

Palestine!

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PALESTINIANS SUPPORT PLO

West Bankers Rise Up

For the past three months, Palestinians have waged the most prolonged and defiant mass disruption to hit the West Bank since it came under Israeli military occupation in 1967. The protests had grown to such militancy that the very viability of the U.S.-backed Israeli strategies for the occupied areas has been thrown into question.

The spark that set off the protests was the U.S. veto on January 26 of a UN Council resolution upholding the national rights of the Palestinian people. On the following morning, the enraged student bodies charged out of the three large high schools in the West Bank town of Nablus, and chanted slogans in support of the PLO and denouncing the U.S. and Israel. Workers who had been handed leaflets earlier that morning on their way to their jobs joined the students converging on the Casbah, the ancient center of Nablus where a maze of alleyways makes military control difficult. The demonstrators stoned police and military frontier guards who attempted to disperse them with fire hoses and by charging the crowds with swinging batons. The

[Con't. on page 2]



Palestinian demonstration outside al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in mid-March.

U.S.-ISRAELI-JORDANIAN COLLUSION

Anti-PLO Strategy For West Bank


This article analyzes one of the basic factors behind the news of the uprising on the West Bank: the US-Israeli-Jordanian strategy for denying the people of the West Bank their national rights as Palestinians.

The PLO's radio station, Voice of Palestine, and its other media have emphatically denounced various elements in this strategy for the past few months: the Israeli plan to set up "self-administration" on the occupied Palestinian West Bank, the actions taken by Jordan to usurp the PLO's right to represent all of the Palestinian people, including those on the West Bank, and moves by the US toward some form of negotiated return of the West Bank to King Hussein's control.

The United States, Israel and Jordan are currently engaged in a coordinated effort to ensure that if the West Bank, or any part of it, is forced from Israeli control it will fall under the thumb of Jordan's King Hussein rather than into the arms of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The chain of events began to unwind with the visit to Washington of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in February; their strategy involves possible negotiations between the Israeli and Jordanian governments under US auspices. At the same time, Israel and Jordan are waging a vigorous campaign, with US backing, to increase King Hussein's political strength on the West Bank and undermine the PLO, recognized by all progressive governments and the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

[Con't. on page 8]



West Bankers

Con't. from page 1

Jerusalem daily, *ash-Sha'ab*, reported that a number of demonstrators were injured.

This uprising in Nablus, the largest city on the West Bank (population 45,000), and long a stronghold of nationalist sentiment, quickly inspired disruptions in the other large towns of the West Bank. Israeli television carried a report of the students of al Birah attacking Israeli forces with "stones and shout[ing] slogans denouncing the American veto at the Security Council." The Israeli newspaper, *Ma'ariv*, reported that in Ramallah "students rioted in protest against American policy." Palestinian sources reported that in East Jerusalem students and workers chanting in support of the PLO clashed with Israeli security forces using fire hoses and truncheons, and that in Hebron a nationalist demonstration attacked and burned an Israeli military car.

The outbreak in January was the beginning of what some Palestinian nationalists are calling, the "Third General Uprising." The First General Uprising occurred on the West Bank in November 1974 as an enthusiastic upsurge greeting Yasser Arafat's invitation to address the UN General Assembly and that body's recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. The Second General Uprising broke out in November 1975 as violent protest against implementation of a so-called "self-administration" plan, through which Israel hopes to hand local administration of the West Bank over to collaborators liked to King Hussein of Jordan in order to prevent the PLO from asserting its national authority over the area.


With each of these uprisings comes a glimpse of the growing strength and sophistication of the clandestine Palestinian political organizations. The Israeli daily *Ha'aretz* noted cautiously that the students of Nablus who touched off the third round of civil disturbances "had apparently coordinated their actions beforehand." As the uprising spread during the next weeks, a number of other Israeli newspapers asserted that organized forces tied to the PLO were behind the disturbances.

Since the October 1973 war, underground branches of the General Union of Palestinian Students and the General Union of Palestinian Women have become active and influential in the area. Significantly, for the first time labor committees have also been organized in a number of places. These clandestine organizations operate within the framework of the Palestine National Front, the political arm of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the occupied areas.

The general uprisings are happening as the growing international recognition of the national rights of the Palestinians and of the PLO's right to assert national authority in the occupied areas is coming into harsh contradictions with Israel's intransigent refusal to consider yielding the West Bank to the PLO. The "self-administration" plan was one cogent indication of Israel's intentions; the proliferation of Zionist settlements in the West Bank, particularly one set up recently near Nablus, provides another piece of ominous evidence of the Israelis' long range aim to keep control over the West Bank.

The almost unanimous support which West Bankers are giving the PLO has no doubt been spurred on by the declining conditions they find themselves facing under occupation.

First, since 1967 the economy of the West Bank has, as a matter of explicitly stated Israeli policy, been made a colonial appendage of the Israeli economy. Thus when an economic crisis hit Israel after the October War, the West Bank was affected most adversely. Over 50 percent of the labor force had been employed by Israeli concerns, and many of them were laid off when the number of available jobs decreased, and preference was given to Israelis. Moreover, due to the occupation policy of forcing the West Bank to be a market for Israeli products, sky-rocketing prices have struck hard at the West Bank, where inflation is even higher than in Israel itself.



The West Bank is the Palestinian area lying immediately to the west of the Jordan River. Jordan illegally annexed it in 1950; Israel gained control of it in the 1967 war. Its current Palestinian population is 705,000.

Second, the continual destruction of Palestinian culture in the occupied areas has inflamed the population. Zionist history is being taught in schools of the West Bank. Palestinian cultural forms are being suppressed and many cultural leaders expelled. Christian and Moslem holy places are being encroached upon.

AL AQSA MOSQUE INCIDENT INTENSIFIES DEMONSTRATIONS

After five days of protests, the imposition of reinforced Israeli security patrols on the streets of West Bank cities and the use of tanks and armored cars to patrol Nablus appeared to temporarily contain the uprising. Then a new affront to Palestinian national feelings touched off even more furious protests.

At the end of January, an Israeli court ruled that a group of right-wing Zionist demonstrators who had earlier conducted a prayer service on the grounds of al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem were within their rights to pray there. Previously, the Israeli authorities had forbidden Jewish prayer in the precincts of al Aqsa, the third most holy shrine in Islam and considered a priceless part of the Palestinian cultural heritage. Since the 1920's, Palestinians have feared that the most fanatical of Zionists would succeed in their announced aims of tearing al Aqsa down, to rebuild in its place the Second Temple which they claim lies buried beneath it. Al Aqsa, from the time of British Colonial rule, has been a focal point of Palestinian national concern and a gathering place for nationalist demonstrations.

