Today, availing myself of the visit I am paying to you, and before talking to you at this conference, I am very happy to convey to you, to our fellow countrymen, cadres, Party members, and armymen in this port city, the fraternal salutations and commendation of the Party Central Committee, the Government, and President Ton Duc Thang.
Our people in the North, with their armed forces as the core, have completely defeated the extremely barbarous war of destruction of the American imperialists. Today we are making full use of the new advantages and strengths of the socialist system to fulfil our task, the task of the great rear base toward the great front line. We are ready to smash all the warlike acts of the Americans against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. In the South our fellowcountrymen and the Liberation armed forces are beating the U.S. war of aggression. In the flush of great victory won in spring 1968, we are making rapid preparations in all fields—material and moral—in position and strength, to bring our greatest war of resistance to foreign aggression to complete victory. That is why, in these glorious days when we are celebrating the 40th founding anniversary of our beloved Party, we have the right to be proud of the great successes we have achieved, the successes of our Marxist-Leninist line, of the correct and creative leadership of our Party.
Today, reviewing the great victories won by our nationwide war of resistance to U.S. aggression for national salvation, we cannot refrain from mourning over the death of our beloved President Ho Chi Minh, the great leader of our Party and our people. All of us, every Party member, every fighter, every inhabitant of this port city, every Vietnamese, whether living in the North or in the South agree with Comrade Le Duan when he said: “President Ho Chi Minh is no more, but he is always there to guide us. We feel his constant presence in our midst. For we continue to follow the path charted by him, we continue his great work. He will live for ever with our rivers and mountains, his name and image is ever more deeply engraved in the heart and mind of each of us.”
With regard to the people’s war waged in the North against the U.S. war of destruction, little by little we have drawn valuable experiences in the recapitulation conferences recently organized in various localities and in various arms and services. But there is another aspect—a most important one—of this problem which needs to be reviewed, and it is the experience gained in our resistance in towns, and industrial centres.
This conference organized by the Haiphong municipality has a very rich content and stresses the strong points of the leadership of the Haiphong Party branch and committee. The city Party Committee has constantly followed and correctly implemented the line and policies of the Central Committee, keeping abreast of the situation in the city with a high determination to fulfil the tasks entrusted by the Party Central Committee and strengthening unity within the Party branch and among the population. It has attached great importance to providing overall leadership while grasping and closely co-ordinating the two main tasks, production and combat. It has worked out the general and concrete tasks, defined its policy and responsibility, speeded up the organization and the measures to carry out these tasks and has known how to concentrate on and complete a task in a given period of time.
In the history of our struggle against foreign aggression, our towns, especially our big towns and cities, have been the site of fierce battles between us and the enemy. In this regard our capital, Hanoi, has achieved many glorious exploits: the battles of Dong Bo Dau, Chuong Duong, and Thang Long against the Yuan army, the victorious battle of Dong Quan in which 90,000 Ming troops surrendered, the resounding victory at Dong Da won by Nguyen Hue over 200,000 Ching aggressors. Haiphong twice routed the aggressors on the Bach Dang river. Nam Dinh and Vinh too have a long-standing tradition of fighting aggressions.
During their eighty years-odd of domination in our country, the French colonialists tried to turn these localities into reactionary political, economic and cultural centres under their control. Our people, with their indomitable spirit have continually risen up to cast off the imperialists’ yoke. Since the foundation of our Party the struggle against the French colonialists, Japanese fascists and their henchmen developed more and more powerfully under its glorious banner among various sections of the townspeople, especially among the workers, the poor labourers, the youth and students, the revolutionary intellectuals and the peasants in the peripheries of towns.
After the complete liberation of the North the patriotism and tradition of revolutionary struggle of the workers and toiling people in urban centres developed more vigorously than at any former time. The successes we have achieved in socialist transformation and socialist economic construction and development have enabled us to turn the luxury- and consumption-oriented towns and cities into political, economic and cultural centres.
First the towns are the political and cultural centres: Hanoi, the capital city, is the seat of the Party Central Committee, the Government and leading political and cultural organs, and the diplomatic corps; Haiphong, the biggest port of the North, links our country with the socialist camp and other countries in the world. Our present-day towns, like others to be built in the future, are political and cultural centres which will attract a great number of workers — a class which, possessed of profound revolutionary spirit and the most advanced mode of production, is capable of uniting with the peasantry and other classes to transform the old society and build a new one. In the past four years of war, the selfdefence units of the working class in the towns and industrial centres, together with the rest of the population, have achieved many brilliant exploits. They have proved their capabilities in combat, combat support, A.A. defence, maintenance of transport and communications and security and order; they have brought into play their vanguard role in production and shown that they are the true nuclei of the urban population’s struggle against the enemy. The energetic actions of the townspeople to counter the predatory raids of American aircraft are symptomatic of the determination of the people in the North and throughout the country to defeat the American aggressors completely and achieve independence and freedom for the Fatherland.
The towns are also economic centres. At present our towns have truly become production centres provided with a modern industry as well as small industries and handicrafts and the areas surrounding them have quite a developed agriculture. In peace time, industrial production in the urban centres plays a role of paramount importance in the whole national economy. In the war, its task has been all the heavier. At the central level, industry serves the fighting, national defence and economic development; in the localities, it serves the people’s life and the gradual development of the material and technical basis of agriculture and other productive branches. That is why the protection of production in the urban centres is of great importance.
At present all our industrial enterprises are concentrated in the towns and industrial centres, which have a network of communication lines to transport goods and materials in and out. These lines fan out to every corner of the land and link our country to other countries, especially the socialist camp. For this reason, in the war of destruction against the North, the Americans have striven to destroy the communication lines of many towns and cities.
The towns have also a strategic importance and have thus been the site of fierce battles between us and the enemy.
We do not have such big cities as many other countries in the world; our future cities will have populations of only about one million. Though our urban population is not very great, it shows great density, amounting in the big towns and industrial centres to twenty or thirty thousand inhabitants per square kilometre, and even thirty to forty thousand in some town quarters. The townspeople belong to various sections and occupations: they are mostly workers, civil servants, cultural, scientific and technical workers or students. They are valuable assets of the country, its huge productive and fighting forces.
These features show the difference between the town and the countryside and also the strategic importance of the towns. They explain to some extent why the large towns, cities and industrial centres were the particular targets of fierce American raids, why they were singled out for the greatest war escalation. If, in the recent war of destruction against the socialist North, the Americans did not attack the big towns from the very beginning, it is not because they were “stupid” but because they had to abide by the rule of “escalation.” They were waging a war of aggression in the sixties of the 20th century, when the balance of forces was most unfavourable for the imperialists. This deterred the Americans from mobilizing their forces for massive attacks from the very beginning. They had to use these forces cautiously and pursue limited goals of aggression in order to avoid heavy losses. While fighting they had to prepare public opinion and proceed with care, probing and listening. In this way, they hoped to be able to ward off heavy military and political failure, avoid being isolated in face of public opinion, and alleviate somewhat the contradictions within their own ruling class as well as those between the American people and the American rulers.
But our people in both zones, North and South, are resolved not to let the American aggressors realize their wild dream. The air operation “Flaming Dart” launched at the beginning of 1965 as a curtain-raiser for their “retaliatory offensive” was repelled with heavy losses. Operation “Rolling Thunder,” another escalation, was duly punished. Then the aggressors attacked Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Ninh Binh, Lao Cai, Yen Bai and began their air raids on the peripheries of Hanoi and Haiphong, which resulted in the loss of many planes and a new failure for their strategic scheme. The determination of our people to liberate the South and defend the North, far from faltering was more and more strengthened.
In face of that stalemate in both zones of our country, the Americans were compelled to take a new, rash step: to strike at the big towns of the socialist North, threatening to send the North “back to the stone age” in order to attain the strategic objectives of their war of destruction. The reports made to Congress by the U.S. Pacific Command and the Commander of the U.S. expeditionary forces in South Viet Nam acknowledged that a plan had been worked out to attack Hanoi and Haiphong as early as November 1965, but the date had been postponed until June 29, 1966, by President Johnson after weighing the pros and cons: he has been asking himself whether that escalation would entail even heavier losses, whether it would soften the blows delivered by the patriots in the South, whether it would shake the determination of our people, and whether it would be severely condemned by world opinion. By raiding Hanoi and Haiphong, the Americans hoped to attain their strategic goals and to prevent the brother socialist countries from helping our war of resistance. In his report Grant Sharp wrote that the aim of the bombing throughout 1967 was “to isolate Haiphong from Hanoi and Hanoi and Haiphong from the rest of North Viet Nam.” In their attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong the American aircraft did their best to destroy all the sources of energy of our nascent industry, all the means of transport and the fuel depots with the definite intent of wrecking our economic potentialities and national defence. The Americans stupidly reckoned that the North would then give up its resolve to fight by the side of its Southern brothers.
This is obviously an impudent challenge not only to our people but also to the peoples of the socialist countries and of the whole world. By this rash action President Johnson committed a mistake of strategic importance.
In practice, it was when the escalation was at its highest that the American aggressors received the hardest blows, the greatest number of U.S. planes was downed and the greatest number of airmen killed or captured, including the “aces” of the U.S. Air Force; the most sophisticated types of planes and the latest new tactics failed before the determination and creative initiative of our people. This shows that, because they wage an unjust war of aggression against our people’s just war of selfdefence, the Americans are doomed to failure despite the use of a huge quantity of war materials and modern technique. This also exposes the truth that the “unimaginable strength of the U.S. Air Force” in fact has its limits and is not so terrible as they boast. At the same time a fundamental military thesis of the U.S. imperialists that “the air force decides the outcome of the battle” has been knocked down by the iron-like determination of our people.
