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From the Editors

For more than 150 years socialists have insisted that only workers themselves can make any fundamental change in social relations because only workers organizing themselves in the process of struggle to become a governing class can ensure that the old class society isn't reproduced by a new class of exploiters; the new society created by them would have democratic workers' control over the means of production. Revolutions in such countries as China, Cuba, Vietnam, and N. Korea were not led by the working class (urban or rural), as Regis Debray made clear in his *Revolution in the Revolution* (1967). We shouldn't want the 1959 Cuban Revolution to be a democratic workers' uprising, he wrote, because "No political front which is basically a deliberative body can assume the leadership of a people's war; only a technically capable executive group, centralized . . . can do so; in brief, only a revolutionary general staff." Contrast that to Eugene Debs's "Too long have the workers of the world waited for some Moses to lead them out of bondage. He has not come; he never will come. I would not lead you out if I could, for if you could be led out, you could be led back again. I would have you make up your minds that there is nothing that you cannot do for yourselves."

A special section of this issue is devoted to workers' struggles today. Who are the workers? How are they organized? What are their chances of success? Both John Hammond and Jennifer Shea-Brandynn Holgate stress difficulties in organizing : Hammond, the World Social Forum activists from diverse backgrounds and interests; and Shea-Holgate, isolated caregivers. Andreas Malm and Shora Esmailian discuss the extremely difficult struggle that Iranian workers are having against the religious dictatorship; John Gibler writes about the bloody uprising of Mexican teachers and other workers in poverty-stricken Oaxaca; but Karen Wirsig tells of a victory for Canadian broadcast workers.

Our special section on the elections highlights the dilemma that activists face in trying to mount an opposition to media-favored millionaire candidates — join a third party or the progressive wing of the Democratic Party? Jonathan Tasini challenged Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primary and was virtually ignored by the media, as was Howie Hawkins in his Green Party challenge to her.

Also featured in this issue is Stephen R. Shalom's analysis of crises in the Middle East: in Iraq, Iran, Lebanon , and Palestine. The rest of our articles again cover a wide spectrum: from abortion, adoption, and psychotherapy to a discussion of whether the Bush Administration is fascist.

When things look bleak, we are reminded of the words of the Spanish Civil War revolutionary, Buenaventura Durruti: "We carry a new world here in our hearts. That world is growing this minute."

Marvin and Betty

CORRECTIONS

Issue #40:

Footnote #9 in Alan Aja's "The Intra-Immigrant Dilemma" should read,

For a discussion on the expanding boundaries of whiteness, see Warren, Jonathan and Winddance Twine, Frances, "White Americans, the New Minority? Non-Blacks and the Ever Expanding Boundaries of Whiteness," *The Journal of Black Studies*, 28, No. 2 (1997): 200-218.

Issue #41:

The name of Helen Lachs Ginsburg, co-author of "The Ups and Downs of the Swedish Welfare State," was misspelled on the cover.

Middle East Developments

Stephen R. Shalom

> What we're seeing here, in a sense, is . . . the birth pangs of a new Middle East. . . .
>
> — Condoleezza Rice, July 21, 2006

The Middle East has indeed undergone some dramatic changes in recent months — in Iraq, the chaos has intensified and U.S. policy is eliciting doubts even from key Republicans; the government of Iran seemingly defies Washington and the European Union; in Lebanon, Hezbollah thwarted the previously invincible Israeli armed forces; and in Palestine, Hamas has taken power and new fighting has erupted in Gaza. But amidst all the changes there are also important continuities. Washington is still pursuing its basic policy of six decades: trying to assure its dominance in a region of stupendous economic and strategic value. And Israel remains committed to the iron fist over diplomacy and continues to refuse Palestinians the same right of self-determination that is exercised by Israeli Jews.

Let me take up each of these four crises in turn.

Iraq

This past March, Howard Kaloogian, a right-wing Republican, sponsored a "Truth Tour" to Iraq to "tell the American people about the accomplishments [U.S. troops] are making in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the fight against terrorism." When he returned he posted a picture of downtown Baghdad on his website — showing a peaceful urban setting complete with a couple walking hand-in-hand. Kaloogian explained that

> [W]e took this photo of downtown Baghdad while we were in Iraq [which is] much more calm and stable than what many people believe it to be. But, each day the news media finds any violence occurring in the country and screams and shouts about it — in part because many journalists are opposed to the U.S. effort to fight terrorism (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 3/30/06).

His photograph was pretty dramatic, except for one small detail. It wasn't a picture of Baghdad at all, but of Istanbul.

Kaloogian's propaganda ploy was astounding even half a year ago, but today no one denies that the situation in Iraq is absolutely horrendous. Military officers and Republican officials are speaking publicly about the unfolding disaster. The most careful survey of death rates — using a methodology that is standard in crisis situations and published in the peer-reviewed medical journal, *Lancet* — suggests a violent death toll of some 600,000 since the beginning of the war. This is far higher than previous estimates, especially those obtained by adding up press accounts, but careful journalists have long known that media reports were likely to grossly undercount the true toll. As journalist Patrick Cockburn noted (*Independent*, 5/23/06), "As Baghdad and Iraq, aside from the three Kurdish provinces, become the stalking ground for death squads and assassins, it is impossible to report the collapse of security without being killed doing so." The *Lancet* figure is also higher than reports from the Iraqi public health system, but there is no reason to expect that system to be functioning reliably in a society in a state of near collapse. It is not surprising, for example, that

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local officials might issue death certificates for people without carefully recording, tabulating, and passing on the resultant numbers. According to UN officials, the health ministry — controlled by followers of Muqtada al-Sadr — understates death totals under pressure from militias (*Christian Science Monitor* [*CSM*], 5/26/06). That Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has barred the further release of death numbers (*New York Times* [*NYT*], 10/21/06) makes clear how politically these numbers are viewed. Perhaps further research will show the *Lancet* figures to be too high, but even if the toll turns out to be 100,000 instead of six times that number, this is clearly a humanitarian crisis of the first order.

Life in Iraq is pretty grim even for those who manage to avoid death. UNICEF reports that 9 percent of Iraqi children under age five suffer from acute malnutrition, compared to 4 percent in 2002, the last year of Saddam Hussein's rule. (And this is hard to blame on insurgent sabotage because the situation is worst in the South, where the insurgency is more or less absent.) Unemployment estimates run from 25 to 70 percent — no one has any real idea. Earlier this year, the food ration was cut, as part of the free market policies urged by the United States and the IMF (Salman, *Iraqi Crisis Report*, 3/29/06). Electricity production and oil production are lower than they were before the war. Water treatment capacity is one third of the prewar level, a figure that overstates the amount of potable water reaching Iraqi households because some 60 percent of water treatment output is lost due to leakage, contamination, and illegal connections, not to mention that leaking sewage sometimes enters the water mains (GAO-06-697T, April 25, 2006, p. 25).

Since February 2006, when the Shiite al-Askari shrine was blown up in Samarra, sectarian violence has escalated to a horrendous scale. True, not everyone thinks this is all bad. Daniel Pipes has commented (*Jerusalem Post* [*JP*], 3/1/06) that "when Sunni terrorists target Shiites and vice versa non-Muslims are less likely to be hurt." But in fact, the insurgency and attacks against coalition troops have not lessened. Average weekly attacks are at an all-time high and twice the rate of spring 2004 (see Brookings' Iraq Index).

Some argue that because of the near civil war in Iraq it is clearer than ever that U.S. troops need to remain. However, the case for withdrawal still makes good sense — and, indeed, better sense than ever.

Consider first Iraqi public opinion. The views of Iraqis are not decisive in these matters (after all, even if the Mexican people voted for U.S. troops to come in and crush the Zapatistas, the U.S. left shouldn't support such an intervention). Nevertheless, Iraqi opinion is certainly something we should carefully weigh.

In the chaotic conditions prevailing in Iraq, public opinion polls are likely to have many weaknesses. Nevertheless, reasonable surveys with representative samples seem to be possible in Iraq. In September 2006, a poll was conducted for WorldPublicOpinion.org by the well-respected Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, using a nationwide representative sample of 1,150 Iraqi adults.

One question asked "Which of the following would you like the Iraqi government to ask the U.S.-led forces to do?"

	Kurd	Shia Arab	Sunni Arab	Total
Withdraw all U.S.-led forces within six months	11	36	57	37%
Gradually withdraw U.S.-led forces according to a one-year timeline	24	38	34	34%
Gradually withdraw U.S.-led forces according to a two-year timeline	34	20	7	20%
Only reduce U.S.-led forces as the security situation improves in Iraq.	31	5	2	9%

The Bush administration's option, which is the last response above — to abide by no timetable at all — was the choice of fewer than one in ten respondents. Seven out of ten want U.S. troops out within a year and more than a third want them out within six months. Responses vary across the main ethnic groups, with Kurds being most in favor of retaining U.S. forces (though note that U.S. troops are not stationed in the three Kurdish provinces); 74 percent of Shia Arabs and 91 percent of Sunni Arabs want the U.S. troops out within a year.

With the U.S. out, there would be strong incentives on Iraqis to reach some sort of accommodation.

But aren't U.S. troops necessary for security? Not if you ask the Iraqi people. Asked explicitly, "Do you think the U.S. military presence in Iraq is currently a stabilizing force or that it is provoking more conflict than it is preventing?" large majorities of Shia and Sunni Arabs chose the second option.

	Kurd	Shia Arab	Sunni Arab	Total
A stabilizing force	56	17	2	21%
Provoking more conflict than it is preventing	41	82	97	78%

In March 2006, the U.S. public was asked the same question and, by a 55 to 43 majority, they too judged U.S. troops to be more of a provocation than a stabilizing force.

The poll further showed that a majority of Iraqis (61 percent overall; 15 percent of Kurds, 62 percent of Shia Arabs, and 92 percent of Sunni Arabs) approved of attacks on U.S.-led troops. Support for attacks on Iraqi security forces stood at only 7 percent and on civilians under 1 percent.

Some of these results are more dramatic than those shown in previous polls, but the pattern could long be discerned. At the end of March 2006 a poll by the International Republican Institute asked respondents whom they trusted for their personal safety. The Iraqi police was the answer of 43 percent, the Iraqi army 35 percent, insurgents 6 percent, armed militias 4 percent, "other" 3 percent, and only 1 percent chose the U.S.-led "multinational forces." In August 2005, a leaked secret British Ministry of Defense poll found that 82 percent of Iraqis strongly opposed the presence of "coalition troops." Those who thought coalition forces were responsible for any improvement in security constituted less than 1 percent of respondents, while 67 percent thought they were less secure because of the occupation.

U.S. troops have been in Iraq for three and a half years now and the longer they've been there, the closer the country has come to civil war. In part this is a result of Abu Ghraib, Haditha, and other well-publicized U.S. abuses of Iraqi citizens. In part it is a result of the main U.S. military tactic of search and destroy, a way of proceeding guaranteed to extend the scope and popularity of the Sunni Arab guerrilla movement. But many U.S. and British military officers have acknowledged that the very presence of foreign troops drives the insurgency. General George Casey, the commander of the "multinational" forces, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last September that coalition forces, as an occupying force, are part of what fuels the insurgency. "We are creating many, many more enemies than we are ever reducing," declared Lt. Gen. Pete Chiarelli, the number two U.S. officer in Iraq, in June. And the commander of British forces, Gen. Sir Richard Dannatt, told a newspaper that Britain should get its 7,200 soldiers out of the south of the country "sometime soon" because "our presence exacerbates the security problems" (*Seattle Times*, 10/1/05; ABC News, 6/7/06; *CSM*, 10/16/06).

This doesn't mean that Iraqis reject international assistance out of some sort of irrational sense of nationalism. They have very good reason to be suspicious of U.S. intentions. Iraqis know, for example, that

- Washington backed the Ba'athist coup in 1963, even giving the plotters lists of suspected Communists to kill (Roger Morris, *NYT*, 3/14/03).
- In 1975, Washington betrayed the Kurds it had been supporting, allowing them to be slaughtered ("covert action should not be confused with missionary work," Secretary of State Kissinger explained in secret testimony contained in the leaked Pike Report).
- During the Iran-Iraq war, Washington supported Saddam Hussein despite the fact that he started the war and used chemical weapons.
- When, after the war, Saddam Hussein conducted his ruthless Anfal campaign against the Kurds, including the use of chemical weapons, the administration of Bush senior continued providing Iraq with agricultural credits and even biological agents useful for making biological weapons. The White House blocked the imposition of sanctions against Iraq, not out of any objection to sanctions on principle, but because it wanted to continue supporting Saddam Hussein (see Jentleson, *With Friends Like These,* Norton, 1994).
- During the first Gulf War, U.S. forces intentionally attacked civilian infrastructure, knowing it would cause a health crisis for the Iraqi population (Gellman, *Washington Post* [*WP*], 6/23/91; Nagy, *Progressive*, 9/01). The infrastructure destruction together with more than a decade of punishing economic sanctions would lead to hundreds of thousands of excess deaths (Garfield, "Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children From 1990 through 1998," March 1999).
- Following the first Gulf War, after urging Iraqis to rise up against Saddam Hussein, Washington denied the rebels access to captured Iraqi weapons and allowed Saddam Hussein to use his helicopters to slaughter the insurgents as U.S. aircraft circled overhead.
- In 2003, Washington began its occupation by protecting the oil ministry and oil wells while allowing the rest of the country to be looted.
- U.S. imposed privatization, sweetheart deals for Halliburton, and other favored U.S. corporations. (See, among many sources, James Glanz's 10/25/06 *NYT* report.)
- U.S. government officials are hard at work securing Iraqi oil for U.S. elites. (See Muttitt, *Crude Design: The Rip-off of Iraq's Oil Wealth*, PLATFORM, 11/05; and various reports by Joshua Holland on *AlterNet*: 5/22/06, 10/16/06, 10/17/06.)
- Despite Rumsfeld's claim that "at the present time" Washington seeks no permanent bases in Iraq, the Pentagon is building what it calls "enduring" bases. (See Sam Graham-Felsen, *AlterNet*, 7/28/05).

ONE DOESN'T HAVE TO CONJURE UP some mythical Iraqi past where everyone got along to realize that whatever conflicts existed between Iraq's ethnic groups would be exacerbated, not reduced, by the presence of U.S. troops. This was so for several reasons. Those who engage in sectarian and anti-civilian attacks hide behind the mantle of opposition to the occupation which has widespread support. If the occupation were to end, these extremists would be more readily isolated. For example, the Association of Muslim Scholars, the leading Sunni organization with ties to the resistance, has said that were a timetable set for withdrawal they would issue a fatwa against any further armed actions.

Moreover, as Nir Rosen, who spent 16 months reporting from Iraq, has observed (*Atlantic*, 12/05), the Shia-dominated government carries the stigma in the eyes of many Sunnis of being collaborators with the occupation; this makes it harder than it would otherwise be for them to recruit Sunnis to any multiethnic police force and army, leading them to depend on militias, which further provokes the Sunnis. With the U.S. out, there would be strong incentives on Iraqis to reach some sort of accommodation.

In calling for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, we need to make clear that we mean the complete withdrawal of all U.S. troops and bases. At the same time, we must demand that the United States contribute funds for the reconstruction of Iraq — but without U.S. control. This is the very least we owe the Iraqi people.

With present U.S. policy so obviously a failure, there is some possibility that Bush will change course after the midterm elections. Perhaps he will take the advice of John McCain and others to increase the number of U.S. troops. But doing so is unlikely to achieve victory. Moreover, it will impose further strains on the U.S. military, and may be unsustainable without a draft, which would entail serious political costs. Nevertheless, given the stakes for Washington, such an option can't be ruled out. Another possibility is to draw down U.S. troops in Iraq, while resorting to counterinsurgency by airpower, with even worse consequences for Iraqi civilians than we've been seeing, and also unlikely to secure the country for U.S. interests. Perhaps the most likely option is for Washington to support some sort of military coup by Sunni and Shia officers, forcing out the elected Iraqi leaders, and trying to establish the sort of regime Washington always preferred for Iraq: Saddamism without Saddam.

This last option would mean that the Bush administration would have to give up on its proclaimed commitment to democracy in the Middle East. But of course Washington was never serious about this. When U.S. officials complained about the results of one of the few democratic elections in the region — the one that brought Hamas to power in Palestine — their close friend, Saudi foreign minister Prince Saud al-Faisal, told them: "Of course we always warned against elections, that sometimes they bring results that you don't want. That's why we haven't applied the system yet in Saudi Arabia" (*WP*, 5/18/06).

But though Bush is not serious about democracy in Iraq (or the Middle East generally), that doesn't mean *we* shouldn't care about democracy — real democracy, not the combination of privatization and elite domination that pundits often mistake for democracy. Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein's legacy and Bush's war and occupation have created great obstacles to the achievement of genuine democracy in Iraq, at least in the short run. Though the Iraqi resistance includes many motivated by a nationalist resentment of foreign occupation, the only organized political expression in the insurgency comes from neo-Baathists, Islamic fundamentalists, and Sunni supremacists. Muqtada al-Sadr opposes Saddam Hussein and George Bush, but the religious orthodoxy imposed by his armed followers is frightening. Even Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, whose nonviolent pressure campaign forced the United States to allow elections in Iraq, posted a fatwa on his website authorizing death for gays (now changed to apply only to lesbians) (see Doug Ireland's report at http://direland.typepad.com/direland/, 10/21/06). One of the great tragedies of Iraq — and there are many — is the extreme weakness of any progressive forces in the country. We should express our solidarity with those that do exist — such as the Basra oil workers' union which has taken a position opposing both the occupation and privatization — but without any illusions as to their current political strength.

Iran

OVER THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF, various analysts (Scott Ritter, Seymour Hersh, Ray McGovern) have reported from inside-the-government sources that Washington or its Israeli ally is about to attack Iran. The attacks have not occurred, and they would be absolutely insane from even the most narrow view of U.S. elite (or Israeli elite) interests. Nevertheless, given U.S. setbacks elsewhere in the region and the disconnect between the Bush administration and reality, such attacks cannot be ruled out. It should also be noted that many signs of preparations for war are consistent not only with an actual intent to launch an attack, but with an intent to intimidate and destabilize Tehran.

Washington's proclaimed justifications for war are Iran's nuclear program and its dictatorial regime. Each of these ought to matter a great deal to anyone concerned about international peace or justice, but is totally hypocritical coming from the U.S. government.

We don't know what Iran is doing with its nuclear research. Though there is no current evidence that it has moved towards developing a nuclear weapon, or gone beyond the civilian nuclear power program to which it is entitled as part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Tehran has not been forthcoming with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as its adherence to the NPT requires. The Bush administration, however, has made all sorts of exaggerated and unsubstantiated claims. The Republicans on the House Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report asserting that Iran's nuclear program was being downplayed by the IAEA, leading the IAEA to respond with a letter charging that the report "contains erroneous, misleading, and unsubstantiated information" and that parts of the report were "outrageous and dishonest" (Heinrich, Reuters, 9/14/06). In any face-off between the Bush administration and the IAEA, one should keep in mind that the former was shown to have lied about Iraq's nuclear program before the U.S. invasion in 2003, and the latter had it exactly right. One should note as well that the former bugged the telephone of Mohammad ElBaradei, the IAEA head, trying unsuccessfully to prove him an Iranian lackey (*WP*, 12/12/04).

Is there cause to be suspicious of Iran's nuclear program? Of course. There is no reason to assume that assurances of peaceful intent by Iranian leaders are any more credible than those of other leaders, especially given the general lack of transparency in Iran. In addition, threats of the sort that have been made against Iran for the past few years provide strong

The way to reduce the likelihood of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is exactly the opposite of that pursued by Washington.

inducement for nations to seek nuclear weapons for their defense. As Israeli military analyst Martin Van Creveld has commented (*International Herald Tribune*, 8/21/04), Iranian leaders "would be crazy" not to be developing a nuclear deterrent.

This doesn't mean, of course, that we should favor an Iranian bomb. Nuclear deterrence is an incredibly dangerous proposition and the possibility of accidental or unintended use or crisis provocation outweighs any defensive benefit the bomb may afford. But the way to reduce the likelihood of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is exactly the opposite of that pursued by Washington. Heavy-handed threats (coupled with the example of the U.S. invasion of Iraq — which, notably, did not have a nuclear deterrent) make acquisition of a nuclear weapon by Iran more likely rather than less so. Despite dire warnings from Bush, even if we assume the worst about Iran's nuclear intentions, it is still at least five years away from having a nuclear weapon (see, *Washington Times*, 4/20/05, 8/31/06; *NYT*, 9/7/06). There is time for diplomacy, if it is in fact desired.

In the spring of 2003, authorities in Tehran — portrayed by Washington and Tel Aviv as implacably hostile — made an overture that clearly showed a peaceful resolution of the crisis is possible. According to Flynt Leverett, then senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council,

> [T]he Iranian Foreign Ministry sent Washington a detailed proposal for comprehensive negotiations to resolve bilateral differences. The document acknowledged that Iran would have to address concerns about its weapons programs and support for anti-Israeli terrorist organizations. It was presented as having support from all major players in Iran's power structure, including the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. . . .Unfortunately, the administration's response was to complain that the Swiss diplomats who passed the document from Tehran to Washington were out of line (*NYT*, 1/24/06).

Iran has also agreed to a system of international control of all fissile material, as proposed by ElBaradei, which would prevent diversion of nuclear fuel to a weapons program — and is indeed the only country to have indicated its agreement (see Chomsky & Achcar, *Perilous Power*, Paradigm, 2006, p. 233).

SOME CLAIM THAT STATEMENTS from Iranian officials make clear that as soon as Iran obtains a nuclear weapon it will use it to "wipe Israel off the map." On the contrary, Iranian officials have explicitly stated that Iran would never attack any nation (de Bellaigue, *New York Review of Books*, 4/28/06). (This, obviously, doesn't prove Iranian peaceful intent, but the claim that an intent to attack Israel has been publicly declared is simply false.) And despite the outrageous Holocaust-denying statements from Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the more powerful Iranian leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, has indicated that Iran accepts the Arab consensus on Israel-Palestine, namely full normalization of relations in return for Israeli withdrawal to its 1967 borders (see his June 4 speech at www.khamenei.ir/EN/home.jsp).

The NPT places various restrictions and obligations on signatories that do not have nuclear weapons. But in article VI it imposes a serious obligation on the nuclear weapons states — and indeed, the have-not nations have made clear that their continued acceptance of the NPT is contingent on the haves abiding by article VI. Article VI states:

> Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

None of the nuclear weapons states, especially the United States, have met their article VI obligations. If we just look at this past year in the UN General Assembly we get a sense of Washington's commitment to nuclear disarmament. Resolution 60/46, prohibiting the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction, was adopted by a vote of 180 in favor to 1 against (United States), with 1 abstention (Israel). Resolution 60/48 on implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace was adopted with three no votes, France, the UK, and the United States. Resolution 60/53 sought effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; it was adopted 120-0, with 59 abstentions, including the United States. Resolution 60/54, aiming to prevent an arms race in outer space, was approved 180-2, with only Israel and the United States voting no. Resolution 60/56 on accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments was adopted with five negative votes (France, India, Israel, the UK, and the United States). Resolution 60/58 on a nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas was opposed only by France, the UK, and the United States. Resolution 60/65 expressing a renewed determination to totally eliminate nuclear weapons was adopted 168-2-7, with only the United States and India voting no. A resolution on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, 60/

92, was opposed only by the United States, Israel, and three tiny Pacific island nations. And resolution 60/95 urging all nations to approve the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was adopted 172-1-4, with only the United States voting against.

There are many inadequacies in the NPT, but the United States has failed to meet its most basic obligations. That some have-not nations feel it's an unjust system is not surprising. U.S. aggression and threats, together with its failure to meet its disarmament obligations, create an international political climate in which Iran (and others) appear to many inside and outside Iran to have a legitimate reason to acquire nuclear weapons. On the other hand, serious U.S. disarmament efforts and a peaceful and democratic U.S. foreign policy would help to undercut — internally and internationally — the case for Iran going nuclear.

Washington's criticisms of Tehran for its dictatorial practices are likewise the height of cynicism, given that it was Washington that snuffed out democracy in Iran back in 1953 and supported the Shah's brutal dictatorial rule for a quarter of a century. And Washington didn't mind the mullahs' repressive policies either, as long as the victims were the right ones. In 1983, according to the official Tower Commission,

> [T]he United States helped bring to the attention of Teheran the threat inherent in the extensive infiltration of the government by the communist Tudeh Party and Soviet or proSoviet cadres in the country. Using this information, the Khomeini government took measures, including mass executions, that virtually eliminated the pro-Soviet infrastructure in Iran.

In Iran today, repression is widespread, there are scores of political prisoners, torture is used, there is violence and discrimination against women and minorities in law and practice, freedom of expression is severely curtailed, and during the presidential elections of June 2005 a large numbers of prospective candidates, including all the women who were running, were arbitrarily disqualified. Those leftists who praise Iran's treatment of women or gays or minorities are foolishly allowing Iran's opposition to U.S. policies to excuse very real oppression. This oppression needs to be vigorously condemned. At the same time, however, we should keep in mind, as Gilbert Achcar has noted, that on every measure of democracy, repression, or women's rights Iran is a beacon of enlightenment compared to the Saudi regime, a close U.S. ally. Candidates for president are not disqualified in Saudi Arabia because a presidential election in that country would be unheard of. Not only don't women run for the most minor offices, they are not even allowed to vote.

Those who want to help the expansion of democracy and women's rights in Iran know, as Nobel Peace Prize winner and founder of the Center for Defense of Human Rights in Tehran, Sharin Ebadi, put it (*NYT*, 2/8/05), that "for human rights defenders in Iran, the possibility of a foreign military attack on their country represents an utter disaster for their cause." There are independent human rights groups in Iran, and their protests have had some impact, yet, Ebadi notes, "the threat of foreign military intervention will provide a powerful excuse for authoritarian elements to uproot these groups and put an end to their growth." She writes:

> [T]he most effective way to promote human rights in Iran is to provide moral support and international recognition to independent human rights defenders and to insist that Iran adhere to the international human rights laws and conventions that it has signed. Getting the Iranian government to abide by these international standards is the human rights movement's highest goal; foreign military intervention in Iran is the surest way to harm us and keep that goal out of reach.

Lebanon

THE MONTH-LONG ISRAELI WAR in Lebanon was in many respects a proxy war fought by

Washington. When Tel Aviv needed more munitions, including cluster bombs, the United States rushed these to Israel. When Tel Aviv wanted a free hand to attack Lebanon without interference by the UN or any other sort of international pressure, the United States provided the blocking. As Israel killed some 1,200 civilians, and destroyed 130,000 housing units, along with bridges, factories, schools, hospitals, and much of the country's electrical network, the Bush administration stalled any ceasefire resolution. Press accounts indicate that Israel officials shared their war plans with Washington long before July 2006, and in any event it is certainly unlikely that Israeli officials would have gone to war without coordinating with their American ally.

For the Bush administration, this was not simply a matter of doing a favor for a friend. Given the close ties between Hezbollah and Tehran, Washington hoped that crushing Hezbollah would not just destroy an anti-American organization, but eliminate one of Iran's chief means of retaliation in the event of an attack (the other being its ability to cause mischief in Iraq).

Though planned in advance, the Israel assault needed a Hezbollah provocation and the organization provided that with its cross-border raid of July 12 resulting in the capture of two soldiers and the killing of several others. Israel argued that it had no choice but to go to war to stop Hezbollah missile attacks against its population, but in fact these attacks were a response to, not the cause of, Israel's massive bombardment of Lebanon's civilian infrastructure. From the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon in May 2000 until July 12, 2006, there was not a single Israeli killed by a Katyusha rocket fired from Lebanon. And from 2000 to May 28, 2006, there was not a single confirmed rocket fired at civilians by Hezbollah (see my "Lebanon War Question and Answer," *ZNet*, 8/7/06). On this latter date, small arms fire that wounded an Israeli soldier led to a major exchange of fire in which the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) used air strikes, artillery, mortar, and tank fire, wounding two Lebanese civilians, and Hezbollah "responded with rocket, mortar and small-arms fire," in the words of the UN observers. The IDF ordered Israeli civilians in the north "to take to the safety of bomb shelters — some so out of use that it was difficult to locate the keys" (*JP*, 6/1/06).

Hezbollah's cross-border raid of July 12, 2006 was accompanied by diversionary rocket fire. Israeli press accounts report that these wounded several civilians, though Hezbollah officials told Amnesty International (AI, ENGMDE020252006, 9/14/06) that no civilian was targeted on July 12. In any event, Israel could have easily stopped any rocket fire at its cities and towns by accepting Hassan Nasrallah's offer to cease its rocket attacks if Israel stopped its air-raids (Cody, *WP*, 8/4/06).

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported "a systematic failure by the IDF to distinguish between combatants and civilians." Israeli apologists have argued that Lebanese civilian deaths were unfortunate collateral damage resulting from Hezbollah's policy of placing military targets in civilian areas, but in none of the specific cases investigated by Human Rights Watch were Hezbollah's weapons or fighters near civilian areas targeted by Israel. Moreover, the broad Israeli definition of military targets makes an intermingling of military and civilian activity inevitable: Israel defines as legitimate targets the private residences of Hezbollah political leaders, Hezbollah political offices, and Hezbollah's TV station — all of which, not surprisingly, are in civilian areas. Further, Israel directly and intentionally targeted civilian infrastructure, as Israeli officials acknowledged (for example, the warning of Israeli army chief of staff Lt.-Gen. Dan Halutz that if the captured soldiers were not returned, the IDF "would target infrastructure and 'turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years'" (*Independent* 7/13/06). As Amnesty International reported:

> The evidence strongly suggests that the extensive destruction of public works, power systems, civilian homes and industry was deliberate and an integral part of the military strategy, rather than 'collateral damage' — incidental damage to civilians or civilian property resulting from targeting military objectives (MDE 18/007/2006, 8/23/06).

Hezbollah, too, engaged in war crimes — in particular its indiscriminate rocket fire into Israel, including cluster munitions (HRW report, Oct. 19, 2006) — though the scale of its crimes as measured by the civilian death toll was 1/25 that of Israel's.

War was not a necessary response to Hezbollah's cross-border raid of July 12. The prisoner issue and the various border issues all could have settled peaceably without the horrible human costs of the war and the further poisoning of attitudes.

Many Lebanese were critical of Hezbollah's provocative July 12 raid, but the brutality of the Israeli response caused most Lebanese to end up assigning primary responsibility to Israel for the catastrophe that befell their country. Hezbollah's tenacious resistance to the Israeli onslaught has greatly enhanced its reputation. However, Hezbollah's resistance and its mass base among the Shiite population of Lebanon (based on its communal social welfare programs and relative lack of corruption) should not lead us to view Hezbollah as a progressive force. It is a fundamentalist political organization — though because the Shia are not even a majority of Lebanon's population, Hezbollah no longer calls for turning the country into an "Islamic Republic" — with socially backward views as well as supporting the neoliberal agenda. It achieved its dominance among Lebanon's Shia population in part by using violence against progressive forces (see Achcar, *Z Magazine*, 10/06). (There was some ill-considered excitement on the left when a supposed interview with Nasrallah was published indicating leftist sympathies, but that interview has been shown to be a forgery.)

The failure of Israel to achieve its aims in this war represented a critical defeat. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert disagrees, revealingly declaring (*Haaretz*, 9/5/06) that "The claim that we lost is unfounded. Half of Lebanon is destroyed; is that a loss?" But Israel's image of invincibility has been decisively shattered. One hopes that this will encourage Israelis to seek peaceful resolutions to their conflicts with Palestinians and others, respecting the rights of everyone involved, but, unfortunately, it may propel Israeli leaders to seek an opportunity to restore their military dominance.

Israel-Palestine

In June 2006, an upsurge of violence erupted in Gaza. Israel claims its military escalation was a response to the abduction on June 26 of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian militants. This claim neglects some crucial context.

Gaza is Israeli occupied territory. Israel argues that in September 2005 it had unilaterally withdrawn from Gaza, thus ending the occupation, but as John Dugard, the UN's respected special rapporteur on the Occupied Palestinian Territories, noted:

> Statements by the Government of Israel that the withdrawal ended the occupation of Gaza are grossly inaccurate. Even before the commencement of 'Operation Summer Rains,' following the capture of Corporal Shalit, Gaza remained under the effective control of Israel. This control was manifested in a number of ways. Israel retained control of Gaza's air space, sea space and external borders. Although a special arrangement was made for the opening of the Rafah border crossing to Egypt, to be monitored by European Union personnel, all other crossings remained largely closed. . . . The actions of IDF in respect of Gaza have clearly demonstrated that modern technology allows an occupying Power to effectively control a territory even without a military presence. (General Assembly docu-

ment A/61/470, 9/27/06)

At the same time, Israel has been constructing a separation "wall" in the West Bank — declared illegal in an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice — in a transparent attempt to seize as much valuable land and resources as possible. Whatever term Israel gave for its policy — '"unilateral disengagement," "convergence," or "realignment" — the intent, Dugard noted, was clear: "the unlawful annexation of large portions of Palestinian territory. The euphemisms used to describe this policy should not be allowed to obscure the hard truth." On the West Bank, settlements continued to grow, and the number of checkpoints, including roadblocks, earth mounds and trenches, increased from 376 in August 2005 to over 500 a year later. For example, the city of Nablus is now completely surrounded by checkpoints. "In effect, Nablus has become an imprisoned city." Dugard noted that Israel justifies the checkpoints on security grounds, but it is "difficult to accept this justification" for many of the checkpoints, whose main purpose "is in fact to make Palestinians constantly aware of Israeli control of their lives and to humiliate them in the process."

> Hezbollah, too, engaged in war crimes — in particular its indiscriminate rocket fire into Israel, including cluster munitions — though the scale of its crimes as measured by the civilian death toll was 1/25 that of Israel's.

Living conditions in the Occupied Territories were horrible, and especially so in Gaza. After Hamas won the January 2006 Palestinian elections, however, Israel moved to impose economic strangulation on the Palestinians and conditions deteriorated sharply. Israel withheld funds owed to the Palestinian Authority, and international donors, particularly the United States and the European Union, cut their financial support. Unemployment increased to 40 percent, and the Palestinian public sector workforce, accounting for almost a quarter of total employment, is employed but unpaid because of Israel's withholding of funds. By June more than half of all Palestinians were deemed by the World Food Programme to be "food insecure," unable to meet their food needs without assistance, a 14 percent increase over the previous year.

In these abysmal conditions, and with hopes of Palestinian sovereignty so dismal, it's not surprising that some Palestinian militants were firing homemade Qassam rockets from Gaza into the nearby Israeli village of Sderot. Israel, in addition to the targeted assassinations with their innocent civilian casualties, was responding by firing artillery shells into Gaza. As always, the number of innocent Palestinian civilians killed far outnumbered the innocent Israelis killed.

On June 24, Israeli commandos launched a raid into Gaza seizing two men. Israel characteristically said they were terrorists, but no evidence was given. (Among its 10,000 Palestinian prisoners, Israel holds a thousand who have not been charged. Thus, as Norman Finkelstein has noted, the claim that Israel only arrests terrorists can clearly be no more than an article of faith.) The next day, Palestinian militants killed two Israeli soldiers and captured a third one. Israel's response was ferocious.

Israel began military incursions into Gaza and unrelenting shelling and bombing. In addition, Israeli F-16s flew low and broke the sound barrier over Gaza, causing sonic booms as loud as the actual bombardments, causing widespread terror among the population, particularly children. Israel seized eight Hamas Cabinet ministers and 26 members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and, later, took other key Palestinian officials into custody. Israel declared that these individuals were being arrested for terrorism, but clearly they were being held as hostages.

Israel's main target was the Palestinian population (who had had the audacity not to vote the way Israel wanted). Between June 26 and September, some 260 Palestinians (at least half of whom were civilians) were killed, including 58 children. (In this same period, one Israeli was killed — a soldier.) The Israeli Air Force destroyed the only domestic power plant in Gaza, cutting electricity as well as the daily water supply. The borders were closed. The Israeli navy prevented Palestinian fishing along the coast. As Dugard noted, "In effect, the Palestinian people have been subjected to economic sanctions — the first time an occupied people have been so treated. . . .[T]he Palestinian people, rather than the Palestinian Authority, have been subjected to possibly the most rigorous form of international sanctions imposed in modern times."

Just as with the Lebanon war, Israeli aggression was enabled by the United States. On July 12, 2006, the Security Council considered a resolution dealing with the crisis in Gaza. The resolution received ten affirmative votes, four abstentions, and one negative vote, but because that "no" vote came from the United States, with veto power, under undemocratic Security Council rules, the resolution failed.

U.S. Ambassador John Bolton explained his "no" vote on the grounds that the resolution was unbalanced and "placed demands on one side, while not placing reciprocal demands on the other side in the Middle East conflict" (SC/8775, July 13, 2006). In fact, the resolution meticulously condemned violence on both sides. Its key preambulatory clauses read:

> *Condemning* [the] military assault being carried out by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Gaza Strip, which has caused the killing and injury of dozens of Palestinian civilians, and the destruction of Palestinian property and civilian infrastructure, notably Gaza's main power station, and *condemning also* the detention of democratically elected Palestinian and other officials,
>
> *Condemning also* the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel and the abduction of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian armed groups from Gaza, and the recent abduction and killing of an Israeli civilian in the West Bank,
>
> *Condemning* all acts of violence, terror and destruction.

The operative clauses included "1. *Calls for* the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldier," "5. *Calls upon* the Palestinian Authority to take immediate and sustained action to bring an end to violence, including the firing of rockets on Israeli territory," and "6. *Urges* all concerned parties to abide by their obligations and respect in all circumstances the rules of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 and refrain from violence against civilian population."

Bolton further charged that the resolution "would have undermined the Council's and the international community's stated support for a two-State vision for peace in the Middle East." On the contrary, the resolution explicitly stated:

> 9. *Stresses* the importance of, and the need to achieve, a just, comprehensive, and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all its relevant resolutions including its resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973), 1397 (2002) and 1515 (2003), the Madrid terms of reference, the principle of land for peace, the Arab Peace Initiative adopted by the League of Arab States Summit in March 2002 in Beirut and the Road Map.

Thus, with the U.S. veto blocking this modest Security Council effort at ending the crisis, Israel was given a free hand to continue its assault on the people of Gaza and the occupied territories generally. One can understand why

Israel's UN Ambassador, Dan Gillerman, jokingly told a meeting of B'nai Brith International back in May that Bolton was "a secret member of Israel's own team at the United Nations." The Israeli delegation, he said, was really not just five diplomats. "We are at least six including John Bolton" (*Haaretz*, 5/23/06).

Washington and Tel Aviv assert that their strangulation of Hamas was justified because Hamas is committed to Israel's destruction and the use of terror and opposed to negotiations. There is no doubt that Hamas has been responsible for serious acts of terror, and the left surely must reject its Islamic program. But it is equally clear that Hamas has given many indications that it is prepared to accept a long term "truce" while negotiations on a two-state settlement proceed (see Ahmed Yousef, *NYT*, 11/1/06; also Jennifer Lowenstein, "Setting the Record Straight on Hamas," *CounterPunch*, 6/12/06). But because Hamas is less corrupt than the old Palestinian Authority leadership, it's less likely to be bought off, selling out Palestinian interests. From Israel's point of view, this makes it not a suitable "partner for peace"; better for Israel to impose its own solution, backed up by U.S. support.

One can't do better than end with the summary of John Dugard:

> Israel is in violation of important norms of human rights and international humanitarian law. While it is readily conceded that Israel faces a security threat and is entitled to defend itself, it must not be forgotten that the root cause of the security threat is the continued occupation of a people that wishes to exercise its right of self-determination in an independent State.

As one surveys the Middle East, one sees immense suffering. Fortunately, Washington and Tel Aviv have been thwarted in their maximal goals, but alas, there is little to inspire hope for the immediate future and reason to fear even worse to come. Only the emergence in Israel, the Occupied Territories, Iraq, Iran, and throughout the region of mass movements for democracy, peace, and social justice offers any real chance to reverse the grim reality. It is hard to be optimistic, but in the United States solidarity with the seeds of these movements and opposition to our own government's aggression, brutality, and anti-democratic policies are the first step.

—Nov. 1, 2006

Is the Bush Administration Fascist?

Matthew N. Lyons

The idea that the Bush administration is imposing fascism on the United States has become increasingly commonplace in leftist and liberal circles. It's often taken as a given in political discussions, at protest rallies, and on the Internet. Sometimes this is little more than name calling, but over the past six years, a number of critics have offered serious arguments to back up the claim, and the claim deserves serious attention.

This is hardly the first time that U.S. leftists have warned against the rise of a fascist state. FBI/police repression against the Black Panthers, Joe McCarthy's cold war witch hunts, even Franklin Roosevelt's early New Deal experiments with state-sponsored cartels — sections of the left have labeled all of these as fascist. But George W. Bush has come to embody the f-word for a whole generation of activists.

The Bush administration is the most authoritarian presidency in living memory. Witness the USA Patriot Act and other measures that shred civil liberties, the mass round-ups of South Asian and Middle Eastern men, the systematic — and now openly defended — use of torture and warrantless wiretapping. Witness the proclamation of permanent warfare, the invasion and occupation of two sovereign nations, the claim that the United States can rightfully invade and conquer just to block a possible threat. Witness the blend of apocalyptic nationalism and religious zealotry that divides the whole world into absolutes of Good and Evil. And, many would argue, witness the suppression of voting results and political manipulation of the courts that put Bush in the White House to begin with.

There's no question that ugly changes are taking place, with serious implications for political activism and daily life now and in the future. But to call this a trend toward fascism doesn't help us understand what is going on in the United States, and it doesn't help us understand fascism. Calling the Bush administration fascist promotes a distorted picture of U.S. politics or history. In some versions, the f-word is essentially a scare tactic to rally people behind Democrats such as John Kerry, whose 2004 campaign literature urged that we "keep 95 percent of the Patriot Act and strengthen the rest." In other versions, the charge of fascism reflects conspiracy theories that the Bush administration itself somehow orchestrated the September 11th attacks.

Even when it's coupled with a deeper critique of the U.S. political system, the claim of impending fascism lumps together radically different forms of right-wing authoritarianism under one label. This confusion hurts our ability to develop clear and effective anti-right-wing strategies.

There are several versions of the claim that Bush & Co. are driving us into fascism, each with its own set of weaknesses. Most of them, however, reflect the widespread idea that fascism equals an extreme version of capitalist repression, an authoritarian regime that does the bidding of corporate elites. For example, some Bush critics define fascism as the merger of state and business interests — a formulation so broad that it could fit any capitalist state. Most famous on the left is the Communist International's 1933 definition, which is still

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in use today: "Fascism is the open, terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chauvinist and most imperialist elements of finance capital." This might describe a company town from the robber baron era but it's a feeble caricature of fascist politics.

> The Bush administration is the most authoritarian presidency in living memory.

FASCISM HAS TAKEN MANY FORMS, and an accurate, nuanced picture of it is difficult to capture in a single sentence. The following points, in my view, describe most of fascism's core features and offer a profile that contrasts sharply with Bush-style authoritarianism:

• *Radical break with the established order.* Fascism overthrows old political elites and sweeps away established forms of political rule. It posits society as an organic hierarchy and rejects the Enlightenment principles of pluralism, equality, and individual rights. In the name of a fascist cultural revolution, it tries to reshape all institutions to embody a unified ideology imposed from above. Some kinds of fascism go further and revolutionize the socioeconomic order, too, as when German Nazism restructured the industrial heart of Europe with a system of exploitation based largely on plunder, slave labor, and genocidally working people to death.

• *Totalitarian mass politics*. Fascism doesn't just terrorize and repress. It also inspires and mobilizes large masses of people around a vision of collective rebirth in a time of crisis. Building a mass movement outside traditional channels is central to fascism's bid to win state power. As a regime, fascism uses mass organizations and rituals to create a sense of participation and direct identification with the state. Fascism celebrates the nation, race, or cultural group as an organic community to which all other loyalties must be subordinated. In place of individual liberties or social justice, fascism offers its followers a culture of action, virility, heroic sacrifice, cathartic public spectacle, and being part of a vast social organism.

• *Twisted anti-elitism.* While it intensifies oppression and murderously attacks the left, fascism also appropriates leftist anti-elitism in distorted form. In place of a structural analysis that focuses on dismantling systems of power, fascists portray evil elites as an insidious cultural or racial threat to be purged. For example, fascism attacks bourgeois values and "parasitic" business elements (sometimes, but not always, defined as Jewish) while defending the underlying institutions of private property and class exploitation. Historically, this approach has enabled fascism to tap into real social grievances, such as those of some middle-class groups who resent the power of big business but also have a stake in class privilege and feel threatened by working-class movements or oppressed communities below.

• *Autonomy from business control.* In or out of power, fascism is not a capitalist puppet but an autonomous force, whose agenda sometimes clashes with capitalist interests in important ways. Business support was crucial to both Italian and German fascists in their drives for power, and they in turn aided big business by smashing the labor movement, imposing top-down stability, and promoting centralization of capital. But as these fascist regimes consolidated themselves, big business increasingly lost political control: it lost the power to determine the main direction of state policy. In Germany, the Nazi program of conquest and genocide simply overrode capitalist priorities — such as exploiting scarce skilled workers instead of slaughtering them — even if big industrialists made millions along the way.

In contrast to fascism, the Bush administration represents a much more conventional form of capitalist authoritarianism. Bush has significantly eroded the liberal-pluralist political system by increasing state repression, claiming a presidential blank check to ignore the law, and promoting an atmosphere of political conformism and national siege mentality. Some pro-Bush factions promote populist hostility toward so-called liberal elites. But the Bush regime is in fact controlled by traditional political elites within established institutions — it lacks fascism's totalitarian mass mobilization, promotion of a new outsider elite, and vision of sweeping cultural and political change. Even in the crisis atmosphere following the September 11th attacks, President Bush urged people to live their lives as normally as possible. And while fascism challenges capitalist control of the state and attacks bourgeois values such as individualism and consumerism, the Bush administration is solidly and unambiguously pro-capitalist.

Some might argue that these distinctions are merely semantic and irrelevant given the political realities today. But fascism as described here isn't just dead history or a lunatic fringe. As the September 11th attacks themselves made plain, some of U.S. imperialism's most militant and committed enemies are on the far right. In the past decade, movements with strong fascistic tendencies have had a major political impact in several parts of the globe — from Italy to Afghanistan, from India to Russia to Guatemala. In the 1992 and 1996 Republican presidential primaries, Patrick Buchanan rallied millions of U.S. voters behind a program that combined anti-immigrant scapegoating, homophobia, and patriarchy with an anti-interventionist foreign policy and a critique of corporate globalization. The Buchanan campaigns stopped short of fascism, but they demonstrated something of fascism's potential.

None of this is meant to belittle the Bush administration's disastrous policies. The point is that militaristic repression — even full-scale dictatorship — doesn't necessarily equal fascism, and the distinction matters. Some forms of right-wing authoritarianism grow out of established political institutions while others reject those institutions; some are creatures of big business while others are independent of, or even hostile to, big business. Some just suppress liberatory movements while others use twisted versions of radical politics in a bid to "take the game away from the left." These are different kinds of threats. If we want to develop effective strategies for fighting them, we need a political vocabulary that recognizes their differences.

To understand more fully what's wrong with claims that the United States is becoming fascist, we need to look at some of the specific arguments offered. Laurence W. Britt's 2003 article, "Fascism Anyone?" describes fascism in a way that implicitly identifies it with current U.S. developments. The article first appeared in *Free Inquiry* magazine and has been widely quoted on the Internet. It is one of the discussions of fascism most frequently cited by Bush opponents.

Britt outlines fourteen characteristics shared by regimes that were either "fascist or protofascist": Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Franco's Spain, Salazar's Portugal, Papadopoulos's Greece, Pinochet's Chile, and Suharto's Indonesia. In second-hand versions (and Britt's own comments about the article) the "protofascist" qualifier usually disappears and the list becomes simply "fourteen defining characteristics of fascism."

Most of the characteristics in Britt's list are not specific to fascism but are shared by many conservative governments: nationalism, militarism, scapegoating of enemies, "rampant" sexism, obsession with national security and with crime, protecting the power of corporations and suppressing the power of labor, and close ties between religion and the ruling elite. Other features seem at first to be more specific to fascism, or at least a dictatorship of some kind: disdain for human rights and intellectual freedom, controlled mass media, corruption and cronyism, and fraudulent elections. But even these characteristics are defined so broadly as to blur all major differences between classic fascism and the U.S. political system today. Consider, for example, how Britt spells out Feature #6, "a controlled mass media":

> Under some of the [fascist and protofascist] regimes, the mass media were under strict direct control and could be relied upon never to stray from the party line. Other regimes exercised more subtle power to ensure media orthodoxy. Methods included the control of licensing and access to resources, economic pressure, appeals to patriotism, and implied threats. The leaders of the mass media were often politically compatible with the power elite. The result was usually success in keeping the general public unaware of the regimes' excesses.

This is slippery analysis. It leaves us no way to distinguish between a political dictatorship and a pluralistic system dominated by economic elites — let alone between fascism and a traditionalist military regime.

It's easy to find commonalities between the U.S. system and fascism, but that is nothing new. The U.S. power structure has always used the state to defend capitalism. It has always been built on a system of racial oppression. It has always promoted militarism and expansionism. It has always used political repression to silence radical dissent. And, at least since Andrew Jackson's followers created the Democratic Party in the 1820s, it has always used mass political organizations to mobilize members of dominant groups around oppressive agendas.

In certain crisis periods, furthermore, the U.S. power structure has expanded and intensified repression dramatically. This happened, for example, in 1917-1920, when radicals, labor organizers, and immigrants were rounded up by the thousands, people were jailed for criticizing the government, anti-Black and anti-Mexican pogroms claimed scores of lives, and the government recruited a wide range of civic organizations to spy on their neighbors. Other repressive highpoints included World War II (the "anti-fascist" war), when 110,000 people were put in concentration camps because of Japanese ancestry and the FBI compiled dossiers on millions of workers, and the early cold war period, when anti-communist and anti-gay witch hunts created a pervasive climate of fear. Between the late sixties and mid seventies, dozens of Black and American Indian activists were murdered as part of an FBI-spearheaded crackdown against the radical left.

So if the United States is fascist, when did it start? Has the U.S. always been fascist? Has it moved in and out of fascism? If fascism equals capitalist repression plus militaristic nationalism, there's no clear dividing line between then and now.

A recent attempt to draw such a dividing line, while making the case that the U.S. is becoming fascist, comes from Michael Novick, editor of *Turning the Tide*, a Los Angeles newspaper affiliated with the Anti-Racist Action network. In a Summer 2003 editorial entitled "Fascism and What is Coming," Novick argues that "in general, fascism can best be understood as bringing the methods of imperial rule in the colonies into the metropole" (i.e., the industrialized capitalist countries) — a conception he attributes to Black Panther leader George Jackson. This doesn't mean that fascism is a top-down, ruling-class affair. "All forms of imperialism...have always been cross-class projects, in which working and other 'subordinate' classes have always participated independently and directly, not merely under the direction of the bourgeoisie or 'ruling' class."

Novick (who is a friend) argues that the U.S. "has always had elements of what became known as fascism" directed against communities of color but "the fundamental basis of white privilege is that white working class people [have been] spared such fascist methods of rule so long as they remain[ed] loyal." Now, however, these forms of oppression and exploitation "begin to make themselves felt against [white Americans] as well, even as they are being courted and propagandized to adopt a new and more intimate and totalitarian identification with the rulers and empire." This "process of fundamentally transforming the nature of the U.S. state...is happening primarily from the top down — orchestrated by the Bush regime and its supportive faction of the bourgeoisie."

Novick's approach has some important advantages. He certainly doesn't promote romantic illusions about the U.S. system or history and, unlike Britt, he offers a clear and specific description of fascism. Novick is also right to draw connections between imperialism and fascism — or at least some forms of fascism. Italian Fascism's adoption of antisemitic laws in the late 1930s was partly rooted in its development of a racist apartheid system in conquered east Africa. German Nazism's eastward expansion was very much an attempt to apply colonial methods of conquest within Europe. A generation before the Nazis murdered millions of Jews and other European peoples, Imperial Germany systematically tried to wipe out the Herero and Nama peoples in South West Africa (now Namibia). One of the top administrators of South West Africa was the father of Hermann Goering, one of Hitler's closest assistants. As Novick notes, Nazi genocidal policies were also strongly influenced by the model of U.S. genocide and mass enslavement.

NOVICK HAS CAUTIONED ME that his article was intended to promote discussion, not to offer a full analysis covering every aspect of fascism's dynamics. Indeed, there are two major problems with Novick's argument. First, his 2003 article seems to exaggerate the erosion of white privilege in the United States. It's true that there have been major changes over the past forty years. But as most of Novick's own work makes clear, there are still profound differences between how whites and people of color are treated by U.S. capitalism and the state. If anything, the Bush regime has intensified these differences, not lessened them. When I raised this

> Militaristic repression — even full-scale dictatorship — doesn't necessarily equal fascism.

point with him, Novick emphasized that white privilege remains an important reality, even as white workers are being increasingly penalized and oppressed by an imperialist system in crisis. But this seems to undermine Novick's claim that fascism is being extended to the white population — if, as he says, being spared from fascist methods of rule is "the fundamental basis of white privilege."

Second, as a description of fascism in general, "imperial methods of rule brought home" just doesn't work. Consider the following:

- Fascist Italy did not bring home its methods of imperial rule. In Libya, Mussolini's armies put half the population in concentration camps and executed tens of thousands of civilians. In Ethiopia, they used poison gas extensively, burned hundreds of villages, and systematically exterminated the country's intellectual class. Fascist repression within Italy itself never approached the level of these crimes. Under Mussolini's government, Italian political dissenters were much more likely to be jailed than killed.
- One of the most vicious fascist movements of the 1930s and 1940s was Romania's Iron Guard. Their preferred tactics included hanging Jews by meathooks and flaying them alive. But Romania had no colonies, no imperialist legacy, and the Iron Guard had no expansionist aims.

Its fascist violence was rooted not in colonialism but in the much longer history of anti-Jewish pogroms within Europe itself.

• If fascism equals imperialist methods brought into the metropole, then by definition non-metropole regions can't experience fascism. Yet Novick also says that "fascism has always presented itself as a competing ideology for state building and economic advancement in colonized societies" and specifically mentions "Arab Muslim fascists" and "Hindu supremacist fascists." In our follow-up discussion, Novick argued that fascism in colonized or semi-colonized societies represents "a desire to absorb and outdo the powers of the master on his own terms." While this is an interesting point worth further exploration, it requires Novick to broaden his original description of fascism.

THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMUNIST PARTY, a Maoist group, makes the case for impending fascism differently. In a leaflet widely distributed since late 2004, the RCP argues that Bush and his cronies are "Christian Fascists . . . who aim to make the U.S. a religious dictatorship and to force this upon the world." The leaflet proclaims that "over the years these Christian Fascists have dug in at every level of the courts, the army and Congress," they are supported by "the most powerful capitalists," and their drive to establish a full scale dictatorship is "coming straight from the White House." In a December 2004 article in the RCP's newspaper, Travis Morales expands on the leaflet. He argues that the Christian right has a comprehensive agenda to transform society to fit their interpretation of biblical law, which radically clashes with core principles of bourgeois democracy. Morales also notes that the Christian right has a large, well-organized mass following or, as he puts it, "a social base of unthinking followers."

A major strength of this argument, unlike the others we've discussed, is that it centers the specter of fascism on a specific political movement, which clearly does have a repressive ideology, a mass base, and substantial power within the Republican Party and the state.

Still, the RCP's position has several key weaknesses. First, it doesn't clearly define fascism or distinguish it from other forms of right-wing authoritarianism. Second, it exaggerates the Christian right's power within the Bush coalition, which also includes neoconservatives and traditional business conservatives, among others. Christian rightists make up a large, well-organized part of Bush's popular support, and they are a force to be reckoned with. But neoconservatives, following a basically secular ideology, have largely spearheaded the so-called war on terror, the main framework for Bush's expansion of repression. Since John Ashcroft left the attorney general post in early 2005, it's hard to think of a single Christian right figure who holds a top position in the Bush administration.

Third, the RCP's argument glosses over important ideological differences within the Christian right itself. A hard-line faction, largely inspired by the doctrine of Christian reconstructionism, advocates a full-scale theocracy and rejects in principle the existing pluralist system. This faction is associated with the most militant, terroristic wing of the anti-abortion movement and arguably does represent a kind of Christian fascism. However, a larger and more powerful faction of the Christian right, including the movement's flagship organizations such as Focus on the Family and Concerned Women of America, has taken a more opportunistic approach. Their main goal has been to amass power through the existing political system, rather than to overthrow it. There are interconnections between these two factions, and the hardliners might eventually pull the bigger faction toward a more radical break with the existing system, but so far that has not happened.

THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM has always been a mix of pluralism and authoritarianism. The authoritarian side has been advancing for decades with measures such as Nixon's RICO law and Clinton's "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act." The Bush presidency has moved this process several steps forward. The authoritarian trend finds grassroots support among Christian rightists and other conservatives but is fundamentally driven by established elites and moves within elite-controlled channels. Fascists — pitching to social sectors that have a stake in an oppressive social order but are threatened by big business — oppose this trend and the forces behind it. Within the United States, neonazis denounce the Patriot Act and the Iraq war, as well as the flight of industrial jobs overseas and the mass influx of immigrants of color, as fruits of a globalist elite corporate conspiracy. Internationally, the Bush administration's expansionist policies have helped make authoritarian far right forces, both secular and religious, a rallying point for militant opposition to imperialism. (Like the Christian right, the Islamic right includes both fascist and non-fascist sectors.)

Don Hamerquist writes in the lead essay of *Confronting Fascism: Discussion Documents for a Militant Movement* (Kersplebedeb, 2002) that the main danger from fascism, at this stage, is not that it's about to become ruling class policy or even that it terrorizes communities of color (since official capitalism devastates these communities far more systematically). Rather, fascism's main danger is its potential to rally mass support away from any liberatory anti-capitalist vision. Many leftists don't take this threat seriously or even have a vocabulary to discuss it, but it is real and growing. "In many countries," J. Sakai notes elsewhere in the same book, "the far right has replaced the left as the main political opposition." Not all of the forces Sakai is talking about should be labeled as fascist, but the category of fascism provides an important reference point for understanding them.

As the example of the Christian right indicates, the line between elite-sponsored authoritarianism and fascist insurgency is not impermeable. Rightist formations can be coopted by elites or radicalized into militant opposition, just as some leftist formations may move between revolutionary and reformist politics. In addition, some fascists deliberately blur the line between far right and radical left in an effort to build broader alliances among militant opponents of the state. Given these complexities, it's all the more important for us to understand and name the different forms that right-wing authoritarianism can take. This is not just a two-sided struggle.

Iranian Workers Fight Back!

Andreas Malm and Shora Esmailian

In recent years, Iran has become synonymous with nuclear ambitions, a mad president spitting diatribes against Jews, morose mullahs back in full power, still challenged only by some fun-craving liberal youngsters of middle class Tehran. But there is more than meets the Western eye. In these very same recent years, Iran has been the scene of intense social struggles. While the soporific saga of the diplomatic negotiations over the nuclear program has unfolded, and the implicit threat of American or Israeli aggression filled the skies, Iranian workers have risen like never before during the reign of the Islamic Republic.

Labor unrest surfaced in early 2004. It escalated over the two following years, and reached its zenith so far with the bus drivers' strike in Tehran in January-February 2006, when some 1,200 unionists were imprisoned and armed forces battled picketing workers in the streets of the capital: this time, even Wall Street Journal and the White House had their eyes opened. Massive sums were instantly earmarked for "support" to Iran's trade unions, under the assumption that these would, like Poland's Solidarity, promote the kind of regime change the U.S. is envisioning. That was, of course, a terrible mistake. Any American money would burn the hands of unions and other popular movements, as nothing is more universally resented than Western attempts to manipulate the politics of the Iranian nation. However, a true sign of international solidarity was given on February 15, 2006, when International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) organized demonstrations and pickets in more than 40 countries worldwide to protest the repression: it was met with jubilation among the bus drivers. Their union survived the onslaught.

In late 2006, strikes are still occurring on the unprecedented level of the last two years. Confrontations between the state and unions, or other workers' initiatives, have become a regular feature of political life. In spite of the deepening international crisis — exploited by the Islamic regime as an excuse to once again silence all internal dissent — unrest has refused to abate, and it is now justified to speak of a labor movement i*n Iran. Though it is still mainly underground, amorphous and unevenly spread, the movement has come to stay, to mature and to mobilize the most powerful force of opposition against the ruling class of millionaire mullahs.*

What follows is a glimpse of the formative period of the Iranian labor movement, 2004 - 2005, with some examples of the methods used by workers to circumvent the ban on trade unions and enforce concessions from employers. They are based on interviews with workers and labor activists in Iran, on the ground in late 2004 and thereafter by phone or email. Because of the illegality of their actions, the names of the interviewees have been replaced with pseudonyms. For updates on recent strikes and other labor actions in Iran, the best available source in English is www.laborstart.org.*

— A.M. & S.E.

In January 2004, fifteen hundred construction workers were building a copper-smelting plant in the sweltering desert near the vil-

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*An excerpt from *Iran on the Brink — Rising Workers and Threats of War*, due from Pluto Books (London, ISBN 074532603x, $28.95) in February 2007, as the first account of the recent social crisis in general and the labor movement in particular to be published in English.

lage of Khatonabad, in the southern province of Kerman. The workers had been hired under a joint venture between a state-owned copper-production company and a Chinese corporation. The plant was now nearing completion and the management had promised the workers permanent employment when the plant came online.

The first stages of copper production were set to commence in late January. Just before then, all but 250 of the workers were sacked. The plant was shut down. Workers, joined by their families, blockaded the building, camping in front of it. They demanded that the agreement be honored and delayed wages paid; they were confronted by the police, but did not relent.

On 24 January, after eight days of strikes and sit-ins, the Security Council of the province dispatched special police forces from Kerman, the provincial capital, to Khatonabad. Circling in helicopters over the plant, the special forces fired rounds of live ammunition into the crowd. Four were declared dead, but according to unofficial figures, seven to fifteen were killed. Up to 300 people were wounded, and at least 80 were arrested and later released — they bore clear indications of torture. Clashes between workers and security forces continued in the area for days.

As word of the carnage in Khatonabad spread throughout Iran, it became a rallying cry for what subsequently developed into a new labor movement. This movement devised a number of ways to circumvent the bans on labor organizing. One was to go mountain-climbing. The state and workplace managers may have eyes and ears on the shop-floor, and in the cafés, but their surveillance does not extend to the many mountains and hills around Tehran and other cities, except in the form of Islamic slogans inscribed into the cliffs and hillsides. Hiking is extremely popular in Iran, and hiking clubs are not (at least in most places) illegal. Workers explore these havens: "We don't really think it's that much fun to hike in the mountains. But it's our only way of meeting outside work! We walk to the first good site and then we sit all day talking," says the chairman of one club in Karrajj, outside Tehran. On the first anniversary of the killings in Khatonabad, an unknown number of "hiking clubs" throughout the country took to the hills, erecting pennants in memory of the victims. Such ceremonies were repeated in 2006.