Soon after the announcement of the Israeli court's decision, Palestinians gathered daily on the grounds of al Aqsa to launch protest demonstrations. Usually about 500 Palestinians displayed the flag of the PLO as they marched each day down from the Mosque through the narrow streets of the old city where they battled with police with sticks and stones. Soon the number of demonstrators grew, as did the seriousness of the confrontations with the Israeli security forces. One such confrontation was witnessed by a *New York Times* reporter who wrote that "Israeli police used tear gas and riot sticks. . . . An Arab crowd threw card tables and chairs into a fire just outside the Damascus Gate and then stoned Israeli policemen and firemen who tried to reach the site."

The al Aqsa incident and the Jerusalem protests inspired

massive demonstrations throughout the West Bank. In Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, al Birah and Hebron, citizens rioted, setting fire to piles of tires and barricading their neighborhoods. While the action was usually initiated by students, the general population soon joined in. Shopkeepers in Nablus and Jenin closed their stores in a strike. One index of the extent to which the demonstrations were political, rather than an exclusively religious protest, is the fact that the upsurge in Ramallah, a Christian town, was quite as militant as that in the Moslem towns.

THE FAILURE OF REPRESSION

In retribution, the occupation authorities forbade the citizens of Nablus, Ramallah and al Birah to cross the bridges to the Jordan East Bank "until the violence stops." The disruption of normal trade, of course, imposed severe hardship on workers and merchants who depend upon trade with Jordan and the outside Arab world. Security forces were stationed on the roof tops of Jerusalem and al Birah and on crossroads throughout the West Bank. Tanks patrolled the streets of Nablus. To regain order in Jericho, the Military Governor ordered a temporary curfew. Hundreds of people were arrested and those released were fined as much as \$480—a very heavy burden for most Palestinian families. By February 28, Police Minister Shlomo Hillel could go on Israeli television and boast, "the situation has reverted to normal."

After a brief respite, however, demonstrations began again. On March 7 the Israeli military ordered soldiers to break up a gathering of students in a schoolyard in Nablus who were chanting slogans against the nearby Zionist settlement at Kadum. The soldiers burst into the confines of the school, pursuing students from the courtyard into the classrooms, beating and injuring 72.

The Acting Mayor and the municipal council of Nablus reacted to the military brutality by resigning from their posts in protest. The entire city closed down in a general strike; as described in

the *London Times*, "the shops were shuttered, schools were closed and buses stood idle in their station."

The resignation of the Nablus municipal administration struck at the heart of Israeli military occupation. The Israelis have sought, quite consistently, to maintain a "low profile," by having the daily matters of civil administration handled by West Bank Arab officials, while maintaining their military presence and their control of the area's economy. The degree of cooperation Israel has been able to exact from municipal officials has varied widely from the open collaboration of Mayor Mohammed Ali al Jabaari of Hebron to the resistance of Mayor Abdul Jawad Saleh of al Birah, who was expelled from the West Bank and now serves on the Executive Committee of the PLO. In general, however, the Israelis have found the municipal officials useful in administering the occupied territory, and often helpful in containing protests. Thus the resignation in Nablus posed a serious problem.

The military authorities responded by rushing reinforcements to Nablus. Youths challenged the Israeli soldiers by attacking them with stones in back alleys. Troops opened fire at least twice, and Israeli sources admitted to wounding a 14-year-old boy.

For the first time since January the rioting then spread outside the cities to the villages around Nablus, where the new Zionist settlement at Kadum has created great bitterness. The village of Tubas held a general strike, and the young men of Hawara threw up roadblocks and pelted Israeli vehicles with stones. Similar incidents erupted in villages stretching west to Tulkarm and south to Jerusalem.

BRUTALITY AT BIR ZEIT COLLEGE

On March 10, 12 miles north of Jerusalem in the village square of Bir Zeit, 200 students of the local college demonstrated peacefully, chanting pro-PLO slogans. Suddenly they were attacked by a detachment of Israeli troops. Twenty-five soldiers chased the students into the college dormitory, smashing

Israeli patrol on streets of Nablus during First General Uprising, November 1974.



windows, overturning furniture, clubbing and beating the students, splattering the blood from their wounded heads across the floors. Of the many students injured, 13 required hospitalization.

The vicious attack on the students at Bir Zeit may well have been a calculated attempt to terrify the West Bank into submission. If so, it backfired. The mayors and municipal councils of the Bir Zeit, Ramallah and al Birah resigned in protest. Soon their counterparts in other towns joined them in resigning, bringing the number of affected municipalities to nine.

Furious rioting grew as roadblocks were set up throughout much of the West Bank; the fever point was reached five days later in Ramallah and al Birah in what the *Jerusalem Post* acknowledged as "one of the worse riots the towns have ever seen"; large crowds "set up roadblocks, burned tires and stoned security forces." On one main street an automobile was overturned and set afire as part of a barricade. Soldiers charging with truncheons failed to disperse the crowds, who retaliated with stones, injuring at least one Israeli officer in the face.

By mid afternoon, the Israelis had had enough. Police vans with loudspeakers toured the streets announcing an indefinite curfew. The 40,000 citizens of the two towns were confined to their homes by frequent army patrols who were ordered to shoot into the air at intervals. Fear grew that hunger faced the inhabitants, as they found themselves living under the longest lasting curfew yet imposed in the occupied areas.

OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES ESCALATE REPRESSION

The Israeli government had obviously decided that force was the answer to the uprising. Shimon Peres, Israeli Defense Minister, summoned the officials who resigned to Tel Aviv on March 16 and threatened "very harsh measures" if the local leaders failed to calm the situation. All stood firm in their resignations; by then they could hardly have imposed order if they wished. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the first fatal shooting in the course of Israeli suppression of the uprising occurred the next day.

As militant demonstrations were in progress throughout the West Bank on March 17, the citizens of Abu Dis, a suburb of Jerusalem, built a large stone barricade. A car carrying four Israeli soldiers was forced to stop and was stoned by the protesters. A soldier sitting in a nearby truck opened fire on the crowd and wounded three children. An eleven-year-old boy, Ali Husain al Sana, died later of a bullet wound in his brain. By the time the child was buried, a 45-year-old man in the village of Salfit, who was arrested after a violent clash between villagers and Israeli soldiers, had also died, apparently of a heart attack after being beaten by the soldiers.

On the evening of the first fatal shooting Defense Minister Peres warned that "Israel possessed enough resources to quell further disturbances," and "would not hesitate to take all necessary measures to restore order."

The response of East Jerusalem to the shooting and Peres' threat was a general strike, which shopkeepers maintained even in the face of a warning from the Israeli Central Command that any shop which failed to reopen would be forcibly closed for three months. Israeli paratroopers were posted on the rooftops of Arab Jerusalem, at each intersection and even in the courtyard of the al Aqsa Mosque. Army roadblocks turned back all West Bankers seeking to enter the city.