On the other hand, the heinous crimes committed by the Americans aggressors against our people brought severe criticism from the world; the American people castigated the American rulers who saw their ranks more and more divided and their inner contradictions, already acute, deepen. The heavier their military setbacks, the more isolated they grew in the political field, and the greater their difficulties and losses in the two parts of our country. That is the reason why the American imperialists scaled down the war and finally admitted defeat. They were compelled to unconditionally stop the bombing and shelling of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and to sit down and talk with the representatives of the D.R.V.N. and the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation, now the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam, the genuine representative of the 14 million South Vietnamese.
We study the law governing the actions of the American imperialists in the past so as to draw the necessary conclusions on the conduct of the war and thwart all their strategic schemes at present and in the future. While they have been forced to end their war of destruction, they are still engaging in armed reconnaissance missions and local raids combined with commando activities, infringing the security of North Viet Nam. In future when the U.S. imperialists suffer even heavier defeats in South Viet Nam, it is possible that they may step up their activities to retrieve their situation in the battlefield, and again attack the urban and industrial centres in the North. We must be highly vigilant and beware of their new perfidious manœuvres. Of course, the war to be waged in future will not be the same as it has been. Since the U.S. imperialists are a most warlike world policeman who recoils from no treacherous means, it is possible that, under definite circumstances, they will not necessarily follow the path of gradual escalation before attacking our big towns and important industrial centres. This analysis of the features and laws governing the activities of the enemy and our experiences from our recent victorious resistance will enable us to raise the level of our conduct of the war in future and to take it to even greater successes.
Assessing the great successes of four years of people’s war against the American imperialists’ war of destruction, President Ho Chi Minh pointed out that “This is a victory of paramount importance for our people’s war against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.”
We have partially beaten off the war of aggression waged by the American imperialists, we have foiled one of their strategic schemes, and a new form of war, a part of their war against our country.
While 1.2 million GIs, puppet mercenaries and satellite troops suffered heavy defeats in South Viet Nam, the “supremacy of the U.S. Air Force” was buried in the North. This testifies to the invincible nature of people’s war, the hopeless bankruptcy of the obsolete military science of imperialism and our ample capability to defeat any kind of aggressive war by any imperialist who dares to invade our country.
As you have mentioned in your report, the victory won by the inhabitants and armed forces of the towns and industrial centres are most brilliant and significant in many ways. I will develop some ideas.
1. First, this is a triumph for the determination of our people to sacrifice themselves for independence and freedom and for the political and military line of our Party and its most correct and skilful conduct of the war.
What our people have experienced in our recent war of resistance against U.S. aggression in both parts of our country has enabled us to see our foe more clearly. The American aggressors are the leading imperialists, cruel, perfidious, wealthy with a huge military and economic potential.
In order to defeat them, we must first have a very firm resolve, for it is the decisive factor of our victories. It is also the manifestation of a profound revolutionary spirit, a firm stand and a solid basis from which to carry out a correct and creative political and military task. Our resolve is to defeat the American aggressors. This is the resolve of our Party Central Committee headed by President Ho Chi Minh, of the 17 million people in the North who are determined to fulfil their lofty duty towards the Fatherland and of their 14 million brothers and sisters in the South. This is also the resolve of the South—the Brass Wall of the Fatherland—whose people are determined that “should the American aggressors strike the North once, the South would strike them ten, twenty times harder.” With such an iron will, our people duly punished the aggressors immediately after they had fabricated the “Tonkin Gulf incident” and brazenly unleashed on August 5, 1964, their war planes against many localities in the North, including the towns of Vinh and Hong Gai. With this firm determination, the people in the North thwarted all U.S. escalations of the war. Meanwhile, the American aggressors who landed en masse in South Viet Nam to save the Saigon puppet regime were soundly beaten by the South Vietnamese people. To escape from their difficulties in both zones of our country, on June 29, 1966, the American air pirates attacked Hanoi and Haiphong, the two biggest cities in the North, inaugurating a most serious stage in their war escalation. Determined to fight selflessly for independence and freedom our people repulsed them. This resolve was expressed in President Ho Chi Minh’s appeal of July 17, 1966, an unforgettable sacred call to the nation. He said: “Johnson and his clique should realize that they may bring in 500,000, one million or even more troops to step up the war of aggression in South Viet Nam. They may use thousands of aircraft for intensified attacks against North Viet Nam. But never will they be able to break the iron will of the heroic Vietnamese people to fight against U.S. aggression, for national salvation. The more obstinate they are, the graver their crime. The war may last another five, ten, twenty years or longer. Hanoi, Haiphong and other cities and enterprises may be destroyed but the Vietnamese people will not be intimidated! Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom. Once victory is won, our people will rebuild our country and make it even more beautiful.”
Responding to that appeal, we resolutely defeated the two wars of destruction of the American aggressors, who reached a very high rung in their escalation. Because we were convinced that “Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom” and were not afraid of seeing Hanoi and Haiphong destroyed, these two cities stood firm and became two heroic cities. This has been confirmed by Western writers and journalists who have visited our country. The British journalist Felix Greene wrote that he had seen every citizen in those cities ready to sacrifice his life, and when an entire people are ready for such a sacrifice, nothing can frighten them.
Our determination is a concrete manifestation of the profound revolutionary spirit of the working class and the superiority of our socialist system. It is also a well founded, objectively and scientificallybased resolve. As soon as the U.S. “special war” strategy proved a hopeless failure in South Viet Nam, our Party foresaw that the Americans might engage in sustained efforts to wreck the North. Our assessment was that the war of destruction was an integral part of the U.S. war of aggression in South Viet Nam. Its task was to hit at the great base of the great frontline, to attack the revolutionary base of the whole nation, in order to save the U.S. and its puppets from severe defeat. That is why this war of destruction is related to the development of the U.S. war of aggression in South Viet Nam, and, in the main, it will end only when the U.S. aggressors are completely defeated there. Besides waging their war of destruction, the Americans are attempting to deliver a blow at the socialist camp and the nations who have gained independence and sovereignty, thus challenging the revolutionary people in the world.
Politically, this is the fundamental weak point of the U.S. war of destruction, because, originating as the by-product of the Americans’ strategic failure in the South Viet Nam battlefront it has from the very outset, borne a strategically passive character. At the same time, as part of the U.S. “limited war” of aggression in the South, it cannot escape the law of this war which works as follows: “As he fails, the U.S. aggressor is obliged to escalate the war; when this escalation comes to grief, he is compelled to scale up the war, only to suffer a bigger setback which eventually forces him to climb to the highest rung. Then, when he meets with even greater failure, he is compelled to scale down the war before he meets total fiasco.”
If the U.S. war of destruction is governed by this law, this is also due to the fact that it bears the character of an unjust and brazen aggression against the D.R.V.N., an independent sovereign country, a member of the socialist camp. This impudent provocation against our people and the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world leads to the fact that the bigger the size of the U.S. imperialists’ military operations, the heavier their defeat and the greater their isolation in the political field. That is why notwithstanding its huge air force, ample modern technical means and air bases close to North Viet Nam, the U.S. is still ruled by the law of gradual escalation. In fact, over the last few years in the big towns we have seen that the Americans have sometimes scaled up the air war, and sometimes scaled it down to escalate it later. They closely combined their barbarous methods with political and diplomatic manœuvres and their acts of destruction with psychological war. At times, they made use of concentrated forces to launch massive attacks on big towns so as to shake our resolve to fight them. But the bigger the battles, the heavier their defeat, and they were compelled to resort to sneak attack by small groups before finally resigning themselves to failure.
To lead our people in their victorious struggle against the U.S. war of destruction, our Party has charted a correct and skilful political and military line. It has come to the conclusion that the war of destruction waged by the U.S. in the North is not yet an outright aggression but a part of its war of aggression aimed at imposing its domination on South Viet Nam. Our Party has laid down for both parts of our country the line and revolutionary task to beat the U.S. war of destruction and build up socialism in the North; it has correctly handled the relation between production and combat and clearly set concrete tasks to our people in the new situation, together with the policy of the transformation of peace time to wartime activities simultaneously with the swift development of the armed forces.
Our review of people’s war in big towns must bring into relief the skilful application of the Party’s general line and policy at the same time as it studies and analyses the military line, the people’s war. It needs to make clear that the people’s war waged against the U.S. war of destruction in the North is part of the people’s war waged by our people throughout the country against U.S. aggression. It has been conducted in the large rear area of the resistance war—the revolutionary base of the whole country—and therefore is a war of liberation. On the other hand, this people’s war is also a war to defend the socialist North, an independent and sovereign country, member of the socialist camp. That is why it has the task and the character of a war for national defence, one which, this time, is waged when the North has a great political and moral strength, a great material force and the superiority of the socialist system. With its own forces and the staunch support of the brother socialist countries, the North can meet the primary needs of combat, construction and the people’s life in a long war and at the same time establish the basis for national construction when the war comes to a victorious end.
Formerly Lenin differentiated between two kinds of just war, the liberation war and the self-defence war or war for national defence. The liberation war is waged by a subjugated people rising up with bare hands and eventually winning victory, as Uncle Ho said in a poem composed at Pac Bo.(2) The self-defence war is waged by a nation which has gained independence, has a political, economic and military base, and uses its power to mobilize its human and material forces to fight foreign aggression. In the history of our struggle against aggression our people have waged these two kinds of war. Today the advanced relations of production in the socialist North have enabled us to make a genuine people’s war with a new quality and a new strength extending over a wide area, from the vast rural areas to the cities and industrial centres.
