

## Comrade PEPPER.

It is necessary to differentiate between the present ultra-Left wave in the Comintern and those Left currents which made their appearance earlier in the history of the Comintern. If we analyse these, we find the four following main currents:

Characteristic of the first wave, in 1919/20, were various anarcho-syndicalist tendencies in the Latin countries, the founding of the party known as the K. A. P. D. (German Communist Labour Party) in Germany, anti-Parliamentary trends in England, and currents in the C. P. of Great Britain opposed to communists joining the Labour Party. At the end of this period comrade Lenin's book on "Infantile Diseases" appeared.

The second wave arose at the beginning of 1921, at the time when the so-called offensive theory was brought forward in connection with the March insurrection in Germany. This second wave was put an end to by the III. World Congress.

The third wave was in connection with the resistance against the united front tactics. It ended at the V. World Congress.

The fourth wave has arisen in the course of the last few years in the form of the ultra-Left in Poland, headed by Domski, in the form of Bordiga's standpoint in Italy, the tendencies opposed to the formation of a "Labour Party" in Norway, the opposition within the C. P. of the Soviet Union, and the ultra-Left in Germany.

The first difference between the new-ultra Left and the old Left wave consists of the changed objective situation. Just before 1921 there was an immediately revolutionary Situation in Europe. Today we are passing through a period of capitalist stabilisation, which, however partial and uncertain, is still a stabilisation. From this arises the difference in the ideology of the new and the old tendencies. The roots of the ideology of the old Left were implanted in the then revolutionary situation, and

above all in the fact that this revolutionary situation had developed unequally in the different countries. The roots of the errors of the present ultra-Left lie in the partial stabilisation in the leading countries.

The second difference arises out of the first. The old Left expressed the idea of **revolutionary impatience**, Lenin accused them of wanting to thrust the vanguard of the working class too early into the battle, alone and unsupported, exposed too soon to the blows of the bourgeoisie. The present ultra-Left are characterised by precisely the contrary: Their whole trend of thought is **unrevolutionary and defeatist**. The Left of 1921 were too optimistic, the present ultra-Left have lost all faith in the power of the revolution, they cannot keep pace with the Communist International and the working class.

The third difference relates to the estimate of the development of the revolutionary movement. The old Left failed to notice the ebbtide of the immediately revolutionary situation. The present ultra-Left not only do not mention any immediately revolutionary situation whatever, but they anticipate — especially Maslov — an almost unending period of stabilisation, or at least a period of decades of stagnation.

The fourth difference consists of the attitude of the old Left, and that of the present ultra-Left, to the Soviet Union. The old Left were full of sympathy for Soviet Russia. They justified the March rising in 1921, for instance, by pointing to the necessity of hastening to the aid of the Soviet Union. They regarded Soviet Russia as the centre of world revolution. The present ultra-Left, on the other hand, does not regard the Soviet Union as the centre of the world revolution, but as its enemy. They declare that the Soviet Union is not a proletarian State, that there exists in it a tendency to bourgeois degeneration, that the C.P. of the Soviet Union is in reality not a proletarian party, and must be combatted.

The old Left were anxious for an immediate revolution in Europe. The ultra-Left of today demand in place of this a second revolution in Soviet Russia. In reality this is a desire for counter-revolution, for there is no third possibility: Every revolution against the proletarian revolution is a counter-revolution.

There are still a few other essential differences. Thus, for instance, the old Left was anti-Parliamentary, whilst the ultra-Left holds an anti-trade union standpoint. They are very willing to accept seats in Parliament, but feel no inclination for trade union work.

With regard to the social foundations of the ultra-Left, there are four social strata upon which the ultra-Left ideology can base itself.

The first stratum is a part of that petty bourgeoisie ruined by the inflation (especially in Germany), and reduced socially to a position similar to that of the working class.

The second stratum is formed by declassed intellectuals thrown out of customary conditions of life in the postwar period; the social position of these has been greatly proletarised, and in many cases they attempted to approach the Communist Party.

The third stratum consists of the declassed members of the proletariat itself, the workers condemned to permanent unemployment.

And finally, the fourth stratum consists to a certain extent of the workers employed in small undertakings, and of the proletariat in the countries with a preponderantly petty bourgeois population.

It need not be said that we must adopt a different attitude towards the declassed intellectuals than to those sections of the working class which have been temporarily thrown out of the process of production.

This analysis is necessary if the ultra-Left are to be successfully combatted.

If we seek for the sources of the recent ultra-Left revival, we find these in the following five phenomena:

1. The partial stabilisation of capitalism, and the slower speed of the revolution;

2. The difficulties connected with the building up of Socialism in the Soviet Union;

3. The offensive policy maintained by imperialism against the Soviet Union, the capitalist policy of encircling the Soviet Union, expressed with great aggressiveness in the "adaption to the West" adopted by the German bourgeoisie. Both the social democrats and a section of so-called communists have fallen under the influence of this trend to the West.

4. Right errors committed by some of the Communist Parties. Those who have not grasped the nature of Braudler's errors in 1923 cannot comprehend the ultra-Left deviations of Ruth Fischer and Maslov. One must not, however, overestimate this fourth source of the ultra-Left revival. The first three are much more important and decisive, being of a social and political nature.

5. The opposition in the C. P. S. U. It is probable that our Russian comrades are not all fully aware of the enormous amount of damage done to our brother parties abroad by the oppositional attitude of Comrade Zinoviev, and by the action of the Opposition against the Leninist line pursued by the C. P. of the Soviet Union. The capitulation of the Opposition in the C. P. of the Soviet Union, the defeat of the ultra-Left in Germany, and the almost hundred per cent defeat of Bordiga in Italy, all go to show, however, that the ultra-Left will soon be a thing of the past.

A final victory over the Opposition is necessary not only because the opposition carries on a fraction struggle and because a leadership is impossible in a Communist Party where permanent fractions exist. This is only one of the reasons why the ultra-Left should be liquidated with all possible speed. The second and decisive political reason lies in the political line taken by the ultra-Left, in the fact that they are opponents of the united front tactics, that their attitude towards the social democratic workers is false, that they actually undermine the work being done in the trade unions, that they oppose the Soviet Union and demand a "second revolution" in Soviet Russia, that they wish to replace Leninism by some new and special West European Communism, that they oppose the so-called "Moscow dictatorship", and that they are opposed to revolutionary centralism under the leadership of the Comintern. All this makes the liquidation of the ultra-Left necessary. The old Left have adapted themselves to the Communist International. The path of the ultra-Left leads further away from the Communist International, into the camp of the social democrats, and often into the camp of open bourgeois counter-revolution. The ideological struggle against the ultra-Left is of first importance, but organisatory measures are necessary at the same time. The Communist International can only march forward over the political corpse of the ultra-Left.