WHAT THEN is the situation taken as a whole? For the first time we have in Germany a vigorous mass movement, for the first time we have gone beyond the mere forms of the parliamentary struggle and have managed to set the masses in motion. Unlike the situation which existed for almost a decade in Austria, we are not confronted by the difficult task of calling mass action into existence in the midst of general apathy, but we have only the rewarding and straightforward task of using the militant and aroused mood of the masses in order to give it political slogans, in order to transform it into political, socialist understanding, in order to go on in advance and point the way to the masses, in order to lead them forwards. The result of this situation is the fact that the slogan of the mass strike has come to the fore in the most natural fashion, and it is the duty of the Party to discuss it openly and clearly as a means of action which sooner or later must result from the development of the growing demonstration movement and the stubborn resistance of the forces of reaction. It is not a case of suddenly commanding a mass strike in Prussia from one day to the next, or 'calling for' the mass strike next week, but of making clear to the masses in connection with the criticism of all bourgeois parties and the explanation of the full situation in Prussia-Germany, of making clear historically, economically and politically that they are dependent not on bourgeois allies, and not on parliamentary action, but on themselves alone, on their own determined class action. The slogan of the mass strike thus arises not as an ingenious patent means of winning victories which is put on a pedestal, but as the formulation and summary of the political and historical lessons of present-day conditions in Germany.
Such an agitation for the mass strike provides the possibility of throwing light on the whole political situation, and the alignment of classes and parties in Germany, in the sharpest manner, of increasing the political maturity of the masses, of awakening their awareness of their strength and their militancy, of appealing to the idealism of the masses, of showing new horizons to the proletariat. Thereby the discussion of the mass strike becomes an excellent means of stirring apathetic layers of the proletariat, of winning over to our side proletarian supporters of the bourgeois parties, in particular the Centre Party[1], of preparing the masses for all eventualities in the situation, and finally of carrying out preparatory work in the most effective way for the Reichstag elections too.
If Comrade Kautsky now opens a campaign against this agitation, declares the discussion of the mass strike to be dangerous, and attempts to focus the whole movement for the right to vote on the coming Reichstag elections as the only target, then that simply means dragging the Party movement, which has already encouragingly opened up new areas of activity, back into the old worn-out tracks of pure parliamentarism.
But Comrade Kautsky is indulging in the superfluous when he preaches parliamentary optimism and parliamentary action to us in Germany. We have in any case for decades focused our Party life on the Reichstag elections as our main activity, and our tactics are in any case influenced more than enough by considerations about the parliamentary elections. Periodic discussions about tactics are condemned with a reminder about the approaching elections for the Reichstag. Because of considerations about the elections for the Reichstag, a completely wrong policy was pursued by 'Vorwärts' in 1907 and all our guns were turned on Liberalism while the Centre Party, because it was part of the parliamentary opposition, was ignored. Only because our provincial press, especially in the western region, did not follow this policy was our position successfully maintained. The attention of our Party leadership is focused principally on the elections for the Reichstag, and while for example it is taken as a matter of course at such elections that an unflagging agitation is spread throughout the whole country, all the speakers are on tour, and countless meetings are held in every town no matter how small, now during the movement for the right to vote nothing of the like is done. The agitation carried out in meetings and leaflets is minimal. Because of parliamentary considerations the 18th March this year, among other opportunities, was not used for the purposes of agitation: the meetings in Berlin arranged for the 15th March were to be linked to the third reading in the Prussian parliament, not to the Revolution[2]. Finally, because of considerations about working in parliament and because of parliamentary habits, the republican agitation is very much neglected by us, at the very moment when it is more pressing than ever.
Was what we needed right now in Germany, therefore, an even greater focusing of all our tactics on the Reichstag elections, an even greater enchantment of the masses by the prospects of the parliamentary elections?
I think not. The 'dangers" which had to be opposed could only exist in the imagination of those who have not been able to free themselves from the anarchistic conceptions of the mass strike. The real effect of Comrade Kautsky's behaviour is therefore only that he has provided theoretical protection for those elements in the Party and in the trade unions who feel uncomfortable at the prospect of the further unchecked development of the mass movement, who would like to keep it in check and withdraw as quickly as possible to the old and comfortable habits of the day-to-day parliamentary and trade union work. Since Comrade Kautsky, through reference to Engels and Marxism, has provided these elements with a means of calming their consciences he has at the same time provided a means once again to ruin for the period ahead the possibilities of the same demonstration movement that he would like to make more and more energetic.
It is clear, however, that, the further prospects of the suffrage movement now demand, on the contrary, a continuation and more powerful development of the mass action. The parliamentary collapse of the suffrage bill means the bankruptcy of both the government and the conservative-clerical bloc. The action of the enemy has temporarily run out of ideas, the action of the proletariat must be applied all the more forcefully. The enemy is on the retreat, for us the offensive is called for. Not consoling expectations about the grandiose revenge in one and a half years at the ballot box, but blow for blow right now; not weariness, but struggle along the whole front - that is what we need. And I repeat, if the mass of the party comrades understand and feel this, then our leaders also will pay attention. 'It is numbers that count'.