The socialist system has created favourable conditions for all regions to develop vigorously, objectively and subjectively, so as to become vanguard regions. Nevertheless, the urban centres, especially the big towns with the features mentioned above possess better conditions for an extensive people’s war with the elements of a modern war, waged on every front.
If our struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation is first of all a decisive test of our will and determination, here, especially in Hanoi and Haiphong, this will and determination is most typical of our people and their armed forces. It is typical of our conviction that nothing is more precious than independence and freedom, of our resolve to smash the greatest war escalation of the American aggressors. Here the socialist relations of production have gained predominance and appeared in the form of public ownership and collective ownership, serving as a firm basis for the close unity and unanimity of the entire people and for the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the Party. Here the profound revolutionary spirit of the working-class is closely linked to the new potentialities of our nascent but developing industry.
That we have defeated the U.S. Air Force and defended our economic and defence potential, especially in the big towns and cities marks a step forward for the people’s war and is a great success of our Party in the guidance of people’s war. We can be proud that we have accumulated valuable firsthand experience on the role played by A.A. units, rocket-launching units, air force and modern war means and weapons used in the anti-aircraft defence in urban centres. These are advanced experiences because in this strategic battlefield we have concentrated a fairly big force against the American aggressors. That is why it is precisely in the towns and urban centres that our people have gained the most important experiences in anti-aircraft defence technique, especially in such fields as the organization of operations, guidance of combat co-ordination and in devising the best fighting methods for each category of anti-aircraft defence and air forces.
In the guidance of anti-aircraft defence in urban centres, especially in big towns and cities, offensive should go together with defensive and people’s air defence should be stepped up. We must lay great emphasis on these two tasks, because they complement each other in the protection of the people’s lives and the property as well as that of the State, they reduce our losses to the minimum and create conditions for our people to replenish their forces for a long war. People’s anti-aircraft defence in big towns and cities also contributes to the stabilization, consolidation and improvement of our living standard and so enhances our determination to struggle.
The people’s defence work has been satisfactorily carried out in every locality in the North, but it was the big towns which gained the most valuable experiences. It is there that the people’s air defence has shown to the greatest extend its initiative, eagerness to fight the enemy, popular character and sense of discipline. It is there that many complicated problems of people’s air defence have been solved. It can be said that it is there that the development of people’s war has manifested itself most clearly in order to beat a war waged mainly by the U.S. air force.
In transport and communications we have gained valuable experiences the most important of which is in long-distance transport south of the 4th Military Zone, which was constantly subjected to fierce American bombardments. Nevertheless the big towns and cities and some big industrial centres have transport problems of their own: the major one is the leadership, organization and mobilization of the huge potentialities of the working class with its well-knit force, a force which has rapidly adapted itself to war conditions, reached a high technical level and possessed modern equipment and means. Another major problem is the simultaneous protection of many communication lines to ensure regular traffic in a small area constantly exposed to enemy raids.
Furthermore, the big towns and industrial centres possess rich experience (different from that gained in the countryside) in such problems as organization of the people’s life, keeping security and order, mobilization of human force for the front, building of the militia and self-defence units.
Another important task of the people’s war policy successfully applied to big towns is shifting the economy from a peace-time to wartime economy and building and developing the local economies. With the manpower found locally, and the assistance afforded by other localities, the central government and the brother countries, we have met the needs of the struggle and sent supplies to the great front, meanwhile helping to satisfy the people’s requirements in primary goods. We have been able not only to protect our material and technical bases but also to establish new ones, to maintain the centrally-run economy while developing the local economies, increasing our economic potential and strengthening our national defence. In the four years of war against U.S. aggression, the economic tasks successfully carried out in the big towns and cities have contributed to the great victory of our people in the North, a victory of strategic significance in all fields.
How has the Party’s economic line been applied to the war conditions in urban centres? Besides those problems related to the policy and trend of production, it is clear that the organization and distribution of production in close coordination with the combat forces and the protection of production, as well as the continuity of industrial production while the enterprises were partially or wholly scattered, are experiences susceptible of further application. These experiences are not only to be applied if war breaks out again but are immediately applicable so as to coordinate the national economy with national defence. The most correct attitude of those who are masters of their country is to see to its economic development as well as the strengthening of its defence.
2. Skilful application of the military art of people’s war to A.A. defense in towns and industrial centres.
In their air strikes at our towns and industrial centres, the American aggressors made use of a huge air force comprising the most up-to-date planes (except for B.52s which were used only in Vinh Linh and Quang Binh), which manned by experienced air pirates, struck in repeated waves of attack and resorted to the most perfidious tricks. The US Air Force used demolition bombs of from 1,000 to 3,000 lbs to destroy buildings in urban centres; time-bombs and delayedaction bombs to seal off access to them; CBUs, gas bombs and fragmentation rockets to strike at populous town quarters, rockets and guided bombs to hit at industrial bases and other important targets. They continually changed their striking methods, using now big forces for massive operations and launching successive waves of attacks; now small forces for sudden attacks, and shifting from day operations to day and night operations.
Though perfidious and cruel the American aggressors could not attain their strategic objectives, because our townspeople had a great resolve and skilfully applied the military art of people’s war to A.A. defence.
This military art stems from the Party’s people’s war line. The primary purpose of this line is to unite the whole nation and entire people for the fight and to use the people’s armed forces as a fighting nucleus under the leadership of the working class to bring into play the combative force of the whole nation in order to defeat the powerful aggressive forces of imperialism. The military art of people’s war applied to A.A. defence derives from the line of people’s war against the U.S. war of destruction waged chiefly by aircraft. The main content of that line is to unite the entire people against enemy air strikes, for A.A. defence and for the maintenance of traffic communications; to co-ordinate closely production and combat, attack and defence; to change the trend of economic production in order to serve national defence, the people’s life and the building of socialism. This military art applied to A.A. defence is also based on the general principles of the war of resistance against US aggression: popular, all-sided and prolonged resistance relying mainly on our own powers while drawing international support.
Basing itself on the above-mentioned points and on our characteristic features and those of the enemy, our Party has at once realized that in order to counter the piratic attacks of American aircraft and to defend our towns and cities and industrial centres—chiefly the big ones—and other important points, it is necessary to mobilize the entire people for the fight, to take the three categories of our armed forces as nuclei, to make the most use of the weapons and war means in hand, from small guns (rifles and tommy-guns) to A.A. batteries of various calibers, rockets and jet planes. From experience in fighting we can now draw the conclusion that this way of posing the question is correct and imaginative and expresses the view-point of people’s war as applied to operations of defence against US modern aviation. The point has been confirmed that in a modern war, the factor deciding victory is man and not weaponry. The new man in the socialist system is one with profound patriotism and deep hatred for the enemy, capable of handling any weapon in hand and using flexible tactics to defeat the enemy.
In the defence of urban centres and other important targets, each A.A. weapon has its own usefulness. Whereas our rockets and aircraft strike the enemy at long distance and high altitude, rifles and 12.7 and 14.5-mm machine guns are needed in battles against low-flying planes. That is why, despite the fact that the big towns and cities have a wide range of sophisticated weapons and war means such as aircraft, rockets and A.A. batteries of various sizes, since the very beginning we have paid attention to the launching of a widespread aircraft-hunting movement among the population.
The correct solution of that problem has not only resulted in a great number of enemy planes brought down but, more important still, it has gradually shaped the fundamental lines of military art in A.A. defence. Today practice has confirmed that an efficient A.A. defence system operating in urban centres must possess a ubiquitous multi-level fire network operating in close co-ordination with the gun emplacements built in the suburbs and in adjacent areas adding their actions to those of the batteries installed in the town itself. In order to bring into full play the fire network defending the town, the key problem in A.A. defence operations is to organize a good combat co-ordination between various arms and various units in which weapons of different kinds must closely co-ordinate their action and develop their full efficiency.
But how is that combat coordination organized in urban centres? Many problems crop up which require a judicious guiding principle. That principle is “to closely combine the operations of the army A.A. defence forces (A.A. batteries, rocket, air force, radar) with those of the widespread aircraft-hunting movement in infantry units, especially in self-defence units and militia.” This principle is most appropriate and has a practical meaning as it contributes to the unity of thought, organization, command and fighting style, enabling the army units to closely coordinate their action, thereby intensifying the efficiency of A.A. fire. Whenever enemy aircraft make their appearance, the harmonious coordination of our A.A. defence is a nice sight to watch. It can be said that all the units recently taking part in the defence of our cities—A.A. batteries, rockets, air force, selfdefence, militia and in some localities, the navy and people’s armed police—have achieved brilliant exploits.