It's not illegal for citizens of Iran to collect money among themselves for social purposes, though to obtain a formal seal of approval, they might choose to consecrate it with an Islamic name. Hence a collective of workers might set up "The Imam Hussein Fund For the Sick and Disabled" or some such. "Sina," a Tehran welder who was expelled from his workplace's *shora-ye eslami* ("Islamic council," the state-run unions-cum-labor supervision organs) transferred his activism to such a fund:

> It is a pretence for meeting. Workers gather in an assembly and decide to start a fund. They agree upon the mandatory deposit and the sum everyone is eligible to withdraw in cases of need. The point is to spare workers from having to beg the foremen for some extra money if, for instance, a child is sick and needs to see a doctor. Instead, he can go straight to his mate currently handling the fund and demand due payment — it's a form of independence, and it's the mutual trust that makes it work.

Associations of this kind have existed for a long time, but since 2004 they appear to have proliferated with new urgency, and new subversive intent.

A related, more audacious form of organization is the clandestine workers' committee. Often evolving out of the meetings of the hiking club or the fund, some workers, relying on each other not to disclose any information, form a committee to be active in the workplace. "Arash" works at Toledie Tehran, a major plastics company producing a range of products for export markets in south Asia and eastern Europe. In 2003, severe rationalizations were implemented at his factory:

> We have to produce more than double the amount of plastics every day, since they laid off more than a thousand workers. That's why we formed a workers' committee. We used to have a cash fund to help each other, but as the pressure increased we came to the conclusion that something more was needed. It was early 2004. From the beginning, we were a tight-knit group of friends, but we have included more and more people. Those of us who belong to the committee cannot be differentiated from the workforce as a whole. The manager knows we are there, of course, as we distribute our leaflets inside the plant, and as soon as he identifies someone as a member, that person is sacked. We have to be very careful. There are collaborators among us; workers who sold their souls to the management and visit the mosque every day. We know who they are as they receive bonuses and a pat on the back from the foremen; we know more about the collaborators than they know about us.

Workers, joined by their families, blockaded the building, camping in front of it.

A workers' committee engages in undercover seditious agitation. How does it evade discovery?

> I stick in leaflets at the time-clock or at the entrance to the canteen when nobody is there. When the mates find them and start reading and talking among themselves, I join in with the conversation, read the leaflet with pretended surprise and begin to elaborate on the points . . . and so I try to convince them.

Agitation, however, is merely a first step. A workers' committee engages in fleeting moments of very direct action. "Arash" again:

> Every day we are obliged to work four hours' overtime. But the payment for these hours is not regulated, differs from time to time and is excluded from the count towards our pensions. We in the committee wrote a letter to the management the other week, demanding that overtime pay be included in the regular wage. We sent one man to hand over the letter at the management's office. They sacked him out of hand. We instantly stopped all production in the factory, and a hundred workers went in to occupy the office, demanding that our mate be reinstated. Management caved in. He was back a couple of days later.

In Saqqez in the province of Kurdistan, the city's many seamstresses, who all work either at home or in small workshops, have tried to form an association of their own. "Abide" tells of one workshop in a basement where the supervisor locks in the women early in the morning, only opening up for them to go home late at night. The seamstresses have tried to obtain a license from the Ministry of Labor to form their association, but the Ministry does not recognize them as workers, and hence won't give them the right even to form a *shora-ye eslami*. But "Abide" says they will not yield:

> We are now some hundred seamstresses who meet just to talk to each other. That's all we want to do, and that's why we demand some real premises. But we don't want to do it illegally. Our men should have no pretext to prevent us from gathering, and the secret police none to harass us. We will take this fight and have our association. Now we have filed an appeal to a court in Tehran, and if we do not succeed there, we will go to the ILO!

From early 2004, and in the following two years, clubs, funds, committees and other similar initiatives animated workplaces in more and more parts of Iran. Their most concrete result was a material upsurge in strikes.

In January 2004, there was another important one. In the course of a few months, two men in their twenties had died of strokes at the assembly line when on night-shift at Iran Khodro's factory in Tehran, the largest auto plant in the Middle East. After the two accidents, exasperation inside the halls reached a tipping point and production was stopped. Striking workers demanded job security, an end to temporary contracts, and overtime pay for night-shift work. The company responded by reinforcing the plant's security troops, called *Herasat*, who were instructed to start taking workers down to the basements for questioning. But the January strike marked the beginning of an enduring radicalization among sections of the workforce, at the very centre of Iran's industrial progress. "Vahid" belongs to one of several committees:

> The only thing we want is the right to try to improve our situation. We fight for the right to go on strike, to form a union, all these basic democratic rights. Everything we do must be kept secret. But we can't just sit twiddling our thumbs, waiting for the Islamic Republic to fall. We must take the right to organize, practice it, without someone's permission. That means we must be ready to sacrifice, as the people did in Khatonabad.

In May 2005, a 30-year old worker at Iran Khodro died in another night-shift accident, the ninth victim since late 2003. Repeated stoppages occurred, while workers' committees circulated harsh indictments against the "killers" who "made contract work the norm." In one committee's leaflet: "We are certain that as long as the cost-cutting measures and subcontracting continue, we will have more such incidents. What does not count at all for the management is the expendable lives of us workers. If we protest, they arrest us in the name of 'saboteurs,' or interrogate us on a daily basis."

On December 13, 2005, workers downed their tools again, and security guards marched through the assembly halls to find the instigators; on March 8, 2006, when unexpectedly low bonuses were announced as reward for new records, production in one section was shut down to chants of "workers' unity" and "death to Daneshiyan [a human resources manager]." This time, security forces filmed the workers after pushing them back to the production lines. These are only some of the actions that have erupted at Iran Khodro Tehran, which is now the scene of recurrent confrontations over everything from hazardous conditions to the detainment and dismissal of dissident workers, a number of whom have been freed and reinstated after protests.

In March 2004, teachers entered the fray. A third of all teachers in the country heeded the call to strike by a mutineer leader of the Islamic councils (in this case, called "guilds"); 800 schools in Esfahan and 400 in Tehran were shut down on the first day of action. Staff at medical sciences universities joined them, in what was probably the first female-dominated strike action on a mass scale in the history of the Islamic Republic. Eighty percent of Iran's teachers are women. Eighty percent live below the poverty line and need at least two jobs to survive; hence the focus was on higher wages, including payment of sizeable arrears. The newspaper of the "guilds" was closed down after publishing reports on the strike and the teachers' complaints, and the Ministry of Education refused to make any concessions. Then a new strike broke out in June. This time, the mutineer, Mahmoud Langarudi, and his accomplices were arrested on charges of "agitating" teachers to walk out from schools; apparently, the state thereby laid their particular initiative to rest.

However, teachers have continued to stage protests throughout the country. So have nurses, against the effects of privatization. One form of action that gained widespread popularity over 2004 and 2005 is to physically confront the mullahs: a workers' collective hires a caravan of buses, drives into Tehran and steps out in front of the Ministry of Labor, the *majles* (parliament), the presidential office, even the office of Ayatollah Khamenei himself. The police refrain from attacking the visiting crowds because generally they're too worried that riots would ignite central Tehran, and officials are somewhat receptive to workers' demands for the same reason. These gatherings have become such a common sight in the capital that news of them sometimes slips through the censorship, as in this report in Iran Daily, from October 18, 2005:

> More than 100 teachers from Fars and Kermanshah provinces gathered in front of the Parliament on Tuesday to protest their expulsion from work . . . Also on Tuesday, some 400 workers from Qazvin province gathered in front of the *majles* to object to poor working conditions. The protestors said they have not been paid for 25 months and demanded a meeting with the majles speaker as well as the chief executive. Some of the protestors have been working for Naznakh Company for eight years now. Workers' representatives said their problems began after the company was handed over to a former deputy minister of industries and mines in 1994 as part of the "privatization drive."

"Death or bread!" . . . "Courageous people — support, support!" . . . "Down with dictatorship!"

Slogans might include "*Ya marg, ya nan!*" ("Death or bread!"), "*Mardom ba gheyrat — hemayat, hemayat*!" ("Courageous people — support, support!"), and occasionally even "*Marg bar estebdad*!" (Down with dictatorship!). Chickens from the provinces are coming home to roost. Most disputes, however, occur in occultation. They are hidden from the view of media consumers, workers' collectives, even the most dedicated activists; a permanent blackout on labor actions is the only reliable method to keep the *umma* united and mute. One hidden case was a strike at a brick mill near Tabriz in the autumn of 2004. Choosing "Kommunard" as his pseudonym, one of the activists describes the strike, an unmistakable pride radiating from his eyes:

> The price on the market for one brick had just been raised from 12 to 30 tomans. The piece rate for us, however, remained 3 tomans per brick produced [one dollar is a little less than 1000 tomans]. What about the difference between 3 and 30? Straight into [the bosses'] pockets! This was a big mill, about 3,000 workers. We decided to set up a shora. Ninety-eight percent of the workers agreed to strike if the boss refused to accept our demand of a piece rate of 4 tomans per brick. [I was one of] six elected representatives who approached him, but he rebuffed our demand.
>
> The day before the strike started, all of us, 3,000 workers, gathered in the desert outside the mill. It was like Karbala! Candidates stood up, and a strike committee was elected by show of hands. Since we brick-makers carry our homes on our backs, our strike naturally meant that we occupied the mill. After one week, the army arrived and started threatening us representatives and the others. But no one listened. Strikes may be banned, but in situations like this the law cannot be enforced — 3,000 united workers are strong. The owner goes to the army and complains, and the soldiers come and fire off some threats, but nothing more.
>
> After two weeks there was a new negotiation with the boss. Now he conceded to our demand! As we went back to work, the shora was dissolved, but we elected representatives remained active and stood up against the boss when he delayed our payment.

In a case that due to its longevity attracted some attention, 350 workers of the Kurdistan Textile factory in Sanandajj, capital of Kurdistan province, fought their employers throughout 2004 and 2005. Their chosen weapon of resistance was a *shora*, "council." A first sit-in strike against mass redundancy plans took place in October 2004, and instantly received support from workers at several other textile, aluminium and plastics factories, as well as from bakers and students in the city. Armed forces laid siege to the factory. After three days, an agreement including only severance pay for those already dismissed was negotiated; the *shora* representatives were threatened with violent reprisals if they refused to sign.

Strike action was renewed in December. The workers were again attacked by the army and the security services; the elected representatives were arrested and beaten. Yet another strike — this one two months long — ended in November 2005, after management had finally accepted all the workers' demands: an end to arbitrary contracts, safer machines, reduction of dust and noise in the production hall, retroactive payment of wages for the whole strike period, return to the workers' fund of the nearly 20 million tomans pocketed by the management, and more. Throughout the long conflict at Kurdistan Textile, all decisions were taken in regular *shora*-assemblies. *Shoras* — that is, councils including all employees — are not underground operations like workers' committees; they are open units of action formed at advanced stages of collective defiance. The practice is most common in northern Iran.

THE LABOR UNREST that has engulfed parts of the country since 2004 (its birth generally dated to the Khatonabad massacre) is not one facet of a national uprising, not begotten by torrential rains rapidly melting down the autocratic state. Committees are formed, tools are downed, factories are seized by people who have no specific political ideology. Theirs is simply an outcry, a last-ditch defense of the basic conditions of life, geographically disparate, and, in general, confined to individual workplaces. But that does not mean it is insignificant, or harmless to the Islamic Republic. Just the reverse. The balance of forces between labor and capital is weighed in the sum of the workplaces; every labor action is a perforation in the special structure supposed to maintain absolute control over the workers of Iran.

The spread of strikes is the most salient feature of this development. We have given only a few examples here. One could point out the textile workers at the Asia Wool Spinning Company in Kerman, who, unpaid for 14 months, walked out of their factory on July 27, 2005, blocked a highway nearby, and were attacked by security forces. One woman was run over and her leg broken, while another woman, who was pregnant, was kicked and dragged along the road. Or one could visit the Filoor factory near Tehran, scene of repeated disputes and briefly, in early 2005, of workers' control. According to one estimate (all are by necessity approximations), there were 140 strikes in October 2005, followed by 120 in November. Compare this with an estimated 46 cases in the twelve months from March 1998 to March 1999, followed by 41 from May 1999 to May 2000. Or compare this with the "handful" of strikes recorded between 1971 and 1973, or with just twenty strikes in 1977. The frequency of strikes occurring since early 2004 appears to be unparalleled in post-Mossadeq *non*-revolutionary Iran — that is, during the ostensible stability of dictatorship.

CBC Unleashed

How Workers Won Job Security at Canada's Public Broadcaster

KAREN WIRSIG

IN 2005, EMPLOYEES at the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation resisted an attempt to roll back their job security and break their union. Creativity and solidarity on the picket lines helped garner substantial public support in their battle against the management of the public broadcaster over the principle of permanent jobs. The campaign reached its peak during an eight week lockout imposed by CBC management in the middle of August, interrupting radio, television and web service across the country and achieving the kind of national attention usually not paid to labour struggles. Employees went back to work in October with a contract that maintains the primacy of permanent work at the CBC.

The Canadian Media Guild, the union that represents CBC employees, used to boast that it had never been involved in a work stoppage in its 50-plus years at the CBC. That can't be said for too many other unions who have dealt with the "Corp." In the previous five years alone, there had been two strikes and two lockouts involving other employee groups.

The round of negotiations that led to the most recent lockout began in May 2004, five months after CBC technicians joined the Guild to create a single bargaining unit for 5,500 non-management employees outside of the province of Quebec. The merger was actually driven in large part by CBC management in an application to the Canada Industrial Relations Board, the body that regulates labour relations in the federal jurisdiction. Apparently, CBC managers were tired of the hassles of dealing with so many different contracts and unions. For them, one big union meant streamlined administration, a glaring clue to the myopic managerialism that has pervaded the broader public service, including the CBC, since the 1980s.[1]

The Guild already represented on-air production and administrative employees after representation votes in the 1990s and decided to propose itself as the "one union" for the CBC. The Guild and the technicians' union, the Communications Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP), fought a pitched battle for the hearts and votes of employees across the country, with the Guild emerging as the victor in late 2003.

Management thought it could use any disarray created by the divisive campaign to extract deep concessions from its newly united bargaining partner, arriving at the bargaining table in mid-2004 demanding the unfettered right to hire temporary employees into a series of job classifications. However, the merged union's bargaining committee had strong representation from the newly-joined unit and was united on the importance of employment security.

Already, nearly 30 percent of employees at CBC work under some kind of temporary or freelance contract. Had CBC management achieved its objectives, it was only a matter of time before the majority of CBC employees would have little or no job security, no pensions and benefits, and a disappearing base for collective organizing.

The successful campaign stands as reason to hope for North American workers who have now suffered decades of setbacks in their working conditions and their ability to organize themselves to improve their situation. It also

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has some lessons for a North American labour movement struggling to demonstrate its relevance and to become a stronger political force.

PRECARIOUS EMPLOYMENT is a feature of decades of retrenchment politics in the public and private sectors that has served to weaken the power of labour unions. It has accompanied the withdrawal of support for equity programs and the shrinking of social programs, making life worse for workers, and especially workers of colour and women, in Canada. This is true even though unionization rates have remained higher than in many other industrialized countries, including the United States, France and Germany, hovering at around 30 percent.

Canada's labour market has undergone twenty years of restructuring; women, who had begun to enter the paid workforce in larger numbers soon saw their permanent, full-time jobs disappear, often replaced by part-time, temporary, employment.[2] Many exited the formal job market and did not return: an average of nearly 20 percent of women who lost permanent jobs between 1993 and 1999 in Canada were not in the labour force — meaning not working or actively looking for work — even 24 months after becoming unemployed. And despite efforts to achieve wage parity with men, women in the workforce continue to earn about 64 percent of their male counterparts.[3]

Recent research by the Canadian Labour Congress[4] has also shown that people of colour — and particularly people of colour born in Canada — are the most likely of all workers to be unemployed and living in poverty. Although they have the highest rates of education of all groups of workers in the country, they tend to find themselves in precarious jobs. And women of color, both immigrants and Canadian-born, fare worse than their male counterparts in terms of low wages and unemployment. The numbers are only slightly better for people of color not born in Canada. And women of color, both immigrants and Canadian born, fare worse than their male counterparts in terms of low wages and unemployment. The CLC concludes that racism is at the heart of the exclusion of such high numbers of people of colour from steady work and points out that workers of colour benefit less than White workers from belonging to a union.

These broader realities are reproduced in Canada's media industry, including at the CBC.[5] Seasonal programming and the broadcaster's reputation as an employer of choice in the industry paved the way for acceptance of short-term employment contracts as a "foot in the door." And, although no data is available identifying racialized groups and gender according to job status, anecdotal evidence from workplaces like the CBC suggests that people of colour and women, as well as younger and older workers, have the most to lose when overall job security is reduced. That evidence also suggests that unions don't always understand or succeed in serving the best interests of their most marginalized members.[6]

THE GUILD HAS LONG BEEN PART OF A larger North American union, The Newspaper Guild (TNG), which includes workers at the New York Times and 35,000 other media workers across the United States and Canada. In the mid-1990s TNG merged with the Communication Workers of America (CWA) to become one of the largest unions on the continent with a substantial defense fund. Ironically, the merger that further embedded the Canadian Media Guild with American workers followed a period of de-linking by some private sector Canadian workers from their U.S.-based unions to resist the concession bargaining strategies being driven south of the border.

The most dramatic divorce was led by auto workers in Canada, who split in 1986 from their U.S.-based union, the United Auto Workers. The Canadian Auto Workers became emblematic of the divergence between the Canadian and American labour movements. John R. Calvert has postulated that the reason Canadian workers retained stronger rates of union membership while the American labour movement floundered related precisely to politics of the Canadian labour movement that, led by militancy in the public sector unions, built a campaign against concession bargaining and for broader social and economic rights.[7] That, together with a push for more rank-and-file control over union strategies, has ensured that Canadian workers tend to see unions as providing credible resistance to neo-liberal labour policy and related attacks on social programs.

> For the employees who had never been involved in a work stoppage at CBC, the first week of the lockout was a shock.

The Guild's affiliation with the Communication Workers of America became an issue during the union merger campaign at the CBC in 2003. The technicians' union, CEP, had been formed after severing ties with an American union. In the merger campaign, CEP played the Canadian nationalism card, suggesting it was unseemly for workers at Canada's public broadcaster to be tied to an American organization. The Guild, on the other hand, pointed to its autonomy in bargaining and decision-making and played up the strategic benefit of its access to a huge strike and defense fund.

When the time came for the Guild to put its relationship with CWA to the test in 2005, the affiliation paid off. The Guild implemented its own bargaining strategy and negotiated a key rule with the parent union to allow equal strike benefits for all picketers, even if some casual and freelance workers earned more in picketing than they would have from the employer. The 500,000-member CWA's deep pockets bolstered the confidence of the union and its members, allowing the Guild to fend off concessions even after seven weeks on the street.

As the Guild neared its standoff with CBC management, leaders began thinking about what kind of work stoppage campaign it might conduct. The majority of members and top union leadership had never been directly involved in a strike or lockout. Some looked to the example set in late 2000 by striking employees of the *Seattle Times*, who combined traditional picketing with production of a popular strike newspaper. Others looked to the website produced in 2002 by locked-out CBC/Radio-Canada journalists in Quebec, who are represented by a different union. While the vast majority of the pre-lockout organizing focused on traditional strike logistics and the strike vote, timid steps were taken to prepare for alternative forms of strike action. Those preparations did not foresee the show of creativity that emerged on the frontlines of the dispute to write a new chapter in North America's labour history.

THE GUILD, WHICH HAD STARTED LIFE AT the CBC as a reporters' union, was more resistant to temporary employment than some of the other unions at the broadcaster, in part because covering the news for radio and TV is a 24/7 operation, 365 days a year. In the round of bargaining that followed the 1993 merger of 13 units, including radio and TV producers, media librarians and announcers, the Guild succeeded in extending the right to permanent employment for many of its new members. Given the labour context of the time, it was an unlikely win and one that has since been characterized as a mistake by senior CBC managers.

The CBC was not immune to the rise in the 1980s of New Public Management in the broader public sector in Canada, a neo-liberal movement that hit most OECD countries in that period, including the United States, and that has only gotten stronger since in its push to "marketize" the relationship between citizens and the state. According to Shields and Evans, "(t)he fundamental principles of the state marketization thesis are the conversion of citizens into customers and the commodification of public goods."[8]

Workers in the broader public sector have faced a constant barrage of attempts by their employers to roll back working conditions and weaken unions in the name of greater flexibility. [9]

There is no doubt that CBC management targeted the very existence of the union when it imposed the lockout of 5,500 employees on August 15, 2005. A few days later, a manager was quoted in a national daily newspaper, suggesting that other, competing broadcasters had lower rates of unionization among employees and, therefore, must have more "flexibility" when it comes to managing their affairs.[10] It is widely believed that the management bargaining team orchestrated an aggressive manipulation of the bargaining system by calling a lockout at the earliest possible moment under federal law, counting on a collapse of the newly merged union.

For the employees who had never been involved in a work stoppage at CBC, the first week of the lockout was a shock. Local leaders in more than 35 cities and towns across the country quickly set up picket lines in the early morning of August 15th, although most buildings had already gone dark as managers made their way to the national broadcasting centre in Toronto to produce replacement programming. As the week wore on, picketers' anger grew at an employer, ostensibly a public service provider, who could spit in the face of employees so committed to their crafts and their audiences.

But there was also something else going on: workers who had been at the mercy of work speedup and declining latitude to make decisions suddenly were freed of the constraints of the job. There was no manager breathing down their neck or playing favourites. The social hierarchies had shifted. They walked around the buildings side-by-side with each other and, for once, had the time to talk and compare stories. The early weeks of the lockout were a period of intense creativity and solidarity from below that gave birth to an array of alternatives to picketing that took the country by storm.

People began swapping stories on the picket line about their insecure employment histories at the CBC and suddenly realized that they weren't alone in how they were being treated by their employer. In an alienated, competitive environment focused on individual success, employees — and many of them women, people of colour and young people — had, in their isolation, been convinced that some shortcomings of their own, or the fact that they simply hadn't been discovered yet, explained their inability to get a permanent job with the CBC. In an article published in the *Toronto Star* during the lockout, broadcaster Nancy Westaway, who had been surviving on a series of temporary gigs at the CBC, laid bare the gender dimensions of precarious employment, comparing her situation to a dysfunctional relationship with an abusive partner.[11]

Within a few days, a locked out radio freelancer based in Vancouver had launched CBCunplugged, an independent website and web journal, otherwise known as a blog, about the conflict. He provided links to other locked-out bloggers across the country and even for a manager stuck in the Toronto broadcast centre, who all kept online diaries of their thoughts and experiences. CBC workers across the country called on their friends in the campus and community radio sector and put on special radio shows, some focusing on the lockout itself, others attempting to provide the public with some of the service that CBC management had denied them. Picketers in Edmonton and Ottawa created live shows for each other and visitors to their downtown picket lines. In Toronto, ad hoc committees organized weekly leafletting blitzes on the subway and tours that included locked-out on-air personalities to smaller cities that didn't have picket lines. Many locations put on concerts and organized fundraisers for other causes. One well known radio broadcaster began a caravan through small communities across the country who were suffering from a lack of local radio alternatives and had no nearby picket lines to visit. Radio shows were produced and were available on the internet to be downloaded around the world.

Meanwhile, work was underway in Toronto to get two union-sponsored websites up and running. The first, CBContheline.ca, was designed as a propaganda site with news about the lockout, photos, personal stories from locked-out members, blog links, cartoons and, soon, feature reports. It had a French-language counterpart, Lignedefront.ca. Both were designed by a crew of picketers who ran a 24-hour operation, five days per week throughout the lockout. The popular sites helped locked-out employees and the public write letters to CBC management and politicians in support of permanent employment, a negotiated settlement and a return of real public broadcasting. Union officials later heard that federal politicians had never felt so much political pressure related to a labour conflict. The second initiative, in the great tradition of the strike newspaper, became CBCunlocked, a news website with global reach to rival the eviscerated CBC.ca site.

Members were so enraged that when a letter by Noah Richler — son of well-known Canadian author Mordechai Richler — appeared in the establishment daily, the *Globe and Mail* in September, disparaging the union and promoting the entrepreneurial and creative virtues of temporary and freelance employment, that several — including a national radio host — had letters published the next day that defended the union's position on permanent jobs at the CBC and provided their own views on why it is so important.

> By October 7, it was all over, with the union actually havng made gains in job security.

Signs of victory were already evident in late September, when the federal labour minister of the time, who had become involved in trying to mediate the dispute, stated publicly that his government supported the notion of permanent jobs. CBC management, almost certainly anticipating a much earlier capitulation by the union and its members, saw the start of hockey season approach — and with it Hockey Night in Canada, one of the CBC's most watched shows — without any signs of weakening on the picket lines or in public support. By October 7, it was all over, with the union actually having made gains in job security provisions, such as improved benefits for temporary employees and clear definitions limiting the hiring of temporary employees, including a cap on the number of contract employees the CBC can hire. Equally important were the gains made in member militancy, ensuring that the new contract provisions were more likely to be enforced once the members went back to work.

The challenges ahead for the Guild include maintaining the solidarity and militancy back at work and making it possible for the workers most at risk of being marginalized, both in the union and by the employer — people of colour, women and younger workers — to take a central place in the successful union of the future.

The campaign was a success for a number of reasons, not least of which were the humanizing effects of being freed from a stressful workplace, the openness of the union leadership to supporting initiatives of rank and file members that went far beyond traditional picketing, and connection with CBC audiences and the Canadian public as human beings and citizens, and not simply taxpayers and consumers. It was also possible because the union itself did not accede to the demand to get rid of the principle of permanent employment, refusing the concession from the outset of bargaining. The Guild victory stands as an important counterpoint to some troubling labour developments in North America. First, that beacon of resistance to concession bargaining in Canada, the CAW, has recently been criticized for promoting concessions aimed at giving General Motors "more flexibility" at its Oshawa plants, which is already among the most productive for GM.[12] Meanwhile, SEIU president Andy Stern, leader of the so called "change to win" breakaway faction from the A.F.L.-C.I.O., endorses a relationship with employers that is friendly to neo-liberal approaches such as contracting out his members' work. [13]

NOTES

1. See Shields, John & Evans, B. Mitchell, *Shrinking the State*, Halifax: 1998, Fernwood Publishing; and Dwivedi, O.P. & Gow, James Iain, *From Bureaucracy to Public Management: the Administrative Culture in the Government of Canada*, Peterborough: 1999, Broadview Press.

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5. See Wirsig, Karen, "The Colour of Casual Work: Canada's Broadcast Media," *Our Times*, Volume 24, No. 3. July/August 2005.

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8. Op. cit., p. 56

9. Ibid, p. 57

10. Dixon, Guy, "CBC, union see contract work as the great divide," *Globe and Mail*, Saturday August 20, 2005, p. A7.

11. Westaway, Nancy, "Was it all just a casual thing?" *Toronto Star Sunday*, September 25, 2005.

12. See Gindin, Sam, "Concessions in Oshawa: the end of an era?" *The Bullet: a Socialist Project E-bulletin*, No. 14, March 22, 2006; and Gindin, "When giving up more is never enough," *Toronto Star*, March 24, 2006, p. A25.

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The World Social Forum and the Emergence of Global Grassroots Politics

JOHN L. HAMMOND

SINCE 2001, the worldwide movement of opposition to neoliberal corporate globalization has met annually at the World Social Forum. The Forum brings together tens of thousands of people from the world's social movements and nongovernmental organizations, pursuing many agendas. They are united in opposition to the international financial institutions (IFIs) that demand austerity programs as conditions of loans to third-world governments and to the transnational corporations that invest in manufacturing plants for export, driving down wages as they threaten to move their investments in search of the lowest costs.

The Forum has met six times, in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005; in Mumbai, India, in 2004; and in a "polycentric" meeting, notionally a single meeting, in Bamako, Mali; Caracas, Venezuela; and Karachi, Pakistan in 2006. It has been a heady experience with tens of thousands of people (155,000 in 2005) who manage to communicate across barriers of language, political orientation, and issue emphasis.

The scene bursts with energy as people who work on particular causes at home — for women, the environment, indigenous peoples, economic justice, human rights, AIDS and other health causes, education (formal and informal), cooperatives, and many others — compare notes and strategies. All the forum's meetings have been highly disorganized, probably inevitably with such large crowds (always bigger than expected) and the short time for planning and holding the meetings, but despite the frustrations, the disorganization intensifies the feeling of spontaneity and dynamism. Musicians and other performers entertain in the open air during the breaks, and dozens of organizations and publishers promote their projects and publications. There is a tent city for impoverished young people, the gathering point for anarchists who have promoted the large demonstrations against major global summits during the past several years.

For some the main issue is to defend the public sector and protect social benefits against the demand for government downsizing and privatizing. Others want to create a "solidary economy," small-scale informal-sector businesses organized as cooperatives to provide jobs to the growing ranks of unemployed workers and basic services to local communities. They join in opposition to the proliferation of trade agreements which give corporations from any member state free rein to operate in other states, with a potentially great competitive advantage against domestic producers. These agreements not only subject underdeveloped economies to unfair economic competition; many fear that they cement U.S. political control and threaten national autonomy.

Cross-cutting the specific issues is a commitment to the public good. They seek to formulate a new discourse to counter the belief in the free market prevailing in much of the world (especially in official circles) today. Against Margaret Thatcher's oft-repeated injunction that "there is no alternative" to transnational capitalism, they insist, in the forum's slogan, that

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"another world is possible."

Diversity itself is a point of unity among the participants. They celebrate the fact that the Forum brings together so many people and groups; they proclaim their respect for the varying opinions expressed and for the many cultures visibly present; and they defend the right of all to differ with each other. The WSF is self-limiting; its charter, adopted at the first forum in Porto Alegre, explicitly excludes political parties and forswears taking political positions or proposing actions that might bind all the members (a point of ongoing contention, as we will see).

Along with hundreds of meetings of like-minded activists in small rooms, thousands of listeners have gathered in plenary sessions to hear the stars of the international antiglobalization movement such as Samir Amin, Noam Chomsky, and Arundhati Roy. The attention they receive causes some grumbling among those who believe that a democratic movement should not give so much space to celebrities, but against this, the WSF weighs the need to attract the international media and to some extent tailors the event to the media's demands.

These events bear fruit afterward. After meeting so many fellow activists from so many different places, people return home actually believing that another world is possible — in part because they feel they have experienced it. But it has concrete results as well. The Social Forum has inspired many replications at regional, national, and local levels, and in special interest groups organized around particular themes. Organizing at the 2003 forum contributed to the massive demonstrations opposing the U.S. invasion of Iraq on February 15, 2003, in which a reported fifteen million people demonstrated in a hundred cities around the world.

Origins of the Forum

THE WSF WAS ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED as a counterweight to the World Economic Forum, the conclave of the international capitalist class, which has met annually since 1970, usually in Davos, Switzerland. (WSF meetings are timed to coincide with those of the WEF.) The WSF has brought together two main currents of activity: the direct action movement against globalization that has called massive demonstrations against international summit meetings, and the emergent worldwide civil society, embodied mainly in the nongovernmental organizations that have mushroomed throughout the world since the 1980s. These forces have been dubbed the "antiglobalization movement" by much of the press, but they generally reject the label, preferring to think of themselves as the global justice movement or alternative globalization (*altermundialización* or equivalents) movement. They favor a unified world, but one unified around common human values and respect for diversity rather than trade.

The direct action movement was behind the 1999 protest of the World Trade Organization summit in Seattle and other major antiglobalization protests to blockade global summits and shut them down. Though the term "antiglobalization movement" is often applied to this group rather than the larger movement, I will call it the direct action current to highlight its differences with the second current.

The NGOs that make up the civil society current became important in the protest movements against dictatorships of the 1980s, especially in Latin America and eastern Europe. Unlike those movements, NGOs aspire to being stable organizations. Seeking funding forces them to cultivate an image of respectability, as do their efforts to influence the governments of their home states.

Like the direct action movement, they are "antiglobalization," opposing the same IFIs that are the targets of major demonstrations. They call for a popular globalization. The two wings of the movement are thus divided more by style than by substance. Antiglobalization demonstrators, many of whom call themselves anarchists, take pride in flouting convention, and criticize the more staid NGOs for losing their movement character and becoming detached from their base.

The idea of a world conclave emerged when two Brazilian social justice activists, Francisco (Chico) Whitaker and Oded Grajew, met in Paris in February, 2000, with Bernard Cassen, a leader of the Association for the Tobin Tax to Aid Citizens (ATTAC, later renamed Action for the Taxation of International Financial Transactions to Aid Citizens), an international movement based in France to promote the Tobin tax, a proposed tax on international capital movements that would make southern countries less vulnerable to capital flight.

They chose Porto Alegre as their site. Porto Alegre had the most longstanding Workers Party (PT) municipal government in Brazil (1990-2004) and was a showcase for the PT's brand of participatory democracy, especially its participatory budget. These founders called on representatives of several Brazilian organizations to join an Organizing Committee (later called the Secretariat). Its members represented six leading Brazilian NGOs as well as the PT-affiliated labor federation Central Unica de Trabalhadores (CUT) and the Landless Farmworkers Movement (MST). Among these progressive organizations, all except the MST espouse a moderate political line. The committee has tried to channel the political enthusiasm of the forum in a moderate direction. It later created an International Council of leading activists and intellectuals, mostly to the left of the Secretariat. The two bodies have not always agreed. Members of the Secretariat have generally held to the idea of the forum as a "space," a meeting place for activists of diverse orientations, while some on the International Council have been in the forefront of efforts to make it an actor in its own right.

> Against Margaret Thatcher's "[T]here is no alternative" to transnational capitalism, they insist . . . that "another world is possible."

Twenty thousand participants from 117 countries attended the first forum in Porto Alegre in 2001. In its most dramatic incident, the MST and José Bové, the French peasant leader and anti-McDonald's protester, led an occupation of a farm owned by the Monsanto Company near Porto Alegre where the company was allegedly developing genetically modified seeds. Some of the Brazilian NGOs on the Organizing Committee, fearing that they might have unleashed a monster that they could not control, strove to moderate the tone of the second forum in 2002.

In 2003 Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez was not given a platform; instead he addressed a hastily arranged outside meeting when the organizers said that the forum was not open to heads of state. They did not exclude the newly elected Brazilian president, the PT's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a charismatic former factory worker, whose address to a huge outdoor rally was a highlight of the third forum.

The fourth forum moved to Mumbai, symbolically staking in Asia the claim to be a genuine *world* forum. About 80,000 people attended, making it smaller than the previous meeting at Porto Alegre, but larger than the first two, and laying to rest the fears of some that it would not be possible to attract similar numbers from the many cultures and the greater poverty of Asia.

The atmosphere was festive, following an Asian tradition of incorporating musical and dramatic performing groups into political events. Political parties were no longer excluded, in recognition of the greater number and competitiveness of left parties in India than in Brazil. Some new issues responded to the Asian context: casteism, racism (not prominently addressed in Brazil and not very prominent in Brazil's left politics even though half the country's people are of African descent), work- and descent-based exclusions and discriminations, religious fanaticism, and sectarian violence. This meeting followed the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The war gained a lot of attention and inspired calls to boycott companies supporting the U.S. occupation. There was also a counterforum, Mumbai Resistance, sponsored by two Indian Maoist parties, protesting the forum's establishment orientation.

In 2005 the forum returned to Porto Alegre. A record 155,000 people attended. In response to previous criticisms of excessive size and insufficient dialogue, the forum's organizers did not sponsor major events and invite speakers but instead turned the agenda over to participating groups to organize their own events. The event was bookended by appearances by Lula on the first day and Hugo Chávez on the last. While some in the audience booed Lula for his continuing embrace of the neoliberal program, Chávez was roundly cheered for his condemnation of U.S. imperialism.

Both at Mumbai and at Porto Alegre the next year, the debate between advocates of the forum as a space and as an actor were aired vociferously. The organizers responded to criticisms of the forum's size and centralization with the decision that in 2006, instead of a single worldwide event, there would be separate meetings on three continents.

The first of these, in Bamako, Mali, was smaller than other sessions — fifteen to twenty thousand participants, according to the organizers. It was overshadowed by the Bamako Appeal, which emerged from a rump session of European and African intellectuals the day before the Forum officially opened. They called on the World Social Forum to adapt a concrete and unified political program and, in the eyes of their detractors, attempted to appear to the world as representing the official position of the World Social Forum.

The Caracas forum followed immediately. The intensely political atmosphere of any World Social Forum was heightened by meeting in the home of Chávez's Bolivarian Revolution and by the recent election of leftist presidents of varying stripes in Bolivia and Chile, joining those already in office in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Some forum participants argued that in this new conjuncture the forum should intervene to support these governments and push them further to the left. Others disagreed, wanting to maintain the forum's nonpartisan and open posture. They have been disappointed in the past, especially by Lula. The conjuncture fed into the debate over the forum as a political actor which had intensified in the previous years.

The Karachi session occurred in a difficult political environment for Pakistan's progressive forces, jostled between a government allied with the Bush administration, a burgeoning Islamic fundamentalism, and nuclear-armed anti-Indian nationalism. They nevertheless found the forum exhilarating. Even if it was subject to the same disorganization as every session of the forum, it was unprecedented for Pakistan. It attracted 35,000 people from 59 countries. Focusing more on Asian issues, and, as at Mumbai, with a lesser presence of intellectuals and a greater presence of grassroots organizations, Karachi was free of the debate about "space" vs. "actor" featured in Bamako and Caracas.

Each forum has attracted parallel events. The World Education Forum, the World Trade Union Forum, the World Judges' Forum, the World Parliamentary Forum, and Via Campesina (a worldwide confederation of national peasants' organizations fighting for land reform) have all met concurrently with one or another annual world forum. Some of these existed independently and have also met apart from the WSF; others came into existence to take advantage of the WSF meeting as a venue.

The WSF has spawned forums around the world at regional (Europe, Africa, Asia, the Americas), national, and local levels. Their political program has been the same — rejection of war and neoliberal globalization — but each has responded to the specific needs of its locality at the same time that all have been influenced by the conjuncture and the actions of the increasingly imperial U.S. government. Though most of them have been riven by internal political factionalism, they have provided an important platform for the social movements of a city or region to come together and communicate as well as an expression of their common repudiation of the institutions of neoliberalism.

Contradictions of Global Politics

THE SOCIAL FORUM IS AN INHERENTLY political event, but each year's forum is political in a somewhat different way. While heady and exciting, the Forum's meetings have been contentious and have taken criticisms from those who are disappointed that it has neither practiced full democracy nor effectively waged global struggle. In the first years, up to 2003, the two streams of its origin — NGOs and direct action — contended over internal democracy in the governing of the forum. In later years, factions within the forum itself have tried to preserve it as a space or convert it into an actor. As we will see, however, neither of these debates has affected the great majority of participants, who use the forum to pursue their own goals of networking and planning within issue-oriented sectors or who come just to soak up the atmosphere.

Critics of the first meetings argued that the WSF had not lived up to its promise to serve as a model of democratic practice for the organization of movements and, eventually, for the exercise of power. The Social Forum seeks both to represent the entire planet and be a model of democracy, but size and format conspire against democratic organization. When plenaries were held in a stadium that seats 15,000 people, they allowed only one-way communication. Even the smaller workshops held in classrooms or tents are often impersonal.

The Secretariat's decision not to sponsor any sessions was one response to the accusations of political insensitivity and monopolizing the event before the 2005 WSF. It also mounted a "wall of proposals" where anyone could post any message, and decided to meet on three continents in 2006, in a further effort to widen participation. Over time the debate about internal democracy has been sidelined, partly because the forum has to some degree reformed and decentralized its structure, partly because many of the more vigorous advocates of participatory democracy have stopped attending.

Debate about whether the forum can take concerted political action as a body, on the other hand, has become more intense. The issue is not whether the forum's constituents should act, but whether the Social Forum itself should cease to be just a debating society open to all comers and instead adopt a coherent platform of action — move from being a mere space to becoming an actor in its own right. This debate has arisen at almost every session of the forum. Those who favor concerted action have been the ones to raise the issue. At Mumbai, Porto Alegre in 2005, Bamako, and Caracas, subgroups have staged well-attended sessions and issued declarations that claimed to synthesize the views of the forum as a whole and make muted calls for some kind of further action.

In 2002 a "Social Movements' Manifesto" issued by some of the major social movements participating in the forum called for demonstrations at several scheduled meetings of world leaders and international institutions. The Assembly of Social Movements was created as a subgroup to endorse political stands that the forum as a whole foreswore. At the Mumbai forum in 2004, it resolved to organize political actions with its "Call of Social Movements and Mass Organizations," a ringing declaration of principles on many fronts. In 2006 it sponsored several sessions in Caracas and laid out a program of struggle, calling for a series of political actions around the world. Because the assembly held a well-attended session to adopt the program on the last day of the Caracas meeting, it could have been taken as the closing plenary and the adoption of a final declaration by the forum as a whole. These proposals have been tantalizingly vague. But critics viewed them as power plays attempting to give the impression of speaking for the forum as a whole and confirming suspicions that they were motivated by an illegitimate vanguardism.

Though issues of strategy and tactics are debated in terms of practical programs, they appear to reflect three important underlying differences of principle, based on contrasting assumptions about how and how much globalization has changed the world: the nature of civil society, the relevance of the state in a globalized world, and the social classes or groups seen as key political actors. These issues raise strategic questions for social movements within and outside of the social forum.

For some, the social forum represents the apex of global civil society; the foremost virtue of civil society is its autonomy from state structures. Civil society is plural, open to all. It is embodied in nongovernmental organizations that deliberately maintain their distance from the governments of their states.

The second difference is over the claim that globalization has steadily eroded the power of the state in favor of international financial institutions and multinational corporations with the conclusion that political attack targeted on the state is increasingly irrelevant. Rejecting the state as a target of action also reinforces the emphasis on the voluntaristic, decentralized organizations of civil society, rather than the coordinated, top-down structure of political parties which mirrors the organization of the state and seems to be required to confront it.

The third covert issue is the composition of the forum's constituency. What actors, what social category or categories are to be part of the worldwide coalition struggling for global justice? The social actors are many and diverse, defined by gender, race, culture, and nationality. The forum recognizes the validity of each group's identity and proposes that all of them should be expressed, not suppressed, by common political action. But how is such a diverse coalition to achieve unity in action? Traditional leftists continue to attribute hegemony in this coalition to a working class as the basis for common interests. Advocates of diversity, on the other hand, point to the danger that calls for unity could overtake the commitment to diversity.

For those who embrace civil society, dismiss the state, and appeal to a multiplicity of actors, the logical conclusion is that the forum should not attempt to unite in political action but should continue to be a space for deliberation and formulation of proposals. But their critics not only challenge both the autonomy of civil society and the demise of the state; they point out that many NGOs are thoroughly entangled with the state and that the state is still the locus for major policy decisions.

Differences over the composition of the forum's constituency are less profound, because those who privilege class nevertheless recognize the importance of incorporating the new constituencies with previously unrecognized identities, especially women and ethnic minorities; even the old institutions representing the working class — parties and trade unions — have taken steps in many countries to incorporate them. But there is an important aspect of social relations inside the social forum which neither side is able to countenance: the forum itself is pervaded by class differences. Though the elites within the movement place themselves in solidarity with the oppressed, the forum reproduces the hierarchy that it fights against on a world scale. The divide is in part mapped geographically between North and South. The cost of attendance introduces an obvious bias — only some can afford a plane ticket. There is also a striking gender imbalance at the forum's sessions — not in participants but in (mostly male) featured speakers.

If differences of ethnicity, culture, and gender are held to be legitimate bases for diversity of orientation and interest, class differences are not. It is paradoxical, of course, that class-based divisions should be so stark within a broad global movement dedicated to equality and to a better life for the planet's poor majority. And the affluent northerners who claim to side with the poor regard themselves as oppressed, beleaguered, and lacking the economic resources they need to carry out their work. But they are clearly privileged relative to those in whose name they wish to act. With better access to the media and to funding, they can more easily promote their views and define the meaning and political direction of the forum.

The Forum aspires to be more than a talking shop.

The advocates of the forum-as-space offer practical rejoinders to the proposal to convert the forum into an actor: that different national contexts require different strategies and different forms of action and that the forum has no authority to order its constituents to join in any common action. Yet some who are uncomfortable with the calls to militant action are palpably dissatisfied with the present limits. They want to go beyond being a space. The challenge is to find ways to struggle collectively while preserving individual groups' autonomy. So there is a tension that François Houtart, director of the Tricontinental Center in Louvain, Belgium, and a member of the forum's International Council, has semiseriously characterized as between "an activists' Woodstock" and the "fifth international."

No one wants this tension to threaten the unity of the forum. The debate will probably go on, without any resolution except compromise and indecision. It mainly engages participants from the North, or others who are in close contact with them through international NGO network connections, and is mostly waged in print and on the Internet before and afterward. The thousands of participants who come from smaller grassroots organizations or who simply show up on their own do not have to pay attention. They can rejoice in the forum's heady experience of interaction, learning, and networking, charge their batteries and return home to continue to fight their many battles independently. They are happy to live the exhilarating experience of global solidarity, tangible in their interaction with others from around the world. They get energized to continue spreading the message and fighting against war and for social justice and popular sovereignty in their communities and in their countries.

What Results?

BUT IS THIS ENOUGH? The Forum aspires to be more than a talking shop. It seeks to have a real impact on the international institutions and practices dominating the globalized world, and it should be judged for its effectiveness on that score.

There are no controlled experiments in history, so it is impossible to say how the antiglobalization struggle would have proceeded in the last six years if there had been no World Social Forum. There is evidence both for and against its effect. On the one hand, it may do no more than make the participants feel good; after meeting with so many like-minded fellow activists from all over the world, talking, and networking, they may go home with a conviction of efficacy that is more illusory than real.

But the antiglobalization movement has

made some progress during this period, for which the forum process can take at least partial credit. Popular pressure on government policy is by its nature diffuse, especially when it is directed across national boundaries at many target governments. Successful efforts must mobilize many diverse sources. The existence of a global organizational forum may help to mobilize pressure. The Forum is not the sole force opposing the institutions of capitalist globalization, perhaps not even the most important. But the concentration of forces it affords has multiplied the efforts of the constituents.

The antiglobalization movement has been more successful in the first half decade of the twenty-first century than in comparable previous periods, so the existence of the Forum may have made some difference. First, the creation of a new world trade regime has clearly been impeded. World Trade Organization negotiations to expand the reach of so-called free trade have been stalled against the demands of the South, led largely by Brazil, that trade be truly free and that northern governments cut subsidies to agriculture to allow southern agricultural products to compete freely in northern markets. The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is also stalled. At the same time, the World Bank and some of the other multilateral lenders have become at least somewhat more open to the concerns of popular movements.

Second, the worldwide antiwar demonstrations of 2003 were significant. They did not prevent the war. But they represented an unprecedented global action on a shared political issue. The WSF and regional gatherings were important in laying the groundwork for these demonstrations, and protest against the war on the popular and diplomatic levels, assisted by the Bush administration's sheer incompetence, hubris, and failure to anticipate the easily foreseeable consequences of its actions, have turned the U.S. invasion of Iraq into a massive debacle.

Finally, the activation of local protest is also important and the forum's effect on participants' consciousness, though hard to measure, cannot be discounted. Important alliances have been made at regional levels and on specific issues, and these have been coordinated in ways that would not have been possible if there had been no worldwide conclave.

Even if no specific outcomes can be clearly attributed to the World Social Forum, the global movement is stronger and more genuinely global than it could have been without it.

ED. NOTE: An expanded version of this article, with references, appears on our website, www.newpol.org.

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SEIU Confronts the Home Care Crisis in California

Brandynn Holgate and Jennifer Shea

Defining the Crisis

The home care crisis in California is one example of a larger crisis in the practice of care in the United States. That crisis involves people's way of thinking about care as well as the actual care. After all, care is a relationship in which one person provides another with fundamental support (physical, emotional, etc.), without which he/she would not be able to function at the same level. Yet care is also a service or activity, oftentimes accompanied by emotional commitment, that may or may not take place within the context of close personal relationships and may be paid or unpaid. Care is actually organized in a multitude of (sometimes fragmented) ways, whether within the family, market, state, civil society or across some mix of these four spheres that order life. All types of care are in crisis, but that crisis is particularly salient where both the givers and receivers of care are living on low incomes because they are more likely than others to patch together resources from all four spheres. Low-income families, who can neither afford to purchase care in the market nor are able to depend solely on family provision, often need to look to the state for public assistance, either of service or funding.

The care receivers of interest in this article are either seniors or people with disabilities who are living on limited incomes. These individuals need some sort of help with activities of daily living, which include eating, dressing, bathing, using the toilet or moving about the home, preparing meals, grocery shopping, managing the household budget, managing medications, doing light housework and other basic activities needed for independent living. They are often related or well known to their care providers. For example, Candace Howes estimates that 70 percent of the home care workers in California's In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) network are related to the care receiver.

The actual crisis in care, which has implications for both care workers and care receivers, has resulted from a combination of demographic and economic shifts that have increased the need for care while diminishing the capacity of families to provide it. One of these shifts is the aging U.S. population, which drives the increasing demand for care services. This high demand is further fueled by a general sentiment that people should be able to live in their own homes instead of medical or congregate facilities and by a trend in public administration that accepts community-based services as providing cost savings to the public.

Another important shift that contributes to the crisis is the growing participation of women in the wage labor market, a reality that makes the traditional role of full-time (never part-time) female family caregiver less and less plausible. Not surprisingly, in-home care work is a highly feminized occupation, often filled by women of color struggling to provide both care and income for their own families. This type of care work is considered low-skill, and is done by personal and home care aids. (Home

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care aides differ from health aides in that they do not provide nursing assistance.) National-level data show that women make up 90 percent of the direct care workers, including nursing assistants, home health aides and personal and home care aides (compared to 47 percent in the labor force as a whole). As compared to other women in the labor force, home care workers are not highly educated — only 41 percent hold a high school diploma or GED, while 27 percent went to college (compared to 92 percent and 63 percent, respectively, economy-wide). On average, direct care workers are 41 years old and one-quarter are single parents. Their ethnic and racial diversity mirrors the population of care receivers: approximately 50 percent are white, one-third are black, and the remaining 17 percent are Hispanic or other. This already disadvantaged group of home care workers is further marginalized by social constructions that fail to see them as deserving of just remuneration. When coupled with the difficulty of translating this sort of care giving into a market value, it results in the persistent devaluation of home care work in the market.

The devaluation of care work has two important implications in this analysis. First, it keeps caregivers in their historically dependent economic positions despite the *increased demand* for care. They are employed either by private providers that contract with the state and/or directly by the individual receiving in-home assistance. They generally do not receive benefits (e.g., health insurance, pensions, paid time off) and, in 2004, earned a median wage of $6.99 an hour. Second, it creates a labor shortage. For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the need for direct-care workers will increase by 39 percent between 2000 and 2010, but the core workforce for the field will grow by only 1.25 percent. Despite these statistics, where government agencies have determined compensation packages for home care workers, as in California, compensation has been low and absent of any benefits, which perpetuates the home care labor shortage. Furthermore, the labor shortage creates a feedback effect that spurs the persistence of a related policy problem — the inability of family members to find care or to get relief from their care-giving duties. As a result, neither the needs of care receivers nor those of care givers are adequately met. For now, family members look to the state for assistance with respite and other services for care receivers, and, if they are fortunate enough, labor union representation to improve wages and benefits for care givers.

The absence of a comprehensive national policy to address these problems has been propelling grassroots demands to improve policies, at least at local and state levels. In order to make these demands, consumer and worker advocates have had to work within the constraints of the existing institutional framework, which does not easily accommodate the complexities of the family home care workforce. In order to examine this situation more closely, we turn to a discussion of the California system.

Analysis of SEIU Strategy in CA

The catalyst for the California home care system is the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, funded by Medicaid dollars and administered at the county level through departments of social services. IHSS was started in 1973 as a way to reimburse low-income families for providing care to their relatives in their homes, an attempt to address the needs of care receivers and care givers in the early years of the shifting economy. This system was based on two important ideas. First, it created a state funding structure that kept costs down by avoiding expensive long-term institutional settings. Second it was based on an "Independent Provider Model" that designated the care receivers as both the consumer and the employer, an idea deeply rooted in a progressive disability rights movement that rejects a traditional medical model (where care receivers are patients) in pursuit of consumer choice and control. Over the next 30 years, this partnership of ideas between fiscal programming and consumer advocacy would develop social service provisions in most states that disregarded the role played by the worker and created unreasonable job requirements that were poorly compensated, unsafe, and disempowering. In short, this partnership was effective in providing low-cost community-based care, but at the expense of care workers' well-being.

> The increased wages and benefits have resulted in lower rates of turnover among home care workers.

Individuals eligible for IHSS are generally care consumers who meet eligibility requirements under the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program criteria. The system serves more than 360,000 people each month across all 58 counties and costs the state upwards of $3 billion a year. County social workers interview and assess consumers' service needs and designate the number of eligible hours of support services that consumers can receive through IHSS. Individuals receiving IHSS are considered private employers having the responsibility and right to hire, train, supervise and fire home care aids, but they do not have the ability to negotiate wages and benefits.

Despite the state of California's attempt to implement a progressive policy that addressed the needs of low-income care receivers and care givers, the relationships it fostered were uneven. Though care receivers had market-based rights as consumers and workers, care givers did not. As a result, prior to the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) home care worker organizing drive in California that began in 1987, the circumstances surrounding home care work (e.g. low wages and workforce fragmentation) had created a particularly oppressed group of workers that lacked any opportunity to exercise or advance their rights outside of private negotiation with the person that they cared for. SEIU's organizing strategy, which is focused on enhancing quality, choice and stability in home care service, successfully brought about concrete and needed gains in wages and benefits, improving living standards for hundreds of thousands of low-income caregivers and care receivers.

In fact, prior to collective bargaining, prevailing wages for IHSS workers were approximately $6.15 an hour (working 40 hours/week for 52 weeks that comes to $12,792/year, before taxes) with variations across counties due to the devolved system of administration. Those workers did not receive benefit packages. Collective bargaining has resulted in substantial, if disparate, improvements for home care workers. Currently, 46,000 workers are organized under SEIU UHW (United Healthcare Workers) in 11 northern California counties and 105,000 are organized under SEIU Local 434b in Los Angeles. In addition, SEIU and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) have entered into agreement and formed the California United Homecare Workers (CUHW) provisional union that represents more than 170,000 additional home care workers in the state of California.

For example as of 2003, in Sacramento County home care workers earned $9.50 an hour, plus health and vision coverage, while in Santa Clara County they earned $10.50 an hour with health, dental, vision, transportation and life insurance. In Los Angeles and San Bernardino counties, the current wage rates are set at $8.45 and $9.25 an hour, respectively, with benefits that include health insurance, transportation, and training. The increased wages and benefits have resulted in lower rates of turnover among home care workers, whether or not they are related to the care receivers. In addition, these accomplishments have helped address the labor shortage by increasing the number of people willing and able to take home care jobs. For instance, during the five year period between 1997 and 2002, wages for home care workers in San Francisco County doubled, from $5.00/hour to $10.00/hour. During that same period of time, the percentage of workers who stayed in their job for more than one year increased from 39 percent to 74 percent. Moreover, consumers' demand to employ IHSS workers in their homes has increased, due largely to the fact that consumers can now hire a worker they know and trust to provide that care (because the person can now afford to give it) whereas before consumers may have gone without adequate levels of care at all times. Employing care workers from one's personal network (family, community, etc.) increases the likelihood of ethnic and racial matching, which helps to explain why this particular segment of the California workforce is not as highly racialized as others.

These accomplishments have not come easily. From the beginning SEIU was faced with enormous challenges brought about by the fragmented nature of work within the state and county systems of in-home support services, which impeded the process of traditional union organizing in two ways. First, there was no single employer of record against whom to make claims. Second, the workforce was geographically dispersed, with no clear place around which to organize.

The earliest and most immediate challenge for SEIU was finding a way to make claims. At times, an in-home care worker might be considered to have three employers: the consumer purchasing care through available IHSS dollars, a private for-profit or non-profit agency that employs and/or brokers service providers, and the county government agency for IHSS programming that resides within the department of social services. Part of the early organizing strategy led by SEIU, in concert with several consumer advocacy groups and IHSS participants, focused on creating one employer of record, so that there would be one cohesive entity with which to bargain.

In 1992, with the passing of the Public Authority Act, this coalition won an important victory that created an employer of record for every county in California. The Public Authority is an administrative agency within the county department of social services and reports to the county board of supervisors. The IHSS Public Authority submits budgets, writes the paychecks, and is a point of contact for lobbying by consumers and workers. Additionally, it engages in bargaining with the union and assists consumers through background checks, training, referral, and setting qualifications. In addition, it created a mediating entity that, to some extent, could deal with the complex arrangements for consumers and their family members. Consumers maintained employer responsibilities in the selection, hiring and supervision of IHSS workers.

Once the employer of record was established, SEIU could focus on the internal organizing of home care workers. Family home care workers do not work the same "shift" on the same "factory floor" with their "co-workers" — they work in individual homes around the county. Workers have busy schedules that significantly depend on other people's needs, where these people may be their loved ones and/or may be one of several people for whom they work. For example, in California, there are more than 300,000 providers of homecare services where approximately 40 percent are immediate family members or related in some way. Almost half these homecare providers are now organized and represented by SEIU. Still, the workforce is highly fragmented and, as is sometimes the case with other workers, home care workers face a dual set of constraints in choosing how to sell their labor, with market imperatives and family ties often reinforcing one another.

SEIU's worksite organizers focus largely on encouraging workers to participate in the union meetings and lobbying activities because family members and other employees find it difficult to get away from work to participate in organizing activity. Nonetheless, anecdotally, SEIU has found that many family members will often participate in union meetings and lobbying activities to the extent that family members and other employees are able to get away from work or other responsibilities. The union experiences real benefits when it is able to bring the home care workers together in one place to share their experiences, challenges and needs. Workers quickly feel empowered and realize that they can make real gains through collective action. Through this mechanism, union staff is then able to develop leadership and promote activism among its members.

Both interviews with SEIU staff and research presenting union organizing strategies reveal significant challenges for internal organizing. SEIU expends a tremendous amount of resources (mostly in the form of staff time) for outreach to union members, identifying and developing natural leaders among the members and motivating activist approaches to solving workforce problems. The establishment of the IHSS Public Authority in California as the employer of record along with consistent involvement from more dedicated union members has helped address workforce fragmentation to some extent. However, like any labor union, the SEIU organizes workers in order to protect and advance their rights and interests in the labor market, rendering SEIU's scope limited with respect to the broader view of care in society. Moreover, while unions may help alleviate the consequences of workforce fragmentation, they do not have the capacity to overcome the fragmentation in service delivery created by popular policies, social services programming, and fiscal systems.

Furthermore, the union has acknowledged that unresolved issues persist around brokering services for respite, leveraging resources from other agencies (e.g. educational services, elder affairs, and disability services), and training the workforce. However, while it is the role of the state to formally address respite and service provisions that link consumer needs with worker needs, little has been accomplished in this regard. One program designed to address coordination problems is the National Family Caregiver Support Program (NFCSP), which provided states with federal grants designed to coordinate caregiver support services. These small $125 million awards are dwarfed by recent market rate value estimates of care giving as well as the number of households that perform extra care duties for people with disabilities and seniors. In California, the NFCSP was primarily able to identify service gaps that the union, caregivers, and advocates already knew existed in terms of language and culturally appropriate service, transportation, respite, training, counseling, and financial assistance. The jury is still out as to whether or not the program has made any impact on coordination and access to services.

One glaring limitation of the California model is the absence of any mechanisms for addressing the now well-documented financial and emotional burdens carried by families, which can be placed into the following five categories. First, the fragmented service system results in either uninformed decision making by families, leaving them ill-prepared to deal with the requirements of care, or forces caregivers into a case manager role that takes significant time and puts a constant demand on care duties in the home. Second, emotional stress results from interpersonal relationships that attempt to strike an often impossible balance between the care receivers needs and desires and the caregivers capacity to provide. Third, poor training regarding lifting and moving has resulted in injuries and physical stress. Additionally, under tight financial and time constraints caregivers will forgo medical help for themselves. Fourth, one out of every five caregivers will quit his/her regular job to provide in-home care and one-third of care giving households will deplete all or most of their savings in the process. Fifth, due to the cost of accessing information and services, committed caregivers (especially family members) pay out of pocket for many expenses associated with medical and health needs when the consumer is normally eligible for coverage.

The example of SEIU home care worker organizing in California provides one example of how the rights of home care workers and consumers both can be advanced within the existing (largely liberal) institutional framework; it also highlights the limitations of that framework. The SEIU strategy, bound by existing institutional constraints, pursues an alignment with market norms that reconstructs caregivers as workers, care receivers as consumers, and traverses multiple definitions of the employer. To some extent, the private or informal practice of care is interpolated into the public sphere and organized through the market. Yet, as this analysis illustrates, the practice of care actually overlaps the spheres of family, civil society, market and the state, especially where low-income families are concerned. Actors in civil society, such as advocates for care receivers and care givers (e.g. labor unions) mediate economic and political processes that dominate the liberal paradigm.

Despite the successes of the California model that were achieved through grassroots organizing, coalition building, state policy changes and a strong presence by organized labor, the long-term capacity of this framework to overcome the problems inherent in workforce and service delivery fragmentation is uncertain. Specifically, the fragmented and still primarily informal nature of in-home care inhibits leadership development and activism, limits access to information and services, and places the economic burden on those least prepared to deal with it — low-income families. In order to transcend these issues, the advancement and protection of rights for home care workers must include additional institutional and policy arrangements that are coordinated by the state and interact across the four major spheres, spanning their boundaries in the same way that caring does. These new arrangements should accomplish a balance between serving and advocating for consumers, advancing worker rights and protecting the various family arrangements that are chosen by the individuals within them.

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For people who support a progressive labor movement but do not want to negate important policy concerns regarding quality of care and cost containment, it is imperative to address these larger system problems within the context of existing, emerging, and new welfare provisions. While we have focused on family home care workers, it is important to emphasize that the lack of any existing comprehensive national policy to address these issues affects *all* homecare workers. In the following section, we offer some conceptual tools that may help in solving the care crisis in a more comprehensive and inclusive way. We argue that caregivers and care receivers may benefit from a reconceptualization of care and its role in ordering society, which could help inform complex policy issues that simultaneously impact healthcare, social services, labor markets and families.

Toward a New Conceptual Framework

THE ROOTS OF THE HOME CARE CRISIS rest in a tension that exists between what many see as the way care work ought to be carried out as compared with the way care work manifests itself in post-industrial society. The tension persists, at least in part, because of ideological, institutional and policy legacies that serve as constraints in accommodating the contemporary economic and demographic realities of life in the United States. Most of the institutions and policies that mediate the relationships between individuals, families, the state, and the market, were constructed in the context of an industrial capitalist economy, and thus reflect the dominant liberal ideology that informed their creation. That dominant liberal ideology tends to divide society into two spheres: a public sphere where people engage in markets and politics and a private sphere that consists primarily of the family and home life and is where people seek solace from the public sphere.