HEBRON RIOTS

Hebron is a hilly southern city of 40,000, dominated for the last 40 years by Sheik Mohammed Ali Jabaari, a feudal leader who while still maintaining his ties to King Hussein has been Israel's closest major collaborator since 1967. Only recently has his control been seriously challenged by pro-PLO forces in Hebron.

The outbreak of large scale protests in Hebron was provoked by what appears to have been a premeditated attempt by the nearby Jewish settlement of Kiryat Arba to intimidate the local Arab population. On March 17, the settlement's leader, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, led a procession of the settlers through Hebron and when some Arab youths began throwing stones at them, the Rabbi had some of his followers open fire and then smash stalls in the Arab market place. Levinger has since revealed that his group had been given 3,000 rounds of ammunition by a high ranking Israeli officer and that the group's actions on March 17 were carried out in cooperation with the Israeli army.

The evening following the attack, Rabbi Levinger blustered on Israeli television, "We have put them [the people of Hebron] very nicely in their place and said to them . . . there won't be any disturbances again, and there won't be any demonstrations."

In fact, the disturbances the following morning were so fierce that the Israeli army had to bring in half-tracks to patrol the enraged city. The army's vain attempts to stop the demonstrations led them a few days later to smash into the municipal building and beat up citizens inside. Mayor al Jabaari apparently felt that he could salvage his stature in the town only by resigning in protest, although at the same time he continued to maintain his opposition to the uprisings. "It's not good for people to have their shops closed or their schools closed," he was quoted as saying; "It's not good . . . for government."

Al Jabaari was not long out of office; two days later, at the personal urging of Defense Minister Peres, he rescinded his resignation, on the condition that the Israeli troops move out of town. Jabaari had promised Peres that he would maintain order, but no sooner had the troops left the city than the citizenry began throwing up barricades and staging demonstrations. The Israeli troops were forced quickly to return in full force, leading one prominent Palestinian conservative leader to observe, "If Sheikh Jabaari can't control Hebron, then the situation is genuinely out of hand. We have no leadership anymore."

Jabaari's failure to control Hebron signaled a major defeat of the subservient members of the Palestinian elite who have been used successfully by the Israelis in the past to contain mass discontent. Conversely it signalled a victory of a new leadership which represents this discontent and is linked to the PLO.

THE ISRAELI DEFEAT

The militance of the PLO supporters on the West Bank has created a new situation for the Israelis. By refusing to be subdued even by brutal repression, these nationalists have forced the resignation of the civil officials through whom Israel has administered the West Bank. The breakdown of this administrative order carefully nurtured by the Defense Ministry caused the *Jerusalem Post* to declare that "the West Bank [had] entered its worst crisis since 1967." Israeli officials admitted to the *Washington Post* that if the Israeli military was forced to administer the areas directly, then "this would be, in effect, an admission of Israeli defeat." And in fact direct forms of military administration are already making their appearance in the curfewed cities of Ramallah and al Birah and less directly in the heavily occupied city of Nablus.

But the ramifications of the Third General Uprising extend still further; it appears to have made a shambles, at least temporarily, of the U.S.-Israeli-Jordanian strategy of establishing a self-administration on the West Bank run by pro-Hussein collaborators. This plan of pushing forward a new "authentic" Palestinian leadership as an alternative to the PLO has received its most effective rejection possible, rejection by the masses of the West Bank.

Indicative of the defiance and genuine nationalism sweeping the area was the funeral procession of the villagers of Abu Dis for the slain 11-year-old Ali Husain al Sana. Carrying olive branches and flowers, the crowd shouted over and over again the name, "Abu Amar," the popular pseudonym of Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO. ●

Exposing Zionist Myths

Is Zionism A National Liberation Movement?

"Zionism is . . . a Jewish form of what today is called a national liberation movement."

—Daniel Moynihan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, UN General Assembly, November, 1975

"Zionism is the name of the national liberation movement of the Jewish people. . . . Zionism is to the Jewish people what the liberation movements of Africa and Asia have been to their peoples."

—Chaim Herzog, Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, UN General Assembly, November, 1975

"We have also been told that Zionism is a national liberation movement. In fact, this claim was first voiced by the 28th World Zionist Congress in 1968. It took Zionism 71 years to discover its purported identity. When Zionism started it called itself colonialism. . . . At that time colonialism was in vogue. Zionism had no difficulty recognizing its true identity as a colonial movement. It called its first bank the Colonial Trust Company. It called its first department of settlement the Department of Colonization. It called its settlements colonies. It likened itself to the *conquistadores*. It likened itself to the French *colons* in North Africa. This was the literature of Zionism. This was recognition by Zionism of its colonial nature."

—Fayez Sayegh, a Palestinian, Kuwaiti delegate to the United Nations, UN General Assembly, November 10, 1975

Any political definition must be suspect when it is issued by Daniel Moynihan, the man who offered us racism and called it "benign neglect." Now he tries to merchandise Zionism as a national liberation movement, when it is actually the very opposite.

National liberation movements struggle against colonialism and imperialism; Zionism is a form of colonialism which flourishes in the service of imperialism.

- The early leaders of Zionism argued that a Zionist colony would serve European imperialism effectively. Theodore Herzl, the founder of Zionism, wrote, "It is of increasing importance to the nations of civilization [i.e., the western imperial powers] that on the road to Asia—the shortest road to Asia—there should be set up an outpost of civilization which would be at the service of civilized mankind. This post is Palestine." He explained, "We [Zionists] should form there a wall of defense for Europe in Asia, an outpost of civilization against barbarism." (in Arthur Hertzberg, *Zionist Idea*, p. 220)

Chaim Weizmann, the first president of the World Zionist Organization, wrote prior to the First World War, when Britain occupied Palestine, "We can reasonably say that should Palestine fall within the British sphere of influence, and should the British encourage Jewish settlement there, as a British dependency we could have in 20 to 30 years a million Jews out there, perhaps more; they would develop the country, bring back civilization to it and form a very effective guard to the Suez Canal." (Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, p. 191)

- When Golda Meir visited the U.S. in 1973 she argued that "Israel is really a safeguard for the maintenance of American interests in the area . . . [and] the first line of defense for American interests in the Mediterranean basin. . . . We are also the main safeguard for the protection of the Islamic [i.e., Arab] regimes that are loyal to them [U.S. interests] in the area." (*Haaretz*, March 7, 1973)

Through national liberation movements the indigenous people of a country struggle against foreign domination, i.e., settler colonialism; Zionism is the movement of settlers to displace the indigenous Palestinian people.

- Zionism was part of the wave of colonialism which brought European settlers to many parts of the third world. Before deciding on Palestine as the site of their colony, Zionists considered Uganda, Angola, Cyprus, Argentina and Tripoli (Libya) as possible places to settle.