Because they have grasped the guiding principles of people’s war and skilfully adapted them to the condition of A.A. defence in the cities, our armed forces have devised many resourceful and flexible fighting methods. The A.A. gunners fight the enemy unremittingly and with mobility, using the surprise factor and sometimes concentrating their fire to the maximum. The rocket launching units focused their attention on a prepared battlefield while sometimes using mobile combat tactics. With its own specialized combat methods our air force has downed many enemy aircraft, including the most up-to-date ones. Our self-defence force and militia have two main forms of fighting: firstly, organization into teams or sections fighting in rotation so that combat duty is permanently assured; and secondly fighting and production work carried out in place, “gun in one hand and hammer or plough in the other.” Thanks to their tight organization and good command our self-defence units were able to save manpower for production while displaying high combat efficiency, particularly the 12.7 and 14.5-mm gun teams. We have devised fighting methods appropriate to Vietnamese conditions and over the towns. These are most valuable experiences which enable us to fight victoriously against superior numbers. With weapons and war means in the main inferior to those of the enemy in quantity and modernity, we were able to defeat him. We have fought with the spirit of “attacking the enemy to wipe him out, defending our targets, maintaining and replenishing our forces, and developing our strength in the course of fighting.” This has prevented the US air force from bringing its strong points into full play while it exposes its weaknesses more clearly for us to exploit.
The struggle of our urban centres against the US air force has enabled us to correctly assess the possibilities, roles and positions of the various components of the armed forces in our A.A. defence network.
Our A.A. artillery units, a most important force, fight perseveringly and unremittingly, showing their great potential in the defence of the town and cities, industrial centres and other targets. They are easy to move and easy to replenish; in addition they have a wide range of fire and consequently in case of need can independently defend a point inside or outside the city. Our rocket launching units and young air force, even in their baptism of fire, have proved to be a match for the modern US air force. Equipped with sophisticated weapons, they are one of the main elements in the anti-aircraft defence system of the cities as they are able to foil the enemy attacks from afar, wipe out the enemy at high altitude, co-ordinate their action and create favourable conditions for A.A. batteries or the militia and other combat units to wipe out the enemy. The building and development of these modern arms is the result of great efforts made by our people’s army towards meeting the requirements of combat, and marks the maturity of our people’s armed forces. Meanwhile, we have paid great attention to spread the aircraft-hunting movement far and wide, taking as core the self-defence forces in the city and the militia in the suburbs.
In fact, the self-defence units and militia in various towns, cities, and industrial centres have played a role of paramount importance. Fighting independently, these self-defence and militia units have shot down many American jets by small arms.
The battle recently given to the sophisticated American aircraft over the towns and cities has made us realize the necessity of fighting low-flying planes in a modern war. It can be entirely undertaken by self-defence and militia units in the towns and cities. In Hanoi, Haiphong, Nam Dinh, Hongai, Cam Pha and other urban centres, besides self-defence units equipped with small arms, there appeared self-defence units handling small caliber A.A. artillery pieces fighting most courageously and resourcefully, an efficient help in air defence. From this fact we can infer that the self-defence forces in urban centres have ample possibilities for using sophisticated weapons to strengthen air defence. The self-defence units in urban centres are composed mainly of workers who live and work together in close-knit organizations belonging to various branches of production, chiefly industrial production, and can therefore quickly adapt themselves to the fighting conditions of the armed forces. These units are also made up of office workers and town people who also have a high revolutionary spirit, a good cultural standard and particularly a fair scientific and technical knowledge enabling them to assimilate modern military tactics and technique. They are organized according to production units and government, technical departments, and have many possibilities to serve in combat and combat support. If over the recent period there had been better organization, equipment and training for self-defence units in urban centres, they would probably have developed their combat efficiency even more vigorously.
Self-defence of late was also the main combat support force in urban and industrial centres. In the past four years, Hanoi and Haiphong alone used tens of millions of work days for combat support; other towns, townships and industrial centres used hundreds of thousands of workdays each. In these localities this work showed a high degree of technical proficiency. There, members of self-defence units of industrial enterprises worked hundreds of thousands of days for national defence to turn out or repair means of communications and transport, and parts for A.A. batteries, rockets, telecommunications, army engineers and the navy. The self-defence units also train tens of thousands of gunners, transport workers and other technicians to replenish the regular armed forces. Here, the workers’ skilful hands and the material and technical basis of our young industry have created huge potentialities for combat support as is proved by facts: it was the worker members of self-defence units who made bridges, ferries, pre-fabricated fortifications or used modern technical means to repair or expand airfields and build “urgent military roads” for the pressing needs of the war. All this shows that the local logistic forces of our socialist towns and cities have a huge potential for serving a long war if they are well organized, protected and made use of.
We are aware that in military operations, particularly in A.A. operations, protection plays a role of paramount importance. Attacking the enemy should go hand in hand with A.A. defence and the protection of the population. This is a most correct policy, a guiding principle of A.A. operations and has yielded tremendous results in the defence of urban centres. These are two tasks closely connected with each other. Whatever the circumstances they cannot be separated. Because we carried out such work as A.A. defence, camouflage, protection of the population, and decoys, suitable to the topography and the conditions of our urban centres, we were able to reduce our losses to a minimum and strengthen our forces in the course of a long struggle.
Our urban and industrial centres have also satisfactorily carried out such work as protection of the lives and property of the population, the property of the State and the stabilization of the people’s life and production work in wartime. Civilian A.A. defence helped to raise the fighting spirit of our people. It is particularly important in urban centres, chiefly in big towns and cities, as conditions there are more pressing and complicated than in the countryside. In the countryside, to protect ourselves against enemy bombs and shells, even in the hardest-hit areas, like the 4th zone, we have concentrated our efforts on protecting the people’s lives and property by building a system of underground shelters without considering it necessary to make a large scale transfer of the population, as its density here is not so heavy as in urban centres and the material and the technical basis not so important. In urban and industrial centres civilian A.A. defence work is more complicated as it is necessary to solve the problem of evacuation, the scattering of the population, machines, equipment, and goods within a short time. Not just tens of thousands but hundreds of thousands of people were evacuated from urban centres to rural areas and not just some parts of a factory but whole factories indeed a large number of modern factories, were transferred. This was a very hard job. However, thanks to the great sense of responsibility of our cadres at all levels who were concerned with the people’s lives and the property of the people and the State, and thanks to the people’s high vigilance, the application of the principle of joint efforts by the State and the population and, to the activity, initiative, scientific organization, and mass character of civilian A.A. defence, we were able to overcome difficulties, which at first sight had seemed to be insuperable. Realizing that this was a most difficult task, we required that evacuation should be promptly done but safely ensured that production and other work should be normalized and the people’s life should not be greatly affected while their living standard should be adapted to the war conditions in order to bring success in both production and fighting.
After organizing evacuation, we can now draw some experiences to be applied to towns and cities and industrial centres. The main points are:
Compulsory evacuation of aged people, children, production units whose presence in the towns is not required, schools, administrative offices, and noncombatants.
Evacuation in case of need of those duty-called to stay.
Partial evacuation or scattering to various places in the town itself of offices and factories whose presence in the towns is necessary, of heavily populated town-quarters, areas where offices and enterprises are concentrated, or those near likely targets of the enemy.
It is clear that for the leadership and guidance of production and combat, and a good organization of the people’s life, it is necessary to classify the objects of evacuation: evacuation of production units, of government offices and of the population.
Haiphong has based itself on that classification to determine the zones of evacuation most convenient for each category such as the zone reserved for heavy industry, the zone for light industry, the zone for government offices and education, etc. Nam Dinh relies on the particular features of each category to provide it with proper leadership in order to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance, establish close relations between industry and agriculture, between town and country. This is an indispensable work, a good experience.
Besides the organization of evacuation, we have also seen to the building of shelters in urban centres. We understand that a shelter is not only destined to afford refuge but also to guarantee the continuation of production and fighting and create conditions for the population to keep up production, fight, and give combat support. One noteworthy success achieved by various localities was the widespread shelter building movement in which the population displayed many initiatives such as the building of 20-mm shell-proof, CBU-proof, demolition bomb-proof shelters, the building of underground trenches for refuge during air raids; the building of revetments and communication trenches to counter enemy surprise raids, etc.
A.A defence in urban centres includes other important works such as the organization of an air-alarm system and of means to overcome the aftermath of air raids (chiefly the rescue of people in collapsed shelters). These problems, which were more complicated in the towns than in the countryside, were satisfactorily settled. Many localities had their own plan to hunt enemy aircraft as well as to combat flood and to check the sabotage activities of the few bad elements which might still remain in urban centres.
These are but some problems related to the guidance of the struggle against American air raids in the towns. Reviewing the whole A.A defence work in urban centres, we see all the more clearly that this is a clear manifestation of the development of the people’s war against the U.S. war of destruction. Its tremendous effects have greatly reduced the damage done to the townsfolk in lives and property.
3. Changing the trend of the economy; meeting the requirements of combat, the people’s life and socialist construction
In the four years of resistance to the US war of destruction, our people, who have fought courageously and with great revolutionary heroism and worked painstakingly, have won victories of strategic significance; these victories were made possible thanks chiefly to the completion of the economic tasks of the various regions in the socialist North, including the urban and industrial centres.
The success of the urban population in production lies first in the shifting of economic activities from peace time to war time, and the building and development of the regional economies. Our townspeople have skilfully applied the Party Central Committee’s resolution on the trend and task of production in the new situation: continuing the construction of the North, closely coordinating production with combat and economic construction with strengthening of national defence, resolutely defending the North and defeating the air and naval war of the enemy. In the light of a correct analysis of the American imperialists’ scheme against the socialist North, the great rear base of the resistance to US aggression and revolutionary base of the whole country, we have rapidly adjusted the direction of our economic building and development in urban centres which includes many lines of production, mainly industrial production. To maintain industrial production in big towns and cities, where is concentrated an important part of industrial enterprises in the North, our urgent task is to efficiently protect these productive forces: men and machinery first of all the men.