For example, care is often thought to be a relationship that is relegated to the private sphere — something that takes place among family, friends or close-knit community members. In that discourse, care is largely seen as a voluntary activity, so that caregivers provide care to care receivers, and is thus decommodified (or at least taking place outside of mainstream market relations). The construction of care as voluntary and private misses at least two important elements of care, even between family members, that are relevant in a post-industrial society: (1) a duty-based compulsion to provide care and (2) the costs to the caregiver. In other words, this private negotiation is increasingly not possible (a reality that is difficult to deny) in the post-industrial economy where women are likely to work for wages outside the home, often to ensure that their families' basic needs are met. In order to combat this discourse, a competing discourse has evolved to reflect the market implications of care work.

In one strand of that discourse caregivers become care workers and care receivers are seen as consumers of care. As illustrated by the success of SEIU organizing in California, this discourse is empowering for both parties and implies that market norms of remuneration and choice (rather than family norms of love and duty) should enter the picture. However, in pushing the discourse of care primarily into the market, this construction risks veiling the important familial and relational components inherent in care work because market norms do not allow for the concept of long-term reciprocity that comes with family relations. In addition, market discourse risks glossing over the fact that there are a whole set of actors and institutions cutting across spheres which mediate the relationship between the providers and receivers of care. The mediating agents include the state/county government, family, the union and advocates for care workers as well as care receivers, where individuals may be actors in more than one of these insitutions. Thus, neither the dominant discourse of care as an activity existing in the private or family sphere, nor the competing discourse of care as existing in the public sphere of market fully captures the complexity of these relationships, especially for people with limited incomes. Instead, by viewing care as a set of activities that take place primarily within one sphere or another, dominant and radical discourses implicitly recognize the various principles that dominate within those spheres and generally argue for the prominence of one over another (market over family, family over market, state over market, etc.).

Even though the dominant liberal division of spheres into public and private are not sufficient for conceptualizing the way care is delivered in post-industrial society, we assert that the concept of sphere differentiation can still prove useful to help resolve the actual care crisis. Different spheres have different norms that govern the distribution of goods and services within them. These norms compete for political attention in the broader realm of the state — differentiation is a way to accord priority for some norms over others, depending on the stakes. Still it is important to emphasize that these conceptual spheres, as well as the real individuals operating within them, "... are positioned in multiple, overlapping webs of discourse, which both constrain and enable individual agency." We assert that viewing care as its own conceptual sphere, which overlaps with the spheres of state, market, family and civil society, may allow us to overcome some of the institutional and policy constraints that impede the simultaneous realization of good care provision and workers' rights protections.

What, then, ought to be the principles that govern the sphere of care? Scholars as diverse as Michael Walzer, Elizabeth Anderson, Deborah Stone, and Eva Feder Kittay offer some useful tools for understanding the limitations of existing ideology and institutions. We use their work here, and build on it, to suggest a new approach for looking at care. Combining the suggestions of Deborah Stone and Eva Feder Kittay, we articulate four guiding principles that ought to govern a sphere of care. We do this to illustrate that care is more than an activity and more than a personal relationship, but is actually a critical sphere with broader societal impacts that are important enough to merit the development of its own norms, rather than defer to norms that govern other spheres and thereby reinforce the racialized, gendered and classed nature of care in the U.S. today. Differentiation by sphere, rather than by race, class, gender, ability/disability, can enable us to develop agreement on universal principles and the rights that protect those principles in order to guide public and private policy decisions, helping to overcome the continued marginalization of care workers along the lines of race and gender.

Bowles and Gintis differentiate among sites and practices. They are: appropriative, distributive, political and cultural. Following these principles, our first principle is that individuals should be able to make reasonably unconstrained choices regarding the provision of care for themselves and their loved ones (a distributive action). The second principle states that people who provide care should be appropriately trained and justly compensated for that work (with wages and benefits), regardless of their kinship relationship to the person being cared for (a political action). The third principle asserts that people who need care should be able to get the level of care they require in the most dignified manner possible (a political action). Finally, the fourth principle claims that there ought to be a balance in accommodating the concerns and rights of persons who provide care as well as those who receive it (a cultural action). In the section that follows, we assess the California home care model in light of each of these principles.

Conclusion and Recommendations

It is clear from the preceding analysis that SEIU organizing in California has been at least somewhat successful in battling the devaluation of home care work and addressing the labor shortage. However, it is not yet clear how well this strategy accommodates the four principles we have outlined in the previous section. In this section, we assess the strengths and weaknesses of the California home care model in light of the four principles we have outlined. This assessment provides us with the basis for a set of final recommendations for other states to consider.

Principle 1: Individuals should be able to make reasonably unconstrained choices regarding the provision of care for themselves and their loved ones (a distributive action).

Union organizing brought about higher wages and benefits, which in turn provided for a larger supply of home care workers, thus providing greater choice for IHSS eligible consumers. However, not all consumers who need home care assistance are IHSS eligible; therefore this strategy results in a fundamental inequality in the distributive action of care in that not everyone's needs are addressed equally. Instead choices remain limited, especially for those who barely miss meeting the IHSS eligibility requirements and are not wealthy (or well-insured) enough to finance home care privately. This affects the appropriative action of getting someone to perform the labor of care. In addition, one question that remains unanswered is whether the organizing of home care workers will diminish consumer control over their own care, even within the IHSS network. There is a need for additional research around the extent to which consumers exercise choice and control in the provision of care, which is both an important measurement of the quality of care as well as a skill in which workers need to be trained.

SEIU organizing in California has been at least somewhat successful in battling the devaluation of home care work and addressing the labor shortage.

Principle 2: People who provide care should be appropriately trained and justly compensated for that work (with wages and benefits), regardless of their kinship relationship to the person being cared for (a political action).

Not all home care workers serve IHSS eligible consumers and not all home care workers are paid. As a result, some home care workers experience different levels of training, support and compensation than do others. Working conditions that are fragmented and variable feed a range of problems that affect everything from dignity to basic pay and benefits. The implications of this fragmented system exist within the state of California, but also beyond, to organized and non-organized home care workers across the country. Stabilizing the workforce requires a commonly understood and executable set of definitions around what constitutes care work and the resources, at the very least, to figure out who is doing it (a political action). It also requires inclusion of all home care workers within any newly established parameters, not only those who qualify for union jobs.

Principle 3: People who need care should be able to get the level of care they require in the most dignified manner possible (a political action).

Despite increasing the number of care workers, the California model still encompasses a coordination problem that impedes the ability of people to get the range of services they need. The state ought to provide the coordinating role, including access to information, in order to ensure that it is equally accessible to all California residents. All states and the federal government should be expending significant resources to develop and evaluate coordinating models within the vein of the National Family Caregiver Support Program.

Principle 4: There ought to be a balance in accommodating the concerns and rights of persons who provide care as well as those who receive it (a cultural action).

In order for this principle to be met there needs to be a dynamic, ongoing dialogue about what people need and how people can provide it that involves both the consumer and the provider. Union organizing and coalition building is a step towards a broader dialogue but, as evidenced by the long history of union organizing in the United States, cannot alone bring about a long-lasting and inclusive cultural movement. Additionally, policy evaluation and program development that is designed under costs constraints and accountability requirements cannot take the place of public education and debates about the social and cultural importance of care. What, then, can other states learn from the California model?

Even within the existing institutional and conceptual frameworks, there is much that states can do to address the crisis of care. Most importantly, states can learn the following important lessons from the successes and limitations of the California model. Care is improved, for consumers and workers alike, when care workers are justly compensated. Yet, states that view both the work of care and access to it as policy problems cannot rely on unions alone to advance the cause for just compensation. Unions, by definition, advocate on behalf of their members while collective bargaining agreements are intended to cover those members. At the same time, unions have no capacity to address the problems surrounding the coordination and fragmentation of service delivery. States must take an active role in coordinating these services and providing information to consumers. We recommend that states pursue one of the following two alternative policy strategies in the immediate term while also embarking on a larger scale long-term project.

In the immediate term, we suggest states pursue one of the following two strategies. One option is for states that foster both a progressive consumer rights movement and labor organizing to bring together these two groups to get benefits while assigning themselves to deal with the coordination issue. The other option is for states to establish a living wage and benefits package for all home care workers — so that the benefits of better compensation (which include a bigger, more qualified and stable workforce) are not limited to unionized care workers and the consumers eligible to employ them.

In the long term, we urge states to foster a culture of collaboration between consumer groups, workers, and public agencies that maintains an ongoing dialogue about the nature of care services and delivery as society experiences demographic, economic, technological and other shifts that are bound to arise in the future. This national level discussion can inform the norms that ought to govern the policy choices and practices of families caregiving.

Ed. Note: A fully footnoted version will be found on our website, www.newpol.org

Morris Slavin, 1913 - 2006

Morris Slavin was born to parents from the Jewish Labor Bund in Russia in 1913. Emigrating to Youngstown, Ohio, in 1923, he began his political life in the Young People's Socialist League and joined the Trotskyist movement in 1934. In the 1940 split in American Trotskyism, Slavin — like the founding editors of *NP* — went with Max Shachtman to found the Workers Party, later the Independent Socialist League, which advocated a revolutionary socialism that saw nothing innately progressive in the Stalinist USSR. Unlike Shachtman, he remained on the radical left after the ISL dissolved. Slavin became an assistant history professor at Youngstown State University in 1961, teaching there for 20 years before retiring as emeritus professor. He wrote three major books on the French Revolution after his "retirement": *The French Revolution in Miniature: Section Droits de l'Homme, 1789–1795* (1984), *Making of an Insurrection: Parisian Sections and the Gironde* (1986), and *The Hébertistes to the Guillotine: Anatomy of a "Conspiracy" in Revolutionary France* (1994), followed by a collection of essays entitled *The Left and the French Revolution* (1995). He was honored with a Festschrift, *Rebels Against the Old Order* (1994), edited by Boris Blick and Louis Patsouras.

Oaxaca Uprising

JOHN GIBLER

"Ulises nos decia: 'ni marchas ni plantones'. Aqui le demostramos que somos mas cabrones."

(*"Ulises told us: no marches and no protests. Here we'll show him that we're more badass than he is."*)

The Oaxaca Uprising began as a annual, peaceful teachers' strike and exploded into an unarmed uprising after Governor Ulises Ruiz Oritz refused to dialogue with the teachers, instead sending in 1,000 riot police to violently lift their protest camp in Oaxaca City's town square, or Zócalo.

THE OAXACA UPRISING IS A REBELLION against, above all else, an offense. Governor Ulises Ruiz Ortiz's brutal predawn attack on sleeping teachers on June 14 consummated decades of corruption, persecution, and repression from the successive governments of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) into a single act of violent disdain, spurring a civil disobedience uprising.

Since his inauguration — under allegations of electoral fraud — in 2004, Ulises Ruiz has repeatedly broken the rules that allowed the PRI to contain explosions of social discontent and hold on for so long — 77 years — to its monopoly grip on power in Oaxaca. In only a year and a half in office, Ruiz cut ties with people and organizations across the state by making unilateral decisions, brushing off dialogue entreaties, and flat out refusing to listen to the protests that resulted.

"Here we hold assemblies for everything," said Alejandro Cruz, a lawyer with an Oaxaca-based indigenous human rights organization, "but [Ulises Ruiz] doesn't consult with anybody. Others simulate consultation, but this guy doesn't even know how to simulate. He thinks he is a king."

Ruiz's arrogance and the excessive use of force against the teachers deeply offended people in Oaxaca and led to the immediate and massive support for the teachers.

> "On June 14, the government decided to repress, sending police to beat people and to fire tear gas from helicopters," one of the teachers present that morning told me. "All the years before, the government arrived and announced over a megaphone: 'We are going to lift the encampment,' and on the third announcement, everyone would grab their stuff and run. This time there was none of that. They even attacked us from the air, as if we were criminals."

An elderly indigenous woman who depends on handouts to survive told me that the governor made a huge mistake by using tear gas: "He shouldn't have used the gas. He could have just grabbed a few teachers and thrown them in jail, like before. But no, he used the gas and insulted them, and that's why we have all this trouble now."

Only hours after the state police attack on the sleeping teachers' protest camp, thousands of local residents took to the streets, joining the teachers' ranks. Together they surrounded the police, pelting them with rocks and bottles and forcing them out of the Zócalo. This victory at the hands of a spontaneous popular outcry formed the base of what would become the Oaxaca Peoples' Popular Assembly (APPO).

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The teachers union convoked the first assembly, hoping to organize this spontaneous support into something that could be sustained over time. But soon, the APPO membership passed all expectations, with hundreds of organizations stepping in, and new organizations forming to pull previously unorganized people into the folds of the APPO.

> The massive grassroots participation in the APPO surpassed any individual leader's ability to corral the movement.

And while the first assembly elected a provisional leadership council — made up mostly of men with many years of experience leading political organizations, and several with less than spotless records — the massive grassroots participation in the APPO surpassed any individual leader's ability to corral the movement. Leaders became spokespeople — those who give press conferences and negotiate with government officials — without powers of unilateral decision making. The movement's power came not from the discourse of figures like Flavio Sosa or Florentino Lopez, but from the huge numbers of people participating daily in protest camps, marches, takeovers of government buildings, public and private media outlets, and building and guarding the hundreds of barricades set up nightly across Oaxaca City.

Background

OAXACA IS THE FIFTH LARGEST of Mexico's 31 states, bordering Chiapas to the east, Guerrero to the west, Puebla and Veracruz to the north and the Pacific Ocean to the south, with a population of 3.4 million inhabitants. There are sixteen different indigenous ethnicities in Oaxaca and over a million people speak an indigenous language. Along with its neighbors in Mexico's marginalized south, Oaxaca is one of the poorest states in the country. Thirty-five percent of all households have dirt floors, and only half the population receives all three basic municipal services: electricity, water, and sewage. Twenty percent of the population is illiterate, and only 40 percent receive education beyond elementary school.

The history of the teachers' struggle in Oaxaca dates back to 1980, when dissident teachers reformed Section 22 of the National Union of Education Workers (SNTE) to root out and avoid future union corruption. They passed new union rules to prohibit reelections for union leaders and ensure grassroots participation in decision-making and full liberty of political affiliation to break the PRI's hold on the local. Many teachers from indigenous and rural farm-working communities, with long histories of resistance, austere lifestyles, and disciplined collective work styles (long marches, protest encampments, and assemblies) actively participated in Section 22's mobilizations, heavily influencing the union's organizing culture.

The Arrogance of Ulises Ruiz

ULISES RUIZ ORTIZ was elected governor of Oaxaca under widespread allegations of fraud on August 1, 2004. In his first year and a half in office he carried out an unprecedented series of offensive and mostly botched moves to exert unchecked power over his opposition. He tried unsuccessfully to have his gubernatorial opponent, Gabino Cue, imprisoned on trumped up charges. He attacked the local opposition newspaper, *Noticias*, first trying to kick its newsstands out of town, then canceling all state government advertising, and finally setting up a bogus union to take over the newspaper's offices in a strike that had nothing to do with actual newspaper employees. He then moved both the governor's offices and the state legislature out of their historic buildings in the center of Oaxaca City into new, expensive, fenced-in offices on the outskirts of town. This move was meant to make it impossible for protesters to hold marches and protests in front of government offices. Ruiz turned the old state legislature into a museum, and the governor's offices into a rent-by-the-hour party hall.

Ulises Ruiz then decided to create a "new face for tourism" in Oaxaca, tearing up the historic Zócalo, ripping up decades-old trees, and destroying several local monuments to build new ones. These moves — largely believed to be money laundering operations to hide state funds spent on the PRI's presidential campaign in Oaxaca — turned much of the middle class against Ruiz, mainly for the brazen manner in which he pushed through his projects without listening to any opposition voices. Meanwhile, in the countryside, the state police beat and shot members of indigenous and farmers' rights organizations, leading to formal human rights complaints, but remaining in complete impunity.

Teachers Go on Strike, Governor Represses

Section 22's Executive Committee meets every April to look over the union's demands for the upcoming school year. On April 29, 2006, the union released its list of 14 demands, most of which called to increase Oaxaca's state and federal education budgets. The state government, under Ulises Ruiz, did not respond. Teachers then organized a march for May first. After May 1, they again asked the government for a response to their demands. The government did not respond. On May 15, teachers organized another march, and again the state government did not respond to their demands.

On May 17, the Section 22 assembly decided to go on strike and set up a protest encampment in the Zócalo on May 22, and from there to wait for a response from the government, something the teachers have done for 26 years. Jorge Franco Vargas, then lieutenant governor, delivered a document calling for the end of the strike, but refused to address the teachers' list of demands.

As the government did not address their demands, the teachers did not lift the encampment. On June 14, Ruiz attempted to repress the strike, sending 1,000 state police into the Zócalo before dawn, beating people, destroying their radio station, and firing tear gas from helicopters hovering above the Zócalo.

Less than two months after federal and state police brutally repressed a land rights movement in San Salvador Atenco, people feared the worse from the Oaxaca attack and for hours rumors circulated that the police raid had turned into a massacre. But almost the opposite turned out to be the case: thousands of people from surrounding neighborhoods took to the streets and together with the thousands of teachers from the protest camp who escaped the Zócalo, they counterattacked the police, first surrounding them in the Zócalo and then forcing them out of the city center. The state police have not been back since.

Enter the APPO

"After the 14th, we recovered the Zócalo," one teacher told me. "The raid even gave us greater strength. From that moment on the sole demand of the teachers union was the immediate ousting of that man, Ulises Ruiz, for being a repressor. The people from the city began to participate, taking up the single demand of Ruiz's ouster."

Upon retaking the Zócalo, and forming the APPO, the protesters organized massive marches with half a million people participating and launched a "punishment vote" campaign against the PRI in the July 2 elections, leading to the first ever defeat of the PRI's presidential candidate in Oaxaca.

After the elections the APPO and Section 22 organized more self-named "mega-marches" of hundreds of thousands of people and began to paint Oaxaca City's colonial-era cathedrals and touristy businesses with graffiti denouncing Ulises Ruiz. They blocked the state's largest tourist festival, the Guelaguetza, organizing an alternative and free Guelaguetza in its stead. But throughout all these protests, the state government refused to budge on the demand for Ruiz's ouster, and the federal government — troubled itself by Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador's claims of electoral fraud and protests in Mexico City — turned a blind eye.

Then in late July the APPO went on the offensive, blocking the office buildings of all three branches of the state government in order to generate "ungovernability" in Oaxaca and thus force the Mexican Senate to "dissolve powers," in the state, the only legal mechanism available in Oaxaca to force a governor out of office.

But as the APPO went on the offensive, the state responded by organizing individual gunmen and later large convoys of paramilitaries to attack the protesters' marches and camps. Gunmen apprehended by members of the APPO and captured in photographs published in national newspapers, have been identified as local and state police and local city officials, all associated with the PRI. From early August through November, such paramilitary gunmen killed 13 people and wounded scores more.

The conflict in Oaxaca finally attracted the attention of the federal government after over 40 cars and trucks filled with paramilitary gunmen firing machine guns at protesters, wounding several and killing one person, drove through Oaxaca City on August 21 and 22. The national television giant, Televisa, filmed this death squad and aired the images on television screens across the country. While this prompted the federal government to call for negotiations with the APPO and Section 22, no one was held responsible for the paramilitary killings. Instead, the killings continued.

After a month of stalled dialogue between the Minister of the Interior, Carlos Abascal, and the APPO, the Senate finally sent a commission to review the situation in Oaxaca, but they declined to "dissolve powers." As pressure mounted, Section 22 voted — after several contested vote counts — to return to classes and continue their struggle for Ruiz's ouster through "other means." This decision threatened to split the union as thousands of teachers vowed to continue the strike.

The day after the teachers' vote, on Friday October 27, plain clothes police officers and local PRI officials opened fire on protesters at over 15 locations across Oaxaca City, killing three people, one of whom was a cameraman for New York City Indymedia, Bradley Will. Will, along with local and national correspondents, was there to cover the attack against the protesters. He stood in the street behind member of the APPO, next to several national newspaper photographers. A shot rang out and Will screamed. He filmed his own assassination. That afternoon, President Vicente Fox ordered the Federal Preventive Police (PFP) into Oaxaca.

Media in the Movement

THE TEACHERS AND THE APPO have used numerous forms of protest and civil disobedience to advance their fight for Ruiz's ouster. They held huge marches and set up protest camps in public plazas and later surrounding state government buildings. They campaigned against Ruiz's PRI party in the presidential elections. They boycotted a major state-sponsored cultural event. They commandeered city buses to drive their "mobile brigades" of graffiti artists around town painting political messages. They led a march of four thousand people over 250 miles from Oaxaca City to Mexico City. They set up a protest camp outside of the federal senate building and held a 21-day hunger strike. But their most surprising tactic — that which has been most celebrated by supporters and most demonized by opponents — has been the takeover and occupation of both public and private news media, and their use of these media to spread political messages and coordinate civil disobedience actions.

During the June 14 raid, state police targeted Section 22's small pirate radio station, Radio Plantón, destroying their transmission equipment and beating the four volunteers present at the station. In retaliation, university students occupied the Oaxaca state university's small radio station, using the airwaves to call people out to the marches and push for Ruiz's ouster. This radio station, Radio Universidad, became the central communication tool for the movement with people calling information in from the various protest camps and protesters listening day and night on handheld, battery powered radios. Radio Universidad was also the target of the first use of live gunfire against protesters when gunmen shot at the station on July 22, mildly damaging the antenna.

On August 1 several thousand women carried out a high-energy women-only march, with the participants banging on pots and pans, creating an amazing din and thus turning their kitchen tools into symbols of political empowerment. After reaching the march's destination at the Zócalo, the women called to take over the statewide public television and radio stations, known as CORTV. The women marched out to the station and asked the director for an hour to broadcast their version of the APPO's uprising. The director denied their request, and the women marched by her and occupied the station. Within hours they were broadcasting live.

"We were outraged with the coverage at CORTV; they never told the truth. They said that the alternative Guelaguetza was a failure; that really, deeply hurt," one of the women involved in the takeover told me.

Since the beginning of the APPO's campaign to oust Ulises Ruiz, protesters have pressed the issue of media veracity, verbally attacking television, radio, and newspaper correspondents whom they accuse of being partial to the government and covering up state violence. One of the more common chants at marches became: "Press, if you have any dignity, tell the truth." Protesters constantly hassled reporters at their marches and protest camps, denying access to some and interrogating others for minutes before letting them pass. At one tense moment someone in the crowd called out that a local correspondent for a national newspaper was a police agent. The correspondent, frightened, turned and ran. Protesters hit him with clubs from behind until he fell, whereupon they beat him until others urged restraint. Later that day the APPO's provisional leadership called a press conference issuing a formal apology and calling on its members to respect individual reporters even though they may be critical of the editorial line of their employers. While the tension did drop, the distrust of commercial media has remained constant in the movement, and this distrust has fueled the movement's support for media takeovers.

The APPO's use of the media has been, understandably, both clumsy and energizing. Under APPO control, for the first time on CORTV, one could watch uncensored, independent documentaries showing footage of brutal police repression in San Salvador Atenco and Oaxaca as well as talk shows hosted by protesters analyzing the many offenses of Ulises Ruiz. But after a few days, almost all the programs were reruns and the broadcast would go off the air for hours at a time for lack of material. On the radio one could hear the 70s Chilean protest song "Venceremos," several times an hour, leading some to nickname the station Radio Venceremos. One local resident said: "They are teachers so you think they are going to put on cultural programs, but no, they don't even play much music, it is pure revolution."

The media takeovers have also been the most frequent targets of paramilitary violence. After the July 22 failed attempt to destroy Radio University's antenna with gunfire, on August 8, someone paid two students $250 to throw acid on the transmission equipment. With Radio Universidad off the air, the movement concentrated their radio broadcasts on CORTV's two radio stations. Then, on August

21 the convoy of civilian-clad police fired on protesters camping out at the base of CORTV's antennas. Several people were injured, but able to escape. The gunmen then destroyed CORTV's transmission equipment, knocking the APPO controlled television and radio programming off the air.

In one of the most impressive moves of the APPO, within hours of the paramilitary attack on CORTV, APPO protesters occupied 12 of the 13 commercial radio stations in Oaxaca City without injuring a single person or breaking a single window. That night the death squad returned, this time attacking the protest camps outside the newly occupied radio stations, killing one protester. The APPO voluntarily turned over 9 of the stations and held onto 3. A few weeks later the signals of the occupied stations began to break up: someone was using high-tech radio transmission equipment to interfere and destroy the APPO-controlled stations. The weaker station was off the air in a matter of days, and the stronger lasted about two weeks, though by the time it went off the air in early October, the protesters had fixed the transmission equipment at Radio Universidad.

The Limits of Civil Disobedience

THE APPO HAS MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT to keep their struggle peaceful, or at least to refrain from using physical violence to achieve their objectives. Many argue that the forced evacuations of government offices, commandeering city buses, and takeovers of media outlets are forms of violence. It is true that the APPO brigades appear rather menacing, with their faces masked, carrying clubs and pipes. They do consistently use the threat of force, but not physical violence. During one attempt to commandeer a city bus, an irate passenger stood the club-wielding APPO members down, refusing to get off the bus. The APPO members urged the passenger off, but she flatly refused. After not more than a minute of heated discussion, the APPO protesters waved the bus on and stopped the next one.

The APPO's fight is not one of principled non-violence; they very much uphold their right to self-defense. Thus protesters say that their rocks, clubs, and Molotov cocktails are merely homemade weapons held at the ready to defend themselves from armed paramilitary attacks. In this context it is important to recall that paramilitary forces killed 13 protesters and one New York City Indymedia journalist in four months of conflict. After the August 21 and 22 paramilitary attacks, the protesters organized the construction of hundreds of makeshift barricades across Oaxaca City. Responding to armed attacks with the mere construction of barricades illustrates their commitment to avoiding the use of arms in their own movement. Also, when the PFP entered Oaxaca, the protesters went to protest at the police lines, but avoided direct clashes, allowing the police to advance toward the Zócalo unchallenged.

> Paramilitary forces killed 13 protesters and one New York City Indymedia journalist in four months of conflict.

When, on November 2, the PFP fired tear gas into the protester-controlled university campus, however, protesters counterattacked with incredible volleys of rocks, bottle rockets, glass bottles and Molotov cocktails. The police fought back with tear gas, riot tanks, clubs, and even military helicopters, from which police lobbed tear gas grenades down at protesters. The protesters battled with the police for four hours straight, finally overwhelming them and forcing them to withdraw from the area.

Herod's Law

IN 1999 LUIS ESTRADA DIRECTED A BRILLIANT political satire of the PRI called Herod's Law. Released just months before the 2000 federal elections, Herod's Law is an artistic vivisection of the PRI's 71-year monopoly control on political power in Mexico. The film chronicles the PRI's attempt to quiet a series of uprisings in the rural indigenous village, San Pedro de los Saguaros. A naïve, new local mayor is sent in after the locals lynched the previous mayor for corruption and repression, and the cycle begins afresh with the new mayor slowly learning that the only way to survive is to follow Herod's law: "Screw or be screwed."

While the film is mostly discussed for its exposition of the PRI's power machine, it also provides an enlightening metaphor for social uprisings in Mexico. In the film, the indigenous locals endure outrageous institutionalized exclusion, racism, manipulation, corruption, and repression only until the mayor goes so far in his scandalous exercise of power that they promptly rise up, hang him from a pole, and then go back to normal. The problem is this: exploitation is personalized in a particularly offensive official. That official is hanged, but the exploitation continues.

This is the danger of taking as the sole and nonnegotiable demand the ouster of Ulises Ruiz. Once Ruiz's political future is destroyed, will the people go back to their everyday exploitation? This is the challenge of the APPO, and not just its provisional leaders. But while the call for Ulises' head resembles the political tactics of San Pedro de los Saguaros, the experience of the past five months of struggle in Oaxaca will doubtlessly leave a deep impact on future social organizing. This lived experience of risking their lives to defend their dignity, of putting everything on the line, of taking over the media, paralyzing the state government, facing down the federal police, more than the ouster of Ulises Ruiz Ortiz, will be the true legacy of the Oaxaca uprising.

Adoption

Betty Reid Mandell

A country's economic system and its cultural practices shape its adoption practices. For example, in Western societies adoption practices are very different from those in the preliterate subsistence economies of Eastern Oceania. In Western societies, the patriarchal nuclear family is the norm; illegitimacy and sexual permissiveness have until recently been stigmatized; property is owned privately and the accumulation of property is highly valued; most people are engaged in wage labor; children are regarded as private property; adoption is atypical and, until relatively recently in some countries, tied very closely to inheritance laws. Some countries, such as France, Greece, Spain, and most Latin American countries, still do not allow adoption when it would interfere with the inheritance rights of biological heirs. The rigidly patriarchal countries of ancient Rome, Ancient Greece, India, Japan, and pre-revolutionary China, allowed adoption only for the securing of heirs for a propertied childless family. In those countries illegitimacy was strongly stigmatized and women were devalued — so much so in pre-revolutionary China and in ancient Rome that female infanticide was practiced. After the Russian Revolution the Bolsheviks — perceiving the relationship between adoption and inheritance — not only abolished inheritance, but also abolished adoption in 1918. They legalized it again in 1926, apparently because of the need for homes for the many homeless children after the civil war. The Islamic religion prohibits adoption, as does the Jewish religious code. No national adoption law was proposed in Israel until 1958.

In France there are two kinds of adoption. In "full adoption" all legal bonds with the birth family are cut. The child does not keep his/her birth family name. In "simple adoption" the child keeps his birth family name and his right to be the legal heir. There are also two kinds of adoption in Uruguay. The form called "adoption legitimation" severs a child's ties to natural parents completely by allowing the adoptive parents to register the child in the record of vital statistics as having been born to them in wedlock, and forbidding the very mention of adoption. In the other form, "adoption," the child is still considered to belong to his natural family and maintains his legal rights as a child in that family despite the fact that he is legally adopted by someone else..

Engels' theory on the family provides some rewarding leads for understanding the prohibition of adoption in patriarchal societies. He postulated that the patriarchal monogamous family had served the function of stratifying society by assuring inheritance of surplus goods through the male lineage. For the inheritance system to work, said Engels, a man had to be sure who his heirs were. In a society where sexual promiscuity was condoned and a woman could have children by many men, a man could not be sure he was the father of a child. Therefore, according to Engels, monogamous marriage was instituted, along with patrilineage. From this came the requirement of premarital chastity for women, prohibition of extra-marital affairs for women, and the double standard of sexuality. Since men were allowed free sexual expression, prostitution arose to serve the men's sexual needs.

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Inheritance Rights

ADOPTION LEGISLATION that gives the adopted child the same inheritance rights as a natural child is more oriented to what is generally considered a "child welfare" concept of adoption. Massachusetts' first adoption statute was in 1851, some 75 years before England's first general adoption statute in 1926. It "was drawn with the avowed object of securing to adopted children a proper share in the estate of adopting parents who should die intestate." By 1929 all states had enacted some form of adoption legislation. A shift to a child welfare philosophy loosens or abolishes inheritance ties to natural parents and tends to substitute the state for the natural parent.

In the status-conscious circles of 19th and early 20th century France, the child welfare function of adoption was declassé. Marcel Proust, writing at the beginning of the 20th century in *Remembrance of Things Past*, gives an example of the sewing-maid, an orphan girl, who had been cared for as a child by strangers. In the eyes of Francoise, the servant of the narrator's family, such an arrangement was beneath her status:

> [The orphan's] situation aroused pity, and also her benevolent contempt. She who had a family, a little house that had come to her from her parents, with a field in which her brother kept a few cows, could not regard so uprooted a creature as her equal. And since this girl hoped, on Assumption Day, to be allowed to pay her benefactors a visit, Francoise kept on repeating: "She does make me laugh! She says, 'I hope to be going home for the Assumption.' Home, says she! It isn't just that it's not her own place, it's people as took her in from nowhere, and the creature says 'home' just as if it really was her home. Poor thing! What a misery it must be, not to know what it is to have a home."

As countries, and sections of countries, move toward a child welfare orientation where the children do not inherit from their natural parents, the natural parents become excluded. The history of adoption and foster care in the United States bears this out.

Eastern Oceania

IN SHARP CONTRAST to patrilineal societies, in many preliterate subsistence economies of Eastern Oceania, kinship is matrilineal, the clan is the most important socioeconomic unit of society, the sibling group is more important than the marital unit; children are regarded as communal, rather than private, property; clan property is owned communally; illegitimacy and sexual permissiveness are not stigmatized. Adoption among consanguinal kin is a common practice, and children retain ties with the natal clan and parents as well as with their adoptive parents. Tahitians attach no social stigma to illegitimacy. A Tahitian woman often has one or two children before beginning an approved conjugal relationship. Hopper says, "It is an ethically neutral act for a woman to give such children to her parents or to other close relatives for adoption. The woman is thus freed to continue . . . 'the business of adolescence' if she should wish to do so."

In Ponape, where missionaries were established in 1850 by colonial governments, the custom of adoption was of interest to both missionaries and administrators. Neither the Protestant church nor the Catholic Church gave ritual acceptance to adoption; in fact they discouraged it when the natural parents were alive and in good health. Fischer says, "Some missionaries have seen a connection, correctly, I think, between the frequency of adoption and the emphasis on sibling ties as opposed to marital ties, and they regard adoption as a renunciation of the responsibility and importance of marriage."

In her study of Samoa, Margaret Mead said that "few children live continuously in one household, but are always testing out other possible residences." This is done under the guise of visits, with no suggestion of truancy. She says, "No Samoan child, except the taupo (like a princess), or the thoroughly delinquent, ever has to deal with a feeling of being trapped. There are always relatives to whom one can flee." All boys and girls call each other brother and sister regardless of the kinship relationship.

Perhaps Mead had this society in mind when she suggested that America build communities where many "relatives" will help each other out — even if they are not biological relatives. Mead says that World War II marked a dividing line in the structure of the family in the United States. The nuclear family (husband, wife, and young children living by themselves in their own house) was a postwar development against which many young people are rebelling. Mead does not advocate eliminating the family, but advocates giving the family more protection and more support. She believes that you can't have a viable community without three generations.

> What we want to do is surround the family, each young couple with children, with enough people to help them, with many pairs of hands, with aunts and uncles — not necessarily biological ones but people who will play the roles of aunts and uncles and grandparents and older brothers and sisters — with a whole group of people such as we had in the small neighborhoods and small towns in this country 75 and 100 years ago.

A Child Welfare Focus

ALTHOUGH THE CHILD WELFARE system has not necessarily increased the welfare of children, as can be seen by looking at the foster care system in the U.S., it nevertheless signaled a different approach. Presumably it was intended to increase the welfare of children, rather than to insure the inheritance rights of biological children. Adoptions carried out by middle class professionals have until relatively recently completely severed the ties between children and their natural parents. The child welfare profession developed with the rise of the middle class. Childless middle class parents want children to adopt, and middle class professionals help them to do it through adoption agencies. Adoptive parents have always had more political clout than birth parents and their children and have had more influence in shaping policy.

In the more advanced industrialized countries, the concern about adoption shifts from anxiety about disinheriting biological heirs to a desire for exclusive possession of children, unencumbered by claims of natural parents. I believe that one of the functions of adoption agencies has been to pose an institutional and almost impenetrable barrier between natural parents and the adopted child. In Hawaii, for example, where kinship ties have traditionally been strong and most adoptions have occurred between relatives because of greater trust between relatives, those kinship ties are beginning to weaken, and adoption through agencies is becoming more popular because of fear of the stranger. Similarly, in urbanized, industrialized societies, high mobility has weakened family and community ties.

To obtain children, the middle and upper classes are more likely than the working and lower classes to turn to adoption agencies rather than to relatives or informal community contacts. The adopted children come not only from strangers, but most often from poor strangers and from unmarried mothers, who have a stigmatized social status. In a polarized class society, the middle and upper classes in general do not want contact with poor or "deviant" people and they do not want contact with the poor or the stigmatized parents of their adopted children. In fact, many do not want to discuss the background of the natural parents with their adopted children and some of them do not even want to tell the children that they are adopted.

Kidnapped Children

THE ROOT MEANING of the word "proletarian" is "people who have no other wealth but their children." To take their children is the ultimate form of exploitation of the poor. Most adoptions are done through legal means, but there have been times in different countries when powerless families have had their children kidnapped by more powerful people.

Irish-American children were sent by train in 1904 to an Arizona copper mining town, where a Catholic priest had arranged for them to be adopted by Mexican mine workers. When the children arrived, the Anglos in the town formed a posse that kidnapped the children from their Mexican homes, and the children were then adopted by the Anglos.

Thousands of Native American children in the U.S. were stolen from their families over the years and put on the black market for adoption. Efforts to find these so-called "lost birds" have intensified recently by Navajo and other tribes. The Lost Bird Society has a web site that received many more inquiries after a nationally publicized case about a Native American woman who had been adopted by whites and found her biological family on a Navajo reservation in Arizona. A 1978 federal bill requires that Indian children removed from their home be placed with relatives or other Native families. In 1996, tribes fought against a bill in Congress (the Multiethnic Placement Act) that would make the adoption of Indian children by whites easier.

Canada also enforced policies for decades that took native children from their families. In 1998 the Canadian government apologized to Indian and Inuit communities for past acts of oppression, including setting up boarding schools aimed at severing youths from their culture. They allocated $245 million to fund counseling and treatment programs for victims of abuse at the schools. Canada's apology prompted the only Aborigine ever elected to Australia's Parliament to ask their government to apologize to the Aborigines. From the 1910s to the early 1970s, about 100,000 part-Aboriginal children and babies were placed in government or church care in the belief that the Aborigines would die out. After hearing testimony that many of the children were sexually and physically abused and faced widespread discrimination, a human rights commission concluded that the policies amounted to attempted genocide.

At that time, the Australian government refused to apologize, but later the government did apologize and declared May 26 to be "National Sorry Day," to express regret at the "gross violation of human rights" of the "stolen generation."

In Israel, authorities took hundreds of Yemeni infants who were in hospitals between 1948 and 1950 and gave them to Jewish adoptive families of European origin. Their parents were told that the children had died. The Yemeni families had immigrated to Israel as part of the Jewish state's clandestine "Operation Magic Carpet," in which more than 50,000 Jews were spirited out of Yemen and airlifted to Israel, where they were settled in crowded shantytowns.

In Argentina, during the reign of a brutal military dictatorship between 1976 and 1983, about 300 babies and children of disappeared dissidents were abducted by the military and given to childless families linked to the security forces. Women whose children and grandchildren had disappeared organized themselves as Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo to search for their missing loved ones. Through the use of genetic identification and mental health professionals, about 50 children have been located and identified.

The Stigma of Adoption

WRITING IN 1964, the sociologist H. David Kirk described the adoptive mother as "role handicapped," saying that both the biological structure of woman as child bearer and the social expectations of her "make her intensely role handicapped" when she cannot bear children.

Things have changed a lot since 1964. Women's Liberation has opened up many more options for women. More women are in the work force and some women voluntarily choose to remain childless. Yet many women still feel that they have not fulfilled their destiny if they remain childless. They consider adoption as a second best solution to having their own biological children. Many go through the expensive, lengthy, and often unsuccessful, process of in vitro fertilization rather than adopt. Others pay a lot of money to a surrogate mother, so that the child will at least have the husband's genetic heritage.

The general public meanwhile has become much more accepting of adoption:

> After generations when it was shrouded in shame and protected by lies, it has come into vogue. Politicians across the ideological landscape embrace adoption as a solution for the foster care crisis and as an alternative to abortion. Rosie O'Donnell and Steven Spielberg proudly announce the arrival of their nonbiological children. Infertile couples, once embarrassed about their inability to produce offspring, gleefully tell anyone who will listen about their trips to Minneapolis or Moscow, Baltimore or Bejing, wherever they traveled to pick up their babies.

David Liederman , the executive director of the Child Welfare League of America, says, "Adoption as a lifestyle, almost unnoticed by everyone outside the field, is becoming as American as apple pie." The greater acceptance of adoption is indicated by the facts that family leave policies include adoption as well as giving birth and the federal government gives child care tax credits to adoptive families. Increasingly, corporations are providing workers with adoption aid, ranging from paid leave to large cash payments.

Nobody knows exactly how many adoptions have been done because the process was so private in the past, but as adoption has become more open, experts are concluding that it is far more prevalent than they had thought. The Census Bureau did not ask about adoption until 2000, when they found that 2,058,915 adopted children are in U.S. households. However, the number of adoptees who are heads of household were not counted.

> As Gunter Grass says in *The Tin Drum,* "The trend is toward the bourgeois-smug."

The idea that one's biological children are preferable to adopted children still hangs on. Elizabeth Bartholet, a Harvard law professor and an ardent advocate of adoption, says that adoption is seen as a last-resort parenting choice, vastly inferior to biologic parenting. She says, "This reinforces for the infertile the message that 'true women' get pregnant and give birth. A more positive construction of adoption would help free the infertile from the obsession to restore their sense of personhood by obtaining a medical fix." Bartholet discusses the barriers to adoption that indicate society's unwillingness to make it easy and that reinforce the stigma. She calls for deregulating adoption, as the current regulatory system makes adoption costly and unpleasant, "and simultaneously degrades and demeans this form of family." She calls for new systems of providing financial reimbursement so that more people can afford to adopt. She would like to see certain practices discouraged altogether, such as egg and embryo sale and commercial surrogacy.

The Stigma of Illegitimacy

THE STIGMA OF ADOPTION is partly due to the fact that, until relatively recently, unmarried mothers supplied most of the children for adoptive couples. The number of their children available for adoption is decreasing because both contraceptive devices and abortions are easier to get, and because there is less stigma attached to keeping out-of-wedlock children. Current attitudes toward unmarried mothers are much more accepting than were attitudes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when legislators resisted adoption because it would make it easy for an unmarried mother to get rid of the "fruits of her sin." The legislators feared that providing such a social outlet for giving up babies would encourage more "sinning," and ultimately undermine the structure of the family and of society itself.

Unmarried mothers were shunned by society and put in maternity homes until relatively recently. The period around WWII and before Roe v. Wade in 1973 was called by some the "baby scoop era." In most cases, adoption was presented to the mothers as the only option and little or no effort was made to help the mothers keep and raise the children.

Karen Wilson Buterbaugh was one of those mothers in 1966 when she was 17 years old. She was forced to go to a maternity home by her family, shocked and ashamed by her pregnancy. This was how she experienced the event:

> On the 10th day after giving birth, she took her baby to a church down the street to be baptized. A few hours later, she was taken into a room at the home that was empty except for a rocking chair. Soon after, a nurse entered the room and gave Buterbaugh her baby and an hour to say goodbye.
>
> "I didn't know what was coming," recalled Buterbaugh. "I sat and rocked her for an hour and talked to her." Then the baby, whom Buterbaugh named Michelle Renee, was gone, whisked away first to foster care and then to an adoptive home. Buterbaugh was left alone, shell-shocked into silence.
>
> While the pain lasted, the silence didn't.

Buterbaugh has since become an outspoken opponent of adoption and one of the leaders of the adoption-rights movement, sometimes called the "search movement." She is a co-founder of Origins USA. She says that those in the movement do not think of themselves as anti-adoption but as "natural family preservationists." She thinks of adoption as "'legalized kidnapping," fraught with coercion, fraud, and class discrimination. She considers adoption "an amputation of a family," saying, "I've lost my daughter and my grandson, and then my great-grandchildren. It goes on to infinity."

The desire of the middle class for "perfect" white babies was intense during this "baby scoop" period. The sociologist Clark Vincent commented:

> If the demand for adoptable babies continues to exceed the supply then it is quite possible that, in the near future, unwed mothers will be "punished" by having their children taken from them right after birth. A policy like this would not be executed — nor labeled explicitly — as "punishment." Rather, it would be implemented through such pressures and labels as "scientific findings," "the best interests of the child," "rehabilitation of the unwed mother," and "the stability of the family and society."

Secret Records

DURING THE FIRST HALF of the twentieth century, states passed laws requiring the sealing of adoption records to insure secrecy and anonymity, a policy urged by social workers in child-placing agencies with the goal of removing the stigma of illegitimacy from children born out of wedlock. These statutes barred all persons from inspecting the files and records on adoption except for the parties to the adoption and their attorneys." These laws required the identities of the birthparents and the adoptive parents to remain secret, even from each other. The original birth certificate would be sealed and an amended one would be issued at the time of legal finalization of the adoption. Minnesota passed the first of these in 1917, and from then and until well into the 1940s, all other states passed similar laws. This practice of sealing adoption records has come under increasing attack since the 1950s.

Before World War I, relatives and friends often raised the child of someone they knew and the biological parents were in touch with the child. But adoption gradually became institutionalized by doctors, lawyers, and social workers, "most of whom sought a match of physical traits that would allow parents and children to pass as a 'real family.'"

In the 1950s, motherhood was glorified. For those unable to conceive on their own, adoption was a blessing, one often kept secret to mimic the wished-for idyll. In addition, social workers seized on a postwar embrace of psychoanalytic theories — which tended to view unmarried mothers as disturbed, adoptees seeking information about their roots as neurotic, and infertile people as unstable — as a rationale for keeping adoptive families and biological families apart.

Adoption agencies in the 1950s sought to replicate their vision of the ideal nuclear family by their adoption practices. A study of adoption practices in nine regions of the country in the 1950s found that the adoptive parents chosen by social workers in all the communities were "shockingly similar." The typical man and wife were white and Protestant, had strong inner controls and little personal flexibility, placed a heavy emphasis on education and ambition, were rational and task-oriented, lived in a single family dwelling, and earned much more than the average income in their communities. Parents who adopted children other than white infants, however, were more accepting of imperfections, were less anxious about achievement, and placed a high value on loving a child.

A decade after this study, another study said essentially the same thing about adoption workers:

> Adoption agencies (are) a product of our middle class culture, responding to pressures within the community in order to gain its support, and also incorporating some aspects of the value system of that environment, which includes values that are not wholly accepting of the deviant child.

As Gunter Grass says in *The Tin Drum*, "The trend is toward the bourgeois-smug."

Opening the Records

IN THE SECOND HALF of the twentieth century, adults who had been adopted developed an urgent need to know their origins, often precipitated by marriage and the prospect of bearing children of their own. They formed advocacy groups to gain access to their birth records and other background information, to which they believed they were constitutionally entitled. The first of these groups was founded by Jean Paton in 1954. Since then, several advocacy groups have been formed. The largest and probably the most influential group of adult adoptees is the Adoptees Liberty Movement Association (ALMA) founded by Florence Fisher in 1971.

Birth parents also began to demand greater involvement in the adoption process, including the right to know the progress of the children they had relinquished. They formed Concerned United Birthparents (CUB). Some people joined the movement after the Hyde Amendment was passed in 1973, prohibiting the use of federal funds for abortions. Joseph Califano, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, proposed to pay indigent women to bear children to be surrendered for adoption as an alternative to Medicaid abortion. One birth mother said, in response to Califano's statement, "I'm not saying that having an abortion doesn't have psychological or emotional aftereffects, but at least there can be some kind of mourning period or some kind of resolution. With adoption, the mourning period never ends because you never know."

These groups focus not only on the emotional distress they have suffered, but also on "a billion dollar industry that focuses more on money than youngsters' welfare." The research firm Marketdata Enterprises Inc. estimated in a 2000 national report that adoption services are a $1.4 billion business. The cost of adopting an infant — domestically or abroad, using a private attorney or an agency — averages $15,000 to $30,000 and sometimes far more.

Not everyone in the movement is entirely against adoption. Some see a need for adoption, but campaign for more openness in adoption where information is shared between biological and adoptive parents, or biological mothers know the adoptive parents and can sometimes maintain contact with the child. Many of them search for their biological mother.

But the most zealous are against adoption under any circumstances, believing it dooms parents and children to a lifetime of misery. They believe the first option should always be to help the mother and father keep their child. If that is impossible, a family member or other caring adult should assume the role of legal guardian. But the child's identity should never be changed, the child should be made aware of family relationships, and all birth records should remain open. No money should change hands.

Psychologist Joe Soll, himself an adoptee and longtime anti-adoption activist, takes issue with the practice of sealing adoption records. "There will always be babies who need new homes, but why must names be changed, records sealed, why must children lose contact with their family?"

Many adoptive parents were alarmed at the prospect of opening records and losing anonymity. The Association for the Protection of the Adoptive Triangle (APAT) was formed in support of sealed records.

Bartholet discusses how the search movement has contributed to anti-adoption sentiment. She says:

> The current emphasis on the importance of genetic heritage has revived certain classic fears about the viability of adoption — fears rooted in an assumption that parent-child relationships are likely to work only to the degree that parent and child are significantly alike. In the ongoing nature-nurture debate, the voices of genetics theorists have prevailed lately.

Bartholet points out that the choice of giving a child up for adoption adds to the mother's choices and can be liberating. It also adds to the choices of infertile couples to choose to adopt, rather than obsessing over the need to have their own biological children. This is true, yet Bartholet downplays the importance of birth mothers' desire to know how their children are faring, their resentment at having been coerced in their decision, and the emotional turmoil they go through. She says that people who oppose adoption because it is the ultimate form of exploitation of the poor by the rich ignore the fact that "adoption functions to improve the economic situation of birth mother and child." Surely this reduces the issue to the cash nexus.

A New Stigma

ALTHOUGH THE STIGMA of unwed parenthood has lessened, there is still stigma attached to women who give up their babies to be adopted. Judith Green, an adoption worker at the Spence-Chapin adoption agency in New York, said, "If a young woman in difficult circumstances chooses to keep her baby, people think she's brave and wonderful; if she goes instead for an abortion, they think, that's a . . . personal decision and she can get on with her life. But if that woman says she's giving up her child for adoption, people are uncomfortable . . .They don't know what to think of her or what to say. They have an uneasy feeling that she's doing something wrong." A secretary in St. Louis said the attitudes she encountered when she considered giving up her baby contributed to her decision to keep her daughter. She said, "Vilification isn't too strong a word. It wasn't everyone . . . but once I tuned into the message between the lines of the attitudes around me . . .it was that I must be a low-class slut or stupid or something to let myself get into this predicament, so I might as well give my baby to some decent people."

Professionals say that the majority of mothers who surrendered their children are not reckless teens, but women in their early 20s to mid-

30s, usually single, who have anguished over their decisions. Most have graduated from high school; many have attended college. Invariably, their primary motivation is not to jettison a personal problem, but to give their babies a better life. And while they often bear emotional scars and want to know about their children for the rest of their lives, they rarely attempt to interfere in the adoptive families or consider trying to get their children back.

Some married women surrender their children to adoption because they already have all the children they can care for. In one case described in the *New York Times*, the birth mother lived with the adoptive mother before delivering the baby. The birth mother did this because, as she said to the adoptive mother, "I want you to feel that this is your baby, your family." The birth mother decided to have the baby adopted when she had three small children and became pregnant again, despite having had an injection of Depo-Provera that was supposed to prevent pregnancy. Her husband, who works in a factory making roll-up doors for trucks, agreed that they could not cope with another child.

Being able to choose the adoptive parents helps birth mothers live more comfortably with their decision and relieves their worry about the baby's welfare. Many birth mothers are offered counseling by adoption agencies to help them deal with their decision, which is a far cry from the days when agencies gave mothers no choice but to give up their babies.

Open Adoption

The idea of Open adoption developed in part because babies for adoption (especially white healthy ones) became more scarce (at least in the U.S.) and thus some concessions had to be made to birth parents. No such concessions were needed when adopting from third world countries.

Open adoption can range anywhere from simply opening adoptees' records for inspection when they are 18 or 21, to a full sharing of parenting between the birth mother and the adoptive parents. Sometimes there is occasional correspondence between the two. Sometimes it simply involves the birth mother knowing where the child is, without having any contact. Open adoption is a *fait accompli* with older children who know their parents. Occasionally the open adoption is made legal. In 1986 parents in Cape Cod, Massachusetts signed papers agreeing to an "open adoption" in which the biological parents will share in the growth and development of their daughter Erin, age 2, who was born with Downs Syndrome. The agreement states that the natural parents and adoptive couple will work out between themselves details of the arrangement such as visitations, phone calls, and finances. The natural mother had gone through a series of traumatic events in her life and was in counseling. Her husband traveled on business 6 of every 8 days, so could not give her much help. She felt overwhelmed. She said, "I've been through a tug-of-war. Had we placed her at birth it probably would have been a closed adoption. We kept her for 14 months because we wanted to get to know her better. We can't close the chapter now, yet the everyday pain of caring for her is not mine." The adoptive mother understands the mother's decision. "For her, Erin was the straw that broke the camel's back. It's easier for us because we don't have the emotional baggage and the guilt."

> "The message between the lines was that I must be a low-class slut."

Opponents of open adoption include adoptive parents who do not want any contact with the birth mother and birth mothers who don't want their children to contact them, sometimes fearing that their husband and children will find out.

A study of over 1,000 birth parents and adoptees who had been involved in searching found that "participants agreed resoundingly that reunion services should be available to anyone who seeks that option. Over 90 percent of all searchers and search subjects reported that reunion was a positive experience." A California study of 1,396 adoptions of children from infants to 16-year-olds found that children in open adoptions had significantly better behavior scores (as rated by their adoptive parents) than children with no access to birth parents and that the adoptive parents who were in contact with birth parents had more positive impressions of those birth parents. Adoptive parents who favored open adoption felt it was in the best interests of the child.

A nationwide longitudinal study of 169 birth mothers and 190 adoptive families found that birth mothers in closed adoptions experienced more unresolved grief than in open adoptions. They also found that adoptive parents who had some form of openness showed more empathy about adoption, talked about the adoption more openly with their child, and were less fearful of the birth parents trying to reclaim the child. Children in open adoptions had higher levels of understanding about adoption.

It has become more common for the birth mother to choose the adoptive parents. Birth mothers tend to choose higher income parents, assuming that this will insure their children better life chances, which fuels a trend toward higher income adoptive parents. Although direct payments to birth mothers are prohibited as illegal baby selling, some unscrupulous lawyers and other adoption facilitators do agree to such under-the-table arrangements. There is also more "shopping" by birth mothers for an agency or lawyer who will offer better health coverage, nicer apartments during their pregnancies, or other indirect benefits permitted in some states. One lawyer commented, "I'm not saying it's baby-selling, but the empowerment of birth mothers is making it much more of a sellers' market."

Adoption records have been open for some time in Australia, Finland, Israel, Mexico, New Zealand, and Norway with satisfactory results. Britain made open adoption legal in 1976, but only a few states have made it legal in the U.S. In 1998 Oregon used the ballot initiative to restore the rights of adults to access their original birth certificates, the first time in U.S. history that any question regarding adoption has been put to a public vote. Six states allow the unsealing of adoption records subject to a "good cause" hearing At least 20 states have enacted some form of "mutual consent" registry laws facilitating the process whereby parties to an adoption can indicate their willingness to meet at a later date. There is no federal law governing open adoption, and adoptee-rights organizations are making a long march through the states to try to make it legal everywhere.

The leader of the campaign for open adoption in Tennessee was a woman adoptee who needed medical information . She had a tiny growth near her right eye, and doctors wanted some medical background to establish if there was a history of glaucoma or other eye disease in the family or if any members of her family were allergic. She was outraged to discover that she could not get access to her birth certificate to find this information.

The internet has made the search for a biological family much easier, and increased the number of searchers. There are also professional searchers who charge for their services and act as intermediaries between the birth mother and her biological family. Some charge thousands of dollars, but one of them, Joe Collins, charges $900, nothing up front, and nothing if the search is unsuccessful. He has found that the vast majority of searches are instigated by female adoptees looking for birth mothers rather than fathers. And he says he's never run into anyone exploring her past because she's unhappy with her adoptive family. He says, "I sense that a lot of adoptees are just curious, others have this compulsive need to know . . . and some subconsciously believe they were given away because they did something wrong. They want to hear the reasons to ease their minds, and they want to hear it from the source."

Race and Class

MOST ADOPTIVE FAMILIES ARE WHITE and middle class or rich, except for relative adoptions. Most of the children adopted come from poor or working class families. This has led some progressives to oppose adoption or to regard it skeptically on the grounds that it exploits poor people and people of color. During the 1960s, adoption agencies were relatively open to adoption of black children by white families, but in 1972 the National Association of Black Social Workers opposed these adoptions, saying that black children should only be placed with black families in order to maintain their cultural heritage and psychological well-being. White social workers generally concurred, whether out of liberal guilt or because of their own feelings about such adoptions. There have been some efforts to increase the supply of black adoptive families through recruitment and subsidies, but the supply has never matched the number of black children in the foster care system who are freed for adoption.

In 1993, Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced a bill in Congress called the Multiethnic Placement Act which prohibited the use of race to delay, deny, or otherwise discriminate in adoptive placements. The National Black Social Workers Association, the NAACP, the North American Council on Adoptable Children, and Native Americans opposed transracial placement under any circumstances and the bill was amended to allow race matching, prohibit only "undue" delay, and permit social workers to choose "long-term foster care" in preference to adoption. "Dozens of law professors across the country and across the political spectrum signed a letter to Congress urging rejection of this legislation as "unwise, intolerable, and unconstitutional." In response to a *New York Times* editorial that said, "Clearly, matching adoptive parents with children of the same race is a good idea," Charles Fried, a Harvard law professor, said:

> Why is this so clear? Lurking behind this unproven assumption is the same logic that held that "clearly" blacks and whites should serve in segregated military units. Or, "clearly" it is preferable not to award custody of a child to a parent who after divorced entered in interracial marriage — a judgment the Supreme Court many years ago ruled unconstitutional . . . Mandating, or even explicitly authorizing preference based on race . . . is to place in the hands of a militant hostile social-worker bureaucracy a device that will easily be used to perpetuate the very situation you deplore.

The bill was signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, prohibiting federal financial assistance to be used to deny a placement solely on the basis of race, but allowing for consideration of the cultural, ethnic, or racial background of the child and the capacity of the foster parents to meet the needs of a child of this background. The law also required that agencies "engage in diligent recruitment" to find foster and adoptive parents who reflect the racial and ethnic diversity of the children needing placement. A GAO study found that many social workers were not complying with the law. Health and Human Services spokesman Michael Kharfen said that enforcing the policy was a tough job. "with the policies of 22 states and District of Columbia giving preference by race."

Many of the original supporters of the bill, including Senator Metzenbaum, urged adoption of a stronger law and the Multiethnic Placement Interethnic Adoption Provisions was signed into law by President Clinton in 1996, which prohibits "a state or other entity that receives federal assistance from denying any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a foster parent solely on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the persons or of the child involved." A study done in 1998 concluded that "much work needs to be done" to determine its effect. Eight states did not ever compile data on the subject,

Elizabeth Bartholet argues that racial matching policies

> represent a coming together of powerful and related ideologies — old fashioned white racism, modern day black nationalism, and what I will call "biologism," the idea that what is "natural" in the context of the biologic family is what is normal and desirable in the context of adoption . . . The claim that a black person, by virtue of race alone, will necessarily be more capable than a white person in parenting a black child is the kind of claim that courts have generally refused to allow. There is no evidence that same-race placement is beneficial to black children and there is a good deal of evidence that delayed placement causes them harm . . . We can recognize the importance of racial and cultural difference without subscribing to separatism. We can believe that people are fully capable of loving those who are not biologically and racially similar but are "other," and that it is important for people to learn to do so. We can regard the elimination of racial hostilities as more important than the promotion of cultural difference.

Many of the black children are in foster care because their families lack the social supports they need to keep their families together.

Although Bartholet is against legally allowing racial preference policies, she recognizes that race should be taken into consideration in adoptions. "A no-preference regime would not mean that agencies would have to ignore private parties' preferences with respect to race."

While I agree with Bartholet's position on interracial adoption, I take issue with her assumption that adoption would solve the problem of large numbers of black children staying indefinitely in foster care without a permanent plan. She does not recognize that many of those black children should not be in foster care in the first place. Many of them are in foster care because their families lack the social supports they need to keep their families together. Many of the families are homeless. One study found that in Washington, DC one-half of DC's foster children could be returned to their parents if they had a decent place to live.

Many parents working at low-wage jobs can't afford day care or babysitting. A study in New York City of children placed in foster care because of "lack of supervision" found that in 52 percent of the cases, the service needed most was day care or babysitting. But the "service" offered most often was foster care.

The welfare reform act (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act), signed into law by President Clinton in 1996, drastically cut assistance to families. The law led to a rise in the numbers of children being placed in foster care, and some mothers have given up their babies to adoptive couples. I know a lesbian couple who assumed that they could get a quicker adoption if they applied in a state that had low welfare grants and few social supports. They adopted two Latina girls from Texas within four months.

The federal government spends nine times more money for foster care than for preventive services, giving states an incentive to place children in foster care rather than provide services. Some mothers with substance abuse problems could keep their children if they got adequate treatment, but there are not enough treatment facilities.

Some black children are placed in foster care because of racist attitudes of white social workers and doctors who view problems of black families as more serious than similar problems of white families.

Many black children in foster care could be adopted if agencies were more culturally sensitive to black adoptive applicants and in their recruitment procedures. An Urban League study found that of 800 African American families who applied to adopt, only two were approved. White social workers generally think that affluent families would provide more advantages to children, and African American families are disproportionately poor. In fact, studies show that working-class and low-income families are often better parents for children because they don't have the same high educational and achievement expectations as do middle class parents.

Some prospective adoptive parents are rejected by white-dominated agencies because they are members of Alcoholics Anonymous. Some are rejected because of a CORI record for a minor offense. A CORI (Criminal Offender Record Information) is a record of past crime or crimes that a person has committed. Often the "crime" is no more serious than a minor drug violation. A CORI check by officials can prevent people from getting jobs or public housing or from becoming foster or adoptive parents. There is a campaign in Massachusetts to change these practices.

Black adoptive parents are often discouraged from adopting because of high agency fees and inflexible standards, as well as systemic racism and lack of minority staff members. Some agencies staffed by African Americans have had a high success rate of finding African American adoptive parents. They have established offices in black neighborhoods, kept flexible working hours, recruited through black churches and other black organizations, lowered fees or not charged at all, educated rather than investigated, done more personal outreach to families, and cut through bureaucratic procedures. Families are allowed to change social workers if they don't like the one they were assigned. Bureaucratic white-dominated agencies could benefit from adopting some of their practices.

Federal and state legislation that forbids the consideration of race as a major factor in the selection of adoptive families has made it harder for agencies that do special recruitment of black families to get funding. The authors of an article on recruiting black families end their article with an observation, probably made with tongue in cheek: "It will be interesting to observe whether in the future the new legislation will be interpreted to facilitate transracial placement of Caucasian children as well as of minority children."

Adoption and Safe Families Act

AMID GREAT FANFARE and in the company of a family with about 10 adopted children looking over his shoulder, President Clinton signed into law the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997. He challenged states to double their adoptions within five years. The Act requires states to file a termination petition in cases in which children have been in care for 15 of the past 22 months, regardless of the child's age or special needs. This means that parents who cannot resolve the problems that led to placement in foster care within 15 months are at risk of having their parental rights terminated. This will be especially hard on parents who are substance abusers and require at least 18 months treatment, as well as on women who are imprisoned.

Adoption was viewed by Congress as the panacea for the problems of foster care. States get $4,000 for every child adopted beyond their best year's total, plus a payment of $4,000 for every child aged nine and older and $2,000 for every special needs child adopted above the baseline year. States receive additional federal funds if they exceed their prior number of completed adoptions and federal technical support to help them reach their adoption targets, *not* their targets for discharging children home. The money is paid when the adoption is finalized, so there is an incentive to place a child with little concern about whether the placement will really last. In fact, if the adoption fails and the child is placed again, the state can collect another bounty. States that do not comply with the law's provisions will be denied a portion of their funds that finance foster care and other child welfare services. Some states pay incentive funds to parents.

