. In our country even mutual links among work organizations are their responsibility, right, and *general obligation* (not

being a concrete legal one). It is being carried out in practice by steps and in face of difficulties. But, this linkage is a safe trend of the economy as a whole, and is not based on the will of the state and its authorities. Economic chambers also exist, and this is their public responsibility. Particularly, it is an obligation of the united trade unions which in turn act or rather should act in the direction of common interests of the establishment of these links.

Development planning, for its part, influences the creation of joint, co-ordinated interests. Normative acts of the state, laws, etc. tend in that direction. But, on the whole, in a common and concerted action, the will of the worker and his interests is being respected this being the constitutional pre-condition of the observance of law.

The results achieved show that the road taken by the self-managing enterprises has been fully affirmed in reality. Unsettled problems and questions which arise in the course of the establishment of self-managing enterprises call attention to the need for re-examining numerous measures and a whole series of institutions which have been rejected by everyday practice, since we have just entered a new world of self-management by the worker being established in enterprises and other work organizations. This process has been under way, and it is being realized through a revision of numerous laws in this field of activity. But, the further strengthening of self-management is the groundwork of this revision.

Dr Nikola Balog, Chairman of the Federal Legal Council, professor at the Faculty of Law in Novi Sad, and at the Faculty of Law of the University of Beograd; Member of the Constitutional Commission of Yugoslavia and Counselor of the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia.

Scientific fields: commercial and business law and nomotechnique (the science of preparation of normative or legislative acts).

Graduated and obtained a doctorate at the Faculty of Law of the University of Zagreb in 1937. Associated professor from 1948, and professor from 1968; United Nations expert for the management of public enterprises.

Published a textbook *Commercial Law*, 1954, as well as about 70 studies and articles, such as *Administrative Management of Public Enterprises*, *International Institute of Administrative Science* (a report submitted at the meeting in Brussels, in English and French); *Industrial Policies, and the Rate of Incentive Measures — the Experience of Yugoslavia* (for the International Seminar in Vienna); *Tendenzen der Jugoslawischen Gesetzgebung auf den Gebiet des Investitions* (for the Meeting of Yugoslav and German experts in Frankfurt); *The Legal Position of Enterprises and Institutional Changes in their Structure* (for the International Seminar in Beograd); *Self-managing Settling the Matters and Social Consultation* (report for the Federal Legal Council, Beograd, November 18, 1970).

Dr Vladimir JOVANOVIĆ, professeur a la
Faculté de Droit de l'Université de Beograd

L'AUTOGESTION DES ENTREPRISES EN YOUGOSLAVIE

Dans la première partie, nous verrons les sources historiques de l'autogestion et ce qu'elle représente aujourd'hui. Mais il faut avoir en vue que l'autogestion n'est pas seulement un système économique; c'est aussi un système d'organisation politique. Dans la deuxième partie, nous verrons comment l'autogestion a été réglée du point de vue juridique, quelles sont les institutions au moyen desquelles le système s'organise.

I — LES CADRES THEORIQUES DE LA CONCEPTION

1. *L'idée d'autogestion en général*

L'idée d'autogestion est la continuation des idées progressistes de «liberté» et d'«égalité» du XIXe siècle. Certains de nos auteurs trouvent la trace de l'autogestion déjà dans l'individualisme libéral, dans l'«Etat naturel» de John Locke, Etat où les hommes entrent dans la communauté créée sans qu'il y ait de chef ou d'intermédiaires, société organisée selon la raison et une gestion directe.

Plus près de nous, l'idée d'autogestion est développée notamment dans les idées de Marx et de Hegel de réaliser l'unité des éléments politiques et sociaux de la personnalité humaine. Ce sont les oeuvres des marxistes qui ont développé ce qui est la base de l'autogestion: l'idée d'aliénation et de désaliénation chez Marx, l'idée du Pouvoir des Soviets, c'est-à-dire de l'organisation d'une société par l'entremise des soviets de travailleurs, chez Lénine. Dans son oeuvre «l'Etat et le prolétariat», Marx a essayé de formuler comment doivent changer les relations dans une société organisée par la classe ouvrière. Un auteur italien, Gramsci, a essayé de développer l'idée des Conseils de fabrique en analysant la pratique de la classe ouvrière italienne dans l'Italie du nord.

La pratique révolutionnaire du mouvement ouvrier a également donné des exemples d'autogestion: la Révolution de 1848, la Commune de Paris de 1871, puis vers 1920 les Conseils de fabrique à Turin, qui essaient de créer un système de gestion à la fois de la production et des affaires sociales par les ouvriers.

Il est important de noter que l'autogestion est née comme une institution politique et comme un rapport socio-politique. Même l'auto-

gestion yougoslave, le plus souvent connue comme un mode de gestion des affaires économiques, a un caractère politique; elle exige un système complexe de changements des pouvoirs politiques et des rapports socio-politiques: il est nécessaire de réaliser un accord entre la politique et l'économie sociale pour pouvoir instituer un système d'autogestion.

Dans les *Manuscrits économiques et philosophiques*, Marx a étudié et analysé l'aliénation du travail et l'aliénation des travailleurs dans le système capitaliste et, éventuellement, dans le système socialiste. La séparation du travail et du travailleur par la division du travail a réduit les forces humaines dans un sens trop unique; le travailleur en a été réduit à former une partie du travail, toutes les forces créatrices du travail (organisation du travail, pouvoir de décider sur les questions économiques, sur la question des revenus des entreprises, sur les investissements) ont été séparées des travailleurs; par un fait historique, entre le travailleur et les moyens de production s'est interposée l'administration, la gestion des professionnels. De plus, ce système d'aliénation économique s'est transformé, dans le système politique, en aliénation des hommes par l'intermédiaire des partis politiques; même dans le système démocratique d'aujourd'hui, il y a de nombreux intermédiaires entre les hommes et le pouvoir politique: il y a toujours quelqu'un qui décide au nom des hommes.

L'aliénation est donc double: économique et politique — et c'est le phénomène marquant de la démocratie d'aujourd'hui. Selon l'idée de Marx, pour délivrer l'homme de cette situation, l'autogestion essaie de créer une «démocratie directe», une démocratie au point de vue économique et politique. Mais, lorsqu'on regarde le développement historique, on voit que le processus se déroule d'une manière totalement opposée. Lorsque l'aliénation a commencé comme aliénation économique et qu'elle se transportait ensuite dans la sphère politique, la classe ouvrière était dans une situation différente: elle était en état de saisir le pouvoir politique et de commencer, avec des déterminations politiques, à changer les rapports économiques, à éliminer les éléments négatifs créés par le système précédent, à éliminer même l'aliénation économique en créant un rapport direct entre le producteur et les moyens de production.

C'est là un processus qui ne peut se dérouler que lentement. Il demande de nombreux changements des conditions économiques. En passant de l'ancien système à un nouveau système, les ouvriers avaient leurs anciennes positions, donc, de fait, une inégalité. Et d'ailleurs, le système socialiste lui-même a créé de nouvelles contradictions, de nouveaux obstacles à l'autogestion ouvrière: gestion administrative de l'Etat, gestion où l'on essaie même d'interposer l'Etat entre les travailleurs et le travail, l'autogestion pouvant, ainsi comprise, conduire à des phénomènes analogues à la gestion des capitalistes.

L'autogestion est donc un processus très lent, dans lequel on essaie de changer la société toute entière; le changement ne dépend pas seulement de la volonté, du système, mais également des conditions matérielles et des changements des conditions matérielles du travail des ouvriers. Les ouvriers, en effet, ne sont pas entrés avec les mêmes chances dans le socialisme: ouvriers qualifiés, ouvriers non-qualifiés, ouvriers à hauts salaires et ouvriers avec des salaires plus bas. Et même — et c'est un

problème qui se pose aujourd'hui en Yougoslavie — la répartition selon le travail a déjà augmenté ces différences, les système socialiste en Yougoslavie s'est trouvé confronté avec le fait qu'il fallait à la fois renforcer la rémunération selon le travail et effacer les inégalités d'une manière scientifique, par l'intervention consciente de la classe ouvrière. La classe ouvrière, qui a saisi le pouvoir politique, commence à éliminer les conditions économiques et culturelles d'aliénation du travail. C'est là un processus assez pénible et qui se déroule lentement.

Il faut noter que, même dans un Etat socialiste, il y a des tendances bureaucratiques qui s'opposent à l'autogestion. Dans les écrits et dans les discours, l'autogestion est acceptable, mais de fait, par sa position réelle dans le système socio-économique, on trouve des pouvoirs qui ne sont pas d'une manière visible contre l'autogestion, mais qui, par le pouvoir d'Etat, s'opposent à l'autogestion, qui change évidemment la position effective de tous les hommes. L'autogestion est cependant un processus inéluctable si l'on veut arriver à une société plus juste, une société qui donne des chances égales à tous.

Sur ce point, il y a une différence entre les pays socialistes. Tous ont commencé par l'éducation du socialisme au moyen de l'Etat. Du fait que le socialisme l'a emporté dans des pays sous-développés ou en voie de développement, donc dans des pays à base matérielle pauvre — alors que l'autogestion demande une base matérielle riche — au premier moment on a développé la conception du rôle de l'Etat dans l'éducation du socialisme. Dès que le prolétariat a saisi le pouvoir, l'Etat est utilisé pour le changement de la société toute entière. Le changement commence par l'économie: l'Etat, au nom de la classe ouvrière, doit prendre l'administration de l'économie nationale et ainsi développer le socialisme de manière indirecte, par une représentation indirecte des travailleurs, mener le pays à l'abondance matérielle et changer les rapports sociaux.

Et la doctrine yougoslave estime qu'il y a là quelque chose de faux. Certes, l'Etat est nécessaire jusqu'à un certain point, mais même l'Etat socialiste peut se trouver, à l'avis des travailleurs, en position d'un corps étranger. Selon la théorie marxiste, pour créer un travailleur libre et pour édifier le socialisme, il faut instituer des rapports directs entre le travail, les moyens de production et les travailleurs. A un moment, donc, s'il dirige, l'Etat peut se présenter comme un corps étranger et être ressenti par les travailleurs comme un propriétaire privé. En effet, le travailleur ne décide pas directement du travail, ne voit pas ce qu'il fait et l'Etat se pose comme une force totalement étrangère à lui. C'est pourquoi, même dans les pays socialistes, il est possible d'avoir des confrontations, même dans le système d'autogestion, comme cela a été le cas en Slovénie, où des points de vue différents s'affrontaient.

Cela s'explique parfaitement. L'Etat n'est pas un être abstrait, mais toujours tel groupe de personnalités qui s'impose. Si le gouvernement dirigeant qui représente l'Etat prétend que chacun qui est contre lui est aussi contre le socialisme, alors naissent des tendances bureaucratiques. Tout Etat produit la bureaucratie, et même l'autogestion ouvrière produit la bureaucratie, particulièrement lorsqu'il s'agit d'autogestion indirecte. En Yougoslavie, l'autogestion indirecte est encore prépondérante: les pouvoirs sont transférés aux Conseils, aux Directeurs, aux Conseils exécutifs; et dans une entreprise, si le système de décision

démocratique n'est pas suffisamment développé, s'il y a des milieux arriérés des ouvriers non-qualifiés, etc., les forces de direction peuvent apparaître comme bureaucratiques. La lutte pour l'autogestion, qui n'est pas terminée en Yougoslavie, est la lutte pour éliminer tout intermédiaire, même élu par les ouvriers, et pour créer des formes de décision directe. L'autogestion est donc un processus de lutte contre tout pouvoir qui s'interpose entre les ouvriers et les moyens, contre tout pouvoir qui décide à la place des ouvriers au lieu de les laisser décider directement.

L'autogestion est une idée séduisante. Même dans les réactions hostiles, on trouve, dans les pays occidentaux et même dans les pays socialistes, des tendances à essayer d'introduire quelque forme d'autogestion. C'est le cas, par exemple, des différentes formes de participation des ouvriers. La participation des ouvriers à la gestion des entreprises est, sous ses différentes formes, une victoire pour la classe ouvrière.

En France, dans le secteur nationalisé (mines, électricité, gaz, assurances), on trouve des formes de participation directe des ouvriers dans les Comités mixtes. En Allemagne, on a introduit une forme de coparticipation des travailleurs dans la gestion de l'entreprise par l'intermédiaire du directeur du travail: sur cinq directeurs, un est élu par les ouvriers. En Italie, sans aucune intervention de la loi, on a introduit la participation dans les usines Olivetti.

Il y a deux espèces de participation. Dans le premier cas, la participation est considérée comme participation matérielle: d'après la loi les ouvriers participeront à une partie du profit. Dans le deuxième cas, la participation est celle qui fait participer les ouvriers aux décisions sur les rapports de travail, sur les assurances sociales. Mais il est important de souligner que toutes ces formes de participation s'arrêtent avant la décision économique. Toutes les décisions économiques concernant l'entreprise (production, répartition du profit) demeurent dans les mains de ceux qui sont titulaires du droit de propriété privée ou de propriété d'Etat. Même s'il s'agit là d'une victoire des ouvriers, elle ne change pas encore sensiblement les rapports socio-économiques et il ne faut pas la confondre avec l'autogestion.


Dans les pays socialistes mêmes, il faut parler de participation et non d'autogestion. Devant chaque mouvement ouvrier (Pologne et Hongrie en 1956, Tchécoslovaquie actuellement), chaque fois que les citoyens et les ouvriers n'étaient pas satisfaits de la situation des rapports socio-économiques, on a tout de suite joué sur la notion de Conseils ouvriers. En Pologne et en Hongrie il y a des Conseils ouvriers; en Tchécoslovaquie il y a eu, juin 1968, un grand mouvement pour le changement des rapports socio-économiques et une loi doit changer complètement la situation juridique de l'entreprise; en grande partie, l'intervention des SoviétS s'explique surtout par la volonté d'empêcher le changement de l'organisation économique, de sauvegarder l'ancien système. La lutte actuelle qui se déroule en Tchécoslovaquie est entre ceux qui veulent sauvegarder l'ancien système administratif (qui englobe la Tchécoslovaquie dans le système de marché socialiste) et conserver les rapports tels quels, et ceux qui veulent changer tout. On parle du danger de restaurer le capitalisme en Tchécoslovaquie, ce qui n'est pas

vrai, car il est difficile de revenir à l'ancien système; il s'agit simplement de changer les rapports socio-économiques.

Ces changements sont progressifs, mais, pour que l'autogestion puisse se dérouler, il faut changer complètement le système économique et le système socio-politique. Ce changement complet ne peut se faire que très lentement; en Yougoslavie, nous sommes encore en train de changer et il y a encore des luttes pour l'autogestion. En Pologne, on a introduit les Conseils ouvriers, mais on n'a pas changé complètement le système; il y a ainsi une contradiction entre le système d'autogestion et le système de gestion étatique de l'économie toute entière; on a même été un peu effrayé: après avoir introduit les conseils ouvriers, l'année suivante on a élargi les conseils ouvriers en y introduisant le représentant du Parti communiste et le représentant des syndicats, dont le poids politique change complètement la balance; actuellement, l'autogestion est gelée; pour un développement futur, des changements doivent survenir: ou bien changer le système de l'économie nationale toute entière, ou bien étouffer les conseils ouvriers et tout le système d'autogestion.

Même dans la Russie soviétique, il existe une forme de participation. Les formes de participation étaient d'ailleurs plus fortes au début, dans la période de la N. E. P.; les premiers jours après la Révolution, on a eu des comités de fabrique, le contrôle des ouvriers; mais peu à peu, comme on a développé la conception de l'Etat socialiste comme gérant de l'économie, on a réduit les formes de participation, on a introduit dans le système soviétique le système de gestion par un homme (Etat, Ministères et Directions, directeurs de l'entreprise ayant une responsabilité effective); on a eu ainsi un système actif qui a donné pendant une période des résultats économiques, mais peu à peu, du point de vue du développement de la société toute entière on a de plus en plus réduit la position des travailleurs à celle qui peut être la leur dans d'autres pays, même capitalistes: du point de vue des rapports de travail, l'être humain est réduit à une personne qui doit former une partie du travail, et l'aliénation du travail n'est pas éliminée. On a des formes de participation: les Conférences des producteurs, où l'on discute. On a même essayé d'institutionnaliser ces formes, de donner quelques pouvoirs, mais tout de suite les pouvoirs étatiques ont étouffé ces tendances. Actuellement donc, il y a des formes de participation des ouvriers: conseils, discussions, mais pas de participation au niveau de la gestion, de la décision.

En Inde, en Algérie, il y a des tendances progressistes: il a y des conseils ouvriers en Algérie; mais, comme dans les autres pays, ce sont des formes à mi-chemin; il faut se décider: la société peut se développer, mais d'une autre manière. Mais il ne faut pas confondre toutes ces formes de participation avec l'autogestion.



2. L'introduction de l'autogestion en Yougoslavie

Il y eut deux sortes de motifs pour cette introduction: motifs économiques et motifs idéologiques. Du point de vue de l'économie nationale,

même en Yougoslavie, après la victoire de la Révolution, on a introduit le système de la gestion étatique; dans la première période, cela était nécessaire: le pays était ravagé, les forces économiques étaient faibles, et il était nécessaire de concentrer les pouvoirs et les moyens. En 1945, pour instaurer un système économique socialiste, il n'y avait pas de temps pour des discussions: on avait besoin d'une force centralisée, concentrée pour sortir de l'impasse. Et pendant une période ce système a prouvé sa force créatrice pour installer le système socio, politique et économique. Mais, au moment de la rupture avec l'Union soviétique en 1949, on a reconnu que le système n'était pas suffisant. De plus en plus les travailleurs perdaient leur intérêt au travail, à la productivité; l'intéressement matériel pour la production baissait; et la gestion étatique a commencé à montrer ses insuffisances pour un développement plus grand de la société. Il y avait alors une industrialisation assez forte, mais même les ouvriers ressentaient l'Etat socialiste comme un corps étranger et la productivité commençait à tomber.

Du point de vue idéologique, l'idée de dépérissement de l'Etat a conduit nos dirigeants à changer le système. Les idées de Marx sont la base, mais la pratique de l'autogestion est plus riche que ce que Marx a pu imaginer. C'est pourquoi nos théoriciens ont essayé de développer les théories marxistes. On a pensé que l'édification du socialisme ne pouvait être le devoir de l'Etat; pour passer dans un système socialiste et pour changer la société même en société communiste, ce sont les hommes eux-mêmes, les travailleurs qui doivent changer; il faut changer les rapports entre le travail et les moyens pour que l'être humain trouve sa place dans la société. Plus l'Etat prolonge sa force, plus l'être humain devient objet — alors que l'homme doit devenir de plus en plus sujet de décisions.

Le changement a commencé avec la loi de 1950 sur la remise des entreprises aux conseils ouvriers. Le développement yougoslave s'est fait en trois phases. La première phase va de 1950 à 1957, et même jusqu'à 1965. On a introduit le système des conseils ouvriers, un système d'organes de gestion de l'entreprise confiés aux ouvriers. On a commencé à changer le système tout entier, mais les changements se faisaient lentement. On avait transféré le pouvoir aux ouvriers, mais quand on regardait la composition des organes de l'entreprise, et même les rapports de l'Etat et de l'entreprise, on peut voir un processus de développement allant pas à pas dans le sens d'une libéralisation du système. En 1950, il y avait bien des Conseils ouvriers, mais avec un directeur hérité de l'ancien système et ayant assez de pouvoirs dans les rapports de travail (pouvoir de décider en matière de rapports de travail, en matière de problèmes disciplinaires); de plus l'Etat a gardé le pouvoir de décider de la plus-value: on remet le revenu des entreprises à la disposition des ouvriers, mais auparavant l'Etat, au moyen d'instruments financiers, a pris la plus grande partie de la plus-value, a décidé de l'investissement (reproduction élargie), donc a gardé l'instrument de gestion de l'économie nationale globale.

Vers 1963, on a commencé de nouveau à changer le système économique, en éliminant les éléments étatiques dans les rapports entre l'entreprise et l'Etat et en essayant d'autre part de décentraliser l'autogestion dans l'entreprise. Le processus est double: du point de vue extérieur du

statut juridique de l'entreprise, il y a libération du système économique en ce sens que réellement on a de plus en plus laissé le pouvoir économique à l'entreprise, en supprimant les instruments financiers qui prenaient la plus grande partie de la plus-value; du point de vue intérieur on a essayé de développer une gestion directe, de décentraliser l'autogestion dans l'entreprise, de créer des unités économiques et de transférer les droits de décision sur de nombreuses questions (organisation du travail, répartition des revenus) à ces unités économiques, où l'on essayait de créer une gestion directe.

Même dans cette période, pour juger ce que les travailleurs étaient capables de faire — et il en est encore ainsi aujourd'hui —, on a proclamé les conseils ouvriers gérants de l'entreprise; les conseils ouvriers étaient plutôt une force politique, mais peu à peu les travailleurs ont été capables de procéder à la gestion économique. Dans une grande partie des entreprises, les ouvriers ont partagé le pouvoir avec les organes exécutifs. Le Conseil ouvrier est l'organe suprême: un conseil des travailleurs est l'organe exécutif, le directeur est le chef de l'administration, qui prépare les décisions que le Conseil ouvrier doit prendre en considération; l'administration a donc en partie décidé: ce n'est donc pas encore l'autogestion. Dans les premiers temps, le Conseil ouvrier a employé sa force politique pour changer les conditions de travail, éliminer les différences entre les travailleurs; cela a été aussi une école d'autogestion. Les premiers résultats tangibles ont eu lieu dans le domaine de la répartition des revenus; c'est là que les ouvriers se sont montrés les plus capables. Mais, du point de vue de l'entreprise tout entière, il y a eu des moments où l'administration s'est montrée plus progressiste que l'ensemble des ouvriers. Actuellement, c'est différent: les ouvriers sont capables de voir que leur intérêt à grande portée est d'investir, de développer économiquement l'entreprise. Mais il y a eu des luttes entre les diverses tendances avant d'arriver à cela. Dans cette première phase donc, le pouvoir des ouvriers était, pour une bonne part, même dans le système d'autogestion, le pouvoir politique. Mais de plus en plus les décisions économiques ont pris une grande place, au fur et à mesure du développement de la conscience et des capacités des ouvriers.

Dans la deuxième phase, il y a eu décentralisation de l'autogestion, création des unités économiques et transfert des pouvoirs de décision sur ces unités. Mais cela était encore insuffisant, et aujourd'hui nous sommes dans une nouvelle phase. La caractéristique de cette troisième phase est l'abolition de l'intervention de l'Etat dans les formes de gestion. Jusqu'à présent, c'est l'Etat qui, par des lois, a introduit les formes de gestion; il y avait décentralisation, mais elle était introduite par le pouvoir législatif. Par l'amendement 15 à la Constitution on a aboli les formes prescrites des organes de gestion; on a seulement conservé le Conseil ouvrier comme forme obligatoire et on a laissé à l'entreprise, aux collectivités ouvrières, le choix des formes de gestion; même le directeur, jusqu'alors très fort dans ses pouvoirs, est actuellement remis en cause.

On a également changé la loi sur les entreprises, en donnant la possibilité à l'entreprise de créer de nouvelles formes de rapports entre les unités économiques; on a même donné le droit au collectif ouvrier de donner à une partie de l'entreprise le statut juridique de personne morale, de lui donner une indépendance assez grande et de créer une association

plus large, de transformer la notion même de l'entreprise. En ce qui concerne l'association des ouvriers (l'association du travail), on laisse aux ouvriers le soin de décider de la forme que prendra cette association de base, des rapports entre les différentes parties de l'entreprise, ce qui peut remettre en cause l'entreprise même comme forme juridique de gestion.

Actuellement, nous sommes en train d'introduire, par la loi, la possibilité que les ouvriers décident des formes des organisations, des formes de l'autogestion, d'une manière beaucoup plus libre qu'auparavant. Peut-être cette voie va-t-elle mener à la création de formes nouvelles, faire en sorte que les rapports directs entre les travailleurs pour tout ce qui concerne le travail soient libres et qu'on ait une vraie association des travailleurs:

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II — LA PRATIQUE DE L'AUTOGESTION OUVRIERE EN YUGOSLAVIE

1. *Les cadres organisateurs et juridiques*

Dans un système de gestion des entreprises par les ouvriers, l'entreprise socialiste est posée dans la situation d'une personne morale indépendante, à la différence du système de gestion administrative, où l'entreprise (même déclarée personne morale) n'est qu'un organe d'Etat dans l'économie.

Certes, même dans le système administratif, il y a des changements assez grands qui traduisent la tendance à l'autonomie de l'entreprise. Mais, dans un tel système, l'entreprise reste subordonnée aux organes d'Etat; par un système de pyramide, on a à la base les entreprises, pour des pouvoirs hiérarchiques qui vont jusqu'aux ministères. Au point de vue économique, on a le plan administratif: les décisions administratives sont décisives pour le contenu du travail de l'entreprise. Le degré d'indépendance peut être plus ou moins grand. En Russie soviétique, la loi de 1965 a changé sensiblement la situation des entreprises économiques; même les trusts ont une indépendance au point de vue financier et on a même déclaré l'entreprise comme personne morale. Mais c'est encore le système administratif qui prévaut: le pouvoir d'Etat est prédominant; puisque l'Etat a le droit de fonder l'entreprise, de faire cesser son activité, de la transférer, de prendre les moyens, et même par le plan d'Etat, d'une manière flexible ou non, de diriger la production. Dans un tel système l'autogestion ne peut pas se développer, et c'est pourquoi le changement commence avec le système juridique de l'entreprise.

A la différence de cela, le statut juridique de l'entreprise yougoslave est celui d'une personne morale autonome dans un système de production marchande. Pour mesurer le travail et pour qu'une collectivité de travailleurs puisse gérer l'entreprise, il faut qu'elle puisse se montrer sur le marché comme productrice de marchandises, comparer le travail, et que l'entreprise soit, en comparaison avec l'autorité d'Etat, en position d'indépendance garantie par l'Etat.

Dans le droit civil et commercial, les plus importants, au point de vue de la personnalité morale, sont les biens et les moyens propres. La

constitution yougoslave des moyens de l'entreprise est la suivante: les moyens de l'entreprise sont propriété sociale; mais la propriété sociale est une propriété collective: en même temps plusieurs sujets ont différents droits; et dès que la propriété sociale est donnée à une entreprise, ou dès que l'entreprise l'a acquise par son travail, l'entreprise a un droit réel sur ses moyens: le droit d'utilisation ou droit d'usage: l'entreprise a le droit d'utiliser ses moyens selon ses décisions propres, d'engager sa responsabilité jusqu'à la valeur des ses moyens (jusqu'à la faillite); l'Etat et l'entreprise sont séparés: l'Etat n'est pas responsable des dettes de l'entreprise et, si cette dernière n'est pas solvable, elle peut tomber en faillite; à vrai dire, la faillite existe surtout pour les entreprises petites et moyennes; pour une grosse entreprise en voie de faillite, si l'Etat a intérêt à intervenir, il peut le faire par le crédit pour assainir la situation de l'entreprise: pour un temps limité, un an par exemple, l'Etat peut écarter l'auto-gestion et revenir à une gestion administrative pour réorganiser l'entreprise. Mais, du point de vue juridique, chaque entreprise peut tomber en faillite, elle est responsable de son travail économique et en prend le risque.

Et même contre l'Etat il y a une protection des moyens de l'entreprise. Une fois que l'entreprise a acquis les moyens de travail, l'Etat n'a pas le droit de les prendre, si ce n'est par la loi fédérale et contre rémunération. L'entreprise a le droit de protéger les moyens acquis par le travail devant la Cour constitutionnelle ou devant les tribunaux normaux, comme un propriétaire privé. Mais, à la différence d'un propriétaire privé, le collectif ouvrier n'a pas le droit de faire cesser le travail de l'entreprise et de partager les moyens ou de changer l'entreprise; une fois fondée, l'entreprise ne peut cesser le travail que dans les conditions prévues par la loi: faillite, absence de conditions économiques (absence de matières premières, constitution provisoire), par exemple pour construire un chemin de fer, une route ou un barrage. La loi donne à l'entreprise l'assurance que son travail ne sera pas interrompu par un acte administratif de l'Etat.

Mais, d'autre part, comme il s'agit de moyens importants, l'Etat a réglé par la loi la manière dont les ouvriers peuvent utiliser les moyens. Dès qu'on parle de propriété sociale, notamment de la propriété sociale sur les moyens de l'entreprise, c'est-à-dire du droit d'utilisation, il y a deux parts; une part de droit civil et une part de droit public. Dans la part du droit civil, l'entreprise comme une personne privée a tous les droits. Dans la part du droit public, l'Etat a fixé un régime spécial pour les moyens fondamentaux (machines, valeurs de base, fonds d'affaires), qui doivent être conservés; l'entreprise est libre de vendre les machines, de changer la structure, mais la valeur des moyens en question ne peut être changée: les ouvriers n'ont pas le droit de prendre les moyens fondamentaux, de les vendre et de les distribuer comme revenus.

Par la loi l'entreprise est obligée d'avoir un fonds de réserve. En effet, comme elle travaille sur le marché, il y a un risque économique normal: les ouvriers sont donc obligés à la répartition du revenu global, d'en prendre une partie pour la mettre dans le fonds de réserve. De même, la loi a fixé comment distribuer les résultats du travail, la plus-value.

Donc, du point de vue des biens et moyens propres, la situation est très semblable à celle d'une entreprise privée dans un système d'économie marchande — à l'exception du droit de disposer des valeurs, théoriquement exerçable dans les pays occidentaux; mais, en fait, les actionnaires d'une grande usine ne peuvent guère décider de fermer brusquement l'entreprise et d'en faire cesser le travail: la fonction sociale, même de la propriété privée, est aujourd'hui présente même dans le système occidental.

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Dans l'autogestion, le revenu global de l'entreprise et la répartition de ce revenu sont des points essentiels. Une fois les diverses déductions faites (pour rembourser les fonds engagés, pour le fonds d'amortissement, etc.), le revenu englobe le bénéfice total. Là il y a encore quelques impôts fixés par la loi, sans que les ouvriers aient le choix; par exemple, les intérêts (allant de 5 à 1%) sur les moyens fondamentaux et sur les moyens de roulement), puis les diverses cotisations (chambres de commerce, coopération économique entre les entreprises, etc.). Le reste est le revenu à libre disposition: ici commence l'autogestion et la différence essentielle entre les rapports salariés et les rapports d'autogestion.

Les ouvriers distribuent la plus-value restante en deux parts: l'une pour le fonds de réserve (selon un pourcentage fixé par la loi) et pour les autres fonds à la libre disposition des ouvriers, l'autre pour le revenu personnel des travailleurs (salaires) et pour la consommation commune; la consommation commune est un fonds spécial qui vise à diminuer les différences qui existent entre les ouvriers, par des conditions matérielles meilleures (appartements, éducation, etc). L'essentiel ici est le fonds de réserve et la somme affectée au revenu personnel, en général laissés à la libre disposition des travailleurs; mais, comme les tendances humaines sont naturellement plus favorables aux revenus qu'au fonds (alors que l'intérêt durable est de renforcer le fonds, d'avoir des investissements sensibles), la loi demande que les conseils de gestion des entreprises, les conseils ouvriers, fixent par un règlement spécial les perspectives de développement de l'entreprise, la proportion à investir dans les fonds et à distribuer comme revenu personnel; même avec le règlement spécial, les ouvriers doivent fixer la manière suivant laquelle ils distribueront le revenu personnel.

Les ouvriers n'ont pas un salaire fixé, même si dans la fixation des prix, le prix du travail peut se montrer comme une somme fixée. Tous les trois ou six mois, ou à la fin de l'année, les ouvriers ont le droit de distribuer le revenu, de faire une balance et de voir combien ils ont gagné, s'ils ont eu du succès ou non. Pour chaque poste de travail on a fixé le revenu de base: soit pour un ingénieur 200 dollars, pour un ouvrier qualifié 150 dollars, pour un ouvrier non qualifié 50 dollars. A un moment donné les ouvriers, s'ils veulent distribuer le revenu, doivent faire la balance et regarder s'ils ont des revenus à distribuer: si l'excédent est double, l'ingénieur recevra 400 dollars (de nouveaux dinars), le travailleur qualifié 300 et le travailleur non qualifié 100 dollars. Inversement, si l'entreprise n'a pas eu de succès, ou si même il y a eu des pertes, l'ingénieur pourra ne recevoir que 100, le travailleur qualifié 75

et le non qualifié 25... Si la situation est encore pire, s'il n'y a pas d'argent du tout, selon le règlement yougoslave l'Etat garantit un revenu minimum, qui, après juin 1968, est fixé à environ 30 dollars. Cette situation peut se prolonger une année; par permission spéciale, si les travailleurs ont le sentiment qu'ils peuvent eux-mêmes assainir la situation, une prolongation de six mois peut être accordée. Sinon l'entreprise commence à tomber en faillite; de plus en plus, elle n'aura pas d'argent pour payer les salaires, les intérêts, les dettes. Selon la procédure civile, les demandeurs demanderont devant les tribunaux commerciaux l'ouverture de la faillite; si la communauté ou les organes d'Etat n'ont pas un intérêt spécial pour secourir une telle entreprise et l'assainir, l'entreprise sera liquidée par faillite et cessera d'exister comme personne morale autonome.

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En ce qui concerne l'administration, jusqu'en 1965 l'Etat prenait 15% sur les fonds restants pour les investissements, partagés en fonds de fédération, fonds de république, etc. et prenait ainsi la plus grande part de la plus-value. Cela a été abrogé en 1965, et ainsi la base matérielle de l'autogestion s'est augmentée.

Jusqu'à cette année les organes de la gestion ouvrière et les formes de la gestion directe étaient les suivantes. Au niveau de l'entreprise toute entière les organes étaient les suivants: conseil ouvrier, comité exécutif, directeur; au niveau des unités économiques: conseil ouvrier, réunion des ouvriers. Les formes de gestion directe étaient le référendum et la réunion des ouvriers.

Le Conseil ouvrier est l'organe supérieur; il est composé des représentants ouvriers, dont le nombre peut aller de 15 à 120 membres. Il élit le comité exécutif de l'entreprise, qui peut avoir trois à onze membres. Le directeur est élu par le conseil ouvrier par concours public; il a des pouvoirs doubles; il est à la fois organe exécutif et, d'après la loi, représentant de l'entreprise dans ses rapports avec l'extérieur (il a le mandat commercial); il est chargé par l'Etat de contrôler la légalité des décisions du Conseil ouvrier. Le directeur doit soumettre son rapport au Conseil ouvrier et l'informer de qu'il a fait en ce qui concerne les décisions prises par le Conseil. Mais, si le Conseil ouvrier a pris une décision contraire aux lois, le directeur peut demander à la commune de suspendre la décision; le pouvoir d'Etat local tranchera ce différend entre le conseil et le directeur. En fait, ni le Conseil ni le directeur ne sont satisfaits; le directeur trouve qu'il n'a pas assez de pouvoirs, qu'il est trop limité par le conseil ouvrier, qu'il n'a pas assez de liberté pour organiser la production, dont il est responsable; et les milieux ouvriers estiment que les directeurs ont trop de pouvoirs, qu'ils ont des tendances bureaucratiques. C'est pourquoi on a essayé d'introduire les formes de démocratie directe: le référendum et la réunion des ouvriers.

D'une manière générale, la loi a introduit des formes directes de démocratie pour toutes les questions de statut de l'entreprise: par exemple, pour savoir si deux entreprises vont s'unifier, on procédera à un référendum. Mais le défaut de la loi est en ce qu'elle n'a pas exposé quels cas doivent être obligatoirement soumis à des référendums. Comme

rapport démocratique, le référendum, notamment dans les milieux de l'entreprise ou des unités économiques, est la façon la plus directe de décider: c'est un vote secret, qui a pour seule alternative oui-non et la décision est obligatoire pour le Conseil ouvrier. Les cas où l'on doit recourir au référendum sont établis par les statuts de l'entreprise; mais, comme les statuts sont rédigés par l'administration, c'est-à-dire par les directeurs en général, le référendum n'a pas donné de résultats très favorables.

Par la Constitution et par le changement de la loi sur les entreprises, on a supprimé l'obligation de toute autre forme. Le Conseil ouvrier reste comme le seul organe obligatoire. Comme toutes les choses nouvelles, cela a créé une assez grande confusion actuellement, mais le développement est très intéressant. On peut avoir ou non un Comité exécutif: les ouvriers décident des formes qu'ils veulent choisir. Le directeur subsiste, mais ses pouvoirs (excepté celui du respect de la légalité) sont complètement laissés au règlement de l'entreprise; il y aura ainsi pénétration des ouvriers dans la fonction de directeur en ce qui concerne le mandat commercial et l'exécutif de l'entreprise. On peut créer un organe exécutif collectif: le directeur et les représentants des conseils ouvriers vont décider, par exemple du problème des contrats — droit jusqu'alors réservé par la loi au directeur seul. On a laissé aux ouvriers le soin de chercher eux-mêmes les formes qui leur paraissent les plus souhaitables. Pour le moment, la plupart des entreprises garderont probablement l'ancien système, mais peu à peu les choses changeront. Jusqu'à maintenant, la gestion administrative était le point faible de l'autogestion; on a partagé l'autogestion au point de vue économique, mais ce sont encore l'administration et les professionnels qui, au moyen de l'organisation technique, décident de nombreuses questions; maintenant, cela est ouvert aux milieux ouvriers et on verra quels seront les résultats.

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En général, le rapport entre le pouvoir politique de l'Etat et l'entreprise est organisé de telle manière que l'Etat a un droit de contrôle de la légalité; s'il existe un droit pour l'intervention administrative des organes d'Etat, cela est toujours fixé à l'avance par la loi, de même que les moyens par lesquels l'Etat peut intervenir directement dans l'entreprise. Il y a des contrôles financiers, des contrôles techniques. Par exemple, tout le régime d'exportation, même libéré, est soumis dans une large mesure à l'intervention de l'Etat. De plus, l'Etat a le droit d'intervenir dans certains cas sur le marché; en général, les prix sont librement fixés par l'entreprise, mais si la hausse des prix risque de menacer sensiblement les produits importants pour le standard de vie, ou bien si la hausse de prix risque d'être dangereuse pour la stabilité de l'économie nationale, l'Etat, représenté par l'Institut de contrôle des prix, a le droit de soumettre les prix de ces produits à un contrôle: dès lors, l'entreprise ne peut élever ces prix sans prouver à l'organe d'Etat que des circonstances objectives l'obligent à le faire. Cela peut être utile si on l'utilise d'une manière prudente. Mais s'il y a de nombreux produits sur liste de con-

trôle, le système reste administratif et produit des conséquences néfastes pour l'autogestion.