THE COST OF ZIONISM: Palestinians crossing Jordan River after Israel occupied the West Bank in 1967.

- From the beginning, the Zionists planned to displace the Palestinian Arabs in order to establish an exclusively Jewish society. "We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries while denying it any employment in our own country [Palestine]," wrote Theodore Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement. (Theodore Herzl, *Diaries*, vol. 1, p. 88)

- As Moshe Dayan said of the Palestinians, "They take us to be foreigners, invaders that took an Arab country and turned it into a Jewish state. And they are right about it. From their point of view, we did it. We didn't come here to contribute . . . to the Arab countries. We came here to establish our state because we feel that this is our homeland." (*Sunday Times*, March 23, 1969)

DOCUMENT

PRESSING ISSUES FACE PLO

Commando Leader At Beirut Rally

On February 15 Abu Eyad (Salah Khalaf) spoke to a rally in Beirut attended by people from the Palestinian resistance movement and the Lebanese national movement. In his talk Abu Eyad, who is second in command of al Fateh, addressed many of the problems now confronting the PLO, and reiterated the Palestinians' determination to overcome all obstacles and regain their homeland.

The following is excerpted from his remarks.



Abu Eyad

[PLO SUPPORTS GENUINE LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY]

We did not come to Lebanon to make Lebanon an alternative homeland. Even if they offer us any part of the world as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, we would tell them all that we will not relinquish Jaffa, Haifa, or Jerusalem. [Applause] We can never accept an alternative homeland to Palestine.

We do not want to violate Lebanon's sovereignty in any way. On the contrary, we are most anxious to preserve Lebanon's sovereignty in the full meaning of the word sovereignty. If there is any fear for Lebanon's sovereignty, then [the source of] this fear does not come from the Palestinians. Fear in this connection can come from any other side but never from the Palestinians, because we seek our sovereignty and freedom on our land of Palestine.

[THE DANGERS OF "TUTELAGE"]¹

The gun in the hands of our revolutionaries is the product of years of struggle, an extension of the revolution of our people since 1917. No one should imagine that tutelage over this gun is easy.

We challenge any Arab state from the south to the north of the Arab homeland to say that we have accepted the tutelage of anyone. We have not allowed any Arab regime, regardless of which one it is—progressive or reactionary, wealthy or not, friendly or hostile toward us—to be a trustee over us. We have

not allowed anyone in this world to be a trustee over us.

We have paid a high price for not accepting tutelage. Some people have tried to exploit the [sacrifices of our] martyrs to recruit fighters. However, I will tell those who have money and tell those who have tried to starve this revolution that our revolution will continue to live through our people.

Let everyone be reassured. This revolution knows from the history of other revolutions in the world that any revolution which places itself under the tutelage of any regime is destined to be devoured by this regime in the end.

[PLO PROGRAM FOR WEST BANK OPPOSED BY UNITED STATES]

On this occasion, I address greetings to our people in the occupied territory who have been staging demonstrations and strikes against self-rule and other attempts. We pledge to them and say: The king of Amman [Jordan] will not return to you. No Arab tutelage over your territory will return to you.

Tutelage will not return at any price. Let our people offer more sacrifices. Our people [in the occupied territories] do not want us to come to them surrendering with our hands up. Our people want us to come to them with our heads held high and to tell them: We have come to you with a national authority for the sake of complete liberation and not with an American national authority. [Applause]

There is one thing which the whole world must understand regardless of the conspiracies against this revolution. Let us all be killed, let us all be assassinated, but we will not recognize Israel. [Applause] We cannot compromise on this.

Yet some people have tried to confuse matters. They have said that political action is not revolutionary action. Military action itself is political action. Every military action which does not have a political aim or involve a political move is useless. This is why some people do not understand us. We say that henceforth we will continue to take political action. When we went to the United Nations, some people objected. But we said that we would enter all fields. We will fight the Zionist enemy

UP TO DATE

A UNITED NATIONS COMMITTEE ON PALESTINIAN NATIONAL RIGHTS began meeting in New York City February 26. Known officially as the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, it is to make recommendations by June 1 to the Security Council and General Assembly on steps to be taken in support of Palestinian national rights.

The Committee is following up on the 1974 General Assembly resolutions supporting the right of Palestinians to "self-determination without external interference," to "national independence and sovereignty," and to "return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted."

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL WILL MEET within the next few months. Negotiations have continued since the middle of February between leaders of al Fateh and the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine "in order to reach agreement on a phased political program." The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has widely circulated an elaborate political program for the PNC meeting. A consensus appears to have been reached by various Palestinian groups that the resistance faces a new stage of struggle which necessitates an expanded political program to unite and guide the PLO.

The Palestine National Congress is the highest political body of the PLO, functioning as a parliament with delegates from all sectors of the Palestinian population, from mass organizations as well as commando groups.

A MONTH LONG HUNGER STRIKE by Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, held in an Israeli jail for smuggling arms to the Palestinian resistance, ended in early March after Capucci lost consciousness and was taken to a hospital.

Other Palestinians held in Israeli jails joined in a sympathy hunger strike in solidarity with Capucci and against inhuman prison conditions. In Beirut, PLO leaders addressed a rally in support of Capucci and others in Israeli jails.

THE CHAUFFEUR OF THE UNITED STATES CONSUL in Jerusalem was arrested in mid-February for suspected involvement with the Palestinian resistance. Israeli security forces are reportedly investigating whether the U.S. consul's car was used for resistance activities, presumably to smuggle weapons.

INTENSIFIED ARRESTS IN JORDAN of pro-PLO Palestinians, as well as a hunger strike of Palestinian political prisoners in the al Mahattah, Jordanian prison, accompanied the recent West Bank demonstrations in favor of the PLO.

Wafa, the PLO news agency, said in a March 1 report that the "arrests of Palestinians working to support the mass uprising and the armed struggle going on inside Israeli-occupied territories are part of the new revival of the self-appointed Jordanian role—blessed by both the United States and Israel—as 'representative' of the Palestinian people."

MONEY FOR ISRAEL AND EGYPT, promised by Kissinger in the recent Sinai interim agreement, was in the foreign aid

everywhere. The important thing is that we should stick to our principles.

Why does the United States want to liquidate the Palestinian revolution? It wants to do so for the purpose of subjugating this area in order to achieve an old idea: namely, the establishment of the United Arab Kingdom so that King Hussein can dominate the West Bank and the Gaza sector. There would be a federation covering all the neighboring countries in the area. From reading the press reports and the information which we receive, we find that the establishment of the United Kingdom plan depends on one decision—King Hussein's declaration that the Palestinian revolution is over.