Adoptions of foster children have increased dramatically since the Act was passed, but the number of failed adoptions has also increased. States, under pressure to complete adoptions in order to get federal funds, often do inadequate investigations, overload homes, and fail to prepare adoptive parents for the problems they are likely to have. Almost two-thirds of children awaiting adoption from foster care are at least six years old. Studies have shown that adoption disruption rates rise dramatically with age at adoptive placement, with disruption rates for older children reaching well into double-digit percentages within the first two years of adoptive placement alone.

Some horror stories have surfaced about failed adoptions. In New Jersey four adopted boys in an adoptive home were being starved on a diet of peanut butter and plaster while the couple was being evaluated for the adoption of a seventh child. The family had received more than $30,000 a year in incentive payments from the state. In Houston, Texas a couple was allowed to adopt six severely handicapped children. "Despite many complaints of abuse and rat-infested conditions in their home, the state acted to remove the children only after the couple beat one to death in 2000. In an internal review the state agency found it had not violated any of its own procedures in approving the adoption."

Darlene Kuster, a welfare rights activist in Idaho, reports that the Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA) "has been a real windfall for the child-hungry middle class." The Idaho legislature has expanded the reasons considered "cause" to take children away from their parents. Homelessness alone is considered "neglect." Homeless women are afraid to even apply for Medicaid for their children.

Kuster gives an example of a mother who was forced by restrictive welfare rules to give up her child to the foster care system. The mother was unable to report to her work site because the sheriff had come to evict her and she had to salvage her belongings. Her worker told her that if she did not show up, all her benefits would stop and the Child Protection Service (CPS) would be sent out.The mother left her sister to pack the car and went to her work site. CPS removed the child anyway for "neglect." She was told she could not have her baby back until she established permanent housing and employment.

Kuster said that the clock on termination of parental rights begins to tick as soon as the kid is out of the home, and the CPS caseworkers always check the "adoption" option rather than the "reunification" option on the "Goals" part of the form. So the case is always filed initially with the assumption that no case plan is really necessary.

Kuster says that the overwhelming majority of poor women in Idaho are white. White babies are especially desired by adoptive couples. She and other activists "accompany women of kidnapped babies to the Department of Health and Welfare and the Public Pretender as advocates and witnesses." They advise women never to disclose homelessness to Department of Public Welfare (DPW) and they tell women in shelters that if shelter staff threaten to report them to DPW, they should leave the shelter. They collect women's stories and lobby legislators.

One of the "unintended consequences" of the ASFA, according to researchers at the University of Chicago, is that family reunification rates have slowed down. Richard Wexler, the director of the National Coalition for Child Protection Reform, had this to say about the law:

> Although ASFA encourages states to do a lot of bad things, by and large, it does not require them. In theory, the mandates of ASFA can be met just as easily with a renewed commitment to keeping families together as they can by embracing the "take the child and run" approach. There is nothing in AFSA that prohibits states from providing rent subsidies so children are less likely to lose their parents

> because those parents lack decent housing. And there is nothing to prohibit states from providing day care so single working parents do not lose their children because of "lack of supervision."

Richard Gelles, dean of the University of Pennsylvania School of Social Work, who helped draft the ASFA, has said, "Initially this was just supposed to be a safe families bill, not really an adoption bill at all. The adoption component was a way of sanitizing the bill, to make it more appealing to a broader group of people. Adoption is a very popular concept in the country right now." Gelles also admits that ASFA might be differentially applied to poor, low income, and minority families. He says, "When you err on the side of safety . . . you're going to make mistakes in terms of sweeping up children into the system who might not belong in the system and those children are almost always going to be from poor families, from minority families, from Spanish-speaking or non-majority-language families."

Even before ASFA was passed, state efforts to expedite termination of parental rights were creating a generation of "legal orphans" with no ties to birth parents but without adoptive homes either. "Thanks to ASFA, the problem is spreading. In New Jersey, between 1997 and 1999 almost four children had parental rights terminated for every one actually adopted. A study of urban counties in Nebraska found that more than a year after parental rights were terminated, fewer than half the children had permanent homes."

Backlash Against Family Preservation

IN THE 1990S there was a backlash against the "family preservation" approach to child welfare. Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray suggested in 1994 in *The Bell Curve* that we should encourage single women to give up their children for adoption at birth. "And even within the child welfare professional community, the mantra of 'child safety' was beginning to replace, or at least overshadow, that of 'family preservation.'"

"Child safety" and "family preservation" are not incompatible, but many people equate "child safety" with removing the child from the home. Leroy Pelton says that Richard Gelles, in his book *The Book of David*, semed to view child safety as incompatible with family preservation.. Gelles says, "The policy of family reunification and family preservation fails because it assumes that *all* biological parents can become fit and acceptable parents if only appropriate and sufficient support is provided." But Pelton points out that family preservation policy has implicitly assumed, and the promoters of this policy have often explicitly stated, that families should preserved only if it is at all possible to maintain the child safely within the family. The policy states a preference for family preservation, not a blind dictate."

Some people think that ASFA was a stealth movement to try to create orphanages for children. Richard Gelles said that because the foster care system is already dangerously overloaded, "orphanages" would be "plausible and cost effective placements." Edward Banfield, in his 1974 book *The Unheavenly City,* proposed "as a thinking exercise" that we consider placing the children of the poor in institutions. Newt Gingrich invoked the nostalgic image of Boys Town in his call for orphanages. Protests against this silenced further open discussion of the idea but, according to Richard Wexler, "The Republicans knew full well there's never going to be enough middle class adopted to go around. The Republicans only started talking about adoption after their pollster, Frank Luntz, told them they could get what they wanted in terms of orphanages — but they had to stop using the term orphanage."

International Adoption

AS THE SUPPLY of adoptable babies in the U.S. has gone down and birth rates in Western industrialized nations have declined, people have been turning to international adoption where birth rates are high and there are few prospective adopters for the many homeless children.

Some progressives have made the same argument about international adoption that they have made about transracial adoption — that children should be kept in their native countries and not deprived of their cultural heritage, and parents should not be forced to sell their babies to rich white couples. Yet, as Elizabeth Bartholet says, "for most of the homeless children of the world, international adoption represents the only realistic opportunity . . . to have a permanent family of their own."

Wars create orphans and homeless children, and that leads to an increase in international adoptions. "Historically, Americans have adopted children left parentless by war: 8,000 Japanese and European orphans were adopted in the late 1940s; thousands more came from Korea a decade later." However, it was not only war that spurred Korean adoptions. For decades after the Korean War, South Korea was the leading source country for foreign adoptions into the U.S., caused by factors internal to Korean society such as taboos on single and divorced mothers, poverty among those mothers with no government or relatives' support, and the massive urbanization of poor people from the rural areas into Seoul. The pattern has been similar for other countries.

International adoptions have doubled in the last few decades. Domestic adoptions still outnumber international ones, but that margin appears to be quickly closing . . . The United States has no shortage of adoptable children: it is just that most of them are over the age of 5 and living in foster care. There is also the little-discussed issue of race; white infants make up the minority of available children but also are the most requested. White Caucasian prospective adopters tend to look toward Russian, Romania, and Eastern Europe rather than to Africa for children.

In the last half century the numbers of children from other countries coming into the United States have been rising over the years from negligible to some 22,739 in 2005, according to the State Department. The countries from which most children were adopted were: China (7,906); Russia (4,639); Guatemala (3,783); South Korea (1,630); Ukraine (821); Kazakhstan (755); and Ethiopia (441).

Some families prefer to adopt overseas rather than domestically because the prevalence of open adoption has made them fearful of contact with birth mothers. One Oregon mother, describing her decision to adopt from Cambodia instead of domestically, said, "I was terrified of hooking up with a birth mother who would change her mind, even if there was only a small chance of it happening."

The Hague Convention

The Hague Convention, an international treaty approved by 66 countries in 1993, including most of the sending and receiving countries in the international adoption world, is the most important law governing international adoption to date. It sets minimum international standards for adoptions that occur between countries, to insure greater protection from exploitation of children, birth parents, and adoptive parents. It makes adoption a preferred option for children over institutional care in their home countries, although expressing preference for adoption in-country over adoption abroad. It prohibits the use of financial payments to induce the surrender of parental rights, or coercion as in kidnapping.

The Convention governs only those adoptions that take place between countries that have ratified it. As of October 2004, 46 countries had become parties to the Convention and 6 had signed but not yet ratified. The U.S. signed it in 1994. Congress passed enabling legislation entitled the Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000 and the regulations are being finalized, with the final ratification of the act scheduled for 2007. At that time, private adoption agencies will generally need to be accredited or approved. Currently, adoption agencies in the U.S. are licensed and supervised by individual states.

Countries can continue to approve international adoptions even with countries that have not ratified the Convention, and China has agreed to continue to allow U.S. citizens to adopt Chinese children. However, Venezuela has refused to allow U. S. citizens to adopt children in that country until the U.S. ratifies the Convention.

Adoption advocates hope that the Convention will help to prevent illegal adoption practices. There have been a number of adoption scandals involving baby buying or kidnapping in countries such as Cambodia, Peru, and Romania. Angelina Jolie was faced with a law suit after she adopted a baby from Cambodia because the organization that brokered the adoption was found to have conducted the adoption illegally. This did not discourage her from international adoption as she kept the child, and she and Brad Pitt later adopted a child from Ethiopia.

Madonna adopted a child from Malawi, despite the country's laws that forbid nonresidents from adopting Malawian children. A children's charity in Malawi went to court to try to stop the adoption. The orphanage from which Madonna got the baby said that adoption is "not like selling property . . . But the action has raised the question: Has Madonna's celebrity status allowed her to steamroll Malawi's legal system?"

Madonna donated $3 million to help children infected with HIV. She is one of several celebrities who have taken on a cause, including Mia Farrow, Ewan McGregor, Angelina Jolie, and Bono. According to Steve Lewis, the United Nations' special representative on AIDS and a frequent critic of what he sees as governments' complacency, said, "The amazing absence of political leadership has left in the hands of the celebrity leadership a vacuum, which they're filling in a pretty important way."

A baby-selling scandal in Romania caused the country to shut down international adoptions altogether in 2000, and in 2004 they eliminated international adoption altogether, except for adoption by a child's grandparents. International adoptions in Romania soared after footage was released in the early 1990s depicting dire conditions at orphanages, which appeared on a Barbara Walters show. About 20,000 children were adopted from Romania from 1990 to 2000, but were halted when Romania banned adoptions by all foreigners except relatives of the children in 2004, without resolving the cases of 1,100 Romanian orphans and abandoned children for whom foreign families had registered adoption petitions prior to the ban. About 270 families in the U.S. were in the process of adopting children from Romania before this law was passed. Romania was responding to pressure from the European Union, whose representative for assessing Romania's EU membership was against international adoption. However, the new representative at the EU stated publicly that he differed from his predecessor on the issue of international adoption. The European Parliament in December 2005 asked that Romania resolve international adoption cases registered during 2001-2004 "with the goal of allowing intercountry adoptions to take place, where justified and appropriate." U. S. officials, including Congress and President Bush, have put pressure on Romanian officials to allow adoptions to go forward, but so far Romania has not budged.

Cambodia, which once supplied large numbers of children to adoptive parents, stopped its intercountry adoptions in 2002 because of allegations of corrupt "baby laundering." The Immigration and Naturalization Service suspended visa processing for adopted children, citing suspicions that they were bought or stolen from their parents and put into orphanages with false paperwork in order to feed the growing American demand for babies. Before the U.S. stopped adoptions from Cambodia, about 400 families were caught in the middle of the adoption process. The INS has cleared some pending cases for adoption, but says it will not approve adoptions until Cambodia changes its laws. Prospective parents have engaged in a passionate letter-writing campaign to Congress and picketed the INS building in Washington.

Politics in International Adoption

COUNTRIES' ADOPTION POLICIES are heavily influenced by politics, as the Romanian situation illustrates. China, troubled by publicity in the late 1990s over gay parents in the U.S. raising Chinese children, now requires all applicants to sign statements that they are not gay or lesbian. It also does not allow more than 8 percent of the country's children who are adopted to be placed with single people. Lillian Zang, executive director of China Adoption with Love, based in Brookline, Massachusetts, commented on the recent decline in adoptions in Massachusetts:

> Homelessness alone is considered "neglect."

> Massachusetts is particularly hard-hit by the Chinese policy because of the high number of educated single women, as well as gays and lesbians, who seek to adopt from this state. Calling it a "blue state, red state" phenomenon, she speculated that liberal urban centers are more likely to be experiencing a drop in adoptions from China.

This is occurring despite the continued rise in numbers of Chinese adoptions nationwide, but Zang says she expects a dramatic decline in Chinese placements across the country in the next decade because there will be fewer children available. "Chinese officials are encouraging the country's citizens to adopt. They have also launched an aggressive campaign to alter the traditional Chinese rural preference for male over female babies, a preference that resulted in the abandonment of many newborn girls."

A University of Massachusetts study indicated that the decline in adoptions in the state was due partly to the decline of the economy, as well as the reduced number of Chinese adoptions. Adoption fees of more than $20,000 are out of reach for many families. More Massachusetts parents adopted through the foster care system, which is the lowest-cost alternative, and more sought babies from Guatemala.

Open International Adoption?

HOW ABOUT OPENNESS in international adoption? As far as I know, there is no group advocating that but it seems to me to be as important as openness in national adoptions, even though it would be more difficult to implement.

One mother who adopted a Cambodian child, initiated an open adoption with the mother of her child. Dale Edmonds, a New Zealand adoptive mother living in Singapore, adopted a child who she was told was 6 years old, but the child told her that she was actually 11, that she and her brother were born with different names than had been given Edmonds, and that she was told not to discuss her history. The facilitator told Edmonds that her children's birth mother had died in a rural province, when in fact the child insisted that her mother was living in Phnom Penh. Edmonds located the children's mother and sister. The birth mother did not object to the siblings' move to Singapore, and Edmonds and her husband, at the mother's request, adopted her other daughter. "What matters most," Edmond says, "is that her Cambodian-born children were stripped of their names and histories and essentially hidden from their birth family. I wanted to think our adoption was ethical," she says, "It hurt bitterly to have those beliefs challenged."

It seems to me that the Edmonds family has chosen the best of both worlds. The adoptive parents know their children's past and do not have any guilt about taking stolen children. The children know their origins and are in contact with their birth mother. Probably there are few adoptive mothers who have chosen an open international adoption, but it is generally working well domestically and I think it would be a good idea to try it on a large scale in international adoptions.

Open adoption has occurred in the Marshall Islands, where many U.S. servicemen stationed there adopted children of native families.

> Traditionally, adoption in the Marshall Islands was practiced within the clan or tribe. The concept of terminating parental rights was never instituted, and the child had a relationship with both birth and adoptive families, often returning to the birth family in the birth parent's old age. The adoptive family, typically with more resources, was expected not only to care for the child but also to provide assistance to the child's birth family. The gift of the child was reciprocated by the adoptive family with ongoing assistance to the birth family.

Between 1990 and 1998, over 140 children had been adopted by U.S. servicemen, with some degree of openness. The birth mothers expected the children to return to Marshall Islands after attaining adulthood, and they also expected to stay in touch with the adoptive families. However, within several years of the adoption, only 28.8 percent believed their children would return. Promised gifts and letters stopped or hadn't come at all, although some did continue contact. Some adoptive families had sent photos and aid packages, made visits back to the Marshall Island, and even helped birth families visit the children in their adoptive homes.

Every birth parent wanted to stay in touch but some had no way of being contacted or making contact. They were very poor and many were intimidated by the prospect of writing a letter, especially in English, or sending items through the mail. Most couldn't afford to make an international phone call. Many moved frequently and left no forwarding address. "When the correspondence dwindles, some birth mothers may not be assertive enough to complain to the 'right' people — such as the local liaison that facilitated the adoption — or they may feel powerless to do anything to correct the situation."

The authors of this article conclude that in order to facilitate contact between birth and adoptive parents, adoption facilitators or the government should provide translation and repository services and calling cards or internet credit for emails. "In the meantime, the Marshallese birth families should be provided with safety net services such as food and medical programs as well as long term capacity building programs such as access to basic services, education, and economic self-sufficiency opportunities." That is also good advice for this country and for all countries that supply children for adoption.

Conclusion

IT IS HEARTENING to see the stigma of adoption lessening. It is time to put aside the idealization of the biological nuclear family. Families take many shapes besides that one — adoptive families, gays and lesbians, childless couples, single women and men, step parents, grandparents and other relatives, older people. Adoption helps people to break away from the obsession with biological reproduction and ethnic purity and to embrace the "other." Open adoption could even pave the way to that ideal society for children where children could choose whom they want to live with, as in the Samoa described by Margaret Mead.

There is no reason to stigmatize adoption. There is no reason to stigmatize unwed parents. There is no reason to stigmatize mothers who choose to give their children to adoptive couples. But there is also no reason why children should be taken away from parents who want them and would be able to parent them if given adequate social supports.

EDITOR'S NOTE: A fully footnoted version will be found on our website, www.new pol.org

Hyde Amendment
The Opening Wedge to Abolish Abortion

MARLENE FRIED

ADVOCATES ON BOTH SIDES of the abortion issue have made sure that the anniversary of Roe v. Wade on January 22 is highly visible. Supporters and opponents use the date to rally their forces. In contrast, September 30, the date in 1976 that federal Medicaid funding for abortion was banned by the Hyde Amendment, has not gained the same attention.

In 2006, as we mark the 30th anniversary of the passage of the Hyde Amendment, the National Network of Abortion Funds (NNAF) is determined to change this situation by launching a new campaign that will focus on state and federal policies restricting abortion funding and access. We call on all member funds and sister organizations to join us in this effort. This article focuses on the history of the Hyde Amendment and its impact on women.

Political Context

BEFORE ROE V. WADE, opponents of abortion had worked at the state level to defeat efforts to legalize abortion. But after the 1973 decision they were galvanized to create a major political movement. The Catholic Church took the lead through the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, which set up an independent lobbying group with the goal of overturning Roe. Other key players included the National Right to Life Committee, which united state anti-abortion groups, and the Christian Evangelicals, who had formerly resisted political engagement. While securing a constitutional amendment banning abortion was abortion opponents' ultimate goal, they realized they did not have sufficient support. They turned instead to tirelessly pursuing a strategy of advocating for restrictions on the state level. In 1973 abortion opponents introduced close to 200 bills in state legislatures; 62 of those 200 measures limiting access to abortion passed.

The Catholic Church stepped up its activities against Roe in 1975, when the Bishops issued a Pastoral Plan for Pro-Life Activities, which called for all Catholic organizations to take up a "pro-life legislative plan." The Plan laid out a dual strategy that has essentially been followed by the anti-abortion movement ever since: work toward outlawing abortion entirely by pursuing direct efforts such as a Human Life Amendment while simultaneously pushing for laws and administrative policies that restrict abortion and build support for criminalization.

The New Right, which was also gathering force at this time, saw the opportunity to expand its ranks by joining traditional conservative constituencies with the growing anti-abortion movement. Opposition to abortion became the centerpiece of a broad "pro-traditional patriarchal family, anti-big government and anti-welfare" agenda. Attacking Medicaid payments for abortion was a perfect way to bring the two groups together concretely. Eliminating government funding appealed both to those who opposed abortion and those who opposed taxes and the welfare state.

Congress Passes the Hyde Amendment

IN 1976, REPRESENTATIVE HENRY HYDE (R-

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IL) proposed attaching a provision to the appropriations bill for the Departments of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare (HEW, now called the Department of Health and Human Services, HHS) that would end Medicaid funding for abortion. This became known as the Hyde Amendment. On September 30, 1976, the Amendment passed the House 207-167 with no exceptions for health or life endangerment, even though a similar but weaker measure had been voted down two years earlier. The Senate initially rejected the Amendment but eventually voted for a compromise bill that contained an exception ". . . where the life of the mother would be clearly endangered if the fetus were carried to term."

Passing the Hyde Amendment was the first big victory for the anti-abortion movement and evidence of its growing political clout. It was also a clear example of the anti-abortion two-pronged strategy of pushing for restrictions on abortion in the short-term while pursuing a full ban in the long-term. In response to the challenge that the Amendment was a vote against poor people, Rep. Hyde said during the floor debate, "I would certainly like to prevent, if I could legally, anybody having an abortion, a rich woman, a middle class woman, or a poor woman. Unfortunately, the only vehicle available is the HEW Medicaid bill. A life is a life."

The day after the Hyde Amendment passed, abortion rights advocates challenged it in court. Federal District court Judge John F. Dooling issued a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the funding ban, and later ruled that it was unconstitutional. While abortion opponents appealed his decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, the injunction was lifted in August 1977 and the Hyde Amendment went into effect the same year.

Because Congress had passed the Hyde Amendment as part of the annual appropriations bill, legislators had to vote on it every subsequent year. Thus in 1977, the House again passed the Amendment, this time calling for a total ban on abortion funding for the purpose of preventing "the slaughter of innocent, inconvenient unborn children." When that version came up for a vote in the Senate, pro-choice Senators pressed harder than they had in 1976 for an exception for "medically necessary" abortions. The debate lasted for six months, holding up a $60 million appropriations bill. There were 25 roll call votes in the House in an attempt at a compromise but the hard core opponents of abortion were holding out against all exceptions.

During the debate, many members of Congress revealed their contempt for and mistrust of women, and especially poor women. For example, in opposition to a health exception, one House member said, "We don't want a woman who wakes up with a hangnail to be able to get an abortion." In response to the effort to include rape as an exception, Representative Silvio Conte from Massachusetts pushed for the language of "forced rape," arguing that without the stipulation, "any woman who wants an abortion under Medicaid could go in and say, 'I'm raped,' and there could be a lot of perjury." Throughout this period there were no hearings, no witnesses called, no medical testimony, and virtually no factual evidence cited in the debate.

Ultimately lawmakers reached a compromise to include exceptions: " . . . where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term . . . for victims of rape and incest, when such rape or incest has been reported promptly to a law enforcement agency or public health service; or . . . where severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two physicians."

In 1980, three years after Congress reached a compromise on these exceptions, the judicial branch again weighed in on the Hyde Amendment. The Supreme Court responded to the appeal brought by abortion opponents to Judge

Dooling's 1977 ruling, deciding in Harris v. McRae that the Hyde Amendment was constitutional. Thus far this has been the only lawsuit to directly challenge the legality and constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment.

Post-Hyde Funding Restrictions

IN THE EARLY YEARS of the Hyde Amendment, the political climate had swung to the right on many issues. Anti-welfare sentiments dovetailed with opposition to abortion across party lines.

> "As you know there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can't."
> — President Carter

As Republicans stepped up their attacks on welfare, Democrats did not want to be tagged as pro-welfare. President Carter had come to power in part through the support of Evangelicals and he and Joseph Califano Jr, Secretary of HEW, pledged to oppose using federal funds for abortions under Medicaid or under any new national health insurance plan. In a statement after the Supreme Court decided that states were not compelled to fund abortions, Carter re-affirmed his position and showed complete disregard for poor women, commenting, "As you know there are many things in life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people can't."

In Congress, anti-abortion forces continued to vigorously oppose all Medicaid funding for abortion and by 1981 the physical health, rape, and incest exceptions were dropped. Anti-choice legislators added "Hyde-type" language to other appropriations bills including a Department of Defense bill, a District of Columbia bill, and a Treasury-Postal Service bill. Through this strategy, they broadened restrictions to include denial of abortion coverage in federal employee health plans, for federal prisoners, military personnel and their families, and Peace Corps volunteers. Today such restrictions are placed in virtually all federal programs.

Adding restrictions to appropriations bills was also an effective strategy at the state level. Before Hyde, 13 states had enacted funding bans. Even though the Hyde Amendment didn't mandate states to follow suit, it gave them the green light to do so and provided an incentive. Because Medicaid is a joint federal and state program, banning federal funding for abortions meant that states would have to shoulder the total cost. Thus it is not surprising that by 1979, 40 states followed the federal lead and cut off state funding. Some also eliminated coverage of abortion in state employee health plans.

Congress did not reinstate any exceptions to the ban on funding in the Hyde Amendment until 1993, when the National Black Women's Health Project spearheaded the Campaign for Abortion and Reproductive Equity (C.A.R.E.), a political mobilization to defeat Hyde. While Hyde was not repealed, the Campaign did succeed in once again broadening the exceptions to include rape, incest, and women whose physical health was in danger. It also built a strong and broad coalition, which included labor and civil rights groups, and was important in bringing visibility to the issue of economic barriers to abortion. Inspired by the earlier effort, seven years later NNAF launched C.A.R.E. 2000 — the Campaign for Access and Reproductive Equity. This two-year coalition effort brought issues of access to abortion and reproductive health care for low income women and women of color to the forefront of the pro-choice movement.

Abortion opponents have continued to attack public funding for abortion both in Congress and in the states. In 1997 the U.S. Congress affirmed the rape and incest exceptions, but tightened the life exception so that federal funding covers the abortion only if the woman's life is threatened by continuing the pregnancy.

Impact of the Hyde Amendment

Before Congress cut off federal funding, Medicaid paid for almost one-third of all abortions — about 300,000 annually. After the Hyde Amendment, the federal government paid for virtually none. The average cost of an abortion at that time was $285, forty-four dollars more than the average total monthly welfare payment for a family of four. In Mississippi, because welfare payments are so meager, the average cost of an abortion is four times higher than the average welfare payment for a family of four. Today the average price of an abortion is $468. When adjusted for inflation, this price has remained pretty steady since Roe v. Wade. However, it is still out of reach for thousands of women. In addition, although the abortion funds, which NNAF distributes, offer financial assistance to as many women as possible — collectively to about 20,000 women annually — the women we are able to serve represent only a fraction of the need expressed by pre-Hyde Medicaid payments.

Funding restrictions do not appear to have led to the large scale increases in maternal mortality that abortion rights advocates had feared. But the consequences have been devastating for poor women, who are disproportionately women of color. In 1977, Rosie Jiménez, a Latina and a single mother, became the first woman known to have died from an illegal abortion after the passage of the Hyde Amendment. There is no way to know how many other women have resorted to illegal abortions because of Hyde and other barriers to access. In a recent article, "Reproductive Regression," Carol Joffe documents an increasing number of women attempting self-abortions. Many women cannot obtain abortions at all — an estimated 18-35 percent of Medicaid-eligible women carry to term because they cannot afford an abortion. Other women who succeed in getting an abortion do so at great personal cost– by borrowing money, postponing bills, or forgoing other basic necessities. Nearly 60 percent of Medicaid recipients in a study by the Guttmacher Institute said that paying for an abortion entailed serious hardship, compared with only 26 percent of non-Medicaid-eligible women. Given the obstacles they face, poor women disproportionately have later abortions that are also more costly. Cutting off abortion funding also encourages sterilization because Medicaid has consistently paid up to 90 percent of the costs for sterilization.

Responding to the Hyde Amendment

There was no large visible mobilization against the Hyde Amendment.. The reproductive rights movement focused on preserving legality rather than access. In this context, the Hyde Amendment became a cause and symbol of fractures among abortion rights advocates. It divided those who prioritized race and class issues from those who did not.

Women of color reproductive rights advocates and their allies criticized the mainstream pro-choice movement for not putting the needs of low-income women and women of color at the center of the pro-choice agenda. They formed their own reproductive rights organizations to deal with a broad spectrum of issues and linked sterilization abuse with funding bans and other barriers to abortion access. Several abortion funds that went on to establish the National Network of Abortion Funds were also created during this period as a direct response to the lack of federal and state funding.

Thirty Years is Enough! Campaign Update

NNAF launched the *Hyde — 30 Years is Enough!* Campaign in September 2006 to address the injustice caused by the Hyde Amendment and state funding bans. The campaign includes abortion funds and national and local groups working on health care access, social justice and human rights more broadly. There is a focus on state-level advocacy, where there seems to be a greater possibility for policy change. We have formed a state advocacy working group which will identify key states in which to advocate for increased public funding.

The deProsse Access Fund in Iowa and the Women's Health and Education Fund in Rhode Island are working with students, providers and other allies to document illegal Medicaid denials in their states and educate their legislators with an eye to restoring public funding for all low-income women. In states that do have Medicaid coverage for abortion, the ACCESS Fund in California and the Women's Health and Education Fund of Southeastern Massachusetts are advocating for improved access for immigrant women and young women.

If you would like to support the campaign's fund-raising efforts, please make a donation to your local abortion fund (see list at www.nnaf.org). If you would like more information about the campaign, please visit the website www.hyde30years.nnaf.org or contact us at 617-524-6040.

Editors' note: A fully footnoted version will be found on our website www.newpol.org

The Political Economy of Psychotherapy

David Singer

In the United States today, psychotherapy, or for that matter any study of the psychodynamics or interpersonal processes involved in mental and emotional difficulties in living, is on the wane. The cause of the decline is the subject here, but to understand it, it must be viewed in the context of the changes to health care in general that have taken place in the past several decades in the United States. These changes amount to a transformation from care being provided by many more or less independent providers and institutions to it being sold by a corporate-run industry driven by a lust for profits.

The Current Condition of Psychotherapy

Huge insurance companies call the shots in the mental health field. They dictate which treatment modalities are to be reimbursed, and, within those, how many appointments are needed, what drugs and dosages can be used, etc. Only a tiny percentage of citizens can afford to pay for psychotherapy "out of pocket," that is, without some reimbursement from insurance. Psychotherapy is a process whose results generally increase proportionately to the time and effort expended in it, so limiting the number of sessions covered by insurance also limits its effectiveness. Often the insurance approved length of treatment is equivalent to applying a band-aid to a broken hip. The situation is the result of the rise of "managed care" over the past several decades, with giant for-profit corporations such as Aetna, Cigna, Metropolitan Life, and Prudential controlling the market. "Managed care" is a health care system in which access to services is controlled for the purpose of keeping costs down. Medication "therapy" has become the favored modality of these insurance companies. Medication "therapy" is the administration of drugs that sometimes alleviates some of the symptoms of what is assumed to be psychiatric "diseases." The word "therapy" is in quotes because the drugs only offer symptomatic relief and do not treat the underlying causes of peoples' problems in living. Psychiatric medication is often accompanied by dangerous side effects. Although reimbursements for medication are expensive, they are less than the costs of psychotherapy. After the initial examination, it takes only a few minutes to write or renew a prescription. The dangerous side effects that often accompany psychiatric medication can also be somewhat relieved by other medications. Thus medication "therapy" is favored by managed care companies.

The explicit rationale of such "treatment" is that the "disease" is caused by a chemical imbalance of biological origin that has always been and will always be present, whether or not it is manifest. The scientific evidence for this is controversial. Moreover, correlations found between certain thoughts and feelings with chemical reactions in the brain do not prove causality in one direction rather than the other. However, researchers increasingly pose the question in the chemical-to-psychological direction, because of the profitable consequences for drug companies. The effect of such profits upon research will be further discussed below. The implicit rationale of medication "therapy" is that people cannot change themselves or the circumstances

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in which they find themselves by means of empathic understanding and analysis by psychotherapists. A result of the promulgation of medication therapy for psychological and interpersonal difficulties has been the addition of vast funds to the coffers of the biggest profit makers in the United States, the pharmaceutical manufacturers.

Some Historical Background

IT SHOULD FIRST BE NOTED that psychotherapy has never prevailed. From Freud until now there has been a century of repression, denial, evasion, and so on, of the examination of interpersonal processes that transpire, to a great extent, beneath the surface appearance of social interactions. The "talking cure" has been viewed primarily as mystical or subjective by the quantitative, measurement oriented, experimental psychologists, as well as the biologically biased specialty of medicine, psychiatry. Psychotherapy flourished briefly, and only relatively, in the 1950s and 1960s. This was partially due to the inroads that psychological testing had made during World War II and in the post-WWII U.S. military. It was also due to the post-war economic boom that enabled people within a wider income bracket than before to afford what used to be an exclusive activity of the privileged. This short success was primarily with "neurotic" patients, conceived of, particularly by Freudians, as less disturbed than "psychotics," and more amenable. The Freudian approach, among others, suffered also from a class bias, stemming from its origins among the better off in Vienna.

The evolution of the state of affairs that has brought psychotherapy to its nadir is tied to the development of health care as a tremendously profitable industry in the United States. The following is an overview of the post-WWII highlights of this development. During the 1950s and 1960s, unions demanded and often won health insurance benefits from their employers (including mental health services). These and other of their victories were generally passed on to the nonunion work force as well. However, there were limits to these victories. In 1946, the United Auto Workers, led by Walter Reuther, had signed an agreement with General Motors instituting company sponsored health insurance. This effectively broke the more progressive demand of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) for a national health insurance that would cover organized as well as non-organized workers. Also, the Taft-Hartley law of 1947 had mandated that workers obtain health benefits only through collective bargaining with their employers, rather than through government programs. Thus the possibility of a state-run health system similar to those in capitalist countries in Europe was outlawed.

Tying benefits to employment also added to the fears of losing one's job, fears that were already considerable given the relative lack of a social safety net in the United States. A U.S. worker who loses his or her job, if it is a job that comes with health insurance, is entitled to 18 months of benefits under COBRA. Essentially the insurance premiums are the same as the sum of what the employer and the employee paid while he/she was employed. This is a sizable amount, and if the employee does not find a job with an insurance plan by the time the 18 months are over, he/she either buys insurance on his or her own, which is even more expensive, or falls into the pool of the (now 45 million) uninsured. Fears of losing one's job, reinforced by the capital-labor accord that unions bought into after the late 1940s, persist today and contribute to the decline of unions and worker militancy. The employment-insurance connection is the reason that each time General Motors closes a plant in the U.S., it zeroes out not only the salaries of the fired workers, but also saves $1525 in health premiums that it had paid out for each car produced.

The Great Society program of the 1960s brought Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the very poor, but nothing for the rest. The effect is still felt today, when 13 percent of

Americans have no health insurance at all, and many of those who do pay for it pay at very high costs. The stagflation (slow economic growth coupled with inflation) of the 1970s was accompanied by capital flight, automation, and competition from other advanced capitalist economies that had recovered from the devastation of WWII. To maintain and/or increase profits, U.S. capitalists cut their work forces, lowered wages, and whittled away at benefits.

Throughout the 1980s, the government did its part to increase corporate profits by union busting (e.g., firing the striking air traffic controllers), reducing corporate taxes, and attacking social programs. During this period, the insurance industry's control over health policies rose at a greater rate than ever before. Between 1981 and 1991 the domination of insurance companies was bolstered by 60 million dollars contributed to congressional representatives by the companies' political action committees. These contributions commanded a great deal of power over health care policies. They still do, as do the insurance companies' lobbyists.

By the 1990s, rising health care costs had become a battleground for large corporations looking to maintain profits and unions trying to maintain benefits. A grassroots movement arose to create a single-payer system, that is, one that the federal government administers, contracting directly with providers and bypassing insurance companies. Clinton's 1992 electoral victory was buoyed by his promise of universal comprehensive health benefits, co-opting much of the single-payer movement. He then appointed his wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to head a task force that implemented the "managed competition" approach of the Jackson Hole group. The Jackson Hole group was comprised of representatives of large insurance companies, the pharmaceutical industry, other major corporations, and several professional organizations. "Managed competition" is health care operated and controlled by insurance companies. It attempts to force providers into networks controlled by the insurance companies that try to cut costs below what they were with free choice and fee-for-service arrangements. The theory was that insurance companies would compete for employer-paid premiums, and lower cost plans would be chosen. "Managed competition" has so far prevailed over single-payer proposals, but instead of the relief that its theorists and Clinton had promised, the nation has experienced increasing costs and cutbacks in care. Corporations, to avoid cutting into their own profits, buy into plans that have less coverage and higher deductibles. For example, Wal-Mart workers, making average salaries of $14,000 per year pay a $1000 deductible, if they even qualify for the stingy health plan. Taxpayers in effect subsidize Wal-Mart, since many of its workers enroll in Medicaid to defray their expenses. In 2004, the growth in medical costs in the United States was nearly four times the growth of wages, making that year the eighth straight that medical cost growth outpaced wage growth.

> The combined profits of the ten drug companies in the Fortune 500 were more than the profits of all the other 490 firms put together.

THE CORPORATE PROFITS of insurance companies, including those of the new entities called health care corporations, have skyrocketed. Health care is now the third largest industry and the United States tops the list of all countries in per person expenditures for health care. Fourteen percent of our gross domestic product goes to the health care industry. The per capita spending of countries such as Sweden and France is about a half of that of the

United States. Great Britain spends close to one-third. Nevertheless, the three countries cover almost their entire populations through national insurance programs. In 2003, the U.S. per capita spending of $5,635 was twice the average of countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, an organization of advanced capitalist countries). Health insurance premiums will rise to an average of more than $14,500 for family coverage in 2006.

Part of the triumph of the insurance companies is due to health maintenance organizations (HMOs). HMOs were created beginning in the 1950s to keep costs down. They have seen enormous growth recently, from 26 million subscribers in 1986 to 55 million in 1996. Insurance companies often sponsor HMOs, and people are forced or enticed into HMOs by lower premiums than plans offering freer choice of providers. HMOs control all aspects of health care, including the selection of providers, authorization of treatment plans, monitoring treatment, etc. They thereby limit the ability of practitioners to determine treatments and the ability of patients to choose their providers. And, of course, they favor least expensive treatments. In the mental health field, this means medication rather than psychotherapy and very short-term rather than long-term psychotherapy.

Besides insurance companies' profits, the profits of the pharmaceutical corporations skyrocketed as well in the past two decades, but they had already been beyond the beyond. Since the early 1980s, the legal drug industry has been by far the most profitable industry in the country. The ascendancy of the pharmaceutical industry is well documented by Marcia Angell, a former editor-in-chief of the New England Journal of Medicine. She reports that in 2002, the combined profits of the ten drug companies in the Fortune 500 were more than the profits of all the other 490 firms put together.

Angell also details how the successes of the pharmaceutical firms was facilitated by industry friendly legislation beginning in 1980 with the Bayh-Dole Act. It allowed universities and small businesses to patent discoveries emanating from research sponsored by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the major distributor of dollars for medical research. Before that, taxpayer-financed discoveries were in the public domain. After that, the universities could patent their discoveries and grant exclusive licenses to drug companies in return for royalties. Other legislation allowed NIH to make deals with drug companies to directly transfer NIH discoveries to industry. Medical schools and teaching hospitals were transformed into "partners of industry." The Joint Economic Committee of Congress found that *publicly* funded research led to 15 of the 21 drugs introduced between 1965 and 1992 that are considered to have the highest therapeutic value, while the pharmaceutical firms reaped the profits.

In 1995, an internal NIH memo lifted limits on the outside income of its personnel, reversed its prohibitions against taking stock or stock options, and freed its leaders to start making personal deals with companies. Between 2000 and 2004, at least 530 government scientists at the NIH, upon whose recommendations doctors rely, took fees, stocks or stock options from biomedical companies. A 2002 survey of medical experts who write practice guidelines found that about nine of ten had a financial relationship with a drug manufacturer and six of ten were tied to companies whose drugs were either considered or recommended in the guidelines they wrote. The financial ties were almost never disclosed.

Angell also states that starting with the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, laws were passed that extended the monopoly rights of brand-name drugs, another boon to the pharmaceutical industry. With these mega-profits came the increasing ability of drug companies, directly and through Congress, to control decisions made by the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) as to the safety of medications. Their lobbyists have made the FDA a de facto partner in industry and successfully pushed laws to have the FDA fast-track approval of new drugs. This was facilitated by the passage of the Prescription Drug User Fee Act in 1992. The drug companies agreed to pay the FDA $300,000 for each new medication, and in return, the FDA promised speedier approval of new medicines.

As an example of this partnership, Angell points to the FDA committees that review new drug applications as to whether or not they should be approved. The financial connections of members of the committees to "interested companies" is exemplified by a report that found that at least one member at 92 percent of the meetings had a conflict of interest, and half or more at 55 percent of the meetings had conflicts. Ten of 32 panelists recently advising the FDA concerning removing pain control pills associated with heart attacks were consultants for drug makers. Without their votes, Vioxx and Bextra would have been pulled from the market. They were not, and the stocks of the drugs' makers soared after the vote.

Tax revenues, a decreasing proportion of which come from private corporations and the wealthy, subsidize the drug corporations that control the most profitable industry in the nation. Those profits fund the drug lobby. The most powerful in Washington, the drug lobby spends nearly $100 million a year pushing its weight around. The drug lobby invested $26 million in the 2000 election cycle. The new president and CEO of the lobby, a.k.a. PhRMA (Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America), is former Louisiana congressman W.J. Tauzin. Tauzin's appointment was his reward for making sure that the new Medicare prescription drug law precluded discounts for Medicaid and Medicare and barred the importation of cheaper drugs from Canada. The power of the drug lobby precludes the possibility of the regulation of drug prices. All other developed nations have some form of such regulation.

The rampant march of the profit-making insurance and drug corporations has been merciless in its effects upon mental health research. George Albee, a past president of the American Psychological Association summarizes the situation:

> Unfortunately, in psychiatry, much that passes as research is financed by the pharmaceutical corporate giants. They pay for the research. They pay the referees who judge the research. They underwrite the cost of the conferences where results are announced and the cost of publishing the psychiatric journals where they are published. The usual freedoms of scientific inquiry are missing.

The Results: Drug Company Dominance of the Mental Health Field

THE POWER OF THE DRUG INDUSTRY is acutely evidenced in the mental health field. Peter Breggin documents its influence upon the professional organization of psychiatrists, the American Psychiatric Association (APA). APA journals, conferences, and projects receive massive funding from the pharmaceutical firms. This started primarily as a result of the loss in membership and income that APA experienced in the early 1970s as it was losing the competition for psychotherapy patients to lower cost providers like psychologists and social workers. In 1980 the APA board of directors voted to encourage pharmaceutical companies to support scientific activities. This unholy alliance has promoted the self-serving view that has been pushed within psychiatry for most of its existence, that mental illnesses have biochemical etiologies and thus biochemical solutions.

APA has also aligned itself with the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI). NAMI consists of parents of mentally ill offspring who deny any parental role contributing to the interpersonal or emotional problems of their grown children. NAMI promotes genetic and biological explanations of interpersonal behavior as well as drug treatment and electroshock to control it. Major drug corporations contribute to NAMI. Albee has warned the mental health field against the alliance of NAMI and biological psychiatry and the alliance's ideology of dismissing family dynamics as causes of severe mental problems. NAMI's counterpart in the realm of children's problems is Children with Attention Deficit Disorders (CH.A.D.D.). Because CH.A.D.D advocates the neurological etiology of attention deficits, the blame is placed on the children for their parents' frustrations. Socioeconomic factors, problems with parenting and/or schools, etc. are downplayed. CH.A.D.D. receives drug company funding, from, for example, CIBA-Geigy, the manufacturer of Ritalin, the stimulant with the biggest share of the attention deficit market.

Psychiatrists are reaping their share of the NIH/pharmaceutical bonanza. For example, Dr. P. Trey Sunderland III, a senior researcher at NIH, endorsed an Alzheimer's drug marketed by Pfizer at an NIH national television broadcast in 2003. He failed to mention that his research was done in collaboration with Pfizer, and that his research had received $508,050 worth of reimbursement by the company. Psychologists, through their own professional organization (the American Psychological Association), have pushed for parity in benefit reimbursement, so that mental health services can be covered as much as medical ones. However, whereas many psychologists used to voice displeasure with the medicalization of mental health, now they primarily have taken a "if you can't beat 'em, join 'em" stance, pushing for their own right to write prescriptions.

About half the U.S. population popped prescription pills in 2003 alone — 3.5 billion prescriptions and $231 billion in drug industry revenues for everything from lowering cholesterol to raising penises. The success of the latter also typifies a sleight of hand that the drug companies have become quite adept at, the invention of new diagnoses to accommodate their marketing ambitions. In Angell's words, "Once upon a time, drug companies promoted drugs to treat diseases. Now...they promote diseases to fit their drugs." Although "impotence" certainly had its problematic connotations, "erectile dysfunction" takes the problem out of the mental and emotional field completely. It overbiologizes and chemicalizes interpersonal interactions.

The same dangerous diagnostic inventiveness fills the APA's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), the official authority of psychiatry. Recent years have seen additions, for example, of adolescent rebelliousness, arithmetic learning problems, childhood hyperactivity, and attention deficit. Angell documents the finesse with which GlaxoSmithKline pushed Paxil to treat their invented "social anxiety disorder." The original DSM listed about 60 disorders, while the latest has about five times as many.

Not only have these new "diseases" spread like the plague, but the old ones — depression, schizophrenia, etc. — are now framed in terms of chemicals. We see this in television commercials and in the drug company publicity adopted by psychiatry. A brochure distributed in a major psychiatric facility in New York is published by drug profiteer Pfizer and typifies the backwardness of the "science" behind it by stating, "The importance of dopamine [a chemical that carries messages within the brain] in psychotic symptoms is clear from the fact that medications that are used to treat psychotic symptoms affect dopamine to some degree." This statement is akin to saying that histamines are important to understanding insomnia because some antihistamines make people drowsy.

The marketing reach of the psychiatric drug business has extended, with newly created diagnoses, toward younger and younger children. Spending on drugs to treat children and adolescents for behavior-related "disorders" rose 77 percent between 2000 and 2003. The expense, $536 per patient per year, is mostly for diagnoses of depression and attention deficit disorder. Sixty-five percent of children and adolescents taking behavioral medicines were on antidepressants, about which even the FDA ordered to include warnings of side effects, such as suicide, in March 2004. Attention disorder drug use by children *under age five* rose 49 percent in that period. Twenty-nine million prescriptions were written in 2004 for Ritalin and similar stimulants — 23 million of them for children. A recent study found chromosome damage to all 12 children who took Ritalin for three months, suggesting increased cancer risk. Ritalin "expert" Lawrence Greenhill, who consults for the companies that make stimulants, questioned why the government became so concerned. In addition, pharmaceutical companies buy influence from state mental health officials. This results in the overmedication of children with anti-psychotic drugs.

The Economic Context of These Developments

THE INDUSTRIALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE and, within it, "mental health" care must be viewed within the context of the advance of the capitalist mode of production. The tide that has swept away many crafts and the family farm, and transformed the family itself, has tumultuously changed health care and medical research. Capitalism has succeeded in commodifying much that was heretofore unthinkable — water, even air, in the form of pollution credits. Why not health?

Technological Innovation and Scientific Research

Technological innovation and scientific discovery have been crucial to the advance of capitalism. Marx was an astute observer and analyst of this in what can now be called the childhood of capitalist development: "[M]odern industry . . . makes science a productive force distinct from labor and presses it into the service of capital;" and "Invention then becomes a business, and the application of science to direct production itself becomes a prospect which determines and solicits it." He saw the motivating force behind this development in capitalists, who in order to cut costs, strive to increase productivity via technical innovation, particularly mechanization, to undersell other capitalists (or capitalist firms). They then could expand their market share, and their profits, relative to others, allowing their survival. This also has the effect of enforcing the adoption of their new production methods by competitors.

Mandel describes how, as capitalism matured, research and development became organized as an autonomous investment, first as a branch of each company, then as independent enterprises themselves. Noble built upon this and Braverman's work in analyzing how industry monopolized science, controlling the products of technology by controlling patents, and directing the process of scientific production by means of organized and regulated industrial research. By the middle of the 20th century, technology and science had submitted to corporate concerns. This is not only attested to by analysts of left-wing persuasion such as Mandel, Noble, and Braverman, but also by the widely respected economic historian Nathan Rosenberg. He writes:

> Industrial societies have created a vast technological realm that is very closely shaped by economic needs and incentives. This technological realm, in turn, provides numerous ways in which daily economic life has become closely linked with science. That realm defines the directions that promise large financial rewards and provides many problems and empirical observations that stimulate creative scientific research. These statements are supported by the increasing institutionalization of research in private industrial laboratories. It is fair to assume that decisions in the pursuit of science are subjected, in these profit-making firms to a calculus of private costs and benefits.

Note that "economic needs" referred to by Rosenberg have no necessary correspondence to any notion of interpersonal, biological, or other kinds of "needs." They may conveniently overlap with these other needs, for example, when the food produced by corporate agriculture has some nutritional value. But "economic needs" may just as well be those that are constructed by the same agents that provide their fulfillment. There are countless technological inventions being created for which the "need" (a.k.a. "demand") is manufactured and marketed with it. Commercials pound at us about our "needs" for cellular phones that take pictures and download music and the "need" for sufferers of the newly invented "social anxiety disorder" to take Paxil. For drug companies, as for any capitalist firms, "need" is profit and this dictates the direction of research: "[T]he pharmaceutical industry is supremely uninterested in finding drugs to treat tropical diseases . . . since those who suffer from them are in countries too poor to buy drugs," states Angell. While railing against ACT-UP and other groups that protest the greed of drug companies, American Enterprise Institute resident fellow Roger Bate states,

> We are seeing 27 percent fewer companies working in HIV research than there were six years ago . . . If they are not making money on their research, they're unlikely to keep funding it. . . These drugs will not be like Lipitor, which made $10.9 billion last year. Compared to such a blockbuster drug, even the best AIDS drug will not earn anywhere near that kind of money.

On the other hand, the profitability of drugs that treat poorly timed penile flaccidity has lead to the investment of extraordinary sums in R&D and marketing. And profit making has inspired (so far unsuccessfully) attempts to bridge the "gender gap" in the "sexual dysfunction" market, to fulfill economic "need."

The fightback against psychiatric drugging and other abuses needs to be expanded to take on the profit system from which they stem.

The subjugation of science to the profit demands of corporate capitalists, foretold by Marx and elaborated by Rosenberg and others above, merits a revised description of what had been known as scientific research. Firstly, the incentives to fudge are eclipsing ethical concerns. More than 15 percent of the thousands of NIH scientists responding to a recent survey *admitted* they had changed a study's design or results to satisfy a sponsor. Determining how many fudge in actuality would require more sophisticated techniques. Secondly, 13.5 percent of the scientists in the same survey said that they knew their research designs would not yield accurate results. Again, these are just the admitted transgressions. Even so, how "scientific" can such knowledge be? Brian Martinson, one of the surveys' investigators concludes, "Science has changed a lot in terms of its competitiveness, the level of funding and the commercial pressures on scientists. We've turned science into a big business but failed to note that some of the rules of science don't fit well with that model."

Thus, the health care industry, spurred by the profit-seeking insurance and drug corporations, has followed the path of other industries within the capitalist economy. Profits have determined the direction of innovation and research. Each firm has tried to expand its market share to survive against the competition. New products are then built upon or changed slightly by competitors. Since patents are central to their profitability through monopoly pricing, the drug companies patent minor changes to existing drugs and claim that their new one works better. Since they control the research, even to the extent of falsifying evidence, the pursuit of science is subjected to the calculations of profit, and their profits allow them to buy further influence in government.

The Commodification of Care

THE ABOVE-MENTIONED ANALYSTS of technological innovation primarily referred to commodities that were physical goods like clothing, machines, food, medicines, etc. However in capitalist societies, not only physical goods become commodified, but services as well. Marx wrote, "A service is nothing more than the useful effect of a use-value, be it of a commodity, or be it of labor." Braverman points out that when the useful effect of labor does not take the form of an object, but is rather sold directly to the consumer, the effect of the labor becomes the commodity, and "[w]hen the worker does not offer this labor directly to the user of its effects, but instead sells it to a capitalist, who re-sells it on the commodity market, then we have the capitalist form of production in the field of services."

Thus, services become commodities that are produced and sold for profit as well. This has become increasingly true for health care. It is now an industry that not only produces medicines, hospitals and dialysis machines, but *care*. Care includes surgery, advice, TLC, counseling, laboratory testing, etc. Some of the care is aided by computers and other electrical or mechanical apparatuses, but all care involves human labor. The labor is increasingly paid for in the form of wages and fees, by firms that reap profits from the labor that they buy. The providers of that labor, who own no part of these companies, become proletarianized. That is, they become workers whose only way to earn income is to sell their labor power. Whether they are being compensated well, as are most physicians, or poorly, as are many other health workers, they are, in the last analysis, workers. In the mental health field the product that is commodified and profited from consists of the relief of symptoms, control of behavior, sociability, etc., and is marketed wherever demand exists or can be created.

As in other profit-making industries, capitalist firms depend upon their workers — physicians, attendants, nurses, technicians, etc. — not being paid for the entire value that they create by their productive activity. Some of the value that these workers create goes towards profits. The value derived from the surplus labor, the portion of their efforts that they are not paid for, is called surplus value, and is the source of profit. Thus, what we see in the commodification of health care and the proletarianization of its workers is in essence the conversion of "the helping professions" to a capitalist industry like any other, assembly lines and all.

Turning the Tide

THE MORAL OUTRAGE expressed by Thomas Szasz in 1960 concerning the abuses of psychiatry resonated with compassionate observers in the mental health field as well as sociologists who noted the coercive function of many social norms. Since then, psychiatry's abuses have become less visually appalling as medicines have replaced straightjackets for tools of control. Medicalized control is not only more convenient; it is also more insidious and tremendously more widespread. More recent expressions of outrage such as Breggin's are as justifiable as were those of the Luddites, who destroyed machines in the early 1800s. However, those machines formed the material mode of existence for the rising capitalist mode of production. Marx notes, "It took both time and experience before the workers learnt to distinguish between machinery and its employment by capital, and therefore to transfer their attacks from the material instruments of production to the form of society which utilizes those instruments." Breggin's well-intentioned pleas for therapy, empathy, and love to replace drugs, electroshock and biochemical theories similarly blur the distinction between the instruments of production and the form of society which uses them. In the mental health field, the fightback against psychiatric drugging and other abuses needs to be expanded to take on the profit system from which they stem.

The treatment of mental disorders is now part of an industry dominated by corporate capitalists engaged in an unbridled rush for profits. The system of agencies, political institutions, and laws, serves a class whose morality consists only in the accumulation of more and more profits. The capitalist class can be likened to an addict that requires more and more of the addictive substance to try unsuccessfully to satisfy the urge and then pushes it upon others to insure an ever-expanding supply line. Capitalists can be influenced by persuasion as easily as a vampire can be convinced to give up its bloodsucking habit. A stake through its heart, or in the case of the capitalist system, a radical transformation of that class system, is the treatment of choice.

The implementation of such a treatment plan demands organization and associations of providers and patients — the producers and consumers of care — in mental health and health care in general. Some steps in organizing the providers have already been taken. For years, "professionalism" has kept health workers from uniting to fight for at least better pay and benefits. This elitist ideology, promulgated by their employers, warned doctors, nurses, and others, not to sully themselves by joining unions. In the name of being professionals, they did not challenge employers' offers, and many remained underpaid. However, about thirty years ago, nurses began to organize. As a result 17 percent are in unions now and make respectable wages — 15.6 percent more than nurses not in a union. Other health care workers have made advances in recent decades, but not enough. There have even been inroads in the unionization of physicians.

The ascendant power of capital, especially since its victory in the "cold war," makes it a more formidable opponent to human needs. But the victims of its commodification of everything and proletarianization of everyone in its path are swelling in numbers here and abroad. A renewal of truly helpful mental and physical care is tied to the success that those billions of people potentially have in eliminating capitalist exploitation.

Ed. Note: A fully footnoted version will be found on our website, www.newpol.org

Murray Bookchin, 1921 - 2006

Murray Bookchin, born in the Bronx in 1921, to Russian Jewish parents, was the most important anarchist thinker of the last forty years. Originally a Communist and then a Trotskyist, he founded the Libertarian League in the 1950s and became a pioneer of ecological politics and the "libertarian municipalist" strain of anarchism. Active in the civil rights, anti-war and student movements of the 1960s, he wrote the classic pamphlet "Listen, Marxist!" as an attack on the growing Trotskyist and Maoist influences on the New Left, and on economism, productivism and authoritarianism in general. In the 1970s he was active in the direct action movement against nuclear power, and anti-nuclear groups like the Clamshell Alliance were directly influenced by him. In the 1980s he was active in the incipient Green movement in the U.S. and explicitly counterpoised his Social Ecology philosophy — most comprehensively laid out in his book *The Ecology of Freedom* (1982) — to the Malthusianism of Deep Ecologists such as Dave Foreman. His legacy is carried on today by the Institute for Social Ecology in Vermont.

The Democratic Party and the Future of American Politics

David Friedman

1. Fiddling While Rome Burns

After six years of the Bush administration, euphoria over the election is understandable. The Democratic victory has been rightly interpreted as a referendum on Iraq as well as a reaction to Republican scandals and mismanagement of the economy. However, the winning strategy was to run conservative Democrats for many seats, and in the flush of victory, to emphasize collaboration with the Republicans. No doubt this will continue into the 2008 Presidential election. People who hope to transform the Democratic Party into a progressive vehicle should take note that "their" party is in fact moving to the right.

Thoughtful people who see beyond the intellectual blinders of party affiliation are becoming aware that things are going terribly wrong for America and politics-as-usual is not dealing with it. We can see multiple catastrophes on the horizon: larger wars, resource shortages and global warming, a growing national debt and trade deficit, health care and pension systems in crisis and a working class whose very livelihoods are under attack. The two-party system helps rather than hinders wealthy elites and powerful corporations to bloat themselves with riches and plunder the earth.

For most of the liberal and labor left the central idea has been to "take back the Congress" in 2006 and then "take back the Presidency" in 2008. This is based on the belief that the Democratic Party is "our party" — albeit a party that may need some changes. However, the actual record of the Democratic Party is one of *complicity*, not opposition, and if it is changing it is in the wrong direction. People who see only that the Republicans are worse — which is undeniable — overlook the ideological similarities of the two parties and their collaboration on issues of the greatest importance, such as the erosion of democracy from the Patriot Act of 2001 to the Military Commissions Act of 2006.

David Friedman *is a mathematician, educator and writer. He has been involved in struggles for free speech, civil rights, peace and trade unionism, and considers himself a democratic socialist in the tradition of Eugene V. Debs.*

2. Congress and the Two-Party System

An analysis of American politics should be based on actions and results rather than wishful thinking. We will do a bit of reality testing by reviewing some important decisions passed by overwhelming votes in Congress.

The Imperial Presidency

The central threat to America's constitutional democracy is the ascendancy of the Executive branch with its huge bureaucracy, covert agencies, military power and global operations. Heading this Executive is a President who possesses more power than any emperor in the history of the world. As global affairs come more and more to dominate all other issues, the principle of the Imperial Presidency is gaining support among America's elites. A very readable account of this process is Senator Robert C. Byrd's book, *Losing America*, (2004) — an eloquent statement on the abdication of the Senate and the security-based demagoguery and rush to war in the post-9/11 period.

The Terry Schiavo Bill

In March of 2005, members of Congress met in emergency session to pass a bill backed by the Bush administration which allowed the parents of comatose Terry Schiavo to seek a special federal court review after normal judicial processes had been exhausted. This grotesque attack on the Rule of Law and the Constitutional Separation of Powers cleared the Senate on a voice vote and passed the House by a late-night vote of 203 to 58 — an unprincipled disregard of the Constitution to curry favor with America's religious right.

> When it comes to basic policy, the two parties seem more like a single bipolar organism.

The Patriot Act — 2001 and 2006

SHORTLY AFTER 9/11, both houses of Congress passed the original Patriot Act in a near-unanimous vote. This could be attributed to the panicky atmosphere at the time, but no such excuse exists for the 2006 renewal of the Patriot Act, a bipartisan decision taken despite years of abuses by the Bush administration.

On July 14, 2005 the *New York Times* reported that Democratic Senator Feinstein had joined with Republican Senator Specter in sponsoring a bill to make fourteen of sixteen expiring provisions of the Patriot Act permanent. On February 17, 2006 the Associated Press reported a Senate vote of 96 to 3 to extend the expiring provisions of the Patriot Act.

The Military Commissions Act of 2006

THIS BILL, WHICH GUTS THE U.S. CONSTITUTION and lays the juridical groundwork for an American dictatorship, passed by a vote of 65 to 34 in the Senate, and 253 to 168 in the House. The Military Detention Act is not normal law; in gross disregard of the U.S. Constitution and the norms of civilized society, it wipes out a centuries-long principle of habeus corpus, gives the Executive branch the power to indefinitely detain anyone it determines to have "purposefully and materially" supported anti-U.S. hostilities, allows evidence collected through hearsay and coercion, and immunizes U.S. officials from prosecution for cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment of prisoners. See, for example, the September 29, 2006 *Washington Post* article by R. Jeffrey Smith, "Many Rights in U.S. Legal System Absent in New Bill." One wonders why the 34 Senators who voted against this bill did not filibuster. It's hard to imagine a more important issue on which to wage an all-out fight.

Immigration and the Border Fence

THE CONTROVERSY OVER ILLEGAL immigrants has given rise to the most massive working class demonstrations of recent decades, in an atmosphere of anxiety over the disappearance and degradation of jobs. The showboating proposals in Congress only pit one kind of worker against another.

Instead of considering jobs programs and joint economic development projects with Mexico that could alleviate both illegal immigration and the justified concerns of American workers, Congress passed a border security bill that contributes to anti-immigrant xenophobia and exacerbates relations with Mexico.

On September 29, 2006 the Senate voted 80 to 19 to approve 700 miles of border fence which would span only a fraction of the U.S.-Mexico border even if it were actually funded and built. Meanwhile, the President has called for a program to import millions of "guest" workers to satisfy employer desires for cheap labor. Ironically, much of the opposition to this idea comes from conservatives in the Republican Party, while leading Democrats support a guest worker program allegedly sweetened by a lengthy, punitive and unreliable "road to citizenship."

Illegal immigration owes much of its recent impetus to massive loss of jobs in Mexico due to NAFTA, which was passed with Bill

Clinton's support. See Jeff Faux's book, *The Global Class War* (2006) for a highly educational account of how NAFTA was approved.

Authorization and Continued Funding of the Iraq War

On October 11, 2002 Congress authorized President Bush to invade Iraq. The vote was 77 to 23 in the Senate, and 296 to 133 in the House. In both houses, the fatal resolution passed by more than two-thirds, far exceeding the simple majority held by Republicans.

On March 16, 2006 the House voted 348 to 71 for an emergency spending package that included an additional $72 billion for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, bringing the costs of these wars to many hundreds of billions of dollars.

Senate Confirmation Votes

- Condaleezza Rice by 85 to 13
- Alberto Gonzales, the defender of torture, by 60 to 36
- Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito with no filibusters

The lackluster opposition to Justice Alito made a farce of earlier claims that Democrats were avoiding small battles in order to fight the big ones. The vaunted struggle over the Supreme Court ended with a whimper. The consequences could prove catastrophic. In addition to the right to abortion, forthcoming issues include the ability of Congress to use its power to regulate interstate commerce for environmental purposes, and the constitutionality of domestic surveillance and oppressive detention without habeus corpus.

Anti-Consumer Legislation

The "class action fairness act" of 2005 passed the Senate by 72 to 26, and the House by 279 to 149. The "bankruptcy reform bill" of 2005 passed the Senate by 74 to 25, and the House by 302 to 126.