D'autres mesures administratives peuvent être introduites. Par exemple, dans le cas où l'entreprise a subi des pertes ou si à plusieurs reprises elle a violé des lois positives, on peut imposer, pour un temps limité, une gestion administrative et écarter pour cette période l'autogestion. Mais ce qui est important c'est la limitation des droits législatifs. Même la loi fédérale ne peut pas dépasser ses pouvoirs; on ne peut pas limiter les droits essentiels de l'autogestion par la loi. Si l'entreprise estime que l'organe législatif a dépassé ses pouvoirs, elle peut demander l'abrogation de cette loi comme contraire aux droits fondamentaux de l'autogestion en s'adressant à la Cour constitutionnelle. De même, si un ouvrier estime que le statut de l'entreprise néglige les droits d'autogestion des ouvriers, il peut demander l'abrogation par la Cour constitutionnelle de telle ou telle partie du statut. Très souvent il arrive que la commune introduise des impôts qui ne sont pas en accord avec la loi: certaines entreprises ont alors demandé devant la Cour constitutionnelle l'abrogation de telles décisions de la commune.

L'essentiel du rapport Etat-entreprise est la légalité. L'Etat a le droit d'intervention, mais toujours dans le cadre de la loi, qui estime les droits essentiels de l'autogestion et qui ne permet pas que cette dernière tombe de nouveau dans un système de gestion administrative.

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Le marché et le plan social sont le point le plus faible du système d'autogestion. Du plan administratif on a passé à une planification, au plan social des proportions du développement; c'est un plan qui exprime les désirs de développement, mais sans obligation directe, sans même de pouvoir civil sur le travail de l'entreprise; c'est plutôt l'obligation pour les organes d'Etat de créer au moyen d'instruments financiers une situation sur le marché, favorable aux buts du plan social; mais dans le plan, aucun instrument ne vient renforcer. A vrai dire, on pourrait faire quelques pas de plus et introduire des méthodes civiles: l'Etat peut demander que tel et tel contrat, telle ou telle décision d'une entreprise puisse être soumise à un tribunal commercial si elle est complètement contraire au plan social.

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2. Les problèmes actuels de l'autogestion

Il y a d'abord de grandes discussions sur les problèmes de gestion. Nous avons vu que ni le Conseil ouvrier ni le directeur n'étaient satisfaits de l'autogestion. D'un côté, on trouve que dans ce système on n'a pas séparé la gestion de l'administration; les milieux de directeurs et quelques milieux politiques, notamment dans les régions développées, se prononcent pour la conception qu'il est nécessaire de faire une différence

entre la gestion et l'administration: les ouvriers ne peuvent pas décider sur toutes les questions, en tout cas c'est l'administration qui prépare le développement technique, qui décide d'une manière effective sur les problèmes techniques, il faut donc laisser aux ouvriers la distribution des revenus, la politique de l'entreprise, confier l'exécutif aux directions et à l'administration, en les laissant sous le contrôle des conseils ouvriers en ce qui concerne la politique et les responsabilités. D'un autre côté, on objecte qu'on ne peut pas séparer la gestion et l'administration.

En fait, ce qui manque — et c'est un deuxième problème — c'est un système de responsabilité effective de tous ces organes, une délimitation précise: où s'arrête la gestion, où commence l'administration? Ce qui manque, c'est un système de responsabilité qui puisse être appliqué d'une manière automatique.

De plus, le manque de responsabilité a créé quelques détériorations du système. Il y a d'abord le risque de privation du caractère social des entreprises, dès qu'on a de petits groupes de travailleurs dans les entreprises, dès qu'on a donné le pouvoir de décider sur les moyens sociaux, de plus en plus les milieux qui s'imposent, même dans les conseils ouvriers, peuvent disposer d'une manière insuffisamment responsable; dès que le manque de responsabilité et de contrôle est visible, il peut y avoir des abus de pouvoir en vue de l'enrichissement privé de quelques privilégiés de la hiérarchie. Il est nécessaire d'introduire un contrôle préventif, afin d'éviter de tels excès.

On en arrive alors au problème du statut juridique de l'entreprise. Probablement, notre système va demander des formes nouvelles d'organisation du travail. On parle en Yougoslavie de „travail associé". Pour changer les rapports sociaux, même dans le cadre de l'autogestion, la forme classique de l'entreprise ne suffit plus. Ou l'entreprise va se transformer en une association des unités économiques et sous une autre forme, ou bien le système de décentralisation va céder la place à un autre système, avec une autre intégration de travail, sous des formes tout à fait nouvelles.

Il y a aussi des problèmes de coopération avec l'étranger, de placement de capitaux en Yougoslavie, de participation dans la répartition du travail mondial, etc.

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Pour comprendre l'autogestion en Yougoslavie, il faut la comprendre comme un processus de changement des rapports sociaux tout entiers. C'est un processus qui se déroule déjà depuis longtemps et qui a des phases de développement. Le but final est la création des formes nouvelles des rapports humains dans la production et dans la vie politique entière. L'autogestion n'est pas seulement une forme économique, c'est aussi une forme politique: elle demande le changement de la société toute entière. C'est ce qui explique qu'il y a parfois des malentendus entre les milieux ouvriers et l'autogestion et les milieux politiques même. On parle de manière générale de la bureaucratie dans les organes d'Etat. L'autogestion doit donc changer la structure des organes d'Etat. Ou l'autogestion ou les tendances bureaucratiques devront céder la place.

Et la garantie de ce changement est la classe ouvrière et le Parti communiste. Il est, en effet, nécessaire d'avoir une intervention consciente

dans les rapports sociaux pour éviter les détériorations et les changements qui peuvent intervenir même dans le système de l'autogestion. L'autogestion comme système n'est pas en soi une garantie complète. Sur cette route, il y a encore des résistances: résistance de la société entière, résistance des forces bureaucratiques, les contradictions mêmes du système. L'autogestion est un processus sur lequel le mouvement ouvrier mondial doit se prononcer; chaque pays a ses conditions spécifiques, mais l'attitude des pays socialistes et des partis travailleurs est de développer le système de l'autogestion: il s'occupe de l'être humain, or l'humanisme n'est pas étranger au socialisme, et il n'y aura pas de socialisme sans humanisme.

Dr Vladimir JOVANOVIĆ

Professeur titulaire à la Faculté de Droit de Beograd.

Président du Tribunal arbitral de la Chambre de commerce de la République de Serbie.

Arbitre de l'Arbitrage du commerce extérieur près la Chambre fédérale de commerce.

Directeur de l'Institut de droit civil près la Faculté de Droit de Beograd.

Spécialité: le droit commercial et le droit des assurances, et tout particulièrement statut des organisations économiques.

Il obtint sa licence à la Faculté de Droit de Beograd en 1950 et fut promu au grade de docteur à la même Faculté en 1955. Il fut élu assistant à cette Faculté en 1952.

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Dr Branislav Šoškic

Professor of the Faculty of Economics of Beograd.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY AND THE SYSTEM OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA

A Few Introductory Notes

Yugoslavia, as an economic whole, has existed from 1918 on, i. e. since World War I. Its various parts (now republics within the framework of a federal community) have lived and developed under altogether different conditions for a long period of time. The Eastern regions of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Macedonia, one part of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro) were for a few centuries occupied by the feudal Turkish empire. This brought about the economic and cultural stagnation of these regions, which had previously reached an enviable level of cultural development. The western regions of Yugoslavia (Slovenia, Croatia and the Western part of Bosnia and Hercegovina) were for a long time incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was economically and culturally more advanced, and thus contributed to the higher development of these regions. These inherited differences were not moderated in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the period between the Wars.

Yugoslavia had a relatively low rate of economic growth during this period. It amounted to only 1.90 per cent per annum in the period 1923—1939 or 0.15 per cent per capita. The share of the agrarian population in the total population of the country changed only slightly throughout this period (from 78.9 per cent in 1921. to 75 per cent in 1939). Foreign capital dominated in mining and industry. It accounted for more than 50 per cent of the total national capital.

The instable political structure of the society, which was not homogeneous in an economic, national, cultural or religious sense, resulted in a political dictatorship in the 1930's.

Characteristics of the postwar economic development

Unlike prewar Yugoslavia, which had a relatively low rate of economic growth, postwar Yugoslavia had an uncomparably higher average

rate of economic growth. The average of economic growth was 7 per cent per annum for the period 1947—1964 or 5.8 per cent per capita. That is three and a half times that of the prewar period.

The first years of the postwar period were years of reconstruction of the economy which had been very much devastated during the Nazi occupation of the country. The reconstruction was accomplished rather quickly. The industrial output surpassed already in 1947 the prewar output (1939) by 21 per cent. During the next three years (1947—1949) of the First Five-Year Plan (1947-1951), national income rose at the rate of more than 8 per cent per annum, and industrial output at the rate of 18.6 per cent annually.

The Yugoslav First Five-Year-Plan started from the theoretical concept, prevailing in the Marxian literature, that the priority must be given to the so-called department one, i.e. the means of production, in other words, to the coal and steel industry, the chemical industry, electrification and the like.

This was in line with the model of an autarkic economy. Purely economic reasons, however, would have favored a firmer incorporation into the international division of labour, even if only within the framework of the economies of socialist countries, to which Yugoslavia was oriented then. The basic economic reasons were the relatively restricted Yugoslav market and the fact that Yugoslavia had no comparative advantages in natural resources for basic industries. There were undoubtedly some noneconomic reasons which worked against. Namely the exaggerated dependence on foreign capital in the prewar period, and the wish to create the material conditions necessary to free the country from political and military dependence on influence, pressure, and blackmail from abroad.

The economic and military blockade of Yugoslavia, which followed the breach with Stalin (i.e. the Cominform) after 1948 and the sudden isolation of the country seemed to justify the autarkic concept of the First Five-Year-Plan. It was in this period that the share of investments in national income was the highest.

Under the pressure of Stalin and his policy, trade relations with Eastern-European socialist countries were broken unilaterally and trade agreements and other contracts were annulled with countries towards which Yugoslavia had been oriented hitherto almost exclusively in its international exchange. The reorientation toward other, notably West European markets, involved huge efforts and time.

The beginning of the rapid collectivization of agriculture (1949) due to ideological pressure from outside and two **extraordinarily severe** droughts (1950 and 1952), caused a drop in agricultural output. In 1952 it was 28 per cent lower than in 1949. Industrial output in 1952 stagnated at the 1949 level. National income was 15 per cent lower in 1952 than in 1949 with a much larger share of the national defence in the national income.

This first postwar phase of the economic development of Yugoslavia was characterized by relatively sizeable sums set aside for new investments, i.e. for reproduction on an enlarged scale. This had an effect upon the rapid economic development in the next period.

This phase is important also because during that time the reorganization of the whole economy on a new basis was started. It was in 1950 that the introduction of the self-management of workers started (which will be discussed later).

During the period 1949—1956 Yugoslavia developed at a very slow growth rate. A shortage of commodities was felt in the market. The economic policy inaugurated in 1956 focused on the production of consumption goods rather than on the production of capital goods (contrary to the orientation typical of the First Five-Year-Plan) as well as on the increase of personal income. This economic policy resulted in a lower rate of investments in the productive sector and in a higher rate of investments in industries producing consumption goods as well as in a higher rate of public capital expenditures (residential construction, in the first place). After this period and not only because of it the Yugoslav economy went through its most dynamic period of postwar development. The Yugoslav gross national product increased by 66 per cent in this five-year-period (between 1957—1961) i.e. double the rate of increase during the whole of the previous ten-year-period.

Yugoslav economists hold different views about the real causes of such a rapid economic upswing. Most economists and the public see the cause of this upswing in the new economic policy which focused on the production of consumption goods, workers' self-management, and the socialist market economy. However, some hold, or at least held at that time, that the cause of this high rate of economic growth lies in the economic policy that preceded this period, namely the policy of investments in heavy industry with a long period of construction and gestation, the results of which were not fully visible before this period (1957—1961).

The truth probably is somewhere in between. The crucial influence seems undoubtedly to have been the economic policy, which was basically expansive and created a higher effective demand in the consumer spending. It released, in addition, market forces, promoting in this as well as other ways the expansion of the production of consumption goods. The multiplier principle has of course also come into play.

This upswing in economic activity and the explanation of its causes — particularly the autonomous role of the enterprise with the workers' self-management and the market orientation of the economy — have had a considerable effect on further changes in the concept of the place and the role of the plan in the socialist economy of the workers' self-management.

This high rate of economic growth, which exceeded that of other countries during this period, was accompanied by a more efficient management of the economy, an expansion of markets, a wider range of assortments, and increase in export and import, and hence the affirmation of the workers' self-management.

The period after 1960 (until 1965) was characterized by uneven growth rates. They were lower in 1961 and 1962. The industrial output increased at the rate of 7 per cent per annum, while output in agriculture stagnated. The rate of the output in industry rose sharply during the next two years, amounting to 16 per cent per annum. Output in agriculture also increased appreciably, 8 per cent per annum.

However, this phase of development was accompanied by a general rise in prices, by an inflation, a very high deficit in the balance of payments (400 million dollars of 1964) and structural disproportions. Monetary and market stabilization, correction of the balance-of-payments-deficit, elimination of structural disproportions, transition to a more intensive management of the economy, reduction of costs of production, greater incorporation into the international division of labor were the basic, although not the only tasks of the economic reform of 1965 (which will be discussed separately).

From what has been said above, as well as from Table 1, we may draw two conclusions. First, the postwar growth rate of the Yugoslav economy of 7 per cent per annum is the average of widely fluctuating rates. Secondly, the unevenness of growth has stood out particularly in some branches. Due to the economic policy, the most rapid development was in industry (9,8 per cent), transportation (8 per cent), the trade and hotel business (9,1 per cent). The building-trade, handicrafts, and notably agriculture and forestry developed more slowly, i.e. below the average growth rate. Agriculture fluctuated from year to year, this having a considerable effect on overall economic growth because of its large share in the formation of the national income.

Table 1*

Activity	Various indices 1947 = 100			Average annual growth rate in %			
	1952.	1960.	1965.	1947— 1965	1947— 1952	1952— 1960	1960— 1965
Industry	135	135	585	9,9	6,2	11,9	10,9
Agriculture	85	158	162	2,8	-2,8	9,6	1,1
Forestry	81	81	100	0,0	-3,4	0,0	4,2
Building-trade	106	158	250	5,2	1,0	5,2	9,5
Transportation	134	323	435	8,0	6,0	11,4	5,9
Trade	146	305	475	9,1	7,8	9,6	8,8
Handicrafts	131	211	277	5,6	5,6	6,1	5,7
Economy (as a whole)	112	235	335	1,0	2,3	9,6	7,2
Population	107	117	125	1,2	1,4	1,1	1,1
Per capita income	105	201	267	5,8	0,9	8,4	6,0

The average growth rate of the per capita national income of 5,8 per cent (for 18 years) in Yugoslavia is extraordinarily high. Its is according to Table 2 much higher (2,4 and 5 times higher) than the long-run growth rates of highly developed economies. It follows therefore, that the difference in the degree of development between the Yugoslav economy and the economy of these countries are likely to have diminished.

*) Data according to „Jugoslavija 1945—1965”, SZS, Beograd, 1965.

Table 2*

Country	First year of observation	Annual growth rate of the national per capita income for the period (in per cent per annum)		
		Until 1913	1913—1950	1950—1959
Japan	1880	3,4	2,6	6,1
Sweden	1863	2,4	1,7	2,8
USA	1871	2,2	1,8	2,2
Canada	1872	1,9	1,5	2,0
Danmark	1872	2,1	1,2	1,8
Germany	1853	1,5	1,4	4,5
Norway	1865	1,3	1,9	3,1
Italy	1863	0,7	1,7	4,7
France	1855	1,5	1,5	3,6
England	1857	1,6	0,8	0,7
Netherlands	1900	0,7	1,3	3,4

It must be borne in mind that the average per capita income of Yugoslavia conceals considerable inherited differences among various regions. The per capita income of Serbia is close to the Yugoslav average. In the republic of Croatia it is by 21 per cent higher and in the republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina, as well as in the republic of Macedonia is only 70 per cent of the Yugoslav average. It is still lower in the republic of Montenegro (less than two-thirds of the Yugoslav average) whereas it is the lowest in the region of Kosmet (one-third of the Yugoslav average). These differences are due also to the very uneven growth of the population, which was for instance 10 per cent in Slovenia during the period 1954—1964, and 27 per cent in Kosmet. Be that as it may, the problem is an actual one and resolving it is one of the basic goals of the Yugoslav economic policy.

Integral parts of the gross national products have been relatively stable throughout whole postwar period. Material costs have participated with about 50 per cent, amortization with about 4 per cent and national income with about 46 per cent.

Table 3 shows the structure of national income in 1966, i.e. the share of personal (net) income, accumulation and funds on the one hand and the share of various branches of the economy on the other.

Table 3*

1966	National income in millions of new dinars		
	Totally	Personal (net) incomes	Accumulation and funds
	91.607	44.000	47.607
Industry	31.702	12.164	19.538
Agriculture	26.003	17.922	8.081

*) According to D. C. Paige, F. T. Blackaby, S. Freund: „Economic Growth: The Last Hundred Years”, National Institute Economic Review, July 1961.

Forestry	1.114	575	538
Building-trade	6.728	3.857	2.871
Transportation	6.412	3.107	3.305
Trade	14.585	3.616	10.970
Handicrafts	4.410	2.512	1.898
Communal activities (productive part)	652	246	406

Gross investments in fixed assets in the whole postwar period have participated with a very high percentage. They have accounted for about 30 per cent of the social product, which is more than (for the period 1950—1960) in developed Western countries — Britain 15,8 per cent, France 19 per cent, USA 18 per cent, Italy 20,8 per cent, Western Germany 24 per cent, Canada 24,8 per cent, and Japan 28,2 per cent. The high degree of accumulation in the Yugoslav economy, particularly during the first phase of the postwar development was achieved by the following means:

1. Slower increase of the living standard of the population (slower than the increase in the national income). That is, the consumer spending was kept on a lower level in order to obtain higher public and investment expenditure;

2. Deficit-financing of investment construction and issue of money in excess of the amount of commodities. All this resulted in an inflationary movement and in a slowdown in the increase in the living standard;

3. Agriculture (through compulsory purchase and low prices of agricultural products compared with high prices for industrial products). In other words, one part of the surplus products was rechanneled from agriculture into reproduction on an enlarged scale;

4. Utilization of amortization for reproduction on an enlarged scale and the desinvestment in certain branches of the economy. These funds were put into reproduction of priority branches on an enlarged scale (metallurgy, energy-producing branches, metal-manufacturing industry etc.),

5. Volunteer youth work (public works);

6. Foreign means (aid, reparations, credits), which participated with about 30 per cent in the accumulation of the economy. The importance of these means has declined in recent years.

The system of workers' self-management

When the War was over and Yugoslavia started to build socialism, the basic means of production became the property of the state, i.e. the society. The collective character of the ownership of the basic means of production has remained basically unchanged. However, the economic

system has changed radically after the Law on the Workers' Self-Management was enacted in 1950.

The economic system during the first postwar period is called the administrative system of management of the economy, administrative or state socialism or centralized planned economy. The state was the chief organizer of economic activity during this period. Enterprises were not at all independent. The central plan of the state firmly directed the economic activity of the country. Plans for enterprises were prepared in so-called general directions and ministries. These plans determined in detail the volume and assortment of production, the users of finished product (dealers or other enterprises), the price of the product, investment funds and the like. In other words, through its authorities the state set all production policy as well as commercial and investment policy. It appointed, in addition, directors of enterprises and fixed the wages for workers. The revenue of the enterprise flowed into the budget of the state and was used to settle planned and unplanned losses.

Such a centralized economic system, which might be suitable for a backward economy, devastated by war (for the sake of centralizing the accumulation), reflected the then generally accepted theoretical concept of socialism, namely that a socialist economy may only be a centralized planned economy, guided by a centralized plan.

From many years and decades Marxian writers used to identify, in their theoretical conception, the socialist economy and the centralized planned economy. The centralized planned economy ranked as the antipode of the market economy and the plan as the antipode of the market. Only a capitalist economy was regarded as a market economy. In other words, a socialist economy had to be, according to these ideas, *ipso facto*, a centralized planned economy. It was thus regarded as incompatible with a market economy and the plan as incompatible with the market. The market was looked upon as the incarnation of spontaneity and anarchy and the cause of many evils.

The idea that plan replaces the market and the economic laws of the market economy in a socialist economy used to be repeated so often in the scientific, professional and political literature during the Stalin era that it became a sort of an axiom and taboo at the same time, admitting of no discussion. Plans were proclaimed as laws in the economic and legal sense.

The first Yugoslav Five-Year-Plan (1947—1951) clearly reflected such ideas. It was comprehensive, providing in details for quantitative elements, place, time, and way of fulfilment, the production of every individual commodity and its distribution. It was a sort of immense input-output table, which went into so much details that there remained almost nothing for enterprises to plan. They had only to accomplish the tasks outlined in the plan and to submit reports on the fulfilment and overfulfilment of the plan.

The resolution of the Cominform of 1948 and the economic blockade following it (which was, among other things the reason why the Plan was not fulfilled in time), Stalin's anathematization of Yugoslavia, its „excommunication” from the socialist bloc and the unprincipled campaign against Yugoslavia that lasted for several years — all these were contributing reasons why Yugoslav economic, social and political thou-

ght started rapidly abandoning Stalinistic dogmas and, among others, dogmas about socialism and the socialist economy being a centralized planned economy, the peremptory role of the plan, and the proscribed role of the market.

The economic system based on the centralized planned management of the economy was thus gradually abandoned, while a new economic system, the so-called workers' self-management, was introduced at the same time (1950). This process has been a gradual one. Enterprises have been taking on more and more functions. They have become more and more autonomous in the sale of their commodities to the markets, in determining the prices of their products and services, in the distribution of income and, finally, (especially after the economic reform of 1965) in the allocation of investments. The personal income of workers has begun to depend on results of the business organization. Direct producers have become more and more interested in the success of the enterprise. Production has likewise become more and more efficient. Direct producers are becoming the managers of their enterprises. The role of the market has been also growing. All this was put into legal form in the new Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 1963. It won the final victory also in the practice.

The autonomy of enterprises in the organization and business activity, their social ownership of the means of production, the decisive role of direct producers whose personal incomes and material prospects depend on the results of their work, and the growing role of the market — these are all the characteristics of the new, specific form of business activity, which has been termed variously in the contemporary literature from "economic democracy" to „the Yugoslav way to socialism". The market economy is no longer only a synonym for private-enterprise, i.e. a capitalist economy. As is shown in practice, a socialist economy with the collective ownership of the means of production may also be a market economy.

The role of planning

In keeping with the process of the workers' self-management the concept of the role and the place of the plan in socialist economy of the Yugoslav type also changes. Economic plans of the state became „social" plans. The „state" ownership of the basic means of production became „social" ownership. The financial plans of the enterprise ceased already in 1951 to be integral parts of the budget of territorial communities. The purpose of all this was to emphasize that the management of the economy had been transferred from state administration to direct producers. The analysis concentrated on „the economic system" in the narrow sense of the word, meaning a collection of economic instruments, and an institutional framework for the functioning of self-management enterprise and the market.

The following dilemmas arose concerning the market versus the plan:

1) The determining role of the plan versus the market. This meant that the plan should determine the general direction of development,

while the market should work within the general framework established by plan. This viewpoint prevailed particularly at the beginning of the period under review;

2) Special domains of the functioning of the market and the plan, which must be coordinated. This meant that certain economic activities (for instance, consumption goods) had to be left altogether to the market, to settle the volume and the structure of production (the allocation of factors of production) and that certain other economic activities, in which the working of the market would be insufficient or socially inefficient, had to be regulated by the plan;

3) The determining role of the market in relation to the plan. This meant that the plan was subject to market fluctuations and to market results in production and investments. In other words, the plan should start from movements and results that would be brought about by the free behaviour of enterprises in the market system.

The optimal solution for the socialist market economy lies, in our view, in the specific synthesis of the above alternatives.

The orientation towards a decentralized economy, the autonomy of enterprises, and market relations in the economy has occasioned significant changes in the planning system. Economic (i.e. social) plans cease to be detailed and comprehensive national plans. They are more and more becoming development plans. They outline the global distribution of the gross national product, directions and the rate of economic growth and the basic structure of investments.

Problems involved in planning under a self-managing economic system have not yet been satisfactorily resolved. The reaction to the comprehensive centralized planning brought about the above-mentioned dilemmas, which may be boiled down to the dilemma of whether or to what extent the market is compatible with planning.

One thing is certain. Namely, under an economic system that rests on self-management, the autonomy of enterprises in their production, investment, market, and income policy, with the growing role of the market in the allocation of factors of production, planning must assume forms and methods different from those under the centralized management of the economy. Macro-planning should not endanger the self-managing character of the enterprise and its independence in economic-decision-making. Likewise, it should not restrict the working of the market mechanism. Macro-planning that would restrict the market and the market mechanism could not be accepted under a system of workers' self-management. The further development of the market along with the further development and improvement of planning is the precondition for the further development of the Yugoslav economic system. The plan and the market ought to complement each other.

The plan ought to start from the needs, possibilities, and interests of enterprises and let the market carry out planned proportions wherever possible. Corresponding measures of economic policy should be resorted to in order to fulfill tasks outlined in the plan that cannot be accomplished through the independent working of the market.

The plan must start from objective conditions and from the socio-economic system. It thus sets long run goals of development. In order to meet these goals, economic measures and instruments of the economic

system must be adjusted to it, if necessary. In this way conditions are created for enterprises to make economic decisions that are aimed at the attainment of goals outlined in the plan. They start thereby from their interests and let economic and market laws work as freely as possible.

Unlike the former system of planning, which was restricted mainly to quantitative relations and quantified goals, plans in a self-managing economy must, in addition to basic quantifications, set the economic policy and instruments of the system that must contribute to the fulfilment of the plan. These are, in the first place, monetary credit and fiscal policy as well as institutional solutions. The plan also provides, of course, for financial resources and the way in which they can be collected (on the level of the federation, republics etc.) for investments in key projects (railroads, highways, energy-producing facilities and the like) and for the development of underdeveloped regions.

Macro-planning ought to start, accordingly, from plans of business organizations and their associations. However, the basic orientation of some activities with regard to production and investments ought to be developed in associations of business organizations on the basis of general development conceptions of a broader community. One might achieve thereby a mutual influence of the general development conceptions of society, on the one hand, and the plans of business organizations and their associations, on the other. The national plan would thus have both a synthesizing and coordinating character and include activities and projects that are relevant for the nation as a whole.

The plan thus determines the basic directions of economic development, the basic distribution of national income, and the basic structure of accumulation. The plan also provides institutional solutions and the conditions (economic policy and system) necessary for the fulfilment of the plan. The working of market relations and other relations of the commodity production may and must stand out fully within this broad framework.

It is within this framework that business organizations and the direct self-managing producers freely develop their business policy and that they determine, under the influence of the market and market demand, the volume and structure of production and investments, i.e. the allocation of their factors of production, the assortment of commodities, their policy of income distribution, their personal incomes, the prices of their commodities and services, except (at least so far) for basic raw materials and semi-finished products (such as steel, electric power, coal etc.) and basic foodstuffs (bread, sugar etc.).

Finally, let me note a few main points.

Yugoslavia was the first socialist country to abandon the centralized planned management of the economy. She was the first to introduce the decentralized decision-making economy with the workers' self-management system.

In this system, direct producers stand in the center. They are no longer simply a unit carrying out economic and other orders from the center. Instead, they are freely determining the conditions under which they will work. Their function is not only that of direct producers. In addition, they manage the social means of production with which they have been entrusted. The management of business organizations by wor-

kers marks the first decisive step towards the implementation of the new economic system. Workers' councils have become the highest authority in business organizations.

The autonomy of business organizations (i.e. the decentralized decision-making on the level of business organizations), the interest of producers in the results of their organization and the more and more significant working of the market, particularly in consumption goods, as a regulator of the structure of production and investments — all these are the vital characteristics of the new system of management.

Radical changes in the position and role of direct producers and business organizations were bound to result, as we have seen, in a new and altered role for planning.

The business enterprise in the system of workers' self-management

We have already clearly stressed the autonomy of Yugoslav enterprises (within a general framework) in making decisions on the volume and structure of production and investments, in their inner organization and operation, in the marketing and (mainly) pricing of their commodities and services, in the splitting up of the income into personal incomes and accumulation (funds) and in the individual distribution of personal incomes. We have also stressed the new role of direct producers from 1950 on i.e. from the time when the management of the factories was transferred from state authorities to direct producers. They perform these self-managing functions more or less directly, through self-management bodies elected in a democratic way, workers' councils, and the management boards. Yugoslav enterprises operate, as we have seen, within the framework of the socialist economy, i.e. an economy with the social ownership of the means of production and with a more and more pronounced market character, which is one of its specific traits. The institutional framework has been determined by the economic system as a system of economic regulators, particularly in the distribution.

The Yugoslav business enterprise is both economically and legally independent. It manages independently — within the framework of the law — the means of production with which it has been entrusted by society. It is a legal entity and has rights and obligations. „Its" property serves as a material guarantee for the obligations it incurred.

Under the Yugoslav economic system, business enterprises may be established by territorial socio-political units (communes, republics, the federation) and other organizations and groups of citizens. Formerly, under the centralized administrative system of management, business enterprises could be established only by state authorities in the framework of the federation or republics.

If the founder does not have sufficient financial means of his own for the construction and equipment of the enterprise, then he usually applies for long-run investment loans. That is, he participates in a contest for the extension of an investment loan from the bank on the basis of a highly detailed professional, construction, technological and economic documentation. The conditions under which the loan is extended the

amount, time of repayment, purpose of loan, rate of interest etc.) are regulated in a contract between the bank and the founder. Until 1954 business enterprises were assigned financial resources for their foundation without any obligation regarding their repayment. Hence many irrational investments were made. As time passed, financial resources were allotted less and often in this way.

During the construction period the business enterprise is managed by a temporary administration which is appointed by the founder. This phase is followed by the constitution of the business enterprise, the election of self-managing bodies, and the generation of regulations of the enterprise until it is handed over to the workers to be managed by them.

Business enterprises decide by a referendum about mergers with other enterprises, starting thereby from their interests. It is the merger of small-scale enterprises that is one of the technological economic necessities for economies that are looking more and more to international markets. This is, by the way, one of the tasks of the Yugoslav economic reform.

In enterprises that do not operate well and do not fulfill their obligations measures of recovery are usually resorted to by the founder. If they yield no favourable results then a compulsory management is appointed first, whereupon the business enterprise is liquidated.

The bodies of the workers' self-management are the following: the workers' council, the management board and the director. Tiny working collectives (up to 7 workers) manage their organization directly, making decisions in their meetings. A little larger organizations (but below 30 workers) elect only their management as their body. Larger collectives elect their workers' council by an equal, free and secret vote for a period of two years. Every year only one half of the members are elected. Every member of the collective may be elected to be a member of every body of self-management. Nobody can be elected twice in a row.

The workers' council, which ranges between 15 and 120 members (this number does not exceed 60 members usually) elects the president and makes its decision only at its sessions. The workers' council provides the basic guidance for the most important questions involved in the business policy of the enterprise. It elects the management board as its executive body and appoints the director as the top manager of the enterprise. The decisions of the workers' council are put into effect through the management board and the director. The workers' council draws up, among other things, the statute of the enterprise, regulations on working conditions, on the distribution of net revenue and personal income, and annual and long-run plans of the enterprise (covering a period of several years). It approves the reports on the work of the management board and the director, the balance sheet of the enterprise, purchases, sales and lease of fixed assets, the purchase of foreign patents and licences, the acceptance of investment loans, the establishment, liquidation and separation of working units, the merger of the enterprise etc. In large business enterprises with special, so-called „economic units" there are elected, along with the central workers' council, workers' councils of economic units.

In their meetings working collectives consider reports of the workers' council. They submit proposals and suggestions for the work of

the workers' council and recall certain members or the whole workers' council. The workers' council is obliged to investigate the suggestions in writing of members of the collective. The most important questions are settled directly by the working collective through a referendum (e.g. the merger with other business enterprises, huge capital projects, the acceptance of a heavy loan etc.). The referendum takes place by a secret vote of all members of the collective.

The management board (which has 3 to 11 members) is elected by the workers' council for period of one year from the ranks of members of the workers' council or from the ranks of other members of the collective. Nobody can be a member of the management board more than two years running. Only one-third of the members of the former management board may be reelected the following year. The management board, as the executive body of the workers' council, manages the business enterprise and is responsible for its work to the workers' council. It prepares and elaborates proposals for all regulations and decisions which are accepted by the workers' council. It also makes independent decisions within the framework of the basic guidelines and decisions of the workers' council, on current questions involved in the operations of the enterprise. It controls the work of the director and that of other managers.

Members of the workers' council and the management board perform their former jobs and enjoy on privileges, except for one thing. Namely, while they are members of self-managing bodies they cannot, unless they agree to it, be transferred to perform another job, nor can they be dismissed.

The director is the top manager of the enterprise. He is responsible for all the operations of the enterprise. He is assisted by an apparatus, which is subjected to him. The director is a member of the management board, he must attend the sessions of the workers' council and put into effect conclusions of the management board and the workers' council. He represents the enterprise, engages workers and clerks (except for managerial personnel who are engaged by the management board) and performs other tasks outlined in the law and the regulations of the enterprise. However, he also protects the interests of the broader social community. He exercises legal control over the work of the management bodies. He is obliged to cancel acts of the management bodies that are not in keeping with the law. The director is appointed by the workers' council through an open contest. The contest commission consists of representatives of the business enterprise and the commune or other socio-political communities. The director is elected for a certain time period (four years) and may be reelected. Upon the proposal of the workers' council he may be replaced also sooner.

The problem of distribution is one of the questions that receives most consideration in Yugoslavia. Distribution according to work is one of the basic principles and the starting point of many documents in Yugoslavia (to begin with the Constitution). Distribution according to work is no longer looked upon as simply as was often the case during the first phase of postwar development. A distinction is made between labour of different quality and intensity, i.e. along with a reduction of labour of different quality to quantity (these problems have been discus-

sed by Smith and Ricardo and resumed by Marx and the Marxian writers) the social efficiency of labour is also taken into account. Every kind of labour, every form of production outlined in the plan was ranked as socially useful under the system of centralized planning. Now, under the system of workers' self-management and a socialist market economy it is the market that must confirm whether and to what extent labour spent on the production of given commodities is socially useful. Moreover the notion of labour has been expanded to the domain of initiative, organization, and business activity. The principle of distribution according to labour has thus become broader, more comprehensive. More and more it is becoming the principle of distribution according to the results of labour and management.

In describing the business enterprise we have borne in mind chiefly the socialist business organization in which the means of production belong to the society. This is the so-called social sector of the economy. Along with it there exist the highly developed individual sector. It is most developed in agriculture. That is apart from enterprises, which operate similarly to the socialist enterprises in industry; there is also a certain number of cooperative farms. All the rest of agriculture is made up of private farms, which operate altogether independently under free market conditions of agricultural products. Many of them cooperate through short-run contracts with the so-called overall cooperate farms in production and trade. Farms under the social ownership account for about 14 per cent and private farms for about 86 per cent of the arable land.

Individual enterprises, which employ a limited number of workers, have become more and more numerous particularly in recent years (in handicrafts, tourism and hotel business). There were more than 100.000 workshops in handicrafts in 1964 and more than 6.000 in the hotel business. This number has soared up throughout in the last two or three years, particularly in the hotel business, which is oriented more and more to tourism.

Dr Branislav Šoškic

Dr Branislav Šoškic, professor at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Beograd and director of the Institute of Economic Research. Dean of the Faculty of Economics from 1964 to 1967. Now deputy and chairman of the Board of Education at the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia (at the Educational and Cultural Chamber).

Chairman of the Council of the International University Center for Social of the University of Beograd.

Awarded the Doctoral Degree in 1954 at the Faculty of Economics in Beograd. In the 1955—56 and 1956—57 academic years studied under the auspices of the British Council at the universities of St. Andrews and Cambridge in the United Kingdom; 1962—63 spent at the universities of Harvard and Berkeley, in the United States of America, under the Ford Foundation arrangement.

More important books published: *The Development of Economic Thought*, Beograd, Institute of Economic Research (1965), 1968, and 1970; *Production, Employment, and Stabilization — Contemporary Macro-economic Ana-*

lysis, Beograd, Institute of Economic Reserch, 1970, 1971. The Distribution of Incomes in the Market Economy — Contemporary Micro-economic Analysis, Beograd, Institute of Economic Research, Contemporary Administration, 1971; Theory of value — a Classical Economic Analysis, Beograd, Institute for Economic Research, Contemporary Administration, 1971.

Co-author of numerous books, collection of works, and encyclopaedia. Author of many articles and reports for domestic and international scientific symposia in the fields of theory of economics and economic policy, as well as that of economic of scientific research and education published in Yugoslav and foreign periodicals.



Dr Ljubiša ADAMOVIĆ

Professor of the Faculty of Economics in Beograd

THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR

The Yugoslav economy has a determined place in the international division of labour, a place which is derived from the level of Yugoslavia's economic development, and, viewed in the long run, the territory of present-day Yugoslavia has been incorporated into the international division of labour under the influence of economic, historical, and geo-political-factors.

Whilst referring to Yugoslavia's present place in the international division of labour, one has in mind above all the improvement of that place, the search for the best conditions of economic co-operation between Yugoslavia and other areas in the world. This is all the more significant insofar as it is a question of a country which should seek its place in the world economy in terms of a twenty years long stormy but extensive industrialization, whereafter its economic structure has changed. Besides extensive development trend, pronounced autarky has been the second characteristic of Yugoslav economy that is relevant to a study of this problem.

That is why the entire matter of economic relations with other countries is considered differently in the conditions of the economic structure where non agrarian production dominates and where the value of foreign trade transactions exceeds 20% of national revenue.