The United States has used and is using certain forces to strike at the Palestinian revolution so that it would lose the initiative. I say in the name of the Palestinian revolution that if we are required to raise our hands and surrender a part of our land, then we absolutely reject such a settlement. We say that if a part of our territory is evacuated by any means, then we will not allow any quarter, especially the king who betrayed our people, struck out at our people, killed our people, and massacred our people, to again rule these people. Our people who are staging daily demonstrations against self-rule [the Israeli self-administration scheme] and King Hussein's treason, cannot possibly allow the return of King Hussein's rule.

[STRATEGY FOR NATIONAL UNITY]

We have extended a clean hand to all of our brother strugglers in all the [commando] organizations for the sake of solid national unity on an agreed upon policy. From this strong position and clear political line, this unity shall set an example for another inevitable form of unity—the unity of all nationalist, revolutionary, and progressive forces in this great land, Lebanon. This unity shall form the nucleus for a broader Arab front which can prepare the masses for another round of fighting against our Zionist enemy. No quarter in the world can [create] this broader front unless there is a strong Palestinian national front.

This broader front shall then extend the hand of friendship to our brothers in the socialist camp and all countries of the world so that we can face together the U.S. imperialist plan which is aimed at destroying the Arabs, dominating our economy, resources, livelihood, and turning the wheel of history backwards.



¹“Tutelage” to the Palestinians means the domination of their national movement by any state. The PLO has no territory under its own sovereignty, and must operate in the Arab states adjacent to Israeli-occupied territory, which contain large concentrations of Palestinians—Lebanon, Syria and Jordan; consequently the nature of the relationship between the Palestinian movement and a number of Arab governments is a serious problem for the PLO.

The regime Abu Eyad particularly refers to here is Syria. A few weeks after this speech Abu Eyad declared, “No Arab regime, including the Syrians, will be allowed to meddle in our affairs, whether in Lebanon or elsewhere.” (Washington Post, March 4.)

²Hussein has proposed a “United Arab Kingdom,” which he would rule, to be made up of a Palestinian province of the West Bank and Gaza confederated with the East Bank.

authorization bill that passed the U.S. House of Representatives March 3.

The bill authorizes \$2.25 billion in aid to Israel, including \$1.5 billion in foreign military sales credits. Egypt is slated for \$750 million in economic aid, Syria \$90 million, and Jordan \$225 million in both economic and military assistance.

The authorization will direct 70 percent of the total U.S. foreign aid money to the Mid-East. The Senate passed a slightly different foreign aid authorization in February; differences between the two versions will be resolved in a Senate-House conference committee.

ISRAEL HAS 10 TO 20 NUCLEAR WARHEADS “ready and available for use,” according to a CIA estimate reported March 15 in the Washington Post.

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION WANTS TO LIFT THE LONG-STANDING ARMS EMBARGO TO EGYPT, beginning with the sale of six C-130 transport planes, as part of the U.S. strategy to move Egypt into closer ties with the West. After the initial sale of the planes, Kissinger said that the Administration would like to sell such military items as transport

helicopters, radio and communications equipment, and mine detectors.

Strong supporters of Israel in the Congress have threatened to block the sale of any military hardware to Egypt. The Israeli Embassy said that it had a “categorical objection” to any sale of military goods. The Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz explained, “We have no objection to anything the United States can do to help Egypt economically.” But, Dinitz said, any type of military aid to Egypt was regarded “as a very unhelpful step” toward a political settlement in the area.

THREE LARGE U.S. CORPORATIONS are seriously considering investments in Egypt as part of Sadat’s “open door” policy to bring in billions of dollars in U.S. investments.

Goodyear wants to build a tire factory in Egypt worth \$50-\$100 million; Squibb, a pharmaceutical company, and an unidentified chemical company are also in the final stage of negotiations.

David Rockefeller from the Chase Manhattan Bank met with Sadat in mid-February, and U.S. Secretary of Treasury Simon was there in early

March to talk business with Sadat. Simon urged the quick approval of an investment project to “prove to the world” that Western industries can function there.

LAOS BROKE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL in February, joining with Cambodia which had earlier broken relations with Israel and turned over the old Israeli embassy in Phnom Penh to the PLO.

ISRAEL'S TAXES WILL RISE TO 70 PERCENT of the national income beginning April 1, in a move by the Rabin government to maintain the chronically ill economy. Living costs are expected to rise in the next year by 25 percent, and according to official Israeli figures, the standard of living will decline by 2 percent. Israel's finance minister told Parliament that the country's economic problems stemmed mainly from the huge military budget, which amounts to 38 percent of the total budget.

UP TO DATE

Anti-PLO Strategy

[Con't. from page 1]

THE U.S. AS INTERMEDIARY IN ISRAELI-JORDANIAN NEGOTIATIONS

During Rabin's talks with Kissinger and Ford an urgent item on the agenda was the means to prevent establishment of a Palestinian "national authority" which the PLO demands in any Palestinian territory liberated from Israel. From the perspective of the Israeli and US governments, one critical step is locating some force, other than the PLO, whom they can deal with as the "representative" of the Palestinians. And, as Rabin later indicated, Washington still shares Tel Aviv's view that Hussein is the force with whom they would choose to negotiate.

Consequently, Ford and Kissinger asked Rabin to allow the US to be the intermediary in seeking negotiations between Israel and Jordan, as well as with Egypt and Syria, on the basis of "an end to the state of belligerency." Rabin agreed on the spot to the approaches to Egypt and Syria, and following his return to Israel, his cabinet agreed on February 22 to authorize the U.S. approach to Jordan. The Israeli government, by this move which has aroused considerable controversy in Israel, now has the political authority to negotiate a treaty with Jordan. The Israeli government is pledged, however, to have parliamentary elections before actually signing a treaty which concedes territory to Jordan.

Following the Israeli cabinet decision, the US ambassadors to the Middle East were recalled to Washington to signify the launching of a new US diplomatic offensive. Ford and Kissinger

Ford and Rabin at White House in February 1976.



are certain to use the occasion of Hussein's visit to Washington this spring to take further action on this initiative.

It is not yet clear whether the US hopes to achieve tangible results from negotiations or whether the government actually believes that the time is not yet ripe for a negotiated settlement between Israel and Jordan, and is awaiting further progress in their informal collaboration on the West Bank. Obviously the U.S. wishes to make an international statement of continuing determination to ignore the PLO as the Palestinian representative and to deal with Hussein in its stead.

Moreover, as Ford told Rabin quite bluntly in their first meeting in the Oval Office, according to a White House spokesman, he is insistent that there be no interruption of the Arab-Israeli negotiating process. Ford and Kissinger hope that an illusion of continuing progress in negotiations arranged by the U.S. would relieve the international isolation of the U.S. on the Palestine question.