Support of Israel's Attack On Lebanon

On July 20, 2006 the House voted 410 to 8 for a shameful resolution that unconditionally endorsed Israel's ongoing attacks on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, praised President Bush for "fully supporting Israel," and praised Israel for "minimizing civilian loss." The Senate passed its own supportive resolution by voice vote.

3. A Conceptual Framework

How is all this to be interpreted? Some people try to explain the performance of the Democrats solely as maneuvering and political cowardice, of which there is no lack, but more important is the actual conservatism of the party leadership, functionaries and big money backers. America's political elites share a broad bipartisan consensus on most major issues; by objective standards and compared to any other halfway democratic country, the spectrum of acceptable ideas is extremely narrow.

The bipartisan consensus includes a commitment to "free market" economics, a drive toward world hegemony, support for a bloated military establishment, and a chauvinistic concept of American exceptionalism. For some deep insights on this subject, see Andrew Bacevich's books, *American Empire* (2002) and *The New American Militarism* (2005), and Chalmers Johnson's *Blowback* (2000) and *The Sorrows of Empire* (2004).

The bipartisan consensus supports the Global War On Terror, a slogan that masks an aggressive foreign policy and may lead to a war with the Islamic world. While alarms ring about North Korean and future Iranian nuclear weapons, there is little talk of nuclear disarmament by our own country and other major powers, or by Israel and the potential tinderboxes of India and Pakistan.

In short, when it comes to basic policy, the two parties seem more like a single bipolar organism. To understand this phenomenon, we have to think beyond the mechanics and machinations of electoral politics. *The essence of a po-*

litical party is the active, organized expression of a class or sector of society, struggling in a variety of ways for their social, economic and national goals and beliefs.

In this deeper sense of "party" America is governed by one party with Democratic and Republican wings. The two wings are not "the same" — they have different styles and somewhat different voter bases — but they collaborate in a single system of governance whose primary allegiance is to the country's wealthiest elites and corporations. Because of the differences there are some benefits to a Democratic Party victory, such as occasional raising of the minimum wage, but this doesn't come close to offsetting the continuing loss of good jobs to offshoring, the prospect of importing cheap "guest" labor from Mexico, the disappearance of pensions and affordable health care, tax benefits for millionaires and billionaires, inaction on global warming, and the terrible human and financial costs of war.

The Party of Davos

IN *THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR*, Jeff Faux observes that "the politics of the global market reflect a virtual one-party system." Faux coins the phrase "Party of Davos" for the constellation of wealthy elites and powerful economic and political institutions that collectively represent the interests of the global investor class and share in its prosperity. Davos is a resort in the Swiss Alps "where managers and agents of the world's most important enterprises meet annually among themselves and with political leaders to discuss the state of the world. . . ."

The Democratic and Republican parties with their elected and appointed officials, functionaries, patronage machines and intellectual defenders, represent the Party of Davos in American politics and government.

The Cases of Joe Lieberman and Howard Dean

HOWARD DEAN'S RAPID TRANSFORMATION from an outspoken critic of the Iraq war and leading candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2004, to a party figurehead and fundraiser illustrates one form of power wielded by the Party of Davos. In a single barrage of newspaper headlines based solely on the triviality of a "war whoop" at the end of a speech, Dean virtually overnight became "non-presidential and unelectable."

For Senator Lieberman it was the other way around. Democratic voters rejected him as their candidate, but with continued funding, respectability and Republican support, he won reelection as a putative Independent. It is naive to think that the Democratic Party can be taken over or moved to the left solely through its official structures and primaries. The Party of Davos doesn't work that way.

4. America Needs a Second Party

ONE OF THE TENETS OF THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS is that "class war," including any serious initiatives that threaten corporate profits or prerogatives, must be avoided at all cost. In reality, a one-sided class war is being waged unrelentingly by corporations, governments, international financial institutions, well-funded think tanks and the mass media. The offshoring of jobs, for example, is not due to a natural force; it is a strategy to maximize profitability, drive down wages and working conditions, and undermine trade unions.

America needs fundamental changes that can only be won by mass movements organized for struggle on many fronts including the political — a true second party and not just in the narrow sense of electing people to office. As long as people depend on saviors from above — presidents, senators or benevolent billionaire — they will remain subject to the Party of Davos. Obviously a credible new party cannot be pulled out of the air or just declared by a few good people. It will require support from the rank and file and leaders of substantial liberal and labor groups that are currently committed, albeit grudgingly in many cases, to the Democratic Party. Until a foundation is laid and a critical mass of support achieved, this is a *perspective*, a *strategy* that can give direction to opposition movements and labor militants, and can be the basis for steps in that direction.

The Shape of a New Party

WHEN PEOPLE HEAR "NEW PARTY" they tend to visualize campaigns, candidates, and elected officials. This is like imagining a building without a foundation, a professional athlete without years of training and development. It assumes that political action must resemble the mode of operation of the Democrats and Republicans. On the contrary, a party that is to be an active, organized expression of working people and progressive movements must be based on democratic mass organizations and commitment to developing a new vision and program for society. A new party should grow out of existing struggles in which people educate themselves to understand complex issues and seek common themes that have broad appeal to the larger public. There are no quick fixes: electoral victories might be won along the way, but it will be necessary to pick and choose those battles.

PDA and the Inside/Outside Strategy

SOME SAY THAT THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY can be transformed through the power of numbers and victories in the primaries. More likely, this would result in the Joe Lieberman phenomenon on a larger scale. However, a serious effort by rank and file Democrats to transform their party requires most of the same tasks as building a new party and could lay a foundation for the latter. The most promising development along these lines is the Progressive Democrats of America (see their web site at http://pdamerica.org/index.php). PDA is a movement organization carrying out public education and action, not just a cheering section for politicians. They have a membership structure with the capacity for expansion and for building associations with "ally" organizations that are not necessarily in the Democratic Party. There is a great deal of potential here, if PDA can meet the challenge of retaining their independence and energy in the face of Democratic Party pressures and betrayals.

The Green Party

DESPITE ITS INDEPENDENCE, the Green Party emulates the major parties in ways that are too serious to ignore. Their chief characteristic is a candidate-centered electoralism based on campaign committees and small, transient branches of activists with a one-note strategy of running as many races as possible.

Internally the Green Party often operates on the basis of a mushy notion of "consensus" that is an invitation to manipulation by leaders and cliques. There is no real membership organization; for the most part, candidates and their entourages, together with small circles of loyalists, speak on behalf of uninvolved Green voters — a familiar pattern in American politics. The Greens could play a more positive role if they adopt a serious approach to organization and seek a fraternal relationship with PDA, instead of viewing them as rivals.

Tikkun/NSP

IT IS WORTH TAKING NOTE of the Tikkun Community and Network of Spiritual Progressives, whose founder and intellectual leader is Rabbi Michael Lerner. An outgrowth of Tikkun Magazine, The Tikkun Community is a voice of progressive Judaism counterposed to the increasingly right wing, Israeli-loyalist positions of many American Jewish leaders. The Network of Spiritual Progressives now plays a similar role as a progressive alternative to the religious right. TC/NSP are developing a vision, values and an intellectually serious analysis of issues, and building membership chapters of people who share those goals. Lerner is one of the few prominent people on the left who has had the nerve and insight to stand up publicly against authoritarians of both the left and the right. TC/NSP is following one of many roads that can converge on an alternative to the Party of Davos.

Organized Labor and the Religious Right

THE TRADE UNIONS DEPEND EXCLUSIVELY on the Democratic Party for their political voice, and pump millions of dollars into that vehicle. Union leaders are not known to the public and mostly confine themselves to issues of immediate concern to the trade unions. There is no network of labor-based newspapers or radio stations, and little ongoing involvement in the affairs of local communities. Most union members do not participate in their locals, with occasional exceptions during contract disputes.

By contrast, the religious right has thousands of congregations that meet regularly, sponsor community activities and have outspoken pastors, publications, a multitude of right wing radio stations, and television personalities with audiences in the millions.

This enables the religious right to exert a strong influence on the political parties.

The labor movement, with its millions of working families, can deliver votes but can't exert much pressure on the Democratic Party because it has no independent ground to stand on. The case for independent political action by labor is that it can draw concessions from the Democrats while building a vehicle for larger struggles.

Conclusion

THE CENTRAL TASK OF A PROGRESSIVE movement is to transform or replace the Democratic Party. In either case, people need to build mass, democratic membership organizations, develop a new politics and fight for it against America's political elites. The alternative is to follow the Party of Davos down a long road into darkness.

Can a Progressive Democrat Make a Difference?

Running Against Hillary

An Interview with Jonathan Tasini

Jonathan Tasini made enemies when he ran against Senator Hillary Clinton in New York State's September 2006 Democratic primary. Some liberal Democrats called his effort a quixotic and self-referential campaign, one that would accomplish nothing beyond potentially harming Clinton's own political standing. Others to Tasini's left wrote off his campaign as a diversion, a way of co-opting critics of neo-liberalism onto a narrow path while draining resources from potentially insurgent third party efforts. But he also made friends, with still others viewing his primary run as a godsend, a brave stand that thankfully someone was taking and that offered a chance to vote against Senator Clinton, her support for the Iraq War and her corporate handlers.

Underfunded, facing a virtual television news blackout, and with the senator studiously refusing to debate — something for which both the liberal, pro-Clinton *New York Times* and the pro-Bush *New York Post*, scored her campaign — Tasini still attracted 17 percent of the primary vote, receiving some 125,000 votes statewide.

Tasini, a highly regarded labor writer, economic researcher, former president of the National Writers Union (UAW), and now president of the Economic Future Group, a national consulting firm, spoke in late October with *New Politics* editorial board members Joanne Landy and Michael Hirsch. Below is the text of their interview.

* * *

New Politics: When launching a progressive primary run against the pro-war, non-progressive and largely shoo-in Hillary Clinton, what assumptions did you bring into the campaign? What did you seek to accomplish? To what degree did you succeed/fail? What would an infusion of dollars have let you do that didn't get done, if anything?

JT: There's no question that this race was the perfect example of how money corrupts politics, and also how the media plays a role in deciding who gets heard and who doesn't. I was often asked, "Am I the Ned Lamont of New York," and I said, "No, I'm not; I'm not independently wealthy, I can't put $12 million of my own money into a campaign." We raised about $225,000. There's no question that if we'd had $1 million, we would have done twice as well. I think we would have gotten 30 to 35 percent of the primary vote, and I simply base that on the reality that two thirds of the people said they agreed with me, certainly on the issue of the war, as well as other issues. And yet two thirds of the people up until the election didn't even know I was running. I ascribe these incredible contradictions directly to money and media.

So, having said all that, I feel like we did extraordinarily well in terms of our goals, which were: First, to make sure that a pro-war senator, who's bad on so many other issues, but certainly on the war, did not get a free pass. To see that there would be an alternative, and an opportunity for voters to vote for somebody opposed to the war. And when you get 125,000 votes — that gave people a place to go. And since then a lot of people come up to me to say "Thank God I voted for you; it really felt good to be able to cast a vote." So that was a small thing that I think was important. Second, I think it was important to make sure that the war was a part of the debate, not just in this race, but throughout the country.

I wasn't the only anti-war candidate running. When people asked me if I was the Ned Lamont of NY, I would say no, I'm the Marcy Winograd. You may know Marcy, who's a friend of mine; she ran against Jane Harmon in southern California, who voted for the war. Marcy's someone I met through Progressive Democrats of America, a schoolteacher. Not like Ned Lamont, not independently wealthy — and she got 39 percent of her district's primary vote. And there are other people like that. Our goal, as part of this kind of loose network, was to make the war a central part of the campaign. I think that happened to the extent that when the media did cover it, they talked about the war as *the* defining issue. My campaign was about many more things besides the war; we had a very progressive economic plan, and so on, but clearly I could not have run this race without the war. Clinton is so bad on so many issues, but the war was supposed to be the motivating factor for people to vote against her.

I got into this assuming that we would have enormous support, motivation and energy from the anti-war movement and I was surprised at how weak the anti-war movement was, what a failure they were. They were much more interested in doing what I consider to be "nice" things like demonstrations, but not interested in, or having the skills, the inclination, or the ability to get down into the political world, and do what was really needed, which was to confront somebody at the ballot box.

NP: Do you think that was because their activists were not accustomed to engaging in political action, or because they just didn't want to confront Hillary Clinton?

JT: I would say yes and yes. And I'll add another thing. Some of them said, "Well, our peace group is a 501(c)3 tax exempt organization and the rules of the IRS say that we can't endorse candidates." I understand that. But Peace Action provides a good example of what *can* be done. They prepared a voter guide, which simply compared our positions, not just on the Iraq war, but on broader issues of defense and peace, as well as other issues. And they didn't endorse me; they were simply informational. And that's fine. They handed that guide out in many, many places, and I think that was very helpful. If they had handed out 100,000 of them, that would have been great. But there are opportunities for the peace movement. I'm going to be frank: what I discovered is how much of a paper tiger the progressive movement is, specifically the peace movement — that it's got a lot of good rhetoric, but it's so thin, in terms of its depth within the community. Yes, they can turn out people to demonstrations, but how many of those people end up being part of the movement and staying to build an alternative? I think that's a very hard question.

I think yes, some of them did not want to confront somebody whom they fear. I found that throughout the progressive movement, and ultimately, and I'm making a generalization — there's a section of them — left, liberals, progressives, however you want to define them, that want a seat at the table, and want to have their phone calls returned, and want to be seen as players.

NP: So if you weren't going to win, they didn't want to be involved with you.

JT: Right. For some people it was that calculation. For a segment of the progressive movement, that's the case, though not for all of it.

But our third goal was to strengthen the progressive movement, and I think we did accomplish that, because it's continuing. Wherever I went, I talked about how this campaign does not end on primary day, September 12. It continues. And we're now working with a variety of people throughout the state; we have hundreds of people who volunteered for the campaign, we're trying to develop a lasting progressive political network throughout the state. Just as a small example, I have a whole bunch of volunteers whom I've been taking up [to Westchester County] the last few weekends to canvas for John Hall, in New York's 19th Congressional District [Note: Musician and activist John Hall won the district with 51 percent of the vote.]

NP: You scored 17 percent of the primary vote. That was far more than your detractors imagined, though less than your closest supporters had hoped. Yet the anti-war sentiment among Democrats is far higher than 17 percent. At bottom, why did so many anti-war Democrats either sit on their hands or vote for war-enabling Hillary?

JT: A lot of people who were against the war didn't vote in the primary — it was a very light turnout, 15 percent or something. [Note: The exact percentage of registered state Democrats casting a ballot for Senator was 13.9 percent.] I think we did as well as we could have, given the lack of money and media attention. So again, what I heard from many volunteers was stunning: at the polls, on election day, they'd hand out a palm card, someone would walk 10 steps, read it, and turn back, and say "I'm voting for your guy." Or, "I didn't even know he was running." It was a dual response that reinforced what we knew, which was that we just did not have the megaphone, and we didn't have the money. And the media always sort of dealt with this as a kind of horse race, and didn't want to deal with issues.

*NP: What about the Working Families Party?**

JT: Their role was negative. I mean, they put Hillary Clinton on their ballot, which I think is a travesty. At some point you have to draw the line. She's terrible on so many issues — I mean, she's for the death penalty, she believes that NAFTA was a good thing; Rupert Murdoch is one of her supporters, you just go down the list. But the ***war*** — which now we know killed 600,000 Iraqis, and thousands of Americans, and the economic costs—how could a party that's supposed to be progressive, or I don't know how they define it, put somebody up who did so much damage to everything that they stand for? I didn't take this personally — people know that if I had been in the hall of the Working Families Party convention and we were debating this, I would have been one of the first people to stand up and say, we cannot endorse her, it's outrageous.

NP: You spoke at the Working Families convention, didn't you?

JT: I spoke at a state committee meeting. They did not have anybody speak at the statewide convention. Partly because I think they did not want to give me a platform at the moment they were debating. There was a lot of manipulation that went on with this. Unfortunately, it was not just a straight-up thing. But just on the position of the Working Families Party. I think that it's a shame to endorse center-right candidates — I mean, where do you draw the line? Do you want to be about economic prosperity and that's all? I was working with the Working Families Party, I was on the state committee, and I left to enroll in the Democrats — to run in the primary. I think that Mike Hirsch raised some ruckus about that (endorsement policy) really well. I thought — okay, so — all this has happened, and then they went and said "As an anti-war vote, vote for Hillary Clinton."

NP: It's right out of Orwell, isn't it?

JT: I read that and I thought: "this is unbelievable!" And then Mike [Hirsch] and I and other people made an issue of it. Not to try to reverse what they had done, that was a done deal, but my God, don't try to—that's disgusting. You know, it *is* almost straight out of Orwell, to say that you should vote for a pro-war person in order to say you're anti-war! War is peace — it's unbelievable!

NP: It's our impression that Working Families tried to walk away from that.

JT: Well, they did walk away, and I think thanks to you (Mike) and a number of people, all the WFP emails now don't mention her name at all. They say, vote for Elliot Spitzer (who has his own problems), but Clinton's name does not appear. Somebody else told me they prepared two different leaflets, that there was a leaflet prepared for union people that had her name on it but for the community people, it's not on there. So, I think that we were effective, though we could have achieved more. But it was an important achievement to prevent Working Families from giving routine support to Hillary Clinton.

NP: So what dirty tricks, if any, did you encounter? What institutional blocks? The two best known were that refusal to let all candidates address the NY State Democratic Party convention, along with the reported pressure on delegates not to defend you. Then there was the local Time Warner (cable, all news) station the demurral by NY1, from hosting a Tasini/Clinton debate because (political director) Robert Hardt and Time Warner deemed you under-funded since you hadn't raised $500,000 and were hence nonviable.

JT: Well let's start with those two. I arrived at the state convention wanting a simple thing — just to have a debate about the war. It seemed incomprehensible that the NY Democratic Party, in one of the most Democratic states in the country — would not debate the war. And yet, they didn't want to. In fact I learned — maybe I'm naïve — that the state Democratic convention is not actually about having a debate, it's about having parties and schmoozing. Don't get me wrong, I'm always the first in line for a party. But, there's got to be some content to it, and we're at war. So I arrived at the convention with 2,500 signatures on a petition asking that the party pass a resolution that essentially mirrored the legislation that Rep. Jim McGovern is promoting — to cut off all funding for the war — HR4232.

So, anyway, I have to be fair: the rules of the convention state that you have to have 25 percent of the delegates supporting your candidacy in order to be nominated and address the convention. So it wasn't just me that didn't get a role — Mark Green and Charlie King [both attorney general aspirants] didn't get to speak; the only three people who spoke were Spitzer, Clinton, and Andrew Cuomo. But there was another issue: was I going to put my name in nomination? Had I been nominated, they would have had to have a roll-call vote, which would have taken three hours. And I wasn't interested — I knew I wasn't going to get 25 percent, but what I wanted to do was to have a debate about the war. So there was some negotiation that went back and forth, whereby I would not place my name in nomination and in return there would be a debate about the war. They ended up reneging on that, too, and there was no debate. They don't believe in actual debate you know, pro and con, and back and forth. What they did was introduce the resolution, and then Congressman Jerry Nadler spoke about it. There was no vote until way at the end, when everyone was rushing out the door.

So we made some progress. The resolution they brought forward was much weaker than the one I brought, but at least it did in some respects contradict Clinton's position, which could be seen as a victory, and the fact that they were forced to talk, to mention the war, I thought was an accomplishment.

NP: It's sad that the fact that if they just talk about the war it's an accomplishment.

JT: It is. It's very, very sad.

Even if it had come to a vote, I'm sure they could have controlled the delegates. There's no doubt that they control all those state committee people — I saw that. There's so much a desire to be part of the crowd and to not step out. You see that in organizations in other places — some people don't want to step over the line because then, you know, they won't get the favors, they'll get opposed the next time they run for state committee person…so there's a general tendency, let's follow the machine. So, I'm sure they could have defeated any anti-war resolution — but why not have a debate? What were they afraid of? I know the answer: because the debate would have made clear there were many Democrats who opposed the war in Iraq, and would have made clear how bad Hillary Clinton was on the war.

NP: She obviously didn't want *to debate.*

JT: They wanted no debate at all. Sort of leads to the NY1 issue and that's a kind of sad thing, the price of admission to debate is half a million dollars now. And since I had not raised half a million dollars, NY1 (Time-Warner cable news channel) said I was not eligible to debate.

NP: That's such a naked statement by the media that "money talks." That's another accomplishment of yours, that they were forced to be open about using such criteria.

JT: It's shocking. It's interesting that the things I confronted in the political process are all the things Americans are disgusted with: the media controlling the message, the obscene way that money dictates who gets heard and who doesn't. The way the machine just roars ahead and there's no interest in debating issues. I mean, I think Hillary Clinton's a coward, not being willing to debate me. I think it is going to come back and haunt her — she's going to have to confront the Democratic base out there. She can't hide if she runs for president. She's going to have a primary. She can't do the same thing she did with me. She's going to have to stand side by side with all these other people and have it out. And I think at that point people will be clear about how unprincipled she is — and the fact that she stands for nothing.

NP: You have said you respect Howie Hawkins, the Green Party candidate for Senate from New York, but that as a Democrat you cannot back him. Why not? And how do you respond to the charge made in Counterpunch *by Joshua Frank, and bruited about in some left circles — that your campaign in effect "distracted the antiwar movement"?*

JT: I don't know much about Frank. The position I took was, from the very beginning that if Hillary Clinton did not change her position on the war, I would not endorse her. And I stuck to that. I did not endorse her. And I think the Clinton campaign was quick to harshly say, "Who cares?" Because they didn't want that to get out. There are some people who are urging me to do a write-in campaign — get people to write my name in as a protest. I'm not sure whether that's worth the time and effort, although certainly people can do that. So, I'm a Democrat working within Democrats. I'm not inclined to endorse Hawkins.

NP: Why not urge a protest vote?

JT: Well they could do it — I actually — what I said is that people should vote their conscience.

NP: Why don't you cast a protest vote for Howie Hawkins, and ask others to do the same. Hawkins has pretty much the same positions you do on the issues.

JT: I don't actually know what he's calling for on the war, whether it's exactly what I do, but it's close.

NP: Why not give a protest vote to the Greens? It's the only kind of protest vote one can make. When Crain's NY Business *comes out for Hillary Clinton, when the* Daily News *comes out for Hillary Clinton, when Murdoch comes out for Hillary Clinton, we need a big protest.*

JT: That's why people were talking about this write-in campaign — I'm trying to get people to write my name in as a protest vote too. I think the cumulative vote of that, plus what Hawkins might get, would be also effective. But — I just don't know, at the end of the day, whatever number we're going to roll up, how much of the vote, once you're out of the Democratic primary, what does that really mean? What is the number? If I thought that we could roll up even 35 percent, I'd do it. But frankly my guess is that he'll be getting 5 percent. [The Nov. 8 preliminary count, as announced by the NYS Greens, showed Hawkins garnering 51,538 votes, or 1.22 percent of all votes cast for Senator.]

NP: If somebody were to run as a progressive in the Democratic Primary and only get 5 percent of the vote, would you discount that? I'm trying to see the logic here—if you're saying, well, it makes you *look weaker than you are. So don't do it.*

JT: I think 5 percent in this kind of race in a Primary, would look pretty weak. I would not have run if I thought we could only do 5 percent, because I do think that makes it look weaker.

NP: But would you have voted for somebody in the Democratic Primary if you thought they could only get 5 percent?

JT: Sure, I would vote for them, in the primary, sure.

NP: When you say, "I'm a Democrat," does that mean that you won't ever support somebody running against a Democrat, or that you wouldn't do it right now?

JT: I haven't given much thought to down the road. Because I was in the Working Families Party I believe in third-party efforts and I think that's a good thing, but if you're trying to change and take over the Democratic Party, I think that it's better to try to do that internally.

NP: But when you're defeated inside the Party, do you think you still shouldn't go outside?

JT: Yeah — to try to keep fighting the battle internally, I think that that's still worth doing. And I can actually hold two contradictory ideas in my mind at the same time.

NP: You have to if you're a Democrat.

JT: Yeah, well, that's right.

NP: What do you see as the possibility of transforming the Democratic Party into one that is both progressive and *(small "d") democratic. What possibilities do you hold out for third party efforts, on any electoral level?*

JT: I think in local races, like for mayor, city council, all those kinds of things, it's more likely that third party efforts can work — because it's a resource issue, it's money, it's capacity. When Tony Mazzocchi started the Labor Party, I was at the founding convention in Cleveland, because I believed that we needed it. It was great. But the fact is, the Democratic Party, and the Republican Party, (1) have a brand name in people's minds; (2) have an enormous number of resources; and that is important in terms of how do you functionally get out to people. Now having said all that, I actually think we're at this crisis point — I guess that we thought this every 10 years, we kept saying this — oh, we're at a crossroads. Every 10 years, going back to the 1970s — where people are just gonna kick the door down now, it has to happen! I do think that the corruption is so endemic in terms of the lies, and people are so pissed off, and we have basically ten years to solve the global warming question or it's over. It may be over anyway. But from what I've read, we have about ten years to actually stabilize it. The question of what's happening with rich and poor, and jobs and globalization, I think all this is starting to come to a head. Now whether that translates itself into a third party, or whether that translates itself into a Democratic Party faction — where we can really shake it up, I don't know.

NP: Part of the resources the Democrats have are corporate resources, which undermine what progressives are trying to accomplish.

JT: Right. One thing I was always in favor of is public election financing. I think public financing of elections is crucial; taking that money out of the system is the best chance we have for getting a different kind of party. And not just a different kind of party. Then it becomes possible, you know, for third party people to run. One of the good things about New York City, even if it's not perfect, is its election financing system. When you run for local office here there's the matching program, it encourages relatively small donations, up to $250, they match 4 to 1. So actually you can get people who are just like us, who can actually, if you get 1,000 people to give $250 each, that's a hurdle, but it's not *in*surmountable.

NP: What do you say to the charge that trying to be *"effective" in the framework of the Democratic Party has historically had a conservatizing effect on people?*

JT: It's a good question. We'll have to see. If you're just speaking about me personally, I had a parallel fight in the labor movement where I don't think it conservatized me — maybe a little bit — saying the things I believe about the labor movement and got a lot of shit for it. But when John Sweeney was first elected president of the AFL-CIO, I ran against ***that*** old regime, and this is one example. I've been doing this for years.

NP: The labor movement, even with its layers of bureaucracy, is not exactly the same thing as the corporate-dominated Democratic Party.

JT: No, but in both labor and the Democrats you have to face the machinery. Going to the state AFL-CIO is very similar to the state Democratic Party meeting. There's not a lot of conflict or debate about issues because there's a tendency for leaders to want to have more control. But you're right, it's not a one-to-one comparison, you bring up a point that is legitimate.

NP: The question is whether it is intrinsic that rebels will be conservatized by a party dominated by corporate and professional political interests. Or are these obstacles that can be transcended? Who advances most, the progressives or the corporations and their friends?

JT: To me, there's not a simple answer to that. I don't know which is going to come first — the fact that there is this brand, the Democratic Party, that still means a lot to a lot of people out there, who could be *our* people, I think that a lot of people are desperate for change and feel horrified on all levels that we probably all agree about, I think there's a way of reaching them. At the same time, I think we should — they're not mutually exclusive — we should encourage people to try these other independent avenues. I've always said third party efforts are important.

NP: What and where was your labor support? What would it have taken to move labor from backing the politically connected incumbent to supporting a progressive insurgent who was not connected to the party apparatus? What lessons are there for other insurgent, issue-oriented primary candidates?

JT: I didn't have any labor support. There were a lot of people who hit me with their elbow and said, "You know, thank God you're doing this," but no labor endorsements. Not a single union. I mean, look at Hillary Clinton's position on our issues. And a lot of people both inside and outside the unions didn't, don't know where she stands. There were great efforts to obfuscate her actual positions. So when I went into progressive groups — homes, you know, for fundraisers — and when I said she has been on the board of Wal-Mart, people would gasp. People would turn to each other — I mean, you could see people's minds start to move — I had people come up to me, Hillary Clinton supporters, and because of what they heard from me, they'll never vote for her again. It's unbelievable. If I could have done that with 500,000 people I would have won the election.

But to go back to your point, I think nobody wanted, no institution wanted to risk their access and their relationship to support me. In a certain way, I don't blame them. I mean, it's easy for us, a lot of people who are free-floating, to criticize, yeah, to be purists about it. And I'm as purist sometimes as they come. But when you actually have to, say, get something for your members — save a plant from closing, I can see where that calculation goes in. Some of that calculation I don't think is legitimate — some of it. I think it comes back ultimately and it hurts working people. The whole thing comes back to this, time and again, to the public financing of elections. If you took the money out of the system, I think it would be a different calculus, because that would make a difference in terms of turf. I say it would make **a** difference.

NP: What would public financing do to the two *parties—would it make them a better operation, or worse operation?*

JT: Well, I think it would make them better because the elections then would not be about fundraising, they would be about issues.

NP: Wouldn't the kind of public financing that most people talk about mean that labor and progressive organizations also couldn't contribute to political parties?

JT: Yes, but we can never compete with corporate money, ever. Because you're always outspent. The number's always 10 to 1 or 20 to 1.

NP: It's true, you can't raise as much money as the corporations do, but on the other hand, to build a really progressive party you would need financial support from labor and progressive groups.

JT: But the funding wouldn't go to the party, it would go to building vibrant political operations. What I'm advocating wouldn't mean unions were barred from get-out-the-vote operations. That's different.

NP: But making candidates accountable to a labor and progressive base — that wouldn't happen if those groups couldn't provide party funding.

JT: If I'm running out there and I know that I have to get X number of votes and I know that you're at all these places and the labor movement can turn out x-percentage, you want to be accountable to the labor movement. I've never had any problem with the labor movement doing what it *should* be doing, which is getting its members out to vote for the right people.

NP: In Europe, where you have historically labor-based parties, it's our impression that their money is as important as their turn-out-the-vote efforts.

JT: Well, I've always thought that where our side is effective is in mobilizing people. Corporations don't have the people — they have the money. We, in theory — this is all theoretical, if the labor movement was healthy as it should be — the body is the people, the voters. So you know, if you take the money out, but don't take the ability of turning out voters, which corporations can't do — it's not, they don't have a base — then we are in pretty good shape.

NP: Because their strong suit is dollars, while ours is numbers.

JT: Right.

NP: The question is, if you take out the ability of progressives to finance their own politics, would that disable them from building up a rebel party?

JT: I don't think so. My gut, my hunch would be no.

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* The Working Families Party operates nominally as a third party in several states, but chiefly in New York, largely as a leftish pressure on elected Democrats. It functions electorally courtesy of state laws allowing "fusion" or cross-endorsing and slating other parties' candidates. Modeled after the old American Labor Party and the now defunct Liberal Party and comprising affiliated community-based organizations, unions and members of local chapters and clubs, it has on occasion endorsed Republicans — especially those with strong pro-labor voting records — using such support as leverage to enact progressive legislation. In scattered cases it runs or supports independents whose candidacies it considers "viable."

In the 2006 general election, as in previous elections, the WFP's statewide candidates were the same as those put up by the Democrats, and it won some 125,000 votes for Democratic gubernatorial candidate Eliot Spitzer on its line, guaranteeing it continued statewide ballot access for the next four years.

A Nov. 7 ballot initiative in Massachusetts, backed by the local WFP and some unions and that sought to amend the state constitution to allow fusion endorsements — the party's hope being to duplicate the New York operation — was defeated.

More War, No Debate: Progressives Give Clinton a Free Pass

Howie Hawkins

1, 2, 3, 4,
Clinton voted for the war!
5, 6, 7, 8,
That was not a real debate!

That was our chant outside WABC studios on October 22 as incumbent Senator Hillary Clinton and her Republican challenger, John Spencer, debated how to continue the U.S. occupation of Iraq. As the Green Party candidate, I called for immediate withdrawal but was excluded from the debate. The League of Women Voters considered me a "bona fide" candidate because I was running a serious statewide campaign and had demonstrated support of at least 5 percent in a Zogby poll they had commissioned. The League had withdrawn sponsorship from the debate because I had been excluded. Some of the media footnoted their debate coverage with a mention of the League's withdrawal and my candidacy, but the media did not say I was the anti-war alternative to Clinton and Spencer.

When Bill and Hillary Clinton emerged out the front door of WABC studios, the chanting immediately turned into heartfelt boos from the Green protesters. Bill and Hillary put on smiles for the cameras and waved at us across the police barriers as if we were supporters. They moved right down the block to the barricades containing the Clinton supporters. About 25 reporters waddled out behind them in single file, like baby turkeys following their mother turkey across a road. I felt like the ugly duckling trying to get the baby turkeys to accept me, too. But all they wanted was a chance to ask the celebrity candidate, Hillary Clinton, a question. She didn't oblige. After briefly greeting and shaking a few hands across the barricades containing the Clinton supporters, she and Bill jumped into a huge, tinted glass SUV and sped away.

That scene sums up my anti-war campaign against pro-war Clinton. More war, no debate — not in the Senate debates, not in the media coverage.

A Green Campaign for Ballot Status and the Anti-War Vote

The Green Party of New York State was unanimous from the start that they would run a candidate against Hillary Clinton for U.S. Senate in 2006. The New York Greens promoted their whole statewide slate for Governor, Lt. Governor, Attorney General, and Comptroller as well as U.S. Senator as the "Peace Slate." An antiwar challenge to pro-war Clinton was sure to help the Greens achieve their practical objective in the election: an automatic ballot line for the next four years by winning at least 50,000 votes for our gubernatorial ticket.

If ballot access was a practical party-building goal, the goal that inspired passion in Greens was the opportunity to give voice to the anti-war majority of New Yorkers in a nationally high-profile race against pro-war Clinton, the presumptive front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008. The Greens also knew they stood with the majority of New Yorkers against Clinton in their advocacy for a single-payer universal health insurance plan; large-scale public investment in an emergency transition from fossil and nuclear fuels to clean, renewable energy sources; abolition of the death

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penalty; legalization of same-sex marriage; and other issues.

I was ready to campaign hard to win a noticeable antiwar vote and a ballot line for the Greens. However, a Zogby poll released on May 30 found that in a race between Clinton and an "unnamed anti-war candidate," Clinton would only receive 38 percent to the antiwar candidate's 32 percent, with 21 percent "not sure" and only 10 percent for "someone else." An antiwar candidate was apparently within striking distance of Clinton. It hit me like a ton of bricks. Now I felt responsible to the antiwar majority in New York for turning our grassroots campaign with its shoestring budget into a serious antiwar challenge to Clinton.

Grassroots campaigns in smaller districts is where the Greens should concentrate their energies now.

After the Zogby poll at the end of May, the rest of the campaign was a mad dash around the state from event to event trying to drum up funds, volunteer campaigners, and media coverage. I still had to work my four-hour night shift unloading freight at UPS, so sleep was neglected. At news conferences around the state in the first weeks of the campaign, I cited the Zogby poll and brazenly declared, "On three of the federal policy issues of most concern to New Yorkers — the war, health care, and energy — the majority of New Yorkers agree with me, not Hillary Clinton. If the New Yorkers vote for what they want, I will be the next Senator from New York."[1] But few reporters came to the news conferences.

Grassroots Campaigning on a Shoestring Budget

HAMMERING AWAY ON THE ISSUES in about 80 media releases, a dozen news conferences, and scores of house parties and speaking events yielded very little coverage from the big media. What little major media coverage there was of the Clinton race in the spring and summer focused on her Democratic anti-war challenger, Jonathan Tasini. Tasini's result in the September 12 Democratic primary was encouraging. With just over $100,000 raised and little name recognition, Tasini received 125,000 votes for 16 percent. We hoped Tasini supporters would vote Green in the general election.

The media was more interested in horse races than issues and Clinton was ahead of Spencer by 40 to 50 points in the polls. On October 10, I finally did show up in the polls, but the media did not find it newsworthy. Zogby International released the only poll to include Green candidates. The poll found me with 21 percent support among independents. That translated into over five percent of all voters based on party enrollments. The poll did release the overall figure for the Green candidate for governor, Malachy McCourt, which was five percent. He had 14 percent among independents. If the ratio of support for McCourt between all voters and independents held for me, I would have had 7.5 percent support among all voters. With about 5 million voters expected in the general election, that would have been about 375,000 votes.

My campaign had not caught fire as the massive anti-war electoral insurgency that we had hoped for in the spring, but it was, according to the Zogby poll, receiving more support than any Green had ever received in New York and more than any independent progressive candidate for U.S. Senate had ever received in New York.

Election Day Results

WHEN THE RESULTS CAME IN on election night, the Greens improved only slightly on their 2002 vote. The initial canvass of votes reported the night of the election had me receiving 52,010 votes. The previous Green votes for U.S. Senate were 14,785 for Joel Kovel in 1998, 40,991 for Mark Dunau in 2000, and 36,942 for David McReynolds in 2004.

The Greens' gubernatorial ticket of Malachy McCourt for Governor and Alison Duncan for Lt. Governor only received 40,729 votes, well short of the 50,000 needed for a ballot line. The previous Green totals were 41,792 for Stanley Aronowitz and Jennifer Daniels in 2002 and 52,533 for Al Lewis and Alice Green in 1998. The other statewide Green candidates did better. Rachel Treichler for Attorney General received 57,564 votes and Julia Willebrand for Comptroller received 108,030 votes, which was 3 percent of the total.

The New York Green results were in line with most Green results around the country — one to two percent in statewide races. An exception was the Greens' candidate for Governor in Illinois, where Rich Whitney received 11 percent of the vote, the most for a third party candidate in Illinois since 1920. In local races, the Greens elected 40 candidates. One notable trend was the wins in black majority constituencies, including eight DC Statehood Green Party candidates to Neighborhood Advisory Commissions in Washington DC and Gayle McLaughlin's election as Mayor of Richmond, California, where three-fourths of the 103,000 residents are black, Latino, or Asian. There are now over 250 elected Greens in local office.

Exit polling in New York and across the country showed that the antiwar vote went to the Democrats. Six out of 10 voters were against the war nationally. Antiwar views were stronger in New York. Edison Mitkofsky, exit polling for the National Election Pool, found that 72 percent of New Yorkers disapproved of the war in Iraq and only 27 percent approved. Bush's approval ratings in New York were 74 percent disapprove and only 24 percent approve. New Yorkers voted for the Democrats to oppose Bush and the war. New Yorkers had voted for the central Green platform plank on the Democratic line.

The Democratic victories were a vote of no confidence in the Bush administration and opposition to the war in Iraq, not so much a vote for the Democrats, because they didn't present a coherent alternative on the war. We never expected much quality coverage from the corporate media, although we had hoped for more and better than we got. We also had hoped that the peace movement and other social movements would get behind our campaign. While we got most of our supporters from grassroots activists in these movements, their leaderships gave Clinton a free pass. It quickly became clear that the movement leaderships figured Clinton was unbeatable and put their energy into electing Democrats to Congress in New York. For example, Peace Action did not print up their usual Voter Guide for the Senate race in the general election.

Working Families for Corporate Lawyers

After the Democratic primary, Jonathan Tasini refused to endorse Clinton, or me. Instead he called upon his supporters to "vote their conscience."[2] Asked to respond, Clinton spokesperson Howard Wolfson had two words: "Who cares?"[3] A strong Green vote might have made the Democrats care and, more importantly, inspired a resolutely independent opposition to the war and corporate politics in the anti-war and progressive movements. But the "professional progressives" who staff and lead the unions and big peace, environmental, women's, civil rights, gay, and community organizing groups had no intention of breaking with Clinton and the Democrats. Institutionalized progressivism is co-opted into service of the corporate-dominated Democratic Party coalition by the material benefits that flow through social and organizational networks from Democratic administrations to the professional progressives. The benefits include funding from Democratic administrations and corporate liberals and their foundations, as well as career opportunities in Democratic administrations and the foundations, think tanks, and political action committees that ally with the Democrats.

While most of the progressive organizations were passive and did not actively campaign for Clinton, the political party of the professional progressives, the Working Families Party, did actively support Clinton. The party nominated Clinton over Tasini by a 94 to 6 percent vote at their state convention in May, where weighted votes carried by staff and leaders from affiliated unions, ACORN, and Citizen Action overwhelmed the pro-Tasini local chapters. Working Families spent between $500,000 and $1 million, much of it from Democratic politicians, on getting progressives to "vote your values" by voting for the pro-war corporate lawyers, Clinton and Spitzer, on the Working Families line. Spitzer gave Working Families $250,000 and recorded a robo-call that most Greens, among others, received.[4] Carl McCall, an African American politician who had been the Democrats' 2002 gubernatorial candidate, robo-called black voters. Pete Seeger robo-called peace voters.

A $25,000 mass mailing the week before the election featured Seeger, Michael Moore, and Cindy Sheehan urging voters to "Send a Message. Start To Bring the Troops Home. Vote on the Working Families Party line." The mailing was controversial because Cindy Sheehan had endorsed the Greens' Hawkins for U.S. Senate and McCourt for Governor. Sheehan promptly issued a statement reiterating her endorsements of Hawkins and McCourt. "That's the strategy followed by Ralph Nader, and it brought us George Bush," Daniel Cantor, the executive director of the Working Families Party, told the New York Sun, adding that Sheehan had given her permission to use her likeness and a quote he drafted for her.[5] Cantor had pitched the idea to Sheehan as a way to support anti-war Congressional Democrats running in New York. The actual flyer made no mention of the Democratic/Working Families congressional slate. The ballot image on the flyer had Spitzer circled.

For all the money expended, the Working Families vote for each of the statewide Democrats was between 122,000 and 127,000, a modest improvement over 91,000 votes for Democrat McCall on their line in 2002. The Working Families vote was not recorded in any of the television or newspaper reporting, but was folded into the Democratic candidates' totals. Democratic insiders will look at the number, but it was not a publicly visible message.

Working Families claims to be pressuring the Democrats to move to the left. In practice, they tail the corporate wing of the Democratic Party. Nominating Clinton over Tasini is one example. Another example is the trajectory of the Working Families Party and its affiliate organization, Citizen Action, with respect to health care. Before the Clintons rejected national health insurance in 1993, Citizen Action was leader in the movement for a single payer health insurance system. In New York, it had been central to the coalition that persuaded the state Assembly to pass a single payer bill, though it failed to pass the state Senate. Since 1993, Citizen Action, now joined by Working Families, has followed the lead of the Clintons and the other corporate Democrats in supporting reforms that reinforce the private health insurance system by expanding private coverage to uninsured groups through government mandates and subsidies. Far from pressuring the corporate Democrats, Working Families and Citizen Action are integral to their dominance by serving to co-opt progressives into supporting the agenda of the corporate wing of the Democratic Party.

No Short Cuts for the Greens

In the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election in which the Democrats blamed Green presidential candidate Ralph Nader for their loss of the presidential race, a faction of the Greens sought to appease progressive leaders by running a so-called "safe states" campaign in 2004 where the Green nominee would not campaign in the states where the race was close in order to not hurt the Democratic candidate's chances. Although probably not supported by the majority of rank and file Greens, the national Green Party did nominate a safe-states candidate, David Cobb, in 2004.[6] In the end, the attempt by the national Green Party to appease progressive movement leaders has done nothing to diminish the attacks on the Greens as "spoilers." The Greens are going to have to make their case for independent politics as the most effective way to advance a progressive agenda directly to movement activists and the broader voting public over the heads of the professional progressives who staff and lead the progressive organizations that ally with the Democrats.

The Democrats may control the House and the Senate now, but they show no inclination to initiate substantial changes in U.S. foreign or domestic policy. The issues will remain and the Greens' platform will remain relevant. A celebrity presidential candidate would give the Greens a better chance of getting their platform into the media and public debate. But celebrities who share the politics of the Greens and are willing to stick their necks out, like an Al Lewis, a Malachy McCourt, or a Ralph Nader, are very rare. In most races for higher office, the Greens are going to have to settle for the time being for base-building campaigns that raise the issues and recruit new activists, but have little prospect of winning the office. Local races are another matter. The Greens can compete with the corporate-sponsored candidates by grassroots campaigns in smaller districts. That is where the Greens should concentrate their energies now.

The Green vote in 2006 in New York demonstrated a modest increase in their core base. Most of the Tasini primary vote and the peace vote – the majority of New Yorkers – went to Clinton and the Democrats. My Senate race showed how difficult it is to win those voters over to an independent challenge to the two-party system of corporate rule in a large-scale campaign for federal office. The media ignored us. The corporate parties overwhelmed us with their money. However, the campaign was still worth doing. We reached thousands of voters through campaign meetings, mostly local radio and TV appearances, and newspaper articles. We will be able to bring some of those people into the Green Party as active members.

However, to expand that base of independent Green voters significantly, the Greens are going to have to rededicate their organizing to building strong local chapters that can engage progressive activists and voters in their own communities. Over the last decade, as the Green Party has focused more on electoral politics, the original base of membership locals that was built up in the 1980s and early 1990s has withered. As state Green parties achieved ballot status and conformed to state election laws, dues-paying membership locals gave way to county and state committees composed largely of self-selecting activists who pass petitions among Green enrollees to secure their positions. Voting in state committees and conventions is not based in too many cases on election by and accountability to an ongoing local organization. In New York, the Greens tried to maintain the old locals as Green political clubs separate from but supporting the formal committee structure required by the state Election Law. But the locals have declined and the energy has mostly gone into the state committee. The Greens need to revisit their structure. In New York, it would be perfectly legal to base the state committee on some combination of Green enrollment and paid membership in each county. This would create an incentive for the local county organizations to reorganize and recruit paid members, which would strengthen the state party at the grassroots and financially. More importantly, it would strengthen the Green Party at the local level where it is best positioned at this point to win new support, lead issue campaigns, and elect Greens to municipal councils and mayorships.

NOTES

1. See "New York's Anti-War Majority Can Elect an Anti-War Senator," Statement of Howie Hawkins, Green Party nominee for U.S. Senate, outside the military recruiting center at Times Square, New York City, June 1, 2006. The text and a video of the presentation can be found at www.hawkinsforsenate.org. All of the campaign's media releases, news coverage, and literature are archived there.

2. The day before the election, Tasini sent an email message to his supporters and posted it on his website telling them how to write in his name for U.S. Senator. The statement is at Tasini's web site: www.tasinifornewyork.com.

3. Marc Humbert, AP Political Writer, "Nader: Clinton's running and it could be her versus McCain," September 19, 2006.

4. AP, Michael Gormley, AP Writer, "Voters choose first new governor in 12 years," November 7, 2006.

5. Russell Berman, "Working Families Party Comes Out for Spitzer, Clinton," *NY Sun*, November 7, 2006.

6. For statements and articles on the 2004 strategy debate in the Green Party and broader progressive movements, and the controversy over how Cobb secured the nomination, see Howie Hawkins (ed.), *Independent Politics: The Green Party Strategy Debate* (Haymarket, 2006).

Socialists, Democrats and Political Action

It's the Movements that Matter

MICHAEL HIRSCH

The following is a slightly expanded text of remarks given at a pre-election debate on the topic, "Is a Progressive Democratic Party Possible." Michael Hirsch, representing the Democratic Socialists of America, spoke for the affirmative, as did Al Ronzoni of Progressive Democrats of America. The negative argument was given by Howie Hawkins of the New York State Green Party and Danny Katch of the International Socialist Organization. The event was held at New York City's Judson Memorial Church on Nov. 3, 2006.

YEARS BACK, THE LEFT WAS RIVEN over two intractable questions: "What is the class nature of the Soviet Union?" and "Should radicals work to realign the Democratic Party?" Well, today we're down to one question.

That's some sort of progress.

The question before the house tonight is this: Is a Progressive Democratic Party Possible? At the risk of having you, the audience, think you were invited under false pretenses, I want to say that that is the wrong question. Of course it's possible to turn the party left. So is making the Green Party the second party in America. With advances in gene splicing, even pigs could fly.

What *either* effort needs to do is take the fight to the center-right neo-liberals — the bloc that controls the Democratic Party now.

So the debate is over what electoral path has the fewest diversions. It's over where those who want to bring the various progressive movements for social change together in a coherent anti-corporate fight can situate themselves to do that best. Where is the electoral location where neo-liberalism and global capitalist politics can be defeated or at least beaten back?

Tonight you will probably hear multiple stories about how awful are the Democrats. I imagine I'll agree with most of them, and add a few, too. That's not what's in contention. What is up for debate is what political work in the electoral arena makes sense for the left now.

SO MY FIRST PROPOSITION IS: It doesn't matter so much if we succeed or fail in moving the Democratic Party left; it's the fight against the neo-liberals and the outcome of the fight that counts. The fight has to be taken to the neo-liberals, and it can only happen in the first instance in a cooperative relationship between the left and the better forces inside the party. And these forces — largely the social movements and the liberals — can't now find their electoral expression through what is called "independent political action." That formulation valorizes an abstract independence — a third party — at the expense of stressing where political action has taken and does take place, irrespective of our wishes.

Proposition 2: What inhibits the Democratic Party from being an anti-corporate opposition party are precisely the weaknesses of the social movements. Those weaknesses will hamstring any third party effort, too, unless the social movements grow.

Absent "street action" then, it's careerism that will predominate, whether in the Democratic Party or in any left alternative that aspires to be more than a sect or a fraternal association. It'll be the influence of big money and the agenda setting by parochial institutional players that will matter. It will be staff domina-

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tion, the capacity of electeds to go off on their own, and the influence of campaign consultants and professional fundraisers that will shape what the party says and does.

> So it is the fate and the fortunes of the movements, not the web spinning of the parties, that matter most.

No third party is immune to these influences, especially if there isn't a fired-up social movement watching what its political representatives do. Absent those movements, the minute a third party looks as if it may be in a position to elect more than a handful of candidates is the minute the jackals descend.

The goal of the left is about confronting class power, about wealth redistribution, about neutralizing the state if not actually making it partisan and user friendly. It's about a more-inclusive ideology that reflects and reinforces a politics of class struggle. So it is the fate and the fortunes of the movements, not the web spinning of the parties, that matters.

Proposition 3: No matter how often the term independent politics is incantated, politics is about coalition building as much as it is base building. Anything a third party can do can be done better and easier in alliance with the center-left of the Democratic party. And that electoral alliance for good or ill will happen whether it's cobbled together before an election — the U.S. model — or after an election, as is the case in nations such as Germany and Italy with multi-party systems.

We all know the institutional impediments to third party efforts in the U.S. There's "first past the post voting," winner-take-all elections. There's no preferential voting, no instant runoff voting, no proportional representation. There are capricious and restrictive state-by-state ballot access laws. There's the lack of public financing — New York City has it (at least for local elections), but who else does? There's the cold reality that only seven states allow cross-party endorsements. These roadblocks won't be removed easily. And a movement that CAN get those changes enacted — and they should be enacted — is a movement that can take over a major party, too.

So instead of asking "is it possible" — and Howie Hawkins's and my generation was the one that insisted we "be realistic and demand the impossible," — a better way to frame this debate and our differences is to ask: how best can movements for social change express themselves electorally in the present period? Where is the terrain on which social and economic justice movements — of feminism, ecology, anti-war, labor, anti-sweatshop efforts, and the battle against white nationalism — can find a political expression and seek commonalities?

If we don't know that, then working inside or outside of the Democratic Party is a matter of consumer choice. I would call it a matter of individual taste, but that phrase. used by Molotov about fascism to justify the Hitler-Stalin pact, still has nasty connotations.

Final proposition: The marginalizing of the Congressional progressive caucus, the lack of a genuine, militant opposition party in Congress and the pathetic Democratic response so far to the 30-year corporate offensive is the outcome of corporate advances, not its cause. That means leaders of movements can't be swayed to abandon the coalitions they operate in now, because the alternative — political irrelevance — is worse.

Consider the labor movement. The unions — and historian Paul Buhle and others have written extensively on just how insular and badly led those movements were — could not break with the Democrats institutionally. Certainly not since the 1930s, a decade after the demise of the last labor party initiatives and after the industrial union movement and the Communists threw in their lot with the New Deal.

Yes, the unions could have asked for more in the succeeding years. They could have acted as critics of the Cold War in the 1940s, as opponents of McCarthyism in the 1950s, and as social unionists in the 1960s, as welcomers and not opponents of black liberation and feminism — and not wait until labor's back was against the wall to discover they had allies. But no amount of suasion or hectoring or appeal to ideals could have built a labor party at any time in the last 50-70 years. That's a sad reality radicals can't change, no matter how passionate the appeal to ideals.

And, to the degree that politically active unionists and shop stewards, black community leaders and feminists are involved politically, it's as Democratic Party activists. It's not a lack of courage that keeps these activists tied to existing political networks. These folks do not see an alternative electoral expression, and not housing one is not an alternative. Insisting on one risks alienating friends for whom politics is not an avocation or an ideological jaunt, but an arena of struggle.

When and if that ceases to be true — and it can only be true after the movements grow, are reconstituted and put up a fight — then an alternative party could be viable. It's not a pole of attraction now.

CRITICS OF DEMOCRATIC PARTY work refer to it as a "corporate" party, something the social movements, especially the unions need to "break from." I fondly remember the old radical slogan, "No to the Elephant, No to the Ass; Build a party of the working class!" Well, nothing is that instrumental.

The Democratic Party is barely a party; it's a series of shifting coalitions in 50 state organizations and some 3,000 U.S. counties. In many states, the center-right controls it. In city and county politics, real estate and banking interests dominate the local councils. But that doesn't make it a corporate party.

What I want to argue is that the Democratic Party is controlled by a center-right bloc that effectively freezes out the left. Just as the GOP can command more resources and media than can the Democrats, the party's center-right has access to corporate giving that can be trumped only by the kind of popular upsurge that will likely be seen in miniature next week in the voting that takes control of Congress away from the far- right. The goal is to reshuffle the cards, creating a center-left coalition that can pose on an electoral level what the movements pose in the streets and in the workplaces. That's what needs to be done.

Yes, there is no question that the policies of the Democrats are in the main pro-corporate. But so are the policies of most unions. Unions don't want to destroy the corporations; they want to tame them. It's we socialists who want to destroy them, and we should — the problem is, we don't have a lot of friends helping.

Neither is it purely the fault of a wily Democratic Party poised to co-opt movement leaders. That's a wrong reading of the dynamic. NARAL, which backs Republicans, too, is not co-opted; it simply pursues too narrow an agenda.

The labor movement is not co-opted into the Democratic Party. Its sins are its own.

And we should be clear about just what are those sins. Working with Democrats and getting too little in return is a problem, not a sin. It's a symptom of weakness, not a cause. Take for example what the teachers unions are doing in this election cycle — I offer it only because as public sector workers whose bosses are in effect public officials — teacher unionists must have an electoral game face. They're also fighting state-level issues like the "65 percent solution." That's a particularly nasty scam that, under the guise of directing at least 65 cents of each dollar in school funding toward classroom instruction, fails to boost funding overall; it just calls for a specific ratio of funding to the classroom. No surprise that the unions and PTAs say such measures are zero-sum gains that would mean cuts in every other school program.

And on the federal level, fully funding the No Child Left Behind law and providing federal college grants and loans mean Congressional elections are critical, too.

Is it co-optation to understand why in Ohio, the state Federation of Teachers contributed $20,000 to Rep. Ted Strickland's gubernatorial race? In part it's because he's been a strong supporter of early-childhood public education. That and the fact that his opponent is Republican nominee Ken Blackwell, Ohio's secretary of state and the man who stole the 2004 presidential election for George W. Bush.

Is this really a stretch to understand why the unions would want to ice Blackwell? Or why even NARAL — now little more than a single-issue, one-dimensional pressure group — would cut a deal with New York State Republican Majority Leader Joe Bruno to endorse his party's endangered incumbents?

My argument has been that the fight over the Democratic Party's direction is the only consistently progressive form electoral politics can take in this period. Electoral politics, or reform politics is — with notable exceptions — Democratic Party politics, and Green politics is protest politics.

Sometimes you need to protest, and when neo-liberals hold the whip-hand, protest is not just honorable; it is necessary. When both *Crain's New York Business* and Rupert Murdoch's *NY Post* endorse Hillary Rodham Clinton, it's time for a protest vote.

But protest voting is the exception, not the rule.

I don't just say that the fight is in the party. The neo-liberals recognize it, too. Rahm Emanuel and Chuck Schumer used their Democratic leadership campaign committee funds like hammers to pound back progressive primary candidates in this election round, and not because their own chosen centrist candidates were more electable. They know the fight is in the party. Why don't we?

Yes, the Democratic Party routinely breaks our hearts and our hopes and our spirit as its neo-liberal leaders grease the skids for global capitalism to victimize whole populations and exploit working people around the world. They vote for measures that increase income inequality and facilitate financial plundering, front for corporate interests, play their own part in making political discourse classless and shallow, and vie to be the more rational purveyors of an irrational social system.

And I'm probably as annoyed as are any of you by the be-true-to-your-school Democratic Party pom-pom waving from the liberal blogosphere, the typists who know everything about political intrigue and nothing about social relations.

Let me close with some observations on what I think are hopeful political signs for change in the party.

Matt Gonzalez's independent run for San Francisco mayor — in a city that has nonpartisan elections — was something Democratic Socialists of America supported actively. And I'm proud we did. And since the end of the Jonathan Tasini Senate primary campaign, I've been urging a vote for Howie Hawkins — and I'll continue doing so unless he pisses me off tonight. [*Note: He did not!!!*]

But these are the welcome exceptions. Meanwhile things are happening at the grass roots of the party. The Wellstone Clubs in California are creating an institutional base for an anti-corporate offensive and are a reflection of the union power that led to the defeat of Gov. Schwarzenegger's ballot proposals last November.

In Massachusetts, the Mass Alliance and Neighbor to Neighbor identify progressive primary candidates in districts where they can actually win. As a result, the progressive group of legislators in the State House went from a tiny, embattled and marginalized group to what one observer called in a private letter to me "a significant power block, whom the new Speaker had to include in his coalition to get elected, and who in consequence have better access to power, some significant committee chairmanships, etc. "There's also the downside," this writer notes. "They have become subject to, and sometimes vulnerable to, the kind of arm-twisting that the leadership expects to use on its allies."

I would call that a better problem.

Just as I would call Democratic control of the U.S. House and Senate a better problem.

In New York, the Working Families Party is poised to be the third largest party in the state, and at a time when it isn't likely the Greens will even win their ballot position back. Some of us in WFP couldn't swallow the Hillary endorsement, which is why we worked so hard and so enthusiastically for Jonathan Tasini, but that party's overall strategy seems sound.

HOWIE HAWKINS BEGINS HIS BOOK, *Independent Politics*, with a wise quote from Dr King:

> Cowardice asks the question, "Is it safe?" Expediency asks the question, "Is it politic?" But conscience asks the question, "Is it right?" And there comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular but because conscience tells one it is right.

To me the key words for this discussion — because they are the least hortatory and the most easy to miss — are "there comes a time."

Because I think Dr. Marx had something to say that's worth remembering, too, about timing and context and conjunctures and the historical conditions required to turn ideals into facts on the ground and the need for an opposition party into a reality.

"Men make their own history," Marx wrote in his study of the failed French revolution of 1848, "but they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past."

Gilbert Jonas, 1930 - 2006

Gilbert Jonas was a longtime *NP* supporter and fundraiser for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). With a few other white students, he formed the first NAACP chapter at Stanford University in 1949 to open admission to African Americans. He ultimately became a senior advisor to Executive Director Roy Wilkins and his successors. From 1962 until the mid-1990s, Jonas ran the Gilbert Jonas Company, a public relations and fund-raising firm based in Manhattan. He served as the NAACP's chief fund-raiser from 1965 to 1995, helping to raise $110 million for the organization during that period. In 2004, Routledge published his book *Freedom's Sword: The NAACP and the Struggle Against Racism in America, 1909-1969*, which was reviewed in the last issue of *NP*.

On the Run from Nazis and Gendarmes, Part II
Betrayal and Survival

Mathis Szykowski

Author's Note: *After my escape from Paris into the Free Zone, I worked on a farm until the fall. My parents were gone, and I sought out the Leizers in Grenoble.*

The Leizers did not know what to do with me. There was no room for me in their life. A few of their friends had also settled in Grenoble, but I did not fit in at all. My clothes, my manners, and my outlook on life were all wrong in that circle. One of the Leizers' friends suggested that I report to the Jewish organization in Grenoble which, he said, was set up to take care of people like me — children whose parents had disappeared. I reported to that center and in a few days I was on my way back to the region of France that I had just left. I reported to a center in Valence d'Agen where children from all over Europe were sheltered. I was back in boarding school, a place with a religious orientation — prayers in Hebrew and wishes for a future in Palestine. It's also the first place where I saw young people dance the hora.

I did not stay in that center very long; I was sent to join one that was a few miles away in a large manor. No more than 15 or 20 boys in addition to a director and one or two staff members were lodged at the center. The manor had been recently rented out, and our sleeping quarters consisted of three or four cots a room. We ate together in a common room, and we showered together as well. I do not remember there being anything to do. The vast majority of the boys were either born in Germany or had fled their homelands through Germany. All of us were without parents. The main thrust of our conversations was about the plans that were being made to transport us to Switzerland, and about the Jews who had succeeded in crossing the Swiss border. Some of the boys spoke French poorly; Yiddish was the language most frequently spoken. Food was scarce, even in that part of the world, so we were absolved from kosher food — but not from prayer. In the last six years I had lost the habit of living according to Jewish law, and was not disposed to embrace it there.

I developed a foot infection. A doctor was called in to lance the abscess, and recommended bed rest for a day. Like the rest of the boys, I did not want to stay in France. I wanted to be somewhere where I would be safe, but waiting for some mysterious person to come and take a group of us to Switzerland did not appeal to me. I was hoping for something more active, where I would be more in control of my life. While in bed, it occurred to me that if I could go to Marseilles or Toulon, I would surely find a recruiting office for the French Foreign Legion. I could enlist for a five-year stint and be sent to Africa. There I would be safe not only from the Germans but from the French police. I knew that once I was in the Legion no authority on earth had any power over me. So I asked to see the director of our center and laid out my plans for the future. He did not laugh at me, nor did he treat my project as if it were the most stupid idea he had ever heard. He did not try to talk me out of it either; instead he deflected the conversation by asking me if I was bored at the center. I replied that I was, and he offered to find me a temporary job near the manor. After that, we could continue discuss-

Mathis Szykowski *lost most of his family at Auschwitz. He emigrated to the United States in 1946 and is now professor emeritus of Romance Languages at Oberlin College.*

ing the pros and cons of my project to enlist in the Foreign Legion. I should think about it for a while, before making any decision. Two days later, the Allies landed in Algiers. Unoccupied France ceased to be. My project came to naught.

The Director kept his part of the bargain and found me a job with a baker in the village. I started a new career. The bakery was managed by a young man and his widowed father. The old man was rarely in the shop; I saw him only in the afternoons when preparations were made for the next day's baking. I reported each morning at 6:00 am. The wood was already roaring in the oven, and the flour had been mixed with water in a trough and lay in a lump. I helped move the mixture into the kneading machine. My other tasks consisted of cleaning the machinery, the troughs, the tables and baskets, sweeping the floor, and splitting wood in the afternoons. I could see the customers coming in for their daily ration of bread and they could see me, but no contacts or conversations occurred. Not even the morning greeting was addressed to me. Bread was, of course, rationed — some of it was sold at black market prices or exchanged for other goods. I was not paid; instead, I was served lunch with as much bread as I wanted. My workday ended at 5:00 pm, so I reported to the center for the evening meal. I worked every day.