The Tendency of Liberalization of Foreign Economic Relations

Regardless of a whole series of reasons which can be taken as a justification of the existence of autarky and its elements in the post-war development of Yugoslavia's economy, the tendency for opening towards foreign countries occurred at a relatively early date. The liberalization policy in foreign economic relations was proclaimed in 1952, but it has been adopted as a prevalent principle only after the implementation of the reform since 1965.

The liberalization policy, that is to say, the opening of the Yugoslav market to other countries was confronted by certain obstacles because of an uneven position of either individual branches or enterprises within the framework of one and the same branch in relation to foreign competition. In 1968, this matter was given a significant treatment and will no doubt be one of the most complicated matters even in the years to come.

At the beginning of the implementation of the reform a few years ago it was believed that this and a series of other problems concerned with domestic and foreign trade policy would not be a serious matter. As a matter of fact, by the introduction of a new dinar rate of exchange and changes in price parity, the preferential policy, and above all the customs policy, was given a special role as an active factor in the accommodation of the Yugoslav economy to conditions of the world boom (changes in the production structure and price reforms in the domestic and foreign market). Moreover, although the customs protection was in the main framed realistically, according to expectations, the protection was meant to be diminished by degrees. In the whole consideration of this kind of approach to the problem itself, a built-in element existed undoubtedly, so that there was no doubt about it at all. It is a question of price stability on the domestic market. But this presumption did not survive for long.

As in other similar cases in Yugoslavia today an increase in customs protection has been called for. As a rule, manufacturers with the lowest productivity rates insist on it. But tacit approval is naturally received in the whole branch; in fact, if protection is based on the protection of the least effective manufacturer, naturally the others would not oppose it as that kind of protection enables them to achieve profit that is above the average rates.

That is why even in Yugoslavia, inasmuch as market economy is being affirmed, one can increasingly follow in turn the behavior of the enterprises which insist on maximum income, and in that connection the interests of the enterprise concerned need not even in this particular case coincide with the interests of the economy as whole. That is why it seems increasingly crucial to have an efficient guidance combined with the use of economic criteria in the interest of the Yugoslav community, so as to co-ordinate various differing interests of individual enterprises when the market itself proves unable to regulate it all with its own automatism.

In other words, insofar as the protection wall exceeds the justified level (regardless of whether its chief components consist of protective customs, foreign exchange limitations, the so-called commodity regime, etc.), the protection increasingly influences the terms of gaining and distributing income of the national economy. The chief mechanism of the protection of the Yugoslav economy consists of several elements —

The 1965 customs tariff;

The FEC authorization concerning a temporary correction of customs fees and the disposal of customs funds;

The „Calendar of Bans” on import;

Bookkeeping taxation, and

Import duties.

Of course, as in all other countries, customs policy has even in Yugoslavia been exposed to various pressures and to the influence of

interested groups either with reference to efforts to secure more favourable terms of business for one particular branch and particular region or with reference to some other economic or noneconomic dimensions. The customs development in 1968 and the influence of that kind of development on the prices fully justifies the standpoints which boil down to the following: the level of protection of domestic production should primarily be determined by the needs of the country's economic development and not by motives of social or some other „equity”, solidarity, and the like. If Yugoslavia wants to intensify its own economy and to make it fit to vie in world competition (at least in certain branches), this should also find expression in the preferential policy. There are some concepts according to which the customs and noncustoms protection in Yugoslavia has been characterized by a high degree of autarky.

Convertibility of the Yugoslav Currency

The convertibility of the national currency is one of the aggregative indicators of the situation in the national economy, above all from the point of view of its place in world economy and the relations of the given country with other countries. Although it is not an end in itself, practically nobody denies but on the contrary considers the attainment of the convertibility of the currency as one of the significant indicators of success in economic policy as a whole. It is above all significant for achieving some uniform criteria of judging the effectiveness and success of a national economy in comparison with world standard or for comparing it with the performance of the economy in individual countries.

That is why ever since 1965 the convertibility of the Yugoslav currency has been one of the objectives of the economic reform which has been fairly pronounced, although in that connection insufficient attention has been paid to explaining the difference between full and partial, or „external” convertibility which has been dealt with here. While implementing the reform, it was often emphasized that, according to expectations, the Yugoslav currency should be a convertible currency around 1970, or at the least in ten years time, that is to say, around 1975.

With the introduction of a realistic foreign rate of exchange of the dinar in 1965 (12.50 dnars to one US dollar), that is to say, with the devaluation, the position of the dinar was automatically improved administratively from the point of view of its value in the banks of the countries possessing hard currencies. The fact that so far there has been no essential difference between the official rate of exchange and its value in the West European market leads to the conclusion that the dinar has practically been a convertible currency. But, one neglects the fact that this is being achieved almost exclusively on the basis of the funds illegally taken out of the country, and that they are not used for any other purpose but, as a rule, to be taken back to Yugoslavia, in the main illegally. The openness of Yugoslav borders to foreign tourists coming to Yugoslavia and to Yugoslav tourists going abroad is in turn the main channel for the appearance and presence of Yugoslav currency in the foreign bank lists of foreign currencies. So, it is a question of a transaction which has been connected with the physical, mostly illegal taking across the border of the Yugoslav national currency.

There have also been other criteria of judging the degree of convertibility of the national currency which should move on from the clearing status to the status of a currency tending to gain convertibility abroad. One of these criteria consists of the difference in the exchange rate between the Yugoslav clearing and so-called free dollar. Although the official rate of exchange of the Yugoslav currency has been a uniform one (one US dollar 12.50 new dinars), in the market of clearing currencies (in Vienna, or Zurich), the ratio between the Yugoslav clearing and free rate dollar by the end of 1968 had the same range as prior to the introduction of the reform (ponderous average „disagir” difference rate of changing weaker currencies into hard ones for the East European clearing 28—33%, Indian 12—18%, Greek 8—15%, etc)¹

The fact that currencies are convertible, that is to say, that they can be exchanged on the free market means nothing in itself, since it is a question of the price at which the conversion is being effected. That is why, if convertibility be interpreted in that broad sense of the word, nearly all currencies are convertible. But, it is a question of something known by the name of external convertibility, or, more specifically, for partners in foreign trade transactions, so that foreign trade enterprises or other companies can, but only for foreign trade transactions, buy any foreign currency at daily exchange rates of the currencies concerned in West European banks, for instance. Contrary to this kind of convertibility; there is also absolute convertibility for all kinds of transactions (export and import of capital individual, private import of commodities, and the like). The National Bank, in case of convertibility, guarantees that movement of the dinar rate of exchange depends on, and is in harmony with, general trends on the monetary market in the world, above all, in West Europe. This can be achieved even by the purchase or sale of currencies in a way which can secure the maintenance of the official dinar rate of exchange with minimal changes that can be tolerated within the framework of the existing Breton-Wood international monetary system. The existence of this kind of external convertibility would show that following factors in the economy have been achieved — an equilibrium between the national product and consumption; Import needs of the country are essentially secured through income realized through export of goods and services, and

Trade is based on world prices.

In the light of the factor mentioned above, it is self-explanatory that convertibility is achievable both in the conditions prevailing in stagnation and in conditions created by economic expansion. The existence or nonexistence of convertibility of the national currency speaks neither in favour nor against the fact that a certain country has also achieved a certain level of economic progress. In other words, both at a lower and at a higher level of economic development the convertibility and nonconvertibility of national currency is possible.

The development of foreign economic relations in Yugoslavia from 1965 to the end of 1968 did not indicate that Yugoslavia was more intensively orientated to the attainment of an equilibrium between the level of

¹) Excerpt from the paper „Ekonomska Politika”, (Economic Policy), issue 881, of Feb. 17, 1969.

production and national revenue and the level of spending. The orientation to achieve the equilibrium by augmenting exports and not by reducing imports is without doubt the best road, but data on the movement of exports in 1968 seem fairly discouraging, particularly so if in 1969 the tendency to stagnation or a mild rise in exports be not changed more significantly. The persistence of a chronic deficit with the convertible area and a surplus with the clearing area, in turn, leads to a postponement of the realization of the convertibility of the dinar. The rhythm of forming monetary reserves (gold and convertible currencies) and the hitherto level in turn do not inspire much hope for an early achievement of convertibility without resorting to severe restrictions, but in a positive way — through an expansion of exports.

This objective is all the more difficult to achieve in the terms of operations in Yugoslav enterprises which have been encouraged to buy in the convertible areas and to sell in nonconvertible areas. Certain consequences of trends in the world market certainly also contribute to the creation of this situation. Above all, it is a question of the integration policy and of the consequences of the creation of the EEC for the sales of some Yugoslav products (meat, tobacco, wine). Yet, there is also ground to refer to an exaggerated value of the dinar in relation to the areas with convertible currencies and the underestimation of the dinar in relation to the areas with clearing procedure. Insofar as one insists here on the maintenance of a single foreign rate of exchange, one should find a subsidiary mechanism for achieving that effect.

The Balance of Payments

The balance of payments for 1968 in the end showed a deficit of 117 million dollars as compared with the 1967 deficit of 82 million dollars. Simultaneously, the foreign exchange reserves rose by about 60 million dollars, but this increase was not based on the net surplus, but above all stemmed from new short- and medium-term loans, totalling 167 million dollars at the end of 1967.

The biggest deficit was shown in the commodity exchange, but was covered by a surplus in the field of services of 355 million dollars whereas the remaining 115 million dollars was received through checks sent by workers temporarily employed abroad, or the „old” emigration which left the country to make a living there, or returnees. In 1968 the interest rate on foreign credits amounted to 77 million dollars in excess of the interest rate received.

This kind of performance of Yugoslav foreign economic relations calls for additional explanation, above all, from the point of view of general conditions in world economy in 1968. As a matter of fact, the difficulties in the sales of agricultural products meant a sure loss of about 50 million dollars. But, it is a positive fact that a series of industrial branches has succeeded in augmenting exports by 104 million dollars on the whole (nonferrous metallurgy by 39, shipbuilding by 23, lumber industry by 11, textile industry by 10, paper industry by nine million dollars), while eight industrial branches diminished exports by 47 million dollars. Here, too, it is above all a question of difficulties

in the food industry whose drop in exports is the gravest, equalling 14 million dollars, in metal industry 13, and in oil industry nine million dollars.

In the course of the year 1968, competition was further intensified, particularly after the devaluation of the British pound sterling, so that considering all the extenuating circumstances one should by no means underestimate the rise of 6% of industrial exports. This is especially important in view of a stagnation of industrial exports in the last few years or even a drop.

Table No.1

The 1968 SFRY Balance of Payments

	(in millions of US dollars)	
	1967	1968. ¹
<i>Goods, Services, and Transfer Payments</i>		
Export f. o. b.	1,253	1,259
Import c. i. f.	— 1,708	— 1,796
	— 455	— 537
	1967	1968
Balance of Trade	— 455	— 537
Trips abroad (tourism) (net)	98	135
Transport services (net)	140	152
Income from investment (net)	— 67	— 77
Checks sent by workers temporarily employed abroad	89	130
Miscellaneous services	81	55
Transfer payments ²		
T o t a l	373	428
Balance of current transactions	— 82	— 109
Capital transactions		
Influx of long- and medium-term loans (in foreign currencies)	334	390
Repayment of long- and medium-term loans (in foreign currencies)	— 200	— 219
Export credits (net)	— 39	— 46
Credits for purchase of agricultural products (net, repayments in dollars)	17	— 6
T o t a l	112	119

² Checks from „old emigration”, noninclusive delivery in hand

Monetary trends

Net position in MMF	33	— 18
Bilateral balances (clearing disputes)	— 94	48
Reserves in gold and in convertible currencies ³	—	— 52
Other claims and debts abroad	31	12
	— 30	— 10

Source: International Monetary Fund,
Balance of Payments Division

The Character of the Deficit

In the adverse balance of trade the industrial equipment imports played a decisive role. In the last three years about 1.2 billion dollars worth machines and installations have been imported into Yugoslavia. From the point of view of intensifying Yugoslavia's economic development and of opening the Yugoslav economy to other countries, this deficit has a different characteristic from that acquired if it be considered exclusively in terms of the balance of payments.

In 1968, it was noteworthy that the deficit in the balance of payments rose, coinciding with an increase in the foreign exchange reserves. This fact which seems contradictory at first sight stems from the conclusion of agreements on more new foreign loans. The deficit in the foreign exchange balance of payments was slightly alleviated by a positive tendency for a reduction in relation to areas using convertible currencies. Concurrently, claims against the East European clearing currencies were reduced in size.

According to incomplete data from the National Bank of the SFRY, the deficit in the foreign exchange balance of payments amounted to 2,766 million dinars in 1968, this being an equivalent of 221.2 million dollars, as compared with 1,195 million dinars, or 95.6 million dollars, in 1967.

Table No. 2

The Foreign Exchange Balance of Payments of the SFRY in 1967 and 1968

Sector	Inflow		Outflow		(in million of dinars) Balance	
	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968
Commodity Transactions	15,327	16,183	19,373	33,538	—4,045	—6,355
Other Transactions	7,807	10,507	5,332	6,918	+2,475	+3,589
Total	23,134	26,690	24,705	29,456	—1,571	—2,766

³ Global bank reserve.

Like both in 1967 and in 1968 part of the deficit was covered in the commodity sector by a surplus from other categories of invisible exports. By individual areas, the foreign exchange balance of payments offers the following picture:

Table No. 3

Foreign exchange Balance of Payments in 1967 and 1968
in Individual Areas (in millions of dinars)

Area	Inflow		Outflow		Balance	
	1967	1968	1967	1968	1967	1968
Convertible currencies	14,368	18,083	16,818	20,289	-2,450	-2,197
East European clearing	6,782	6,653	6,156	7,501	+626	-848
Other clearing	1,984	1,954	1,731	1,675	+252	+279
Total	23,134	26,690	24,705	29,456	-1,571	-2,766

Yugoslavia's total debts abroad in 1968 exceeded the 1967 debts by 13%. The foreign loans and credits as of December 31, 1968 totalled 24,014 million dinars (1,921.2 million dollars), whereas on December 31, 1967 foreign debts totalled 21,342 million dinars (1,707.3 million dollars).

This shows that one the objectives of the reform is not being achieved regards the creation of foreign exchange reserves on the basis of changed terms of business operations and the introduction of more realistic elements into Yugoslavia's foreign relations on the one hand and perhaps, above all, as regards the dimensions and structure of domestic consumption on the the other hand. Without doubt, these tendencies of increasing debts were influenced by a series of extraordinary elements which could not have been foreseen and which could not by any means influence positively the domestic as well as foreign balance of the Yugoslav economy. In this context, one should above all remember the aggravation of the international situation in August, 1968, which undoubtedly led to extraordinary expenditure from August to the end of the year. That expenditure will even on condition that the international situation improves and that tension be alleviated continue to be reflected on economic events even in 1969 either directly or indirectly.

Data on the foreign exchange balance show that the liquidity of the Yugoslav economy has to a great extent been maintained by the growth of foreign debts, since the foreign exchange reserves hardly reached the value of one-month imports.

Considering even from the point of view of the foreign exchange balance the economic trends in Yugoslavia in 1968 one can get an explanation of reviewed activity and a rapid employment rate in the latter half of the year. As a matter of fact, the growth of the money mass in circulation in 1968 as compared with that in 1967 inescapably influenced in turn a rise in imports primarily from the convertible area, whereas the clearing surplus was retained and was partly reduced as a result of a prompt repayment of state loans. That is why every assessment of economic relations with foreign countries without considering internal trends would, to put it mildly, be insufficiently thorough and incomplete.

The Commodity Exchange — Structure and Trends

A characteristic feature of commodity exchange with other countries in 1968 undoubtedly consisted of a tendency to increase the role of the industry in exports.

In Yugoslav exports seven branches provide about 80% of their total value — metal industry, non-ferrous metallurgy, and the textile, timber, shipbuilding, chemical, and electrical engineering industries. In total imports those branches participate with about three-fifths, that is to say, with some 60%. Surpluses are shown in the timber and shipbuilding industries, in non-ferrous metallurgy, and in the leather and footwear industry. Of course, here one has temporarily neglected the foreign exchange effect from the point of view of the import as a component (the case of the shipbuilding industry, for instance), or from the point of view of the sales or purchases in the areas using the hard currencies or the clearing houses. Both factors should certainly be taken into consideration while the development trends are being studied. The highest trade deficit has been shown in the metal industry, ferrous metallurgy, and the chemical and textile industries.

Table No. 4

Import and Export of Industrial Products planned for 1968

Category	Export value in millions of dinars	% participation	Import value in dinars	% participation
Reproduction material	7,870	49.82	12,770	56.99
Equipment	2,449	15.50	5,593	24.90
Consumer goods	5,477	34.67	4,097	18.24
Total	15,796	100	22,460	100

(Data quoted from „Indeks” of the Federal Bureau of Statistics, No. 3, 1969.)

The orientation to imports of equipment which was suddenly expressed during the implementation of the reform was carried on even in 1968. The value of equipment exceeded by 84% that of equipment imported in 1965 and that in 1967 by 27%. Machines in workshops, means of transport, ships, locomotives, and electrical motors headed the lists of imports. The chief buyers of equipment were oil refineries, thermo-electric power stations, ironworks, nonferrous metallurgy, chemical industrial enterprises, the textile and leather industries, transport companies (maritime, railway, road, postal, and air).

As for the trends in trade, the chief leading partners in Yugoslav foreign trade in 1968 were Italy, FR Germany, and the USSR, with relatively equal shares of 14.6%, 14.4%, and 13% respectively.

The share of trade with socialist countries in Yugoslav exports amounted to 34% (as compared with 1967, the value of exports was diminished in this area by 5%) and in imports to 27% (as compared with 1967 the import rose by 6.7%).

In advanced capitalist countries 52% of the whole value of Yugoslav exports was received, whereas their share in 1968 amounted to 60% of global Yugoslav imports. The role of the EEC countries was of special significance where 26% of all Yugoslav exports went and wherefrom 39% of all Yugoslav imports came. The participation of the EFTA was considerably smaller — 13% in exports from Yugoslavia and 14% in imports into Yugoslavia.

The underdeveloped countries took 14% of Yugoslav exports and participated with 13% in global Yugoslav imports.

The movement of the exchange of goods by region is shown in Table 5, for which data have been taken from the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Trade; the data for November and December, 1968 were only incomplete.

Table No. 5

Commodity Exchange by Region in 1968
in millions of dinars: 1 US dollar — 12.50 new dinars

Region		Exchange 1967	Figures 1968	Balance	Index	Participation	
					1968 1967	1967	1968
Western Europe	Export	6,998	7,031	33	100	44.7	44.7
	Import	11,351	12,379	+1,028	109	53.2	55.1
	Balance	-4,353	-5,348		123		
The USA and	Export	1,029	1,160	+131	113	6.6	7.4
	Import	1,586	1,146	-440	72	7.4	5.1
Canada	Balance	-557	+14				
Oceania and	Export	57	37	-20	65	0.3	0.2
	Import	512	827	+315	162	2.4	3.7
Japan	Balance	-455	-790		174		
Eastern Europe	Export	5,674	5,420	-244	96	36.3	34.5
	Import	5,729	6,113	+384	107	26.8	27.2
	Balance	-55	-683		1,242		

Africa and Near East	Export	1,011	1,030	+19	102	6.5	6.5
	Import	960	961	+1	100	4.5	4.3
	Balance	+51	+69		135		
South- East	Export	657	811	+154	123	4.2	5.2
	Import	524	471	-53	90	2.5	2.1
	Balance	-133	-40		256		
Latin America	Export	220	244	+24	111	1.4	1.5
	Import	680	556	-124	82	3.2	2.5
	Balance	-460	-312		68		
Total	Export	15,646	15,743	+97	101	100.0	100.0
	Import	21,342	22,453	+1,111	105	100.0	100.0
	Balance	-5,696	-6,710		118		

Industrial Co-operation

The year 1968 was also the first year of experience in the development of industrial long-term co-operation between Yugoslav and foreign enterprises. Decision to the effect was passed by the Federal Executive Council towards the end of 1967 (Decision on Cooperation in the Field of Production) and towards the end of 1968 the Federal Secretariat for the Economics received for approval over 90 contracts on long-term co-operation. Of these 55 contracts were actually approved. From among the approved contracts 16 relate to co-operation in the field of electrical engineering and electronics, four to machine tools and agricultural equipment, nine to road transport vehicles, 18 to other products of the metal processing industry, four to light bulbs, tubes, etc. As for regional co-operation, 82% contracts were concluded with West European firms, 9% with enterprises from Eastern Europe, and nine with enterprises located in all the other parts of the world.

There has been a division of opinion to the extent to which this kind of contracts on industrial co-operation will help introduce supreme technological methods of work and engineering into Yugoslav enterprises. It is another question which from among Yugoslav enterprises are in a position to be partners in supreme technology. According to an estimate of the Federal Secretariat for the Economics, up to 10% of all contracts concluded can be classified as transfer of high rank technology. Yet, considering the fact that they also cover manufacture of electrical shaving apparatuses, but that the firms like Braun and Remington („Sperry Rand”) retain the production of so-called razor heads, these contracts appear in a different light. „Pretis” from Vogošće has made a contract with the Swedish firm AB AKF extended to 20 years' co-operation in the manufacture of bearings, but in the beginning our firm will use simple technical methods and engineering, whereas only gradually it would later be given more complicated tasks.

Regardless of all the shortcomings of some contracts and the fact that Yugoslav enterprises are not yet treated as partners in supreme engineering, it can be stated that the terms of co-operation and current results are acceptable only insofar as the present level of co-operation is considered as a phase in the promotion of co-operation of that type.

The insistence of a series of enterprises on various transactions with foreign firms being registered as contracts about long-term co-operation is understandable in view of the fact that this kind of treatment entails certain privileges (the refund of customs duties paid for the import of parts, if these are exported as part of ready-made products in the next phase, the ceding to the exporter of the foreign exchange for meeting requirements in imports for completing the ready-made product, etc.). At the beginning of 1969 action was taken within the framework of the Federal Economic Chamber to seek special privileges in the form of reduced customs duties and up to 50% of transactions carried out within the framework of longterm co-operation in the field of production. If these and similar proposals were accepted, this would pave the way for highly unsuccessful Yugoslav enterprises to acquire privileged terms for the import of more complicated components by establishing contracts through production with other firms and by exporting some products of an inferior type of production.

That is why these and similar open problems from the sphere of foreign trade policy and regime must be viewed above all from the point of view of long-term development and long-term interests of the Yugoslav economy, so as to distinguish between real business in long-term co-operation in production from fictitious business which only signifies an effort to acquire a privileged position with regard to import of ready-made products.

Industrial-technological co-operation is one of the significant forms of fostering economic relations between Yugoslavia and other countries. But, all opportunities within the existing arrangements have not been used to give that type of co-operation the place that is by now a realistic one.

For instance, an Agreement on Industrial and Technical Co-operation in the field of mining, the civil engineering industry, agriculture, transport, tourism etc. was concluded with Italy as far back as 1964. The Italian Government for that purpose also approved a credit totalling 20 million dollars and Yugoslavia approved a five million dollar credit towards implementing the Agreement. So far, within the framework of this Agreement the following contracts on industrial co-operation have been concluded:

- on washing machines (between Castor and Rade Končar and between Zanussi and Gorenje);

- on refrigerators (between Aspera Frigo and Obod, Cetinje);

- sewing machines (Necchi-Vlado Bagat, Zadar);

- ceramic tiles (Sacmi Impianti and Progresinvest);

- doors and windows and other products made of plastic (Bandera-Jugovinil);

- asbestos products (Ispra-Bosna Azbest);

- Aluminum rubbons and sheets (Comital TLM-Boris Kidrič, Šibenik).

In these transactions only 12 million dollars worth of the Italian credit has been used thus far. At the end of 1968 negotiations also started about co-operation in producing small-sized tractors and agricultural machines, parts for compressors, and the like.

In relations with all developed countries, Italy and West Germany in particular, one can gradually less expect a stabilization of exchange or a reduction in the deficit on the basis of better sales of agricultural products. On the contrary, in view of the intentions of agrarian policy, and also in the light of mutual relations among EEC member-countries in that domain, the search for a settlement through increased industrial exports seems absolutely inescapable.

Manpower Migration

This form of economic co-operation with foreign countries has been acquiring increasingly a long-term character, simultaneously attracting the attention of the analysts not only from the point of view of the balance of payments, that is to say, the foreign exchange effect of the employment of our manpower outside of Yugoslav borders, but also from the point of view of the future economic development and the possibility to be offered by the domestic economic sector to employment in the coming years.

The growing foreign exchange inflow consisting of checks from the workers temporarily employed abroad is no doubt the most visible element of this temporary migration. However, it also involves several other less visible both positive and negative implications. During 1968 in Yugoslavia a far more systematic care and engagement of various factors, besides the authorities issuing passports and the labour exchange offices, could be noticed; this concerns banks (dealing with the collecting of foreign exchange) and the educational system (preparations for work abroad ranging from professional training to language teaching and the instructions as regards the basic elements of rules of conduct in individual countries) to cultural, recreational, sports and political organizations.

To what extent that matter had been neglected previously and viewed exclusively from the angle of the effect on the balance of payments is evident in turn from the fact that it is difficult indeed to find reliable data not only on the rhythm of migration but also on the total number of Yugoslavs employed abroad. According to detailed information carried in the Yugoslav press, the number of persons employed through the labour exchange offices totals 145,231, whereas according to estimates of certain institutions, it amounts to about 360,000 persons. Most workers have been employed temporarily in various West European countries, although there are some even in overseas countries. In the latter case, it is mostly a question of permanent emigration rather than of temporary one.

Table No. 6.

Yugoslavs Temporarily Employed Abroad

Country	According to OECD data based on issue of work permits	According to Labour Exchange Office figures
FR Germany	97,700	82,673
Austria	48,930	41,205
France	46,700	6,159
Switzerland	8,000*	6,176
Sweden	13,100	1,045
Italy	7,000*	1,534
Holland	1,800	967
Great Britain	5,000*	681

Data taken from „Ekonomiska Politika”, No. 882 of Feb. 24, 1969.

* According to estimates from Yugoslav sources.

To this total one should add an explanation that after the Second World War 25,000—35,000 workers left for Canada and around 10,000 persons for the USA from Yugoslavia. According to 1967 official data, there were 73,484 persons from Yugoslavia in Australia including 39,917 persons who have retained their Yugoslav passports.

There is ground to accept the estimates of certain institutions stating that some 360,000 Yugoslavs have been temporarily employed abroad, so that the migration rate in Yugoslavia reaches 1.85%. From the point of view of the Yugoslav economy as a whole, it is not a high rate, because other countries (European) exporting labour have a higher migration rate (except Turkey). By individual Republics, the picture shows significant differences: in Croatia, the migration rate amounts to 4.21% this being above the migration in an European country, in Slovenia 3.3%, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2.21% (at the same level as Greece), in Serbia 1.23%, and in Macedonia 0.74%, while in Montenegro it is only 0.16%.

As for the direction of migration, from Slovenia most workers go to work to Austria, from Croatia to Germany, and from Serbia to France.

It is also noteworthy that most workers leave from the more advanced Republics, and this simultaneously indicates the motives of migration. Although the motive of leaving in many cases lies in impossibility to get an adequate job in Yugoslavia, it is far more important that abroad they can earn more. According to certain inquiries, the impossibility to find a job in Yugoslavia ranks only sixth among the motives for leaving for another country, whereas higher earnings rank first, chiefly motivated by a relatively prompt purchase of durable consumer goods (flat, car, and the like).

The average earnings of Yugoslav workers working abroad are about 2,400 dinars a month, and the cost of living makes about half that amount (mostly the cost of food). This enables the workers to build savings more intensively, thus reducing the stay abroad, particularly if the persons concerned were stimulated to leave to collect funds for some concrete purchases.

Considering the number of Yugoslavs temporarily employed abroad, it would have been natural had certain action been taken in an organized way timely to channel and settle this extensive migration. This action was taken with a delay during 1968 in the sphere of federal administration and in the sphere of the economy. Preparations have been under way for forming the Federal Committee for Migration Trends Abroad. According to the writing of the Yugoslav press, the institution had not been organized earlier because matters like the choice of functionaries and the location of the institution itself could not be settled satisfactorily.

In economic circles concrete action was taken thanks to the efforts of the Yugoslav Foreign Trade Bank which, guided by business concerns, concurrently launched an economic and a social-political action. On the initiative of this famous Yugoslav business bank, a community was set up, consisting of „Elektronska Industrija”, Union-Engineering, JAT, the Tourist Union, the paper „Mladost”, and enterprises „Šipad”, and „Zadrugar”, as an association that is going to deal with offering assistance to clubs of Yugoslav workers abroad, and simultaneously every participant as members of those clubs will be able to get in touch with their clients, either in connection with the collecting of savings or sales of ready-made goods and the like. After this initial step negotiations started with a series of other economic organizations for joining this association of a special type („Jugodrvno”, „Zastava”, Sleeping and Restaurant Cars Company, „Pretis”, etc.).

As for the future activity of this association and state organs concerned, special attention should be devoted to the settlement of the process of repatriation of persons temporarily employed abroad and their joining the Yugoslav economy. It is certainly hard to imagine that suddenly many Yugoslav citizens temporarily employed abroad, in West European countries, would return and seek employment in the Yugoslav economy, except in the event of an unexpected deep crisis involving disturbances, but such a development would itself seriously affect even the Yugoslav economy. But it is a question of developing an employment system and organized return home, to avoid grave disturbances on leaving and return of Yugoslavs temporarily working in foreign countries.

The possibilities for a more intensive use of funds owned by Yugoslavs employed abroad in Western Europe have been based on estimates that about three-fifths of their income they send to their families or keep in Yugoslav banks, and only the rest in foreign banks. At the end of 1968 and at the beginning of 1969, according to estimates, the funds deposited in foreign banks totalled 200—250 million dollars. It appears that most persons employed abroad are interested in transferring their earnings to accounts in Yugoslav banks provided that they can secure for them the construction of a flat in Yugoslavia.

According to latest data, the qualifications structure of the Yugoslavs employed abroad is —

Table No. 7.

Qualifications Structure of Yugoslavs
Employed Abroad (by Republics, in %)

Category	B and H	Monte- negro	Croa- tia	Macedo- nia	Slove- nia	Serbia	SFRY
Unskilled	69,2	27,5	60,3	55,1	37,5	41,1	57,6
Skilled Workers	16,6	38,2	21,2	26,4	27,5	34,5	22,5
Agricultural	8,6	0,0	8,8	3,5	20,0	3,9	9,2
Semi-skilled	4,5	10,0	4,3	10,4	8,0	5,3	5,3
With University, higher, and secondary school education	0,6	2,6	3,4	1,5	4,6	9,3	3,3
Highly skilled	0,5	0,7	1,2	2,7	1,3	4,5	1,5
With lower edu- cation	0,2	1,0	0,8	0,4	1,1	1,4	1,7
Private arti- sans	0,05	0,0	0,04	0,0	0,02	0,04	0,03

Source: „Ekonomiska Politika”, No. 882, Feb. 24, 1969, p. 12.

The structure of persons employed abroad shows that the supply of unskilled workers is the highest. In view of the modernization process in Yugoslav industry and the intensification of business transactions and operations, it is only natural for this category to find it most difficult to get a job in Yugoslavia. However, even the foreign market has been increasingly interested in workers of special categories, particularly in connection with organized leaving and employment. That was why in 1968 an intensified role of federal and all labour exchange bureaus was emphasized in training certain categories of workers before they actually leave for work abroad under contracts with their employers. Consequently, a less painful process of accommodation and a more rapid adaptation to the new environments can be achieved, particularly with regard to unorganized leaving of Yugoslav manpower for other countries where they are handicapped because of not knowing the foreign language spoken in that particular country, the new environment, its way of life and business habits, or even work habits.

*Joint Investment in Promotion of
Production in Yugoslavia by Yu-
goslav and Foreign Firms*

In 1968, first experience was gained from contacts between Yugoslav and foreign firms in possible joint investment in the expansion of production in Yugoslavia.¹

¹ More on this matter was reported in greater detail in „Godišnjak IMPP for 1967”, in a supplement to it entitled „Economic Relations between Yugoslavia and Other Countries in 1967.”

Since in 1967 legal regulations were endorsed settling transactions of this kind, the first contacts achieved by the end of 1967 and during 1968 showed that, according to expectations, that type of transaction cannot rapidly be introduced into Yugoslavia's foreign economic relations. Even if it were not a question of regulations, that is to say, of some provisions of positive legislation regulating this matter which has by now been dealt with, this kind of development of events should be considered as a surprise.

During 1968, a number of Yugoslav enterprises started negotiations of this kind:

— The Subotica „Zorka” Chemical Industry and the Czechoslovak Chemical Research Institute from Bratislava;

The Sarajevo „Energoinvest” and the Roul-Malmaison „Compagnie d'Etudes et des Constructions Techniques;”

The Zagreb Oil Industry and the Milan „Shan Progetti” concerning the founding of a joint designing organization.

From among the arrangements registered with the Federal Secretariat for the Economics, one should call attention to:

The Belgrade Printing Enterprise and the Printing Developments International from New York on preparing and selecting dyes for printing photographs;

The furniture factory and the Buzet plastics factory and the firm Vinciguerra Pietro, Monselica, Italy on tourist equipment production;

The Kragujevac „Crvena Zastava” and FIAT, Torino, on joint investment in motor-car production;

The Celje Zinc Factory and the Berlin Vereinigung Volkseigene Betriebe Lacke und Farben, PR Germany, on investment in titanic dioxide production;

The Idrija Collector Factory and the firm Kautt Bux ONG Specialfabrik fuer Kolletoren, Stuttgart on collector production;

The Zagreb Lead and Aluminium Product Factory and the Abadio Lariono Tubettificio Ligure SPA on the manufacture of aluminium packing material.

Besides the critical remarks which can be made on the regulations relating to the matter of taxation and re-investment in case of joint investment by Yugoslav enterprises and foreign partners, the first contacts on the conclusion of contracts on co-operation show how justified suggestions made by certain sections of the Yugoslav public earlier were. This above all applies to the need for aiming at co-operation between Yugoslav enterprises and big foreign partners, or at investment in more important operations. The highly complicated procedure and engagement of both the enterprises and the administration has very often been worthless because of small scope and insignificant investment, and this even applies to cases when transaction as such was performed effectively. The Yugoslav economy has above all been interested in securing through this kind of co-operation the following:

- (1) Inflow of foreign means of payment;

- (2) Introduction of new technology, methods, and solutions which can enable Yugoslav production to narrow the gap separating it from modern technology of the countries or firms heading the list of technologically advanced ones.

It is by no means easy to achieve these two objectives, but it is even more complicated if co-operation is limited to miniature forms of co-operation with second- or third-rate firms. However, from this purpose even on the Yugoslav side partners which could be a worthy partner of foreign firms should make their appearances on the market on the level of these aspirations, that they may attract big firms and the ones that take the lead in the technological process in certain branches of production.

As it has been expected that gradually there would be growing interest among potential participants from abroad in joint investment with Yugoslav enterprises in the promotion of production in Yugoslavia, it would undoubtedly be necessary to secure a specialized institution that would be in a position to assist the foreign investor both in the field of general information on Yugoslavia and her economy and with regard to offering commercial, legal, foreign exchange and other pre-conditions about which the investor should be given absolutely reliable information. This special kind of service has been introduced by numerous countries which wanted to attract foreign investors. Information of the kind should be highly qualified, while Center for Investment forms a valuable mediator between firms that may be potential partners (both foreign and Yugoslav) and the states, that is governments of the countries importing capital. It is one of the questions raised but not yet answered.

The first step towards a better settlement of this matter was taken by a Supplement to the Federal Law on Income Tax payable by foreigners investing funds in a domestic economic enterprise with a view to joint investment (Official Gazette, 31/67 and the Supplement in 1968). The Supplements to that Law in 1968 provide an opportunity for the less developed Republics to give special facilities as regards taxation on income realized by foreigners. Several months after the passing of those supplements the initiative was taken in the Republics (Montenegro, for instance) to fix a 10% income tax payable by foreign firms and physical persons who may realize profit from joint investment in production in Montenegrin enterprises. According to a Draft Regulation of the Republican Secretariat for Finance of the S.R. of Montenegro, the share of profit invested in joint operations (re-investment of the profit) or deposited with a business bank for five years would not be taxable. If funds realized in this way be deposited for a shorter term, 3—5 years, the taxation rate would be reduced to 5%. According to Federal Law, in other areas which have not been given the treatment of the less developed areas the taxation rate is 35%, but if funds be deposited with the banks for a fixed period of time, but not less than five years, the rate can be reduced by up to 50%, of course, of the envisaged rate.

According to estimates made by the Secretariat for Finance of the S.R. of Montenegro, with these facilities and with the other ones designed to attract funds from other areas in Yugoslavia, one should stimulate

the development of the branches of production in Montenegro which have a comparative priority in the domestic market and which are believed to be able to compete successfully even in the foreign market (tourism, maritime shipping, oil, processing industry, ferrous- and non-ferrous metallurgy). Regardless of how realistic the list of the branches mentioned above is, this particular case it is a question of a gradual accommodation and elaboration of general regulations on the inflow of foreign capital and their adjustment the given circumstances in individual parts of the country.

One of the reasons why during 1968 no more significant or even more numerous cases of joint investment by foreign and Yugoslav enterprises occurred mostly in insufficiently clear legislation on the matter and unrealistic estimates of terms of using foreign capital. Certain basic characteristics of remarks on this matter were explained in „The 1967 Annals of the Institute for International Politics and Economics”. In this context one should state that most remarks made at the time, along with critical appraisals of the matter, were confirmed by the development of events in 1968. On the basis of direct contracts with international organizations and representatives of individual firms, most critical remarks proved to have been justified.¹

One of the most serious remarks was about the treatment given to profit. It is considered that in Yugoslavia a mistaken idea has been formed about the normal profit rate for foreign capital investment. As a matter of fact in the conditions in which capital may be invested in the form of loans securing 10% interest rate in the form of profit, it is hardly possible to expect a potential investor to make up his mind to make investments, particularly abroad, unless the profit in question does not amount to 15—20 per cent.