At the end of 1964, when the US air force was intensifying its spying activities and carrying out provocations south of the 4th zone, we took an initial measure to protect our industrial installations, especially in the regions likely to be attacked by the enemy. We also urgently carried out the necessary preparations with regard to the stocking of goods and material, while taking measures to maintain traffic in the best conditions, aware that “transport and communications is the urgent central task of the Party and the people.” Early in 1965, while coping with the raids of the US air force which was committing crimes against our population south of the 4th zone, we foresaw that the enemy might intensify his war of destruction by unleashing his aircraft against our big towns and cities and attacking relentlessly these centres and their suburbs. We advocated that in order to cope with the US air war, the best way in the urban centres is to organize combat as well as defence and protection, to normalize the people’s life and production quickly after each battle and to keep communications and transport in good order under all circumstances. That is why, before the enemy’s attacks on big towns and centres, we had had a concrete policy with regard to the activities of industrial enterprises by deciding which of them would be evacuated, which of them would remain, that the evacuated ones should have a definite plan for that purpose, and the remaining ones should dig shelters, build revetments and arrange things in a suitable manner.
The purpose of the evacuation of workshops and factories is to protect the productive forces so as to maintain the continuity of production and wage an all-sided and prolonged war so as to win repeated victories. Stemming from this the evacuation of industrial enterprises was zealously carried out in order of priority and classification: which would be evacuated first, which would follow suit, which would go for good, which would be transferred only partly and which wholly.
The guidance in the evacuation of production units in big towns and cities calls for a long process of political education with the creation of various forms and methods for its execution. It is for us a new task which requires a concrete and scientific plan to carry out. Under the energetic leadership of the Party at various levels, learning from the example set by the cadres and Party members and bringing into play the role of the T.U. organization with the militia and youth union members as core, we have satisfactorily resolved that problem. Over the past four years, hundreds of enterprises and store houses at central and regional level have been carefully protected together with hundreds of thousands of tons of machines and equipment and millions of tons of goods.
This protection requires great efforts on the part of our people and armed forces. It is of paramount significance as it allows the continuation of production under any war conditions. The maintenance and acceleration of socialist construction in big towns and cities has an important effect as it enables us to meet the requirements of combat and supply to the front and contributes to the stabilization of the people’s life and of other aspects of life.
In order to successfully shift the economy from a state of peace to a state of war and to build and expand the regional economies, it is necessary to inculcate a sense of vigilance on the masses, combat all complacency, raise their sense of responsibility in the struggle and do away with all manifestations of shirking duty. In government offices, enterprises and workshops, this ideological education must be translated into action in combat, protection of production and development of the role of the working class.
One of the many experiences we have gained in the organization of evacuation is the need to make a careful study of the characteristics of each enterprise, of its chain of production, its system of management... in order to find an appropriate site, decide the extent of evacuation, and calculate the size of the new constructions. Due to difficulties in the evacuation of a huge volume of machinery and equipment, many enterprises have had to alter their production processes to adapt themselves to the war conditions. In the end, they were well protected and able to rapidly normalize and maintain the tempo of production. On the other hand, through lack of preparation and delay in evacuation many workshops took a long time to stabilize their production and even suffered human and material losses.
Another important experience in the evacuation of enterprises from big towns and cities is the co-ordination between the urgent need of evacuation and the drawing up of plans for the building of permanent local economic enterprises which should lead to the gradual stabilization and development of production, whatever the circumstances, to meet immediate as well as long-term requirements.
In big towns, cities and industrial centres, skilled workers go to the front in greater and greater numbers; nevertheless production is not disturbed because the Party’s combat slogan “the more stubbornly we fight, the greater victories we win, and the stronger we become” has been made to govern wartime production: “produce while seeking to raise productivity and expand production.” In urban centres, tens of thousands of cadres and skilled workers have been recently trained in long term courses and correspondence courses, the major part being trained on the job. Many women workers can now replace men in work requiring advanced technique so that they can go to the front. Resolved to “produce well and fight well”, the working class and other toilers in the towns, and collective farmers in the peripheries of towns have energetically defended their production work and courageously clung to their working sites to keep production going. As it is an important front in the struggle against US aggression, all the fighters on that front have shown clearly that they stand firm on it. “Fight when the enemy comes, continue production and normal life when he has been driven away.” In this struggle, the working class and peasantry have set a bright example in worker-peasant alliance. Despite fierce enemy raids the workers have toiled day and night to meet the requirements of the fighting and the people’s life, and especially to serve the technical revolution in agriculture. In the new relations of production, the collective peasants have given up lands and houses to the workers to set up industrial enterprises, and fought with them to defend the workshops as well as their villages. It is clear that, thanks to the superiority of the socialist system and the material and technical basis of socialism, our urban and industrial centres have enjoyed more favourable conditions to strengthen the worker-peasant alliance and to use it as a firm basis to unite the people and step up people’s war in the political, military and economic fields. This is the new force and potential of people’s war in urban centres at present.
Another problem to be solved by urban centres is “how to combine the triple revolution: the revolution in relations of production, the technical revolution, and the cultural and ideological revolution, while maintaining and developing production in wartime conditions.”
We know that a good organization of wartime production is dependent on the socialist relations of production. The urban centres are the points of industrial concentration and if they are determined to develop industrial production to an appropriate size they can serve the people’s life and the fighting while helping to improve the new relations of production. To accelerate industrial production we must overcome such shortcomings as perfunctoriness, slackness, the relaxation of labour regulations, and the tendency to think that “in time of war, the mere fact of producing commodities is already a good thing” and belittle their economic value. There is also a tendency to relax management and flout cost accounting practice. The movement in which the workers take part in the management of their workshops and take their production team as a basis, launched in many localities, has raised the sense of responsibility of the workers, their love of labour and their courage in combat and has taught them to live an organized and disciplined life. Experience has confirmed that, when production is scattered, the production team is the best-managed unit. Nevertheless, it is necessary to maintain in good working order the leadership of the local Party branch, and the activities of the trade-union, youth organization and self-defence unit, to lay emphasis on better management, gradually solve the problems of labour management, ensure the efficiency of workdays, rationally divide manpower between production and fighting, carefully manage receipts and expenses, encourage the workers and production teams to raise productivity.
There is no hiding the fact that, as a consequence of the revolution in the relation of production achieved in the four years of war, the technical revolution in urban centres has continued to make its effects felt in industry, agriculture, communications and transport…
Industry : On the whole, industrial production was maintained in the fierce war years. The enemy strove to deny us electric power by hitting at our depots of fuel, materials, equipment and machines causing us great difficulties, but our various industrial branches were able to maintain their activities. Regional industry has increased its production year by year and built new production units. The economic structure has undergone an initial change and many valuable branches of production have taken shape, meeting the war requirement. Engineering developed fairly harmoniously supplying greater and greater quantities of implements to agriculture and gradually equipping it with small machines for the technical revolution.
The industrial branch harnessed to communications and transport also developed at a quick tempo, fulfilling its targets every year and satisfying the requirements of central and local transport and communications. The consumer goods industry also made progress. We may come to the conclusion that in the stubborn struggle against the US air force, our townspeople have not only successfully defended their material and technical bases, but also maintained production. Though still with shortcomings, these are very big successes and valuable experiences of our people.
Agriculture : The farmers in the periphery of the towns and cities have gradually overcome the impediments caused by natural calamities and war and surmounted the difficulties created by the enemy, including the shortage of manpower caused by recruitment for the army or other activities. Over the past years, the agriculture around urban centres has always met the food requirements of the farmers and provided a major part of the foodstuffs to the townspeople, the raw materials for the processing industries and agricultural produce for exports.
With the assistance of industry, the technical revolution in agriculture has been accelerated. The supply of implements, ordinary and improved, mostly equipment produced by small shops for agriculture, has been a practical help for the development of agriculture. Today the farmers around urban centres have favourable conditions for intensive cultivation and increased crops, to push forward the “three targets in agriculture” movement for the attainment of 5 tons of paddy per hectare per year. The socialist relations of production has improved day by day and testifies to a powerful vitality in war time. Thanks to these new relations of production, the cooperatives have fulfilled their food quota to the State. They manage labour, organize the fighting forces, give work-points for missions carried out for the benefit of production, combat and combat support, civilian A.A. defence and transport and communications. Generally speaking, the life of co-op members has remained stable; solidarity is closer and identity of mind greater in the cooperatives.
Besides industry and agriculture, the building sector has also devoted greater efforts to serve the other economic branches. The commercial and financial branches, whose function is circulation and distribution of goods, have helped production develop in its initial stages and served as a bridge linking industry to agriculture, production to consumption, home trade to foreign trade, the State trade sector to the cooperative trade sector.
The cultural and ideological revolution has been carried out in the political, economic and military framework of the war of resistance against US aggression in general and as the task of the urban centres in particular. Here the Vietnamese national and working-class tradition of unyielding struggle has been applied to the education of the masses to raise their patriotism, love of socialism and revolutionary heroism, to build a revolutionary mode of life, to resolutely foil U.S. aggression in order to liberate the South, defend the North, reunify the country, and fulfil our task toward our country and our internationalist duty. Here, in the fierce struggle against the US air war, the building of the political forces has been carried out among the masses simultaneously with ideological work. If there were no strong Party Organization and no broad mass organization such as the Trade-Unions, Youth Union, Women’s Union, Young Pioneers, and the militia in enterprises and town quarters, it would not be possible to achieve any task. If no patriotic emulation movement had been launched, it could not be possible to stimulate the masses to carry out revolutionary activities ceaselessly and vigorously.