I remember one late afternoon in November sfternoon. We were splitting wood in the shed next to a garden, where a persimmon tree stood. I never had tasted a persimmon, so the young man handed me one that was not quite ripe. I still remember its acidity and the awful way my tongue felt. That afternoon, the old man began to talk about his love of opera. However, he did not understand or approve of the volume of the orchestral music; it prevented him from hearing and understanding the words sung by the performers. Years later, I remembered his remarks when I read that Charles Bovary had the same complaint. He also wished to understand what was being sung in an opera.

During the period that I worked at the bakery, we began to hear rumors of Jews being exterminated in Eastern Europe. According to these rumors, Jews were being packed into railroad freight cars or trucks, with a thick layer of quicklime spread on the floor. The Jews would die burned or asphyxiated. It turned out later that this was not an accurate description of mass murder. One evening, a new boy arrived from Paris; he and I bonded almost immediately. We talked all night, about how we had ended up at this center, what we had done and what we hoped to do. He did not want to stay in the center; he was leaving in the morning. He was not waiting for the Germans or for the police to come and get him; instead he would find a way to London or North Africa and join up with the French army. Life for him was an adventure that should be lived to the fullest, while rejoicing in the beauty and simplicity of nature. The new boy taught me that human beings could transform the world, and make it a just, peaceable place. He kept his word, and left the next morning. I have forgotten his name.

I DID NOT WANT TO STAY in the center either. I did not feel that I was really safe since the whole community knew that the manor was a refuge for Jewish children and we had to depend on everyone's discretion — including that of the authorities — for our safety. I felt that this was too risky, despite the assurances the staff gave us. I had no ambition to become a master baker, and I persisted in asking the director to help me find a way out of France. I was nearing 17, and thought that an army would surely accept me. The director promised that he would do what he could to help me, but in the meantime suggested that I go work on a farm until a satisfactory solution was found. That is how I found myself back on a farm where I spent the following six months. The center was built high on a hill on the left bank of the Garonne river, and the farm was situated on its right bank at about five kilometers from the manor. I was always out of breath when I reached the center, but I would run down the bank quite fast as I traveled down toward the river.

The farm was located on flat ground, and produced wine weak in alcohol. The farmer lived there with his wife and three children. Its size was modest, far more modest than the last farm I had worked on. I was fortunate to get a job in January, the slow season on a farm. There was plenty of wood to split, repairs to make on the barn, and preparations for the spring planting. It was in this farm that I learned to plow a field with a team of cows. A few incidents from that period stick out in my mind.

> The new boy taught me that human beings could transform the world.

One Saturday afternoon, the local butcher showed up with his helper to slaughter a pig that had been properly fattened in the previous months. I had fed that animal and cleaned up his sty; I think he knew who I was and he could recognize the humans in the farm. When we took him out that morning, he sensed that something horrible was going to happen. Did we all smell of death? Did our behavior give us away? The pig began to yell, roar, and cry out as the sharp knife slit his throat. He cried until his heart stopped. The killing of the pig was quite an event on the farm; not an ounce of edible flesh was wasted — not a drop of his blood, not an inch of his intestines. He was cut up, put up to cure, put up in preserves. He would serve for a whole year. I regret to report that while I witnessed that death with some pity, it did not deter me from taking part in that day's feast.

On another occasion, a fox managed to get into the rabbits' hutches and carnage ensued. The solution for preventing another such episode was to raise the hutches on higher stilts, out of the fox's reach. The farmer's plan was to take a beam and use it as a lever to raise the hutches; when one side was sufficiently raised, I was to slip a pole under the cages, and we would raise the other side. The farmer raised his side, but as I was about to slip the pole under the cage, the beam the farmer was holding gave way and the rabbit cages came down with a crash, tearing my nail from my left thumb. That day, I walked with a bandaged hand to the center, where I was treated, I think, with sulfa drugs, and properly bandaged. The next day, I was back at work. To this day the tip of my thumb is still sensitive, particularly to cold.

One morning, the farmer told me that I had to kill a litter of dogs and bury them deep so the mother would not dig them up. I refused to do it. I had seen animals killed since early childhood, but it was always for food. Dogs and cats were not food, they were pets and the idea of killing them was revolting. Why wouldn't he kill them? Well, his children had discovered the puppies, and had played with them — he did not want to be directly blamed for getting rid of that litter. I had no emotional ties to the children; it did not matter if I did the deed. He handed me a hatchet and a spade, ordering me in no uncertain terms to dispose of the dogs. That day I became a murderer.

To give us some added protection, the administrators at the center arranged to acquire fake identity cards. Actually, the cards were not forgeries; the blank stamped cards had been obtained from the city of Valence in the Rhône river valley. But names and addresses were fake. We carried these identification cards with us, as was required by law, but I always felt uneasy with mine. One Sunday in June, three men in civilian clothes walked into the common room and addressed us in German. They asked for our papers, first in German and then in French. There were about ten boys in the room and we handed our fake papers over. While they perused our papers, two boys and I took to our heels through an open back door. I do not think that I ever ran as fast as I ran that day, down the hill while one of the German shouted at us to stop and calling us *verfluchte Juden*.

I ran all the way to the farm, arriving out of breath and yelling that the Gestapo was after me. I was frightened and had to find a way to leave the country. It was easy to ask the farmer to help me escape — the tide of war had turned, and a mass resistance movement had begun to mobilize. With the Germans suffering major defeats at Stalingrad and El Alamein and the Allies in control of North and Sub-Saharan Africa, it was clear that an invasion of Europe was imminent. Moreover, young Frenchmen were taken to work in Germany, allegedly in exchange for prisoners of war. As the Allies were bombing Germany on a daily basis, French youths were not eager to leave their homes. Instead, they joined the underground and fostered a climate of defiance that fed off Germany's defeats on the battlefields.

The farmer took me immediately to one of his vineyards where he kept a tool shed, and told me to stay there until he had an answer to my problem. Food would be brought to me — I was not to worry. I stayed in that shed three nights and three days, before the farmer came to fetch me. He led me to another farm in the vicinity, where I was given an address in Toulouse and a password. I could be in London in a week — that was being done on a regular basis, under the very noses of the Germans. The next day, I took my leave from the farmer and his family, and took the train once again to Toulouse.

I arrived in Toulouse late that afternoon, and found the man whose address I had been given. The man was in his forties, bald and sporting a medium-sized moustache. He was a veteran of World War I with a fiery spirit — the Boches had not gotten to him then and they would not get to him now. He had, he said, an indomitable nature, and had never been defeated. He wanted to be sure that I understood that about him. The man told me I would be in London the following week. Meanwhile, I must eat and go to bed. The next day I was to go to a village at the foot of the Pyrenees mountains, and meet my contact at the entrance to a bridge at 6:00 pm precisely. After an exchange of passwords, I would be hidden until it was time to be taken to London. I hardly slept that night; I was too busy trying to imagine and anticipate the next few days.

The next day I took a train to Pau and from there rode a broken down bus to the village. I was met on schedule, and walked up several paths in the hills for a couple of hours. I arrived at a shack in which a dozen young men were sitting on stones or makeshift furniture. During the course of the evening, I found out that all of them were there to avoid being sent to work in Germany. The conversations encompassed two topics: how soon they might be taken out of France, and whether they would wind up in London or North Africa. The desire for either destination depended on the political personality they admired most. Those who favored De Gaulle hoped to go to London, and join the French Forces that were being trained for a future invasion; those who favored General Giraud hoped to join him in Algeria. To my surprise, no one had left-wing leanings. I was the only Jew in the camp. I had no preference as to where I went; my only goal was to get out of France. I did not feel any passion for the political figures vying for power after the war. I simply felt that after the war the conditions that had prevailed in 1939 ought to change, and that a world should be built in which wars would be outlawed and justice and brotherhood would triumph. I did not have the vaguest notion of how this could be brought about.

During the first few days I spent in the shack, we focused on our lack of food. Our supplies consisted of wild lentils boiled in water, and I started feeling hungry again. I was beginning to wonder about our impending departure when a man showed up and declared that all escapes from France were being stopped. Moreover, we would be the first group in the region to start armed resistance. We were not asked if we wanted to participate in armed rebellion — we were told that these were our orders, and that we were now soldiers. That night our group was split in two; eight of us assembled and left camp to go deeper into the mountains. We were given two carbines to carry. We marched all night, and in the morning we reached a small valley, and were told to build our camp. Though it was early July, it was cold in these mountains. I did not sleep very well that first morning; I shivered from the cold, and probably from fatigue.

Suddenly I woke up one morning with a gun pointed at my nose.

In the middle of the day, we started building shelters made of branches. We even made beds out of branches and thick foliage. Other than that, we had nothing to do. We did not know what to do with our carbines, so we hid them under our improvised beds. One afternoon, a man showed up and conducted a drill with the carbines. We were told how to fire them, but we were not issued bullets. We were not told to post guards, and it did not occur to any of us that we should. We were camping out in the mountains, quite puzzled as to our role as the future liberators of France. This went on for about a week, when suddenly I woke one morning with a gun pointed at my nose. A platoon of special police, the Gardes Mobiles, had surrounded the shelter where all of us were happily sleeping. Armed with sub-machine guns, they had entered our hiding place and rudely awakened each of us. We did not, could not, offer any resistance, and we were quickly manacled. The shelter was searched and the carbines were found. We were marched out of our little valley, carrying the carbines, and loaded in police trucks. By noon, we were back in Toulouse and incarcerated.

The prison was overcrowded. There were not enough cells to put us in, so we joined a group of prisoners in the courtyard. No names were taken, no identification papers were demanded. We sat in the courtyard, surrounded by our meager belongings. I thought that I would surely be delivered to the Germans who would not hesitate to have such a dangerous terrorist shot, or at best, deported. The courtyard was very hot during the long July afternoons, but the nights did not bring much relief either. In fact, nighttime was in some respect a difficult time to endure. On my first night there, a prisoner went berserk; he kept talking in gibberish and stamping his feet, but no one did anything to take care of him or make him be quiet. The guards did not intervene, nor did they seem to care. The rest of us were perhaps too frightened to approach him, or did not wish to call attention to ourselves. I slept fitfully that night.

I do not remember what we were given to eat, or if we were given anything at all. We were not able to wash up; the smell of sweat and bodies, mixed with the odors of the courtyard bathroom, became pervasive. It's doubtful that I had any desire to eat. My stomach was in knots. That afternoon I was taken into the building for interrogation. I sat at a desk, facing two policemen in civilian clothes. They were in their early 30's, and their demeanor was relaxed — devoid of the brutality that I had seen in the movies. I told myself that I must be alert and not reveal anything that might implicate my host in Toulouse. I realized very quickly that I had not prepared a story to tell them. I had no experience in contriving alibis, and became hesitant in my speech. As they became aware that I was beginning to panic, they changed the line of questioning and began to help me fabricate a story that they could type on their report sheet.

It became clear to me then that these policemen were annoyed about having to investigate my activities. They wanted to be done with me as soon as possible. What was not clear was what they intended to do with me. Would they keep me in jail or turn me over to the Germans?

After that, they avoided asking about the group and concentrated on me. What was I doing in the hills, and why had I gone there in the first place? Was I trying to go into Spain? Or was I trying to find my way to North Africa? Did I intend to use the weapons that were found in the camp and become a terrorist? No, I was not, I had never used a weapon in my life, I replied. I was in the hills because I was a Jew. I had found the group through contacts in the countryside who had sent me to Toulouse, but I did not have their names and addresses. I signed my deposition and was taken back to the courtyard. Toward the end of the evening, some prisoners who were in the available cells came out under guard. I recognized among them my Toulouse host who signaled to me to be quiet. The next day, I was taken again to be interrogated. This time, I felt more at ease. I was asked if I had family that I could rejoin somewhere out of the region. I told the policemen that the Leizers lived in Grenoble, under Italian control. I was given orders to report weekly to the police in Grenoble, and a voucher to buy a train ticket. The next morning, I was let out of jail and directed to the train station. Apparently, we had been the first group arrested in the region. We did not seem very dangerous — quite the contrary. I do not know what motivated the two policemen to help me, but I owe them my life, and I am grateful to those men. I never knew their names.

For the second time in less than a year, I was on my way to Grenoble. I had never traveled so much in my life.

The GOP Today

THE PARTY OF LINCOLN AND LIBERTY (has been) transmogrified into the party of hairy-backed swamp developers and corporate shills, faith-based economists, fundamentalist bullies with Bibles, Christians of convenience, freelance racists, misanthropic frat boys, shrieking midgets of AM radio, tax cheats, nihilists in golf pants, brownshirts in pinstripes, sweatshop tycoons, hacks, fakirs, aggressive dorks, Lamborghini libertarians, people who believe Neil Armstrong's moon walk was filmed in Roswell, New Mexico, little honkers out to diminish the rest of us, Newt's evil spawn and their Etch-A-Sketch president, a dull and rigid man suspicious of the free flow of information and of secular institutions, whose philosophy is a jumble of badly sutured body parts trying to walk.

— GARRISON KEILLOR

On Speaking the German Language

Eva Kollisch

I stopped speaking German as soon as I came to the United States. The "mother tongue," they called it. But what if they cut out your tongue? Or rather, cut from under you the place where it is spoken? Stopped, I should add, except with my mother. With my mother it was the only natural way to talk; but I wondered for how long I would be able to understand her and communicate with her in that language which I wanted to uproot but couldn't, in her presence.

In my childhood, my mother had set the standard for speaking German: Burgtheater-Deutsch it was called. (The German of the Vienna national theater.) She told me that the Prussian-Germans, the "*Piefkes*" as she called them, didn't know how to speak German! The German the *Piefkes* spoke was more like a bark or a sniffle or sometimes like a whiplash; later I identified it with Erich von Strohheim's German.) The best speakers and actors from Germany, my mother insisted, with her pride of being Viennese, had to come to *Vienna* to learn German.

There was this snobbery, this hierarchy in my mother's addiction to pure Austrian German: Jewish inflections were no good. Too much dialect was no good, except for country people, peasants. A touch of dialect was pleasant; a touch of sloppiness *(Schlamperei*) — as, for example, a slight "o" sound instead of a full "a" sound in the word "*Ja*." Taxi drivers might speak this way or a *Fiakerkutscher* (a coachman). This bit of easygoing, sloppy German didn't keep them from knowing exactly what was playing at the opera or the Burgtheater that evening, my mother would add admiringly. They could even sing an aria from the *Fledermaus* or from Carmen.

My mother was a writer and poet, steeped in German culture. In America she continued speaking, writing, thinking what, for her, I can truly call the "mother tongue." At the same time she was completely fluent in English and French and communicated easily, on a "kitchen level," as she would call it, in Italian, Czech, and Hungarian.

When I met my second husband, G., after the war, my hatred of Germany and Austria was at its height. G. was a young Jew from Berlin who had emigrated to Sweden in 1939. His parents had been killed in Auschwitz. We had a lot to share, our common refugee background made for instant communication. But the only problem was, G. didn't speak any English. After years of living in exile, his German was soft, and devoid of any hated Prussian inflections. But by then I had rejected *all* of German, not just the "Piefke Deutsch." Yet, ironically and by force of circumstance, for the first few years of our relationship, we spoke only German. German was like a secret language, half something to hide in shame (even from ourselves), yet also something that made a deep bond between us. I don't remember when we stopped speaking German entirely — certainly as soon as we could. Some of our Jewish friends were relieved that the language of the enemy

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Born in Vienna, Eva Kollisch *escaped Nazi persecution via a Kindertransport in 1939. She has been a Trotskyist, a peace activist, an academic (professor emerita, Sarah Lawrence College), and since her retirement, a full-time writer. She published* Girl in Movement *(Glad Day Books, 2000), a memoir of her first years in America and her youth in the Workers Party. She is now completing* The Ground Under My Feet, *to be published by Glad Day Books.*

was no longer in our mouths; a few others, however, had at various times expressed envy over the fact that we were bilingual and knew "the language of Goethe." G. and I weren't comfortable with either response. Only *we* knew how hateful and assaulting and sometimes heartbreaking that language really was.

"Hey you, young woman, you belong in jail."

When I went to Brooklyn College, after having worked in factories during the war, I took German courses — mostly because I thought it would be easy. However, our professors were recent German and Austrian refugees, and it wasn't easy. These were serious literature courses in which we read writers like Goethe, Schiller, Heine, and Thomas Mann. I greatly enjoyed studying literature, but the fact that this literature was in German hardly touched me. My mother felt pleased that I was finally getting to know the German classics. But to me, these works could as easily have been written in English or Russian; the particular "container" in which they came, I managed to ignore. It was like getting some precious gifts wrapped in disposable cellophane.

Sometimes I would accompany my mother to readings of her German and Austrian exile writers' circle. There was always so much emotion at these gatherings. For my mother, they constituted the high points of the year. The writers wrote and read only in German. The audience was deeply attentive; afterwards there was cake and whipped cream. They were another generation from mine; I envied them and pitied them for their attachment to the mother tongue.

During my first visit to Vienna in the 50's, I stayed in a convent-hotel my mother had recommended because it was cheap and clean. I unpacked and sauntered down the street (the *Ungargasse*) with that particular excitement and sense of freedom which I always experience on being in a strange city. *Ungargasse* was quite dark and almost deserted.. Suddenly I heard a man's voice bellowing behind me: "Hey you, young woman, you belong in jail." *(Sie, junge Frau. Sie g'hoeren ins G'faengnis.*) I don't know what the caller must have surmised, in observing my back from the distance. That I was a prostitute? I was swinging my pocketbook gaily. Or that I was a "Jew," that is, a "criminal-by-instinct-illegal-alien."

In Vienna I was a "spy." I spied on my mother's past, the parks she had played in as a child, the buildings she had passed on her way to school or to the university. I spied particularly on what people said, on the different expressions of anti-Semitism that I encountered or expected to encounter in my disguise as an American tourist.

In the early 60's, I went back to graduate school for an advanced degree. I was divorced, had a child to support, and needed a respectable profession. I was about to enroll in English literature at Columbia University when I received a message from my old chairman of the Brooklyn College German Department who had taken an interest in me. In essence the message was: if I did my graduate work in *German*, I could have a job right away — there was a part-time opening teaching Beginners German at the college. I accepted. My motives were purely practical and mercenary — but something became still and content inside me. I had only one qualm: Did I still know German? I hadn't read it or spoken it in over ten years. Where does a language go which, like an unwanted child in a myth or fairy tale, is put out to fend for itself in the wilderness?

At Columbia, I had a wonderful professor who gave a course in Lessing and Kleist; he was a "White Russian aristocrat," — politically probably on the wrong side, but he wasn't *German*! And he spoke a beautiful German. From him I relearned that language miraculously in about a week and a half! And to my delight, it was an adult literary German that had collected itself, unbeknown to me, in the secret pockets of my soul, which I was able to draw on to write my papers in German.

When I applied for a job teaching German at the small progressive college where I would be hired and where I spent over 30 years, teaching German and Comparative Literature, one of the Jewish professors from the interviewing committee asked me: "Why would someone like you, with your background, want to teach German?" To this I gave an answer which struck me as an illumination: Who else but a Jew like me could be trusted *not* to be nationalistic, or chauvinistic, or anti-Semitic, or sentimental — who could be, in turn, ambivalent, loving, sarcastic, bitter — and who would transmit critically the best as well as the worst she knew of German literature and culture?

I've come nearly to the end of the story. Already retired and without colleagues to speak German with, the only time I use my native tongue now is when I visit Austria. I'm still uncomfortable speaking it with most people of my generation, except for a few non-Jewish friends in Austria, former classmates from Baden, whom I have come to love and trust. With them I communicate easily, both in speaking and in writing.

I SOMETIMES REFLECT on what would have happened to me if I hadn't allowed my mother tongue to sneak back inside me, as I must have done at several important junctures of my life. My older brother, for example, went into the American army shortly after our arrival in this country. When he returned at the end of the war, he no longer spoke German. Unlike me, he speaks English without a trace of accent. He has had a happy and successful life in America, but he lost almost all his memories of his childhood in Austria. He may have wanted that to happen, and I can understand it. My needs were different. Unconsciously, I must have known and understood that I wouldn't let them do that to me. That they drove me out, yes! That they despised and killed those like me, yes! That I will never forget or forgive what they have done, yes! But for them to take away what was *mine*, what connects me to my beginnings, to my mother and my childhood-happiness-and-unhappiness, that wasn't going to happen. That, I didn't, or my good fortune didn't, allow them to do to me.

One day, after we had rediscovered each other and our friendship had deepened, I found a message on my answering machine from my dear old classmate, G.F.

I played it over several times. Already her voice on the machine sounded so unselfconscious and warm — a piece of my past. I called her back. A note of jubilation in her voice: "*Eva, ach du mein Liebes*." (Eva, oh you dear one). She invited me to the class reunion in my hometown. I said I wouldn't be able to come but added: "I love to hear your voice. You sound like home." She said, "Of course, I never left Baden" — which is not quite what I had meant. But I think at bottom she knew: it was the "healing" I was after, patches of which she and my two other Austrian classmates had offered me, that made me respond with my own joy to the joy in her voice.

Naguib Mahfouz's Window on the World of Islam

BILL MOSLEY

IN THE WEEKS following the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, I, like most Americans, tried to make sense out of madness. Who could have plotted and carried out such an insane act? What did the attacks tell us about our world that we didn't understand before, but should have?

Immediately after the attacks, many people of Arab descent or the Muslim faith — or those perceived to be one or both — became targets of anger or objects of fear, no matter their innocence. Reports abounded of attacks on Arabs, Muslims and people who "appeared" to be one or both; people with olive complexions, turbans and names such as Mohammed were turned away from commercial flights. Even President Bush himself at first called the counterattack a "crusade" — a reference to the Christian military attacks against Middle Eastern Muslims during the Middle Ages — before his advisors convinced him to drop the term.

Nevertheless, we could not ignore the fact that all 19 of the hijackers *were* Arab and Muslim, and that they acted in the name of a militant Islam for which peaceful coexistence with the liberal, capitalist — and largely Christian — West was not an option. That even this few young men would be willing to kill themselves and thousands of innocent people in the name of Allah was a chilling thought. Was this mad act somehow emblematic of the culture in which it arose? Was there something about the Arab or Muslim mind that was fundamentally different from its Western counterpart?

I then remembered Naguib Mahfouz, the Egyptian novelist, who died Aug. 31 at the age of 94, spent his life examining his slice of the Arab Muslim world — Egypt, and principally his home city of Cairo — from the inside: street by street, face by face, story by story. And I realized that in the midst of this modern age's uncertainty and craziness, there remained at least one voice of clarity and truth, untainted by cant or extremism.

Like many Americans, I first heard of Mahfouz when he won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988. Only afterward were his works translated into English — championed by no less than Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, an editor for Doubleday. Reviews of his earliest works in translation were glowing, especially for his *Cairo Trilogy*, a moving glimpse into the life of a fictional but very real Egyptian family over three decades in the early 20th century.

So I picked up *Palace Walk*, the *Trilogy's* first volume. Within the first few pages, Mahfouz had carried me from my own world to the old quarter of Cairo during the era of the First World War. I found myself fallen into a world utterly different from my own — one in which women were cloistered in the home, fathers ruled their families as dictators (sometimes benevolent, sometimes not) and marriages were arranged.

And yet I quickly acclimated to my new surroundings, thanks to Mahfouz's clear, direct prose, and especially because of his characters. Despite their living in a conservative Muslim society with all of its social, political and sexual differences from our own, I *recognized* these characters. Mahfouz brought them alive, giv-

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ing us not stock exemplars of a given time and place but real people with real fears, desires and aspirations.

There is al-Sayyid Ahmad Abd al-Jawad, the stern paterfamilias, whose iron hand over his household masks a deep-seated love and concern for his family — and who nurtures a passion for women and drink utterly at odds with the strict Muslim creed he imposes on his home. There is Amina, al-Sayyid Ahmad's dutiful wife, whose complete submission to her husband is counterbalanced by her firm control over the domestic affairs of the household. Al-Sayyid Ahmad's three sons are studies in contrast: Yasin, devoted to sensual pleasures, yet without the elder's dignity and discretion; Fahmy, whose seriousness of purpose leads him into the movement to free Egypt of British rule; and the scholarly, introspective Kamal, whom Mahfouz carries from childhood to middle age and from youthful Muslim piety to philosophical skepticism. Indeed, Kamal serves as a stand-in for Mahfouz himself, and embodies Egypt's struggles with its own identity. The two al-Jawad daughters — sharp-tongued Khadija and delicate, dreamy Aisha — strain against their cloistered existence without rebelling, for in their world, there are no alternatives to marriage, childrearing and a domestic life.

Mahfouz, diabetic and nearly blind, was attacked by one or more knife-wielding assailants on a Cairo street.

Mahfouz carried the al-Jawad family from the late 1910s to the mid-1940s through the three volumes of the trilogy — from *Palace Walk* through *Palace of Desire* to the final installment, *Sugar Street*. Over the course of the saga, the first generation ages, the second grows to maturity, and a third takes the stage. Characters marry and have children, experience joy and heartbreak, yearning and disappointment. Some die, a few in tragic circumstances. Younger generations press against the constraints imposed by their elders and eventually break through to maturity. In short, Mafouz transcended time, place and culture to bring us into the lives of characters who, when one looks beneath the ultimately superficial differences, are little different from ourselves and our own friends and loved ones. And while we experience the family's daily lives, we also witness the subtle but real societal changes that impact even the conservative al-Jawads.

THE *CAIRO TRILOGY*, published in Egypt between 1956-57, was the crowning achievement of Mafouz's career, yet was only a small part of his prolific output. He wrote more than 30 novels, many of them in the Westernized, realistic style of the Trilogy — *Midaq Alley* and *The Beggar* are among his other fine realistic novels — but also books that drew on the oral and allegorical traditions of Arabic literature.

One of his non-realistic novels, 1959's *Children of Gebelaawi*, nearly cost Mahfouz his life. The novel, on its surface the story of the inhabitants of a single neighborhood over several generations, is an allegorical treatment of the evolution of Western religions, with characters standing in for Adam, Moses, Jesus, Muhammad and even God. Fundamentalist Muslims, angered by this heresy of literary imagination, responded with demonstrations in the streets of Cairo. Egyptian censors quickly suppressed the book within the country, and the controversy soon faded.

However, when Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini issued his infamous *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie in 1989 for writing *The Satanic Verses*, Mahfouz again found himself in the center of controversy. Mahfouz condemned Khomeini's *fatwa* as "an assault on Islam," adding that "freedom of expression . . . must be considered sacred." Soon afterwards, the Egyptian cleric Sheik Omar Adel Rahman, in an interview published in a Kuwaiti newspaper, asserted that if a similar decree of death had been issued against Mahfouz for *Children of Gebelaawi*, Rushdie would never have dared publish *The Satanic Verses*. (This same Abdel Rahman later moved to the United States and was convicted of conspiring in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.) Five years later, Mahfouz, diabetic and nearly blind, was attacked by one or more knife-wielding assailants on a Cairo street. He survived his wounds, but the attack interrupted his literary output until last December's publication of his final story collection, *The Seventh Heaven*. Thirteen men, who confessed that they were carrying out Sheik Omar's *fatwa*, were convicted of plotting and carrying out the attack.

Yet even were it not for *Children of Gebelaawi*, those who value dogma over candor and understanding would find plenty not to like about most of Mahfouz's work — including the *Cairo Trilogy*. For in the *Trilogy*, Mahfouz depicted devout Muslims as well as those who rejected the native faith.

As the *Trilogy* begins, World War I is raging in Europe, and a growing nationalist movement demands full independence from Egypt's British colonial overlords. At the conclusion of *Sugar Street*, World War II has come to Cairo, bringing nighttime bombing raids on Cairo's ancient quarter where the al-Jawads live. Within this framework of conflict, the Egyptian nation gradually breaks free of British domination only to struggle internally over its own identity and destiny. While these national and world events come to impose themselves on the al-Jawad's domestic normalcy, the mores of the household are challenged by another, more subtle force: the creeping influx of liberal, Western ideas. Over the course of the *Trilogy* the combination of social change and his own aging gradually loosen and break al-Sayyid Ahmad's once-supreme command over his family.

Egypt's conflicted relationship to the West — in particular, to Great Britain — is central to shaping the outlook of the al-Sayyids and their neighbors. As *Palace Walk* opens, British and Australian troops are an everyday presence on the streets of Cairo. Egyptians openly resent the colonizers, but many hold an inward admiration for them, as illustrated by Yasin's encounter with a British soldier:

> The soldier had asked for a match and smiled . . . An Englishman — in other words, the kind of man he imagined to embody all the perfections of the human race. Yasin probably detested the English as all Egyptians did, but deep inside he respected and venerated them so much that he frequently imagined they were made from a different stuff than the rest of mankind. . . . How could he believe the brutal acts attributed to them?

As the third generation grows to maturity in *Sugar Street*, we see new divisions in Egyptian society. Khadija's two sons each embrace a different nascent movement: one the radical-nationalist Wafd party, the other the militant Muslim Brethren. Embodied in these two characters are the divergent paths Egyptians chose as a reaction to colonialism: on the one hand, solidarity with a Western-inspired revolutionary tradition; on the other, the attempt to purge everything Western and non-Muslim from society. Another member of the third generation, Yasin's son Ridwan, becomes the lover and protégé of an influential gay politician. Meanwhile, al-Sayyid Ahmad and his generation, who hold to their traditional beliefs — strict Islam leavened with practicality — are bewildered by these changes in their world.

Within the character of Kamal lie the crossroads of all of society's contradictions. He grows up with unquestioning loyalty to his family's strict yet pre-militant practice of Islam. But as he enters adulthood, he increasingly questions his received beliefs, rejects all established religions and philosophies, and embraces atheism and skepticism. Yet Kamal's quest for the truth does not make him free. "The intellect can rob a person of peace of mind," he muses in *Sugar Street*. While he publicly supports the Wafd party, he privately doubts the usefulness of politics. "[A]s an intellectual skeptic, he thought nothing mattered. . .No sector of his life was free from contradictions and therefore from anxiety . . ." — an apt metaphor for Egypt's own internal stresses.

The lives of the *Trilogy*'s female characters could, to Western readers, be the most difficult to compare to our own world, except unfavorably. Al-Sayyid Ahmad confines his wife and daughters to the house – they are not permitted to venture outside for any reason, even to go shopping or to the mosque. And yet the al-Jawad women subtly rebel against their physical and social confinement. The daughters are forbidden to let men even see them, but Aisha delights in repeatedly allowing a young police officer on whom she has a crush to glimpse her briefly through a window. When al-Sayyid Ahmad leaves town for several days, Amina dons a veil and dares a trip to a mosque — exposing herself to her husband's wrath when he learns of her insubordination. Khadija asserts herself through her strong personality and her razor-like sarcasm which, after she is married, allow her to dominate her passive husband.

Despite their subordinate position, the *Trilogy*'s women exert full authority over their own world — the domestic sphere. As submissive as Amina is in al-Sayyid Ahmad's presence, she rules the house once he leaves for his shop. As time passes, Amina grows in stature while the aging and increasingly infirm al-Sayyid Ahmad shrinks, and she becomes the real head of the household. Yet Mahfouz also recognizes the limits of women's identification solely as wives and mothers: When Aisha loses her husband and children in tragic circumstances, she sees little choice but to move back to her parents' home and slide into depression.

"Nobody else lives like us," Khadija moans in *Palace Walk*. While her complaint is an exaggeration — many women of Cairo lived like the al-Jawads — many did not. Mahfouz depicts Egyptian families who practice a more relaxed Islam, with their women walking the streets unveiled, some even taking jobs. As *Sugar Street* moves to its conclusion, the Muslim Brethren is mobilizing in reaction to these changes — setting the stage for our contemporary conflicts.

What, then, does the *Cairo Trilogy* tell us about Arab and Muslim ways of thinking? That there is no such thing, any more than there is an American, Christian or Jewish way of thinking. Within every society there are complexities and contradictions that defy stereotyping. To truly understand another culture, one must delve beneath the surface. Such a quest can occupy a lifetime. Fortunately, when it comes to early 20th-century Egypt, Mahfouz is available to be our guide. While the *Trilogy* made Mahfouz a pariah among some in his own society, it also made him an icon among peoples of all cultures seeking genuine understanding of the world we all share.

Capitalism in Iran

Faramarz Dadvar

In Iran, the regime of the Islamic Republic has played a vital role in suppressing the working class movement in the last 26 years. From the beginning, the regime attempted to annihilate the left-oriented and pro-working people's political organizations, imprisoning, torturing and executing thousands of dissident activists. For all these years, no independent union has existed, and every organized resistance has been vehemently suppressed. In the economic arena, under the presidency of Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1996) and Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005), the neoliberal measures (privatization and open door policies) prescribed by the IMF and World Bank created more unemployment/poverty and a higher degree of concentration of wealth in the hands of a small economic elite connected to the regime, who invested their resources primarily in the highly profitable industries of commerce and finance. As reported in the Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA), due to the nature of economic plans for development in the last 12 years, distribution of wealth has taken a turn for the worse, and now "more than 10 million people live under an absolute poverty line and almost 20 million live around a relative poverty line" ("Nameh Mardom,"—the official organ of the Tudeh Party of Iran — June 21, 2005). And as reported by the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), since 1979, prices have inflated 147 times, indicating the terrible conditions that the Iranian masses are caught up in (ibid, Aug. 16, 2005). In the words of Ramasan Lotfi, an official of the regime, the number of unemployed is not the official version of 4 million, but more than 10 million. Jalil Mahmoudi, a labor activist, writes that in 2004 alone, 93,770 workers were laid off. He quotes Rajab Ali Shasevari, the head of the regime-made union of part-time workers, who says that more than 60 percent of laborers in Iran work under short-term agreements, which relieves them from already limited social benefits. Due to the trend of privatization in Iran, since the 1990s quite a few industrial units have been given to cronies of the regime, in the name of privatization. In the words of Jalil Mahmoudi, until a year ago, some $130 million (120 billion tomans) worth of stock shares belonging to state-owned industries, such as Navard-e Ahvaz, Pars Electrics, and telephone and airplane firms, have been "sold" to individuals. Additionally, there is talk of privatizing major mines, including those involved in extracting copper, coal and iron ("Arash," — a Persian monthly of cultural and social affairs, printed in France — Aug./Sept. 2005:14). The oil industry is also being considered for partial privatization.

Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in June 2005, the same economic path of neoliberalism is being followed; however, there is caution regarding the interests of the traditionally entrenched merchants, the investor capitalists who get their financial nourishment from regime-made funds and the security segments. Ahmadinejad and his economic planners frequently stress that the policy is aimed at ridding the country of obstacles impeding foreign investments. They claim that the best way to generate stability for capital investments is to allocate state shares to the "people"

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by decreasing the number of bureaucrats and inviting private investors to become partners in the economy. Ahmadinejad is of the view that "the government should support the capital market" because "both state and market are important elements in controlling and adjusting" ("Ettela'at Int" — the international edition of Ettela'at, Tehran, printed in New York — Oct. 7, 2005). Of course, the word "people," in today's economic world—particularly in Iran—mainly refers to individual capitalists who are closely connected to powerful politicians in the regime. Only a few months after his taking the presidency, Ahmadinejad's government encountered further economic crisis. Financial corruption is rampant, the budget deficit is high and stock prices have sharply declined. In attending to the problems of economic corruption, the regime identifies the absence of a stable condition for capital (local and foreign) investments as a primary obstacle and suggests, among the solutions, normalizing commercial relations with the international community, expanding stock market activities, investing in multiple energy sources, starting down the path of economic openness, and privatizing state-owned enterprises. In the meantime, the regime wants to renew subsidizing items such as bread, automobiles and fuel in the spring 2006 ("Khorasan" — printed in Iran — Oct. 21, 2005). It has also brought cement production back under protective regulation, allocating almost $1 billion (860 billion tomans) to it, which is vital for the housing industry ("Hamshahri" — printed in Iran — Oct. 20, 2005).

Almost 20 million live around a relative poverty line.

The above set of economic policies — neoliberal, populist and partially protectionist — are undertaken mainly to keep the economy afloat for the sake of saving the existing political order. Otherwise, the present non-productive, oil-dependent and service/speculative-oriented economy does not even function along a path of global modern capitalism. As far as export-import is concerned, the yearly exportation of non-oil commodities, mainly textile and agricultural, barely tops $6 billion, while importation rises above $30 billion. The 2004 official statistics show that while Iran imported more than $3.107 billion dollars from South Korea, it only exported $133 million commodities to that country (ibid). That raises a major question: If yearly oil revenues have been around $40 billion in recent years and if the gross national product surpasses $500 billion, then where are the activities of capital ("*Time Almanac* 2006," Boston)? They are either invested in commerce and service (non-productive) sectors or have moved beyond the border, particularly to neighboring countries. One figure indicates that more than $300 billion of Iranian capital is invested in Dubai.

Meanwhile, differences in policy-making among the ruling factions have spilled over to the controlled media. For instance, an article in the moderate newspaper, "Shargh," blames the new administration for the recent sharp deterioration of economic recession and the price decreases in the Tehran stock market. It argues that the new government should forcefully pursue a market-oriented and privatized economy and should take real measures against economic and bureaucratic corruption ("Ettela'at Int," Sept. 30, 2005). "Re Sa'alat," a right-wing newspaper, offered in a lead article a solution to current economic problems and the budget deficit by suggesting that "people" should be allowed to get involved in economic activities; otherwise, since "80 percent of the economy" remains in the hands of state and state-owned companies, it will remain unproductive and ill ("Ettela'at Int," Sept. 23, 2005). Also, there are those in the government, like Representative Muhammad Khosh Chehreh, who admits that "profit-making incentives" and absence of "correct managements," among other factors, have contributed to inflation and other economic problems ("Sharghnewspaper.com" — printed in Iran — Nov. 8, 2005). Not surprisingly, among the complaints that Iranian workers raise, a common theme is existence of a wild type of crony capitalism, under which state-owned enterprises are given to firms owned, in part, by current and former officials. The protests in front of the parliament by the workers of Naznakh-e Ghazvin, related to their unpaid salaries, is an example, in which they raised the issue of factories being sold to former officials by the state ("rahekargar.net," Oct. 21, 2005, originated from "akhbarrooz," an Iranian web site).

The point to stress is that although current and former officials, along with their dependent intellectuals in the cultural/religious institutions and their mouthpieces in the media, share the belief that no policy should undermine the present political (theocratic) order, there are strong differences regarding political governance (e.g. the degree of socio-political openness versus security measures) and economic policies (e.g. the degree of state intervention versus privatization, level of subsidies and the extent of populist/protectionist overtures). It seems that on the conservative side, certain personalities doubt the ability of Ahmadinejad and his ideological/security minded officials to run the country's affairs smoothly. Even Ali Khamenei, the "supreme leader" who strongly endorsed the new president, has recently extended the "supervisory" power of The Expediency Council (an appointed deliberative body) "over all branches of government" (*The Economist*, Oct. 15, 2005).

FROM THE POINTS OF VIEW of more moderate elites in the regime (in particular the technocrats belonging to the former administration), what has been carried out by the new government not only fails to conform with the 4th economic plan, which started in 2004, but is, in fact, a "non-plan" — it is only due to the increase in oil revenues that some populist and subsidizing programs have been renewed or initiated. Muhammad Ali Najafi, a former education minister and economic planner, blames the recent (August/September 2005) fall in Iranian stock market activities, partly as a result of ill-advised policies initiated by the new government, such as renewing subsidization of the cement industry. Behzad Nabavi, a reform-minded former technocrat, also is of the view that the main problem with the agenda of the new government is the absence of a well-defined economic policy at the top. Likewise, in the words of Muhammad Sattarifar, a former official, the problem with the economic policies of the present administration is the lack of trust in spreading "justice" expansively, through "vertical" (selective subsidizations) and "horizontal" (capital investments) measures. Otherwise, under the pressures of radical populist actions (like the extension of certain subsidies that rely on oil reserve income), the result will be further flight of capital from the country and a deepening economic crisis, which in turn will have political consequences ("Ettela'at Int"/ "Shargh," Oct. 17, 2005). Along the same line, an article in "Haya'at-Nev" (September 2005) warns the new administration that due to the rentier (oil-dependent) nature of Iranian economy and the absence of an institutional system of economic rights and laws, coupled with a lack of officially reliable information, a heavily neoliberal-oriented policy (market-oriented openness) will bring complicated problems in the future. Officials thus need to attain a deeper and more extensive outlook regarding the economic affairs of the country ("Ettela'at Int," Oct. 17, 2005).

Let's return to the original issues in this paper: No matter what kinds of strategic economic policies (neoliberal, statist or a mixture of the two) are undertaken and how radical the difference between various factions in each regime (e.g. between Republicans and Democrats in the United States, and between conservatives and reformers in Iran), as long as capitalism (a system of private control and ownership over the means of production, market allocation and hierarchical division of labor) dominates the economic relations in society and consequently produces class divide and exploitation, particularly in the wage-labor sphere, then the fundamental obstacle confronting the socialist movement will persist. Obviously, the degree and characteristics of exploitation vary between the more industrially advanced and politically liberal countries (partly due to centuries of struggles by labor and other democratic movements) and the less economically developed and often politically closed and undemocratic societies (e.g. Iran). For this reason, for leftist movements the correct tactics and strategies also vary.

But one principle stands tall: While socialists should participate in every stage and sphere of people's legitimate democratic struggles, they must not put aside even for a moment the fight for achieving their ultimate goal of moving beyond capitalism. Only a free, just and equal society, one that is devoid of human-made impediments such as exploitation, inequality, alienation and poverty, will satisfy the socialist movement.

An example, in Iran, helps point out the root cause of societal problems in a developing capitalist country where the problem of crony capitalism is much more naked and destructive. For instance, although Mahmoud Ahmadinejad claimed during his presidential campaign that if "elected" to presidency he would fight against economic corruptions and injustices, included on his list of candidates for the post of oil minister was Sadeq Mahsouli, who comes from the ranks of revolutionary guards. Mahsouli has become a super-rich businessman, thanks partly to privatization projects in the last 15 years; like other security officials, he received (seized) public properties and state-run institutions in sweet deals and became very wealthy. Today in Iran, where political opposition and independent organizations in the labor, women, youth and student movements are continuously suppressed, capitalist functionaries, particularly those connected to the regime, freely dominate the commanding heights of the economy and thus people's lives. Shoja Ahmadvand, the head of the center of traders and merchants in Iran, is of the view that all ruling factions in the regime believe in "an economy oriented towards free market and privatization," and for him this is highly positive. He emphasizes his "trust" in the merchants of Bazaar, the traditional commerce centers in big cities (ISNA, Nov. 20, 2005). Of course, due to the capitalist economy in Iran, the population is continuously polarized: a tiny elite of powerful, rich capitalist class on one side and the vast majority of the proletariat on the other. This trend is so obvious that the officials in the regime admit to the condition. In the words of Ali Farzin, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, "because of inequality and injustice in Iran more than 7.5 million of the workers face serious living problems . . . and 20 percent of the population is not even able to feed themselves." (Iranian Labor News Agency, Dec. 13, 2005). In a future socialist Iran, when a real democracy has been established, the economy will develop according to the needs of people and not under the control of big capital and their political partners. The real representatives of the people would make conscious decisions in the service of establishing equality, justice and, ultimately, non-exploitative social relationships.

> A common theme is existence of a wild type of crony capitalism.

The Sociology and Politics of Orientalism: A Refinement of the Intellectual Legacy of Edward Said*

EMAD EL-DIN AYSHA

THE LATE EDWARD SAID vigorously opposed Orientalism. This is what it meant for him: The southerners, Muslims included, cannot represent themselves —– understand their plight and the ultimate cause of their primitiveness — and must be represented. Therefore, not surprisingly, only the West or North can solve the South or East's problems, developmentally speaking, via its superior knowledge. This is an academic version of Rudyard Kipling's infamous "white man's burden" where the West must send forth its best and brightest to serve altruistically the needs of its captives. It certainly is true that this attitude is strewn all over academic Orientalism, the kind Said's arch foe Bernard Lewis represents.

The *bête noir* of academic Orientalism is the notion that there is a cultural entity, a civilization, whose essence is determined by a religion — Islam — and that this essence is somehow flawed, forcing Islamdom into perpetual stasis and decline. Worse than this, the authoritarianism of the political and religious elites makes it impossible for the Muslims to become self-aware of this fundamental affliction and therefore renders them impotent to rectify their condition. So it is left up to the Orientalists to do the job for these inevitably ungrateful Muslims. Hence Lewis' exhortation that Islam, this homogeneous, uniform cultural totality, needs a dose of what got the Europeans out of their self-same fix, namely, a religious reformation.

Tempting as this account is, however, it misses the polemical origins of Orientalism in the "war psychosis" that developed with the "confrontation" between Christendom and Islam from the 12th to the 14th century. The latest flare-up between the Vatican and the Muslim world, courtesy of (the Catholic) Pope Benedict XVI's comments about Islam and the Prophet Muhammad bring these origins to the fore, citing as he did a Medieval (Orthodox) Christian text saturated with the usual themes: how Islam swamped Christianity through violence alone and the supposed Islamic anathema towards Reason as mandated by Christianized Greek philosophy.[1]

Conceptual Muddle

IN FACT, PRACTICALLY EVERYTHING Edward Said has to say about Orientalism can be traced back to the Medieval Christian "experience" of Islam, as expertly catalogued by the late Normal Daniel in his seminal *Islam and the West — The Making of an Image*, among other works. The Orientalists of those times were churchmen, polemicists to a man, whose chief and only concern was *not* to "study" Islam, with the aim of ruling Muslims more effectively, but to *disprove* Islam altogether. They wanted to undo it, make it as if it had never happened, disaggregate the theological glue that bounds Muslims

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*Out of deference to English readers unfamiliar with Arabic I use "Said." *Sa'eed* is a closer transliteration that would have no doubt pleased the émigré intellectual as he was persistently picked on as "Ed Said, said what?" during his schooling in the U.S.

together as Muslims. (There are still quite a few Orientalists with this objective explicitly in mind — Michael Cook, Patricia Crone of *Hagarism* fame).

In the context of the Crusades the objective was often to either convert, or failing this, exterminate the Muslims, intellectually if not literally. Muslims claim to believe in God, the

In European eyes, the Ottoman Empire was transformed from the "scourge of Christendom" to the "sick man of Europe."

same God of the Christians and Jews; this cannot be the case, therefore they must in reality be polytheists and thus no different from pre-Islamic pagan Arabs. From here comes the myth that Muslims worship the Ka'aba, or worship pagan idols in the Ka'aba, or worship Muhammad himself as an idol — hence, the term "Mohammedanism." Muslims follow a prophet who carried the same message of previous prophets; this cannot be the case and Muhammad, thus, *must* be a false prophet, which is why biographies of the Prophet degenerate into character assassination. The Muslims have a holy scripture, but it cannot be holy and proof of this is contained in the stylistics of the Quran itself. It is written in a non-chronological, non-Biblical fashion, therefore it cannot be authentic and *must* be nothing but the ramblings of a copycat epileptic.

The historical records of the Muslims purport to prove that all this occurred in the past — monotheism, the Quran, the Prophet — so the very historiography of Muslims *must* be wrong, historical accounts fraudulent at best, inaccurately exaggerated at worst. The polemicists fit the proper understanding of the word "prejudiced" because they had already made their minds up about what was the case long before they ever took a look at the evidence. This is amply illustrated by the fact that the very first polemicists, the founders who drew the broad contours of all subsequent polemic, were Greek Orthodox Christians from Syria. The great grandfather of Orientalism, irony of ironies, John of Damascus (676-749 CE), was an *Arab* and a Levantine one at that.[2] Speaking Arabic and having ample access to flesh and blood Muslims did not daunt their absolutist faith that all that was not Christian was false and evil out of necessity. Saint John was actually the chief councilor of Damascus under the Umayyad Caliph Abdul Malek!

It was specifically this absolutist rejection of Islam that led to the Orientalist insistence that Muslims could not represent themselves but had to be represented. As Norman Daniel explains:

> Apparently, under the pressure of their sense of danger, whether real or imagined, a deformed image of their enemy's beliefs takes shape in men's minds… even the facts are modified — and in good faith — to suit the interpretation. A "real truth" is identified: this is something that *contrasts* with what the enemy *say* they believe; they *must not be allowed to speak for themselves*.[3]

Passion overpowered reason and it is this that takes us, methodologically, from Edward Said's understanding to a very different theorization of Orientalism, Medieval or contemporary. Even the political quadrant of the academic derogation of Islam, Oriental Despotism, bizarrely, originates in the Middle Ages as well, not exactly a period of European history known for its political or religious pluralism. The Latin Church of Jerusalem, for instance, informed Innocent III that in Baghdad "Muhammad is God and the caliph is Pope."[4]

Orientalism of this kind is an instance of what I call the *politics of knowledge*, the moral compromises intellectuals often make — unwillingly *or* willingly — over academic veracity in the real world if they want to be heard and get things done. I put forward this idea alongside the well-known and more benign notion of the "*sociology* of knowledge," where the assumptions implicitly involved in social knowledge conceptually blind the social scientist in his/her work. Said's account, rooted as it is in Michel Foucault's post-modernism, belongs to this species of critique. When Orientalist discourse is dissected, conscientious political considerations appear repeatedly alongside the more strictly paradigmatic problems of translation and interpretation.

Penis Envy

According to Karen Armstrong, formerly a Catholic nun herself, Christian sexual polemic against Islam came not coincidentally at the same time that Catholic Popes were *imposing* celibacy on their priests. Monks and priests hid (rather badly) their envy of the Islamic position on sex and marriage through such self-indulgent sexual polemic.[5] Besides polygamy the very idea of marriage in Islam was castigated because, God forbid, "desire" was seen by *that* religion as an appropriate reason for marriage, whereas in Christianity lust is a sin, *even* in the context of holy matrimony. Marriage is solely for the sake of procreation, with what the patriarchs got up to before Christianity conveniently swept all under the carpet.

This was partly a reflection of the ascetic, spiritualist, anti-material nature of Christianity, but the sexual angle was also deployed as a conscious propaganda tool, certainly of character assassination. Medieval tabloid journalism, as it were; (more on this below). It was even used to rationalize the successes of Islam in first defeating, then converting, the Christians of the holy lands. Muhammad was described as the "seducer" of Orthodox Christians through the fleshy delights of the Quranic paradise, which one Catholic preacher described as "not a Paradise at all, but a brothel, and the most obscene of places."[6] The same was said of Spanish Christians. The Arab identity of Muhammad added grist to the mill, with George Sale hundreds of years later saying: "Muhammad was, as the Arabs are by complexion, a great lover of women."[7]

Even the supposed irrationality of the Arab mind and the unscientific pretensions of Muslims also originate in the (Dark Age) European frame of mind, with polygamy and divorce condemned for being "illogical" and contrary to both scripture and "natural law." This emphasis on what Greek philosophy had to tell them about the irrationality of Islamic doctrines was aimed at protecting *pre*-Christian European civilization from Christianity itself as much as protecting the Christian faith from Islam.

U-turn

Then something changed. With the closing of the Middle Ages, polemic went from the defensive to the offensive as new horizons of possibilities opened themselves up with the global shift in power. Prior to the 17th century, with Europe as the proverbial Third World, Christian thinkers were more concerned with protecting their flock from the "temptations" of Islamdom. Christians took refuge in their anti-material spirituality. Even during the Crusades, missionaries to the holy lands were busy consoling the troops or (willingly) getting themselves martyred. The temporary shift in the military balance of power did not alter Islamophobia, leaving it as essentially propaganda designated strictly for *domestic* consumption.

The Crusaders thought of themselves as (absolutely) right, but they were quite well aware of their own primitiveness. The first generation of Crusaders had to be handed catapults by the Byzantines, catapults which they couldn't figure out how to use by themselves. Crusader kings even employed Muslim doctors. From the 17th century onwards — the voyages of discovery, the shift from feudalism to capitalism, the gunpowder revolution, etc. — Europe was on the move and the Arabs and Muslims were on the run.

The audience became "internationalized." Time now to civilize and convert *them* to *our* modern, advanced ways by using the polemical techniques of earlier times — scandalizing the sensuousness, despotism and irrationality of Islam. The polemicist put on the garb of the missionary; out to convert Muslims to the path of salvation and — critically — worldly prowess, confident that Islam's history of great creativity had now degenerated into, as Hegel famously put it, "Oriental ease and repose."[8] This is how, in European eyes, the Ottoman Empire was transformed from the "scourge of Christendom" to the "sick man of Europe," the expected result of Islam's (all of a sudden) flawed essence.

> The static picture of Islam (ironically) is rooted in hatred of Judaism.

Parallax Vision

THE LONG TERM RESULT OF THIS, psychologically, at the level of Western society is a kind of bipolar paradigm of the world, as Lawrence Davidson puts it, where the West is advanced and progressive while the East is backward and in need of guidance, on a Western socio-political model. This developmental dualism is accompanied by the moralistic notion that the West possesses the superior religion of Christianity, which is a "prerequisite" itself for democracy, industrial capitalism and free markets.[9] Europeans began confusing the superiority of the West with the superiority of Christianity, thinking that one led to the other, the Christian Dark Ages conveniently forgotten. Christians, as it were, began to feel their oats.

The kind of imperial narratives Said saw as constituting Orientalism originate in this period of Western ascendancy, the 18th and 19th centuries. This is all true but we must remember that the Muslims and Arabs were never really generically lumped into what we now call the Third World, at the *ideological* level. As missionary (and colonial official) William Muir made clear in his *The Mohammedan Controversy* (1897), the problem posed by Islam, unlike other "pagan" faiths, was its intellectual sophistication and stubborn resilience in the face of repeated attempts at conversion. He describes "Mohammedanism" as the only formidable antagonist to Christianity, in spite of Europe's colonial supremacy. They couldn't be dazzled into conversion with the "obvious" superiority of the white man's religion.

This is why many English Orientalists, such as Kenneth Cragg and W. Montgomery Watt, threw up their hands over converting Muslims and decided it was more fruitful to "reform" Islam itself, Christianize it from the inside out. They were open advocates of "secularizing" Islam on Protestant lines, long before Lewis.[10] Said's own immediate Orthodox ancestors were converted to Protestantism by waves of missionaries, who switched targets after failing dismally to convert Levantine Muslims and Jews. Muslims, in short, were deserving of "special" intellectual treatment, and, boy, did they get it.

A Pinch of Salt

THIS PARADIGMATIC DEVELOPMENT, however, conceals a political continuity with the antagonisms inherent in the polemical tradition. Orthodox Christians were considered as heretical as Muslims and Eastern Christians got their fair share of massacres, conquests and sacking from their Latin brethren during the Crusades. In the imperial era, with the geographical shift of Christian power, the Catholics lost their position as the prime representatives of Christianity. George Sale, for instance, felt it necessary to note — in the preface to his 1734 (sex-filled) translation of the Quran — that, while he sees no "danger from so manifest a forgery," it is the "protestants alone [who] are able to attack the

Koran with success; and for them, I trust, providence has reserved the glory of its overthrow."[11]

Max Weber's Protestant Work Ethic was directed at Catholics as much as it was against Muslims and other Orientals, a "rationalization" after-the-fact of the peculiar geographical rise of industrial capitalism. Much academic Orientalism, moreover, is really just disguised and updated anti-Semitism. What Hegel had to say about Islam was actually driven by an attempt to reconcile Christianity with the Enlightenment. This involved picking on the Orient as a convenient scapegoat for everything that was wrong with Europe prior to the Enlightenment. This took the form, interestingly, of *de-Judaizing* Christianity, leaving only the Greek rationalist tradition as a source for modern Christian civilization.

The Young Hegelians characterized Judaism as an "Oriental religion," static and irrationally wedded to its legalist past with peculiar, "archaic" customs — such as circumcision — that separated Jews off from everyone else. The static picture of Islam (ironically) is rooted in hatred of Judaism and one can see this in attempts to liken Allah to the vengeful, jealous God of the sword (supposedly) found in the Old Testament. The wellspring of the polemical tradition is also anti-Semitic to a considerable extent. John of Damascus himself designated the Muslims to be *Saracens* — meaning "empty of" or "away from Sarah" — and *Ishmaelites*,[12] drawing on St. Paul, in Galations 4, who describes Jews who reject Christ as Ishmaelites. They have become, ironically, the children of the slave Hagar and not worthy of their original status as children of Isaac through Sarah.[13]

Orientalists themselves, thus, are not too serious about Orientalism, using Islam as a talking point in their own domestic, European problems. Even Maxime Rodinson, an arch Orientalist himself, admitted that there was a Muhammad for every different ideological and philosophical group in Europe, with a socialist Muhammad for the socialists and a constitutional liberal one for the liberals, etc.[14] "All politics is local," as the saying goes. This is even truer of Orientalism in the arts. Ziauddin Sardar, much like Said, takes the poetry and plays of the *chansons de geste* much too seriously.[15] These amateur dramatists did take up the battle cry of a crusade against the polytheistic Muslims, with quite a few Trinitarian, 666 derogations of Islam, but they also generously peppered their stories with "both Christian and Saracen goodies and baddies."[16]

The Kipling Syndrome*

QUITE A FEW PLAYWRIGHTS, POETS AND NOVELISTS just used negative images of Islam as an indirect way to critique their own societies, attacking the authority of the Church or poking fun at the privileges of nobles when it came to concubines. This is even true of one of Edward Said's classical literary Orientalists, the infamous Rudyard Kipling. David Pinault notes a curious contradiction in how Kipling presents Muslims in his diverse writings. He admits to how orderly and obedient many Muslims and Indians are under the Raj in his journalistic scribblings for Lahore's *Civil and Military Gazette*. Yet his novella *On the City Wall* portrays them as unruly and fanatically violent, restrained only by the civilized Brits.[17]

Kipling knew, therefore, that Indians could very readily represent (and rule) themselves, but is that what his British audience wanted to hear? Kipling thus was tailoring the facts to an audience that would readily lap up what he had to

*I have adapted this term from Ekkehart Krippendorff's "Kissinger Syndrome," taken from his chapter, "The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations," in Hugh Dyer and Leon Margassarn, eds, *The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art,* (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 28-39. The term designates the kind of pressures and temptations the foreign policy intellectual is placed under when in a decision-making position. (Please see Markus Euskirchen's new Krippendorff blog, http://wbk.in-berlin.de/wp/?p=197).

say, spicing up the political point he was trying to make with generous dollops of violence, in tabloid fashion, and getting popular and rich in the process. (Interestingly enough, he takes a potshot at Catholicism along the way). And he's not the only one. If anything, this schizophrenic presentation of Islam is endemic of professional Orientalists to this day, an exemplary illustration being, once again, Bernard Lewis.

Ian Buruma of *The New Yorker* characterizes Lewis as having "Two Minds," something brought out by his latest work, *From Babel to Dragomans*. While a collection of older publications, this passage was notably absent:

> Islam is one of the world's great religions . . . Islam has brought comfort and peace of mind to countless millions of men and women . . . given dignity and meaning to drab and impoverished lives… taught people of different races to live in brotherhood and people of different creeds to live side by side in reasonable tolerance. It inspired a great civilization in which others besides Muslims lived creative and useful lives and which, by its achievement, enriched the whole world.[18]

In an interview with Elizabeth Wasserman in the *Atlantic Online*, Lewis goes as far as tearing the Oriental Despotism argument to shreds, even explicating an account of democracy in Islamic jurisprudential and philosophical terms![19] Buruma, then, is quite correct in arguing that Rashid Khalidi is wrong to lump Lewis in with the "enthusiastic ignorance and ideological blindness" that went into the Iraq War.[20]

The Punch-line

THERE IS CERTAINLY A GALLING IGNORANCE of Islam and Arabs in Bush circles — while Bush is ignorant of almost everything — but what is actually taking place is something quite different. Orientalist stereotypes are being dredged up as propaganda tools by non-Orientalists while the proper Orientalists themselves, many of whom know better, have decided to hop onto the bandwagon as well to temper the excesses of the ideologues and play a part in making history, even if that means compromising on their true opinions. There is little difference, then, between Bernard Lewis and Colin Powell in this regard, both backtracking on former positions following 9/11, and for the most noble of motives.

Therefore, I believe that the conceptual schema I put forward of the two separate dynamics behind Orientalism — the sociological and the political, paradigmatic misinterpretation and willful derision — with their common polemical origins provides a more accurate account than Said's of this persistent phenomenon. Not that we should take it *too* seriously. Orientalism may be a chimera altogether, just an excuse for a handful of intellectuals who can neither hack it in the real world — like most intellectuals — nor in the cloistered world of academia.

This forces them to seek glory, fame and *influence* in other quarters instead. The international target audience of Islam, following the missionary transformations of the 18th-19th centuries, becomes a psychological substitute for what academics value the most — the respect of their peers. I speak as an academic who faces the self same temptations. I just take my pathology out on my students!

Special thanks to Lawrence Davidson, Maria Rosa Menocal, Markus Euskirchen, Hugh Nicol and Glada Lahn.

NOTES

1. Please see Uri Avner, "Muhammad's sword: Pope Benedict XVI in the service of George W. Bush," www.informationclearinghouse.info/article15089.htm, 24 September 2006.

2. Please see Jabal Muhammad Buaben, *Image of the Prophet Muhammad in the West: A Study of Muir, Margoliouth and Watt,* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1996) and Mervyn Hiskett, *Some to Mecca Turn to Pray: Islamic Values and the Modern World,* (St. Albans: Claridge P, 1993).

3. Norman Daniel, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*, (Oxford: Oneworld, 1993), Rev. ed., p. 12; Un-

less otherwise noted, all italics are mine.

4. Abbot Hope-in-God, quoted in Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 339.

5. Please see Armstrong, "The Future of Islam in the West," English Public Lecture delivered at the American University in Cairo, 12 December 2006.

6. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 19.

7. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 322.

8. Hegel, quoted in Bryan S. Turner's masterful, *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1978), p. 8.

9. Lawrence Davidson, "Christian Zionism and American Foreign Policy: Paving the Road to Hell in Palestine," *Logos 4.1* – Winter 2005, p. 1-10.

10. Please see Ziauddin Sardar, *Orientalism*, (Buckingham: Open UP, 1999).

11. George Sale, *The Koran, or Alcoran of Mohammed: With Explanatory Notes and Readings from Savary's Version also Preliminary Discourse*, (London: Frederick Warne, 1734), p. V.

12. Oleg Grabar, "The Umayyad Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem," *Ars Orientalis*, 1959, 3, p. 44.

13. "Tell me, you who want to be under the law, are you not aware of what the law says? For it is written that Abraham had two sons, one by the slave woman and the other by the free woman. His son by the slave woman was born in the ordinary way; but his son by the free woman was born as the result of a promise. These things may be taken figuratively, for the women represent two covenants. One covenant is from Mount Sinai and bears children who are to be slaves: This is Hagar. Now Hagar stands for Mount Sinai in Arabia and corresponds to the present city of Jerusalem, because she is in slavery with her children. But the Jerusalem that is above is free, and she is our mother . . . Now you, brothers, like Isaac, are children of promise." *Galatians* 4:21-28, quoted in Rev. Stephen R. Sizer, "Christian Zionism: Justifying Apartheid in the Name of God," *Evangelical Theological Society, Colorado Springs, Defining Evangelicalism's Boundaries*, 14-16, November 2001, www.albushra.org/ecu-inter/sizer.html, p. 24.