The transfer of the profit is another contentious matter. According to Yugoslav regulations, the transfer can be made of the amount of foreign exchange realized in the form of the retention quota. In view of the dimensions of the retention quotas, it is most insecure whether funds realized in that way would be sufficient for the transfer of profit. It is also considered that self-management organs in Yugoslavia are in a position to determine the profit rate subjectively, and that subjectivism itself introduces elements of insecurity.

Since in the initial phase of business operations a series of difficulties could crop up before the production process be firmly established it is believed that during that process one should secure adequate facilities for the investor.

As regards the „repatriation” of capital, it is considered that the regulations have been insufficiently clear and that ipso facto the insecurity of the potential investor is being augmented, so that this has a discouraging effect on the investor and his business interests for investment in Yugoslavia.

As regards the remarks referred to above, this time the criticism on the proportion of participation, that is to say, the ratio between domestic and foreign investment deserves special attention. By positive

¹ „Ekonomska Politika”, No. 889 of April 14, 1969, p. 12

legislation the participation of foreign investor has been limited so that the foreign investor cannot invest a share that is bigger than that invested by the domestic partner. Yet, there are cases in which the foreign investor considers his investment to be profitable only if he can have a bigger share, even over 50%, to be able to secure greater control and a more direct conduct of affairs of the given enterprise. Direct influence on the business decision-making is a special zone in which the foreign investor does not see much opportunity for influencing the decisions concerning the choice of the staff, or conclusion of concrete transactions.

As regards taxation, it is considered that the tax rate is not only non-prohibitive, but is also milder than the rates in many countries wherefrom capital could be exported to Yugoslavia. This situation does not exist in taxation on personal earnings. In effect, rigid progressive taxation of personal income in Yugoslavia, even starting from a level of earnings considered to be low in terms of criteria in more advanced countries, certainly discourages foreign experts to work in Yugoslavia. But, one of the essential objectives of the orientation to import capital into Yugoslavia is concerned to the same extent or perhaps even more with the import of new technology, knowledge, experience, and organization of production than with capital itself, that is to say, additional funds for investment from foreign resources.

Without doubt, this can also account to a certain extent for the fact that by the end of 1968 only six contracts on joint investment by Yugoslav enterprises and foreign partners were registered. Experience from July, 1967 to the end of 1968 shows the need for the possibility of introducing new forms of economic co-operation between Yugoslav economy and other countries to coincide with the promotion and special study of economic, legal, political, psychological, technical, scientific, and other aspect of the matter. Especially so since neither Yugoslavia nor any other socialist country has so far gained any experience whatsoever from co-operation of this kind.

Yugoslavia and Integration Groupings

Last year, significant moves were taken within the framework of Yugoslav policy towards economic integration groupings. Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with the EEC Commission and appointed the first ambassador to the EEC. Despite a very limited mandate given by the EEC Commission, in September, 1968 the first negotiations began on economic co-operation between Yugoslavia and the EEC, whereby one phase of relations was completed, filled with preparations for the talks and the introduction of a new phase of direct and immediate negotiations, first at the level of governments and after that at the level of expert groups (work groups).

Simultaneously, in economic relations with CEMA member-countries Yugoslavia carried on with application of the principles and basic element of their platform on international economic and political co-operation. Regardless of a certain tension in political relations in Europe above all provoked by the entry of troops of five member-countries of the Warsaw Pact the territory of the Socialist Republic of Czechoslo-

vakia, giving her independent appraisal of moves, of that kinds, Yugoslavia tried to develop economic co-operation with all CEMA member-countries in compliance with results achieved by that time. Although opposing regional economic groupings, above all because they ipso facto impose limitations on existing trends in commodity exchange and economic co-operation, developing intra-regional exchanges, even in 1968 Yugoslavia offered evidence of respect for the will of other countries and the realization of realities in the contemporary world.

Simultaneously, despite certain economic difficulties confronting her and respecting her own foreign policy platform, Yugoslavia has not been able to make up her mind to join any one from among the regional economic groups, especially since everyone of them has had, among, other things, (particularly in Europe) some military-political characteristics. At the same time, it is inescapable to see that existence outside of the integration groupings imposes increasingly difficult conditions of both existence and joining trends of the international division of labour. In other words, the policy of nonalignment and active peaceful co-existence has in turn certain implications affecting Yugoslavia's economic co-operation with other countries. Realizing those difficulties, Yugoslavia does not display interest in joining them as a member, particularly not in the formal and legal sense of the word, but is interested in discovering realistic forms of co-operation. This was achieved in 1964 with a group of CEMA member-countries. During 1967, the same was achieved with EFTA member-countries, whereas in 1968 the first from a series of concrete measures were taken for finding a solution to relations between Yugoslavia and the EEC.

Although relations with CEMA were formally and legally settled as far back as 1964, various forms of economic co-operation develop above all on a bilateral basis, as CEMA has not been institutionally fit for and adjusted to, multilateral economic co-operation. This had adverse consequences for CEMA member-countries as well as for Yugoslavia. The existence of differing economic systems in CEMA countries and in Yugoslavia also causes one of the difficulties hampering the fostering of mutual relations. The concrete difficulties which have so far been noticed in the development of co-operation between Yugoslavia and CEMA member-countries are:

The clearing system of payments;

Nonelastic goods lists;

The exclusive role of the state in negotiating various forms of industrial co-operation, co-operation, and specialization, and

Different conditions of price setting in commerce, and the like¹

That was why within the framework of CEMA, Yugoslavia raised the question of discovering new methods of co-operation, above all, towards abandoning the rigid clearing, inflexible goods lists, and the application of methods of trade which those countries have been applying in their own practice with countries with hard currencies. Simultaneous-

¹ A. Grličkov: „Temporary Stagnation in Relations”, from „Ekonomika Politika”, No. 882, Feb. 24, 1969, p. 8.

sly, Yugoslavia made it clear to accept long-term and annual agreements on various kinds of commodity as firm mutual commitments, or even as an indicative element for organizing trade. In the field of industrial co-operation, in CEMA countries that area has been the direct responsibility of the state organs, whereas in Yugoslavia state organs settle the general terms for that activity, while the implementation of the given activity is a matter for the concern of the enterprises. To discover joint solutions, Yugoslavia offered for her part to accept the institution of state guarantees for the realization of agreements on co-operation, although this, strictly speaking, is not part of the system prevailing in Yugoslavia as to the foreign economic relations and their settlement. In the domestic field, with a view to implementing the agreements, a solution was found in the form of counter-guarantees of enterprises and business banks in relation to state organs, whereby the material damage from nonobservance of the agreements is shifted to the enterprises and should not be paid for by the state.

Because of a whole series of unsettled problems and the need for co-ordinating commodity exchange and other forms of economic co-operation between Yugoslavia and CEMA member-countries in conditions in which there is no identical system of economic operations, a stagnation occurred, followed by a drop in trade. In 1967, as compared with the 1968 trade figures, trade between Yugoslavia and CEMA countries was reduced by 7%, and in 1968 as compared with 1967 by 4%. The existence of the Yugoslav clearing surplus is still a reality. Considering the situation in which 45—49% of Yugoslav trade has been subject to payments through clearing procedure, it is not difficult at all to understand the orientation taken in 1968 in the form of a initiative displayed by Yugoslavia for shifting to trade and payments in convertible currencies. It has not only been a question of the need for surmounting unnecessary parallelism from the point of view of method of business operations, but also of the need for doing away with the tendency for making debts in the areas with convertible currencies and for crediting the clearing areas from among Yugoslav partners.

In the past year no satisfactory results have been achieved in the talks with partners from CEMA countries about dropping the clearing system and moving on to payments in convertible currencies. Certainly, the adoption of this Yugoslav initiative would not automatically lead to a rise in the exchange of goods, but would open up new real frames for trade and for other forms of co-operation. Yet, the existence of the clearing method of payment is on guarantee either for a rise in the exchange of goods, as has been evident from Yugoslav experience in the last three years.

Dr LJUBIŠA ADAMOVIĆ

Dr Ljubiša Adamović, born in 1928, in Zemun graduated at the Journalist and Diplomatic School in Beograd, in 1952. Studied at the post-graduate level at the University of Ohio in 1958. Awarded a Doctoral Degree at the Faculty of Economics in Beograd, in 1961.

From June 1963 Lecturer and from April 1967 Associate Professor at

the Faculty of Economics in Beograd. Subject: International economic relations.

In the academic years 1961/63 and 1970/71 visiting professor at the Florida State University; lectured at various universities in the United States and Western Europe. Member of the editing board of the review „Economist” Beograd, and a Member of the Economic Council of the SR of Serbia.

Published, among other works: Changes in the world production and international trade, Beograd, 1960, (co-author with prof. ing. M. Hubeny); International relations after the Second World War, Beograd, 1965; Foreign trade policies of the developed capitalist countries and their impact on the developing countries, published in The United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development, Beograd, 1964; Social-economic characteristics of the contemporary capitalism, Beograd, 1966; International economic relations — contemporary trends, Beograd, 1970; many articles on international trade in Yugoslav and foreign reviews, such as Les pays sous-développés et le commerce international, in: Les Annales de l'économie collective, No. 2—3/1963— Underdeveloped countries in the world trade, in: Naša stvarnost, No. 4/1959, etc.

Dr Veljko KORAC

Professor of the Faculty of Philosophy in Beograd

HUMANISM AND SELF-MANAGEMENT IN OUR TIME

I

Never before in history has man had more reason to believe in his privileged place in the world than he has today. The real power brought to him by the advancement of science and technology has reached proportions which could, until recently, hardly be envisaged, and there seems to remain nothing which could challenge or jeopardize this place of his, and his future.

However, there has never been a greater number of doubts regarding the potential of man to live as a man than there is today. While the triumph of science and technology is glorified on one hand, the death of man and humanity, and the end of humanism and historical thinking, are announced on the other. The paradox cannot be greater! We must ask ourselves from where does this paradox stem, at this very time in which man is demonstrating his ability and potential to transcend the boundaries of this planet, to materialize his childhood dreams?

On the surface, power and humanity coincide and from the gist of the over-all progress of mankind. Since man is a practical being which purposefully appropriates the scattered potencies of nature for its own needs, his special place in the world becomes safer at the same rate at which the universality of his practice, and the magnitude of the power created by him, increases. This is why the efficiency with which human knowledge becomes transformed into real power is increasingly considered as the basic criterion of advancement. It appears as if the well-known Hegelian formula about cunning of the mind is being materialized, to the effect that the mind is powerful as much as it is cunning.

However, it is Hegel's system which shows that power and humanity coincide only in the sphere of the metaphysics of power, and that development may be viewed also as a process in which there is no room at all for man and humanity. This is to say that existence in Hegel's system is a pure ephemerality. Because of this Hegel says without any scruples that the world spirit conducts its business on a wholesale basis, sacrificing to its needs and goals (which obviously remain beyond human needs and goals) not only certain individuals, but entire peoples, even entire generations. This is why the radical critique of Hegel's philosophy

was formulated, on one hand, as *the philosophy of man* (first by Feuerbach, then by Marx), and, on the other, as the philosophical rehabilitation of *existence* (Kierkegaard) of *life* (Nietzsche, Dilthey). In both cases, man is placed in the center of philosophy, with existence and life in the very bases of the thinking of the epoch.

It is characteristic that man as a man also remains outside the dimensions of the positivism mode of thinking. This applies both to early positivism, in which human existence disappears in the sphere of sociological realism, and to the latest forms of positivism and empiricism, in which man as a man is reduced to linguistic expressions, to functions and structures, through which the end of man and humanism is proclaimed in the name of a totally rationalized system. This results in the total lack of commitment of the positivist and empiricist mode of thinking, in its total lack of interest for humanistic problems and issues, all this occurring in the historic situation in which the existential issues of man and humanity have epochal importance. The extreme form of this mode of thinking has been reached by contemporary structuralism which completely rejects the historical dimension of man as an ordinary myth, and restricts its interests to the problems of structure, so that man is dissolved in rationalized and mathematized systems.

The enthusiasm that took hold of a great many people upon seeing on television screens the first man on the Moon, showed, however, that historical thinking is denied as being a myth only in order for the new myths, the myths of science and technology, and the myths of power produced by science and technology, to be promoted. At the moment when man transcends this human world of his, in which he was born, and in which he matured, in order to enter the other, transhuman world, he cannot triumph unless he asks himself what will this adventure yield to him, to man? Could not this enthusiasm that swept over the world in an instant be expressed by the pathetic exclamation:

Sciences are flourishing, spirits are waking, it is a delight to live!

But this exclamation dates from the first decades of the 16th century, from which we are separated by four-and-a-half centuries, the time that marked the first bloom of humanism. If 1969, the year in which man set foot on another planet, is simultaneously the year that marks the end of humanism, we must ask ourselves whether this exclamation of joy suits our time at least to the extent to which it suited the time of the wandering knight, the hapless humanist Ulrich von Hutten, who thus addressed the world amidst the bloody peasant and religious wars, amidst the slaughter and terror that ruled all of Europe, when one could only dream, but not speak with reason, of the flourishing sciences and the joys of life. Four and-a-half centuries ago, men were at the very treshhold of the modern epoch but the prospect of progress thrilled them so much that, as Friedrich Engels says, they were great in virtue and vice alike. They were anything but thrifty and calculating. After the long-lasting medieval theological terror that forces them to be what they were not, angels, they comprehended perfectly well that man was neither angel-like nor devil-like but human, and that only as a man he could have a privileged place in the world. Therefore, they knew that man's place in the world, its quality, depended on himself, irrespective of all of his virtues and vices. They had, therefore, comprehended the

meaning of the French philosopher M. Merleau-Ponty's lucid and courageous warning to our time: *in order to be a man, one must be both somewhat more and somewhat less than a man!*

Man is a being unique in the world, thought the humanists at the outset of the modern epoch. This is the basic standpoint of traditional humanism. Man's uniqueness was explained by his unique abilities and potentials to create himself as a purposeful being and to thus elevate himself above other living creatures. Man is conceived as a unique potency and this is the foundation of humanism, the gist of which lies in the notion that man may be everything, as much as he may be nothing. Or — as Pascal wrote — to be the mid-point between everything and nothing!

Three hundred years after Pascal, man is indeed stretched between everything and nothing, between the earth and the sky, between existence and essence, and has lived to witness the proclamation of his own death. And why? Because the power created by himself has outgrown his human potentials, has become the sphere of alienation and reification, the weapon of repression. The gap between his existence and his essence has reached unprecedented proportions, shaking his trust in humanism. He now lives in the paradoxes of the existential and social crisis which is threatening him, and which incapacitates him to discover the sense of progress, as an answer to the question: what does progress actually do for him. Does it achieve the recognition of humanity or merely the big systems in which the rule of the „Big Brother“ will be established, Orwell's horrifying vision of a society in which men have nothing human left except — outward appearance?

II

One must admit that neither the existential nor the social crisis of the contemporary world holds forth much hope for man in the near future. Enormous forces of nature have been released and employed without making it possible for them to serve purely human purposes. Furthermore, it is questionable whether man is capable of keeping them under control at all: what is the likelihood of them turning against him one day, perhaps in the near future, and imperiling his existence? This question in itself evokes a feeling of anxiety; contemporary man lives like the fisherman from the fairy-tale who sets free a spirit from the bottom of the sea by opening the bottle in which it was imprisoned, bringing thus upon himself the risk of destruction by this very spirit. There is nobody who relieves man of this anxiety. On the contrary he is further bewildered and frustrated by assurances that some are already in possession of so much nuclear energy that they could destroy mankind ten times over, while others are lagging behind as they could not destroy the human species more than four times. The irony of insanity presupposes a seemingly deliberate oblivion to the fact that the human species does not have to be destroyed either ten times or four times, that it would suffice for it to be destroyed just once. This danger is more than real. Bewitched by a maniac feeling of power, an American general

recently told the world that a mere ten big aircrafts would be sufficient to cause immediate destruction of sixty million people by biological poison. Existing planes far outnumber the mentioned ten, and far more poison is available than the quantity required for destruction of sixty million people. If the fate of the world depends solely on the tantrums and ambitions of one or more generals, how is it possible to believe in progress? It is obvious that power escaped from under the control of man's mind and began to hover over human existence as an ominous cloud. Existential anxiety is not, then, a single moment of uncertainty, but a permanent situation of the human species that offers no guarantee to the effect that mind will be above power.

In the sphere of social life the paradox is no lesser. It has become common knowledge that the advancement of science and technology has reached such proportions that it would be possible, already at this stage, to raise the poorest and the most backward part of humanity out of the fathomless depths of poverty and misery in which it still find itself. However, the achievement of science and technology do not serve this purpose but enable the most developed part of humanity to move forward at a still faster rate, to continue to increase its power. The gap between the developed and the undeveloped ones is steadily widening so that the world is polarized between the two extremes, one of which is the omnipotent elite of the contemporary world which is daily becoming more powerful and more prosperous, while the other is represented by the major part of mankind living under conditions not completely incomparable to those in prehistoric times, subject to ruthless exploitatons, and stricken by hunger and poverty. These antipodes conceal in themselves the dangers of explosion that may break out at any place and at any time, with unforeseeable consequences. The deeper the gap between the rich and the poor, the greater the likelihood of an explosion. The tendency of the superpowers toward a strict division of their respective spheres of interest and influence adds to the likelihood. In any case, the world is spectacularly dividing itself into two parts: one, a highly organized type of industrial society, carrying the label of „affluent society”, and the other, consisting of undeveloped countries. Such a division continuously makes all ethnic, racial, class, and national conflicts more drastic, raising doubts concerning the justifiability of use of the term humanity in the sense of a single unique being. It is understandable that the traditional conception of social life and social conflicts, inherited largely from the nineteenth century, are hopelessly outdated. Social crises acquire new dimensions and new features, and within themselves breed new forces which act in a completely new manner, often striving to attain the same general objectives, although the nature of these forces is highly diverse and far from uniform.

Which are the forces in question?

These are forces which are compelled by the turbulent course of contemporary history to be conscious of the existential and social crisis which endangers not only the further development of the society but the sheer survival of man. Presently, they manifest themselves in great blazing movements, from Paris and Berlin to Tokyo, from Tokyo to Buenos Aires, from European to American universities. Direct causes which incite

these movements vary a great deal but their ultimate objectives are the same or almost the same: revolt against all forms of economic, political, national, or racial repression, revolt against poverty and war, revolt against bureaucratic self-will and unhumanity, revolt against the systems of political manipulation, etc. By their very appearance, these forces demonstrate how quickly the world is undergoing changes, how the character of social and international conflicts has been altered, and how necessary it is to employ a new mode of thinking in order to understand the real problems of contemporary man. Satisfaction experienced by the ruling elite, convinced that the existing systems have definitely integrated and institutionalized the workers' movements and the traditional revolutionary forces, suddenly deflated as it became obvious that any, apparently minor, crisis, a seemingly insignificant conflict, in any corner of the world, may inflame hundreds of thousands, indeed, millions of men. Masses that appear inert and without interest in any revolutionary action may be stirred up in unprecedented number. Last year's events in France proved this in a most convincing manner. The great movement of students and workers revealed practically overnight that the existing political parties, those with revolutionary traditions included, have lost their reputation and their ability to act. New historical needs require new forces and new movements. This, again, is new in our epoch: the general conflict between institutionalized power, the Establishment, and humanity. On one side are the organized forces of institutionalized power, striving to maintain the existing order, while on the other are movements which defy this power, striving to effect a change in the existing state of affairs, and resisting all forms of repression. These movements experience the serious conflict between power and humanity as the crucial situation of their epoch.

III

It would be naive to believe in the possibility of a uniform solution for such a deep-rooted crisis. It is clear that due to the advancement of science and technology, the power of production has surpassed all existing forms of social relations and of social organization. In this context, what are the real prospects of social transformations which would bring social relations in accord with the fast development of science and technology? Will progress lead to the end of humanism and to the death of man, or will it enable man to create conditions for human life, i.e. for human community?

Undoubtedly, the idea of a true human community is nowadays presented as a mere Utopia, but this idea is not entirely a product of imagination: it is the result of the consistent critique of all past forms of social life which were dominated either by non-economic or economic coercion, and in which social power inevitably became transformed either into the rule of man over man, or into the rule of things over man. When social relations are maintained by non-economic coercion, the place of each individual in the society is strictly determined, the social coercion being maintained by a system of direct management of men, which system does not permit any freedom of choice and of individual mobility. In such societies, it is only exceptionally that men are persona-

lities: as a rule, they are merely parts of an organism. In the societies of economic coercion, the so-called economic societies, man is independent of man, and his place has not been predestined beforehand, but his freedom of mobility is restricted to the political and legal spheres; this freedom is fundamentally limited by economic dependence which is nothing but a dependence on reified and alienated social relations. Man's freedom, then, is partial and abstract. True social freedom is possible only in a community in which exploitation and traditional division of labor would cease to exist, and in which man as a man becomes a true creator of history, the master of his fate. The first and the most essential condition for true freedom is the unlimited progress of productive power which elevates man from the sphere of work, work in the sense of necessity and economy. The growth of production shows that this prospect is real, and that the advancement of science and technology does not lead only to the establishment of big inhuman systems, but that it also makes a true human community possible. Already today, in developed industrial countries, production depends less and less on the quantity of invested work and on the amount of capital, but rather on the state of science and technology. Science and technology no longer trail behind industry but are abreast with it or in front of it. This means that science and technology have become the basic force of production. One should not forget that, one century ago, Marx became aware of the essence of this process, and that he wrote the following:

„At the same rate at which big industry develops, the growth of real wealth becomes decreasingly dependent on the duration of work invested in production and on the quantity of work, and increasingly so on the power of factors that we set in motion (during work), which factors, on their part, have no relationship with the time necessary for production, but depend to a much greater extent on the general state of science and on the advancement of technology, or on the application of science in production“.

In such highly automated industry, science becomes the main force of production, technology more and more the worker, while man increasingly ceases to be a worker of necessity; the difference between management of production and direct work falls to the minimum, and, similarly, the difference between manual and mental work gradually disappears. Machine takes over the role of the worker, while social work increasingly becomes productive in the full and true sense of the word. This is due to the fact that under the conditions which enable social work to free itself from direct necessity, it becomes elevated to the sphere of research, planning, and control. In this way, highly developed industry, into which automation has been fully introduced, transforms production into what Marx called „the collective worker“. This is already a step toward the humanization of work: The worker becomes a producer, a man. Man ceases to be a means and becomes an objective — the first and the most fundamental principle of humanism.

Naturally, this process is not a simple one, at all. In fact, it contains within itself many a contradiction. Automation leads to a total integration of the processes of production, to centralized planning, and to the formation of big systems, in other words, to the rationalization and concentration of all functions of productions and consumption. And what is this, then, but the kingdom of big systems in which structuralism

predicts the death of man and the end of humanism? The systems will, doubtlessly mean an end for the authority of the bureaucracy also, even when bureaucracy is extremely rational, as it must be replaced by the authority of technical knowledge. The bureaucratic knowledge of which Marx speaks becomes an unnecessary surplus in the big automated systems. In the U. S. A., as well as in other highly developed industrial countries, this process is already quite clearly visible: the logic of production has succeeded in eliminating many traditional institutions, from economic and political organizations to scientific laboratories. The domination of technical knowledge creates the power of technocracy. In the Soviet Union also, this process is becoming spectacular, but due to the relative backwardness of society and to political centralism, the power of the bureaucracy is still so great that it allows technical knowledge to become dominant only in the areas in which the system is most vitally interested (armament and everything directly or indirectly connected with it), while in the other areas, especially in the sphere of social relations, the more or less primitive forms of bureaucracy are still dominant. This is the reason why Stalinist and the neo-Stalinist bureaucracy has so persistently countered any attempt at rationalization which could jeopardize its political and social power. It is not accidental that bureaucracy is so fond of the theses of structuralism and functionalism, that it is pragmatically oriented, and that it does not tolerate any manifestation of humanistic inclination. In order to discredit humanism, the omnipotent formula of „abstract humanism” has been invented.

However, the fast development of the forces of production does not lead solely to the constitution of power of the big systems which become the kingdom of technocracy. If there were no other tendencies, the death of man and the end of humanism could indeed be proclaimed. One who does not notice these tendencies, most frequently sinks into pessimism, or thoughtlessly forms a negative attitude toward technology thus resembling those of the workers at the early stage of capitalism who destroyed machines in the belief that they were the only cause of unemployment and poverty. Man has set his foot on the Moon, but it is this achievement which should force him to contemplate himself rather than the unfriendly surface of the Moon. In the big systems, the interconnectedness of all of the processes of production becomes perfectly clear, and this automatically increases the responsibility of all producers participating in the process of production. The smaller the difference between management and direct work, the greater the responsibility of those participating in production. This sense of responsibility then leads to the awareness of the necessity of direct participation in management. The producer is no more merely an executor, because the method of production employed in highly automated industry forces him, at an increasing rate, to participate in planning, decision-making, and in controlling the materialization of projects. This occurs, at first, in a partial system, but then spreads to the social system as a whole, in which the partial system is operating. It is, therefore, not accident that the French workers' demand to participate in the management of companies was one of the basic goals of last year's events in France. This demand is not a product of the adoption of a certain doctrine, but the result of the awareness of the changed role of the producer. There is no doubt this

is not a solitary case in the industrial countries of today, and that the future development of production will soon lead to the formulation of the same or similar demands elsewhere, since these demands are the result of the perfecting of production. As productive forces develop, production becomes more and more socialized; masses of producers isolated hitherto, become transformed into the „collective worker”, who, under conditions of self-management, seeks his *human rights and the recognition of humanity*.

However, the needs and the possibilities of participation in management and of self-management of producers, are questioned and denied in the very name of rationality and efficiency of production. The spirit of technocracy, intolerant to the very idea of self-management, thus shows its true face.

There are claims, for example, that a wide participation of producers in the management of production and exchange would obstruct, if not completely incapacitate the efficient planning of production. This claim is based on the standpoint that social production, at the contemporary level, can have only one of the following two extreme forms: optimal centralism, which is a characteristic of all big systems, and optimal decentralization, which makes production partial, and which cripples its efficiency. This is, however, as Erich Fromm notes, a false dichotomy, because the optimal centralism of management may exist only if this be so required by large-scale organization and planning, while the rationality of the large-scale organization and planning not merely does not exclude but, in fact, presupposes optimal participation in management. On the sheer grounds of the producer's being also the consumer, it is the rationality of this need which must be the only criterion of the efficiency of planning, and of the materialization of projects, i.e. of the humanization of production and consumption.

It is further claimed that wide participation in planning will not be necessary if there exists an efficient control of the decision-making process by the legislative and executive organs of the State.

This argument overlooks, though, that legislative and executive organs cannot possibly maintain efficient control of production and consumption, because they are themselves under the control of the power created in the sphere of production and consumption.

There are also other objections to self-management, but at the core of them all lies the tendency to protect the interests of a certain power-elite which, when it advances arguments on the behalf of the rationality of organization of the big systems, in fact, endeavors to retain its monopoly.

The ruling classes and the big systems are nowadays making every effort to utilize the fruits of the progress of science and technology in a technocratic manner, and to retain their privileges in society. However, they are forced to choose between two extremes, one being their tightening of statist control over the whole of social life, the other — their acceptance of direct producers' participation at least to some extent; by accepting the latter, they would automatically have to agree to bear all the repercussions which participation may mean for them.

Even an authoritarian statesman like de Gaulle could realize that statism is not a solution for the deep economic crisis of contemporary

society as it leads not only to the total alienation of men from the existing institutions, and to all kinds of social conflicts which inevitably follow, but also to a variety of forms of adventurism, in which the self-will of military power is openly manifested, and which may end up in war. The two world wars, and the one presently waged in Viet-Nam, are convincing proof of the fact that the outcome of wars is not in accordance with the plans of their initiators. War adventures give birth to revolutions in the same way in which the development of the forces of production gives birth to forces which cause the existing order to tumble down. No concentration of power can offer a guarantee to the effect that social transformations, if these have become a historical necessity, would be impeded. The current social contradictions are more and more striking as the power of production increasingly falls out of proportion with the existing forms of social organization. Even in socialist countries where there appears a concentration of power in bureaucratic and technocratic hierarchies, the disproportions is becoming more visible, and the demand for self-management more vigorously and emphatically voiced. If direct producers are not able to augment their responsibility in society by participating in the making of all decisions concerning issues in which they have vital interests, the gap between power and humanity will not only fail to close but will increase and become deeper; this will occur in certain countries as well as in society as a whole. The crisis may have a human, or an antihuman, outcome. If one observes critically the present state of the society, and the tendencies of development of the power of production, he will arrive at the conclusion that self-management is the most human perspective of the contemporary world. For this reason, the problem of self-management is not a problem characteristic of this or that country but of society as a whole. One may even say that this is a problem concerning the definite recognition, or else the end, of humanism.

Veljko Korać, PH. D., professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Beograd. Born in 1914. Graduated in philosophy at the University of Zagreb. Continued studies in Prague, Czechoslovakia and then obtained his doctorate at the University of Beograd. During the occupation of Yugoslavia (1941 to 1945) participated in the National Liberation Struggle.

From 1950 taught philosophy at the Faculty of Philosophy in Beograd. Fields: history of philosophy, history of social theories, philosophical anthropology. From 1964 to 1968 Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy. One of the founders and first editor-in-chief of the journal „Philosophy“; member of the editorial board of the international edition of the journal „Praxis“; vice-chairman of the Korčula Summer School of Philosophy. In 1958 spent a year on research in Paris, from 1962 — 63 was in the USA (at the universities of Columbia and of California in Berkeley). In 1968, special lecturer at Western Michigan University and at the universities in Cleveland, Ann Arbor and Columbia. Participated in a large number of philosophy symposia and congresses in Yugoslavia and abroad.

Principal works: *Marx and Contemporary Sociology* (1962, 1968); *Philosophical and Empirical Anthropology* (1963); *In Search of Human Society* (in „Socialist Humanism“ ed. by Erich Fromm, New York, (1965/1968); *Philosophical Anthropology and Marx's Humanism*, Beograd, 1967; *Vocation of Philosophical Anthropology* (in *Memorias del XIII Congreso di Filosofia*, Problem of Man, Mexico, 1963); *Lob der philosophischen Vernunft* (in *Revolutionare Praxis*, München, Rombach Verlag, 1970; *Hegel's Founding of the History of Philosophy*, Beograd, 1963/1970).

Dr Radomir LUKIC

Professor of the Law Faculty of the University of Beograd

YUGOSLAV SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION

The social structure of Yugoslavia can be best understood if the villages, i.e., agricultural areas, are distinguished from the cities, although the process of transition from villages to cities and from agriculture to other activities is rapid.

Among peasants, three specific horizontal strata can be distinguished: a small number of wealthy peasants, a considerably larger number of middle peasants, and the largest number of poor peasants of which a great number are peasant-workers who maintain a house and land in the village and work in a nearby industry, travelling to their working place. In addition there is a relatively small number of agricultural workers who work permanently for the socially-owned farms and enjoy the rights of self-management.

When a stratum of wealthy peasants is distinguished, it should be noted that the wealth is completely relative within the context of Yugoslav socialism. This socialism permits the existence of private peasants' property, and about 90% of the land is in the private sector, but the peasant's private property is limited to 10 hectares' maximum. Naturally, with such a small amount of land, it is not possible to attain any special wealth, even in the most favorable circumstance.

On the other hand, it should also be stressed that peasants generally form the lowest stratum of the social structure, even if they are prosperous. A peasant who is significantly wealthier than a city worker or white collar worker would nevertheless be in a lower stratum. This is even more true for the middle and poor peasants. In Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, people are not stratified in high and low categories exclusively, not even predominantly according to wealth but primarily according to prestige, type of job, education, style of life, and so on.

In the population which is not in agriculture, three main horizontal strata can also be distinguished. First, the upper stratum consists of leading political and economic officials, leading intelligentsia, relatively well-off people in the commercial field, professionals and the like.

¹ One hectare = 1.8 acres.

Second, the middle stratum consists of people who can be called white collar workers. They are not manual laborers and are predominantly concerned with services. Finally, the third stratum consists of manual laborers. Naturally, in each of these strata there are many particular groups or substrata, but roughly speaking, it appears that such classifications correspond best to reality. Although wealth is not the main measure of determining membership in the respective stratum, it should still be noted that, as a rule, wealth is in proportion to the level on the interstrata scale. In addition, of course, it should always be kept in mind that the notion of wealth is very relative and that it corresponds to Yugoslav standards. What is considered to be wealth in Yugoslavia, in the frame of reference of socialist principles, is barely significant in comparison with other systems.

In addition to this horizontal stratification, Yugoslav society is characterized by strong vertical differentiations which cross the horizontal strata. There are various reasons for this, of which the historical ones are the most important. Before Yugoslavia was united, it was made up of many states, regimes, and regions, all on very different levels of economic, political and cultural development. In the last fifty years since unification, these differences have not been eliminated, and many are still very significant.

There are parts of Yugoslavia which can be compared to Central Europe (Slovenia, parts of Croatia), and others which could be compared to the Middle East (Kosovo, parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina, parts of Macedonia and Montenegro). There are regions where peasants are no more than 15% of the population and those where they are almost 90%; where there are no illiterates and where half the population is illiterate; where the population decreases because of the low birth rate and where the birth rate is among the highest in the world. But it is not only these different levels of development; there are also differences in nationality, mentality, language, religion, culture, occupations, and so on, which do not depend on level of development, and which even increase through further development.

Such differences create a community of people with similar interests who differ from others and thus form the following groups: national, religious, cultural, ideological and professional. These vertically defined groups cross horizontal strata, and one horizontal stratum can vertically be divided in several groups. Various horizontal strata and vertical groups are continually crossing, conflicting or uniting, and the relation between these two kinds (horizontal and vertical) of groups is in constant change in an already rapidly changing Yugoslav society.

There is little research of social structure and its dynamics in Yugoslavia. Neither all horizontal strata nor all vertical groups of Yugoslav society have been studied in detail. In particular, their movement has not yet been determined — which groups are decreasing, which are increasing, and at what pace. Relations between these groups have not been determined: cooperation or conflict, whether one group is open or closed to another group, and the speed of transition from one group to another. Of particular importance to our question, public opinion, is that we do not know the features of social consciousness which characterize each particular group, nor do we know how it is formed or changed. Without

specific and exact research about these phenomena, it is not possible to speak with exactness about these questions; we must rely on general observations and some further indirect data. Consequently, this paper should be considered as a tentative hypothesis about reality rather than a developed thesis.

Summing up what has been said, it appears that the most important vertical groups in Yugoslav society are determined by nationality, social development, culture, and, finally, by ideology, especially political ideology.

There are five Yugoslav nations within the country: Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, Macedonians and Montenegrins. Of these, Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins speak one common language, Serbocroatian, while Slovenians and Macedonians each have their own language. Common language brings together the first three nations, especially the Serbs and Montenegrins. A recent viewpoint is that the Yugoslav Moslems represent a nation in the process of formation. As a consequence of specific historic circumstances — long Turkish rule over parts of Yugoslavia — a considerable part of the Yugoslav population was converted to the Moslem religion and accepted Moslem, Turkish (oriental) culture. As a result, this part of the population was separated from the majority of the Yugoslav population which remained Christian. The Moslem population, for the most part, does not belong to any of the three nations which form the Yugoslav Christian population and speak one language (Serbs, Croats and Montenegrins). The Moslems remained „national undecided” since they did not feel that they were Turks either. Now, they develop proper national consciousness.

Besides the Yugoslav nations, there are significant national minorities: first of all, Albanians (about 1 million) in Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro; Hungarians (about one-half million) in Serbia; and finally, Turks (about a quarter of a million) in Serbia and Macedonia. In addition, there are other less significant minorities: Rumanians, Slovaks, Czechs, Ruthenians, Italians, Germans, etc.

Such a complex national composition represents a basis for the existence of a great complexity of public opinion. Moreover, this is reinforced by the fact that nations in presentday Yugoslavia are in a state of very developed national consciousness and national sensitivity, especially those which are „young” nations or in the process of formation. This creates a basis for national controversies and even conflicts.

But the nations alone would not make the vertical Yugoslav structure so complex and differentiated if very significant differences in social development and culture were not added to them, deepening the national differences.

From the point of view of general social development, there are major differences between the regions in the country. Generally speaking, regions which belong to Middle Europe (North from Sava and Danube) i.e., Slovenia and a considerable part of Croatia, Vojvodina, and the largest part of the Adriatic coast (Dalmatia, in Croatia), are more or less similar to the societies of Central Europe to whose political and economic influence they have been exposed throughout history. As a contrast, Balkan parts of Yugoslavia are much less developed in all respects. In this Balkan region, there are parts which are hardly

in the market economy as such, and which have barely developed class differentiation. This would be parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and also the south eastern part of Serbia.

It is understandable that with such differences in general social development, very strong differences in culture also exist. Roughly, two main cultural regions can be distinguished. These are the result of historic development — cultural domination of certain regions on the basis of political rule. Those cultural regions are usually called the Western and Eastern cultural regions. This division is historically connected with the split in religion — Catholic and Orthodox, and then Moslem. It is also connected with cultural and political domination by Rome and Byzantium, then by Venice and Austria, on the one hand, and by Turks, on the other. There were also free national states which were under Russian influence. The Western cultural region, which is predominantly Catholic, is somewhat larger than what we call the Central European region, since it includes the Balkan parts of Croatia and, to a certain degree, penetrates Bosnia and Hercegovina. The Moslem cultural region stretches mostly over Bosnia and Hercegovina, with only minor influence on Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro.

These cultural differences, reinforced by religious and national differences, are very significant and lead to differences in mentality, in social relations and institutions, in family life, and other spheres. Because of cultural differences and similarities, nations which are close or identical in language, such as Serbs and Croats, are significantly different, while those which have different languages are sometimes closer to one another, such as Serbs and Macedonians. In the same way, the identical culture brings together the Serbs and Montenegrins.

Religion is a very significant cultural factor. Three religions are important: two of them are Christian, Catholic and Orthodox, and one non-Christian, Moslem. The Catholic Church exercises an especially strong cultural influence, for it is very active and well-organized, and uses national feelings to strengthen its influence.

These cultural regions, particularly the Catholic, play a great role in formation of public opinion and, to a great extent, prevent the formation of a common Yugoslav public opinion.