Two factors have contributed to the U.S. embarrassment on this score. First, the rise of the PLO in the international arena has been meteoric. The turning point came in the fall of 1974 at the Arab Summit Conference in Rabat, which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and upheld its right to establish a "national authority" in any Palestinian land liberated from Israel. Second, Kissinger's "step-by-step" diplomacy broke down after the second Sinai Agreement; it seemed apparent that his piecemeal approach might never secure Israeli withdrawal from the entire Sinai, would probably not be able to arrange a settlement between Israel and Syria in the Golan Heights, and would certainly not be able to provide any answer to the Palestinian national question, which is being posed with increasing insistence.

ISRAELI-JORDANIAN COLLABORATION AGAINST THE PLO

These international maneuvers were closely linked with measures Israel and Jordan have been taking on the West Bank. Discussions between representatives of the two governments have been held in recent months privately but hardly secretly: Hussein and Rabin are known to have met face to face, and even the locations of their desert rendezvous were reported in the press.


The two governments are beginning to implement a phony "self-administration" plan for the West Bank, which would give Jordan administrative control, while maintaining the underlying Israeli control of the area. Israel and Jordan plan to undercut genuine Palestinian self-determination by forging an interim "Palestinian leadership," derived from old feudal families loyal to the Jordanian regime. This class of Palestinians supplied local administrators for the Turkish and then the British empires, for the Jordanian monarchy which controlled the West Bank from 1949 to 1967, and now for the Israeli occupation.

The first major element in the "self-administration" plan is the Israeli and Jordanian governments' collaboration in choosing a slate of these men to run against the PLO in the municipal elections on the West Bank, planned to be held April.

The self-administration scheme became necessary following King Hussein's setback at the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit Conference. When it became clear that Jordan would have to renounce its claims to the West Bank at the conference, Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon hinted that his government would help establish its own "interim Palestinian leadership" to allow Jordan to maintain indirect control and subvert the massive popular support for the PLO.

The long-range Zionist thinking behind self-administration was set forth very candidly in a memorandum by Mordechai Nessiyahu, director of research at Beit Berl, ideological center of the Labor Party, and his assistant Yoav Kavie. Their memorandum, published shortly after the Rabat conference (*Jerusalem Post*, Nov. 19, 1974) has three essential points:

1. There should first be a "functional rather than a territorial division of the West Bank. Israel would retain all security



U.S. relationship with Hussein goes back a long way. Rockefeller and the king in New York City, 1959.

prerogatives in the area, while the political and administrative powers would be restored to Jordan." This program has obviously begun with the self-administration scheme.

2. "The beginning of that process of normalization could be marked by a prolonged, yet still interim, political agreement on mutual non-belligerency." This, of course, is the intention of the current U.S. diplomatic initiative.

3. There could conceivably be "an ultimate peace settlement based on a confederation of a Jewish Israel and a Palestinian Jordan, with the West Bank enjoying a 'special status' in which both of the confederated states would have a share." As the proposal points out, Hussein suggested something very much like this in his own 1972 plan for a "United Arab Kingdom," which would make the West Bank a province confederated to the East Bank under Hussein's authority.

ISRAELI-JORDANIAN CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST BANK

Israel and Jordan are actively working to tighten Hussein's political grip on the West Bank. Early this year, according to an article in the Israeli daily *Yedi'ot Aharonot* (Feb. 6, 1976) Jordanian and Israeli representatives agreed on a virtual joint slate for the West Bank municipal elections planned for April 12 and worked out a strategy for the electoral campaign. Rabin then reported the discussions during his trip to Washington and the State Department contacted Jordan to follow up the matter.

Current moves by Israel and Jordan, some aimed directly at the elections and others with a longer-range goal, include the following:

1. In January, Jordanian and Israeli representatives discussed ways to enlarge the conduits through which Hussein's money flows to his supporters on the West Bank, and to increase his control over the municipal budgets. (*Yedi'ot Aharonot*, Feb. 6) *Ma'ariv*, an Israeli daily, described the grants as "part of a general offensive by King Hussein to strengthen his influence in the West Bank and toward possible negotiations with Israel." (Feb. 9, 1976) Hussein also continues to send salaries to thousands of his former civil servants on the West Bank, without regard as to whether they are performing their jobs or drawing a second salary from Israel.

2. Hussein reconvened the Jordanian Parliament in early February. Since half of the deputies are from the West Bank, his action was a clear restatement of his claim to represent the West Bank. The West Bank deputies had been pensioned off since November 1974 when Hussein dissolved Parliament, to restrict his government to representation of the East Bank as was required by the resolutions of the Arab Summit Conference at Rabat. Israel gave its stamp of approval to Hussein's new move when it allowed the West Bank deputies to cross the Jordan river without difficulty for the meeting of Parliament.

3. Israel is planning to give Hussein an indirect role in civil service appointments for the West Bank. (*Washington Post*, Feb. 7, 1976)

4. Hussein has established a Permanent Bureau for Occupied Land Affairs to represent his regime on the West Bank. The Bureau will use its initial million dinar funding from the Jordanian government "to support its agents in the occupied West Bank to run for the municipal elections," according to a February 24 report by WAFA, the PLO news agency.

5. Israel is allowing its favored candidates to dispense patronage. An anonymous Israeli official told *Newsweek* (March 8), "The way to get elected in the Middle East is to provide favors, to win the release of somebody from jail, to get for somebody else a travel permit. We know the system and we use it."

The trump card for the Israeli-Jordanian slate is, of course, Israeli military control over the population and the electoral process.

THE PLO AS NATIONAL AUTHORITY

The eventuality which Jordan, Israel and the U.S. are uniting to avert is the establishment of a Palestinian "national authority" in the West Bank.

The necessity of the PLO's program for a national authority rests on the bitter lesson of Black September 1970, when Hussein's army moved to smash the political and military "rear base" the resistance movement had established in the East Bank to support their struggle against Israel. Hussein spelled out then, in the blood of more than 3000 people killed in the massacre that the Hashemite monarchy is the enemy of the Palestinian national struggle.

The Hashemites had actually been brought into power by British colonial officials in order to have an effective policing agent for the desert east of Palestine. Since the U.S. replaced British power in the region, it has subsidized the creation of the Jordanian state apparatus with a single basic function: containment of the Palestinians.

The shift in the balance of power in favor of the Arab countries after the October 1973 war, and the ensuing international momentum toward a "peace settlement" encouraged the PLO to plan to prevent the return to Hussein of any Palestinian territory taken from Israel. In June 1974 the Palestine National Council passed a transitional program calling for struggle toward the assertion of Palestinian national authority in any of its territory liberated from Israel. The PLO's right to establish such an authority was subsequently affirmed by the Rabat Conference, and the PLO's legitimacy as the sole representative of the Palestinian people has since been ratified by the U.N. General Assembly and many other international bodies.