Finally, a small historical reminiscence which, however, is not without parallels to the present. Comrade Kautsky rejects for Prussia the examples of other countries in which the mass strike has recently been used. Russia was not valid as an example, nor Belgium, nor even Austria. In no way is it "possible to refer to the example of other countries in order to strengthen one's case about the present situation in Prussia". Comrade Kautsky himself, however, in order to find the right model for our tactics, goes back to the ancient Romans and Hannibal. Here he finds the example by which the German proletariat should be inspired, in Fabius the delayer, with his supposedly victorious 'strategy of attrition'. It seems to me that referring to the ancient Romans is going back a bit too far, but since Comrade Kautsky does indeed do this, I would like to point out anyhow that here too the facts are not quite accurate.
The fable of the necessary and victorious strategy of the Cunctator has already been destroyed by Mommsen, who points out that the "natural and correct use" of the Roman forces would have been a determined offensive right from the outset, and that the hesitant attitude of Fabius, which Mommsen describes as "methodically doing nothing", was not the manifestation of some deep strategic plan dictated by the actual situation, but flowed from the whole conservative, senile policy of the Senate.
"Quintus Fabius", says Mommsen, "was an old man, whose caution and steadiness appeared to not a few people as hesitation and stubbornness. An enthusiastic admirer of the golden age of the political omnipotence of the Senate and the authority of the civil leaders, he expected the salvation of the state from, after sacrifices and prayers, methodical conduct of the war". "There cannot have been a leading statesman who possessed an understanding of the situation as a whole", he says elsewhere, "everywhere either too much or too little had happened. Now the war began, at a time and place determined by the enemy; and, despite being justifiably quite aware of their military superiority, the Romans were at a loss with regard to the goal and course of the immediate operations". An offensive in Spain and Africa was the first law of tactics, "but what advantage commanded was neglected no less than what honour commended". "That the Spanish allies of Rome would be sacrificed for a second time as a result of that hesitation could be foreseen just as clearly as the fact that the hesitation itself could easily be avoided". "However wise it was on the part of the Romans to adopt a defensive stance and to expect the main victory from cutting off the enemy's food supplies, it was nonetheless a strange system of defence and starving into defeat in which the enemy had laid waste the whole of central Italy in full view of a numerically equal Roman army without being hindered, and in which the enemy to a large extent had collected sufficient supplies for the coming winter in its well-planned foraging expeditions". "Finally, as far as the Roman army was concerned, it was impossible to say that this type of war was forced on the generals. The army certainly consisted partly of enlisted peasant militia, but its core was formed by the experienced legions from Arminum, and, far from being discouraged by those recent defeats, it reacted bitterly to the scarcely honourable task which its leader, 'Hannibal's lackey", allotted to the army, and loudly demanded to be led against the enemy. There resulted the most vehement speeches in the civic assemblies against the stubborn old man". In this fashion Mommsen continues at length.
It was "not the 'delayer' who saved Rome", he says in short, "but the well constructed organisation of its confederacy and, perhaps as importantly, the national hatred with which the Phoenician was received by the Occidentals". This was so obvious that finally even "the majority of the Senate, in spite of the quasi-legitimation which the most recent events had given to Fabius' system of delay, was firmly resolved to abandon this form of war, which was slowly but certainly destroying the state". [Theodor Mommsen's Roman History, vol. 1, 3rd edition 1856, pp. 551-7].
Such was the situation of the victorious 'strategy of attrition of Fabius Cunctator'. In fact it is a legend which is preached in our schools to the grammar school pupils in order to drill them in conservatism and warn them against 'rashness' and 'revolutionaries', in order to hammer into them as the spirit of world history the motto behind which the veteran reserves march, 'Always slowly forward'. That this legend is now to be valid for the revolutionary proletariat, today, in this situation - that is one of the unexpected twists of fate.
However that may be, the spirit of the noble Quintus Fabius, who expected the salvation of the state from, after sacrifices and prayers, the methodical conduct of the war, is, it seems to me, adequately represented in our supreme Senate of the Party and of the trade unions. So far as I know, we have not yet suffered much in our Party leadership from a lack of caution, from youthful presumption and rashness. As Comrade Adler said at the German-Austrian Party Congress in Graz: "The whip always has a positive effect, and I admit that speeches at this Party Congress which complain that too little is happening are far preferable to those which advise prudence and circumspection. We already have circumspection, perhaps too much. We do not need you as a brake". And it is, I believe, much the same with us. That Comrade Kautsky lent his pen and his historical knowledge to endorsing the Cunctator's strategy was a waste, to say the least. As a brake, comrade Kautsky, we do not need you.
Notes
1. The Centre Party was a Catholic confessional party founded in the 1870s which had a large following in the Catholic areas of the country. It was strongly opposed to Prussian domination of a united Germany. The Centre Party had some support among Catholic workers (many of whom were in Catholic unions), particularly in the Rhineland.
2. The Revolution: i.e. the German Revolution of 1848.
Last updated on: 14.10.2026