Finally, ideological differences, especially political ideology, are also a very important factor for vertical division of the society. Although there has been no specific research on this subject, it can be said that the socialist general and political ideology is linked mostly with the regions which are culturally and economically more developed, with urban areas, and the less religious sections of the population. The opposite is the case of the conservative and reactionary ideology. But one should note a discrepancy between the factor of general development and the religious factor. The Catholic cultural region is the most developed region and therefore has the most progressive ideology. On the other hand, this same region is the most religious one and is characterized by the strongest church influence.

Because of such major differences, vertical groups, and often relatively small ones, can have their own public opinion which is very developed and embraces the whole group, but which differs from

the Yugoslav public opinion and from the opinion of the other groups as well.

II

Before we begin the discussion of the process of formation of public opinion in Yugoslavia and its connection with social structure, it is necessary to say something about public opinion itself — how it is conceived in this paper — and some general rules concerning its process of formation.

In public opinion, as the name itself implies, there are two major elements: *public* and *opinion*. Public *opinion* is here understood as opinions which consist either of value judgements or indicative judgements about facts which are not exactly known. In other words, the opinion of which public opinion consists cannot be related to things for which indicative judgments are reliably confirmable, i.e., the truth, and which are known facts to those who think about such matters. Practically, public opinion does not exist about the question, for example, of when Yugoslavia was formed, which city is the capital of Yugoslavia, or when World War I took place. But, public opinion can be formed about questions such as whether there is life on Mars, for the truth about it has not yet been established. Public opinion can also be formed on the question of whose behavior was moral or immoral during the War, whether it was a good thing that the Germans were defeated, etc.

While the element of „opinion” in the notion of public opinion is thus relatively easy to define, it is much more difficult to define the element *public*. Public as an element of public opinion can be conceived in three different ways, and consequently there are three meanings of the term „public opinion”.

In the first meaning, public refers to questions about which public opinion is forming. It must be a public question, a public matter. A public matter or question is one in which a whole social group is interested (it is unimportant which group is in question — society as a whole or a particular component group). Interest of the group can be strong or weak, direct or indirect, but this common interest must exist for the opinion to be public. In practice, it means that public opinion is opinion about what each individual member of a group is interested in just as a member of a group, not as an individual. This kind of public opinion is, therefore, distinguished from private opinion.

In the second sense, public opinion is distinguished from *secret* opinion, and in this sense, public opinion is that which is expressed in public. The term „public” should be understood as accessibility for everybody, that is, the opinion which is expressed so that it can be accessible to everyone that is interested in it. It is obvious that an opinion could never be accessible to everyone nor even to everyone who could be interested, but it is essential that those who express their opinions in public do not undertake any measures to prevent other from knowing their opinion. Above all, public opinion in this sense is one which is expressed through the public means of mass communication, which are in principle and in practice accessible to almost

everyone. Yet, in this sense, an opinion is also public if it is expressed, for example, in a meeting of a professional association which can be attended only by the members of the association but where it is permitted for the members to make known their opinion to non-members.

Public opinion in this sense can be *official* (opinion of bearers of the state government) and *free* (opinion of private persons), and between these two stands *semi-official* opinion (opinion of powerholders which is expressed by private persons).

Finally, public opinion is the opinion of a group and not of individuals who do not compose any group. In this sense *public* opinion is counterposed to *individual*, resp. *particular* opinion. Definition of public opinion in the third sense is, perhaps, the most difficult of all because as soon as a group does not have a unified opinion about a public question (cases of really unified opinion are very rare; they are only theoretically possible), this group can be immediately divided into two or more groups which hold one opinion or another. In such a case, the public opinion of a given group would be the one which all of its members share (those members who are capable of thinking and who do think about the issue). But, if the group is conceived in a broader sense — as a group of people who are interested in the same question (public matter) — then the public opinion of the group must be posited, even if all the members are not united in that opinion. Which is then the opinion that should be considered as being the opinion of the group? It seems that it can only be the opinion which is shared by the majority of the group. In some cases, one can say that there are two or more public opinions in a group and one may try to find out which one of them is predominant.

On the basis of these three meanings of the term *public opinion*, it can be seen that the ideal case of typical public opinion should combine all three meanings in a specific case: — when one public opinion would be simultaneously public in all three meanings, that is, when it would not be secret, individual or private, when it would refer to a public matter which is expressed in public and represents the united or predominant opinion of the group. But such ideal cases are rarely found. It is possible that one opinion which refers to a public matter would be expressed secretly and that it represents only the opinion of a minority of the group. It is also possible that one opinion is expressed in public and is predominant in a group, but that it refers to a private thing. Nevertheless, all these different combinations of various elements or kinds of public can be considered as public opinion (although not completely ideal cases). It should be stressed, however, that the basic element of „public” is usually considered to be the opinion referring to the public matter.

It is very important to distinguish both in theory and in practice these three kinds of public opinion. One can discuss one meaning now and shift to another or a third one, and in that way contradictory statements would be given, which are not really contradictory because they refer to various kinds of opinion. Therefore, it is important to designate precisely what kind of opinion one is discussing. The opinion which is expressed in public is specifically often confused with the opinion of a group, although it is often the case that an opinion which is expres-

sed in public is not the opinion of a group but is *individual* (resp. *particular*) opinion.

With regard to the process of formation of public opinion, one should distinguish four stages or activities through which this process takes place. The first is the *generation* of public opinion which means the launching of the basic idea about a given question. The second is *development*, which is the completion and more detailed exposition and, to some extent, transformation of the basic idea. The third is the *propagation* of the public opinion which is already developed. This propagation can be simple transmission, or it can be followed by persuasion that the opinion be accepted. Finally, the fourth is *acceptance* which consists of accepting the respective opinion as one's own, or of agreeing with it. The first two elements can be combined in one, which would be called the *creation* of the public opinion in the narrow sense.

Three out of four kinds of activities of the public opinion-making process can be linked to one person, that is, the same person can create the opinion (generate and develop it) and propagate it among other persons who accept it. Therefore, as a rule, but with some exceptions, those who make the opinion and/or propagate it also accept that opinion. It is a very rare and only theoretically possible case that all members of a group equally participate in creation, propagation and acceptance of public opinion, i.e. equally influence one another. This participation is usually unequal, particularly when complex groups or modern societies are in question. There is usually a division of labor in making public opinion into those who create it, those who propagate it and those who accept it (creators, propagators, and acceptors). Besides this, one can also distinguish between those who generate (generators) the public opinion and those who develop it (elaborators). This division of labor and of roles can be more or less rigid, and can lead to the professionalization of particular roles, especially of the propagator's role.

This division of labor and role distinction means that in the frame of reference of every group which has its own opinion, one can distinguish a small group of those who create and propagate the public opinion, and another considerably larger group of those who accept this public opinion. The first group can be called the activists of public opinion. Sociologically speaking, it is important to find out who these activists are, to what extent they are separated from the mass of the group, from the acceptors of public opinion, and to what extent they are professionalized.

From the sociological point of view, of particular interest is the relationship between the generators and elaborators of public opinion among the activists. There is usually a small number of generators while there are more elaborators and still more propagators. However, the generators may not belong to the group of activists but to the mass which, usually, only accepts public opinion, but does not make it. In that case, generators can be very numerous, and would be culturally lower than the elaborators, although they are usually at the same level or higher than elaborators. If the generators are culturally higher than elaborators, the elaborator has difficulty in understanding the gene-

rator's ideas, and the lower he is, the less he understands those ideas. Therefore, such an elaborator impoverishes, reduces and simplifies the generator's ideas (although from the point of quantity he may extend, complete and elaborate). On the other hand, if the generator is culturally lower than the elaborator, then the latter raises, enriches and improves the idea. Of course, whether the elaborator will raise and enrich the generator's idea or will reduce and impoverish it, depends not only on the cultural relationship between the generator and elaborator but on other circumstances as well. One factor seems to be particularly important: the direction in which public opinion is directed. If it is directed toward broad masses, it is understandable that the opinion is often simplified. Consequently, there are two variants of essentially the same public opinion: one for the masses and one for the upper strata.

It is also important to note the relation between narrower groups which make up a larger one and that of the large group itself to public opinion. As we have stated, one should distinguish public opinion of a group as a whole from the particular opinions of particular narrow groups. (It should be kept in mind that particular opinion is opinion about a matter which is public for the group as a whole, but which is in the minority and which does not become predominant). It is only theoretically possible that one relatively large group which is composed of small groups has an unique common public opinion in the proper sense of the word. Such opinion would be identical for most members of the group. On the contrary, even when all members hold essentially the same opinion, there are still some personal shades and variants in that opinion which depend on particular narrower groups and on individuals too. It happens more frequently, however, that in the scope of a broad group exist two or more different public opinions which often can be opposed to each other. In this case, some groups (or individuals) have their particular public opinion, while the opinion of the group as a whole is considered to be the opinion which prevails and with which the majority of the group agrees. Moreover, it is a rule that one or more narrower groups in relation to other groups within a large one can be leading with respect to public opinion or activist groups. On the other hand, the importance of a smaller group in creation of public opinion of a larger group can be measured by the number of members of the respective narrow group who accept the public opinion of the larger group, thus becoming an element of the majority of those who accept that opinion, making it predominant in the larger group. In other words, one narrow group can accept entirely the respective public opinion and if that group is numerous, can considerably contribute to making that opinion the predominant opinion of the larger group. Likewise, it is possible that only a small number of a group accepts the respective public opinion and, therefore, contributes little to its becoming the predominant opinion of a larger group.

From a sociological viewpoint, it is very important to establish the role of these particular narrow groups, but this is difficult to do with the customary methods of public opinion research. In addition, one has to consider the distinction between the opinion which is expressed in public and the opinion which is accepted by a respective group. It is

a rule that narrower groups in one larger group are not equal in respect to the possibilities of expressing their opinion in public. There is a danger that, if these two kinds of opinion are not kept in mind, the particular opinion of a narrow group, which has the possibility of expressing its opinion or of expressing it more than other groups, can be proclaimed as the public opinion of the larger group as a whole, although it may not be the case.

One should, therefore, distinguish activists of public opinion of the group as a whole from the activists inside of each particular narrower group which make up the larger group. It is possible that these activists of the larger group are independent and originate exclusively in its framework which overcomes all component groups. It is also possible that these activists are not independent, but that they are activists of some narrower group which plays the most important role in the creation of public opinion of the larger group, and, consequently, its activists become at the same time activists of the larger group. In this last case, the process of opinion formation flows in two parts: first, the public opinion of the component group is formed which plays a decisive role in formation of public opinion; and, second, this public opinion of the component group becomes public opinion of the larger group. On the other hand, when the larger group has its own activists, they immediately influence the group as a whole including all component groups or the majority of component groups. This does not mean, of course, that the opinion which activists put forth was not previously the public opinion of one or more component groups and then became the opinion of the larger group.

III

Considering what has been discussed until now, if one attempts to examine more closely the process of public opinion formation in Yugoslavia, then it is obvious that there exists the particular public opinion of numerous narrower groups which make up the composition of Yugoslavia, either of horizontal strata or of vertical groups, and those opinions differ considerably, at least in some areas. These opinions are not equal with regard to the questions which give rise to their formation, nor are they equal in the possibility of being expressed in public. They are also not the same with regard to the number of their bearers and their importance for the society nor for formation of Yugoslav public opinion. On the other hand, there is also general Yugoslav public opinion which may be unified or predominant.

In view of the importance of component groups for formation of Yugoslav public opinion, it is very difficult to say which component group is the most important. In some questions one group is more important, while in other questions it is another group. However, if an attempt at any presumptions is made about the importance of these groups, it could be said that the importance of a group rises according to the position it occupies on the ladder of social strata. Accordingly, if we observe only horizontal strata groups, the upper groups will be the most important. The peasants would have the least despite their

large number. However, it should be stressed that on certain basic questions, lower groups are often more important than upper groups. In these questions they create Yugoslav public opinion independently and sometimes in spite of efforts of upper groups to have some other opinion accepted. No matter how passive the lower groups are, they are not however completely passive. In some questions they are very active and are able to impose their views on the upper groups even though they do not have as much possibility of expressing their opinion in public. In any case, it would be very interesting and important to find out for which questions in the formation of Yugoslav public opinion do the upper groups have the decisive role, and for which questions are the lower groups involved.

We will not consider the process of formation of public opinion in component narrower groups, among which there are some with very well-formed public opinion which have a strong influence on the Yugoslav public opinion, but do not succeed in making their opinion country-wide. Such groups are, for example, certain churches, or some political-ideological groups. We will consider, however, only the process of formation of *Yugoslav* public opinion in which case it is necessary to see who are the activists of this public opinion (its creators and propagators), how they influence the society and corresponding smaller groups, in which area they operate, and what is their importance in the formation of public opinion. In addition, it should be stressed that we deal here primarily with those independent activists of *Yugoslav* public opinion, and not with those who, in the same time, are activists of certain narrower or specific groups.

As the most important Yugoslav activists of public opinion, one can distinguish politicians, legislators, administrative officials, managers, intelligentsia and the mass communicators. These six groups, as a rule, do not include all members of the relative groups but only the prominent or most prominent, with the exception of mass communicators, who can be included as activists because of their particular role in formation of public opinion, about which more will be said later. Actually, in all these groups there are various narrower strata, of which the highest generate public opinion, while the lower elaborate or expand it; furthermore, the lower the stratum, the less active it is in public opinion and, accordingly, the less important to it. All these activists influence the society as a whole, while, of course, some have more influence and some less on the particular narrower groups in its framework. Such a definition of these groups of activists gives rise to some questions.

To begin with, only the internal groups of activists of Yugoslav public opinion have been defined. Therefore, the question of possible external influence on that opinion can also be raised. There is no doubt that this influence exists and can be of considerable importance. Which groups from abroad and how much they influence the Yugoslav public opinion is a question which deserves attention and examination. Nevertheless, since it is supposed that this external influence cannot be as important as the internal, it will not be discussed here.

The second question which can be raised concerns the bureaucracy as a group. Among the six groups, the bureaucracy is not selected as

a separate group. Bureaucracy is, however, so significant a social force in Yugoslavia that there is an official opinion about the existence of considerable state-bureaucratic forces against which present-day leading social forces have to fight, and that it probably has a great influence on public opinion. However, bureaucracy is not discussed here as a separate group for the following reasons. First, the notion of bureaucracy is not conceived in the fixed way so that it has narrow and broad meanings. In one sense, bureaucracy can be understood as a stratum of politicians who are alienated from society; in the second sense, it can be understood as a separate group of high state officials, to which group are usually added technocrats. In this very broad sense, bureaucracy is divided in groups, upper and lower strata, and these of course cannot have the same influence on public opinion. Sometimes, bureaucracy is conceived so broadly that non-alienated mentioned groups are also considered as bureaucracy (those who execute the people's will and protect the people's interests). In this case, it is even more difficult to say what is common for the whole bureaucracy taken in such a broad way. Second, without using the notion of bureaucracy, it is included in all its meanings in groups which were selected as being activists of public opinion. But, since particular groups are distinguished, it is possible to say what is specific for each group.

However, it seems useful to add something about bureaucracy to that which is going to be said about each group. If bureaucracy is understood as a group which consists of professional administrators, including economic managers, then four out of the six groups which will be discussed are specifically a part of the bureaucracy, while intellectuals and mass communicators are not. Thus understood, bureaucracy enjoys considerable social privileges and has major social and political power. It has at its disposal means which can considerably influence the formation of public opinion. These means are, first, state and economic power and the means of mass communication. In this way bureaucracy is able to make its official or semi-official opinion if not the only opinion which can be expressed in public, then, at least, the one which becomes more easily and completely dominant than any other. Furthermore, it can suppress more or less completely the development of public opinion which is directed against it. But that is not all. Having at its disposal such a power, the bureaucracy is able to link to itself or to subordinate the group of mass communicators and certain intellectuals, thereby transforming them into means for the formation of public opinion which corresponds to its own goals.

Nevertheless, it is wrong to think that bureaucracy is omnipotent with regard to public opinion. Besides all its power, experience clearly shows that man has remained strong enough to resist the influence and pressures of bureaucracy and its public opinion, and to have his own opinion. Against bureaucratic public opinion was always posed a secret or semi-secret opinion of broad and free social strata, to such an extent that the bureaucracy often violently turned against these strata. Therefore, it is impossible for bureaucracy to ensure the monopoly of formation of public opinion. With regard to the Yugoslav case, as will be seen, bureaucracy accepted in many cases the public opinion of free social masses and became its expression. (From this it is clear that

the term bureaucracy includes not only the alienated groups, but all the groups without regard to whether they are alienated or not).

In this connection, there is a question about the influence of government on public opinion. Here let us consider first the state government. There is no doubt that government everywhere exercises considerable influence on opinion. This is also true in Yugoslavia. However, there is no need to pay special attention to this because we have discussed the bureaucracy which, among other things, includes state government. We can now turn to a discussion of the specific groups.

A. The Mass Organization Leader.

The group of politicians is composed more or less of professionalized politicians both from political organizations in the narrow sense (League of Communists and Socialist Alliance) and from larger social organizations which have a more or less political character (Trade Union, Youth organizations). Among these organizations, the League of Communists, Socialists Alliance and Trade Union are the most important, and the first is undoubtedly the most important of all. All these groups affect Yugoslav society as a whole, although not to the same extent. Without closer examination it is very difficult to say which of these organizations affect which sections of Yugoslav society, so we can only state certain presumptions. Such a presumption follows.

Although the Yugoslav socialist system has already moved considerably away from the state in which, officially, the Communist Party is the only organization which makes public opinion (while all other organizations serve only as a means of conveying that opinion to the masses), it is still true that the League of Communists has the leading role in this respect, especially when political public opinion is in question. Actually, there is a unified political public opinion related to basic questions, and the main creator of this opinion remains the League of Communists. Other organizations contribute to the formation of this opinion, but to a considerably lesser degree, so that they do not have, at least on some questions, an independent public opinion. Thus, the League of Communists, as the creator of public opinion, affects these organizations which accept this public opinion and then elaborate and expand it. But the League of Communists does not influence only these organizations, nor does it have its influence only through them. It also acts independently, directly affecting the masses. With respect to this, a presumption can be stated that the League of Communists influences, first of all, its members and then educated elements of the working class, and finally, other social strata. The League of Communists influences the peasants the least. However, its significance in the formation of Yugoslav public opinion lies in its widespread influence on Yugoslav society as a whole, that is, on all vertical groups. The Socialist Alliance presumably has influence on the broader, less educated mass, primarily on the peasants, while the Trade Union has influence primarily on the workers. The outstanding importance of the League of Communists in the formation of Yugoslav public opinion is based on its activists of public opinion who are at the same time

the activists of Yugoslav public opinion as a whole, and thus most significant.

Among the activists of the League of Communists, the generators of public opinion are several of its most prominent leaders, while the others elaborate and expand their ideas. Sociologically, it is important, however, to notice that the largest amount of these ideas either originate from the broad mass of members of the League of Communists (but from others too) or bears their considerable influence. This means that in a certain way the generators of these ideas are the masses. In such cases, the most prominent leaders of the League of Communists only shape and elaborate these ideas which are theirs, for the ideas often exist in the masses only as a vague idea or tendency, but not as precise ideas. This tie between the broad masses and prominent leaders in generating some basic ideas of Yugoslav public opinion is a trait which comes out of the specific Yugoslav road toward communism.

This fact means not only that the road is adapted to Yugoslavia's specific circumstances, but that it is also adjusted to the opinions and ideas of the Yugoslav masses (which means that the ideas of the latter enter the political public opinion). The most striking example is, perhaps, the farmers cooperative associations (collective farming) as the form of socialist agriculture, which was rejected through the resistance of public opinion of the broad peasant masses and others. Later on, these ideas were formed into the coherent political public opinion by the prominent leaders of the League of Communists.

Generally speaking, the basic direction of the Yugoslav socialist revolution — democratic socialism — was the creation of masses or, at least, the creation of leaders of the revolution who had regard for the opinion of the masses. In this respect, the leaders were following the masses because they realized that the success of the revolution depended on the opinion of the masses and that the masses did not want other types of socialism.

Of course, stressing that the basic direction of the revolution and the subsequent building of socialism corresponds to the opinion of the masses does not mean that such harmony exists on all questions nor even that it exists on all basic questions. There are many important questions about which the League of Communists had its own opinion, different from the opinion of the masses, which it tried to impose on the masses in one way or another. In many cases, the League confessed, at least later on, that it had not been right and blamed such actions as the work of bureaucratic forces.

Politicians, but better to say the most prominent leaders of the League of Communists, make the Yugoslav public opinion, first of all, in the area of basic questions of the political and social system — questions which can be called the basic political questions. The politicians who are leaders of other socio-political organizations which do not have an immediate political character — Trade unions, Youth organizations, etc operate, however, less in that area; their area of operation is a narrower one which is specific for them. In recent times, the trade unions are getting a greater significance, being more independent and original in their specific area and often expressing the opinion of the broad mass of workers.

B. *The Legislators*

Prominent legislators are those deputies of the federal Assembly who have leading roles in it, either on the basis of their formal position or in some other way. One part of these legislators are also prominent politicians. However, the other part does not belong to the group of politicians and, thus, presents an independent group of creators of public opinion. Recently, it seems that this part of the legislators is tending to increase in number and importance.

No matter how less important is the role of other groups of activists of public opinion than the group of mass organization leaders, and although they represent only the elaborators and propagators of ideas, nevertheless, these other groups also have their own role in the formation of public opinion and they are becoming more and more important. This is the case with prominent legislators. On a series of questions, they have their original ideas, and in some cases they are opposed to the ideas of politicians. They developed their own ideas in the area which is predominantly of technical-executive character but not primarily political. However, that area is getting more and more significant with the development of the society and its growing complexity.

The importance and strength of the legislators as a group of activists cannot be compared with that of the politicians, but in recent time their role is increasing along with the significance of the Parliament and with the general process of democratization of public life in Yugoslavia. It is difficult, however, to define social fields in which legislators have predominant influence. There is no research about that. Most probably they have influence, first of all, on those whom they represent — on the corresponding communities and on social horizontal and vertical strata. The legislators of Chambers of the Working Organizations have the special significance of having influence upon the professional groups which they represent. It is also true, however, that these groups have influence on the legislators because of direct and relatively strong connections with them; therefore, legislators appear to be elaborators of the opinions which originate in the broad base which they represent. The sociological importance of this group and the need to investigate its function in more detail is based on its growing importance. By their function, legislators have influence on the decisive group of activists of public opinion — politicians.

C. *The Administrators*

The third group of activists of public opinion consists of high state administrative officials, again, of course, on the federal level. These are senior experts, relatively permanent in their positions, who constitute a firmly connected, homogeneous group with strong internal group solidarity. This group is of much less significance for the formation of public opinion than the first two groups. It does not have so many contacts with the public as the first two, and is neither by mentality nor by function directed toward the public. It operates in the cabinets and corridors and through other two have the connections

with the public. But its influence should not be underrated. Although this group does not stress its original ideas (even less than legislators), but only elaborates ideas of politicians and legislators, it is still very influential, particularly in the process of elaboration in the technical and executive area. Because of their expertise, they enjoy considerable respect and influence in that area so that they can oppose, on technical grounds, proposal on some basic questions and, therefore, influence the politicians and legislators and, through them, public opinion. Regarding the social area on which they have influence, they are, above all, the white collar, intellectuals, which better understands professional-technical matters, especially the economy, i.e., the prominent economic leaders.

D. The Economic Leaders

Prominent managers and economic leaders constitute the fourth group of activists of public opinion. They are those who have leading roles in particular economic enterprises and those who have that role in various higher economic associations and organizations. They have close connections with both members from the third group, who deal with economic questions in the state cabinets, and with legislators who deal with those matters in the Economic Chamber, which is in considerable part composed of these prominent managers, or in various committees of other assembly chambers. It goes without saying that this group also mainly elaborates basic ideas which come from the group of politicians; nevertheless, this group has its own ideas primarily in the economic area, and is probably more independent than the third group, the state-administrative group. This can be explained to a certain degree by their greater immediate interest in the respective area and by their greater familiarity with it. They have their influence, first of all, on economy and within their working organizations, that is, in those to which they are attached. In this role they considerably affect the workers in those organizations. In addition, since they have relatively good access to mass communications, it can be concluded that their role in formation of public opinion is rather significant, and it seems to be increasing.

E. The Mass Communicators

The fifth group are the mass communicators — those who work on informing the broad masses through the means of mass communications: press, radio, television, movies, publishing. This group consists mainly of intellectuals and is closely connected with them, as well as with other groups of activists of public opinion whose views they express. The significance of this group is clear. It lies primarily in spreading of opinions created in other groups. This group is the main propagator of public opinion. Second, its significance lies in elaborating of opinions which are made by other groups. Contrary to the intellectuals, this group tends, as a rule, to simplify opinion and make them accessible to the broad masses whom they inform. Finally, but less

important, this group has its own opinions. Recently, it is becoming somewhat more independent.

There is no doubt that being the propagator of public opinion, this group has the largest and most direct contact with people because it has direct disposal to the means of mass communications. As such, this group is a means through which the other groups spread their opinions. It is also clear that mass communicators, first of all, have influence on the better educated part of the people who are interested and capable of following the means of mass communication. Through that part of the population, however, their influence penetrates to less educated people. With regard to the size and suggestibility of the means of mass communication, it is clear that the influence of this group is very strong.

F. *The Intellectuals*

The sixth and last group consists of intellectuals. Without getting into a closer definition of this concept, it should be said that this group is strongly related and partially identical both with all previous groups of activists and with the mass communicators. Indeed, a considerable number of politicians, legislators, administrative officials, managers and communicators could be considered as intellectuals, and there is no doubt that it will be more and more the case in the future. When these intellectuals who belong to other groups are eliminated from the group of intellectuals, who remains to constitute this particular group? Obviously, free professionals (lawyers, writers and artists) those who do not work for state administration — university professors and other professions, intellectuals who work in administrations and social organizations, but who do not perform administrative work, students and the like.

This group of activists is also characterized by elaboration of the basic ideas of politicians. But it tends — in recent time more and more — to stress its independence, creativity and originality, interpreting often the ideas which it elaborates differently from their generators and trying to develop as much as possible its own ideas even about the most basic questions. When the socio-political public opinion is in question, it should be stressed that the most important intellectuals from this group are philosophers, sociologists, political scientists, lawyers. Historians, and those who deal with the natural sciences are less important. These prominent intellectuals have their main influence on others, less prominent intellectuals, and, above all, on the intellectual youth, mainly students. Only then do they have influence on other social groups which are, of course, better educated. Intellectuals have very little influence on broad, less educated masses because they have little direct contact with them and because their way of presenting ideas is relatively complex and difficult to comprehend. Intellectuals have major possibilities of expressing their opinion by various means, including mass communications, and, above all, the press.

Besides these six main groups of activists of Yugoslav public opinion, there are also other groups which are less important. It is difficult to say without research which are those groups and how important

their influence is. Such research might show that some of those unmentioned and undiscovered groups may be more significant than some of these six, although such a probability seems small. For example, one particular group can be mentioned for inclusion among the relatively significant activists of Yugoslav public opinion: the military group — the group of prominent military leaders and experts. This group has a general Yugoslav character and has influence, first of all, on the considerable number of young officers and soliders. Its influence is certainly considerable, particularly on less educated soliders who are very often given elementary and general, beginning with the literacy, social and political education. Its significance, therefore, lies in expanding and, to some extent, in elaborating the basic ideas, but this group is less important in initiating new ideas.

IV

One of the important questions remains about the formation of Yugoslav public opinion: whether publicly expressed Yugoslav public opinion is actually only particular public opinion, opinion which is accepted only by a minority. That is, all that has been said until now relates to the impression about Yugoslav public opinion which is publicly expressed, contrary to secret opinion. In such expressed public opinion, activists, who make it, really the mentioned six groups and the opinion in question is really their work. Opinions of these groups do not necessarily agree, nor do they always match, but if only the opinion which is expressed in public is considered, then it is always possible to see with relative precision which of those opinions is Yugoslav, or at least predominant.

However, sociologically, the more important question is whether this public opinion is actually general Yugoslav opinion, whether it reflects the thinking of the majority which is capable of having an opinion about public matters, or whether the majority rejects it and has another opinion which is the real Yugoslav public opinion, but which cannot be expressed in public. In other words, does there exist a case when the opinion expressed in public, which seems to be Yugoslav, is actually the particular public opinion in Yugoslavia, while the real general Yugoslav opinion is not expressed in public, but is secret. In this last case, it should remain to be explored who are the creators, the activists of that secret Yugoslav public opinion, by what means they make that public opinion, and how they spread it.

Since there are no exact scientific investigations, sociology cannot give an answer as to whether there are such cases of Yugoslav public opinion expressed in public which is not really Yugoslav but only particular, nor do we know which are these cases, how large their number is and what is their significance. On the basis of general and unspecific observations, it can be said that there are such cases, and it would be very unlikely if they did not exist, as they do in every country.

The most striking example seems to be the one about the collectivization of agriculture in 1949. The secret and real Yugoslav public opinion was not specially created and spread by anyone — it was the

opinion spontaneously created. It would certainly be important from the point of view of the working efficiency of the mentioned groups of activists in the formation of Yugoslav public opinion to investigate scientifically all these cases and to draw conclusions for practical purposes.

Dr Radomir Lukić, Professor at the Faculty of Law in Beograd, and a Regular Member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. Fields of interest: the theory of the state and law, sociology, and political science.

Professor Lukić was born in 1914, in Miloševac, near Smederevo, Serbia. Graduated at the Faculty of Law in Beograd in 1937, and was awarded a Doctoral Degree at the Faculty of Law in Paris, in 1939, the title of the thesis being „La force obligatoire de la norme juridique et le problème d'un droit objectif”, Sirey, Paris, 1939.

From 1940 on the teaching staff of the Faculty of Law in Beograd, and from 1956 full-time Professor. In the academic years 1958/59 was the Dean of the same Faculty.

Published the following books: *The theory of the state and law*; *History of the political and legal theories*; *The fundamentals of the sociology*; *The political theory of the state*; *Political parties*; *Constitutionality and legality*; *The formalism in sociology*. Contributor to many reviews in Yugoslavia and abroad.

Dr Svetozar STOJANOVIC

Lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy in Beograd

THE CHARACTEROLOGICAL PATH OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

1.

The ethical evaluation of a revolution and of the society which it creates can be made only indirectly: through a reply to the question as to what kind of character it is rearing. This approach is in keeping with Marxist personalism according to which the ultimate goal of the socialist revolution is the creation of a new man. Man's character constitutes his moral innermost part.

Even though Marxism represents the „regardless criticism of *everything* existing" (Marx) it must determine priorities in this criticism. Even while appearing as an ethical critic a Marxist must be concentrated on the so-called system-approach. The sociology of morals and normative ethics converge in such criticisms. The prime question is what type of character is favoured in the revolutionary movement and in the social system which it creates. So far, we are evidently in the sphere of the sociology of morals. After this one approaches the ethical evaluation of that type of character. The movement and the system are thus *indirectly* assessed (since only men can be directly ethically evaluated). This characterological approach is fairly comprehensive because the character represents the centre of motivation and action and thereby to a large extent also of the entire moral phenomenon.

The priority of the system-approach in Marxist criticism stems from the theoretical belief that in order to make possible a massive moral revolution it is necessary to revolutionarize the social system. The social system is revolutionalized by associated men. That is why, along with the global system the revolutionary organization which is creating it, is heading the list of priority in ethical evaluation. In this way the philosophy of politics and the philosophy of morals converge in ethical criticism. In the focus of Marxist ethics are the problems of the so-called social ethics in which the relationship between the personality and the social organization is in the first place.

A social system which will favour highly moral personalities can be created only by an organization of people who are already such to a certain extent. The minority always initiates the struggle and stands out in the endeavours for the creation a humanistic-ethical programme.

That is why the question of the real moral avant-gardism of the revolutionary organization must be in the centre of Marxist ethical criticism. If this avant-gardism is not continuously re-examined, the organization will become a victim of ethical self-delusion.

The centering of Marxist criticism on the social system and the revolutionary movement stems from the revolutionary nature of Marxism. Without relying upon such a movement Marxist ethics would be mere feeble moralism rather than the ethics of revolutionary action.

Marxist ethics must take off the ideological-moral veil also from the society which calls itself socialist. It must identify the *real* social system and the *real* type of character which it favours. Otherwise, ethics would unwittingly evaluate the illusions created by the rulers. It must penetrate the so-called moral alibis and symbols and establish the real moral identity of such society. It is only in this way that a moral philosopher will not deal with ideological shadows.

During the course of preparations for and the effectuation of the revolution the communist movement has been massively rearing the *revolutionary-collectivistic* type of character. With the degeneration of the revolution there emerges the *oligarchic-etatist* system which favours a corresponding type of personality. But this degeneration is not inevitable. The socialist society makes possible a *democratic-socialist* type of man. We shall see that a special kind of *anarcho-liberalistic* type of character also presents itself as a democratic-socialist one. It is evident that these are only the so-called ideal types that combine the qualities of various individuals and describe the imagined maximum of the prevalent character-tendencies of corresponding groups of people.

2.

The communist movement which had prepared and carried out the revolution was composed of persons whose basic characteristic was collectivism. Such a man wittingly subordinates and, if necessary, sacrifices for revolutionary goals his personal happiness, requirements and intimacy. We find in it some sort of oblivion of the personality that treats both itself and others primarily as a means for attaining humanistic ideals. The revolutionary movement attracts the most selfless people, those who are prepared to suffer the gravest tribulations and even death. It cannot exist without great friendship, mutual loyalty and solidarity. The homogeneity and unity of the movement definitely suppress individual and group differences. Its collectivism is autonomously and voluntarily accepted because it stems from the same goals, the same living conditions and the common struggle. Boundless, fanatic allegiance to the revolutionary goals and movement naturally has also another facet: extreme self-reliance, exclusiveness, suspicion and intolerance in relation to different outlooks.

The underground revolutionary movement must be strictly hierarchical if it is meant to succeed.* This is why it is massively developing

* Before the revolution the communist party in Russia had only about 80.000 members while in Yugoslavia it had about 10.000 members.

and favouring a hierarchical and even military mentality which is usually expressed through the formula „I am a soldier of the party”. Directives and initiatives circulate through the hierarchy of authorities from above downwards. Such hierarchy in fact is based upon common goals and mutual confidence.

An extreme duty-orientation is organically connected with the collectivist and hierarchical mentality. A special kind of ethics of duties, obligations, directives, tasks and discipline is its theoretical expression. Such a man accepts duties even though, as a rule, he does not take part in their determination. Allegiance to the movement is understood as the unconditional discipline in the execution of revolutionary tasks.

Collectivistic, hierarchical and duty orientation indicates a special kind of heteronomy. But, the heteronomy of revolutionaries can be spoken of only conditionally. The revolutionary has autonomously decided to wage a struggle against the capitalist world. In that society there do not exist more autonomous than the revolutionaries. Their heteronomy is expressed only in relation to their own movement. The goals which the revolutionaries have autonomously accepted can be achieved under the existing conditions only in the event that individuals are absolutely subordinated to an organized movement. This is where a genuine *revolutionary* differs from an isolated *rebel*.

The moral integrity of revolutionaries is secured through the harmony between personal beliefs and hierarchically established obligations. This moral integrity is at stake when the revolutionary must perform a task with which he does not agree but has no possibility of pleading for the alteration of the decision. Moreover, the one who disapproves of a decision that has been made is often appointed its principal executor. Man is educated in such a way as to doubt only in conscience when a conflict between discipline and his conscience occurs. In brief: the integration of personality in the movement is sometimes to the detriment of its own integrity.

The basic traits of a revolutionary-collectivistic personality include also extreme anti-conformism. However, on the one hand there is full criticism concerning capitalist society and on the other a virtually total lack of criticism towards one's own ideological and political system. Within the framework of the hierarchy of authorities, higher levels have a critical attitude towards lower ones while these are self-critical in relation to them.

By asceticism, self-denial and extreme selflessness in the revolutionary struggle one can also discern the revolutionary-collectivistic type of man. He despises material wealth and comfort and is motivated primarily by moral-political considerations. The unwritten moral code of the revolutionaries is most often extremely rigid and puritanic, especially in patriarchal environments. Under such conditions the revolutionaries considered the patriarchal style of intimate life as the natural element of revolutionary morality.

We must supplement this sketch with the exceptional revolutionary enthusiasm and moral idealism which often turns into utopianism. As a matter of fact the willingness to endure the greatest tribulations

and make sacrifices is psychologically hardly possible without the sincere belief that it is possible to create paradise on earth.

3.

The revolutionary movement is a *collective* fighting for *social interests*. Consequently, in either respect it is characterized by real collectivism. However, the oligarchic-etatist class has transformed collectivism into ideological rhetoric that is due to conceal its *particularism*. That is why its ethical doctrine incessantly preaches collectivism — the total subordination of individual interests to the interests of society — as the fundamental moral principle.

The terms „collective” and „collectivism” contain the possibility for mystification. Even in the revolutionary movement the danger had existed of the transformation of general interest into abstraction and illusion and of the infiltration, under this guise, of group interest. This has in fact happened when the October revolution turned into an oligarchic-etatist society. The hypostatization of the general interests and the forcible suppression of group and individual interest, as a rule, does not bring about the gratifying of the genuinely social interests but rather the complete supremacy of interests of the group which insists upon this relationship between the general, group and individual interests.

And yet, while speaking about such a society we must not disregard the fact that it is headed by a young and enthusiastic ruling class which brings considerable social progress. Rapid industrialization, the creation of a numerous working class, the promotion of the cultural level of the population, good social services, etc., — all these are achievements in which the class interest and social progress are overlapping.

The oligarchic-etatist type of man is extremely de-personalized. Boundless allegiance and the full integration of individuals into the oligarchic group are considered to be the greatest quality. Faithlessness towards this group is considered to be the most serious infringement. For the sake of preserving the class homogeneity even mutual spying, reporting, imputation, intrigues, provocations and slander are required. Inexpertness can be excused provided that it is not accompanied by faithlessness. As the centre of the ruling class is shifting from politycracy to technocracy expertness is increasingly becoming the necessary quality but political loyalty is the *conditio sine qua non* for the preservation of one's social position and for progressing in the hierarchy. In such a society it is increasingly necessary to prove one's political allegiance since this is a criterion which cannot be side-stepped while reproducing the ruling class.