It is clear that the socialist system has given our people a huge force and our army a very solid rear base, it has been a decisive factor in beating the US war of destruction.
The victory won by big towns and cities has the same cause as the success obtained by the socialist North in the economic field. It is the outcome of the very correct Party line, the great heroism and creative and painstaking labour of our people, the superiority of the socialist system of the North and also the precious assistance of the brother socialist countries.
4. Successes in communications and transport, mobilization of manpower in war time, building and expanding regional armed units, ensuring security and order
The successes scored by the inhabitants of big towns and cities and industrial centres in transport and communications, in the mobilization of man-power in wartime, in the building and expanding of regional armed units, in the organization of the people’s life and in ensuring security and order stand also as great and all-sided successes and testify to a new turning-point in the development of people’s war against the US war of destruction.
In transport and communications.
We have frustrated one of the fundamental strategic objectives of the US in its scheme to destroy our big towns and cities and industrial centres. The “isolation of Hanoi from Haiphong and that of these two cities from the rest of North Viet Nam” as threatened by Grant Sharp and Westmoreland was not realized by the aggressors according to their subjective calculations. The roads radiating from the capital, Hanoi, the heart of the whole country, are like arteries sending healthy blood to various parts of the Fatherland. In the war years, the port city of Haiphong remained bustling. In other towns, our communication lines were, generally speaking, opened to traffic. The struggle waged by the inhabitants in big towns and cities to protect our roads was vigorous and stubborn. All the most barbarous means of war used by the enemy—concentrated attacks and indiscriminate strikes by big waves, or sporadic incursions by small forces day and night—were foiled by our armed forces and people. All the kinds of sophisticated weapons and modern war means used by the US to destroy our communication lines such as demolition bombs, time-bombs, magnetic bombs, have of course created difficulties for us but proved powerless in face of our high fighting spirit and the skilful and creative labour of our inhabitants and armymen to protect our communication lines.
Skilfully applying the Party line and principle, we have affirmed since the very beginning that “to maintain communications and transport in good order is the central task of the Party, armymen and inhabitants in urban centres in order to meet in any circumstances the requirements of the national economy and national defence, to serve production and fighting in the rear and at the front.” With this determination, a movement was launched in urban centres, urging our people to ensure communications and transport. This was carried out according to the principle that one should regard the communications and transport forces as core, and the vanguard youth brigades as shock troops, to bring into play the potentialities of the region and solve urgent problems on the spot. In our guidance of this work, we have rapidly found the main links in the chain which is, the efficient organization of river crossings and keeping the roads and rivers open. We have devoted all our efforts to beating the enemy on this front. This is a successful experience we have gained in transport and communications in big towns and cities.
We had estimated that this would be the fiercest trial of strength between the enemy and us, one which would be concentrated on a number of “vital” points inside and outside the urban centres and so we guided, developed and organized our forces and strongly increased our road and river transport means compared with pre-war days. In the same spirit we correctly advocated that traffic could be guaranteed only when we hit hard at the enemy, regarding this as a very important task of the armed forces. While doing such a heavy and urgent work, we had also to carry out the “militarization” of the communication and transport service so as to raise the quality of that branch; we had to intensify the repair and overhaul services, build new roads and bridges, increase the means of transport, resolutely ensure traffic at “vital points” while finding other roads and making the most use of all means available.
With their determination to shed their blood if need be in order to keep traffic going, the A.A gunners of the regular forces and regional army units, together with the self-defence groups and militia men using rifles and machines guns, resolutely defended the communication lines. It can be said that wherever there was traffic, there were forces to protect it. This explains why, despite the fact that the number of enemy air strikes on communication lines in big towns and cities was very high, and big quantities of bombs and shells were used by the enemy, we could reduce the damage we suffered to the minimum.
Especially in a number of “key points,” our bridges and traffic were in good order, whereas hundreds of enemy planes were downed by our A.A. batteries.
With the intelligence and creative initiative inherent in the working class, the defenders of communications and transport have solved many problems which at first sight had seemed to be insoluble. Such bridges as Long Bien, Duong (Hanoi), Quay, Niem (Haiphong), Ham Rong (Thanh Hoa) attacked tens and even hundreds of times, were immediately reopened to traffic. The ratio was two or three bridges newly built for one bridge hit. After each combat, we accumulated many more experiences, devising new methods to protect communication lines with more advanced techniques. The workers of the transport and communications branch in urban centres were capable of repairing the transport means of the army and other branches, maintaining a high technical standard. With their own strength and local possibilities they were able to repair the existing air fields and build new ones in a fairly short time. In the de-activization of time-bombs and delayed-action bombs the local engineers have introduced many valuable innovations, combining rudimentary methods with modern technique and splendid courage with great resourcefulness and initiative.
We have successfully carried out the work of guiding transport, kept the transportation means and goods secure and fulfilled the transport plans. The main experiences which deserve our attention were the following: to make the most use of all possibilities and means, take advantage of all favourable conditions to do transportation work, combine rudimentary means with modern means, handicrafts with engineering, use roads or waterways according to circumstances, all this with the determination to be able to use both. The establishment of a transport coordination committee from the centre to the base, the maintenance of this committee’s normal functioning in urban centres under fierce bombings and the continuation of the normal activities of the port were the result of lessons learnt from past achievements.
Today, we have all the facts for an assessment of the huge potentialities of the localities in transport and communications. Besides reviewing the guidance of people’s war, the transport and communications department must make a more profound analysis in this respect. The local Party committee and organs concerned must enhance their guidance in this work and do it well. Whatever the war conditions, communications and transport is a most important strategic task for our Party and people. At present, though the local requirement in this respect is not so urgent as in time of war, the urban centres and other localities in the North are duty bound to meet the needs of the whole country and the front line in this field. The experience we have recently gained shows that preparation work in peace time, such as additional roads and bridges, repair facilities, manpower available, guidance and direction, is of paramount significance for the shift from peacetime to wartime work. Therefore, we must be constantly prepared to cope with the eventuality of a new attack by the enemy as well as to satisfy the permanent requirements of national defence.
Mobilization of manpower in war time and building and expanding of local armed forces
We are aware that any victory won at the front stems from our strength in the rear area. The greater our victories at the front, the better they contribute to the defence and consolidation of the rear. That is why replenishing our forces for the front and strengthening the rear area are indispensable tasks for all localities if we are to ensure the success of the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.
The resistance to the recent U.S. war of destruction has shown that the towns, cities and industrial centres in the socialist North have huge potentialities and favourable conditions to carry through this task. Nevertheless, we met a number of difficulties as it was the first time that we had carried out large-scale recruitment for military service. Moreover that mobilization was undertaken in conditions of urgent production and fierce fighting in order to foil the new U.S. air escalation. These difficulties have now been surmounted and these possibilities and advantages developed. The Party cadres at all levels and the inhabitants in these urban and industrial centres have realized more and more clearly the role, requirements and relations between these two tasks and consequently have done their best to fulfil their tasks. The urban and industrial centres have met the requirements of the tasks of strengthening forces for the front, building local armed forces and consolidating the rear area in every respect.
They have, on the whole, carried out the mobilization of troops well and, by this, have shown their determination to foil US aggression. The industrial enterprises have trained workers for replacement and made careful arrangements in the chain of production. Preparations for this mobilization have been made in peace time, ready for wartime, and have been accompanied by education and the drawing up of regulations. In time of war, political education and ideological remoulding among the people is increased particularly among the youth and mass organizations. Thanks to this, we have been able to launch a widespread, seething, movement in which the slogan: “We have the potential to deliver the quantity of grain required by the State and to recruit soldiers in the number required by the army,” is changed into “We have the potential to deliver a quantity of grain above that required and to recruit even more soldiers”. In the four years of fighting against the U.S. war of destruction, tens of thousands of cadres, Party members and workers have been mobilized for the front. Battalions and regiment-sized units numbering tens of thousands of officers and soldiers made up of young men coming from urban and industrial centres have achieved brilliant exploits. We are highly elated and proud to know that these young people have greatly contributed to the common victory.
These successes have illustrated the patriotism and love of socialism of the townspeople and their deep hatred for the enemy. They have been obtained thanks to our ability to rely on the local Party branches, the local military organs, the coordination between various branches, and the sense of responsibility and contribution of the cadres at all levels. They are also the outcome of the “three readies” movement launched among the youth and “three responsibilities” drive among women. Experiences have taught us that in urban centres as well as in other localities, political education, ideological remoulding, good implementation of policy coupled with a tight guidance in organization are fundamental factors leading to a successful mobilization of troops.
Parallel to the task of serving the front, the townspeople are also anxious to strengthen the rear base; one of these tasks is to build and expand the local armed forces as this meets the immediate requirement and also the long-range need to defeat US aggression under any circumstances.
In the four years of war, our self-defence groups in the towns and cities and militia in the periphery of cities have fought the enemy while doing construction work and serving as shock troops in other activities in the localities. They have now matured in all fields—political, ideological, military, organizational, and in equipment; they have swollen in numbers and improved in quality. Within a short time, through our experiences gained in the war years, we have been able gradually to classify the self-defence units according to their characteristics and efficiency to lay the basis for the building and utilization of each of them. This is an excellent task which can raise the strength and combat efficiency of the self-defence forces; we must continue to study them and draw experiences for better work.