14. Please see Fred Halliday's discussion of Oriental mystique in his *Islam and the myth of confrontation: religion and politics in the Middle East*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

15. Please see Sardar's other major work on Orientalism, with Merryl Wyn Davies, *Distorted Imagination: Lessons from the Rushdie Affair*, (London: Grey Seal, 1990).

16. Daniel, *Islam and the West*, p. 342.

17. David Pinault, *The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1992), p. 66-69, for Kipling's journalistic writings and p. 69-72 for *On the City Wall*.

18. Quoted in Ian Buruma, "Lost in Translation: The Two Minds of Bernard Lewis," *The New Yorker*, Vol. 80, No. 16, 14 June 2004, p. 185.

19. Elizabeth Wasserman, "Islam's Interpreter," *The Atlantic Online*, 29 April 2004, www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200404u/int2004-04-29, p. 1-10.

20. Khalidi is Edward Said Chair in Arab Studies at Columbia and author of *Resurrecting Empire: Western Footprints and America's Perilous Path in the Middle East*. The quotation above comes from Philip S. Golub's review, "The Wasteland of Empire," *Logos 3.3* – Summer 2004, p. 141.

Marx and Weber: Critics of Capitalism

Michael Löwy

In spite of their undeniable differences, Marx and Weber have much in common in their understanding of modern capitalism: they both perceive it as a system where "the individuals are ruled by abstractions" (Marx), where the impersonal and "thing-like" (*Versachlicht*) relations replace the personal relations of dependence, and where the accumulation of capital becomes an end in itself, largely irrational.

Their analysis of capitalism cannot be separated from a critical position, explicit in Marx, more ambivalent in Weber. But the content and inspiration of the criticism are very different. And, above all, while Marx wagers on the possibility of overcoming capitalism thanks to a socialist revolution, Weber is rather a fatalist and resigned observer, studying a mode of production and administration that seems to him inevitable.

The anti-capitalist critique is one of the main force-fields which run across Marx's work from the begining to the end, giving it its coherence. This does not prevent the existence of a certain evolution: while the *Communist Manifesto* (1848) insists on the historically progressive role of the bourgeoisie, *Capital* (1867) is more inclined to denounce the ignominies of the system. The usual opposition between an "ethical" young Marx and a "scientific" one of the mature years is unable to account for this development.

Marx's anti-capitalism is based on certain values or criteria, generally implicit:

a) universal ethical values: freedom, equality, justice, self-accomplishment. The combination among these various human values builds a coherent whole, which one could name *revolutionary humanism*, that functions as the main guiding principle for the ethical condemnation of the capitalist system.

Moral indignation against the infamies of capitalism is obvious in all chapters of *Capital*: it is an essential dimension of what gives such an impressive power to the book. As Lucien Goldmann wrote, Marx does not "mix" value and fact judgements, but develops a dialectical analysis where explanation, comprehension and evaluation are rigorously inseparable.

b) the viewpoint of the proletariat, victim of the system and its potential gravedigger. As Marx clearly asserted in his preface to *Capital,* this class perspective is at the root of his critique of bourgeois political economy. It is from this social viewpoint that values as "justice" are reinterpreted: their concrete meaning is not the same according to the situation and the interests of different classes.

c) the possibility of an emancipated future, of a post-capitalist society, of a communist utopia. It is on the light of the hypothesis — or the wager, according to Lucien Goldmann — of a free association of producers that the negative features of capitalism appear in all their enormity.

d) the existence, in the past, of more egalitarian, or democratic, social and cultural forms, destroyed by capitalist "progress." This argument, of Romantic origin, is present for instance in all Marx and Engels' writings on primitive communism, a form of communitarian life without commodity, State, or private property and without patriarchal oppression of women.

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The existence of these values does not mean that Marx holds a Kantian perspective, opposing a transcendental ideal to the existing reality: his critique is *immanent*, in so far as it is developed in the name of a real social force opposed to capitalism — the working class — and in the name of the contradiction between the potentialities created by the rise of productive forces and the limitations imposed by the bourgeois productive relations.

Marx's anti-capitalist critique is organised around five fundamental issues: the injustice of exploitation, the loss of liberty through alienation, venal (mercantile) quantification, irrationality, and modern barbarism. Let us examine briefly these issues, emphasizing the less known ones:

1) The injustice of exploitation. The capitalist system is based, independently of this or that economic policy, on the workers' unpaid surplus labour, source, as "surplus value," of all the forms of rent and profit. The extreme manifestations of this social injustice are the exploitation of children, starvation wages, inhuman labour hours, and miserable life conditions for the proletarians. But whatever the worker's condition at this or that historical moment, the system itself is intrinsically unjust, because it is parasitic and exploits the labour force of the direct producers. This argument takes a central place in *Capital* and was essential in the formation of the Marxist labour movement.

2) The loss of liberty through alienation, reification, commodity fetishism. In the capitalist mode of production, the individuals — and in particular the labourers — are submitted to the domination of their own products, which take the form of autonomous fetishes (idols) and escape their control. This issue is extensively dealt with in Marx's early writings, but also in the famous chapter on commodity fetishism in *Capital*.

At the heart of Marx's analysis of alienation is the idea that capitalism is a sort of disenchanted "religion," where commodities replace divinity: "The more the workers estranges himself in his labour, the more the estranged, objective world he has created becomes powerful, while he becomes impoverished . . . The same happens in religion. The more man puts things in God, the less he keeps in himself . . . The concept of fetishism itself refers to the history of religion, to the primitive forms of idolatry, which already contain the principle of all religious phenomena.

> Marx : capitalism is disenchanted religion where commodities replace divinity.

It is not by chance that liberation theologians, such as Hugo Assmann, Franz Hinkelammert and Enrique Dussel, extensively quote from Marx's writings against capitalist alienation and commodity fetishism in their denunciation of the "market idolatry."

3) The venal (mercantile) quantification of social life. Capitalism, regulated by exchange value, the calculation of profits and the accumulation of capital, tends to dissolve and destroy all qualitative values: use values, ethical values, human relations, human feelings. Having replaces Being, and only subsists the monetary payment — the *cash nexus* according to the famous expression of Carlyle which Marx takes up — and the "icy waters of egoistic calculation" (*Communist Manifesto*).

Now, the struggle against quantification and Mammonism — another term used by Carlyle — is one of the key *loci* of Romanticism. Like the Romantic critics of the modern bourgeois civilisation, Marx believed that capitalism has introduced, in this respect, a profound degradation of social relations, and an ethical regression in relation to pre-capitalist societies:

> At last, the time has come in which all that

> human beings had considered as inalienable has become the object of exchange, of traffic, and may be alienated. It is a time when the very things which before were conveyed, but never bartered; given, but never sold; conquered, but never purchased — virtue, love, opinion, science, conscience, etc. — when, in short, everything has finally become tradable. It is a time of generalized corruption, universal venality or, to speak in terms of political economy, the time when anything, moral or physical, receives a venal value, and may be taken to market to be appraised for its appropriate value.

The power of money is one of the most brutal expressions of this capitalist quantification: it distorts all "human and natural qualities," by submitting them to the monetary measure: "The quantity of money becomes more and more the unique and powerful property of the human being; at the same time that it reduces all being to its abstraction, it reduces itself in its own movement to a quantitative being."

4) The irrational nature of the system. The periodical crises of overproduction that shake the capitalist system reveal its irrationality — "absurdity" is the term used in the *Manifesto:* the existence of "too many means of subsistence" while the majority of the population lacks the necessary minimum. This global irrationality is not contradictory, of course, with a partial and local rationality, at the level of the production management of each factory.

5) Modern barbarism. To some extent, capitalism is the bearer of historical progress, particularly by the exponential development of the productive forces, creating therefore the material conditions for a new society, a world of freedom and solidarity. But, at the same time, it is also a force of social regression, in so far as it "makes of each economic progress a public calamity." Considering some of the most sinister manifestations of capitalism such as the poor laws or the workhouses — those "workers Bastilles" — Marx wrote in 1847 the following surprising and prophetic passage, which seems to announce the Frankfurt School: "Barbarism re-appears, but this time it is created inside civilization itself and is an integral part of it. This is the leprous barbarism, barbarism as the leper of civilization."

All these criticisms are intimately linked: they refer to each other, they presuppose each other, and they are combined in a global anti-capitalist vision, which is one of the distinctive features of Marx as a communist thinker.

On two other issues — which are today of the greatest topicality — Marx's anti-capitalist critique is more ambiguous or insufficient:

6) The colonial and/or imperialist expansion of capitalism, the violent and cruel domination of the colonized people, their forced submission to the imperatives of capitalist production and the accumulation of capital. One can perceive in Marx a certain evolution in this respect: if, in the *Manifesto,* he seems to celebrate as a progress the submission of the "peasant" or "barbarian" (sic) nations to the bourgeois civilization, in his writings on the British colonization of India the somber aspect of the Western domination is taken into account — but still considered as a necessary evil.

It is only in *Capital*, particularly in the chapter on primitive accumulation of capital, that one finds a really radical critique of the horrors of colonial expansion: the submission or extermination of the indigenous people, the wars of conquest, the slave trade. These "horrifying barbarisms and atrocities" — which according to Marx, quoting M.W. Howitt, "have no parallel in any other era of universal history, in any other race, however savage, brutal, pitiless and shameless" — are not simply presented as the cost of historical progress, but clearly denounced as an "infamy."

7) The *Manifesto* rejoices with the domination of nature made possible by the expansion of capitalist civilization. It is only later, particularly in *Capital*, that the aggression of the capitalist mode of production against the

natural environment is taken into consideration. In a well known passage, Marx suggests a parallel between the exhaustion of labor and of land by the destructive logic of capital:

> Each progress of the capitalist agriculture is not only a progress in the art of exploiting the worker, but also in the art of plundering the soil; each short term progress in fertility is a progress in the long term destruction of the basis of this fertility. (. .) Capitalist production thus only develops . . . but at the same time exhausting the two springs from which flow all wealth: the land and the laborer." One can see here the expression of a really dialectical view of progress — also suggested by the ironical way the word is used — which could be the starting point for a systematic ecological thinking, but this was not to be developed by Marx.

QUITE DIFFERENT is Max Weber's approach. His attitude towards capitalism is much more ambivalent and contradictory. One could say that he is divided between his identity as a bourgeois which fully supports German capitalism and its imperial power, and his statute as an intellectual, sensitive to the arguments of the Romantic anti-capitalist *Zivilisationskritik* so influential among the German academic mandarins at the begining of the 20th century. From this viewpoint, he could be compared to another split — if not schizophrenic — German bourgeois/intellectual: Walther Rathenau, Prussian and Jew, capitalist entrepreneur and sharp critic of the mechanical civilization.

Rejecting any socialist idea, Weber does not hesitate, on some occasions, to use apologetic arguments in defense of capitalism. This is particularly obvious in his description, in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, of the origins of capitalism as the result of Protestant work ethic, i.e., the combination of hard work, methodic economic activity, frugal life and the reinvestment of savings: a description which is very close to the idealized self image of the bourgeois! Usually he seems to lean towards a resigned acceptance of bourgeois civilization, not as desirable, but as inevitable. However, in some key texts, which had a very significant impact on 20th century thought, he gives free rein to a insightful, pessimistic and radical critique of the paradoxes of capitalist rationality. According to the sociologist Derek Sayer, "to a certain extent his critique of capitalism, as a life negating force, is sharper than Marx's." This is an exaggerated assessment, but it is true that some of Weber's arguments touch at the foundations of the modern industrial/capitalist civilization.

Obviously, the issues raised by Weber are quite different from those of Marx. Weber ignores exploitation, is not interested in economic crisis, has little sympathy for the struggles of the proletariat, and does not question colonial expansion. However, influenced by the Romantic or Nietzschean *Kulturpessimismus*, he perceives a deep contradiction between the requirements of the formal modern rationality — of which bureaucracy and private enterprise are concrete manifestations — and those of the acting subject's autonomy. Distancing himself from Enlightenment's rationalist tradition, he is sensitive to the contradictions and limits of modern rationality, as it expresses itself in capitalist economy and state administration: its formal and instrumental character and its tendency to produce effects that lead to the reversal of the emancipatory aspirations of modernity. The search for calculation and efficiency at any price leads to the bureaucratization and reification of human activities. This diagnosis of modernity's crisis will be, to a large extent, taken over by the Frankfurt School in its first period (Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse).

What is striking in Weber's pessimistic/resigned assessment of modernity is its refusal of the illusions of progress which were so powerful in the European consciousness at the beginning of the 20th century. Here is, for instance, what he said in one of his last public interventions in 1919: "It is not the flowering of Summer that is waiting for us, but a polar night, icy, somber and rude." This pessimism is inseparable from a critical view of the nature itself of capitalism and its dynamics of rationalisation/modernisation.

> Weber's attitude towards capitalism is much more ambivalent and contradictory.

One can distinguish two aspects — intimately linked between them — in Weber's critique of the substance itself of the capitalist system:

1) The inversion between means and ends. For the spirit of capitalism, of which Benjamin Franklin is an ideal-typical figure — almost chemically pure! — to win money, to gather more and more money (to accumulate capital would say Marx) is the supreme good and the ultimate aim in life:

> The pursuit of riches is fully stripped of all pleasurable, and surely all hedonistic aspects. Accordingly, this striving becomes understood completely as an end in itself — to such an extent that it appears as fully outside the normal course of affairs and simply irrational, at least when viewed from the perspective of the 'happiness' or 'utility' of the single individual. Here, people are oriented to acquisition as the purpose of life: acquisition is no longer viewed as a means to the end of satisfying the substantive needs of life. Those people in possession of spontaneous (*unbefangene*) dispositions experience this situation as an absolutely meaningless reversal of 'natural' conditions (as we would say today). Yet, this reversal constitutes just as surely a guiding principle of [modern] capitalism as incomprehension of this new situation characterizes all who remain untouched by [modern] capitalism's tentacles."

Supreme expression of modern aim-oriented rationality — Weber's *Zweckrationalität* or, according to the Frankfurt School, instrumental rationality — capitalist economy reveals itself, from the viewpoint of the "substantive needs of life." or of human happiness, as "simply irrational" or "absolutely meaningless." Weber returns several times to this issue in *The Protestant Ethic,* always insisting on the *irrationality* — his emphasis — of the logic of capitalist accumulation: a comparison between the spirit of capitalism and economic traditionalism — for whom business is simply "indispensable to life" — "renders obvious the *irrationality*, from the viewpoint of one's personal happiness, of this way of organising life: people live for their business rather than the reverse."

Of course Weber believes that this "absurd" and "irrational" system has its own formidable rationality: his remarks show nevertheless a deep critical distance towards the spirit of capitalism. Obviously two forms of rationality are in conflict here: one, the *Zweckrationalität*, purely formal and instrumental, whose only aim is, in capitalism, production for production, accumulation for accumulation, money for money; the other, more substantial, which corresponds to the — pre-capitalist — "natural conditions," and refers to values (*Wertrationalität*) such as: people's happiness, the satisfaction of their needs.

This definition of capitalism as irrational is not without certain affinities with Marx' ideas. The subordination of the aim — the human being — to the means — the enterprise, money, commodity — is an argument that comes very near to the Marxist concept of alienation. Weber was conscious of this similarity, and refers to it in his 1918 conference on socialism: "All this [the impersonnal functioning of capital] is what socialism defines as the 'domination of things over the human beings.' which means: the means over the aim (the satisfaction of the needs)." This explains, by the way, why Lukacs' theory of reification in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923) is based on both Marx and

Weber.

2) The submission to an all powerful mechanism, the emprisonment in a systèm which oneself has created. This issue is intimately related to the former one, but it emphasizes the loss of freedom, the decline of individual autonomy. The *locus classicus* of this criticism is to be found in the last paragraphs of *The Protestant Ethic*, doubtless the most famous and influential passage of Weber's work — and one of the rare moments where he permitted himself what he calls "value and faith judgements."

First of all Weber considers, with a resigned nostalgia, that the triumph of the modern capitalist spirit requires the "renunciation of the Faustian multi-dimensionality of the human species." The acknowledgment of the rise of the bourgeois era has, for Goethe — as for Weber — the meaning of a "farewell to an era of full and beautiful humanity."

On the other hand, capitalist rationality creates a more and more constraining and coercive context: "The Puritan *wanted* to be a person with a vocational calling; today we are *forced* to be." The modern — capitalist — economic order, with its technical conditions of mechanical and machine production, "determines the style of life of all individuals born into it, *not* only those directly engaged in earning a living." This constraint, Weber compares it with a sort of prison, or "iron cage," where the system of rational production encloses the individuals: "According to Baxter [a Puritan preacher — ML] the concern for material goods should lie upon the shoulders of his saints like 'a lightweight coat that could be thrown off at any time.' Yet fate allowed a steel-hard casing (*stahlhartes Gehäuse*) to be forged from this coat."

The expression became famous. It strikes by its tragic resignation, but also by its critical dimension. There are different interpretations or translations for the words *sthahlhartes Gehäuse:* for some it is a "casing" for others a "shell" or a "cell." But is is probable that Weber borrowed the image of an "iron cage of despair" from the English Puritan poet Bunyan. In any case, it seems to describe, in the *Protestant Ethic*, the reified structures of capitalist economy as a sort of steel-hard prison — rigid, cold and pitiless.

Weber's pessimism leads him to fear the end of all values and ideals, and the advent, under the aegis of modern capitalism, of a "mechanized ossification, embellished with a sort of rigidly compelled sense of self-importance." He foresees the process of reification as extending, from the economic sphere, to all areas of social life: politics, law, culture.

Well before the Frankfurt School, Karl Löwith had already grasped, in his brilliant 1932 essay on Weber and Marx, the "dialectics of reason" at work in the Weberian critique of capitalism, and its affinity with the Marxian one:

> The peculiar irrationality formed within the process of rationalisation (. . .) also appears to Weber in terms of this relation between means and ends, which for him is the basis for the concepts of rationality and freedom — namely, in terms of a reversal of this relation. (. . .) Means as ends make themselves independent and thus lose their original 'meaning' or purpose, that is, they lose their original purposive rationality oriented to man and his needs. This reversal marks the whole of modern civilization, whose arrangements, institutions and activities are so 'rationalised,' that whereas humanity once established itself within them, now it is they which enclose and determine humanity like an 'iron cage.' Human conduct, from which these institutions originally arose, must now in turn adapt to its own creation which has escaped the control of the creator.
>
> Weber himself declared that here lies the real problem of culture — rationalisation towards the irrational — and that he and Marx agreed in the definition of this problem but differed in its evaluation. (. . .) This paradoxical inversion — this 'tragedy of culture,' as Simmel has termed it — becomes most clearly evident when it occurs in exactly the type of activity whose innermost intention is that it be spe-

> cifically rational, namely, in *economically* rational activity. And precisely here it becomes plainly apparent that, and how, behaviour which is purely purposive-rational in intention turns inexorably into its own opposite in the process of its rationalisation.

TO CONCLUDE: what Weber, unlike Marx, did not grasp, is the domination, over human activities, of exchange value. The mechanisms of valorisation and the automatisms inscribed in the commodity exchange lead to a monetarisation of social relations. The sociologue from Heidelberg does not conceive the possibility of replacing the alienated logic of self-valorising value by a democratic control of production.

Both Weber and Marx shared the idea of a substantial irrationality of the capitalist system — which is not contradictory with its formal or partial rationality. Both refer to religion to try to understand this irrationality.

For Weber, what one has to explain is the origin of this irrationalism, this "reversal of natural conditions," and the explanation he proposes refers to the decisive influence of certain religious representations: the Protestant ethic.

For Marx, the origin of capitalism does not relate to any religious ethics, but to a brutal process of plundering, murder and exploitation, which he describes with the term "the primitive accumulation of capital." The reference to religion plays, however, a significant rôle in explaining the logic of capitalism as "reversal." It is not a causal relationship, as in Weber, but rather a structural affinity: irrationality is an intrinsic, immanent and essential feature of the capitalist mode of production as an alienated process, and as such it has a structural resemblance with religious alienation: in both cases, the human beings are dominated by their own products — respectively Capital (money, commodities) and God.

Exploring the elective affinities between the Weberian and the Marxist criticisms of capitalism, and combining them in an original way, Lukacs produced the theory of reification, and Adorno/Horkheimer the critique of instrumental reason — two of the most important and radical theoretical innovations of 20th century's Western Marxist thought.

A fully footnoted version will be found on our website, www.newpol.org.

The Militarization of Police

WE HAVE A NEW CULTURE of police oppression fittingly described as militarization.

• The first SWAT teams were organized after the 1965 Watts riots, an experiment to train police in mass formations.

• In 1967 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration was set up as a result of the rioting. It set up a three-year project called the California Specialized Training Institute run by the Army Combat Command. It trained police in military weaponry and tactics.

• In the early 1980s Ronald Reagan enlisted the military in the so-called "drug war." He involved the National Guard in marijuana cases and beefed up efforts to train police in exercises using military vehicles.

• The Justice Department and the Defense Department created the Technology Transfer Amendments in 1995, which legalized the process of militarizing police to officially fight terrorism but unofficially to silence protesters against powerful corporate interests.

• In the last decade even the smallest and most peaceful demonstrations have been met by violent intolerance by law officers. SWAT teams, once reactive, are now proactive in policing. At the 1990 WTA conference in Seattle, hundreds convened to protest the WTO peacefully. Still, the city mayor declared a "state of civil emergency" — one step short of marshal law. SWAT teams corralled protesters, sweeping them away in mass arrests while setting up a "command post" at the local Ramada. Meanwhile, the protesters were divided in two crowds: the peaceful protesters, and a small minority of vandals who willfully set out to damage property. Interestingly, the police arrested the peaceful protesters while leaving the vandals free to do their business. Why? To videotape the second group as part of a PR-scheme meant to fabricate impressions that all protesters are "trouble-makers," thus justifying violent police action.

• The Fourth Amendment is now flouted to the extent of 80 percent of house arrests involving "no knock" warrants. SWAT teams either don't knock before entering or they knock lightly and then blow doors down with detonation devices.

RICHARD HIATT

The Campaign for Peace & Democracy

Iran: Neither U.S. Aggression Nor Theocratic Repression

A CALL FOR A NEW, DEMOCRATIC U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

This statement was revised on May 15, 2006

Please join Michael Albert, Tom Ammiano, Stanley Aronowitz, Rosalyn Baxandall, Medea Benjamin, Eileen Boris, Jeremy Brecher, Noam Chomsky, Ariel Dorfman, Martin Duberman, Rusti Eisenberg, Carlos R. Espinosa, Gertrude Ezorsky, Samuel Farber, Mansour Farhang, Barry Finger, Barbara Garson, Larry Gross, Mina Hamilton, Thomas Harrison, Howie Hawkins, Michael Hirsch, Adam Hochschild, Nancy Holmstrom, Doug Ireland, Melissa Jameson, Jahanshah Javid, Joy Kallio, Robin D. G. Kelley, Larry Kramer, Joanne Landy, Jesse Lemisch, John Leonard, Sue Leonard, Rabbi Michael Lerner, Nelson Lichtenstein, Norman MacAfee, Marvin & Betty Mandell, David McReynolds, David Oakford, Barbara Watson Pillsbury, Henry Pillsbury, Frances Fox Piven, Nancy Romer, Ruth Rosen, Peter Rothberg, Matthew Rothschild, Jennifer Scarlott, Jay Schaffner, Sydney Schanberg, Jason Schulman, Stephen R. Shalom, Wallace Shawn, Meredith Tax, Lois Weiner, Cora Weiss, Peter Weiss, Naomi Weisstein, Cornel West, Edmund White, Reginald Wilson, Julia Wrigley, and Howard Zinn in signing this statement.

Thank you, Joanne Landy, Thomas Harrison, Jennifer Scarlott, Co-Directors, CPD

JUST AS IT DID BEFORE ITS INVASION OF IRAQ, the Bush administration is manufacturing a climate of fear in order to prepare public opinion for another act of aggression — this time against Iran. Three years ago it was the specter of Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction; today it's the threat of a possible Iranian nuclear bomb. Washington's immediate goal is to get the U.N. Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran and, in all probability, to justify a military attack on Tehran's nuclear facilities — a job that may be outsourced to Israel. The White House even insists on keeping the catastrophic "nuclear option" on the table — that is, using tactical nuclear weapons to strike Iranian nuclear facilities, many of which are located in or near civilian population centers. Although a full-scale invasion of Iran is highly unlikely at the moment, there can be little doubt that the neoconservatives in the Bush administration have a grand strategy that includes, eventually, "regime change" in Tehran as a way of further enlarging U.S. imperial power.

We strongly oppose the U.S. occupation of Iraq: it has brought appalling suffering to the Iraqi people with fatalities in the tens of thousands, descent into civil war and the strengthening of the most authoritarian elements in Iraqi society — as well as more than 2,400 U.S. soldiers dead and thousands more wounded. Likewise, the U.S. government's attempts to bully Iran are succeeding mainly in terrorizing the Iranian people and weakening internal opposition to the mullahs. The Bush administration's claim that it is promoting democracy in these two countries is the grossest hypocrisy; its only interest is power and control of oil resources. We, on the other hand, care very much about the ability of the Iraqi and Iranian people to control their own societies, about civil liberties and the rights of women, gays, workers, and ethnic minorities there. That is why we raise our voices against the current threats to Iran and call for immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq.

We too would like to see a regime change in Tehran, but one brought about by the Iranian people themselves, not by Washington. For 26 years Iran has been ruled by a repressive theocracy. Behind the formal trappings of democracy, real power is held by an un-elected oligarchy of clerics; all electoral candidates must receive their approval, and their authority is enforced by gangs of religious thugs. President Ahmadinejad is a Holocaust denier who has called for the elimination of Israel.

Iranian women lack some of the most basic human rights. They cannot dress, work, travel or choose spouses freely. "Honor killing" is legal, and by law women can be hanged or stoned to death for "unchaste behavior." Millions of Iranian women find ways to at least partly circumvent these restrictions, and relatively few suffer the most extreme penalties. Women vote and sit in parliament, and there are significant numbers of women both in university and at the workplace. But the fact remains that there are few countries in the world where women face legal handicaps as severe as those in Iran.

Workers who try to strike or form independent trade unions are often violently put down. Large numbers of workers have not been paid for months and in some cases for years. Attempts to organize are frequently attacked by club- and knife-wielding mercenaries, security forces and the military. Despite this repression, workers are continuing to organize, however, and independent unions are gaining a foothold.

As in many countries, homosexuality is outlawed, but Tehran has gone further than most by making homosexual conduct by men or women punishable by death and unleashing a vicious pogrom against Iranian gays, many of whom have been tortured, beaten, and publicly executed. The government is carrying on a massive campaign of entrapment through the Internet; victims are subjected to constant surveillance, loss of employment, arrest, and violent blackmail that forces them to reveal the names of other homosexuals. Torture is used to make gay people confess to crimes they never committed. The basiji and other religious parapolice forces kidnap gay people, who are sequestered and tortured until they name names. Gays on the government's lists are forbidden to leave the country. And now Iran has exported its violent anti-gay crusade to Iraq.

In recent years there has been growing resistance within Iranian society, particularly from workers fighting privatization and unemployment and young people chafing against social and political repression. This resistance holds the promise of bringing grassroots democratic change to Iran. The threat of military action or broader and harsher sanctions from outside — and especially the horrifying menace of nuclear strikes — only serve to rally people around the regime and to give it another excuse to clamp down on dissent, inhibiting a potentially revolutionary process and strengthening the right-wing clerics. U.S. threats have already served to legitimize nuclear weapons to the Iranian people.

Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has the right to develop civilian nuclear power, though the Bush administration has tried to obscure this fact. Many of us oppose the use of nuclear power by any country, both for environmental reasons and because of its link to nuclear weapons — but that is not the issue in the present U.S.-Iran confrontation. While there is reason to doubt Tehran's assurances that it only wants to develop civilian nuclear energy, Iran is probably still several years away from being able to produce nuclear weapons. And if Tehran acquires the bomb, it is unlikely that the ayatollahs, who hold decisive power, would use it since it would be suicidal to do so. Israel alone has between 200 and 300 nuclear warheads capable of striking Iran, and this is not counting the thousands of warheads the U.S. can launch at Iran. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that Iran, or any other state armed with nuclear weapons, won't use them or make them available to others. As long as these barbaric weapons exist, they can be used, and the more countries that possess them the more likely it is over time that they will be used.

We therefore strongly oppose any effort by Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons. But as long as a handful of nations arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to possess nuclear weapons, the have-nots will always be able to point to the threat posed by the nuclear powers and will constantly seek to acquire such weapons for themselves — as North Korea has already done, withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. Likewise, Iran, which has been menaced by the U.S. for more than two decades and was a charter member of Bush's "axis of evil," may opt out of the NPT.

An end to Washington's belligerence is a crucial step in preventing Tehran from joining the nuclear "club." Beyond that, the only way to stop proliferation is for those countries that have nuclear weapons to begin disarming — something the Bush administration and previous administrations of both parties have refused to do, despite the fact that the U.S. is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which commits it to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." At the same time the nuclear powers must work toward nuclear-free zones around the world, but especially in the Middle East, a particularly volatile and dangerous region.

We call for a new democratic U.S. foreign policy that would deal with the threat posed to all of us by terrorist networks, and by weapons of mass destruction, and promote real democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, by:

• Renouncing the use of military intervention to extend and consolidate U.S. imperial power, and withdrawing U.S. troops and bases from the Middle East.

• Ending U.S. support for authoritarian and corrupt regimes, e.g. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Egypt.

• Opposing all forms of terrorism worldwide — by Al Qaeda, Iraqi death squads, and Palestinian suicide bombers, and by U.S.-backed forces like the Colombian paramilitaries and the Israeli military in the Occupied Territories — as well as the brutality and humiliation inflicted on Iraqis every day by U.S. occupation forces and Washington's ominous threats against Iran.

• Supporting the right of national self-determination for all peoples in the Middle East, including the Kurds, Palestinians and Israeli Jews. Ending support for Israeli occupation of the West Bank and oppression of the Palestinian people.

• Taking unilateral steps toward renouncing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, and vigorously promoting international disarmament treaties, instead of obstructing even minimal efforts to end the arms race.

• Abandoning the effort to impose, through the IMF/World Bank or unilaterally, neoliberal economic policies of privatization and austerity that bring mass misery to people in large parts of the world. Initiating a major foreign aid program directed at popular rather than corporate needs.

The majority of people in this country now believe that the invasion of Iraq was disastrously wrong and that they were systematically lied to by the Bush Administration about the reasons for going to war, and they are wary of new U.S. military intervention in the Middle East. At the same time, the administration's scare tactics may succeed in generating popular support for aerial attacks on Iran. It is therefore imperative to speak out now against Washington's threats, to educate public opinion, and to build organized opposition to aggression against Iran, as well as support for immediate, complete withdrawal from Iraq. It is time to demand a new democratic U.S. foreign policy that genuinely expresses solidarity with the aspirations of people for liberty everywhere, renounces once and for all imperial intervention, and is committed to real disarmament.

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In Search of Economic Justice: A Reply

ROBIN HAHNEL

FIRST OF ALL, I want to thank Steve Shalom for probing the themes discussed in my book, *Economic Justice and Democracy: From Competition to Cooperation* (Routledge, 2005) at great length and depth in his review essay published in the Winter 2006 issue of *New Politics*. It was in hope of stimulating the kind of thoughtful dialogue his essay exemplifies that I wrote my book in the first place. I also want to thank him for his excellent, comprehensive summary of what is covered in the book. He and *New Politics* have done a better job of telling interested readers what they will find in my book than I could have.

I will not take time to comment on the many points where Shalom expresses or expands upon points of agreement between us. Instead I will confine my response to areas where Shalom disagrees with my analysis or recommendations. Since — unlike Shalom in his review essay — I take up only points of *dis*agreement, I hasten to caution readers not to infer from my reply that I believe there are fundamental disagreements between myself and Shalom. Quite the contrary, Shalom and I seem to be in close agreement about economic justice and democracy, and about what it will take to replace the economics of competition and greed with the economics of equitable cooperation.

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Economic Justice

I ARGUED THAT ECONOMIC *JUSTICE* requires that people be compensated according to the sacrifices they make in work, but for an economy to be *humane* people's basic needs must be provided for in any case. While he is in broad agreement, Shalom writes "I'm not sure this distinction is compelling." Frankly, neither am I. Treating consumption based on sacrifice as a matter of justice and consumption based on need as a matter of humanity is probably overly simplistic. Let me explain what I was thinking, and then qualify my conclusions in light of Shalom's criticism.

In any economy there are a large number of people who are able to work, who are expected to work, and who do work. My principal concern was how regular members of the workforce should be compensated. After discussing a number of alternatives at great length, I concluded that the system of compensating people who work is fair if and only if the rewards a worker receives are commensurate with the sacrifices the worker makes. I shortened this conclusion to "economic justice requires reward according to sacrifice," and later in the book "reward according to sacrifice" was listed as one of the defining features of the theoretical model I advocate known as a participatory economy.

However, in real world economies we must also decide what consumption rights should be given people who, for a variety of reasons, do not work. There must be rules for judging who is able and expected to work, and who is deemed not able, or not expected to work for some reason. After which, consumption levels must be set for those who are not expected to work and for those who are deemed able but who are, nonetheless, unwilling to work. My comments on consumption rights for those who do not work were brief for several reasons. First, while reward according to sacrifice in work was a defining feature of a participatory economy, specific rules for compensating those who do not work had never been agreed on by the co-creators or later advocates, and were not considered a defining characteristic of a participatory economy. Second, I considered the rules for rewarding those who work and the rules for granting non-workers consumption rights to be logically separable. For example, capitalism *means* reward according to the market value of what is produced by the human and non-human capital one owns. In practice all advanced capitalist economies provides some kind of safety net, and at least in theory, a capitalist economy could provide a generous safety net for those with little or no labor or capital income. On the other hand, a participatory economy *means* reward according to sacrifice. But a particular participatory economy might have a more or less generous safety net for those who receive little or nothing based on their sacrifices in work. Third, it seemed to me that people who agree on the moral necessity of rewarding those who work according to sacrifice might not necessarily agree on specific rules for granting non-workers consumption rights. For example, advocates of rewarding work according to sacrifice might disagree on the age at which workers should no longer be expected to work. Or, they might disagree on whether pensions should be the same for all retirees or vary somewhat depending on a person's effort ratings over his or her work life. Or, they might disagree on the level of consumption full time students should be awarded. And finally, while I believe economic justice requires rewarding work according to sacrifice, I am not sure there is only one way to allocate consumption rights to those who are able but unwilling to work that is morally satisfactory. For example, consider a very wealthy participatory economy where all who work enjoy consumption considerably in excess of what is necessary to meet their basic needs, as compared to a poor participatory economy where an average effort rating barely covers a person's basic needs. In both economies I believe justice requires rewarding those who work strictly according to their relative sacrifices. But while I might criticize the wealthy participatory economy on moral grounds if it did not guarantee those who are able but unwilling to work an allowance substantially above subsistence, I would hesitate to criticize the poor participatory economy for granting only a bare subsistence allowance to those who choose not to work. In any case, these were the major reasons I treated the issue of consumption rights for non-workers separately and only briefly. This is also why I said "While I believe justice requires compensating people according to the sacrifices they make, it seems to me that it is our humanity that compels us to provide for those in need." (p. 32)

> The distinction between "for reasons of justice" and "for reasons of humanity" breaks down.

However, I now believe I devoted too little attention to a discussion of procedures for determining who should be exempted from work, and the terms of compensation for those who are exempted as well as for those who are able but unwilling to work. While I believe it is possible to reach a definitive conclusion regarding a fair rule for rewarding those who do work, as explained above I am less sure a definitive conclusion can be reached regarding a single way to allocate consumption rights to all who do not work that is morally defensible. However, the issue of consumption rights for non-workers is of great moral importance, and I regret if my treatment gave the impression I believe otherwise. Moreover, I now think I was wrong to argue that consumption rights for non-workers is a matter only of humanity and not of justice as well. To take an obvious example, if a wealthy participatory economy failed to grant pensioners consumption rights sufficient even to meet their basic needs during retirement, it would be treating them unjustly as well as inhumanely. In general, Shalom is correct that justice as well as humanity are both relevant to compensating those exempted from work. I also suspect that when push comes to shove the distinction between "for reasons of justice" and "for reasons of humanity" breaks down the deeper we go into a moral evaluation of the distribution of consumption rights.

Effort Rating Inflation

Shalom does not accept my answer to his question: "What is to prevent a group of co-workers from all exaggerating the effort of one another?" He quotes my answer accurately: "To prevent the possibility of 'effort rating inflation' the average effort rating a council awards its members cannot exceed the worker council's ratio of the social benefits of its outputs divided by the social costs of its inputs." (190) But he says: "I don't think the social benefits to social cost ratio will prevent it."

Shalom is wrong to believe the above rule will not prevent effort rating inflation. Any rule that caps the average effort rating for every worker council will stop effort rating inflation in its tracks. As long as there is a cap on the average effort rating in my council, exaggerating the ratings of any members must necessarily come out of the effort ratings of other members. Only if there is no limit on how high the average effort rating for my worker council can be is there an incentive for me and my coworkers to inflate one another's effort ratings. Any system of caps will prevent effort rating inflation. Different caps for worker councils chosen randomly will stop effort rating inflation, but of course arbitrary caps would be grossly unfair.

It is not difficult to prevent effort rating inflation; the trick is to do it fairly. Here Shalom has put his finger on an important issue that has generated debate among advocates of participatory economics. Some advocates support equal caps on the average effort rating for all worker councils. Others support a cap for each council equal to the social benefit to social cost ratio for that council. The case for caps equal to a council's social benefit to social cost ratio rests on the belief that the planning procedure will successfully charge worker councils for the true social cost of all their inputs, including any differences in the skill of their members. In which case, any differences in ratios between worker councils must be the result of differences in average efforts in those councils, and it is only fair to permit the councils where workers really did exert greater effort on average to distribute effort ratings among themselves that are higher on average. The danger with this rule is that the planning system may fail to level the playing field among worker councils. In which case a higher social benefit to social cost ratio could be the result of members whose higher skill was not reflected in a higher indicative price their council was charged for using this more valuable social resource, and not, in fact, the result of greater effort. The case for equal caps for all worker councils rests on the assumption that there will be very little difference in the average effort in different worker councils. Those who support this rule have less faith in the accuracy of the indicative prices generated by the participatory planning process and more faith that the law of large numbers makes significant differences in average efforts at least between workplaces with many members improbable. In sum, either rule will prevent effort rating inflation, and there is debate among advocates of participatory economics about which is more likely to be fair.

Self-Management and Participatory Planning

Shalom characterizes participatory planning as a referendum approach to planning which insufficiently allows for deliberative democracy. He also questions whether the model can live up to its advance billing that it delivers economic democracy: "A final problem with the participatory economic model is the question of whether it actually accomplishes Hahnel's goal of economic self-management: that is, letting everyone have a say proportional to the degree to which they are affected by the decision . . . . Does it really give me one-third the say in a decision relative to someone who is affected by the decision three times as much as me? Unlike some aspects of the model which are documented in great mathematical detail, the claim that the model yields self-management seems to me unproven."

The iterative planning process we propose is unique to the model of a participatory economy. It is not a referendum process. We did not propose that an Iteration Facilitation Board draw up a set of alternative national economic plans for workers and consumers to vote on. Nor is what we call "participatory planning" a procedure where representatives from different worker and consumer councils and federations gather in one big meeting to propose different national economic plans, debate their merits, and somehow agree on one. Our planning procedure is an alternative to both these (common) visions of how democratic economic planning should be carried out.[1] Other critics have misconstrued participatory planning as a one-big-meeting model, and proceeded to point out flaws in the one-big-meeting approach to national economic planning as if these were valid criticisms of participatory planning. I believe Shalom has misconstrued participatory planning as a referendum approach to planning and that is why he fails to see that it is, in fact, unlike referenda, a procedure designed to facilitate and enhance meaningful, deliberative, economic democracy. Perhaps the procedure is often misconstrued precisely because the model of participatory planning is unique in the history of economic planning. Participatory planning is not only an alternative to authoritarian, or command planning, it is also an alternative to one-big-meeting *and* to a referendum — the two best known approaches to democratic planning. If the procedure is neither a one-big-meeting nor a referendum model, how do we propose that the national economic plan be determined? Here is how I described the procedure in brief:

> The participants in the planning procedure are the worker councils and federations, the consumer councils and federations, and an Iteration Facilitation Board (IFB). Conceptually, the planning procedure is quite simple. (1) The IFB announces what we call "indicative prices" for all final goods and services, capital goods, natural resources, and categories of labor. (2) Consumer councils and federations respond with consumption proposals. Worker councils and federations respond with production proposals listing the outputs they propose to make and the inputs they need to make them. (3) The IFB then calculates the excess demand or supply for each final good and service, capital good, natural resource, and category of labor, and adjusts the indicative price for the good up, or down, in light of the excess demand or supply. (4) Using the new indicative prices consumer and worker councils and federations revise and resubmit their proposals. Individual worker and consumer councils must continue to revise their proposals until they submit one that is accepted by the other councils. The planning process continues until there are no longer excess demands for any goods, any categories of labor, any primary inputs, or any capital stocks — in other words, until a feasible plan is reached." (193)

This iterative procedure in which worker and consumer councils propose and revise their own activities is an alternative to both (1) a meeting where alternative different national economic plans are proposed and debated by representatives of interested parties, and (2) a referendum on different alternative national economic plans drawn up by an external agency. But if there are no meetings between the different worker and consumer councils and federations, where is the deliberation? There is deliberation inside each council and federation regarding its own proposal and how to revise it during each iteration of the planning procedure — because decisions about what they, themselves, will do are the decisions that most affect their members. The manner in which those in other councils and federations "deliberate" about what my council or federation has proposed to do is carefully constrained to protect my self-management. The guiding principle is that only if others believe my proposal would use scarce productive resources belonging to everyone[2] inefficiently or unfairly should they be able to intervene. The procedure is designed to provide others with quantitative information necessary to determine if this appears to be the case, and it is designed so others have an incentive to intervene only if they have reason to believe this truly is the case. Because we recognize that quantitative information often does not tell the whole story, i.e. that an exchange of statistics is not all there is to deliberative democracy, we also recommended that councils provide qualitative information about the why's and wherefore's of their proposals to supplement the quantitative signals others will consult. Deliberation can also take the form of requests for face to face meetings with representatives from other councils to explain or seek explanation, and face to face meetings that are part of appeal procedures. But we have labored mightily to avoid overburdening the main planning process with meetings, and particularly meetings without a clear agenda and clear criteria for settling disagreements. We have tried to come up with a procedure that avoids unstructured, inefficient deliberation where everyone proposes, debates, and votes on what everyone will do (one-big-meeting to agree on a national plan). We also sought to avoid lack of deliberation altogether as everyone votes on a list of alternative national plans drawn up by experts based on whatever information they could gather and whatever values they thought were important (a national referendum on a national plan). Instead we devised a format that provides meaningful deliberation through a carefully structured, social, iterative process where workers and consumers have a great deal of control over what their own economic activities will be at the same time they can effectively protect themselves from socially irresponsible behavior by others.

Can a participatory economy deliver perfect self-management where every person has decision making authority exactly to the degree he or she is affected in every decision that is made? No, of course not. Nor have I ever believed or claimed that it can. It is important to understand clearly what our goal should be: Try to distribute decision making power in proportion to the degree different people are affected. But the best we can do is devise procedures that approximate this goal.[3] Moreover, unlike efficiency, where different decision making rules can be subjected to mathematical models and proofs, measuring the degree of self-management does not lend itself to that kind of analysis. So how does a participatory economy better *approximate* economic self-management than other kinds of economies do? 1) Every worker has one vote in his or her worker council. 2) In larger worker councils sub-units govern their own internal affairs via one worker one vote. 3) Job Complexes in every workplace are balanced for empowerment. 4) Every consumer has one vote in his or her consumer council. 5) Federations that govern different levels of collective consumption are governed by democratic decision making procedures where ultimately each federation member has one vote.[4] 6) Worker and consumer councils and federations not only propose what they will do in the initial round of the participatory planning procedure, they alone make all revisions regarding their own activity during subsequent iterations of the planning procedure. 7) During the planning process councils can vote not to approve proposals of other councils if they have good reason to believe those proposals would use scarce productive resources belonging to everyone either inefficiently or unfairly.[5] "Does it really give me one-third the say in a decision relative to someone who is affected by the decision three times as much as me?" If Shalom means by one-third exactly .333333, then the answer is "no." If he means will workers in a council have considerably more say over what they produce and how they produce it than other workers who also have an interest in how society's scarce productive resources are used, or if he means will consumers in a neighborhood have considerably more say over their own mixture of local public goods than other consumers who also have a claim on society's scarce resources; then the answer is "yes." Nothing more exact was ever intended, or in my opinion possible.

Handling Pollution in the Planning Process

SHALOM CLAIMS I have not only not solved the NIMBY problem, my proposal aggravates it. "By giving veto power to a region it will lead to a more extreme version of the NIMBY (not in my back yard) problem that plagues capitalism. Say we need a vaccine to save millions of lives, but the factory that produces the vaccine pollutes. Where do we locate the factory? The region where the pollution would cause the least harm says we do not want any pollution, hence we veto construction of the factory in our region . . . . This is nothing more than a giant game of chicken — who's going to concede first — with the most socially irresponsible regions benefiting most."

Apparently Shalom misunderstands the procedure I recommend for handling pollution. NIMBY happens because local residents do not want to incur the entire social cost of hosting Shalom's vaccine factory while they only enjoy a tiny fraction of the benefit of having the vaccine available for all. In other words, NIMBY occurs because local residents are *not* properly compensated. But my proposal is precisely to compensate local residents. Shalom identifies the best solution: Build the factory — because presumably the social benefits far outweigh the social costs. Locate the factory where the pollution would cause the least harm — because that minimizes the social costs. My recommendation will achieve this result. As long as the social benefits of the vaccine outweigh the social costs — including the damage caused residents of a region by pollution where the vaccine factory is located — a worker council will propose to produce it and the planning procedure will approve the request. Any region willing to host the vaccine factory will be compensated for the damage according to the indicative price of the pollutant. In effect regions will bid against one another to host the vaccine factory weighing the compensation they would receive against the damage they would incur. The planning procedure will hone in on an indicative price for the pollutant that will be too low for regions where the damage would be relatively high to find it worth their while to host the factory, but high enough so that the region where the damage is least will find it in their interest to host the factory. Problem solved.

Shalom's concern that "allowing veto power is a very different decision-making rule" than "people have input into a decision in proportion to how much they are affected" is also based on a misunderstanding of when and how vetoes are used in the planning procedure. Residents are allowed to veto pollution *as long as they are not sufficiently compensated*. If they cannot be compensated enough to make it worth their while to give their permission, then permitting the pollution is socially inefficient and should not be permitted. Other participants in the planning process are allowed to veto a worker council's proposal *if the proposal would use scarce productive resources in a way that would* *leave others worse off*. As long as the social benefits of the proposal exceed the social costs this will not be the case, and others would be cutting off their nose to spite their face if they vetoed such a proposal. Moreover, the procedure I recommend is suited to handle issues like desires for open space and scenic vistas, not just pollutants which can be measured in physical units. As a matter of fact, one of its advantages is that it generates better quantitative estimates of how much people value what the profession terms "environmental amenities" than contingent valuation surveys commonly used today precisely because market systems fail to provide quantitative estimates for these kinds of "goods."

Shalom's last criticism is: "Hahnel's environmental procedure seems inconsistent with his general decision-making rule. The problem is that he defines the relevant region as that geographic area where residents believe they are affected by a pollutant, without taking into account the degree to which people are affected." I am aware that those within a region affected by a pollutant will not be equally damaged. This is most obviously true for a non-uniform pollutant where those who live closer to the source receive more of the pollutant. If this were the only reason some in a region are affected more than others, we might be tempted to award votes within the regional federation in proportion to one's distance from the source since there is an objective and measurable relationship between quantity of pollutant and distance from the source, although wind patterns would complicate measurements even in this case. (I think this would work better than Shalom's proposal to create nested regions with multiple indicative prices for the same pollutant.) However, there are other reasons beside proximity to the source that people are affected differently by pollutants. Many pollutants harm the very old, the very young, and those who are in poor health more than they harm healthy people in the prime of life. Even more problematic is the fact that just as people have different "preferences" for how many apples they would be willing to give up for an orange, people have different "preferences" for how much consumption they would give up to have less pollution.

The problem of how to get people to reveal their true preferences for public goods — or in this case, their true aversion for a public bad — has been studied at great length. The literature on "incentive compatible mechanisms" for providing public goods and collecting revenue to pay for them identifies two critical issues: (1) Will a "mechanism" provide the socially efficient amount of a public good? (Or in this case, permit the socially efficient amount of a public bad to be produced.) (2) Will a "mechanism" make those who benefit more from a public good pay more than those who benefit less? (Or in this case, compensate those who suffer more to a greater extent than those who suffer less.) Prior to the 1970s economists believed it was impossible to design a mechanism that did both. It is impossible to provide the efficient amount of a public good unless people reveal their preferences truthfully. But it was long assumed that if people who report a higher preference are charged more than people who report a lower preference, there would be an incentive for everyone to understate how much they benefit from the public good. (In our case, the problem is if we give more compensation to those damaged to a greater extent, everyone will have an incentive to exaggerate how much (s)he is harmed.) In the early 1970s Edward Clarke and Theodore Groves sparked a flurry of creative theoretical work designing new "incentive compatible mechanisms" for

NIMBY occurs because local residents are *not* properly compensated.

providing public goods that, in theory, can induce people to reveal their true preferences while still charging those who benefit more.[6] However, even economists responsible for these theoretical breakthroughs conceded that none of their "mechanisms" seemed to have any practical application because they required a great deal of information gathering and processing. However, it is possible to design a mechanism that will produce the efficient amount of a public good (or bad) without undue complication if we abandon the attempt to calibrate how much we charge (or compensate) individuals on the basis of how much they benefit (or suffer), and that is what I recommended. If 1000 people are affected adversely by a pollutant, and if each will receive one one-thousandth of the total compensation awarded victims for a certain level of pollution, each of the 1000 people has an incentive to vote honestly about how much of the pollutant they want their region to accept. If these "honest" votes are averaged, the efficient level of pollution will be reached. However, under this procedure those who are damaged to a greater extent will receive no more compensation personally than those who are damaged to a lesser extent. This is unfortunate, but I think I agree with other economic theorists that people would probably decide that any remedy was more trouble than it was worth.[7] However, I should have qualified my claim that the procedure not only obeys the polluter pays principle but it also compensates the victims of pollution. It compensates the victims as a group, but individuals within the group are not compensated exactly according to their individual damages.

Shalom does put his finger on an issue that bears attention. How to define who is affected by a particular pollutant and who is not will not always be simple to determine or agree on. I did say that scientists in the employ of federations would have to assist in this matter. I also said that if a larger federation comes to the conclusion that its members are affected, it should be included in the definition of the region of those affected. However, since there is compensation, federations representing people who truly are not affected might be tempted to misrepresent their case. So interested parties may well contest where to draw the borders for regions where people are affected by a pollutant. Perhaps environmental courts would be required if disagreements proved sufficiently troublesome. Hopefully drawing borders for relevant environmental regions in a participatory economy can be handled better than the Republican controlled Texas State Legislature recently handled redrawing U.S. Congressional Districts in response to Tom DeLay's prodding!

However, I should point out that there is no way to draw borders so all within a border are equally damaged by a pollutant. Unfortunately life is not that simple.

International Economic Relations and the Fifty Percent Rule

SHALOM HAS SEVERAL OBJECTIONS to my proposal that a participatory economy use what I call the "fifty percent rule" when engaging in international trade and investment. The rule is that a participatory economy must agree to terms of trade that give *more than fifty percent of the efficiency gain* from specialization and trade to any country that is poorer than the participatory economy. The same rule applies to interest rates on international loans. Shalom's first objection is that the assessment is based on "the relative wealth of another country as a whole, rather than of the specific individuals who stand to gain or lose from the transaction." Shalom worries: "What if the entire benefit from the transaction goes to the rich capitalist who owns the coffee plantation or the garment factory, with the impoverished workers getting nothing?" This is a valid concern, but Shalom himself explains why it is very difficult to do anything about: "Most economies do not provide outsiders (or most insiders, for that matter) with sufficient information to judge the actual impact of a trade." But instead of concluding that the best that can be done is to apply a simple fifty percent rule which requires no calculation beyond the average wealth of different countries, Shalom concludes that lack of information regarding the internal distributive impacts of international trade (or investment) make "it hard to see how the fifty percent rule could be applied in practice." But I proposed the fifty percent rule precisely because the kind of evaluation Shalom wants is usually impossible to apply in practice while the fifty percent rule is easy to apply. I have no disagreement with Shalom's suggestion that perhaps fair trade groups and unions in a wealthy participatory economy should monitor the fifty percent rule to identify cases where it should be suspended. But I agree with him that the determinations necessary would not be easy. I also suspect a more effective way to handle these concerns is for the government of a participatory economy to heed the recommendations of organizations representing the oppressed and the political opposition in poorer capitalist trading partners regarding suspension of international economic relations. It is better if the suspension is done at their suggestion than on the initiative of organizations in the wealthier economy no matter how well intended.[8]

Shalom is correct that if poorer countries receive only 51 percent of the efficiency gains, international economic injustice would persist for centuries. But Shalom also surmised correctly that I proposed the fifty percent rule only as a minimum requirement to prevent a participatory economy from violating its core principles. I would join Shalom in praise of any wealthy participatory economy that adopted a rule such as "the percentage of the efficiency gain going to the poorer country should be equal to the ratio of the GDP per capita of the richer country divided by the GDP per capita of the poorer country."

Conclusion

As I warned readers, I have not reviewed the many points of agreement between myself and Shalom. When I review our disagreements it seems to me we do so usually because Shalom wants more economic justice, more self-management, or more environmental protection than he fears a participatory economy actually offers. I do not disagree with him that it would be nice to figure out ways to better achieve the goals we share. And if anyone can come up with ways to do so that are also practical — that is, not more trouble than they are worth — I will be delighted. But I do think we need to recognize that often we are trying to design procedures that *at best* can only approximate our goals. Often my answer to a Shalom criticism is that what I have proposed is the best that can be done, or what he has proposed instead would not work or is not worth the extra trouble. But I always hope he is right and I am wrong!

NOTES

1. When I refer to the "one big meeting" approach to formulating a national economic plan, I do not mean to imply that representatives of different councils and federations would only meet one time. As a matter of fact, I am convinced this approach would result in endless meetings where these representatives would go over the same ground repeatedly as they discussed and debated different plans. I think coming up with an agenda for such an ongoing meeting, and formulating coherent criteria for evaluating alternative national economic plans presented at such meetings is impossible. Consequently, I suspect what would eventually happen if people ever tried the "one big meeting" approach to democratic planning would be that a plan with little merit would eventually receive a majority vote when attendees exhausted themselves and realized further discussion held little prospect of yielding a superior result.

2. Scarce productive resources belonging to everyone include not only all natural and human-made capital, but all human capital as well. A participatory economy considers scarce productive skills and talents of its members as well as all productive knowledge to be part of the overall productive asset base that is the common property of everyone.

3. In my view, the same holds for economic justice. It is important to understand clearly what our goal should be: reward according to sacrifice (for those who work.) But the best we can do is devise ways to reasonably

approximate this result.

4. These include federations which have the right to set the level of pollution their members are willing to tolerate as discussed below. I should also point out that the exact democratic voting procedures within federations have never been fully specified. Should federation collective consumption proposals be drawn up by delegates selected by councils comprising the federation who meet for that purpose, or submitted directly by councils for consideration? Should collective consumption proposals be voted on by delegates representing each council or by all federation members? There are important issues to weigh when thinking about how to best design decision making procedures inside federations. Advocates of participatory economics have simply agreed that these procedures must be thoroughly democratic.

5. While there are very specific procedures for calculating the social benefits and costs associated with proposals, I should point out that nobody has proposed exact rules for voting to approve or disapprove proposals. There are obviously many possibilities whose relative merits should be weighed. Consensus seems overly demanding while a simple majority might be too lenient. There is an extensive political science literature on the advantages and disadvantages of different voting procedures I believe may be useful. On the other hand, deciding on a particular voting procedure may best be left to those implementing participatory planning when the time comes. I, for one, never see the harm of thinking about important issues in advance even if it turns out there is good reason to expect there is no single, best voting rule for all kinds of proposals, for all rounds of the planning procedure, or for all participatory economies.

6. See chapter 3 in Robin Hahnel and Michael Albert, *Quiet Revolution in Welfare Economics* (Princeton U. Press, 1990) for a thorough discussion of this literature. The trick is to find a way to tax those who receive greater benefit more than those who receive less benefit, but *not* to use the information anyone provides about their own willingness to pay for the public good to do so. One way to do this is to charge everyone the same amount initially, but then subtract from each person's assessment the sum of everyone *else's* reported willingness to pay. For any who report a high willingness to pay, less will be substracted from their assessment since their high willingness to pay is *not* included in the amount subtracted for them. For any who report a low willingness to pay, more will be substracted from their assessment since their low willingness to pay is *not* included in the amount subtracted for them. Since nobody's own reported willingness to pay figures in the calculation of their own assessment there is no incentive to lie about how much one really benefits from a public good.

7. It would be interesting to investigate whether there may be fewer practical disadvantages of using the "incentive compatible mechanisms" for public good provision designed by Groves, Clarke, and others in the 1970s inside federations in a participatory economy than there are in market economies. It may be that a participatory economy is better suited to implementing one of these innovative mechanisms which calibrate charges (compensation) for public goods (bads) according to how much a person benefits (is harmed). If any federation chose to implement one of these alternatives I would certainly not criticize them. I, along with Clarke and Groves, would be most interested in how the experiment worked out in practice!

8. When the ANC asked other countries to boycott investing in South Africa as part of its campaign to overthrow apartheid, any participatory economy would have joined the boycott immediately.

Stephen R. Shalom Replies

I thank Robin Hahnel for his response to my review of his book. His clarifications and refinements of his argument bring us much closer together, which was already quite close.

Here I will only identify a few of our remaining differences.

Effort-rating inflation: I agree with Hahnel that the law of large numbers will prevent a work place from inflating its effort-rating, when, as he says, these are workers' councils chosen randomly. (Random selection would mean that the council would consist of workers of average abilities, hence any difference in output can be attributed to differential effort.) But will workers be chosen randomly? Presumably the skill needs of different workplaces will vary, and hence the skill of their workers. Let me emphasize, however, what I noted in my original review. Even if preventing effort-inflation is not quite as easy as Hahnel claims, this by no means suggests the infeasibility of a participatory economy. Other economies have vastly more potential for gaming the system and still manage to function.

Self-management: Hahnel argued in his book that we need not just democracy, but self-management, where people have a say in decision making proportional to the degree the decision affects them. I expressed skepticism that his model actually achieves this sort of self-management and he replies that of course it doesn't do so to the sixth decimal place. Obviously not, but that wasn't what I was concerned about. There are some mechanisms in his model that give groups of people equal say on decisions where they are equally affected and some that give people zero say when they are not affected at all. But that's the easy part. The challenge is developing mechanisms for decision making when people are affected neither 100 percent, 0 percent, nor equally, but to some other degree. This challenge, it seems to me, is still before us.

Pollution: I take Hahnel's point that "Residents are allowed to veto pollution *as long as they are not sufficiently compensated*." But with veto power it seems to me that residents who, for example, object to the building of a vaccine factory in their neighborhood (though it's by far the socially optimum location for the necessary facility) can hold out for compensation equal to almost the entire social benefit of producing the vaccine, rather than equal to the amount they are affected. That is, with veto power they can effectively hold society hostage. Hahnel later raises the possibility of some sort of environmental court, a view I endorse, but note that such an option isn't consistent with veto power.

I think there are still issues needing more thought and development in the participatory economics model — as one would expect from any effort to envision a new social order. I continue to believe, however, that participatory economics offers the best model we currently have for achieving economic justice and democracy.

LETTERS

Onfray on Meslier on Atheism: Two Logical Mistakes

In "Jean Meslier and 'The Gentle Inclination of Nature,' " Michel Onfray offers Meslier's *Testament* (ca. 1729) as a model for combining atheism and social morality.[1] The model suffers, however, from two logical flaws.

Onfray portrays Meslier: ". . . this Prometheus kills God on paper, ravages religions, . . . [and] spares nothing and no one who resembles from near or afar a figure of authority . . . ." (p. 56). Further: "Meslier is the first atheist philosopher, he also holds another glorious title: he shines equally in the sky of ideas for his mastery of the first deconstruction of Christianity" (pp. 60-61).

Onfray summarizes one line of attack, labeled: "A Sick Person Named Jesus" (p. 62):

> His mode of life equally bears witness against him: why did he, this raving person, have to run everywhere, to come and go through all the areas of Judea in order to evangelize and try to convert to his fables the greatest number of people? And then to say that the Devil led him to a mountain peak in order to tempt him? Is he serious? Would all this be proposed by a man equipped with all his mental faculties? (p. 62)

Such rhetorical questions aren't arguments. They merely *assume* that Jesus was mentally inadequate. Merely assuming a position under dispute would entail the fallacy of question-begging. Such a fallacious strategy could easily be used (equally ineffectively) by all parties to a dispute.

The more pressing logical problem (the first of two) is: Having inferred from the *New Testament* gospels that Jesus is mentally defective, Onfray sums up the gospels: "Historical truth does not exist. The witnesses disagree in every sense" (p. 63). If, however, "historical truth does not exist" in the gospels, we cannot use the gospels to derive historical truths about the mental (in)adequacy of Jesus. If we use the gospels to infer that Jesus was mentally inadequate, we have to allow for some historical truth therein. Otherwise, we have a logical inconsistency. Onfray overlooks this logical problem.

Another logical problem confronts Onfray's sketched case for atheism from what is now called "divine hiddenness":

> . . . God wants us to love him, but he never manifests himself. A straightforward, clear and incontestable appearance ought to be in his power . . . . He wants obedience, but never makes his will clearly known (pp. 60-61).

Aiming to avoid question-begging, we should not simply assert that God "never manifests himself." Instead, we should look for a sound argument. Likewise, we should not simply assume that an all-loving God would offer an "incontestable appearance," even if it is within God's power.

Divine elusiveness, or hiddenness, has generated an extensive literature in contemporary philosophy of religion, but Onfray ignores it.[2] Might an all-loving God have purposes that would not be served, but actually be frustrated, by an "incontestable appearance." (It's unclear that the idea of an "incontestable appearance" is coherent, given that people can, if unreasonably, contest *anything*; mere contesting comes too easily to offer a *cognitively* significant standard.) God could, quite reasonably, want to avoid prompting human intellectual assent to God's existence without also eliciting human love and obedience toward God. God may want to move human *wills* so as to counter human deficiencies.

We can't assume that it's part of the concept of God that God would offer us an "incontestable appearance." The concept of God allows for divine purposes that entail divine elusiveness. God may not want to be trivialized by giving us evidence of divine reality that does not challenge our selfish wills. There is thus a logical flaw in the conception of God presupposed by Onfray.