Members of the oligarchic-etatist class always seek to represent the state even when they are no officials at all. Man does not differ from the citizen and society does not differ from the state. The feeling of minuteness towards the new Leviathan which characterizes the mentality of subordination, compensated precisely through this feeling of representation.

The spirit of exclusiveness, self-reliance, suspicion and intolerance towards different attitudes and opinions, in brief, the spirit of monopoly, increasingly prevails in the oligarchic-etatist class while it is becoming more powerful. Great in-class solidarity is expressed also in full discretion towards other citizens. Internal clashes and affairs are kept in strict secrecy as long as possible.

One of the basic principles of that class is the strictest possible hierarchy. Hierarchy is based upon common class interests and, if necessary, even upon coercion. The former revolutionary discipline is transformed into blind and boundless subordination. Through the degeneration of the revolutionary movement hierarchy has been transformed, from means for attaining humanistic goals into a condition for securing special class interests. Oligarchic hierarchy engenders domination, brutality and contempt on the one hand, and subordination, servility and envy on the other. Man is taught to disdain honour, ideals, the truth and morality in order to preserve his position and to progress in hierarchy. Aspirations for power and careerism represent the real motives of etatists. A privileged material position, authority and social prestige can be attained by them and promoted solely in hierarchy.

This mentality escapes from individual initiatives, freedom, and responsibility into the security offered by subordination. In contrast to revolutionaries, the greatest number of members of the etatist class *do not* desire personal freedom because it produces risks. But, such great class homogeneity engenders the crisis of efficiency: no one is prepared, without directives „from above” to undertake on his own anything important, even if the situation absolutely requires this. It is interesting that this type of totalitarian escape from freedom emerges with the degeneration of revolutionary collectivism, while the Nazi type — according to From — is based upon the pettybourgeois fear from the onus of solitude.

Educated people seek to rationalize their position in etatist oligarchy by means of understanding freedom as a known necessity. The idea of the objective historical necessity, which is independent from human practice, eliminates personal and class responsibility before society. Whenever etatist oligarchy must explain measures amending previous ones it turns outright — in order to preserve the illusion about its infallibility — from a subjectivist into an objectivist. It maintains that the formed measures had been objectively necessary under the conditions existing at that time but that the new measures are equally objectively necessary since conditions have allegedly greatly changed in the meantime.

It is interesting that even the top ranks of etatist oligarchy also feel the need for subordination, although very specific one. In contrast to certain other leaders who had believed that they were serving God or providence, etatist leaders place themselves at the disposal of „history”.

Rigid hierarchy defines with precision the competences and rights, on the one hand, and obligations, on the other. Higher ranks take the liberty of doing many a thing which they do not allow to be done by lower ranks, not to mention other people. Lower ranks must only work

out, defend and carry out the directives of higher ranks. It is accurately known what each level of the hierarchy can and is allowed to know. But, precisely for this reason the system of communication and information in the hierarchy is endangered by mutual delusion. Since the subordinated are punished, relieved and even physically liquidated when the superior are discontent, the former must embellish the picture of social reality. In this way, reports while climbing the hierarchical ladder are increasingly altered. The consequences are fatal: the hierarchical top ranks hear as reaction to their measures only approval and even enthusiastic reception. In this situation who could possibly fail to labour under the illusion of his own omnipotence and infallibility? The best example of this mutual delusion is perhaps the situation before the Hungarian revolution in 1956 which had caught napping the ruling oligarchy.

The top ranks of the oligarchic-etatist hierarchy usually favour an extremely irrational attitude of the lower ranks towards the top. They create an entire hierarchy of „personality cults“. Every member of the hierarchy must thereby see to it that his cult be commensurate to the position he occupies on the ladder of authority. Even though Khrushchev's secret report delivered at the XX congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was certainly very important, it was extremely superficial. This is due to the fact that he had spoken about the personality cult in the singular and sought the full explanation in the characterology, instead of seeking it also in the nature of the social system to which corresponded a leader possessing such a great lust for power and also such great hatred, revengefulness and suspicion.* Stalin's supercult relied upon the entire pyramid of the personality cults on the one hand, and of impersonality cults on the other. People made up for their impotence by means of identification with the fetichized leader who represented the supreme genius, sage, hero, revolutionary, tribune, scientist, philosopher, army leader and „idol of the masses“.

This system as a rule creates some sort of *ersatz*-religion for lower ranks and ordinary citizens. This is proved by the existence of cults and their guardians, of the corresponding rituals and ecstasy, the erection of monuments to living persons and the like. The first sign of this has been the transformation of Lenin's grave into a sanctuary. It is known that Stalin had insisted upon the exposing of Lenin's embalmed corpse in the mausoleum, consequently, upon introducing an ugly, primitive and mystic-religious custom from the distant past into socialism. Had not Stalin in this way revealed already at that time his outlook on the attitude of masses towards the leader, and had he not in this way, perhaps even unwittingly, anticipated the attitude towards him, alive or dead? But, while Lenin's burial contained something tragic because Lenin had incessantly been fighting against anything mystical, Stalin's burial was distasteful farce as his body was later thrown out of the mausoleum. This has been a symbolic and just sentence by history pronounced on Stalin's role in the process of degeneration of the revolution.

*A rather modest mode of personal life and continuous referring to a historical mission created a wrong impression of Stalin's impartiality and dedication to the common cause only.

Let us hope that the remaining injustice towards Lenin will one day be eliminated by means of taking his coffin out of the mausoleum. It seems that according to the burials of leaders — Marx (an ordinary grave), Engels (whose ashes have been thrown into the sea at his own request), Lenin and Stalin — it is possible to draw a conclusion on the path of a great part of the communist movement since its emergence.

The oligarchic-etatist type of character is extremely duty-oriented. But, since its duties, except in ideological rationalization, have no factual connection with former revolutionary goals, the duty-orientation of such a man bears the mark of an exclusive orientation upwards. But, it must not be forgotten that it is a class which, both with itself and other citizens, has created *certain* elements of a work mentality and work discipline which are absolutely necessary for the functioning of an industrial society.

Oligarchic hierarchy favours extreme heteronomy of man. Lower ranks always seek to fathom fully the reasoning of higher ranks. A full sense of adaptation to all about-faces of the hierarchy, for self-censure, insincerity and hypocrisy, has developed.

This type of character is extremely conformist. The man who doubts nothing official is considered stable. As the hierarchical group pretends to infallibility, possible dissensions with it are not considered to be a right of the individual, but rather a political scandal or even political delict. Whoever raises „awkward” questions becomes suspect at once as regards his motives and his character. *Cognition* motives transcending the setting of the official policy and its ethical norms are not recognized. Any attempt to go beyond these limits is qualified as sabotage and serving the enemy. Punishments for this are often more serious than for the factual enemy identified previously. In this situation ideological-political cowards who know how to swim with the stream, massively emerge on the surface.

Instead of the former revolutionary enthusiasm there appears the opportunist spirit of gradual trimming of the etatist system. The moral idealism of revolutionaries is suppressed by means of cynical „realism” and moral materialism of rules. Modesty and asceticism are used as moral guises for class privileges and vulgar hedonism.

4.

The system of *integral* social self-government can be the sole adequate setting for the realization of ideals of the democratic-socialist personality.

Revolutionary collectivism must be surpassed by socialist personalism. In the core of Marxist humanism is not man in general (the realistic-collectivistic deformation of Marxism), but human person, naturally socialized one. This man does not conceal but rather admits the differences between individual, group, and social interests in socialism. He consciously seeks to gratify not only general needs but group and individual ones as well. And yet, he proceeds from the fact that social interest in socialism is secured solely through the democratic compari-

son of various individual and group interests, and not through their suppression in the name of social interest.

The gap between the „selfish individual” and the „abstract citizen” can be overcome only in the system based upon the *concrete citizen*. While engaging man in carrying out social affairs and in determining social interests, socialism places him in a position in which he can act as a citizen every day factually and concretely. In this way socialism considerably exceeds the ambition of the bourgeois society to develop full consciousness of citizens. No efforts to educate a new man or appeal to people that they should realize that social interests are concurrently their own interests are of any avail until social interests are determined and protected in a monopolistic fashion by one group only — the state-party apparatus. It is only to the degree to which individuals participate in the definition of social interests that they can intimately coordinate them with their own interests. It is only such interests that individuals and groups can be considered to be their own and it is only interests defined in this way that can be factually and concretely general, as they encompass like a synthesis the interests of individuals and groups.

Certain Yugoslav critics of collectivism wrongly maintain that the democratic-socialist personality can never accept the principle of *subordination* to the social collective and its interests. In fact, in a situation in which it is not possible concurrently to gratify social and group or individual interests, the question is raised only concerning the fact to whom one must be subordinated: to the real community or to its substitute. Since the real *res publica* represents the community of persons and their interests, subordination to it has the character of solidarity.

In fact, however, *integral social* self-government has not yet been by far built up. To the degree to which our existing system has an etatist dimension it strives to create an oligarchic-etatist type of man. On the other hand, self-management, when it is exclusively of a group nature, mutually unconnected and atomized, is building rather an anarcho-liberal than a democratic-socialist type of character. The anarcho-liberal type of personality is marked by individual and group selfishness. On account of that selfishness, a special group — the state — can still play the role of protector of general interests. The selfish individual and group, on the one hand, is seeking an „abstract citizen”, on the other. Of course, the man characterized by egoism, particularism and merciless competition, cannot be the factual champion of socialist development.

The self-governing community cannot function without hierarchy, but it must be reduced to the absolutely necessary minimum and be factually democratized. Those who have been entrusted on the part of society by a mandate to determine the tasks and control their execution, must be under the democratic control of society. Otherwise, a personality with an „upward”-orientation will not be replaced by a personality with an increasingly downward-orientation. In this respect our social life often goes between two extremes. The first is composed of nondemocratic and rigid hierarchy in the etatist elements of the sys-

tem. The second is composed of the negation of any subordination in the name of self-management which is sometimes primitively conceived as a system without any, even operative-work hierarchy.

The democratic-socialist character tends to the synthesis of duties and rights. The degree of the voluntary engagement of people in the execution of duties towards the society is commensurate to their participation in the determination of these duties. Only in the system of integral social self-government one may attain a successful union between individual and group rights and social discipline. The place of unconditional discipline, as one of the most appreciated qualities of the revolutionary-collectivistic character, must be occupied by personal social engagement at one's own initiative.

However, from the extreme duty-orientation which stems from the etatist structure, the social pendulum often goes in the direction of the other extreme — the one-sided right-orientation. Such anarcho-liberalist personality stresses only the rights, freedoms and initiatives of individuals and self-management groups while disregarding the obligations towards the social entity. One of the greatest original weaknesses of self-management is the collectivization of responsibility with the concurrent strong development of awareness of personal and group rights.

For a short period after coming to power the revolutionary avant-garde which was numerically small but was responsible, could secure the socialist development. However, in a situation when an ever greater number of people must take part in the decision-making process, the socialist moral consciousness of the masses of the people is absolutely necessary. No legal provision, however comprehensive, can fully regulate the decisions of organs of socialist democracy. Without the *moral* concern and responsibility of their members they may be transformed into organized listlessness and irresponsibility.

The democratic-socialist personality is autonomous. Fear from independence and resort to collectivism can be successfully eliminated only in a community in which man is active. But, autonomy can be lasting only if it is socialised or else man, as soon as the situation becomes unstable — as shown by Fromm in his book „Escape from Freedom” — will resort to heteronomy and will look for a „firm hand”. However, in our system the tendency of development of integral self-management is not the only one. With its etatist facet it stifles autonomy and, by means of atomized self-management, favours isolation and monopoly of groups.

The democratic-socialist personality preserves its moral integrity far more easily than the revolutionary-collectivistic one. When he disagrees with some decision and even with the entire policy, this man seeks to change them with all democratic means. If the execution of the decision made by the majority would demand that he should violate an important moral principle, he could walk out of the corresponding group, institution or organization in the democratic society without any danger.

The general but responsible anti-conformism also characterizes the democratic-socialist personality. The number of those who consider

that infallible and inviolable authorities exist is rapidly decreasing in a self-government society. But in spite of its evident progress the public social criticism in our country is not yet sufficiently penetrating upwards and it is especially not sufficiently efficacious.

In contrast to the asceticism of the revolutionary-collectivistic personality, the democratic-socialist personality is characterized by the effort and sense of enjoying life. Material stimulation gains full legal, moral and political legitimacy. But, one is now often going to the other extreme, disregarding moral stimulation. We seem to have fully forgotten the period in which a vital role was played by the mutual moral support in the struggle for the realization of revolutionary goals. Today, there is an increasing number of those who consider that the sense of living is in gaining things and in increasing the standard of living. It is naturally not pleaded here for asceticism as some sort of permanent quality of revolutionaries, but only for modesty which stands between asceticism and luxury based upon the revival of the urge for possession, which is renewed like a hydra and threatens to swallow the earlier historical merits.

The democratic-socialist character is far more realistic in relation to the revolutionary transformation and the expectations from it. However, as one of the reactions to an excessively romantic and publicly oriented person from the period of revolutionary collectivism in our country, one is increasingly noticing the lack of enthusiasm for social engagement and withdrawal. It is certainly a positive thing that in the present period a great number of actions for which one used to be held responsible in the communist organization, is considered to be his private business. It is difficult to deny that in the armed phase of the revolution and immediately after it there were great exaggerations in this respect under the stress of circumstances, the patriarchal mentality of the environment, etc. But, it is also true that there exists moral privatization today even when actions are extremely relevant to society.

If the so-called generation problem is not placed within the characterological path of the revolution, only its trivial, biological aspect will be seen. Every revolution undergoes the most serious test when it is confronted with new generations. The current phase of our revolution needs people of an incomparably more democratic mentality. In this respect certain old revolutionaries have exhausted their possibilities.

Many politicians assert that we have achieved great progress and even progress of moral nature while they concurrently deny that essential moral differences and clashes have taken place between generations. If total political and moral continuity were to exist between generations, this would mean that the revolution has stopped.

Young people, *on an average*, are considerably more autonomous and more democratic. Those who believe that revolutionary enthusiasm can be transmitted to new generations primarily by education on the examples of the revolutionary past — collectivism — are quite wrong. Only the existing obstacles can be a source of revolutionary inspiration for new generations. They cannot be content with small improvements but only with new radical changes of social organization. The maintai-

ning of the revolutionary temperature represents one of the difficult tasks of every revolutionary movement in power.

The young and the old differ substantially by the content of their historical recollections and also by their attitude towards the accomplishments of the revolution. For the new generations the first phases of our revolution constitute the so-called pure history. The revolution is their *direct* experience only now. They cannot intimately assess the success of the revolution according to the starting point — pre-war Yugoslavia. Young people mercilessly evaluate the results of the revolution according to its own *ideals* and the *standard of developed countries*. Among other things, it is due to this change that they have a more critical attitude towards the results attained so far and that they are far more impatient and are incomparably more open towards the world. They are often at a loss between occasional official campaigns of excessive optimism and radical criticism without being told in a sufficiently sincere way in either case about the real conditions, possibilities and chances for a further revolution.

For the new generations there is no ideological-political taboo. They are not inhibited with the achievements or illusions of the old generations and they are not inclined to make an identification of the revolutionary programme and the existing reality. On the contrary, they are characterized by a special kind of irony, an irony which does not call to question the revolutionary ideals but rather their preachers when they are hypocritical and the social reality when it is contrary to those ideals. This irony can be the first step to their revolutionary engagement.*

Illusions about young generations are not at all less dangerous when they conceal flaws. That is why one must not disregard the fact that young people sometimes hesitate between the democratic-socialist and anarcho-liberal examples.

5.

In the contradictory nature of the revolutionary-collectivistic personality one must seek the key for the understanding of opposite characterological tendencies and achievements of the socialist revolution. The democratic-socialist character emerges through the dialectical negation (in Hegel's sense) of the collectivistic mentality, i.e. through developing of its positive ethical core and suppressing of its oligarchic-etatist tendencies.

The new man must take over the best characteristics of revolutionary collectivism. Unfortunately, with negative features some of its moral qualities are disappearing. Thus, for instance, the willingness of revolutionaries to make sacrifices in the struggle for humane goals certainly embraced some elements which we are lacking today for a stabler and more extensive solidarity. It seems that it is for this reason

* The demonstration of students in June 1968. refuted the thesis on the massive de-politization of the young generations in our country. It has been proved that they are repelled only by political manipulations which are said to be a revolutionary policy as well as by the collectivistically conceived political consciousness and discipline.

that many people idealize the „good old times” of revolutionary collectivism. But, the way out is certainly not in the past. The revolutionary-collectivistic character could have been the protagonist of the revolution only under previously existing conditions.

Numerous paradoxes of the revolutionary communist movement emerge due to the fact that a man that is authoritative in many points must create conditions for a society of democratic man. Collectivism, strict hierarchy, official orientation — all this must be at the service of revolutionary ideals the characterological essence of which is the democratic-socialist personality. Revolutionary victors must be capable to see and to transcend their own limitations even though they are not forced to do so since they have monopoly of power.

A further revolution is possible only if the revolutionary-collectivistic character is not established as an example but begins changing in the direction of autonomy, socialist personalism and democracy. The real initiators and champions of that process can be only those revolutionaries who are willing to be radically critical not only towards the old world but also towards their own oligarchic-etatist impulses. Their revolutionary nature must undergo another test, more serious than the preceding ones, because it is a question of their own personality.

The revolutionary-collectivistic character is inclined to succumb to the ideological illusion according to which it incarnates the *ideal* of the socialist man. The myth of an avantgarde-revolutionary and concurrently *unchangeable* character is created. Such a man sincerely believes that the revolution would be endangered without him, such as he is. In fact the revolution is endangered chiefly by his inertia. If he desires to be loyal to himself he must change not only the world but also himself.

A number of revolutionaries are not able to get used to the need for substantial changes. They withdraw being disappointed and embittered, or this being even worse, they offer active resistance to the further revolution. Their self-reliance as victors grows into autocratic arbitrariness. While using their political biographies to get rich they imitate the style of life of the deposed ruling class and then desire to replace it in every other respect as well. When they are verbally adapted to the new times they are betrayed by „caution”, „realism” fear from the „immaturity” of masses for radical democratic steps, the striving to keep self-management within small groups and the like. The words „socialist democracy”, „self-management”, „freedom of criticism” and „conflict of ideas” have a shallow resonance when these people apply them because character dispositions for corresponding action are not behind them. The first practical test reveals their meaning of these terms because they are ready to persecute everyone who dares to take seriously the programme of democratization. Wherever these people hold positions of decisive importance they seek to reduce democratization to the introduction of purely formal organs and institutions. One must not doubt that the majority of them sincerely believe that they are rendering a service to the revolution.

Even certain victims of the Stalinist oligarchy did not managed to rid themselves of the tragic illusions about its real nature. This is

confirmed best by their attitude on the occasion of their expulsion from the party, at trials, while serving their time or while being executed. Many of them had fully lost their dignity stating that they had not been up to the position they had been occupying, they had „recognized” most repellent and most improbable accusations, written letters to Stalin and died with his name on their lips not believing that he was the mastermind of the purges. To make the tragic irony worse, certain signatories of the Resolution of the Cominform against Yugoslavia in 1948 were killed later under Stalin’s as „Titoists”.

If one takes into consideration only physical fear it is difficult to explain convincingly such great self-humiliation of men who had previously proved their revolutionary courage. Only hyper-collectivism can account for their behaviour.* Shocked at the arrests and brutality, psychically rejected and isolated, with a metaphysical-reifying idea of the party according to which the leaders and members can do such things while the party nonetheless remains pure and one must therefore keep serving it, with the desire „not to serve objectively the enemy” through the disclosure of the factual situation, they had decided to sacrifice themselves by assuming the blame and thus „serve their movement and the revolution” even with their latest act. The strong collectivist illusion has prevented them from carrying out a genuine revolutionary undertaking, from unmasking the oligarchic-etatist plot against the revolution and from calling for a struggle against this. Their example shows that a revolutionary cannot give up his dignity *in favour* of the revolutionary movement, even though he may provisionally give up many other things, even personal freedom.

Yugoslav communists have been unable to rid themselves of illusions on Stalinism for a long time after receiving the accusations of the Cominform in 1948. It is known that a great number of them, as an initial reaction, had sent letters and telegrams to Stalin with the naive request that he rectify the mistake made by „others”. The general attitude, including the attitude of the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had been that „deeds would prove that the accusations are unfounded”. Since at that time the top of the pyramid of authorities was outside the Yugoslav party, this rupture placed every Yugoslav communist before the serious dilemma. It is only in literature that it will be possible fully to explain the seriousness of this difficult situation because by its nature it *approaches events from inside*, from the individual-psychological angle.

A comparatively small number of members lent support to Stalinist attacks on their own party. Provided that we do not take into consideration careerists, those were as a rule people with an extremely developed heteronomy and the irresistible desire to be subordinated to the „world revolutionary centre”. Their attitude towards Stalin’s accusations has remained irrational. Their first question was not as to whether the accusations were true, but rather who was making them. That is why they could absolutely not accept the idea that even Stalin

* In his book „The Ritual of Liquidation” N. Leites, Glencoe, 1954, maintains that being old members they were pre-disposed to be caught in the logic of subordination to the party and thus to admit everything fatalistically.

may err and that „we, the small”, must say „no” and remain „alone”. One should now speak about two things which are usually not mentioned in our country.

Twenty years after the Resolution of the Cominform, science, art, philosophy and policy must seek to treat from the point of view of determinism and thus from the point of view of personal tragedy those who have failed at this moral-political test under the heavy burden of Stalinist heteronomy. Naturally, this cannot free them from human responsibility because we do not believe in absolute determinism. And yet, we must not forget that this tragic facet of a super-authoritative person was partly conditional upon the attitude of the entire Communist Party of Yugoslavia until that time, which had reared its members in the spirit of unconditional allegiance to the first country of socialism, its communist party and to Stalin himself. That is why it can be said that many Yugoslavian „Cominformists” at that time had been also the victims of history and not solely culprits.

Due to the external danger the authorities had been compelled to isolate them. History is going to justify that. This does not at all mean that it had been necessary and still less justified to apply sometimes in this struggle against domestic Stalinist even Stalinist methods: psychic and physical torture reprisals against relatives who had not wanted to renounce the defendants, the arrest of a certain number of innocent persons due to haste, etc.

This period is only to be investigated. In the light of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia not even we, the direct participants in and witnesses of events in 1948, are quite clear how Yugoslavia managed to hold out in that uneven struggle. Before that conflict Yugoslavia had been earnestly copying the Soviet social model. Among all the communist parties in power at that time, the Yugoslav party was considered to be the „most bolchevized”. At the meeting of the Cominform in 1947 the Communist Party of Yugoslavia adopted the accusations of Stalin against the Communist parties of France and Italy and stood out in the denunciation of these parties. For a certain time following the Resolution of the Cominform the Communist Party of Yugoslavia sought to collectivize forcibly the countryside, to „exacerbate the class struggle” and „purge the National Front from bourgeois elements”, nationalize greengrocer’s shops and the like. Judging by all this one could not even dream of a rupture between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Soviet CP. But, beneath that surface there always beat the pulse of a national and autonomous revolution which in 1948, irrespective of the fact that even the leadership of the CPY had not immediately grasped the far-reaching nature of its decision, confirmed the historical level which it reached in 1941—1945.

This was the first breach in the Stalinist dam through which anti-stalinist currents in the international communist movement began flowing later. The heroic feat in 1948 prevented Yugoslavia from finding itself (under the pressure of „Big Brother”) in Orwell’s *1984*. It is quite natural that this beginning of liberation from Stalinism evolved within the framework of collectivistic mentality. But, the then state-national emancipation had been the first harbinger of the subsequent democratization.

Dr. SVETOZAR STOJANOVIC, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Beograd, Yugoslavia.

Born in 1931. Graduated from the same Faculty in 1955, and appointed as assistant at the same Faculty in 1957. While studying for his doctoral thesis „Contemporary Meta-Ethics”, was in Oxford in 1960—61. Doctoral degree awarded by University of Beograd in 1962. Assistant Professor from 1962. Spent 1965—66. academic year in the United States as a Ford Foundation Scholar while preparing his second book. Associate Professor from 1969.

Vice president of the Yugoslav Philosophical Association in 1967 and 1968, and Editor-in-Chief of its journal „Philosophy” during the same period. In 1964 and 1965 founder and Editor-in-Chief of „Gledišta”, the theoretical journal of University of Beograd. He has been the president of Philosophical Association of Serbia, and is presently a member of the editorial board of the journal „Praxis”.

Books:

„Contemporary Meta-Ethics”, in Serbo-Croat, Beograd, 1964; Rumanian translation, Bucarest, 1971.

„Between Ideals and Reality”, in Serbo-Croat, Beograd, 1969; German translation „Kritik und Zukunft des Socialismus”, Karl Hanser Verlag, München, 1970; French „Critique et Future du Socialisme”, Les Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1971. (Also in several other languages).

Papers:

Several papers in the international edition of „Praxis” and journals abroad, to mention only:

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Dr Miladin ŽIVOTIĆ

Lecturer at the Faculty of Philosophy in Beograd

SOCIALISM AND CULTURE

I

In all definitions of culture so far it is determined above all as an entity, the total of all values.

According to these definitions culture is »that complex entity that includes knowledge, belief, art, morality, law, habits, as well as all other aptitudes and habits that man has gained as a member of society.«¹ Or, culture is »part of the environment created by man.«² A great number of social anthropologists investigators of culture seek to define this term above all by listing the spheres of values that it includes; culture is defined as a collection of moral, habitual, legal, scientific, political, religious, artistic, etc., values; it is a collection of ideas, norms of behaviour, methods in which people produce and use tools, manner in which people express their ideas, feelings; etc.

Such definitions of culture could never be adequately comprehensive.

However, the problem of determination of the notion of culture neither consists solely nor above all, in the listing of its constitutional elements.

When theoreticians of culture seek to determine what is fundamental in all cultural values, to determine the »core« of culture, a great discussion and delimitation of varied anthropological orientations begin.

Among these varied theories concerning the substance of culture two opposite theories frequently clash — those maintaining that within the framework of all cultural values there exist something that is common to them and is independent from man — the creator of culture — the realistic theory, and those maintaining that culture is only a general name for a series of specific, special forms of human activity — the conceptual theory. According to the realistic theory, culture as a whole has its own laws of development, independent from the individual creating these values; according to the other theory it does not have

¹ Taylor's definition of culture; see Al. Kroeber and C. Cluckbon — *Culture*, A Vintage Book, New York 1963, page 81.

² M. Herkovic, in the cited book, page 84.

such laws independent from the creativeness of individuals, it is what people do while creating values.

A typical representative of the realistic theory is Emil Durkheim who considers culture a system of collective ideas by means of which is expressed the mode of thinking, action and feelings that the social entity introduces into the individual. Culture is a collective consciousness, it is a »psychic being« that has its own, special laws of existence, independent from the individual.³ Realistically, culture is determined as the expression of the totality of the society that is above the individual also by V. Malinovsky, A. Kroeber, Leslie White and others.

In contrast to them, Ralph Lynton defines culture in the following way: »Culture exists only in individuals that constitute a society. It obtains all its qualities from persons in that society and from interactions of these persons«.⁴

According to the conceptual definition: »Culture is a term used to denote the manner in which members of a group act in mutual relations and in relation to other groups«.⁵

Attempts made with the purpose of transcending the controversies of realism and conceptualism produced no results without the implementation of Marx's theory of alienation.

Realistic theories of culture rightly underline that culture is a system of values which does not boil down to the mere result of values that it includes, but that it has specific characteristics. Conceptualist theories rightly emphasize that culture is above all the product of the individual creating it.

How can culture possess also characteristics that are not the expression of its creator.

Both these theories express each only one of the objectively contradictory facets of culture itself — the realistic one underlines the fact that cultural value as the product of man gets beyond his control, that cultural values are a world that is above him, as a »supra-organic entity«, »collective concept« and the like.

The conceptualist definition insists upon the fact that culture is created by man who places in his individual human characteristics. These clashes in theories on culture express solely the objective state of culture. The culture created through the activity of individuals has characteristics that are independent from the individual.

II

We are living in a world in which man »leads a double life — celestial and terrestrial, but not only in thoughts, in his mind, but also in reality, in life. Life in the political community where man emerges as a social being and life in the bourgeois society where he acts as a private person, where he considers other people to be means and where he becomes the toy of other powers«.⁶

³ E. Durkheim, *Moral Education*, Free Press, New York, 1961, p. 65.

⁴ Ralph Lynton, *The Study of Man*, New York, 1936, p. 464.

⁵ Lasvel, compare: Kroeber, Clucklon, *Culture*, page 97.

⁶ Marx, *German ideology*, »Kultura«, 1964, Beograd, p. 85.

This twofold, split nature of the contemporary man is expressed in the sphere of creation of cultural values, in the coexistence between two types of culture that are clashing but are mutually conditional and supplementary in the sense in which they are clashing, but also in the mutual interdependence between the bourgeois and citizen, man as a private person and as an abstract citizen, the public and private sphere of the contemporary bourgeois society.

»The unfortunate conscience« of the contemporary man by means of which is expressed this conflict shows in the intertwining of authoritarian culture with the contemporary hedonic-utilitarian culture.

One of the basic characteristics of the time in which we live is the emergence of bureaucracy as the principal regulator of the social processes and the emergence of the so-called affluent society. In the sphere of culture these facts are expressed in the contemporary forms of authoritarian censorship and authoritarian control over man as well as in contemporary hedonism. Both these types of culture — the authoritarian and hedonist alike are of repressive nature.

The authoritarian culture is the culture in which heteronomous norms and values prevail, norms and values by means of which one regulates the behaviour of individuals within the framework of bureaucratic-state social structures. This culture represents the system of values in which man is defined as a rational social animal vittingly adjusted to the existing conditions of life, to the existing social environment. The basic social function of cultural values in this type of culture is — to control and impel the impulsive, instinctive side of human nature and accustom it to the settings of the existing social censorship, to be a form of protecting a given society from what is exaggerated, excessive in the mind, requirements and behaviour of individuals. The protection from what is excessive is performed in that kind of culture within the limits which make this culture the authoritarian alienated system of values — within the limits of the authority of man over man and human inequality.

Cultural values in this culture are not a form of expression of liberated human spiritual energies, a form of man's self-reliance, but the limit of freedom of behaviour and action imposed by authoritarian social forces. Social censorships are here forms of the defence of society and its self-initiative that are discrepant with the structure of the given social relations. The basis of this culture is an egoistic society and egoistic individual living in authoritarian social communities.

The incompatibility of this culture with human happiness is most frequently expressed in the form of the transfer of human aggressiveness, human desires are most often transformed into aggression. Thus, in the setting of authoritarian cultures, a vicious circle is created: the authoritarian censorships provoke manifestations of conflicts of individual interests and manifestations of aggression of individuals get their raison d'être precisely from this conflict. This authoritarian culture has been borne in mind by Sigmund Freud when he defined cultural values as rational sublimations of individual destructive instincts and affects.

Laws, morality, policy, religion and other forms of social values have in this culture the function of maintaining an equilibrium, the equilibrium of conflicts between personal interests, goals, inclinations and strivings, they have the function of maintaining proportions in these

conflicts, the proportion which stems from the need for the preservation of the macro-social structure of a given society. Social values do not settle here the conflicts in human relations, but only maintain them in a state of comparative equilibrium.

The basic characteristic of authoritarian structures of values of the contemporary society consists in the fact that they are increasingly depriving the individual from the autonomous personal initiative striving to transform his behaviour into functional-rational behaviour within the framework of the existing social processes. That is why personal commitments and the autonomy of social norms are ever more disappearing in this behaviour, human behaviour is increasingly becoming the resultant of definite programmes of manipulation of man by means of social institutions and media for mass communication. Contemporary authoritarian cultures massively produce, through this functionality of human behaviour, the emergence of anonymous individuals; the man guided from outside is increasingly living in the vacuum of internal motives, and, in the lack of self initiative man is increasingly becoming a routinist cast in the existing norms. The loss of personal initiative and resourcefulness is also the characteristic feature of settings of numerous authoritarian social systems which call themselves socialist. Private, egoistic personality is only stifled in them, but it is not transcended.

The loss of personal initiative is explicitly characteristic for the modern bourgeois society in which the individual experiences every day the decomposure of »protestant ethics« founded upon the beliefs that personal resourcefulness is the foundation of social prosperity. The individual is ever more striving today to adapt his conscience to his defeats, to the contracted area of the private sphere of his life within the settings of the authoritarian social structures. This adaptation is carried out through various forms of escapism among which the consumption fever and the strivings for easy recreation offered by the modern mass culture are most striking.

Since the authoritarian culture stems from the conflict between the personal and all-social with the goal to maintain this conflict within the setting of the class social structure man is tamed by means of these authoritarian values but he is not humanized as well, he does not reach the harmony between the rational and the affective through this culture, the harmony between needs and duties, virtue and happiness. These aspects of man's being continuously collide. This conflict is often expressed in the sphere of contemporary bourgeois theories on culture in attempts to stress one side of these split sides of man's being as the basis of all values.

Within the framework of authoritarian cultures man has a partial conscience, partial needs and interests. The authoritarian settings and functional rationality place man into a position of incessant frustration of personal needs, personal interests and inclinations, into a position of incessant conflicts with other private persons and with society as a whole. The human mind that is the product of action of authoritarian norms and values loses futurist dimensions, man loses the aptitude to perceive the world and himself from the point of view of what he still is not and could be on the basis of the possibilities that have been created. Instead of being open to the future there develops a »sober«

(technocratic) spirit which perceives all social processes from the point of view of the efficiency of action of the given global structures, from positions of usefulness within the framework of the given society, from positions of control of human behaviour within this setting and predictions the goal of which is an authoritarian control over individuals and not the development of his human dispositions and spontaneous creativeness. The manipulation of men is the ultimate goal of this culture. The modern authoritarian culture is increasingly followed by the belief that conflicts between individuals and the social environment are shortcomings that must and can be settled by means of technological rationalization of the existing social relations. A movement of the »engineering of men« has begun which is aimed at eliminating all the obstacles for the realization of accord and balance that is absolutely necessary to the existing class society. This authoritarian technocratic mentality is underlying Stalin's theory on social organizations conceived as a »transmission« — the means of manipulation of men from a definite centre of social power. This technocratic optimism does not mind the fact which is appearing daily — that the heteronomous and authoritarian manipulation is only stimulating the destructive forms of human practice, destructive forms of rebellion of the human nature.

The social development is conceived within the framework of this technocratic mentality as a simple extension of the existing one and not as the opening of new horizons and new possibilities, as innovations in social conscience and practical activity. The authoritarian society stimulates solely scientific-technical discoveries while receiving with extreme intolerance every non-conformist idea. The loss of disposition for new ideological horizons and new values is the principal result of the action of values and norms of the authoritarian type of culture.

The hedonist-utilitarian culture emerges as the necessary form of complementation of the contemporary authoritarian culture. It is a form of expression of the other pole of the modern homo duplex. It is a culture in which basic values are connected with the goals of private life. In the sphere of this private life the needs for consumption and easy recreation are becoming the basic motives. A materially wealthy bourgeois society creates a man who does not need — according to Marx — the totality of man's expression of life. Instead of a wealth of human requirements we see in that society that requirements are reduced to needs for consumption, the stockpiling of goods, and easy recreation.

The basic sources of the emergence of contemporary hedonist values are the isolation of the need for consumption from other needs, the reducing of human requirements to the need for goods-monetary means, the emergence of a non-productive attitude towards these values and the need for recreation as a form of escape from reality.

The hedonist attitude towards life is a form of sublimation of authoritarian settings of life of the modern man.

A modern hedonist is not a happy man; our times ever more confirm the old truth on hedonism reached by the ancient philosophy: a onesided orientation to the gratifying of sensual needs makes every sensual satisfaction turn into its opposite, into discontent and pain. The table of pure hedonist values, of values that do not have harmful consequences, does not exist. Contemporary sociological investigations show

that with the spread of the hedonist mode of life there emerges also the expansion of the neurotic syndrome, the feeling of loss, insecurity, lack of sense of reality. The modern hedonist is not a person that has reached the sense of life, he has remained the object of manipulation on the part of authoritarian social forces.

Hedonist values — the aspiration for carefree life, easy recreation and consumption are a form of alienation because in this man — according to Marx — feels active only in his animal functions while in his human functions he feels only like an animal . . . The animal becomes human while human becomes animal. In the abstraction that is separating them from other forms of human activity these sensual human functions become animal (see »Rani Radovi« — Early Works, Zagreb 1953, p. 201).

With this isolation of sensual needs from all other needs there emerges the manifestation of fictitious needs, imposed by the competition of selfish interests and commercial advertisement. While being part of the total expression of man sensual needs have their limit and when they become isolated from other human needs they become unlimited. There appears an unlimited need for appropriation as a form of the non-productive attitude of man towards durable values. The emergence of fictitious needs becomes the cause of the loss of sensibility of man for genuine, authentic, spiritual values. The need for empty recreation remains as the sole need in that vacuum.

Contemporary hedonism diverts the interest of man from crucial humanitarian problems towards narrow utilitarian problems of everyday life, intensifies the process of disintegration and partialization of human mind and becomes a suitable ground for the emergence of new myths. The modern hedonism is one of the principal forms of man's reconciliation with the alienated world in which he lives.

Contemporary hedonism thus creates ideological listlessness of the modern man, maintains the »incompetence of masses« (R. Michels) upon which is based the authoritarian-bureaucratic competence of managing the society.

*

In his work »The revolt of the masses« José Ortega y Gasset⁷ writes: »There exists a fact which, irrespective of whether it is good or bad, is of greatest importance for public life today. This fact is the appearance of masses as the top-ranking social force. Since masses, by their definition, neither must nor can manage their own existence and can even less manage the society as a whole, this fact means that Europe is now undergoing the most serious crisis that can involve people, nations and civilization. This crisis has been appearing on several occasions in history. Its characteristic features and consequences are well known. And so is its name. It is called the revolt of masses.«

Ortega y Gasset goes on to say that in order to understand these horrible facts of our times a meaning that is exclusively or primarily

⁷ José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*; cited according to the edition W. W. Narthton and Co., 1932, page 11 onwards.

political must not be ascribed to the words »revolt«, »masses«, and »social force«. »Public life is not solely political but it is equally, and even primarily, intellectual, moral, economic, religious; it encompasses all our collective habits. . .«

In what does the essence of the revolt of the masses consist? »There is no longer a protagonist on the stand of public life, there exists only a choir«.