THE BASIS OF IMPERIALIST, ZIONIST AND REACTIONARY OPPOSITION

The rulers of Jordan, Israel and the United States each have their own distinct but interrelated reasons for opposition to Palestinian self-determination through the PLO in the West Bank.

King Hussein is not prepared to write off the West Bank, which is richer than the East Bank, although a sector of the Jordanian elite advocates leaving the West Bank to its own

problems, and reducing the Palestinian population, 60% of the East Bank total, to the status of aliens.

Hussein understands, however, that renouncing major tasks in the role allotted to Jordan—containment of the Palestinians—would dangerously cut the value of his regime to U.S. imperialism. Jordan's major "industry" is its army, designed for internal security—controlling the Palestinians—rather than national defense, and is subsidized heavily by the U.S. Moreover, the existence of Hussein's unpopular regime has been essentially guaranteed by the U.S. U.S. support extends to the point of military intervention, as when Nixon was prepared to send the 82nd Airborne in a joint strike with Israel to rescue Hussein's throne from the PLO if the tide had not turned against the Palestinians in September 1970.

Finally, Hussein realizes that his regime would be severely endangered by an independent revolutionary neighbor. The Palestinian majority in the East Bank, along with progressive Jordanians, could overthrow him and join the East Bank to the Palestinian national entity, precisely as the PLO's transitional program advocates.

The decision-makers of Israel fear that Palestinian control of the West Bank would mean the doom of the Zionist state. The PLO is firmly committed to struggle for the dismantling of the Zionist state structures and for the establishment of a secular democratic state in all of Palestine. Wielding state power in part of Palestine would enhance the ability of the PLO to achieve that aspiration.

In addition, the Israeli ruling class is loathe to lose its economic interests in the West Bank. Since the occupation began in June 1967, Israel has been transforming the West Bank into a classical colony: a source for labor at low wages and raw materials, such as agricultural products for Israeli industry, and a captive market for Israeli manufactured goods. Since the Arab boycott cuts Israeli industry off from the markets of surrounding countries, they want to retain the West Bank not only for its own market, but for the bridge it provides to the markets of the East Bank and beyond.

The U.S. has consistently refused to accept any independent Palestinian state, supporting only the status quo or the idea of a West Bank Bantustan-like area within the state framework of Jordan.

First, the Palestinian state would drastically weaken Israel, which remains the strongest, most stable and most steadfast client in a region vital to U.S. imperialism. Second, the unleashing of the Palestinians could have what the State Department calls "destabilizing effects" for the whole region. If the West Bank goes, can the East Bank be far behind? And how will the reactionary government of Saudi Arabia fare once the political buffer of Jordan is no longer there to block out the germs of revolution? And then what of the vast Saudi oil wealth, and astronomically lucrative source of profits for the powerful U.S. energy corporations?

OBSTACLES IN THE PATH OF THE U.S., ISRAEL AND JORDAN

The anti-Palestinian forces are facing many obstacles. First of all, the Israeli government and political parties are so rife with division over the question of the West Bank that their ability to pursue any strategy is hampered. One sliver of the ruling coalition, led by Yitzhak Ben Aharon of the Labor Party and Histadrut, is willing to withdraw from the West Bank to preserve the ethnic purity of the Jewish state. These forces tend to be rooted in the Zionist bureaucracy, and based economically on the transfer of foreign capital to Israel (as philanthropy and government "aid"), which has traditionally permitted Israel to boycott cheaper Arab labor and award special privileges to "Jewish labor."

The strongest forces in the government are rooted in the ruling

class, especially among the "new millionaires" who have made a fortune on the occupation. For them, the old clichés about "Jewish labor" are easy to discard since the labor pools of Gaza and the West Bank became accessible in 1967.

These forces, however, are themselves divided. Some like Rabin and Minister of Justice Zadock believe that it is wisest to give at least the appearance of willingness to make concessions to Jordan on the West Bank and to accede to the U.S. diplomatic initiative. Others, like Moshe Dayan and Abba Eban, believe that the timing is wrong for any formal alteration in the status of the West Bank. This rift has grown so bitter that the Labor Party could see no way to salvage its leadership other than bringing Golda Meir and other old leaders out of retirement, to join a Steering Committee to unite and guide the party.

Further to the right are strong forces which oppose yielding any form of control on the West Bank. To them, "Judea and Samaria," as the Zionists call the West Bank, were given to their nation by God, and their enjoyment of God's gift would be considerably enhanced if its Arab inhabitants were removed.

With the disunity of the Israelis compounding the difficulties set in motion by the growing strength of the PLO, the U.S. government has totally lost the initiative on the Palestine question. An article in the Spring issue of *Foreign Policy* quotes Kissinger as saying that the U.S. ability to manipulate the Arabs on the Palestine question was "miscalculated."

The turning point came at the Rabat Conference in 1974 when the Arab governments denied Jordanian claims to be considered the representative of the West Bank and supported the PLO's demand for national authority. Now the U.S. finds itself in the position of maneuvering to reinstate Jordanian leverage over the West Bank in order to subvert real Palestinian self-determination.

With hindsight, the U.S. government must be cursing its singular emphasis on strengthening the Israeli military and its failure to move earlier to manipulate the issue of Palestine and other Arab claims. During the Johnson era and until early in the second Nixon administration (1967-1973) the U.S. relied on attempts to physically liquidate the Palestinian national movement (via Hussein in 1970 and the Lebanese right in 1973) in combination with moves to bolster Israel. The U.S. government believed in this period, according to the author of the *Foreign Policy* article, Edward Sheehan, that "a strong Israel, militarily much superior to its Arab foes, would prevent wars and serve as the surest sentinel of U.S. interests in the area."

Soon after the Arab show of strength in the October 1973 war, which made clear that political shifts in the area were mandatory, Kissinger embarked on his "step-by-step" diplomacy, intending to settle some of the outstanding differences between Israel and the Arab states, but to avoid the basic "step," recognition of Palestinian national rights. On the eve of the Rabat Conference, the bankruptcy of the U.S. policy was becoming obvious. Too late Kissinger flew to Cairo to plead with Egyptian President Sadat to support Hussein in the upcoming contest with the PLO. Hussein was sent to Rabat with empty hands; he had to admit that he had no promises from the U.S. about the West Bank; the PLO became a sure winner. A clear opportunity for the U.S. to attempt to contain the Palestinians was missed.

The most fundamental obstacle to the success of the U.S.-Israeli-Hashemite plan, however, is the massive support the people of the West Bank have given to the PLO, and their persistent and deepening struggle for self-determination. Demonstrations of students and citizens recur; military resistance is building. *Al Fajr*, an Arabic paper in Jerusalem, surveyed 500 public personalities in the West Bank on the issue of "self-determination" and found universal opposition. And the Mayor of Ramallah publicly remarked recently that "Ninety-nine percent of the people here support the PLO." ●



Last year's Solidarity Day demonstration in New York City.