Onfray's two logical shortcomings obscure a vital issue: how does politics rest on hope? Political engagement presumes hope in something. So, what can reasonably recommend all of the hard work required by political change? If we all will soon be decomposing in our graves anyway, how much hard political work can reasonably be expected of us? The struggle for political change often yields more pain than pleasure, at least for those who undertake the struggle. So: why bother? Onfray offers us no answer. So, we cannot be cheery about his atheism. Morally robust politics needs another foundation.

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1. See *New Politics* 10, #4 (Winter 2006), 53-75. (Contrary to p. 73, Meslier did not die in 1715.)

2. For a sample of the literature, see Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser, eds. *Divine Hiddenness* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), including my own essay, "Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiding," 120-48.

Response to Immanuel Wallerstein's Review of Gil Jonas' *Freedom's Sword*

1) THE NAACP REFUSED TO SUPPORT militant blacks in attempting to portray itself as a middle class, repectable organization. It didn't support blacks in Georgia or in North Carolina who faced vicious Klan violence. In fact it suspended the person in NC who was the president of the local NAACP! Was this due to the influence of wealthy whites who were the financial backers of the NAACP? I don't know if Jonas addresses this.

2) Jonas (or Wallerstein) gets carried away: "blacks in elite institutions . . . are near their proportion in the population . . ." I won't even mention Colin or Condi, but I do take exception to elite colleges: Harvard, 5.2 percent; Michigan, 5.0 percent, Stanford, 6.1 percent. With blacks over 12 percent of the population, that's hardly "near their proportion of the population."

REG WILSON

Rural Perspectives on Gay Marriage

AN ARTICLE IN THE *NEW YORK TIMES* about Representative Marilyn Musgrave, sponsor of an amendment to ban gay marriage, caught my eye because I also was born and raised in the prairies in northeastern Colorado near Roggen. Her chief of staff, Guy Short, says he had no doubt that Ms. Musgrave's rural roots on the plains were fundamental to her perspective. "Her family and her life are a mirror of Greeley," Mr. Short said. I can match her in rural background. My father was a farmer, a homesteader, my mother stayed home to raise the children, and I raised prize 4-H steers which I showed at the county fair in Greeley. I even once beat Richard Montfort, featured in Frederick Weisman's *Meat* documentary, in a competition. I graduated from Greeley High School and Colorado Aggies (now Colo. St. U.).

We might have been neighbors, but we have certainly taken different paths since our rural childhood. I have been married for over 50 years, and I am mystified by people's assertion that gay marriage will threaten heterosexual marriage. I can't conceive of how it would threaten my marriage.

I have some wonderful homosexual neighbors. They shovel our sidewalk when it snows. They take our trash barrels in when we are away. We exchange garden plants and garden advice. Their house is a jewel to behold. The improvements they have made to it will raise the value of all our property.

If they got married, they would still shovel our sidewalk, take our trash barrels in, and exchange garden plants.

The Catholic church has done incredible damage to the family by allowing priests to sexually abuse children. Are they making a fuss about gay marriage to divert attention from their sexual abuse scandals?

BETTY REID MANDELL
Boston, MA

This letter was published in the Greeley (CO) Tribune.

Reading the Summer 2005 *Anthropologie* Catalogue

MARY PINARD

Damsel cardigan: (camel or soft plum), its tattered
chiffon basted to a metallic-stitched placket
topped with navy and bronze sequins. Floral
fossil skirt: a pleated circle, abstracted fauna
rendered in earth tones, slate bugle beads over
a hidden side zip. Katrien turtleneck: demure
shape rendered (again) in breathable voile, pin-
tucks on shoulder backs create a vintage
silhouette — white, sizes 0-14. A palm fruit
necklace: USA, $128. Multi-ruffled shower
curtain: tailored by a chenille strip in pale sage
and 12 buttonholes for easy hanging — machine

wash, imported. Excursion pant: removable
paisley scarf belt with Lurex threads tops this
wide-legged linen trouser: dry clean. A tropical
locale: palms, dirt roads, a market with passion
fruit, mangosteen, bamboo, beautiful dark-skinned
boy on a bicycle, or in a cab letting a model out
so she can shop. Raffia wristlets, prince charming
peep-toe pumps, dupioni silk pillows, tufted fringe
lampshades, an iron fan bed with fluted accents.
But it's the bird-cut armoire I fasten on, bending
page 11's edge so I can return, show my husband
later: a light yellow wash tints tulipwood doors —

backed with linen panels (more like curtains) as if
to promote their theatrical birds, scrolling cutouts,
some perching, some in flight from curlicue

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to curlicue — with working keyhole, hardware,
4 drawers, all included: Italy, $1898 ($200s/h).
Out of the question. But the catalogue's artful,
seductive. Now that I look more closely, I see it's just
2 models being used: sultry blonde, 1940s-looking
WASP (the one who gets out of the cab), and the other,
light-skinned, exotic, often barefooted, East Indian . . .
I note she arrives by train, carrying her own bags.
A full page in jungle greens fashions her, box-perched,

fanning herself (fan not for sale in the catalogue),
and UNAWATUNA, bold metal letters across the top —
the transit station for a real place, or a stage for catalogue
copy? Further in, page 27 showcases more jungle
opened by train tracks, this time with *Unawatuna*
spelled out both in English and an Asian script. Curious,
I decide to dig around online, find it's a coastal town
in southern Sri Lanka, and linked with words like *tsunami*
and *survivor journals.* I travel quickly through slideshow
after slideshow of uprooted palms, the ribs of fishing
boats studding the beaches, houses dashed to rubble
threaded with ribbons of saris, roof tiles shuffled

like tarot cards across the sand — the waves were
that high in December. An Unawatuna native writes
in her e-diary . . . *an internet café emptied itself,*
all its computers onto the sand. First rows of illegal
beach huts were washed away — then the big hotels
faced the sea, so while damaged, they were pleased
since their location on the beach had improved.

My catalogue arrived just last week, in between
the first day of spring here in New England
and the arrival of daylight savings time. I'm looking for
where it was sent from — hard to find, the return address
(1700 Sansom Street, Philadelphia) turns out to be
in a miniscule, pale grey font on the back page, near my —
or current resident's — keycode and customer number,
above a long list of stores, from coast to coast,
and this invitation: "Come visit us, our stores
near you: 799 Boylston, Boston & The Atrium,
A Caravan of Possibilities at Anthropologie.com"

War and a Piece of the Action

KURT JACOBSEN

Flags of Our Fathers
DIRECTED BY CLINT EASTWOOD
Dreamworks Production, 2006

SOMEWHERE ON MY TEEMING bookshelves a Vietnam vet recalls John Wayne, the *Sands of Iwo Jima* star who inspired countless lads to enlist, ambling through a hospital ward of wounded soldiers and getting booed. Maybe it happened, maybe it didn't. But it sounds right, doesn't it? Growing up naïve in Yankee Doodle Dandy America can, to this day, be terribly costly. Ron Kovic, paraplegic author of Born on the Fourth of July, was, alas, not the last teenager to be enticed into Marine Corps boot camp by Wayne's cinematic heroics, only to collide with the likes of Full Metal Jacket's blood chilling high decibel drill instructor. Automaton killers, not autonomous men, are what they really want, kid. The military covets clueless youths because anyone mature enough to think about what they are doing to whom and why disrupts the robotic rhythms of the ranks. Unapproved thought is a threat to order. It only took Marine General Smedley Butler, a two time Medal of Honor winner, the better part of a life time to figure out that he was nothing but a cut-rate enforcer for the worst scam artists and bandits on earth, the pinstripe suited ones who rob you with a fountain pen and beckon smartly uniformed stooges with guns to back it up.

In the American Civil War fiery young men flocked into the Union (and Confederate) Army while draft age robber barons Morgan, Rockefeller, Fisk and others paid substitutes a pittance to risk their lives instead. Then those world renowned gents proceeded to palm off defective weapons and four hundred percent marked-up meals to the poor devils at the front. Business is business. Bribes, applied with impressive surgical precision, protected these stout survival-of the-fittest braggarts against retribution. Halliburton had plenty of predecessors. And injustices galore away from home buttressed every nasty form of local foul play. The history of trade union organizing in America is rife with ugly incidents of U.S. troops summoned by industrial masters into cities or mining districts to crush desperate workers struggling for decent wages and working conditions. Civil war hero General Phil Sheridan, for one, took a break in 1877 from hunting inhospitable Sioux on the prairies to mow down insolent swarthy strikers in city streets. So if you weigh military courage against the circumstances in which it is displayed, you might find distressingly little to be said for it. The racist Johnny Reb at Shiloh, after all, was doubtless as brave as righteous John Brown at Harper's Ferry.

The Second World War of course was what Studs Terkel labeled with awfully apt quote marks as the "good war." Even an eminently justifiable war waged against formidable enemies — more racist than the average white American of the era — could not entirely ennoble and excuse the scale of the butchery in-

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volved. Still, the Marine Corps, least of all military branches, is no place for a sensitive young man to have epiphanies, or even second thoughts. In Anthony Swofford's acrid memoir *Jarhead* — skip the movie — the young Marines in the first Gulf War, no less than ancient Greeks on the shores of Troy, buzz along on a high octane blend of testosterone, propaganda, team spirit and Pavlovian conditioning. Conscience is only an annoyance out here, best tuned out for the duration. Swofford knew perfectly well that he and his pals were being used by cynical elites to serve their interests at whatever cost to the common good, but he does not — and at this woebegone stage cannot — dare to care, and is consoled by the giddy prospect of wreaking massive state-sanctioned violence. Ever call in an air strike? Peer pressure kicks in and seals the deal.

Conscience is only an annoyance out here, best tuned out for the duration.

ONE NITTY-GRITTY TRUISM that combat veterans mention whenever they are willing to speak is that no one under fire is motivated by abstract causes. What keeps grunts going is the welfare, and good opinion, of their cherished buddies. Militaries everywhere appreciate this handy tidbit of group psychology and wring it out for all its worth. The civilian version is that we "support the troops" in whatever exploitative venture into which rash leaders — all too understandably taking the citizenry for idiots — drop them. So insidiously potent is this induced reflex that many a dolt instantly fell for the recent Rovian spin that Senator John Kerry's "botched joke" about Bush's spectacular lack of studiousness was really a knock on troops about whom solicitous chicken hawk neocons tenderly care. These are the same shop-till-you-drop patriots who, apart from conjuring a gratuitous and ghastly war, strived to cut military benefits, skimp on field armor and make maimed soldiers pay for their own hospital meals. Funnily enough, these shameless shits are merely the latest spawn of the hardass politicians, skinflint tycoons and small town Babbitts whom Clint Eastwood lampoons liberally throughout *Flags of Our Fathers*. Right wingers adore this flick in much the same ADD way that they love Bruce Springsteen's song 'Born in The USA." They pay attention to nothing but the chorus. Eastwood seems to have figured out that so long as you are waving a flag you can get away with anything.

True, Eastwood, a customarily quirky and unsettling film maker, is thoroughly guilty of concocting one of the corniest entries in the war movie genre: *Heartbreak Ridge* (1986) — a hokey tale of a laryngitic Marine sergeant whipping badass recruits into shape just in time to liberate oppressed Grenada from the clutches of Cuban construction crews. (Of recent fare only *Windtalkers* is more dire, due to unbridled John Woo derring-do.) Eastwood certainly racked up brownie points with that outing. Eastwood's new film also enjoys the protective coating of four star tear-jerk source material. *Flags of Our Fathers* is James Bradley's book-length ode to his father, a decorated Navy medic who in February 1945 helped raise the flag on Iwo Jima, immortalized in a famous photograph. For all the joy that dittoheads take in this rousing old-fashioned subject matter, a certain directorial sobriety intrudes, stopping just short of sardonic. In light of the Pentagon's fractured fairy tales of Jessica Lynch and of the late former NFL star Pat Tillman, Eastwood seems acutely aware that nothing our esteemed authorities say coincides much with reality except by accident. Truth is trumped by the Bush administration's implacable urge to enact its feverish project for a New American Century.

What the torrential post-9/11 propaganda assault on our senses has stirred in Eastwood, happily, is a good long look back at the way that public perceptions expertly became "managed" into feelgood imagery. Eastwood refreshingly dislikes PR stunts no matter who manufactures them, or why.

Has any combat vet ever recognized his or her war experiences later in newspaper accounts? Maybe Bill Mauldin's wartime Willie and Joe cartoons best captured emotional fragments of it: a deep gut mistrust of the brass, a fatalistic bone-weariness, the bushwhacking nature of war and "feelin' like a fugitive from the law of averages." Eastwood, like Mauldin, wants to stand firmly on the side of ordinary dog faces, which means he isn't inclined to paint a pretty picture of their superiors; this comes as no surprise given Eastwood's choices as actor and director. *The Outlaw Josey Wales* ultimately depicted a guerrilla fighter achieving a separate personal peace after the Civil War. The state and its devout minions are viewed as intrinsically untrustworthy, if not insane. (A villainous army zealot eerily adumbrates pseudo-evangelical Bush when he proclaims, "Doin' good ain't got no end.") *Kelly's Heroes* envisioned for the fun of it an entrepreneurial expedition for gold bullion, manned by lowly GIs who only want a cut of the action. The State, and the well-connected creeps, hog all the loot. Neither are huge private organizations seen as an antidote. In *Pale Rider* a ghostly avenger aids poor miners against a tyrannical company at a time when parts of the West featured pitched battles between capital and labor. The grizzled sodden cowpoke Eastwood portrayed in *Unforgiven* smashed to subatomic smithereens the myth of the gunfighter hero. (I recall exquisite cynical *Mad Magazine* parodies of *High Noon* showdowns too but never mind.) So is Eastwood tempted here to do for World War II stereotypes what he did for gunslingers in *Unforgiven*? Not if you aren't looking for it. Eastwood prefers to slip dissident thoughts gingerly into otherwise stereotypical scenes. It's sly stuff but he's bright enough to understand it is the only remotely interesting way to enliven his sacerdotal subject.

Combat scenes are, despite the big budget, sheer rote screen stuff. The trademark jitterbugging camera and washed-out look of *Saving Private Ryan* and *Band of Brothers* replicates itself here without surprises. Technically innovative, this film is not. The wide shots of an increasingly grisly beachhead under withering Japanese fire contain unconvincing special effects, except for those souls for whom video games set the standard. The upshot is plain enough, though, that pure dumb luck deals out all the gruesome deaths, gashed flesh and near misses. Aerial cockpit views of Corsair fighters strafing Mount Surabachi — honeycombed with immensely elaborate tunnel systems — likewise achieve only a video game feel. As analysts remarked, the Japanese were not on Iwo Jima, they were *in* it. Eastwood, accordingly, stresses a scene wherein Navy officers callously decline to offer the Marine commander adequate heavy bombardment time to 'soften up' the infernal island. No one, on the other hand, is more admirable than a Navy medic who pinballs from one screaming stricken man to another. I recall a friend talking about his father's infantryman memories in the Heurtgen Forest campaign in late 1944, saying his dad felt most sorry for the medics. One can imagine what he meant — uh, no, not really.

The unutterably grim Iwo Jima campaign, apart from John Wayne's film, had been told earlier in *The Outsider* (1961) with Tony Curtis mustering up a memorable turn as Pima Indian and Marine veteran Ira Hayes, a man hurting badly from survivor guilt. In *Flags of Our Fathers,* Eastwood highlights the long ignored fact that two flag raisings actually occurred that day on Mount Suribachi. Only the second was acknowledged because of that legendary photograph. Why distract civilians with untidy facts, was the familiar reasoning at the top. The flag raisings also were wildly premature signs inasmuch as the bulk of U.S. casualties were minced and mauled over another month of vicious fighting. Three members of the second flag raising were killed. Three survivors, Corpsman John Bradley and Marines Ira Hayes and Rene Gagnon, were plucked from almost certain death or mutilation — 2 of 3 Marines were killed or wounded in the first few weeks — in order to perform like circus animals at war bond drives, which by the way are highly overrated in both book and movie as crucial to the war effort. Actually, Congress refused to fund the war with the kind of steep taxes that would slice into upper tier wealth. Instead, the government borrowed money at a higher percentage of total spending than did Britain or other allies. Instead of paying additional taxes the rich were repaid for bond purchases with funds extracted mainly from the rest of the population — just as Bush is doing now, except tapping far more foreign debt. The notion of equal financial sacrifice was almost as empty then as it is now. But rich men's sons, like Bush's daddy, did see action in that era.

OUR THREE LUCKY FLAG-RAISERS soon suspect their next diabolical foes are their official handlers, bent on using the Suribachi achivement to raise public spirits and, most of all, cash. The boys are marched though a round of parties, meeting haughty women who wouldn't spit on them otherwise, grieving parents (including the mother of an uncredited flag raiser), and glib business men with oily empty promises. A flag raising reenactment in Chicago's Soldier Field stadium in April 1945 was likely the tackiest gimmick since Buffalo Bill Cody's Wild West Show re-staged gallant cavalry triumphs over wicked native Americans. Eastwood explores ethical and emotional conflicts within or among the three bemused survivors. Rene Gagnon laps up media attention as does his opportunistic girl friend. Bradley reluctantly plays along. Hayes, who loathes the spotlight, takes refuge in the nearest liquor bottle. Without comment or laugh track Eastwood crafts a scene in which an indignant Marine general is shocked, yes shocked, that Marines get drunk. Hayes, barred from most drinking establishments because of his race, vaguely wonders what he is fighting for. It's a mighty mystifying masochism that demands unstinting devotion to abstractions from the poor and at the same time ponies up guaranteed cost-plus contracts to assure the allegiance of the rich.

So Eastwood's new film swerves uneasily between a "greatest Generation" puff piece — 4 of 5 servicemen in this supposedly popular war were draftees, folks — and the sour bedrock reality that these guys usually had little choice but to go into the services and try to survive — and were no less laudable for it. As always Eastwood draws a steady bead on what the protagonists make of circumstances not of their own choosing. Sure, he is sentimental about soldiers, but not about home front honchos. His almost disdainful stance in this regard injects the film with an intriguing critical tension wholly absent in Spielberg's or HBO's idea of warfare. It is as if a time machine suddenly plopped down in a war flick and out swagger a Rumsfeld and a Cheney and other neocon nitwits in period attire who hatch plots and do deals to serve their cronies while everyone else around them suffers and dies. Eastwood admires individuals who operate according to their own codes in the baleful face of mammoth organizations. Good causes, he realizes, can get bent to evil ends, and always will do so if the rest of us don't watch out. The military-industrial complex indeed starts here, Mr Eastwood. Welcome.

Gulag: An American Tragedy

SI KAHN

American Gulag
MARK DOW
U. of California, 2004

AMERICAN GULAG IS AN IMPORTANT contribution to a number of critical ongoing debates. The number of issues that Mark Dow explores reads like the cast of characters from a film based on the life of John Ashcroft: immigration, crime, punishment, citizenship, the Border, "homeland security," due process, detention, deportation. It strikes at the heart of such questions as what it means to be or not to be a citizen of the American republic and whether, in such a republic, one is truly innocent until proven guilty.

This achievement is all the more remarkable, because, as Dow states in his introduction, the book is ostensibly about what might at first appear to be a fairly limited and even technical subject: prisons operated by the federal agency formerly known as the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). As Dow writes:

> In this book I examine the reasons that people are in detention, but I am not concerned primarily with immigration policy. Rather, this book is about prisons — about a particular American prison system operated by the INS or, since early 2003, by the BICE — with an astonishing lack of accountability, not only to outside criticism, but to the rest of the government as well. (11)

First and foremost, *American Gulag* is an extensively researched, well-documented and profoundly chilling portrait of human suffering. Again and again, Dow profiles people who have been caught up in the INS' web, in meticulous detail and with wrenching emotional impact:

> The group noted the case of a Somali woman who had been raped in front of her children because of her membership in a minority clan, and who was detained at Wackenhut when she arrived in the United States. Attorneys requested that she be released to stay with family members legally residing in this country. An INS officer responded that "the only individuals who would be released from Wackenhut were those who were 'near death' or [were] government witnesses." (122)

But while all people who are in prison suffer, and while conservatives will argue that this suffering is the whole point of being incarcerated, except in those cases where the sentence is life without parole, there is a foreseeable if often distant end to the suffering. (Those living under a death sentence could technically be described as having a foreseeable end to the suffering of imprisonment, but the probability of eventually being killed by the state could hardly be described as a hopeful or positive prospect.) Most judicial sentences are determinate, that is, they are for a specific period of time. If someone is sentenced to, let's say, 5 to 15 years imprisonment, they have a reasonable expectation that, at some point with that period of time, they will no longer be incarcerated.

In the good old days of crime and punishment, before mandatory minimums and "truth

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in sentencing" laws, which require that a certain high percentage of the sentence imposed be served before release is possible, a person could shorten his or her stay behind bars by earning time off for good behavior, a process which still exists in some places. Time served could also be lengthened even beyond the original sentence by real or imagined behavior that allowed those in authority to try to sentence that person on an additional charge, something often experienced by political prisoners, racial minorities, and those that just plain got on the wrong side of the prison administration. But there was still for the most part both the possibility of release, and a series of checkpoints at which certain steps could be taken to try to obtain that release.

But not at the INS. Within the INS' facilities, there is no such thing as an established set of principles or standards on which an incarcerated person can rely to work towards his or her release.

In *American Gulag,* Dow does a careful job of explaining and continuing to emphasize the central set of contradictions within INS policy and conduct. Legally, *people incarcerated by the INS are not in prison.* They are considered to be not imprisoned, but *detained.* Their cases have been not been decided by an independent judiciary, but rather by career INS bureaucrats. They have not been found guilty or given a sentence. *They are simply being detained behind bars until and unless another bureaucrat decides, again without reference to administrative rules and regulation, let alone laws and court rulings, that they should be either deported or released.*

As Dow writes, "Wherever they are held, INS prisoners are 'administrative detainees'; they are not serving a sentence." (9) This is an absurd technical difference. But, however absurd, it is a difference of immense importance to the legal status of those behind INS bars:

> Immigration detainees can be held for days, months, or years. Serving time that cannot be counted, to paraphrase a Somali prisoner, can make INS detention intolerable. (16) . . . What does it mean to be held in a prison for weeks or months, even for a decade or more, and to be told by the administrative agency renting bed space for you that you are not a prisoner? What does it mean for these men and women that the INS argues that immigration detention is not "punishment"? (17)

Within the INS' facilities, there is no such thing as an established set of principles or standards on which an incarcerated person can rely to work toward his or her release.

Dow argues that because immigration decisions are made by bureaucrats employed by the INS (whether they are referred to as "administrative judges" or not), rather than by members of an independent judiciary, their decisions can be unduly influenced. He writes:

> The Bush administration needed to limit the power of immigration judges who might rule against its wishes. So the Justice Department announced that it could now invoke an "automatic stay" to keep certain people detained even if an immigration judge ordered them released. Immigration judges do not hold their positions by constitutional mandate but are Justice Department employees — "bureaucrats in judges' robes," in Robert Kahn's words. (23)

ANY U.S. HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT is at least supposed to know that the federal government consists of three branches — the legislative, the judicial and the executive — which were established as separate entities so that they can check and balance each other. Public philosopher Elizabeth Minnich has argued that the concept of *balance* is central to many other key aspects of U.S. democracy, at least in its theoretical construction. Minnich points out that the "three branches of government" structure is just one in a series of national balancing acts, among them public versus private, individual versus community, national versus local. In her book *The Fox in the Henhouse: How Privatization Threatens Democracy*, written jointly with the author of this review, she states:

> We know that it is a startling thought that privatizing corporations, which justify themselves by invoking the freedom of the market and attacking what they see as both the threat and the ineptitude of "Big Government," actually need governments committed to the public good. But they do. The international economist Andrew Kamarck, reflecting on history, makes the thought-provoking claim: "The welfare state and modern capitalism are Siamese twins." Think about that: Siamese twins are two people who differ from each other, who think for themselves, who can and do disagree — but their bodies are organically joined. Like it or not, they need each other to stay healthy, to stay alive (171).

When the balance between powerful contending societal forces gets out of whack, when one element begins to dominate the other (as, for example, when multi-national corporations such as Lockheed-Martin begin to create national military policies which depend on the use of their proprietary products), then democracy itself becomes unglued. Disparate power creates inequity: absolute power tends to corrupt absolutely; and dictatorships are never benevolent.

So it should come as no surprise that the exercise of arbitrary power in INS detention facilities (not prisons: remember?) reaches extremes, and that human suffering reaches Kafkaesque proportions. INS employees at all levels feel themselves above the law — and, in practice, they apparently are:

> The officers who ran the camp were immune to the effects of bad publicity. As one of them later told me, "We knew about the criticisms, but it wasn't something we really paid attention to. To tell you the truth, everybody in there felt untouchable. It was our world." (2)
>
> As we cruised along the steel border wall in the San Diego Sector, a Border Patrol supervisor I had interviewed years earlier candidly stated, "We're not a police state." Then he smiled and said he wouldn't mind if we became one, "since I'm the police." On the other hand, a fifteen-year federal law enforcement officer who lost friends in the September 11 attacks told me, "If you're going to give me too much power, believe me, I'm going to do the wrong thing." (24)

One defense against this the abuse of executive power — whether that power is exercised by a hereditary monarch or by a career bureaucrat who has been appointed as an INS district supervisor — is citizenship, and the rights of citizenship. But because immigrants are not citizens, they have only limited rights, and are therefore subject to the most capricious and self-serving decisions:

> If the keepers and their contractors are occasionally difficult to predict, it is safe to assume they will resist any challenge to their arbitrary authority. In 1992, when a group of Romanian asylum seekers in the Houston Processing Center went on a hunger strike, CCA headquarters in Nashville declared that they "had 'lost their right to talk to the media.'" (98)

Here, as Dow points out, we have Corrections Corporation of America, a for-profit private prison corporation, apparently reinterpreting the constitutional right of freedom of speech on behalf of the INS. But it should come as no surprise that the INS relies increasingly on for-profit private prisons to build and manage its detention facilities, or even to make its policy decisions. There is a remarkable convergence of self-interest among these institutions. To begin with, both rely heavily on secrecy. As Dow writes, "The immigration agency is further shielded from accountability by its expedient relationship with private prison companies." (14)

> Where there is no accountability, the arbitrary use of authority governs the trivial as well as the substantial. One insidious aspect of the private contractor's relationship with the INS is that it pairs bureaucracies that are hostile to public scrutiny. The buck stops nowhere. While the INS pretends to be open to scrutiny, the corporate offices of CCA make no secret of their antipathy to oversight, at least not in materials directed to shareholders. In a recent annual report, CCA warns that one of the "risks inherent" in this business is that "the private corrections industry is subject to public scrutiny." (90)

FOR-PROFIT PRIVATE PRISONS are also a remarkably effective transfer-of-wealth mechanism: not from those who have much to those who have little, but from public assets to private pockets (despite the misleading nomenclature, private prisons are publicly funded through contracts with governments at different levels; what's private is the control and the profit). But the federal funds that support the INS' detention centers don't only end up in corporate coffers. They also provide income directly to many poor rural counties, that depend on INS contracts to keep their budgets afloat. According to Dow, "In 2003 approximately 60 percent of INS detainees were in local prisons and jails and in private contract facilities." (9)

> "The federal government paid York County $45.00 per detainee per day, although it only cost the prison $24.37 to maintain each prisoner. As the Chinese asylum seekers approached the two-year mark of their detention, the county's general fund boasted a profit of about $1.5 million." (10)

This is one of the reasons that immigrant detention has risen so radically, from an average daily number of 2,370 in 1973 to some 23,000 today. Many prisons which were otherwise slated to close due to budget cuts and/or falling crime rates were reinvented as immigrant detention centers, at least in part due to lobbying by local governments, chambers of commerce and for-profit private prison corporations. Not only these corporations but many rural governments are aggressively seeking to boost their bottom lines by adding incarceration to their economic development strategies. They have been led to believe that there is nothing like a prison, a jail, a detention center, with federal dollars underwriting their continuity, to create the hope for economic stability to a desperately poor community buffeted by layoffs and plant closings. Whatever else you can say about the INS, a tendency towards downsizing and layoffs is not among its prominent characteristics. But as a number of studies have shown, the hope that prisons, jails and detention centers will rescue a failing rural economy is often illusory:

> [Oakdale mayor] Mowad would later tell [Robert] Kahn that immigration prisons are "'a recession proof industry,' because if the U.S. economy suffers, the world economy will follow, which will lead to more undocumented aliens coming to the United States, and thus more employment for Oakdale." (156)

One place to find a high concentration of such impoverished, job-starved communities is along the border. Not, of course, the Canadian-U.S border. That highly permeable line drawn in the snow is crossed annually by hundreds of thousands of immigrants to the U.S. My own paternal grandfather crossed it over a hundred years ago, after escaping the Czar's army and working as a laborer helping to build the Canadian Pacific Railroad. As many times as he told the story of his trip from Winnipeg, Manitoba to Lowell, Massachusetts, presumably in a more or less straight line, I can't recall his ever mentioning a detour to Ellis Island so that he could arrive in this country properly and officially. If there were a truthful count, it would almost certainly reveal that many of those who today are most aggressively anti-immigrant are themselves descended from so-called "illegal aliens."

Of course, my grandfather, to all visible intents and purposes, was white — or at least as white as such European immigrants as Jews, Sicilians, Irish, Italians, Greeks and Portuguese were considered by those U.S. residents who'd gotten here a few boats earlier. Today's immigrants — or at least those being detained by the INS — are not exactly coming from the European Common Union. Here's Dow again:

> The countries with the largest representation were Sri Lanka (30 detainees), China (29), Nigeria (23), Sierra Leone (16) and Ghana (15). The other countries of origin were Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, England, Ethiopia, Guinea, Haiti, India, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia, Macao, Mali, Mauritania, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Togo, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

Are we surprised? Prisons, after all, are about many things, and different things at different times. But in the U.S., they are always about race. The INS, in the current Home Sweet Homeland Security era, is not just detaining immigrants. It is very specifically detaining immigrants of color. New York reportedly has over a hundred thousand undocumented immigrants from Ireland alone, but you don't see INS agents raiding the St. Patrick's Day parade.

DOW DOES AN EXCELLENT, HEARTBREAKING job detailing and documenting how racism permeates the thought and action of both the INS and the for-profit private prison corporations that both drive and are driven by agency policy. Here, for example, is Steve Logan, at the time CEO of Cornell Corrections, speaking to investors on a conference call shortly after 9/11:

> It can only be good . . . with the focus on people that are illegal and also from Middle Eastern descent . . . In the United States there are over 900,000 undocumented individuals from Middle Eastern descent . . . That's *half* of our entire prison population . . . The federal business is the *best* business for us . . . and the events of September 11 [are] increasing that level of business. (10)

But Dow also presents without challenge the contention of both insiders and outsiders that the INS is relatively powerless to do anything about this extreme racism:

> For years, agency officials and immigration attorneys have spoken off the record about the inability of INS Headquarters and Justice Department officials to do anything to change the arbitrariness and even the brutality with which policy is carried out in the field. (252)

Yet why should this be the case? Of course, U.S. society and politics are shot through with racism — when the economic, political and social elements of your national structure are founded on slavery, what else would you expect? It's also arguable that, due primarily to the courage and political sophistication of those African Americans who in the 1960s launched the Southern Freedom Movement to challenge both segregation and racism, things are significantly (if not completely) better for many (if not all) people of color in this country. But this is certainly not the case at the INS' Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami:

> Seeing this scene, another officer threatened us by saying: "I hate you fucking Chinamen the most, tomorrow all of you will be sent back to China," then he pointed at one detainee's forehead and made a gesture of shooting with his hands and said: "Bang" "Bang" . . . (60)

When things get this bad or stay this bad, there are usually good reasons why this is the case. Finding out that "why" is one of the critical first tasks of organizers and activists who are working to change systems. The classic organizer's question "Whom does it serve?" is certainly a good one to apply to the INS.

Mark Dow argues that one of the reasons for the extreme conditions in the INS' immigrant detention centers is to make potential immigrants think twice before setting out for the U.S. Given that the INS has hung on to its appallingly inhumane management techniques for at least several decades, you have to wonder what statistics on immigration they're looking at in drawing the conclusion that this strategy works. It's not at all clear, for example, that, proportionate to population, more undocumented immigrants are coming to this country than, say, in the several decades before the outbreak of World War I — or, for that matter, that anti-immigrant feeling today, however appalling, is actually worse than during that time. In 1899, for example, five immigrants from Sicily were lynched in the rural community of Tallulah, Louisiana, itself until recently the site of what was arguably the most notorious juvenile detention center in the U.S. Whole national political parties had as their main platform extreme anti-immigrant and xenophobic measures: déjà vu all over again.

Such a deterrent policy, Dow points out, is not just inhumane, but illegal:

> The use of detention as a deterrent to potential refugees "violates obligations assumed by the executive" under international law, according to Helton, but this policy remains explicit today. (7)

Questions of legality aside, the INS, however much it tries, can't have it both ways. If, as the INS claims, (as do the leaders of the current Administration, who to a large extent control INS policies), the flow of undocumented immigrants into the U.S. is completely out of hand and growing exponentially, then obviously the policy of deterrence-through-detention isn't working and should be abandoned.

So why not give it up? Perhaps it's simply bureaucratic inertia that keeps the INS stuck in its old ways. On the other hand, it may be that the INS' detention policies and practices have entirely different goals than those stated, and that the long range target of these policies is not those who are coming to this country, but those who are already here. Here is Dow on John Ashcroft:

> Whatever might have had to do with security was subordinated to "a deeper and more troubling agenda," wrote two former INS general counsels. The nation's top law enforcement officer more or less admitted this himself. He told the International Association of Chiefs of Police, "the critics . . . would have us return to a reticent law enforcement culture of inhibition which existed prior to September 11, 2001 . . ."
>
> One priority, as Ashcroft stated repeatedly, was to prevent future attacks. Another, about which he was less explicit, was to make it look as if the law enforcement agencies that had made serious errors were now on top of things. What thousands of detainees and their families experienced as "destruction" was the strategy of "disruption" articulated by the attorney general. (25)

IS IT TOO MUCH TO IMAGINE that, for Ashcroft and the Bush administration, INS policies represent, not a rogue agency running out of control, but a deliberate controlled experiment, one that tests to what extent people in the U.S. are willing to lose the liberties, rights and privileges that they believe are theirs?

In a way, it's as Pastor Martin Niemoller paraphrased: "They came first for the undocumented immigrants, and I didn't speak up, because I wasn't an undocumented immigrant"; and then on to documented immigrants, U.S. citizens convicted of crimes, the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, the homeless, those without jobs, the old and infirm, those who are chemically dependent, religious minorities who "don't properly appreciate our traditions of religious freedom," and ultimately those who are inappropriately critical of the government and don't appreciate the freedom that's theirs when they live in "the greatest country on earth."

The list could go on and on. After all, the U.S. already sees prisons, jails and detention centers as the solution of first choice to virtually every human and social issue. With 5 percent of the world's population, we hold 25 percent of its prisoners. One out of every three African American men in his 20s is in a prison, jail or detention center, on probation or on parole.

So Mark Dow has chosen well in naming this fine book after *Gulag Archipelago*, the term coined by the famous Soviet dissident and detainee. He says:

> Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn describes the nation within a nation constituting the gulag archipelago. His translator, Thomas P. Whitney, writes, "The *image* evoked by [Solzhenitsyn's] title is that of one far-flung 'country' with millions of 'natives,' consisting of an *archipelago* of islands, some as tiny as a detention cell in a railway station and others as vast as a large Western European country, contained within another country" . . . But the INS prison system is in a sense the *American* gulag; its raison d'être is the control of certain non-Americans among "us." (12)

Dow is partly right here, but he could take the argument even further. True, the immediate goal of the American gulag is the "control of certain non-Americans among 'us.'" But it is also a step on an even more dangerous road: the increasing control of all of "us," of all people who live in the United States, citizens and non citizens alike:

> The 1996 immigration laws targeting noncitizens expanded the INS detention net so drastically that the lines between "us" and "them" began to blur. People who did not think of themselves as immigrants found they were subject to detention. Difficult as this may be to believe even now, almost ten years after they were passed, the 1996 laws might require the INS to detain, for example, someone convicted of misdemeanor drug possession or of jumping a subway turnstile without paying a fare or even of hair pulling. (15)

The Russian gulag, after which Mark Dow has named his book, did many things. Among them, it "disappeared" people, either temporarily or permanently. Out of sight, out of mind. As in the American gulag, there were no laws, no rules: only arbitrary control and command, preventive detention at its finest. Dow writes:

> Half a century earlier, a Hungarian man who had lived in the United States for twenty-five years left the country for nineteen months to be with his dying mother. He was detained on his return, charged with being a national security threat on the basis of secret evidence. Justice Robert Jackson wrote: "Quite unconsciously, I am sure, the Government's theory of custody 'for safekeeping' without disclosure to the victim of charges, evidence, informers or reasons, even in an administrative proceeding, has unmistakable overtones of the 'protective custody' of the Nazis, more than any detaining procedure known to the common law. Such a practice, once established with the best of intentions, will drift into oppression of the disadvantaged in this country as surely as it has elsewhere." (40)

And Dow concludes the paragraph:

> Justice Jackson would have understood the seriousness of the analogy, having served as chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg trials just a few years before. Unfortunately, his was a minority opinion, and those words are from his dissent. (40)

"Then they came for me, and by that time there was no one left to speak up for me."

Germany: the Revolution that Failed

MARTIN COMACK

The German Revolution 1917 - 1923
PIERRE BROUÉ
Translated by John Archer
Edited by Ian Birchall and Brian Pearce
Introduction by Eric D. Weitz
Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2006, 991 pp. $50

BY THE END OF THE WORLD WAR IN 1918, Imperial Germany was prostrate in defeat, having suffered some six million killed or wounded in the four-year ordeal. Traditional authority rapidly disintegrated with war weariness and malnutrition among the civilian population, growing rebellion in the German army and navy, and massive strikes in the large urban centers. Councils of workers, soldiers, and sailors assumed power in one locality after another across the country. Facing little resistance, the spread of the radical tide was due more to the weakness of the old regime than to the unity or coherence of the rebels. Nevertheless, Germany seemed poised on the verge of national revolution, ready to follow the Russian example of just the year before. But there would be no German Revolution; Berlin would not be another Petrograd.

The authoritarian bourgeois order established in Germany by the late nineteenth century would survive the revolutionary storm — the strikes, protests and armed uprisings — and within a few years would find its power as secure in the Weimar Republic as it had been before the war — secure at least from the forces of the Left. According to the author of this study, the great failure of the German revolutionaries was due to two decisive factors. In the first place, the German capitalist class, "the most conscious and determined bourgeois in Europe, if not the world," faced a divided Left and "an immature, and indecisive Communist Party." Secondly, "there was no Lenin" (908).

The late Pierre Broué was a historian of the revolutionary workers' movements of the twentieth century, a Trotskyist and veteran polemicist against Stalinism. Most of his work is yet to be translated from the French, although his volume on the revolution and civil war in Spain, written with Emile Temime, was published in English some thirty years ago. It stands as one of the few histories of those events that takes full account of the profound social revolution that swept through Republican Spain in 1936 and 1937. But in this recently translated work on the abortive German Revolution, Broué has not produced a general history of the turmoil and class struggle in central Europe, nor does he devote much attention to the early efforts to secure workers' power — the seizure of factories by councils of workers, the popular assemblies and organs of local governance in the proletarian districts of Berlin and the other industrial cities of Germany. Instead, in a detailed exposition derived from his doctoral dissertation, Broué has chosen to focus upon this revolutionary period from the perspective of the German Communist Party — beginning with its origins in the agitation of the Spartacist League led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, to the ideological and tactical confusion that accompanied the Party's founding and early experiences, through to the failure of the "German October" rising of 1923, and the final consolidation of a Communist movement in Germany that would be under the strict con-

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trol of the Comintern in Moscow — and eventually Joseph Stalin.

Indeed the difficulties and complexities of fomenting revolution in continental Europe's most advanced industrial society particularly impressed Karl Radek — the Comintern's agent in Germany. The Party could establish itself, he insisted, only if it "fights to achieve clarity in its conceptions, and becomes the point of ideological regroupment for the German workers' movement" (312). The Russian Bolsheviks, he admitted, had followed a far easier path to victory compared to the considerable obstacles confronting the German comrades.

The German Communists would soon be tamed, and find themselves under the tutelage of Moscow.

But the German Communists failed in these turbulent years to follow Radek's counsel and win the full allegiance of the working class, faced as they were with powerful rivals to their left and right. The radicals of the ultra-left — the Revolutionary Shop Stewards, the German Communist Workers Party, the anarcho-syndicalists — all commanded mass followings and, rejecting formal party organization, looked to the factory councils as the basic organs of the social revolution. But, as Broué notes, it was the Social Democratic Party and its trade unions that most effectively quelled the revolutionary tide. For years the Social Democrats had preached a mechanical Marxist doctrine to their millions of highly-organized loyal followers, assuring them that the inevitable processes of history would bring about the socialist millennium, if only they would remain patient, disciplined and obedient. But instilling such habits of passivity and regimentation, critics like Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek had warned, would enervate the rebellious spirit and smother the natural initiative of the rank and file. Broué approvingly cites Pannekoek to the effect that the Social Democrats had insured the hold of conservative bourgeois ideology over the proletariat, so that even when the real opportunity for revolution presented itself, the "masses were still completely governed by the bourgeois mentality, they restored the hegemony of the bourgeoisie with their own hands after it had collapsed" (328).

Maintaining at least the passive allegiance of most German workers, the Social Democrats opted for reform rather than revolution, diluted the power of the workers' councils and proclaimed a republic — backed by the industrialists and the conservative middle classes. When the small postwar German army proved reluctant to suppress strikes and rebellions by shooting down their former comrades and fellow citizens, the Social Democratic regime resorted to hired mercenaries — the so-called Free Corps, composed of right-wing war veterans. Proletarian districts in Germany's cities were turned into free-fire zones and subjected to infantry assault and artillery and aerial bombardment. The behavior of these Free Corps units would later earn the praise of Hermann Goering, who called them "the first soldiers of the Third Reich" (Robert Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: The Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany 1918 – 1923*, 1969, 264).

Between the moderate reformism of the traditional Social Democrats and the revolutionary activism of the extreme Left, the Communists were unable to capture the leadership of the German working class. Broué quite candidly admits that "Bolshevism was, in a certain sense, an experience and a doctrine external, not to say alien, to the German workers' movement" (852). Decades of Social Democratic authoritarianism under an inflexible bureaucracy had bred in German radicals an instinctive aversion to rigid party organization and a belief in the spontaneity of the revolutionary masses, an attitude that an exasperated Lenin would be moved to denounce as "an infantile disorder" (*Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder* [1920], Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1969.)

But by the mid-1920s many workers had become wearied and confused by the conflicting, and sometimes overlapping, rhetoric of the various socialist groups. As revolutionary prospects dimmed, the long years of war and upheaval finally bred apathy and resignation, and a longing for stability. The insurrectionary wave subsided. The German Communists would soon be tamed, and find themselves under the tutelage of Moscow. Their party would, in the author's words, be transformed into "nothing but an apparatus ... intended to meet the needs of the foreign policy of the Soviet bureaucracy." And far from concerning itself with a revolution in Germany, the latter actually feared that such an event would "threaten to overturn the precarious status quo upon which its survival was predicated" (910 - 911).

Broué wrote this exhaustive study as a corrective to the various Stalinoid versions of these events, much of which was accepted by Western historians. However he assumes on the part of the reader a basic knowledge of the history and politics of post-Imperial Germany, subjects which he refers to only within the context of his close attention to the early days of the Communist movement. It may be useful for English-speaking readers unfamiliar with these topics to first consult works like Haffner (Sebastian Haffner, *Failure of a Revolution: Germany 1918 - 1919*, Chicago: Banner Press, 1986) or Taylor (Simon Taylor, *Germany 1918-1933: Revolution, Counter-Revolution and the Rise of Hitler*, London, Duckworth Press, 1986), who can provide a concise description and basic background to Broué's more focused narrative.

Throughout this lengthy discourse Broué is painstaking in his careful description of the ambiguities and contradictions, the frequent twists and turns of Party strategy and tactics. But his writing never becomes obscure or pedantic. In following the sometime Byzantine nature of intra-party factionalism, the Communists' dubious relationship with the rest of the German Left, and the uncertainties of their connection with the Moscow International, the clarity of his prose (and the skill of his translator) remain constant.

Given all that the author has revealed concerning the uncertain and divided state of German Communism and the German Left itself during these years, along with the powerful opposition that it confronted, it is hard to credit his assertion that the presence of a commanding personality with a unifying vision would have made any real difference. In that environment, even as skilled a tactician as Lenin would not, in Marx's phrase, have been able to make history just as he pleased. The consequent failure of social revolution in Germany was a disaster for the entire world. It signaled the defeat of revolutionary efforts throughout Europe and ensured the continued isolation of Soviet Russia. The German Revolution that never was paved the way for the rise of Stalin and Hitler, for totalitarianism and finally another world war.

Hollywood Red Star — a Dwarf Star?

MICHAEL WRESZIN

> Red Star Over Hollywood:
> *The Film Colony's Long Romance with the Left*
> RONALD RADOSH AND ALLIS RADOSH
> San Francisco: Encounter Books 2005
> 309 pp. $25.95

IF THE HOLLYWOOD FILM COLONY had a long romance with the Left, they should be indicted for abuse since they often slandered and assaulted the left at every opportunity. This book is, it would appear unintentionally, an account of the ineffectiveness of the Communist Left and the defeats and failures they suffered from the late thirties through the first decade of the Cold War. It is argued that they tried to get the Communist ideology into the movies and invariably failed, except when it coincided with the government sponsored propaganda of the United States. They tried to gain control of the Hollywood film unions and invariably were defeated. They tried to stand up to Congressional investigations and were betrayed even by early supporters. They tried to take over the Group Theatre in New York but failed. They supported and even ran the Wallace campaign and were roundly defeated. They allegedly stifled all artists and intellectuals in their orbit of influence, but their orbit of influence was dismally small and beleaguered. At one point the authors quote *Variety* claiming that the Communists were taking over Hollywood "a fantastic sovietizing of the lots," the studios were becoming "writer controlled." The authors candidly admit that this "breathless account was rather exaggerated." The Party had little success in organizing sound stage and back lot workers. But it did have success in organizing two major guilds, especially the Screen Writers Guild, but even there they were soon defeated.

This is a strange account because the authors are obsessively, almost hysterically, intent on showing what a menace the Communists were in Hollywood and the only evidence they seem to have are the crimes of Stalin. However, they resurrect some testimony from Budd Schulberg, a friendly witness, before the committee, who expressed guilt for those crimes. At one point he felt a particular responsibility for the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It almost sounded as though Stalin had checked with Schulberg and other Hollywood reds before he made his tyrannical decisions. Do those who defend the administration's policies in the Middle East share the responsibility for the torture in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib? In this book there is a one-way purity. Even Dalton Trumbo, who is credited with understanding the oppression in the Soviet Union, is indicted for not waging a war against Stalinism when he felt that the racism and imperialism of the United States was a more immediate threat to America. He is described as contradictory and confused. Presumably because, as the Radoshes point out, that even though he "knew the truth about the evils of Soviet Communism . . . he accepted and parroted the Soviet line on foreign policy, viewing the United States as an 'imperialist' power." Believing the United States was an imperialist power during the Cold War years was not simply a Soviet line. There are many scholars in the United States who believed that during the

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Cold War and believe it even more so today. There is no mention of our policies in Guatemala or Iran during these years. The so called "non-Communist Left" liberals were notoriously quiet on those matters. Is that relative silence complicity? If one criticized American foreign policy it was seen as service to the Soviet Union. In fact, Nixon in 1950 in his attack on Helen Gahagan Douglas, made the point that she voted the same way as Marcantonio on several issues, making her a defender of Communism. On the other hand Communists, who opposed racism, class divisions, the attack on labor unions, and American imperialism in Latin America are seen as insincere, political manipulators and somehow implicated in the crimes of the gulag.

There is very little new of consequence in this account. It is mostly more anecdotes from new sources supporting old denunciations. But the same old anecdotes are trotted out. Albert Maltz's forced recantation and groveling submissions to Communist apparatchiks is dealt with great umbrage. The Maltz recantation is seen as a crime far greater than hounding people out of their jobs for political opinions. The friendly witnesses like E.G. Robinson and E.J. Cobb and others are not charged with "groveling" before the "degradation ceremonies" demanded by the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Collaborative witnesses like Budd Schulberg and Elia Kazan are portrayed as courageous heroes far more than those who denounced the Committees and refused to answer questions. They might well have legitimately attacked the Communists in speech and publication but to turn to and support the power of the state to harass and oppress and ultimately jail their opponents is another matter altogether. Dwight Macdonald proudly admitted to being a " red-baiter" but he never gave support to the investigating committees. Richard Hofstadter, hardly one of the romanticists, understood that the McCarthyite witch hunt "was not so simply rational as to turn up spies or prevent espionage or even to expose actual Communists (they had most of the names anyway), but *to discharge resentments and frustrations to punish, to satisfy enmities whose roots lay elsewhere than in the Communist issue itself*."[italics mine] But if Hofstadter is too liberal an observer one might turn to the erudite conservative historian John Lukacs. He has written that "anti-Communism "from a safe distance springs from two sources. The first is a sense of self-satisfaction knowing that one is on the right side, on the respectable side, together with all those right-thinking people. The other is the exaggeration of the diabolical powers and machinations of Communism and Communists. While the Radoshes, like so many contemporary conservatives, see themselves as a courageous but beleaguered minority in one of the most conservative periods in our history they, like so many other Americans across the political spectrum, have exaggerated the menace of Communism. It is a good political ploy and, as Lukacs observes, "it may be turned to personal and occupational profit." This might be the case with Radosh who, when on the left, did not have the influence and access to publications that he now enjoys.

In this book there is a one-way purity.

ONE QUESTION THAT NEVER OCCURS to the authors is why the countries of western Europe, Italy, France and England, for example, all with large Communist Parties, never experienced the kind of mania over the threatening menace of Communism. In those countries the Communist Party was just that, another political party among many. Among virulent anti-Communists in America that was simply not accepted. Since Communists were viewed as agents of a foreign power, the members in America for the most part tended to keep actual membership a secret.

When it comes to discussing films that had been influenced by Communist writers, it is mostly the same old story of *Mission to Moscow* largely influenced by the ambassador to the Soviet Union, Joseph Davies, and *Song of Russia* approved and defended by the Office of War Information. These were, of course, wartime propaganda movies written by Communists in the service of the wartime alliance. The Radoshes dwell on *North Star* by Lillian Hellman which is an anti-Nazi film that presents the Russians as heroic and, particularly, *Cloak and Dagger* with Gary Cooper and Lili Palmer. This film is charged with preaching "straight Party line": "God have mercy on us if we ever thought we could really keep science a secret . . . if we think we can wage other wars without destroying ourselves" (the scientist, Nils Bohr's, position among many others). But the studio cut out the allegedly pro-Communist rhetoric at the end. Oops, another defeat. The fulminations of Ayn Rand are treated with grave respect, as the work of a courageous fighter against the crimes of Stalinism. The Radoshes think a film like *Action in the North Atlantic* is soft on Communism. However this blatantly nationalist and pro-merchant marine film proves, as Nora Sayer has commented, that "almost no one wrote more passionately patriotic movies than American Communists did in wartime."

Several reputable reviewers have praised the Radoshes study as fair, objective and solidly researched. If so, why is it that the Radoshes can only refer to The Conference of Studio Unions as "a left wing group" supported by Communists but when they describe the CSU's opponents in the International Alliance of Stage Employees and Moving Picture Operators (IATSE) they don't see it as mob controlled or racket dominated? On the contrary it is described as "AF of L affiliated and the oldest show business union in the country." They go on in an obviously selective and biased manner describing Herbert Sorrell, the head of the CSU, as a "pro-communist" militant, but they never mention that George E. Browne, president of the IATSE, and Willie Bioff, its Hollywood representative, were two mob members who were later convicted and jailed for shakedowns. When they write of the CSU strike against Warner Brothers they fail to mention that it was Roy Brewer, an aide to the Committee, and Joe Tuohy of the Teamsters who transported bus loads of strike breakers through the picket lines. Brewer is always treated with great respect as an "anti-Communist union leader," but they don't mention that Brewer had promised HUAC's Donald Jackson that the Hollywood AFL Film Council would make every effort to stop the exhibition of the Communist made and produced film, *Salt of the Earth.* The projectionists and staffers that belonged to Brewer's union did refuse to show the film. At this time Brewer, a great defender of American values, was the chairman of the Motion Picture Alliance for the Preservation of American Ideals which had much to do with the hiring and firing of the Hollywood studios. Nor do they discuss his large roll in the "clearance business" of getting people off the blacklist if they became cooperative. It was Brewer that negotiated the repentance confessions and final clearance of Edward Dmytryk, Jose Ferrer, Gene Kelly and John Huston. Brewer's unsavory role in the "groveling procedures" and "degradation ceremonies" is omitted.

This is a selective history concentrating on the great crimes and danger of Hollywood Communists. There is little mention of the victims of the Congressional investigations — of the jobs lost, lives destroyed — nor any appreciation of the repressive atmosphere and assault on free speech.. The lengthy section on John Garfield is appalling. Emulating the Committee they rummage through the research material to present him as a lying opportunist fellow traveler and conclude that his premature death was caused by the Party which used and "guilt baited" him, not by the constant harassment of the Committee. It is the Communists who have tried "to transform him into a martyr killed by HUAC." Garfield gets so much attention because the portrait is totally negative. It's "heroes and villains" throughout this account. There may have been some problems in the States during this disgraceful period in our history but it was never like the gulag!!!!!!!! It is like arguing we have no poverty in America compared to Calcutta.

Martin Dies, the early head of HUAC, publicly deplored "the fact that throughout the South today subversive elements are attempting to convince the Negro that he should be placed on social equality with white people, that now is the time for him to assert his rights." The Radoshes present him as a fair minded and sympathetic investigator only seeking the truth. His reputation as one of the great demagogues of the period is ignored. Marquis Childs, an astute observer of the congressional beat, recalled that he had never encountered a more cynical man who, despite his display of good humor, seemed to have nothing but "utter scorn for the whole institution of Congress." The Committee itself, desperately seeking evidence of the influence of communists in Hollywood, is presented as a fair, reasonable and intelligent investigation in the interest of national security. When the party during the wartime alliance opposed Black activism on civil rights, favored the Japanese internment, called for an end to labor strikes (all positions held by the majority of Americans as well as the Roosevelt administration),they were obviously hypocrites. When before and after the wartime alliance they favored black radicalism, labor agitation, anti-imperialism, they were obviously pro Soviet and anti-American. In any case they were only agents and servants of a foreign power. There is no discussion of sincere dedicated rank and file Communists. Such a concept is the line of pro-Communist revisionist historians. In the Radosh view they are either dupes, deluded, or deliberately and calculatingly subversive. The Radoshes make a big point of praising Trumbo's famous speech in which he argues that during this period of the black list and oppression

> "there was bad faith and good, honesty and dishonesty, courage and cowardice, selflessness and opportunism, wisdom and stupidity, good and bad on both sides, and almost every individual involved some or all of these antithetical qualities in his own person, in his own acts. . . . It will do no good to search for heroes and villains because there were none; there were only victims."

Many scholars and historians can accept this balanced reflection. But there is little evidence that the authors of this book do. They know very well who the villains and heroes are. This volume is a classic example of the good guy-bad guy history that they denounce when written by leftists. They don't even accept the view of Walter Goodman and, more recently, Michael Ybarra, who declared a plague on both the Committee and its victims. That was unfair, since the power of the state to destroy lives was far greater than any threat posed by the miserable, ineffective Hollywood Communists.

Katrina Illustrated

SETH TOBOCMAN is a New York-based illustrator and cartoonist whose iconic images of protest have appeared in numerous magazines and books. He founded the political comics magazine *World War Three Illustrated* with his friend Peter Kuper in the late 1970s, and he continues to write and draw comics that tackle real-world issues from an anti-authoritarian left perspective. This strip is part of his ongoing effort to document the combined impact of Katrina and neoliberal public policy on the people of New Orleans.


IN A CITY THAT HAS SUSTAINED NEAR APOCALYPTIC DAMAGE,
BU GER ORLEANS
THE BRICK BUILDINGS AT SAINT BERNARD AVENUE HAVE PROVEN TO BE STABLE. BUT THOUSANDS OF RESIDENTS ARE KEPT OUT WITH A FENCE.
BECAUSE THESE BUILDINGS CONSTITUTE SOMETHING AMERICA FEARS MORE THAN A HURRICANE,
THESE BUILDINGS ARE HOUSING PROJECTS.
FENCED OUT


BUT ARE NEW ORLEANS HOUSING PROJECTS WORTH SAVING?
THOSE ARE HORRIBLE PLACES. EVEN THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE, THE NICE ONES, ANYWAY, WANT THEM TORN DOWN!
CLEARLY THERE IS MORE THAN ONE POINT OF VIEW.
I'VE ALLWAYS WANTED TO GET OUTTA THE PROJECTS. BUT NOT THIS WAY. THIS AREA USED TO BE VIBRANT. I HAD SOME PEOPLE COME FROM H.U.D., THEY INSPECTED THE BUILDING I WAS LIVING IN. I WAS TELLIN 'EM I HAD A PROBLEM WITH THE CEILING. PARTS WOULD FALL DOWN. THEY TOLD ME THAT'S 'CAUSE OF THE INFRASTRUCTURAL DAMAGE THAT WAS CAUSED BY THESE APARTMENTS BEING SO OLD. THEY WERE BUILT IN THE 1940S, THEY SAID THAT IN A COUPLE YEARS THEY WOULD TEAR IT DOWN. SO THEY HAD PLANNED TO TEAR IT DOWN BEFORE KATRINA HIT, BUT IT WOULD BE DONE IN PHASES. THEY ALREADY TORE DOWN A COUPLE ACROSS THE STREET. IT'S STILL AN EMPTY LOT....
I THINK GOD WANTED TO CLEAN THIS CITY OUT. BECAUSE IT HAD BECOME A REAL BAD, UNSAFE, PLACE TO LIVE.... AND IT WAS BECAUSE OF THE DRUGS..... ONE DAY I'M GONNA BUY A HOUSE, WHEN I IMPROVE MY CREDIT. IT WON'T BE HERE. I'M AFRAID OF THOSE LEVEES! MY AUNT, SHE THINKS SHE CAN MOVE BACK HERE, CAUSE THE CAMP OUT PEOPLE, (ACTIVISTS) ARE MAKIN' IT SEEM LIKE IT'S O.K. TO MOVE BACK IN.
Jennifer


I'VE BEEN LIVING IN IBERVILLE SINCE MARCH. I LEFT NEW ORLEANS BEFORE THE HURRICANE.... I WENT TO TEXAS....THEN I CAME BACK. BEFORE THE HURRICANE, I LIVED IN ST. BERNARD HOUSES, FOR 44 LONG YEARS, MY WHOLE LIFE! I HAVE HISTORY THERE. THAT'S WHERE MY WHOLE FAMILY AT!
I LOVE IT! AND I'M A WORKIN WOMAN! I BEEN WORKIN' 25 YEARS STRAIGHT! I WORKED FOR THE SAINT BERNARD SCHOOL BOARD AND FOR THE HOUSING AUTHORITY. IF SOMEONE WAS TO OFFER ME A HOUSE THAT WOULD BE MY OWN, I WOULD GET IT. BUT IF I WAS TO LIVE ANYWHERE ELSE, I WOULD BE IN SAINT BERNARD 'CAUSE THAT'S WHAT I LOVE! MY MAMA RAISED ME THERE, MY MAMA'S MAMA RAISED HER THERE. IT'S A WHOLE GENERATION AND IT GOES DOWN AND DOWN. I'D LOVE TO RAISE MY CHILDREN THERE. I HAVE 4 KIDS, 2 BOYS AND 2 GIRLS. TWO OF THEM ARE IN COLLEGE. ONE OF THEM IS IN HIGHSCHOOL AND ONE IS IN JUNIOR HIGH. AND ALL OF THEM ARE VERY WELL DISCIPLINED. I LIKE IT BECAUSE I'M A WORKIN' WOMAN AND THEY HAVE A NURSERY. IT SITS AT THE HEART OF THE DEVELOPMENT. YOU BRING YOUR KIDS THERE AND ALL THEY CHARGE IS $5. AFTER SCHOOL THEY GOT 3 PROGRAMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT. IF YOUR KID'S 12 to 16, THEY GO THERE AND THE COMMUNITY HELP 'EM WITH THEIR HOMEWORK. THEY GOT PEOPLE THAT VOLUNTEERS TO MAKE SURE THEY GET THEIR HOMEWORK DONE.
Stephanie


THEY SAY WE DON'T PAY RENT. BUT WE PAY LOTSA RENT. THEY GOT PEOPLE THAT PAY UP TO $499 DOLLARS IN THE PROJECTS. I WAS PAYIN $383. RIGHT NOW, I'M NOT EVEN MUCH WORKING, AND I PAY $302 IN IBERVILLE. SOME PEOPLE SAY THERE'S A LOT OF MURDER THERE. THERE ISN'T MUCH KILLING. I MEAN, IF YOU MESS WITH SOMEBODY, SOMEBODY MESS WITH YOU. JUST LIKE ANYWHERE ELSE. BUT IF YOU RESPECT SOMEBODY, A PERSON GONNA RESPECT YOU RIGHT BACK. IT'S A MATTER OF HOW YOU CARRY YOUR SELF. I STILL WANNA LIVE IN NEW ORLEANS BECAUSE THIS IS MY HOME. WHEN I WAS IN TEXAS, I HAD A 12 FOOT GARAGE, 4 BEDROOMS. BUT I WASN'T HAPPY. NOT THAT I CAN'T LIVE SOMEWHERE ELSE. IF I LIVE IN NEW ORLEANS, EVEN IF I DON'T LIVE IN ST. BERNARD, I'M VERY COMFORTABLE. I CAN GO UP TOWN, I KNOW PEOPLE, I CAN GO DOWN TOWN, I KNOW PEOPLE. BUT IF I MOVE OUT, YOU GONNA HAVE TO LEARN THAT NEIGHBORHOOD. YOU DON'T KNOW ONE STRANGER FROM THE NEXT. IT WOULD BE HARD TO LEARN ALL THOSE PEOPLE. I WOULDN'T KNOW WHICH ONE'S A KILLER, RAPER, ROBBER. BUT IN NEW ORLEANS, I KNOW EVERYBODY. AND WHEN YOU LIVE LIKE THAT, YOU CAN BE COMFORTABLE. YOU CAN WALK OUT YOUR HOUSE, 1,2,3 IN THE MORNING. YOU SEE A PERSON, YOU KNOW THAT PERSON. YOU DON'T KNOW THAT PERSON, YOU KNOW SOMEONE IN THEIR FAMILY.
AND THIS IS WHERE I WANNA BE! WHERE I WANNA RAISE MY FAMILY! I HAVE FAITH! AND I BELIEVE IN GOD! AND I BELIEVE HE WILL MAKE A WAY OUT OF NO WAY! AND THOSE MY FAVORITE WORDS! AND I BELIEVE, I REALLY BELIEVE, THEY GONNA BE OPEN!



SETH 06, PROPS 2 JULES