José Ortega y Gasset rightly stressed one of the most important facts of our times — the phenomenon of depersonalization of mass society and depersonalized culture of that society, but he is an aristocrat — conservative, his teaching on the revolt of the masses contains strong tones of regret for the aristocrat society of the elite. According to Ortega y Gasset, the society is always a dynamic unity of two components — the minority and masses. Minorities are individuals or groups of individuals with special qualifications. »The average man of a mass character . . . the man who does not differ from another man but who himself proliferates the general type«.

These definitions of massiveness could be adopted were they not containing the identification of the terms massive and non-elite, or rather, massive and democratic. A man pertaining to the masses is to Ortega y Gasset the same as the man as an impersonal »one« (das Mann) is to Martin Heidegger, the man who thinks, acts, feels as it is thought acted and felt in definite social communities; this is the man as an impersonal non-authentic unit. And yet, Ortega y Gasset sees a way out from this impersonal massiveness in the return to a society of the elite and culture of the elite. In this sense he fully follows the old Alexis de Tocqueville who had connected any artistic progress to the existence of the aristocracy. Ortega y Gasset reviews the dynamism of relations between the self-confident minority, i. e., the elite, and the impersonal majority, i. e., the mass, as a struggle between two perpetual principles: when the principle of the elite wins one obtains authentic culture while when the principle of the mass wins one obtains an impersonal, average and mass culture. Such is, according to Gasset, the culture of our times. »The revolt of the masses« in the modern society, or rather, the emergence of impersonal massiveness becomes the fundamental form of contemporary human existence.

Gasset explains that »every individual is massive when he possesses no peculiar value (good or bad), no value based upon a specific foundation, but is an individual feeling just 'like anybody else' and is nonetheless never alarmed on account of that. . . In fact, this individual is quite happy to feel equal with everyone else«. . . »The characteristic of the time is that an average conscience being aware of the fact that it is average, dares proclaim the right to be average and to impose this right everywhere«. In the contemporary society, says Gasset, the rule is in force »To be different signifies to be undecent«. A mass society destroys everything that is different, everything that is exceptional, personal, qualified or special. The one who does not think just like all the others runs the risk of being eliminated from society.

This division of society into masses and the elite minority does not correspond, says Gasset, to the division of society into classes.

Impersonality, or rather, a mass character, is the feature of all contemporary classes.

Even though he has accurately seen one of the essential characteristics of our times — the manifestation of depersonalization, or rather, of mass society and mass culture, Gasset is far from seeing the factual reasons of this process and from perceiving the real settlements of this crisis which, according to him, is the principal crisis of the contemporary world. Gasset sees a way out from this situation in the reverting to a society of elite and culture of elite.

There exists a great number of those who have desired to settle the problems of the depersonalized, massive culture of our times by means of the theory on the society of the elite and culture of the elite. One of the greatest critics of the mass culture of our times, Friedrich Nietzsche, seeks (in his »Zarathustra«) the escape from »fair flies« or rather the isolation from the masses. Only a recluse-artist and recluse-philosopher can, according to Nietzsche, become an authentic, unimitable creator who will impose his values on the world. This recluse becomes a philosopher-tyrant and artist-tyrant who shatters the old tables of values and proclaims new ones.

Among those who support this theory of culture of the elite are Arnold Toynbee, Thomas S. Eliot, Oswald Spengler and others.

With this theory came the emergence of an impersonal, mass culture of the contemporary society. »A big artist«, B. Gartier⁸ sums up these concepts, »can be the one who separates himself from the rest of society...« »The position of a thinking man in society is the position of an outsider«.

What is vital in the theory of culture of the elite is the quest of special social privileges on part of those who are due to create authentic cultural values. George Santayana expressed this idea as follows: »To annihilate the aristocracy in the sense of social privileges and sanctioned authority would mean to abolish the source from which all culture has been stemming so far.«⁹

III

In the development of socialism in our country so far we have been proceeding between two types of culture: authoritarian and hedonist-utilitarian.

The period of bureaucratic etatist management of society is characterized by the presence of authoritarian concept of social unity and uniform culture. Bureaucratic unitarism has been carrying out, in the name of the revolutionary future, the censorship of cultural activity and conceived culture as a form of transmission of the will and decision of political centres and, in an authoritarian manner, it has annulled personal commitments in artistic creation. Political pragmatism and voluntarism in the cultural policy has been the principal criterion of values in all spheres of cultural activity in the period of supremacy of the bureaucratic-etatist method of management of society. Any digression from authoritarian unity and unitarian principles has been attacked as pseudoliberalism, impermissible anarchy and abandonment of the goals of socialism and humanism. The authoritarian bureaucratic conscience

sought to censure all spheres of cultural creativeness. Etatist management of culture expressed suspicion concerning everything that is not foreseen and planned, that is not in the field of vision of the homo politicus. This suspicion underlied the pragmatic selection of values that we have inherited from the past, it underlied the cultural policy favouring polishing and impersonality in culture.

The reaction to this authoritarian cultural policy emerged also in the form of a particularist concept of pluralism in culture, the pluralism which stresses in culture what is separating man from man, the nation from the nation, the pluralism behind which stand special, selfish interests. This particularism emerged where the decentralization of social power has not meant concurrently the radical de-bureaucratization of society. Under these conditions the ideological, cultural particularism appeared as a form of the struggle for the intensification of national peculiarities and not for their transcending, as a form of glorification of what is special and autochtonous in definite national cultures and not of what is universally human in them, as a form of insistence upon what makes a distinction between national cultures and not upon what in national cultures enters into the fund of general human values, what facilitates the emergence of a „socialized mankind”. Particularist pluralism has always been the platform of the struggle for special prestiges, isolation from the influence of other instead of imbuing culture, a form of looking at the past instead of looking in the direction of a more humane future.

Marx has established a long time ago that. . . „private egoism is disclosed as the secret patriotism of citizens”... (Towards the criticism of Hegel's philosophy of state law), and thus indicated the real causes of the appearance of separatism in culture. Only to the degree to which the class structure of society and the class division of man into alienated authoritarian and private selfish spheres of life is factually transcended in social relations, when the two poles of this fundamental contradiction of the contemporary man is transcended, it is possible to transcend every separatism in culture and to develop general human culture.

The authoritarian and private egoistic spheres of private life are in principle complementary and mutually interdependent where neither is transcended. The reaction to the authoritarian settings may be an escape into the particular and human, into selfish separatism; the reaction to this separatism may be bureaucratic-authoritarian. In either case the structure of human relations is not moving in the direction of the radical general-human emancipation, culture does not develop by means of bureaucratic restraint. The coexistence between authoritarian and particularist tendencies in culture, along with their mutual collisions, emerges where bureaucracy does not give up its pretensions to be the chief expert in the management of society; in that even the particularist and selfish and authoritarian and generally social are not transcended but are mutually complementary.

⁸ In the article *The Social Role of Literary Elite*, »Social Forces«, 1950, No. 2, page 183.

⁹ George Santayana, *Atoms of Thought*, 1950, page 33.

One of the principal questions of our cultural situation is also the question: are we moving between the authoritarian and utilitarian cultures or are we transcending both of them as two inseparable poles of the split man in a class society?

IV

The emergence of an authentic human culture is possible only with the creation of a free human community in which free, unrestrained personal creativeness is the condition for the development of the social entity. The struggle for socialist culture is identical with the struggle against all forms of the authoritarian fettering of the human spirit as well as against the loss of creative potentials within the framework of a society of consumers.

The socialist cultural policy aimed at the creation of socialist cultures can be the component part solely of the social practice by means of which are transcended both the types of alienation of the contemporary man, the authoritarian social whole and the selfish individual.

When such practice is non-existent there emerges a blend of bureaucratic and technocratic concepts in the development of culture, with the emergence of the theory on „more pressing needs”, the theory according to which it is now vital for the society to develop only its material basis, according to which the development of culture is left for the future, to the times when a materially wealthy society will be created. These concepts fully express the misunderstanding of the sense of socialism. Socialism is identified here with material welfare, culture is considered solely to be an appendage, and not the vital conditions for the humanization of society. For the bureaucratic-technocratic mentality it is vital to attain the technological efficaciousness of management of natural and social processes, it is vital to develop the tools by means of which is achieved an efficacious manipulation of nature and social phenomenon and this, technocratic method of thinking does not raise questions of the humanitarian content of social relations and social values. The need for science and culture is expressed here only to the degree to which science and culture help the development of the technical-productive power. The question of utilitarian effect of science and cultures is the principal field of vision in which their sense is perceived. The bureaucratic-technocratic, authoritarian method of thinking favours only the elements of science and culture which contribute to a more efficacious rule over nature and to a more efficacious control of the existing social processes: technology and media for mass communication are favoured while almost all other spheres of culture are proclaimed questions of personal taste, a sphere of purely personal requirements. From the point of view of these concepts concerning the place and role of culture in society it is requested to set aside from the national income funds solely for the spheres of culture which have a direct pragmatic effect. The bureaucratic-technocratic lack of sense of the goals of radical humanization of the society and of man emerges in the form of a non-critical belief that the man who gains a certain amount

of material welfare begins developing other spiritual needs himself. The authoritarian conscience envisages the fact that economic wealth in the contemporary world goes along with the spiritual pauperization of people, that production and the goods produced are not neutral as far as values are concerned, that form certain definite relations in society and a definite profile of man, of the structure of his requirements and his ideological horizons. The development of material welfare without a concurrent development of authentic-human culture can bring about solely the coexistence between the hedonistic-utilitarian mode of life and bureaucratic-authoritarian forms of rule over man.

Bureaucratic-technocratic concepts in cultural policy express the tendencies to shift the goals of the socialist revolution, to interrupt the continuity in the development of socialism and the diverting of the direction of social development from the basic goal — the liberation of man's personality — to the goal of material development. From the point of view of these tendencies Marx's revolutionary thinking on the general human emancipation and on the society of free personalities has the effect of an abstract romantic phrase.

Bureaucratic-technocratic tendencies in the cultural policy are expressed in the form of theses on the development of economic wealth being the principal goal, the „decisive link” in the contemporary stage of development of the socialist society, the „link” to which must be subordinated all other goals of social development. This thesis leads to the pragmatist point of view in which the principal goal of socialism — liberation of man and the radical humanization of society is replaced by another goal — the creation of a society of material abundance and the preservation of the existing social structure.

The question of human freedom is not raised in our country, in Yugoslavia, so much as the question of the possibility to express human thinking, or rather as the question of being free from authoritarian-bureaucratic censorship, but is raised above all as the question of creation of freedom, possibilities for the development of personal spiritual energy; freed spiritual forces of the creative personality. Without the creation of these conditions of the removal of bureaucratic fetters and bans can provoke manifestation under which freedom from authoritarian bans can provoke manifestations under which freedom from authoritarian censorship is transformed into the freedom of various forms of expression of a privatized man.

V

The problems of development of culture in a country that is building socialism must be conceived as the problems of humanization of human relations, as the problems of development of the persons being qualified to transform the politically proclaimed right to freedom into the reality of a free human community. Before the development of culture is considered to be the prime task, the political programme of development of a free society cannot be adequately effective, it cannot lead to the radical negation of bureaucracy because bureaucracy rema-

ins the absolutely necessary part of society wherever men are not capable of being self-managers.

The proclaimed political principles of the struggle against bureaucracy are only a challenge while the real struggle is conducted in the sphere of the struggle for the new content of human conscience in which the foundations of a new humanism will be contained. These foundations are contained in the humanized man, in the cultural self-manager, while the material, economic development of society is solely a condition and possibility and not the reality of a new humanism.

The man who achieves no contacts at all with cultural values, the man who was not evolved into a cultural being, may live in material welfare but not also under conditions which offer possibilities for achieving human happiness and a genuinely human community.

New trends of the political guidance of society in the direction of self-management can be radical in our country under conditions of connecting the economic development with the cultural transformation of man. We are a country which, by the number of illiterate and semi-literate people is at the bottom of the ladder of European countries and by the number of the books read, according to data of UNESCO, we occupy an extremely low place. Under these conditions cultural development become the only basis upon which it is possible to implement the proclaimed principles of the struggle against bureaucracy because bureaucracy can be adapted to new political proclamation wherever the human factor is lacking — the massive increase of man's self-development.

The de-bureaucratization of society has a self criterion: how much this society is giving for the development of culture, or rather, of the factor which enables men to become aware of their human possibilities and to abolish various forms of authoritarian manipulation with them. Whether man will be a creature, the object of manipulation, of action of bureaucratic social forces, or the subject and creator of social relations along with the development of the economic basis which offers possibilities for the liberation of human work, depends also upon the development of man's awareness, and the basis for the development of awareness is given in contacts with culture and the development of culture.

In our country a struggle is still being conducted for understanding this decisive place of culture in the development of socialism. In our country the relationship between culture and socialism is still inadequately discussed.

The problems of cultural transformation are raised today above all as the problems of reaching clear concepts concerning the role of culture. It stands to reason that the question of these concepts is not solely the question of theoretical discussions but above all the shattering of bureaucratic resistance against the development of culture and principal means of general human emancipation.

In our country there are, explicitly or implicitly expressed contained in definite concepts, various opinions concerning the place and role of culture that are backed by definite social interests. We still do not have any clearly built and adopted principles of cultural policy. Resistance against the charting of clear principles of the cultural policy pro-

ceeds in our country along with the strong remnants of bureaucratic voluntarism in the sphere of culture, especially in the sphere of distribution of funds for science and culture.

What kind of concept on the place and role of culture in our society exist?

In our country the theory on „more pressing needs” is defended in the first place, the theory which expresses definite technocratic tendencies on the social conscience and practice since, according to it, it is vital for society to develop solely the material basis while culture, the development of culture are left for the future. These concepts fully express the misunderstanding of the sense of self-management and of socialism in general. Socialism is identified here with a materially wealthy society. This theory prevails the more the technocratic mode of thinking is spreading. For, it is a technocratic fashion to consider culture to be solely an appendage and not the vital condition of humanization of society. These technocratic tendencies have facilitated and still facilitate the emergence of the depersonalized mass culture.

It has been often requested that, under the present conditions of cultural backwardness, cultural activities be financed from funds for personal consumption. All this has meant favouring the forms of culture that offer only mass recreation. This created the vicious circle that characterized the society of consumers: the production of culture-commodity must pay attention to the mass, impersonal taste in order to be able to exist under conditions of market relations and while paying attention to that taste it stimulates and develops further the process of depersonalization of man instead of enabling the human spirit by means of authentic cultural values; with a retroactive effect the lowered mass taste requires an even lower cultural merchandise... etc.

Culture as recreation without content is increasingly becoming the basic content of what media for mass communication convey. We are achieving remarkable successes in this direction in developing interest for impersonal heroes-sportsmen, for attractive details from the life of spurious talents followed by commercialism and advertisements, in developing interest for an ever greater number of yellow papers. Sufficient attention is not yet paid to the development of elementary culture, to the introduction of a definite minimum of factual knowledge and values which represent a condition, the foundation for the self-development of man, the basis for the creation of human needs, for further self-perfection. This minimum can be developed only through a systematic bringing of authentic cultural values closer to man. The clash between the authentic and non-authentic in culture cannot be settled by means of administrative measures, but society as a whole cannot rid itself of the responsibility for the destiny of culture. The socialist cultural policy which must pay attention to the general ideological and cultural level of builders of the self-management society must develop principles by means of which this conflict will be settled. The belief that this conflict will be settled on its own does not produce good results.

Dr Miladin Životić, born in 1930. Graduated at the Faculty of Philosophy, Beograd, in 1953. Obtained a Doctoral Degree in 1961. From 1959 on in the teaching staff at the Faculty of Philosophy in Beograd, now Associate Professor. A one time president of the Philosophical Society of Serbia, editor-in-chief of the review *Filozofija*, and a member of the editing board of *Praxis*.

Published many articles in the fields of the theory of cognizance, ethics, axiology, political philosophy, and the history of philosophy. His doctoral thesis is published under the title *Pragmatism and the contemporary philosophy*, and books include a work *The man and the values*, as well as a treatise on ideology.

At the Faculty of Philosophy he is now teaching the Contemporary West-European philosophy and the General theory of values.

His texts are translated into German, Italian, English, Rumanian, and other languages.

Dr Najdan PAŠIĆ

Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Beograd

SOCIALISM AND MODERNIZATION OF POLITICS

The modernization of politics in the socialist countries has a twofold character in terms of sources and motives. On the one hand, this modernization has been motivated and inspired by criticism of bourgeois political institutions, criticism of institutions of general political representation as submitted by socialist theorists many decades before the victory of the first socialist revolutions. On the other hand, this modernization and particularly its contemporary trends, have been motivated by pragmatic-political impulses and inspirations. It would be a difficult task, and I shall not attempt it, to draw a line between those impulses to innovation in political institutions and modernization of forms of political participation deriving from theoretical conceptions and the principles of socialism, and those that are conditioned by the requirements of practical life, as these two aspects, conditioning the same process, are interwoven. Moreover, the fact the changes occurring in the socialist countries as a reflection of changes in economic and class structures, of the development of modern productive forces, etc., make necessary the modernization of political institutions as a practical political imperative, simply confirms the justification and farsightedness of socialist criticism of the institutions of bourgeois representative democracy. The further as society has gone along the road of socialist development, the more developed the process of socialization of its economic and political life, the greater is its need for modernization of political institutions and the discovery of new forms of active participation by individuals and groups in the democratic process of political decision making.

Various forms of and attempts at modernization of the political set-up in the socialist countries have as a rule, therefore, a common point of departure. That is criticism of the classic bourgeois system of general political representation. In a way, this criticism anticipates the requirements of a society whose life will be based, to a much greater extent than before, on association of labour and socialization of the process of production and income distribution. Consequently, in our times, this criticism acquires more timely and direct political significance.

I should like to recall only three main points in the criticism of the basic institutions of the classic representative state and its political structures.

Socialist thinkers have criticized bourgeois representative democracy in the first place for its inconsistency, which benefits the richer sections of society. This inconsistency is reflected, firstly, in the fact that the theory of equal political rights, and the possibility of citizens, via elections, to participate in formation of the general will, has not taken into account the very great real differences in the possibility of wielding political influence, existing between the rich and the poor, the owners of the means of production and those who make their living by selling their own labour power. Furthermore, socialist criticism was levelled at the concrete, legalized restrictions on democracy operating to the detriment of the poorer sections of society, in view of the fact that all systems of bourgeois democracy, particularly in the initial phases of their development, were possessed of one or another form of property census and other forms of political favoritization of the wealthier sections of society.

Another target of socialist criticism was the indirectly democratic, representative character of bourgeois democracy. The most eminent theorists of bourgeois democracy, beginning with Edmund Burke, and the legislation itself, established the independence of political representatives in relation to the voters, thus giving elections the character of transfer of the formal sovereign rights of the people to an elected political elite. The expression of the „general will“ — formally the supreme democratic act — in point of fact signified abdication by the formal sovereign, that is the people, in favour of elected representative elite.

The third basic point in the criticism, which remains applicable even in the present day, is the criticism relating to the limitations of the classic institutions of the representative state associated with the division of society's life into the public and the private spheres. According to the conceptions of classic liberalism and the corresponding practice, the state, meaning the organized political authority, as a rule acts and functions only where private initiative proves itself incapable of satisfying certain social requirements, that is, where such action is imperative in the interest of exercise of authority by private capital.

This criticism of the classic institutions of representative democracy, as developed by socialist theorists and thinkers, and especially by marxists, did not approach this subject either exclusively or primarily from the standpoint of general democratic ideals but rather from the standpoint of the conception of the division of society into classes. Every political system, as a form designed to maintain a socio-economic order, is so organized as to act in the interests of the ruling class. Marxist theorists have criticized bourgeois representative democracy because it assures political domination by the bourgeoisie and other sections of society whose existence is based on private property. They sought such changes in political organization and political relationship, such modernization of political institutions, as would make it possible for the working class to use the means of organized political power for putting through social changes that are in its interests as a class. What they sought, therefore, was fuller and broader democracy, *demo-*

cracy for the working class and broad sections of the working, the exploited people. In that sense, analysing the experience of the Paris Commune, Marx declared that the Paris Commune was the political form found at long last, through which it would be possible to effect the economic emancipation of labour. Abolishing the independence of executive functions, that is, the professional apparatus of government employees standing aloof from the people, and putting the promulgation and implementation of laws, by merging the two, in the hands of representative bodies comprising elected delegates who could be recalled at any moment, the Commune, to Marx's way of thinking, gave the working class and working people political instruments through which they would be able to achieve their socio-economic goals. It was from the same standpoint that Lenin considered the Soviets that emerged from the October Revolution. He said that the Soviets were a form of dictatorship of the proletariat and at the same time a form of radical extension of democracy. This for the reason that, through the machinery of the Soviets, the masses of exploited people, previously excluded from political affairs able for the first time to wield a direct influence over the solution of vital questions of society's development. The dictatorship of the proletariat, which was maliciously interpreted as the abolition of democracy and which, regrettably, sometimes served as an excuse for suppressing and restricting elementary democratic rights, had, in the authentic socialist theory of Marxism, an utterly different meaning: not the abolition of democracy, but such an extension of democracy as would secure for the workers and working people a direct and dominant influence over state policy. In this respect, the modernization of political institutions engendered by the socialist revolution meant, above all, removing the possibility that the bourgeoisie, that is, the wealthy propertied class, would be favoured by the structure of political institutions; rather was the reverse true — in the system of political decision making, it was the industrial workers and other sections of the working people who would prevail.

Objective analysis of the Soviet state and political system and even of political practice in the years immediately following the October Revolution clearly demonstrate that these were the motives and the significance of the far-reaching changes in the structure of Soviet authority in comparison with the classic representative state. The election laws deprived certain groups in society, particularly those who lived of the labour of others, the right to vote. On that basis, roughly 2 percent of the population was disenfranchised. The property census dating from earlier phases of development of bourgeois democracy, and later, altered forms, had affected a much larger number of persons. Also, in a country where the working class comprised only a minority of the population, a political system which harboured serious pretensions to representing a system of dictatorship of the proletariat, had to abandon at least temporarily, the principle of equal voting rights and, in delegating representatives to the highest representative bodies, to assure greater representation for the workers and for the urban population generally. There was one representative in the Supreme Soviet to each 25,000 of the urban population or 125,000 of the rural population. The subordinate economic position of the poor peasants and farm

labourers, which continued to prevail, was to be compensated for by special political institutions such as the committees of the poor, known as „kombedi”. These organs of the rural poor not only politically represented particular group interest but also possessed certain attributes of power. Analogously, in industry, in the factories, „workers' control” organs were introduced during the very first months of the revolution. The power of the individual capitalist was replaced by the authority of elected workers' deputations. Later on, these forms of participation by the workers and their influence over the management of socialized enterprises acquired a different aspect, reflected by and large in certain rights enjoyed by the trade unions and party committees in the factories. However, all these and other elements of „political modernization” — during which institutions of classical representative democracy were abandoned, altered or supplemented — were not in themselves sufficient to ensure on a lasting basis a dominant social position for the working class. Even during the Paris Commune, and on the grounds of its experience, Marx had declared that without a radical change in the economic position of the working class, and unless the wage labour relationship, that is wage labour slavery, were abolished, the working class could not maintain itself in power politically.

The fundamental question of political modernization which came to the fore in all countries that had embarked on the road of developing a socialist social system was, in fact, how to build such a structure of socio-political organization, such forms of political life and action, as would make possible radical revolutionary changes in socio-economic relationship in the interest of the working class as the social backbone of the new social order. To put it otherwise, a fundamental question was posed: who would have the social power emanating from nationalized ownership of the means of production and how would it be expressed in political terms?

As the process of technological socialization of production, and the closely related socio-economic integration, advance, it became increasingly clear that the classic system of general political representation did not suffice to provide a real reflection of differing social interests, to facilitate real and adequate participation by particular social groups in the process of political decision making. This is not the case with the socialist countries alone, as there is also obvious indication of dissatisfaction in the West with classic political institutions; there, powerful pressure is being exerted to find new, more adequate forms of political organization which would either change fundamentally or at least supplement the classic mechanism of representative government. This need for political modernization in keeping with the demands of profoundly altered socio-economic realities is much greater in social countries where it is a question of vital importance for political life as a whole. In such countries, private ownership of large-scale means of production has been abolished and with it the economic foundations for the existence of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class which was previously in a position, in line with its economic power, to maintain control over those who exercised direct political power and, on that basis, to develop and sustain certain forms of representative, parliamentary democracy. In the socialist countries, immediately after the

revolution and abolition of private property, the state, as the mandatory of society or rather of the working class, took over, more or less completely, the management of all socialized production and income distribution. By this very fact, there was an enormous growth in the role, relative independence and real social power of the executive organs of state power, or, to put it more accurately, of the political power which controlled those organs. How, then, under such conditions, to secure real democracy for the working class, that is, effective control by associated labour over those who exercised power? The experience of Stalinism demonstrated that formal representative institutions elected by universal franchise, etc., could serve as an excellent screen for what was actually arbitrary power held by those in executive post, arbitrary power by the state apparatus, or rather by those at the top. The formal introduction of institutions of classic representative government, of universal and direct voting rights, and formal concentration of the basic prerogatives of state power in representative organs thus elected, was paralleled by strengthening of arbitrary state-party power, attended by the political abuses and political self-will described by the term „personality cult” at the 20 th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Institutions of formal representative democracy adopted under the Soviet Constitution from 1936 onward proved absolutely incapable of preventing all these negative manifestation and deformations. It became obvious that in conditions where the means of production were state or social property, the question of democracy could not be solved or democracy itself guaranteed by way of institutions of formal representative democracy, that is, by equal voting rights, by formal concentration of state power in representative bodies, and so on.

Taking as a point of departure experiences such as these, which were in no way limited to the Soviet Union alone but were rather confirmed even in the development of Yugoslavia and other socialist countries, the following thesis might be submitted: in order to assure genuine democracy where the state or society owns the basic means of production, in order to protect society from arbitrary, uncontrolled power by the state-party executive and its top circles, at least two basic conditions are required: first, a change in the real position of the basic mass of the working population in the sense that the working people, or the associated production workers using the socialized means of production, must be in a position to become the dominant socio-economic force, that social factor making the decisions on the fundamental question in any social system, which is disposal of the surplus of social labour: the second condition is the development of an integral system of institutions and relationships of direct democracy making it possible for the changed position of the working people in the sphere of material production and income distribution to be reflected appropriately at the political level.

The achievement of these conditions is increasingly becoming, in a growing number of socialist countries, the most important impulse to and motive for modernization of politics in the sense of greater and more direct participation by various social groups and citizens generally in the management of social affairs which were previously the exclusive

domain of the state administration. Elimination of the worst forms of Stalinist dictatorship and the broad process of democratization launched in the USSR at the 20th Congress, could not remain confined to the framework of affirmation of the principle of formal representative democratization. It led to modernization primarily through development on reaffirmation of numerous forms for direct expression of particular group interests and sociopolitical participation which had emerged in the revolution but which had, through the further evolution of the Soviet system on statist lines, been either suppressed or liquidated, or had simply stagnated. Consequently, during this period there was great insistence on the revitalization of the committees and commissions of the Soviets as representative bodies, particularly the commissions attached to the basic Soviets where citizens also took direct part in the solution of the social problems in which they had an immediate interest. The trade unions and other mass social organizations had a new, more significant and more independent role. For instance, it was compulsory under law to consult or take decisions in conjunction with the trade unions in the regulation of labour relations, in the employment and discharge of workers, and other questions concerning relations in the enterprise and the position of the working man. New importance was also attached to production consultations which, while retaining their advisory role, became a form of permanent and obligatory consultations between the enterprise management and the production workers.

In other socialist countries, too, the implementation of economic reforms, abandonment of rigid administrative forms for managing production and income distribution, was regularly attended not only by greater independence on the part of the working collectives, enterprises and institutions but by measures of modernization of the political system in the narrow sense of the word. Various forms were introduced enabling groups of citizens to take part in the solution of certain social problems and greater opportunities were provided for co-action by sociopolitical organizations in managing the affairs of state. All of this offered convincing proof that more modern and flexible organization of the economy was interwoven and interdependent with democratization of the political system. It was obvious that one could not do without the other, that greater independence for the enterprises meant greater influence for the working people over society's affairs, which sooner or later had to be reflected at the political level. The economic reform and more stimulative forms of conducting the economy, conditioned by a higher degree of development of material productive forces, and the modernization of the economy, go hand in hand with the processes of modernization of politics, as reflected in abandonment of administrative-centralized and bureaucratic forms of management in political life, in limitations on independent action by the state executive and in greater democratic participation by citizens and social groups in political decision making. It is precisely for this reason that economic reforms may run into resistance from bureaucratic forces, and their implementation temporarily stopped or delayed. For, although the economic advantages of measures of economic reorganization, either undertaken or proposed, are sufficiently obvious, they are nonetheless not always acceptable in

view of the distribution of forces and the possible political repercussions of such trends in the sphere of the economy.

The situation is a specific one in those systems of organizations of socialist society which are based on worker management, on such changes in production relationships as place the associated production workers in the position of disposing directly of the larger part of the social product. The type of socialist society founded on these bases is still in the initial stage; it has not yet acquired its final historical profile. Nevertheless, there is already sufficient theoretical and empirical grounds to assert that in such systems it is not only possible but imperative to have such forms of political modernization as will signify complete emancipation from classic forms of representative government and general political representation. In Yugoslavia, the introduction of worker-management on a modest scale in 1950 simultaneously marked the beginning of a revolution in the entire structure of the political system. Worker-management was the point of departure for far-reaching reconstruction of the entire political set-up, from the local communities to all organs of the various republics and the federation. Its development over a period of 18 years has still not been satisfactorily studied and elaborated from the theoretical point of view but it has demonstrated the transformational power of the new socio-economic structure and position of the production workers in relation to the organization of the political system in its entirety. As stated above, the essence of the process of modernization and democratization under such conditions lies in the gradual extension of self-administering relationships also to the sphere of management of the joint affairs of smaller and larger social communities. Thus does the working man, associated with other working men, and no longer in a position of subordination in his sphere of action and work, become truly a subject and not merely an object of broader social processes. This, however, is not possible without finding, constituting and putting into practice forms of political engagement and participation by interest groups and above all of the direct expression of the interests of associated labour, which slowly deprive the state and primarily its executive apparatus of a monopoly on representing the general social interest. This invests democracy with a new dimensions as the function of coordinating divergent, freely expressed social and group interests and of assuring pursuit of the common interest of society comes increasingly within the sphere of direct influence by the citizens themselves and their various associations.

Along this road of development, both the character of representative bodies and the role of the state apparatus have changed as they cease being powers and factors existing independently of society and of those social forces in the name of which they act. Their day by day activity is increasingly interwoven and imbued with the active influence of those freely associated, voluntarily engaged working people and citizens whose direct interest in the solution of particular social problems is most intimately bound up with the general social interest. Practically speaking, this should mean that problems of production are decided by the production workers and those sections of society which are particularly interested in a given type of production; it should mean that the last word in the organization of health services should be left up to the people

working in that sphere and to those enjoying health insurance, organized on a self-administering basis; it should mean that the parents of students and even the students themselves, in addition to teachers and other educationalists, should have their say in the educational system; in a word, general representatives of social interests, standing aloof and alienated from the people, should be eliminated from social life to the greatest possible degree and all problems of the broader social communities should be dealt with on the basis of direct democracy, as an extension of the process of self-administration in the basic cells of society.

Reference is, therefore, made to such forms of political modernization as would in a more highly developed form, provide a concrete defense against the threat of bureaucracy in social institutions and relationships which, as an inevitable evil, attends the contemporary processes of growing integration in the life of society and multiplication of society's requirements and functions. By providing a direct link, based on self-administration, between the broader and the narrower social interest, such a system opens up vistas of a new democratic mobilization and activation of society's energies and potential as opposed to the blind forces of bureaucracy.

In Yugoslavia, these ideas and action in this direction served as the foundation for far-reaching transformation of and innovations in the entire political system. Naturally, new forms of political participation were first to appear in the very places where socio-economic self-administration had taken the firmest root. The trend toward greater political activity and influence on the part of those social forces that are most directly interested in the modernization of production, the advancement of the process of production and thereby also the general material advancement of society, was reflected in the establishment of the Council of Producers which was introduced by Constitutional Law in 1953. Except in complex, federative state systems, where it reflects the special state-political existence of federal units, the second house in parliament usually signifies a form of organization of democracy favouring conservative social forces, a defence against any radicalism in the houses of parliament elected by universal suffrage. In contrast, the Council of Producers is a historical innovation also in the sense that, in the entire mechanism of representative institutions, it enables greater influence to be wielded by the most progressive social forces, the forces of associated labour in the sphere of material production.

Self-administration has not, however, been limited simply to the sphere of material production nor have the council of producers remained the sole expression of self-administering relationships at a broader social level. By the end of the fifties, that is, before the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1963, there had developed a broad process of degovernmentalization of social services and activities. The point of departure for this process was provided by the introduction of organs of self-administration and social management in educational, cultural, scientific and health institutions, in social insurance services, in the management of housing projects and generally in all working organizations with the exception of the army and state administration in the narrow sense of the word. Two types of self-administering organs were formed

parallel to each other in the non-economic working organizations: on the one hand, some organs were elected directly by the employees, that is, by those persons directly engaged in a given activity while others comprised, partially or entirely, delegates representing the citizens concerned, meaning the broader social community. The intention was to coordinate, without intervention by executive organs, the interests of persons engaged in a particular activity and the interests of the social community at large, in whose interest it was for the activity in question to develop successfully in line with the general aims and requirements of society.

This manner of organizing the management of various spheres of the life of society and social activity offered citizens the opportunity of broad participation in society's affairs. Naturally, however, it posed certain problems, among them unwillingness on the part of some of the citizens concerned to shoulder sufficient in public responsibility on a voluntary basis, slowness in procedure, etc. These are all problems connected with innovations in political institutions designed to democratize them through direct participation by the citizens in public affairs. Nevertheless, the movement of society toward self-administration, regarded as a whole, was confirmed in social practice. The new Constitution, adopted in 1963, in no way signified abandonment of that course but rather its more consistent implementation.

The most meaningful innovation was the development of the parliamentary system by a new form of bicameralism. All assemblies, from the communes, through the republics and up to the federation, acquired in addition to the general political chamber in the election of which all citizens participate, a self-administering chamber for various spheres of social activity. There are thus four self-administering chambers in the republic assemblies and in the Federal Assembly, and also in some of the commune assemblies: economic, cultural-educational, social-health, and organizational-political. It is typical of the chambers of working communities, at least as far as the conception is concerned, that they do not represent the interests on any special branch, profession or trade; rather, they are forms of self-administering organization of various kinds of social activity on a territorial basis, an extension of the process of self-administration that is unfolding within the working organizations themselves.

The Constitution also confirmed the principles of social self-administration in the sense that it not only provided for participation in the management of various institutions by the citizens and working people concerned, but also laid the foundations for relations between various branches of social activity, and coordination of social activities at the broadest social level, to be regulated on the basis of self-administration. Thus, for instance, by establishing the principle of compulsory social insurance for workers, the Constitution simultaneously and explicitly stresses that the service of social insurance as a whole is to be managed by the insurees directly, or through organs that they themselves elect or may recall. Analogously the position and obligations of health institutions and the conditions under which they function are not simply regulated by state laws but the activities of self-administering organs of social insurance which represent the interests of the insurees. Agree-

ements regulating questions such as expenditures, prices for various health services, and so on, are concluded between the health institutions, which are themselves organized along self-administering lines, and social insurance institutions, etc. General regulation, and the financing of educational institutions, had been undertaken by organizations such as the Community of Education, that is, organs whose members are appointed by the assemblies and the educational institutions themselves. This, too, is an attempt to have the social interest pursued by those sections of society and those members of the social community who are most called upon and most highly qualified by dint of their position to exercise such functions in a directly democratic way, rather than having the state administration take independent decisions on such matters.

It goes without saying that the party does not, nor could it for long, stand aloof from this process of modernization of politics. In other words, the changes outlined above have a great influence on the organization and working methods of the ruling party. In the case of Yugoslavia, this made it necessary to reorganize the League of Communists, which is shedding the characteristics of a classic political party the basis purpose of which is to keep a hold on the levers of state power with which to implement its own political program.

In a society where the general social interest is expressed to a growing extent in a complex manner, through a broad mechanism of self-administering institutions directly included in the process of social management, the party must assure itself decisive influence over the general direction of society's movement in a manner differing from that it used under the system of administrative management. Under the new conditions, political activity by members of the League of Communists in the different social, self-administering and political bodies, which are in one way or another included in the system of political decision making, takes on paramount importance. Instead of functioning as the leading nucleus of the state apparatus, the Party is transformed into an organized political force acting within the mechanism of self-administration, *and subordinating itself to the laws of self-administering organization and self-administering decision making.*

In view of the fact that the Communist Party is a key factor in the political organization of any contemporary socialist society, including the Yugoslav, the changes taking place in the Party and around it are an essential component and perhaps the most significant determinant in the entire modernization of political institutions and relationships under discussion here. But this is a topic in itself which cannot be dealt with adequately in this report. It may therefore be relegated to the oral part of the discussion.

NAJDAN PAŠIĆ

Dr Najdan Pašić, professor of the Faculty of Political Sciences in Beograd, Editor-in-Chief of the review »Socializam«, and a Member of the Council of Peoples of the Federal Assembly. Born in 1922, in Skoplje. Graduate of

the Faculty of Law in Beograd, diploma 1949; post-graduate studies from 1949—1951 at the Institute of Social Sciences in Beograd.

Professor Pašić began lecturing at the Faculty of Law in Beograd, in 1951, and in 1956 obtained his Doctoral Degree in the field of public corporations in the United Kingdom. From 1960 on at the School of Political Sciences in Beograd, as one of its first lecturers; full-time Professor at the Faculty of Political Sciences as well as, from 1965, Editor-in-Chief of the »Socializam«.

Professor Pašić is actively engaged in the publishing activity and in journalism; as early as 1951 he started the magazine NIN and was its first Editor-in-Chief.