In the last war, our self-defence units have proved their ample combat possibilities. They can fight independently or in coordination with army A.A. units against enemy war planes. Usually their weapons are rifles and machine-guns. Many of them have been organized into companies or battalions armed with small A.A. artillery pieces or into groups to defend production bases, or they have fought in close co-ordination with A.A. units of the regular armed forces. The technical teams or brigades of the self-defence forces such as engineers’, scouts’, telecommunications, chemical teams, and the sections handling mortars or other sophisticated weapons, have fought efficiently and given an effective support to combat in urban centres. The self-defence forces in the towns have trained tens of thousands of reserve gunners to replace if need be those manning batteries of the regular armed forces fighting in their localities. The combat support force in town is composed mostly of self-defence fighters who have undergone military training or taken part directly in the fights. Against the fierce raids of American aircraft, the self-defence units are the shock forces of the workshops and factories which have been entrusted with difficult assignments at vital points.
We can come to the conclusion that, if we build a powerful self-defence force and militia, we will not only be ready to fight and fight well, but we will be able to maintain and intensify production in all circumstances. The growth of self-defence forces with their new possibilities are obviously a novelty in urban and industrial centres, going hand in hand with the growth of the working class in factories, construction sites and agricultural farms. These forces occupy one quarter of the total self-defence forces in the North. If experiences can be drawn from past lessons to give them a better leadership, a more efficient command and training and appropriate equipment, surely they will become very powerful forces capable of meeting the local requirements in wartime as well as in peace time, in the strengthening of the rear area as well as the replenishment of forces for the frontline.
In the building of the self-defence forces at present, it is necessary to pay attention to raising the quality of the fighting forces. Stress must be laid on the main task which is the training of the commanding officers. The military organs in urban and industrial centres also need to be strengthened so as to discharge their task as staff of the Party local committee in the guidance of the self-defence and militia movement in particular and in the direction of the armed force in general.
Apart from countering air raids, the task of the people’s war in urban centres is to foil in time all the sabotage acts of the enemy, all his psywar activities and all his slanderous propaganda and to check all trouble-making by bad elements. It is even more important to keep order and fight against enemy psychological warfare in urban and industrial centres than in other localities, because they are the political, economic and cultural centres and form the material and technical bases of our country.
In the war years, security and social order was maintained and the people’s life was not disturbed. The leading organs at central level and in various regions, foreign embassies and foreign visitors and the ships calling at our ports were kept safe. Evacuated or dispersed workshops and factories, storehouses, and machines and equipment were well protected by our people.
These great achievements were obtained thanks to the concern of the Party committees in the towns, the great efforts of the authorities and the determination of the security forces, chiefly the people’s police and the self-defence units in various factories, government offices, town quarters, construction sites... With the movement to keep security and order spreading all over the urban centres and countryside, the people’s police and self-defence forces have played a most important role. Usually they co-ordinated with each other very closely and together worked out a common plan of action. The forces in charge of security and order also knew how to divide the sectors of protection, to rely on the masses and make use of educational methods, and most important, to mobilize the masses so as to ensure security not only inside the urban centres but also outside them, particularly in the localities to which the state organs and townspeople were evacuated.
This work has been well executed by the capital, Hanoi, and the port of Haiphong, the two biggest cities in North Viet Nam. During the war, our people’s material and spiritual life has met with difficulties, but has remained stable in the main and even improved in some aspects. The Party Committees have solved many problems regarding, for example the distribution of foodstuffs and commodities, and the expansion of services to evacuated people and those required by duty to remain in the towns. We have made housing arrangements and solved housing difficulties for the air raid victims, and combined the action of the State and that of the population in the organization of relief to these victims.
During the war, the medical network has developed very rapidly. Disease prevention and treatment and health protection have increased together with the number of hospitals and physicians. All this has greatly contributed to the preservation of the people’s health and the strengthening of their productive and fighting forces. The educational movement and cultural activities have reached down to the lowest level.
We can take pride in the success of people’s war as shown in the keeping of order and security and organization of the people’s life in big towns and industrial centres. This success which testifies to the growth of people’s war in urban centres is the result of the political, military and economic forces as well as the outcome of the good management and organization of the people’s life in war time. It also reflects the superiority of the socialist system, manifested in the political awareness of our people and their spirit of being collective masters. It also demonstrates that only socialist relations of production can offer great advantages to overcome the difficulties created by the war. Though shortcomings still exist, the achievements recorded by our big towns, cities and industrial centres in order and security and in organization of the people’s life are great indeed!
The people’s war in urban and industrial centres in the socialist North was waged in the form of valiant surface-to-air battles fought at a fairly high technical level. It brilliantly defeated the U.S. air force even when the war escalation in the North was brought to a height. This victory played a great part in the defeat of the U.S. air and naval war waged on an unprecedented scale against North Viet Nam.
Together with the victory won in the South this victory dealt a hard blow not only at the aggressiveness of the Americans in Viet Nam but also at the neo-colonialist policy pursued by the U.S imperialists in many countries. Many American politicians admit that the U.S. defeat in Viet Nam is the failure of a major part of US global strategy, its aim as well as its policies and means of execution. Institutes for strategic studies in the U.S. and other countries in the world have also advanced many data showing that the huge expenditure defrayed by the U.S. for the Viet Nam war has landed it in an economic plight which seems to be beyond remedy. And worse still, this predicament has gone beyond the economic field and led to serious difficulties in the political field. Most typical of this is the confusion within American society. Johnson called it an “event” while Nixon more vividly called this a “moral crisis” of the American people. For their part, the Western press made no bones about it. An American paper (the Los Angeles Times) wrote that this crisis was rampant in the US and that the American people had lost all confidence in the government. The Viet Nam war, it said, had ruined U.S. reputation abroad, kindled riots in the country and driven young people abroad. The English paper, the Times, pointed out that the U.S. was sinking into a deep social crisis.
In the military field, the defeat of the U.S. in Viet Nam has worn out and emasculated its military potential and sapped the fighting spirit of its army. The American militarymen have complained that the U.S. strategic reserve forces were “thinned out” by the Viet Nam war, being reduced from eight divisions to four. With this reserve, they were afraid that it would be very difficult for the US to have a “quick response” in threatened areas. Part of the five divisions defending the strategic bases of the U.S. in West Europe was sent to Viet Nam, while within Viet Nam the U.S. had a force corresponding to ten infantry divisions, and an important naval and air force. Yet it could not stave off defeat.
It was with this gloomy background that the “Nixon doctrine” and the “Vietnamization” of the war saw the light of day. This new strategy is an official acknowledgement to the American and world’s people that the U.S. was economically, politically and militarily weak. It shows that the U.S. is no longer in a position to squander its money and scatter its armed forces all over the world to meet the requirement of massive response as it did before. Though still clinging to their role of world policeman, the U.S. imperialists are compelled to reconsider the key points of intervention and to revise the extent and method of intervention in their counter-revolutionary global strategy. They must tailor this strategy to a situation in which the balance of forces in Viet Nam and in the world is more and more unfavourable to them.
But they are very obstinate. Behind the camouflage of the Nixon doctrine and the “Vietnamization” of the war the aggressive and warlike nature of the U.S. imperialists is always apparent. They continue to pursue their neo-colonialist and warlike policy in order to consolidate their position, dominate the capitalist world and carry out their global strategy.
The American imperialists are doing their best to achieve their “Vietnamization” plan in order to get out of their quagmire in South Viet Nam. This is an aggressive plan in all fields—military, political, economic—a most perfidious strategic scheme, aimed at consolidating their defence line, pushing forward the pacification program and destroying our liberated zone, in order to prolong the war, strengthen the Saigon army and administration and gradually repatriate the GIs while maintaining their position of strength. “Vietnamization” is for the U.S. a way to get out of the war but also an effort to win a position of strength while being in fact in a losing position. It is an aggressive plan full of contradictions and considered crazy dream by public opinion in the world as well as in the U.S. With an expeditionary force over half a million strong, the US has bitten the dust. How can it expect to carry the day when the GIs are superseded by a disintegrating puppet army and our people and armed forces are growing in strength and posture in the military and political fields?
President Ho Chi Minh said in his testament: “The resistance war against U.S. aggression may drag on. Our compatriots may have to face new sacrifices of property and life. Whatever may happen, we must keep firm our resolve to fight the U.S. aggressors till total victory.”
We are resolved to follow his teaching and to fight the American aggressors until they give up their aggressive design, withdraw their troops and respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country. We defeated them when their “limited war” was at its height; we can surely beat them completely as they are losing the war and gradually scaling it down. In the frontline of the world people’s struggle against U.S. imperialism our people are quite aware of their heavy but glorious responsibility. Despite all our difficulties and hardships, we are determined to defeat the U.S. imperialists; this is our duty to the Fatherland, to the revolutionary people in the world and also an honour and a historic mission of our people.
1. Today our urgent task is to perseveringly wage the war against the U.S., liberate the South, defend the North and progress towards the peaceful reunification of the country. Therefore the primary task of our people in the North, and of the inhabitants in urban and industrial areas, is to supply and reinforce the front line in every respect.
As the revolutionary base of the whole country, the North must, after the U.S. war of destruction, fully play its role as the great rear area of the great front line. While our fellow-countrymen in the South are making great sacrifices to wrest back national independence and freedom we, in the North, must overcome all difficulties and hardships to build and develop the national economy, strengthen national defence, step up socialist construction and do our best to fulfil our duty towards the South. Only by satisfactorily building socialism and turning the North into a solid rear base, can we replenish the fighting forces at the front and step up our resistance to U.S. aggression till complete victory. Commemorating the 40th anniversary of our Party, Comrade Le Duan, First Secretary of its Central Committee, analysed the main content and the great experiences in socialist construction in the North. We must carefully study that document for future application in the concrete situation of our respective regions.