Demonstrate!

The Palestine Solidarity Committee is calling for support of the observance of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People on May 15 and for a counter-demonstration to the Israel Independence Day Parade in New York on June 13. If you are interested in working on these events, please write the PSC.

RESOURCES

Available from the Palestine Solidarity Committee:

—Schleifer, Abdullah; **THE FALL OF JERUSALEM**. Monthly Review Press, 1972; 247p., \$3.45 ppbk.

A fine combination of prose and journalism that places the 1967 war in the context of Arab and Palestinian resistance to Western and Israeli aggression. Looks at the international politics that preceded the 1967 war, and gives an eyewitness account by the writer of the fall of Jerusalem.

—Stetler, Russell, ed.; **PALESTINE: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT**. Ramparts Press, 1972; 297p., \$2.95 ppbk.

Useful articles on the nature of Israeli society and its relationship to U.S. imperialism. Selections from political documents of major Palestinian groups, interviews with Palestinians who experienced the "Black September" attack on their movement, and the "Diary of a Resistance Fighter." Missing is the resistance strategy following the Black September, 1970 massacre.

—Boder, Arie, ed.; **THE OTHER ISRAEL: THE RADICAL CASE AGAINST ZIONISM**. Doubleday-Anchor, 1972; 264p., \$2.50 ppbk.

A collection of anti-Zionist analytical articles on the history, ideology, economic development and class structure of Israel and Zionism, by members of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen).

—Leon, Abram, **THE JEWISH QUESTION: A MARXIST INTERPRETATION**, Pathfinder, 1970; 270p., \$2.95 ppbk.

Written during World War II by a Belgian Trotskyist. A serious attempt at Marxist analysis, its research and insights are useful, and serves as an antidote to Zionist interpretations of Jewish history.

—El-Asmar, Fouzi; **TO BE AN ARAB IN ISRAEL**. Frances Pinter, 1975; 215p., \$2.50 ppbk.

Dramatic autobiography of a Palestinian who was able to remain in Israel after 1948.

—Jiryis, Sabri; **THE ARABS IN ISRAEL**. Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969; 180p., \$2.45 ppbk.

An account of the Palestinian-Arab people in Israel from 1948 to 1966. Documents land expropriation, deprivation of civil rights, and massacres in Israel. The author is an Arab lawyer in Israel.

—Abu-Lughod, Ibrahim and Abu-Laban, Baha, eds.; **SETTLER REGIMES IN AFRICA AND THE ARAB WORLD: THE ILLUSION OF ENDURANCE**. Medina University Press International, 1974; 251p., \$4.95 ppbk.

Fifteen original essays that examine in depth the growth of Zionist ideology, the process of Zionist colonial settlement in Palestine, and the resulting Palestinian response. Other essays look at settler regimes in Africa and the South African apartheid ties with Zionists.

—Turki, Fawaz; **THE DISINHERITED: JOURNAL OF A PALESTINIAN EXILE**. Monthly Review, 1972; 156p., \$2.95 ppbk.

A poignant description of the life of a Palestinian undergoing exile and oppression in the Arab host country. Personal aspect of book valuable.

—**PALESTINE AND ZIONISM**. 1975; 44p., \$0.50.

Speeches given by the PLO at the 1975 UN General Assembly debate on Palestine. Also includes the text of five resolutions that were passed in 1974 and 1975 supporting Palestinian national rights and national liberation.

—**TRANSCRIPT** of the meeting held on January 20, 1976, between four leaders of the PLO and 600 U.S. activists in New York City. Speech by Shafik al Hout from the PLO and an interesting 2-hour question and answer period. \$1.00.

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—#33 **A PALESTINIAN STATE?** An independent analysis by an Arab writer supporting the current PLO program for a national authority on the West Bank and Gaza.

—Childers, Erskine; **THE WORDLESS WISH: FROM CITIZENS TO REFUGEES**. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1973; 41p., \$1.00 ppbk.

—Ruedy, John; **DYNAMICS OF LAND ALIENATION (IN PALESTINE)**; Abu-Lughod, Janet; **THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE**. Association of Arab-American University Graduates, 1973; 44p., \$1.00 ppbk.

—Hanegbi, Machover, Orr; **THE CLASS NATURE OF ISRAEL**. Israeli Socialist Organization, 1971; 24p., \$0.25.

—Stevens, Richard P.; **ZIONISM, SOUTH AFRICA AND APARTHEID: THE PARADOXICAL TRIANGLE**. Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, 1969; 37p., \$0.50.

—**THE ABC OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM, PART 1, 1896-1949**. The Arab Women's Information Committee; 70p., \$1.00.

—**DAVID AND GOLIATH COLLABORATE IN AFRICA**. The Africa Research Group, 1969; 17p., \$0.25.

—**PALESTINE LIVES**. Paredon Records, \$5.00. Sixteen songs in Arabic by Al Fateh members.

Palestine Solidarity Committee Formed

"It's a very simple problem," Shafik al Hout, PLO spokesman in Lebanon, told a New York audience. "It's the problem of a nation that has been chased out of its homeland, which is fighting now to restore that homeland and to live in equality and peace."

Six hundred New York activists heard al Hout and three other PLO leaders in the first mass meeting between people in the U.S. and the PLO. After a short address by al Hout, members of the audience participated in a lively two-hour question and answer period with al Hout, Basil al Aql, member of the PLO's delegation to the UN, Yasser Abd ar Rabbou, member of the PLO Executive Committee and head of the PLO's Information Department, and Hassan Abdul Rahman, the PLO's Deputy Permanent Observer at the UN.

The meeting was the first project of the Palestine Solidarity Committee, formed in New York last November. The PSC grew out of the work of individuals on the Palestine issue, and their participation in pro-PLO activities organized by the Arab community over the past year. A number of U.S. activists worked to mobilize support for the demonstration which greeted Yasser Arafat when he made his historic speech at the UN in October 1974, and for the Evening of Solidarity and demonstration on the occasion of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People on last May 15.

The Palestinian Solidarity Committee is launching a program of education and action in support of the PLO and against U.S. imperialism's oppression of the Palestinians. Current projects include publication of this newsletter and a series of pamphlets on the role of the U.S. and Israel and on the Palestinians; the PSC will also serve as a center for distribution by mail of educational materials on Palestine. Plans will be announced soon for a demonstration to mark May 15, the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People.

Palestine Solidarity committees have already been established in several other cities; they can be contacted through the following addresses:

P.O. Box 6123, Albany, Calif. 94706
P.O. Box 2203, Youngstown, Ohio 44504
P.O. Box 2072, Denver, Colorado 80201

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Photo by Anne Dockery



PLO representatives in New York (left to right): Shafik al Hout, Basil Aql, Yasser Abed Rabbo, Hassan Rahman.

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