As one of the most active Yugoslav contemporary theoreticians in the field of political science he particularly concentrated his attention to the following problems: the theory of a modern state and the etatization of social life; comparative political systems; problems of self-managing society.

His publishing activity includes: several essays on national question and on federalism; more than a hundred articles, as well as five books (Public corporations in the United Kingdom, 1957; Contemporary state, 1960; Comparative political systems, 1962; The social classes and the politics, 1968; and Political education of the self-managing society, 1970). For his book The social classes and the politics he was awarded the 1969 October Prize.

Some of Professor Pašić's articles and essays are translated into foreign languages.



Dr Mihailo V. POPOVIĆ

Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, Beograd

SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN SOCIALISM

Introduction

Every new society that is under construction passes through several different phases, and each of these phases has its own economic, legal-political and ideo-philosophical characteristic features. The assumption that it is only a matter of unessential changes which do not influence more significantly the social aspects of a given society that is coming into being is as mistaken as it is politically conservative. This sociological truth could not by-pass even the historical development of socialism. That is why this new historical form of society is differing not only „geographically”, that is to say, from one country to another, but also „linearly and historically”, i.e., within the framework of evolution of every individual country.

In the case of Yugoslav socialist society, roughly speaking, it is possible to divide its postwar development into three main periods — from the end of the war to the introduction of workers' self-management, then a period of transition from the 1950 's to the the 1965 economic reform, and, lastly, the current period of the economic and social reform. Although all the three periods have some characteristics in common including common social contradictions, since it is a question of a certain socialist society, differences between these periods as listed above are as significant as to lead to a danger which is greater if they be underestimated than if they be overestimated. As a result of our adaptability, we are as a rule prone not to see any more after a certain time, or at least not to the same extent, the difference between the present and the previous situation in our society. Student demonstrations in June, 1968 and the protests in Slovenia against the omitting of two roads in that Republic from a list of projects partly financed by the International Bank were unthinkable in the previous periods of our country's development. Public threats by a Republican Government and other high officials from that Republic that the Slovene deputies would walk out of the Federal Assembly unless their demands be satisfied have even now aroused amazement and disapproval among the major section of Yugoslav public opinion. In the previous period of transition a similar demonstration of social conflicts was not possible at all,

although this does not mean that previously there were no either similar or even essentially identical conflicts.

On the whole, we have been the witnesses of certain aggravation in the situation regarding the national problem in Yugoslavia in recent years. In various areas this trend gives rise to the conviction that we have gone too far in the economic and political decentralization of our country, so that the existence of the Federation, that is to say, the whole Yugoslav community has been endangered, as is alleged. On the other hand, separatist and localistic forces want and try to push the decentralization process to the end, although verbally they are not in favour of a disintegration of the Yugoslav society.

Does this signify that such and similar nationalistic tendencies and conflicting situations did not exist at all in previous periods of the development of Yugoslavia, as well as that national contradictions did not arise until the current period marked by the economic and social reform? The assumption that only the economic reform and its socio-economic consequences have aroused national tension and have raised the national issue which was fully solved previously is as naive and unrealistic as the opinion that in the previous periods the question of remuneration according to work was settled successfully and that the economic reform had only disturbed a consistent implementation of that socialist principle.

On the other hand, one-sided as well as mistaken are the views according to which the economic reform has *only* made open and public social conflicts and problems which were, as is alleged, only seemingly settled previously, even though this conclusion is true in a way. In point of fact, every individual phase has not only its own ways of expressing and settling social conflicts but also has its specific social contradictions. In the first administrative period of socialist construction in Yugoslavia (and not only in that country) contradictions between the central state planning and the economic and other initiatives of workers' collectives and working people as individuals were the dominant and characteristic feature. These initiatives were in the main hampered. The national and other contradictions were at the time of secondary importance and were mostly dealt with within the framework of contradictions between state organs and subordinated social groups and institutions. If, for instance, one had to decide in which republic an important economic project was to be carried out, the decision in the main depended on the »balance of power« between republican representatives and leading officials in the central state or political body responsible for decision-making. Other professions and social groupings, for instance, engineers and economists, did not usually influence more significantly the making of those decisions, of course, insofar as they were not simultaneously political and state functionaries. *A high degree of concentration of political power in the administrative period essentially conditioned the nature, the method of settlement, and the relationship between social contradictions.*

For example, in the period of so-called administrative socialism, there prevailed almost all the time a conflict or tension between a high accumulation rate of funds which were most frequently used for the building of heavy industry or some other priority branches, on the one

hand, and a usually low level of public and personal consumption on the other. The burden caused by this social contradiction was not even at the time evenly distributed among all the regions and social groups. Prevalently agricultural regions and agricultural workers themselves as a social stratum carried the heaviest burden, because agriculture was the main source of accumulation of funds needed for industrial development and new industrial plants. On the other hand, prevalently industrial regions and the population employed in industry usually had a higher standard of living and a higher social status. Simultaneously, contradictions between the employed and the unemployed, which have developed into a characteristic and dominant trait of the current period of the economic reform, did not receive priority in the administrative period. Or, to put it more accurately, they were subordinated to contradictions which were dominant at the time and were settled if and when this was possible in terms of primary contradictions in the administrative period.

Although the unemployment rate was not as big as it now is, latent unemployment, particularly in the countryside, reached considerable proportions. The extensive form of the economy called in turn for an extensive form of employment, but even this could not abolish the unemployment of every type. In other words, the contradiction between the employed and unemployed was real even at that time, but the difference is that it was not dominant but only overshadowed by fundamental contradictions of administrative socialism. So, it was subordinated in a way to the significant contradiction from those days between the industry and agriculture, between urban and rural population.

In postwar years, an unemployed person was more frequently recruited from the countryside where the standard of living and the social status were at the time relatively low. In the current period when the position of the village population has improved to a certain extent and when migration from the countryside to urban areas has been slowed down, unemployment appears more among the townspeople and as such it is more striking and develops into a more acute social problem among the laborers and other strata of townsfolk who, according to historical assumptions, should be the main pillars of socialist construction.

From what has been stated above, one can arrive at the following conclusions:

(1) Although every socialist society in its development has some common characteristics and contradictions which are common to all periods of its development, every individual period is in turn characterized by the domination of specific contradictions and conflicting relations;

(2) The other non-dominant contradictions emerge then in either a latent form or are subordinated to dominant contradictions;

(3) Periods are also distinguished by the way in which contradictions and conflicting situations emerge and are being settled, and this applies both to dominant and to secondary contradictions.

If these sociological generalisations are accurate, one should examine more closely the emergence of specific contradictions in the three

periods classified above from the development of Yugoslav socialist society, and one should find out what their social background has been. Simultaneously, we are going to follow, insofar as it is necessary and possible, the operation of fundamental or general contradictions which have been characterizing socialism in general.

Social conflicts always and above all emerge as conflicts among social interests between determined social classes, strata, groups or regions. Although very often, not to say regular, they arise as conflicts between differing ideo-political concepts, partial, more uncontrolled or formed as developed ideologies and political doctrines, social conflicts as a rule stem from unequal material, economic interests. Either if it were a question of decisions on an important investment in an economic project concerned with broader national interests (for instance, road construction), or the pension system, the shaping and application of the concepts of the economic reform, the educational system, or equality of languages spoken by individual nations and national minority groups, in each case the interests of various strata, groups, nations, or whole regions are involved either directly or indirectly.

Of course, besides particular there are also *common* interests of all or of the majority of members of a socialist society, such as the raising of labour productivity and growth of material production, the observance and promotion of civil rights, personal security and individual freedoms of the individual, right to school education, right to work, etc. Without these common interests and rights a socialist society could not survive for a long time except by resorting to force. And yet, common interests do not exist beside and independently from particular interests between which there may be and very often are minor or major differences, concealed or open conflicts.

One should also point out that scientific, sociological approach to the problem of contradictions and conflicts in socialism is a matter of a more recent date and that in most socialist countries an essentially different viewpoint on this matter prevailed for a long time and is still prevailing. The administrative period was characterized by a dogmatic-ideological standpoint according to which socialism is in essence a class non-conflicting society, that contradictions, if they still exist, contrary to the previous class forms, are non-antagonistic and »friendly«, that they can and should be settled only through persuasion and friendly understanding among fraternal classes, strata, and other groups. The conception of socialism as a harmonious society was especially notable in the Stalinist era. So, in his famous Report to the 18th Congress of the Party in 1939, Stalin expounded a thesis according to which Soviet society is »free of class conflicts and supplies an example of fraternal co-operation among the workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia«. Instead of a class struggle and a conflict of interests which prevailed in class formations, the motive force in the building of a socialist, particularly Soviet society was, according to Stalin and his followers, derived from »the moral and political unity of Soviet society, from friendship among the nations in the USSR, from Soviet patriotism«¹. So, Marx's theory of the class struggle and social conflicts was in fact

¹ J. Stalin: »Problems of Leninism«, Belgrade, »Kultura«, 1966, p. 587.

replaced by functionalist organicist theory about socialism as a harmonious society, about national unity and other factors of social integration as basic motive force of socialist development.

Although in Yugoslavia, not even in the administrative period, was Stalinist dogmatism present in so rough forms, the functionalistic viewpoint on the nature of socialism prevailed even in this country for a relatively long time. As a matter of fact, it has not yet disappeared at present. With the introduction of the workers' self-management and with the process of socialist democratization, social differences, inequities, and conflicting situations grew increasingly open, so that it became more and more difficult either to ignore them, or to hush them up by a functionalist, that is, organicist theory about society. But, from open recognition, even in terms of principle, of social contradictions and latent possibility of conflicts arising even in a socialist society to their actual scientific research, the road to be followed is neither short nor simple, and is not devoid of minor and major obstacles. That is why this paper should be taken more as a *sociological effort to approach this problem* with more objectivity and theoretical criticism.

A significant stage in the development of a socialist society in Yugoslavia, particularly from the point of view of the problem under discussion, was reached at the 7th Congress of the League of Communists in 1958. The Programme endorsed at the Congress contained major novelties to the very approach to the problem of the socialist construction. In principle, the idea of socialism as a harmonious, non-conflicting society was rejected, an idea which had been characterizing mostly the administrative and prevalently bureaucratic system of administration. Simultaneously, an attempt was made to note and analyse critically all social processes and forces which had increasingly been developing into leading factors of public life and development at the time of socialist democratization.

According to the concept expounded in the Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the fundamental pillars of development of a socialist society, besides political and other social organizations, are the individual as the producer, the workers' collective, and the commune (the municipality). The State as their »common instrument« may be a significant factor in the advance of socialism only if »all these factors operate freely within framework of common interests«.²

There are therefore two vital pre-conditions for a successful functioning of a socialist state as »a factor in the advance of socialism« — (a) that the producer (the workingman), the workers' collective and the commune act relatively *freely* as basic factors in a socialist social development, and that those factors act »within the framework of common interests«. If one of the pre-conditions does not exist, a certain greater or smaller distortion occurs in social relations developing in terms of socialism. If the workingman, the workers' collective and local community (the municipality) are deprived of a certain freedom of action within the respective jurisdiction, the State grows as practically the only economic power. This is the stage when the bureaucratic

² »The Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia«, »Kultura«, Belgrade, 1958, pp. 127—129.

structure of the society begins to take shape. If, on the other hand, these factors act freely, and increasingly »beyond the frame of common interests«, another process of distortion in socialist relations occurs and could be described as »socialist disintegration«. In both cases, although there is an essential difference between them, it is a question of a non-socialist or insufficiently socialist accommodation of common, particular (group) and individual interests. And every failure to adjust those interests and to co-ordinate them creates an opportunity for social conflicts of various types and intensity, for the emergence of group, professional, class, national, or regional conflicts.

Contradictions and Conflicting Relations in the Administrative Period

In the period which is usually described as administrative socialism the State was not only the only serious force of guidance in the country's economic and social development but it was also the force which assumed the right to co-ordinate general, particular (group) and individual interests of the citizens. In the conditions which were created during the administrative management from the political summit to the work organization, the state mechanism was in fact the only social factor capable of taking that kind of role. In emphasizing this, we do not mean that the socialist state in that period usurped all the rights of the working class and that it acted in contradiction to the workers' interests. It is a mistaken viewpoint as it is opposite-opinion that every self-management by the workers' collectives can automatically secure harmonious relations between common and individual interests. As the freedom of decision-making by the individual or groups is not always a reliable guarantee that every decision would be in accordance with *real* individual or group interests, so indirect decision-making by a socialist state *on behalf* of the working class, without actual participation of the workers in decision-making need not *a priori* signify that the decisions of the state organs are contradictory to the interests of the working class. Whether this is going to be so depends on the day-to-day policy, on the ability of state factors to grasp the real interests of the workers and of the socialist community as a whole as well as on other circumstances which we are not going to analyse herewith.

At any rate, in the conditions in a statist structure of a socialist society the process of co-ordinating common and individual interests is practically exclusively in the hands of the State, that is to say, of the political party and its organs. The socialist state has been in a way determining criteria and has been fixing the common interests of the social community. Through a policy of central planning, determining what and where is going to be built, which branches of the economy would be favoured, and so on, the socialist state has imposed its own model of decision-making, its own system of co-ordinating common and individual interests. If one wanted to make a relevant distinction between the administrative and self-management periods one could state the following: whereas within the framework of the self-management structure *common* interests are *created* more as a *result* of a free „play“, that is of a freer activity and operating of the three pillars of a socialist

social development — the workingman as the individual, the workers' collective, and the local community (the commune), in the system with an exclusively state-socialist structure common interests are more *fixed in advance*, practically *formed* by the system itself.

For instance, the rate of accumulation which is in harmony with common interests of the country's economic development, the system of education and schooling that suits the broadest interests of the population, the type of books and their circulation, the relations that should be built between the nations and the smaller ethnic groups — these and many other important social problems are decided by the socialist state, that is by its organs. Even though this need not mean that decisions are being made arbitrarily, exclusively subjectively, the fact remains that *criteria* of decision-making are determined only by state, i.e., leading political organs. These criteria almost in advance determine what the common interests of the community or one of its sections would be and what method should be adopted as to the co-ordination of common and individual interests.

This sociological analysis of the mechanism of decision-making or, *distribution of public power* in conditions of statist socialism does not *a priori* cover the *assessment* of the decisions and criteria used as a basis for decision-making. The question of whether those criteria are „good” or not, whether they „really” suit the common interests or not can be answered only after a detailed examination of particular cases and not on the basis of general sociological analysis of the mechanism of social decision-making. Although it possesses the monopoly of decision-making on practically all major public problems, the socialist state does not have a monopoly of taking exclusively „correct” or exclusively „incorrect” decisions.

Nevertheless, the system of statist or administrative socialism contains a significant fundamental contradiction which does or can bring about various types of social tensions and a conflicting situations. As classics of Marxism affirmed and predicted, even a socialism society, however historically inescapable and progressive at a given time, is a form of „political alienation” of the individual in a period of transition to a classless society. If for a moment we ignore the *ultimate* objectives and interests of the working class to abolish itself as a class and political institutions of class society, primarily the state, as an organ of the class rule — if we only consider historically *current* interests of the working class to retain a socialist state and its political institutions — it is a fact that the monopoly held by state contains a significant contradiction which could cause a discord between the real interests of the workers, on the one hand, and the criteria or the whole system of decision-making, on the other. In fact, it is difficult to deny that the socialist state constitutes the force which rules „in the name of” the working class and that in this respect the workers influence very little or not at all the decision-making in political and other important matters concerning their own existence. Here I am primarily referring to decision relating to the distribution of the surplus of work. Even though the worker has been given certain rights which he did not have in capitalism or which he now has to a greater degree than previously (the right to employment,

to full economic security, to full social insurance, etc.), did not gain in the administrative period the right to administer the production and distribution of the surplus of production. The workers have liberated themselves from their class master and exploiter, but they did not take over their management over the production and distribution which was taken over exclusively by the socialist state and its organs.

It is an undoubtedly historical and sociological fact that is undeniable. What can, though, be established, according to one opinion, is the fact that the worker is not „really” interested in management over production, or even in decision-making on the distribution of the surplus of work. The worker, according to this viewpoint, is only interested in permanence of the employment, in having „reasonable wages” and an appropriate standard of living and let other worry about the organization of production and distribution. Although similar concepts exist even among the workers, in this particular case the whole working class is described as having „the mentality of an employee” with a permanent and safe job as the highest objective.

Even if the workers do not show dissatisfaction with the existing situation in the period of statist socialism, it is a fact that they do not have in this system the real right to management over production and distribution. Despite the positive aspects, this state of affairs can, after a certain time, incite the emergence of certain problems, difficulties, tensions, and conflicting situations. In this distribution of economic power the worker is nevertheless a subordinate factor with limited rights and duties. If he is no longer satisfied with only getting the equivalent of his work output if „the mentality of safe wages” does no longer suit him, the dissatisfaction arises among the workers and cannot be done away with unless the existing system of socio-economic relations begins to change.

Of course, this latent or manifest dissatisfaction of the workers with the existing „state hired labour” relations should not be the only, although it is the chief, decisive cause of a transition to the system of workers’ self-management. Whether one should switch over to that system or not depends on other factors as well. For instance, the conflict with Stalinism in 1948 played a highly significant role in that respect in Yugoslavia, and even in reality showed what can be a result of a bureaucratic alienation of the state and its policy from the real interests of the working class and the workers’ movement as a whole.

Anyhow, the contradiction between the statist structure and the interests of the working class to become a more significant economic and political factor constitutes the *basic dominant contradiction* of the administrative period, which is either directly or indirectly connected with numerous contradictions of this period. We can mention here only more significant contradictions partly dealt with in the beginning of this paper. From the cited basic contradiction arose more or less the contradiction between centralized, very often prestressed accumulation and a relatively low level of production of consumer goods, that is, the low standard of living of the population. Furthermore, the contradictions between centralized decision-making in the hands of the state and the absence of initiative of work organizations and individuals both in the economy and in other sectors of public life, in science, art, philosophy,

culture, are closely interconnected. The activity of the workers' collective and the individual is mainly guided by directives issued from „above”.

A series of other contradictions has been suppressed by being put into a latent state or indirectly subordinated to the settlement of primary, dominant contradictions. So, for example, the relationship between developed and underdeveloped regions of the country, which has very often included relations and differences between the interests of individual nations, was subordinated to and decided within the framework of the highest state and political forums, most frequently without the presence of the public at large. Nearly every raising of the question of broad publicity about problems and relations between the republics and other regions could have been interpreted as either conscious or unconscious „undermining” of brotherhood and unity of the people. Even though during the revolution and later on the national problem in Yugoslavia was solved on the basis of the principle of equality of nations and the abolition of every national discrimination, it is a fact that life itself has posed a whole series of questions affecting relations between nations and individual regions, the questions which were in the main considered at the highest state and political level, without a broader participation and engagement of the public at large. That was understandable not only because of the nature of the system of social decision-making which prevailed in the administrative period but also because of the fact that the national issue was still a delicate matter owing to highly tense national relations in the World War II.

Contradictions and Conflicting Relations in the Present Period of the Economic and Social Reform

If we leave out the consideration of characteristic and contradictions of the period of transition from the introduction of workers' self-management to the introduction of the economic and social reform, which would need a special analysis, one can state that the transition to the economic reform led to at least two essential consequences:

- a) the revolution and strengthening of some contradictions which were either more latent or secondary in the administrative period, and
- b) the emergence of relatively new contradictions which become dominant in or characteristic for the present period.

We are going briefly to examine these two types of contradictions.

By a gradual abandoning of the statist structure and the introduction of workers' and social self-government not only basic socio-economic relations began to be changed, but this also happened to conditions under which social contradictions and conflicting situations in Yugoslav society evolved. As the dominant contradiction of the preceding period weakened (statism against still relatively subordinated economic and social position of the working class), other contradictions made their respective appearances on the historical scene imposing themselves with growing strength and grew dominant in the present period of development.

Now the question arises what is *the basic, dominant contradiction of the present period of the economic and social reform?* In the opinion of some Yugoslav theorists, it is the contradiction between self-management and commodity production. Despite certain elements of the truth in this statement, this view is nevertheless essentially mistaken. In effect, a *certain* development of free relations on the market is no obstacle but, on the contrary, it is the essential *precondition*, a vital *prerequisite* of a fuller and freer development of self-managing work organizations. If it is desirable for the state to interfere decreasingly in relations within and between enterprises, then the development of a freer market is a pre-condition of a freer activity of work organizations as a factor in self-management.

Consequently, the essential contradiction of the present period should be sought elsewhere. In my opinion, it lies in *a contradiction between public planning in a new form and some spontaneous uncontrolled tendencies in commodity production*. On the one hand, the further evolution of self-management calls for more liberalization in relations on the market between more independent self-managing work organizations, whereas a process of liberalization of the market, on the other hand, aggravates the implementation of social planning. In this context, I am not referring to the classical, mostly outdated central planning, but to *a new system of social planning* which has to be developed at a future date in the conditions of a more dynamic self-management and a more liberal influence of the market.

In that respect in our country there has been a clear-cut basic political orientation which also found expression in the following standpoint taken in „The Guidelines on the Most Important Tasks Facing the League of Communists in the Development of the System of Social-Economic and Political Relations“: „... Considering the workingman in associated work as the basic factor of social reproduction, the self-management structure of the whole society should be organized in such way that it is made fit to direct and control relations in the market and to co-ordinate them with the principles of a socialist society.”³

Therefore, it is not a question of establishing some absolutely liberalized market economy which, by the way, does not exist even in capitalist society any longer. It is a question of a more liberal and dynamic social management of economic relations on the market whose principles can and should encourage economically *more rational and independent activity of work organizations*. But, if without a certain development of market economy self-management cannot develop any further, without a certain social guidance it is impossible to establish a *socialist* market economy. In that sense even in „The Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia” a clear attitude was taken that „a relatively liberal and concurrently controlled market should constitute one of the instruments of social planning and economic policy.”⁴ In essence, the same

³ Published by »Komunist«, Belgrade, 1968, p. 7

⁴ »The Programme of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia«, Belgrade, 1958, p. 161.

idea is repeated in „The Guidelines”, stating that the overcoming of existing contradictions arising in the conditions of commodity production can only be sought in „a conscious directing of market economy in terms of self-management”.

The essential direction of political and social action for overcoming the dominant contradiction between social planning and spontaneous, uncontrolled tendencies in commodity production is therefore clear enough in principle. Simultaneously, such a socio-economic system develops which should enable „conscious directing in terms of self-management of market economy”. In everyday practice, however, just because of the fact that that system has not yet developed sufficiently and because it is a question of an objective contradiction which cannot be fully abolished by any law or regulation, oscillations, difficulties, mistakes in one direction or another are inescapable.

Another contradiction is directly connected with the dominant contradiction in the current period between social planning and the spontaneous negative tendencies of commodity production that are at work. It is the *contradiction between the socialist principle of remuneration according to work whose implementation calls for an equalization of conditions of economic operations and the commodity production intensifying unequal conditions of production, particularly if socially uncontrolled*. Unequal conditions of work and distribution are not, though, only a consequence of more liberal operation of the market which stimulate stronger enterprises and threaten economically weaker ones. These conditions are mostly a result of the effect of two factors: (a) the fact that all work organizations did not enter the period of the economic reform from one and the same „starting positions”, since certain enterprises, because of their higher technological level, better opportunities for selling their products and other advantages which stemmed from the previous economic policy of the State and not from their own activity — started the economic reform under relatively easy conditions, whereas others, particularly the factories known under the name of „political plants”, are even at present in a difficult situation; (b) unequal conditions of running economic operations are in turn a result of the present policy of the State which has been stimulating certain branches and neglecting other; for instance, agriculture is still in a situation that is far more difficult than in most industrial branches, resulting, among other things, from the setting of the maximum prices of the main agricultural and livestock products (wheat, corn, meat, lard, etc.).

Anyhow, the liberalization of the market intensifies the economic differences in the position between enterprises which are not otherwise a result of higher efficiency of the given workers' collective but very often of past or present economic policy of the State. That is why the State is still held responsible for the existing situation in the economy and as such is obliged to intervene by its economic policy in the direction of equalization of conditions for all branches and enterprises. Naturally, a significant portion of responsibility rests on the economy itself in this respect, because economic organizations should join forces and help each other so as to surmount difficulties which they cannot

otherwise be blamed for, since those difficulties did not result from their own work.

In the field of the economy other latent or new contradictions also arise, stemming from the economic reform as its special result. We are going to list here briefly certain contradictions from the sphere of political life pertaining to the present period.

Socialist democratization of the economy had sooner or later to bring about a democratization in political life as well. The old method of political government, the role of the Party which was „the factor of authority” gradually collided with new forms of self-management in the economy and in other sectors of public life. The process of political „re-qualification” of the party is under way — from a force which was practically identified with state authority in the administrative period, into a social force which should orientate only ideo-politically the socialist development of society, leaving it up to state organs and social self-government to make decisions independently. This process has been going on approximately ever since the days of the 7th Congress in 1953. Naturally, it is a contradictory process and it reveals the *essential political contradiction* of the present period — the one between the old and still existent function of the Party as „the factor of authority” and its new role of an organized political force directing Yugoslav society and its development in the conditions of self-government.

Numerous political problems, difficulties, tensions, and conflicting situations emerge, as it appears to me, from this fundamental political contradiction or are closely interconnected with it. On the one hand, the League of Communists is still the leading political force responsible for the whole policy of Yugoslavia including, above all, the activity of the state and basic organs of social self-government. On the other hand, it is the champion of a process which could be described as „the withering away of the policy” in the classical sense of the word. The League of Communists has been trying to stir up the development of social conditions in which there would be less cases of political decisions being imposed „from above”, and there would be more decisions resulting from an understanding among self-managing organizations. This should introduce a process of developing a society in which, as Marx put it, the individual will be in a position „to reincarnate the citizen in the abstract sense of the word and as the individual to become a *generic being* in his empiric existence, in his individual activity, in his individual relations”.⁵

In the conditions of this process in which the essential political contradiction of the present period has been expressed, political oscillations of the League of Communists which has sometimes appeared in the role of „the factor of authority” and at other times as „the guiding ideo-political force” are a normal occurrence. It is equally understandable why the democratization of political life creates conditions for the appearance of two essentially different types of opposition — *the classical opposition* rallying various forces opposing socialism as a social system and *the new socialist opposition* criticizing the current policy of the League of Communists, particularly the concept of the

⁵ K. Marx: »Contribution to the Jewish Problem«, in the book »Early Works« by K. Marx and F. Engels, Zagreb, 1953, p. 65.

economic reform, starting from the theory of socialism but interpreting it in its own way. The appearance of socialist opposition in current circumstances in Yugoslav society is a new social phenomenon which yet calls for a separate analysis and sociological studies.

At any rate, the democratization of political life leads to a differentiation of political concepts and possibilities that differing political views be expressed in public. The limitation to political concepts which are „correct” and as such the only ones publicly recognized are characteristic only of the previous period of administrative socialism. A democratic differentiation of political views in the current period calls for *the constituting of new* forms and norms of political behaviour which are different from the classical forms of activity of the Party as „the factor of authority”. New forms and norms of political activity are, however, in the phase of development. They are still fluid, and this make it possible for conflicting political situations to arise more intensively. It is not my intention to conclude that the introduction of greater „political order”, that is, the development of new norms of political behaviour would prevent the arising of political conflicts in Yugoslav society in future. I want only to emphasize that these and other political and social contradictions in future socialist society would arise and be solved in a new, different form whose outlines can only hazely be seen at present.

Dr Mihailo V. Popović, born in Beograd, in 1929. Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Beograd and Head of the Department of Sociology. Field — general sociology (theory of sociology).

Graduated at the same Faculty in 1950 and obtained a Doctorate in 1956. Published more than 30 studies and articles in the field of general and political sociology. Books published: *Contemporary Sociology*, Kultura, Beograd, 1965, 2nd ed.; *The Subject-matter of Sociology*, Institut društvenih nauka (Institute of Social Sciences), Beograd, 1966; *The Problems of Social Structure*, Kultura, Beograd, 1967.

Le Centre universitaire international des sciences sociales de l'Université de Belgrade a édité en 1969 le premier recueil des conférences tenues aux séminaires du Centre au cours des dix premières sessions. Cependant, dans ce recueil, qui par mégarde n'est pas marqué comme premier, ne figurent pas toutes les conférences des dix premières sessions: on a fait une sélection, en donnant la préférence aux conférences de la X-ème session.

Ce volume renferme d'abord, en guise d'introduction, les trois articles suivants:

Prof. Borislav T. Blagojević: *Au nom de l'éditeur*

Prof. Vladimir Jovanović: *Dix ans d'activité du Centre universitaire international des sciences sociales de l'Université de Belgrade*

Prof. Savka Gligorić: *In memoriam — professeur Dragoslav Todrović, un des fondateurs et premier directeur du Centre.*

Les conférences de ce recueil sont réparties selon les thèmes traités et sont imprimées dans la même langue dans laquelle elles avaient été prononcées lors des sessions, en français ou en anglais:

THEMES GENERAUX

Dr Jovan Đorđević: *Le système politique et constitutionnel de la Yougoslavie*

Dr Branko Pribičević: *Yugoslavia and the Contemporary Workers and Socialist Movements*

Dr Radovan Samardžić: *L'évolution des cultures nationales des peuples yougoslaves.*

Dr Vladimir Šolaja: *Science and progress*

THEMES ECONOMICO-JURIDIQUES

Dr Ljubiša Adamović: *Yugoslavia and International Division of Labour*

Dr Borislav T. Blagojević: *Some Characteristic Private Law Institutions in the Socialist Countries*

Dr Živomir Đorđević: *Les formes de propriété en Yougoslavie*

Dr Andrija Gams: *Aspects juridiques de la propriété sociale*

Dr Vladimir Jovanović: *Le statut juridique des entreprises économiques yougoslaves et leurs rapports avec l'État*

Dr Miladin Korać: *Differences in the Amount of Personal Incomes between Economic Branches*

Dr Ivan Maksimović: *Yugoslav Economic Reform and Certain Problems in the Policy of Reform*

Dr Branislav Šoškic: *A Yugoslav View on the Main Trends and Schools of Economic Thinking*

THEMES PHILOSOPHICO-SOCIOLOGIQUES

Dr Veljko Korać: *Personality and Community under Socialism*

Dr Radomir Lukić: *La stratification sociale dans le socialisme d'autogestion*

Dr Dušan Nedeljković: *La conception moderne du monde et l'humanisme de la liberté d'autogestion*

Dr Vuko Pavićević: *Sur quelques problèmes de la morale socialiste*

Dr Branko Pavlović: *Les fondements philosophiques de l'autogestion*

Dr Miroslav Pečujlić: *Socialism and Class Changes*

Dr Mihailo V. Popović: *Influence, Power and Authority in Socialism*

Dr Svetozar Stojanović: *From Primitive towards Developed Communism*

Dans l'annexe du présent volume est donnée la liste des membres du Conseil du Centre du temps de la publication du premier recueil.

A la différence du présent recueil, le premier ne contenait pas une liste complète des auditeurs, car il ne s'agissait pas d'une seule session, mais d'une sélection des conférences tenues au cours des dix sessions précédentes du Centre.

Le premier recueil a été envoyé aux rectorats des universités en Yougoslavie et à l'étranger, ainsi qu'aux instituts des sciences sociales et à d'autres institutions. Les intéressés peuvent commander ce livre en s'adressant directement au Secrétariat du Centre.

Le Secrétaire du Centre,
Dragiša Stijović

CONSEIL DU CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES SOCIALES

Smilja AVRAMOV, professeur à la Faculté de droit; Borislav BLAGOJEVIĆ, professeur à la Faculté de droit; Toma BUNUŠEVAC, vice-recteur de l'Université; Žarko BULAJIĆ, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences économiques; Vida ČOK, collaborateur scientifique de l'Institut du droit comparé; Dragiša IVANOVIĆ, recteur de l'Université; Vladimir JOVANOVIĆ, professeur à la Faculté de droit; Ljubisav MARKOVIĆ, professeur à la Haute école des Sciences politiques; Dejan MEDAKOVIĆ, professeur à la Faculté de philosophie; Stojan NOVAKOVIĆ, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences économiques; Zoran PJANIĆ, professeur à la Faculté des Sciences économiques; Mihailo POPOVIĆ, professeur à la Faculté de philosophie; Milan ŠAHOVIĆ, conseiller scientifique de l'Institut pour la politique et l'économie internationales.

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LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS

Abdelmotaleb Ali,
Student,
UAR;

Andreocci Paolo,
Researcher in
Public Law,
Italia;

De Antoni Umberto, Etudiant,
Italia;

Arnaud Nicole, Etudiant,
Suisse;

Bakos Gabor, Researcher —
Institut of economics,
Hungary;

Benet Ivan, Rechercheur scientifique —
Institut de l'économie,
Hongrie;

Blok Zbigniew, Assistant,
Polska;

Buccheri dr Carla Maria, Lecturer —
Faculty of Economics,
Italia;

Cabrera Castro Edilberto, Professeur en Sociologie —
Faculté de Sociologie,
Colombie;

Carrado Medici, Student —
Faculty of Engineering,
Italia;

Craig Mc Donough, Doctoral
candidate in Economics,
USA;

Ditu Gheorghe, Chargé de cours —
Faculté des sciences économiques,
Roumanie;

Cinquelpalmi Ascanio, Collaborateur scientifique
Faculté de Droit,
Italia;

Feuerle Peter, Candidate doctoral in
Political Science,
USA;

Francisco L. Lima, Professeur —
Faculté des sciences politiques,
Brazil;

Gene Vanderport, student —
Political science,
USA;

Goertz Ulrike
Cand. phil.
BRD;

Vincenzo Grasso, Etudiant,
Italia;

Hamed Mansour Attia, Conseiller juridique —
Faculté de Droit,
UAR;

Kalo Mohamed, Conseiller commercial et culturel,
Guinée;

Kovo Safeta, Lecturer —
Faculté des sciences politiques Sarajevo,
Jugoslavija;

Konneker Marie Luise, Etudiante —
Faculté de philosophie,
BRD;

Avia Lazzerini, Etudiante —
Faculté des sciences politiques et sociales;
Italia;

Maschio Paolo,
Employé de banque,
Italia;

Masset Marie Jeanne, Assistante de publicité —
Institut d'Etudes politiques,
France;

Mitar Miljanović, Assistant —
Faculté des sciences politiques Sarajevo,
Jugoslavija;

Dr Molnar Istvan,
Chef de section Bibliothèque universitaire,
Hongrie;

Antonino Montemagno, Etudiant —
Faculté de Droit,
Italia;

Muraru Ioan, Assistant —
Faculté de Droit,
Roumanie;

Nichols Patrick, Assistant —
Western Michigan University,
USA;

Luigi Nocita, Collaborateur —
Faculté de Philosophie,
Italia;

Ilaria Papanti, Professeur et avocat —
Faculté de Droit,
Italia;

Mary Anne Poggenburg, Student,
USA;

Poujade Eric, Etudiant —
Faculté de Droit,
France;

Dr Prisca Nistor, Maître de conférences —
Faculté de Droit,
Roumanie;

Protas-Šotrić Tereas, Assistante —
Politechnika Poznanska;
Polska;

Carlos Roman del Rio, Professeur
Faculté de sciences économiques,
Espagne;

Dr Romanew Zbigniew, Adjoint —
Haute école des sciences économiques,
Polska;

Ryan Eileen, Student,
USA;

Saad Nassar, Ph. d. researcher,
UAR;

Sabru Cornel, Chercheur principal —
Faculté des sciences économiques,
Roumanie;

Tamara Spampinato, Licenciée —
Faculté des sciences économiques,
Italia;

Spiridon Aneta, Chercheur principal
Faculté de sciences économiques,
Roumanie:

Starck Brigitta, Licenciée —
Faculté de sciences sociales,
Finlande;

Tenyi Gyorgy, Rechercheur scientifique —
Faculté des sciences économiques,
Hongrie.

SOMMAIRE — CONTENTS

Dr <i>Branislav Šoškić</i> et Dr <i>Pavle Nikolić</i> : INTRODUCTION . . .	III
CONFERENCES	
Dr <i>Jovan Đorđević</i> : LA YUGOSLAVIE: VER UN SOCIALISME AUTOGERE	3
Dr <i>Dragoslav Janković</i> : LA QUESTION NATIONALE ET LES RAPPORTS ENTRE LES NATIONALITES EN YUOGO- SLAVIE	27
Dr <i>Milan Šahović</i> : LA POLITIQUE DE NON-ALIGNEMENT ET LA YUGOSLAVIE	41
Dr <i>Živomir Djordjević</i> : LA PROPRIETE SOCIALE ET LE TRAVAIL EN TANT QUE SOURCE DES DROITS DE PRO- PRIETE	53
Dr <i>Dušan Bilandžić</i> : RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-MANA- GEMENT AND MANAGEMENT IN THE ENTERPRISE	71
Dr <i>Nikola Balog</i> : THE LEGAL POSITION OF ENTERPRISES AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN ITS STRUCTURE	83
Dr <i>Vladimir Jovanović</i> : L'AUTOGESTION DES ENTERPRISES EN YUGOSLAVIE	95
Dr <i>Branislav Šoškić</i> : DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY AND THE SYSTEM OF WORKERS' SELF-MANAGEMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA	111
Dr <i>Ljubiša Adamović</i> : THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY AND THE INTERNATIONAL DIVISION OF LABOUR	127
Dr <i>Veljko Korać</i> : HUMANISM AND SELF-MANAGEMENT IN OUR TIME	150
Dr <i>Radmir Lukić</i> : YUGOSLAV SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION	159
Dr <i>Svetozar Stojanović</i> : THE CHARACTEROLOGICAL PATH OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION	177
Dr <i>Miladin Životić</i> : SOCIALISM AND CULTURE	193
Dr <i>Najdan Pašić</i> : SOCIALISM AND MODERNIZATION OF PO- LITICS	207
Dr <i>Mihailo Popović</i> : SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND SOCIAL CON- FLICTS IN SOCIALISM	219
<i>Dragiša Stijović</i> : REPLIQUE	233
CONSEIL DU CENTRE UNIVERSITAIRE INTERNATIONAL DES SCIENCES SOCIALES	235
LISTE DES PARTICIPANTS	237

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