We have come out victorious of the fierce wars against truculent imperialist countries, Japan, France and the US, and are held in high esteem by the people of the world. This is because our Party has adopted a sound strategic line and creative, judicious revolutionary methods. In the conduct of the war, we have grasped the law governing the activities of the enemy and fully understood the law of revolutionary war in our country. Likewise in economic construction, we must grasp the economic principles and apply them creatively to economic organization and management. Economic construction has its own special features and laws. We have revolutionary zeal and ardour, we have a large amount of experience in leadership and organization in revolutionary warfare. With the progress made in our study and work, we will surely grasp the law of socialist economic development and do ever better in socialist construction in the North. We will resolutely turn our urban and industrial centres into economically prosperous and strongly defended areas.
2. As said above, being builders and guardians of socialism, in all circumstances we must see to the development and protection of production. Furthermore, as at present the American aggressors are still waging a ferocious war in the South, certainly they are working out perfidious plans to sabotage our socialist North.
Our people’s armed forces must constantly heighten their vigilance, be ready for the fight, and do their utmost in training to raise their technical, tactical and organizational standard and perfect their command in order to down American aircraft of all types if they dare to violate our skies. In big urban and industrial centres, our plan of combat must cope efficiently with all war conditions and closely coordinate with the plan for the protection of men and material and technical bases. We must organize the fighting force, the defence of the people and the camouflage and decentralization of goods and warehouses all at the same time. While they are fighting American aircraft, the self-defence units, militia and regional troops must closely co-ordinate their actions with the people’s armed police to counter the enemy land attacks (raids, commando operations) and help in the maintenance of order and security in their localities, especially in city streets, district and provincial towns and other important areas.
The military line of our Party has been more and more perfected during the war of resistance against U.S. aggression. We have gained richer experiences in operations as well as in the building of our armed forces and consolidation of our national defence. In the new conditions, we must apply these experiences well. As required by the region, we will study, readjust and amend our plans of local defence and building of armed forces in urban and industrial centres. These are urgent basic tasks to strengthen our potential for national defence which needs to be carefully planned and not scamped in such a way as to cause a waste of labour and money and delay.
3. In the development of the local economies, we must closely coordinate economic construction with the consolidation of national defence in urban and industrial centres as they are the seats of our political, economic and cultural activities. This co-ordination must be carried out in all fields, especially in the following:
In the industrial sector (particularly local industrial enterprises in urban centres) attention should be paid to mechanical engineering, chemistry and some light industries so that when the war breaks out we will be in a position to manufacture or repair some kinds of weapons and equipment, and meet the requirements of production, the people’s life and the armed forces. The industrial enterprises must be built in such a way as to facilitate their protection, guarantee production in war time, be consistent with the policy of economic reorientation in wartime, and suit the trend and plan of long-term national construction.
In the agricultural sector in the suburbs and the surrounding areas, it is necessary to meet a part of the needs of the locality in foodstuffs and to satisfy other wartime requirements. The development of hydraulics and afforestation must be closely linked to the defence of the locality, the transformation of the terrain and construction of fighting villages, and facilitate the operations to wipe out the enemy and the protection of the people.
In local transport and communications, attention should be paid to motor roads, railways and waterways. We must build a solid and extensive communications network to facilitate the movement of troops and meet transport requirements in war time.
In the health service we must train technicians, build a solid broad medical network to enable the medical branch to treat soldiers and civilians wounded during the war, develop our potentialities to counter chemical warfare and heal the wounds caused by the enemy’s weapons and other war means.
In postal communications, we must pay attention to both telegraph and radio in order to maintain steady communication in wartime, serve the Party and State leadership and the operational commands of the armed forces, and guarantee normal exchange of correspondence among the population.
The people’s war waged in the North and the South of our country has supplied us with a wealth of experiences including those regarding the building and development of our armed forces and the establishment of local bases. We must sum up these most important experiences to raise our level of leadership and the quality of our future work.
In the co-ordination between the national economy and national defence in urban and industrial centres, we must speed up the people’s preparation to switch from peace-time to wartime activities. In peacetime we must have a plan to evacuate and scatter the population, enterprises and storehouses, and a plan of on-the-spot defence for when the war breaks out. In heavily-populated areas, there must be an adequate plan of reorganization in line with the development of local production and co-ordination between the construction of important works and the building of shelters together with the maintenance of the existing shelters, chiefly in urban and industrial centres.
Our experience is to concentrate big enterprises in one locality. In the construction of major industrial enterprises, consideration should be taken either to maintain their production in place or move them to safety in the event of war.
In a word, the shifting of the townspeople from a state of peace to a state of war should be considered in State plans and prepared for in peace-time. Only in this way can we replenish our human and material forces, keep production going, rapidly normalize the people’s life and ensure peace and order in time of war.
4. We must build our national economy and strengthen our national defence in the new conditions. Local economies are more and more developed. The provinces and big towns are becoming important economic and military bases. That is why, at present and in the future, local military work has a strategic role of greater and greater importance and is an essential part of the Party’s military line; it is one of the main requirements for the Party to carry out its policy of people’s war and national defence. This calls for a radical change of views in the Party and army to lead and step up local military work.
The strengthening of military work in urban centres as well as in other localities includes many tasks which have been laid down in various resolutions. In 1970 we had to do such work as strengthening the Party’s leadership over local military work, perfecting the system of leadership and the local military organs, particularly strengthening the organization and raising the quality of self-defence units and militia and the guidance for the implementation of policies in the rear area towards the army.
At present, the self-defence forces and militia in urban and industrial centres are developing quite vigorously. Therefore, in time to come, our main task is to strengthen them. We must go further in assessing the concrete task of the regional armed forces in each sector (countering air strikes, commando attacks, maintenance of order and security, doing production work, etc), and on this basis streamline and consolidate our organization, personnel, rationalization of equipment, and regulating the training to suit the immediate task. First we must pay attention to priority sectors and areas where our bases are still weak, strengthen our nuclei (guerilla and self-defence combat forces) mobile forces, gun emplacements and technical teams. We must lay stress on the building of the self-defence forces inside the towns while building the guerilla and militia in the peripheries. The self-defence units are the armed forces of the working class and toiling people in the towns; they are not divorced from production. In the process of socialist construction, as the working class is growing, the self-defence forces have greater fighting possibilities and are a very important source of technical reinforcement for the various arms of the standing army.
In organization we must base ourselves on the requirements of combat and on the characteristics of production of each branch to ascertain the use of the self-defence forces in peacetime and wartime and to classify these forces in order to give them appropriate training. We must build the self-defence forces in workshops, factories, mines, transport and communications, posts and telegraphs, construction sites, geological survey teams, agricultural farms, etc. In government offices we must consider the necessity of setting up self-defence groups in certain organs and not necessarily in all of them.
The building of the reserve force and its mobilization in wartime is one of the major military tasks in urban and industrial centres. The reserve forces should be built with an eye to both quality and number; infantry is to be completed by various categories of other forces. They must be able to reinforce the standing army in peacetime, and be in a position to readily replenish and increase the strength of the armed forces in wartime. The urban centres are localities in which to build reserves, and to recruit and train forces in order to strengthen the standing army. At the same time as recruitment, we must improve our work of building and managing the reserve army, especially the registration and administration of ex-servicemen capable of serving in the reserve force; we must rehearse military mobilization so that in case of need, we can rapidly strengthen our armed forces and the regional units as well as the regular army.
In urban centres we must build our reserve force in all branches and departments of the State, but more particularly in factories and workshops (chiefly engineering) transport and communications, health service, post and telegraph, in a word where members of the reserve force are proficient in techniques badly needed by national defence, particularly in the event of war.
To guarantee that the ex-servicemen when recalled to service may develop their abilities and make rational use of them, the cadres in various localities must be fully aware of the political, military and technical level of each man. They must also grasp the quality and number of the reserve force in their localities, branches or State organs.
If this work is well done, if close co-ordination is established between the building, management and training of the reserve force and of the self-defence units and militia, the localities can always fulfil and even overfulfil the targets for recruitment, in both quality and number. The regions which have recently gained rich experience and distinguished themselves in local military work are those which have thoroughly implemented the Party’s resolutions on this work. This year and in years to come, this work will be ever heavier and more urgent. That is why we must strengthen our leadership and guidance in order to carry out these resolutions, grasp the central points, strengthen supervision, and study and propose concrete and efficient methods so as to win greater and greater successes in every respect.
Our resistance war against U.S. aggression is now entering a most important period. The situation is very propitious for our entire people. We will win bigger and more glorious successes for our revolutionary cause.
For the sake of the liberation of the South, the defence of the North and the reunification of our country, let us valiantly march forward. For the sake of our lofty internationalist duty, our working class must heighten its splendid revolutionary heroism, our people’s army its high revolutionary spirit and determination to fight and to win, and the entire heroic Vietnamese people their indomitable spirit. In the flush of our victories, let us close ranks with our 14 million fellow-countrymen in the South and bring our greatest war of resistance to complete victory. Let us be resolved to fulfil the oath made before the soul of President Ho Chi Minh.
(1) Talk given on February 17, 1970, at the Conference of Cadres of Haiphong City, reviewing four years of victorious resistance to the U.S. war of destruction (1965-1968).
(2) The author is referring to the poem Majestic Pac Bo which Uncle Ho wrote in February 1941.
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