People's war against U.S. aero-naval war

Võ Nguyên Giáp


4

STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL ARMED FORCES(1)


I. LOCAL PEOPLE’S WAR AND LOCAL ARMED FORCES: MOST IMPORTANT BASES OF RESISTANCE WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENCE

Our country has a long tradition of people’s war against foreign aggression, which was waged by the Trung sisters, Tran Quoc Toan, Nguyen Trai, and Nguyen Hue who developed a peasants’ revolution into a war against foreign aggressors.

Since the founding of our Party its military line has been that of a people’s war waged under the leadership of the working class. In comparison with other periods in our history our people’s war today has a new quality, a rich content and a great strength.

The people’s war is waged by the entire people.

In the armed forces, we have operations launched by concentrated units of the regular army in all parts of the country and operations of regional units and self-defence militia who wage guerilla warfare, or local people’s war.

Guerilla war, local people’s war, has been a basic content of our Party’s military line all through the various revolutionary stages. Local people’s war, self-defence militia and regional forces are the firmest and broadest basis of the whole armed struggle and all the people’s armed forces. Leading the local people’s war and building the local armed forces have always been the bases of our Party’s military work, and of the anti-US struggle and the long-term consolidation of national defence.

Marxism-Leninism and the Problem of Arming the Masses.

In the waging of a people’s war, making full use of the fighting force of the masses in the revolution and armed struggle, one of our Party’s fundamental and outstanding experiences has been the creative and successful application to the Vietnamese situation of the Marxist-Leninist theory on the problem of arming the entire people and building the people’s army.

More than one century ago, Marx and Engels advocated the problem of arming the masses in insurrection and revolutionary struggle in opposition to the then rulers’ emphasis on the building of a professional army. According to Marx and Engels, when the working class, the peasantry and the conscious toiling people rise up, they must certainly wage armed struggle to seize power. But Marx and Engels believed that socialism would succeed simultaneously in many countries and would be unlikely to succeed in a single country. Therefore, the countries which have just carried through the socialist revolution would have little fear of being besieged by the imperialists. So when the armed masses rose up and seized power, it would be only necessary, in order to protect the fruits of the revolution, for them to organize such armed forces as people’s troops, people’s military police or armed units which would be concentrated mainly in the localities, but most of all to arm the masses. Thus, it would not be really necessary to maintain a strong standing army.

In the historical conditions of that time, according to Marxist military theory, the organization of the armed forces was the problem of arming the masses and not yet the problem of organizing the army. In the present historical conditions, we can see that this problem is clearly a basic one.

After the triumph of the October Revolution, the armies of 14 countries invaded the Soviet Union. A new problem arose: after arming the masses for the uprising, was it necessary to organize them into an army? At the Central Committee meetings and at the Congress of the CPSU (Bolshevik) there were heated discussions on this problem. Some people thought that it was simply necessary to arm the masses and rejected the idea of building the army. Then Lenin advocated the arming of the masses at the same time as the organization of a standing, regular army. He advanced the well-known thesis: to build the worker-peasant Red Army on the basis of arming the masses. At the Third Congress of the All-Russia Worker-Peasant Soviets held from January 10 to 18, 1918, Lenin said that the socialist Red Army is an army set up by all socialist people on the basis of arming the entire people.(2) In his declaration made in January 1918 on the rights of the toiling and exploited people, he wrote: “To ensure the sovereign power of the working people and to eliminate all possibility of the restoration of the power of the exploiters, the arming of the working people, the creation of a socialist Red Army of workers and peasants... are hereby decreed.”(3) And the worker-peasant Red Army was born.

Since then, many uprisings, many revolutionary wars, have taken place in various countries. Thus a new problem arose: after the building of the revolutionary army, the regular army, how would the problem of arming the masses be handled? Generally speaking, after the triumph of the revolution, after the formation of a modern regular army, the problem of arming the masses, arming the entire people, was not, in many countries, given its true importance.

Why was it necessary to pose the problem of arming the masses at the same time as building the people’s army? When this question came up, Engels saw clearly the might of the armed masses. At that time the working class had nowhere seized power; but Engels had realized that, when that seizure of power took place, all able-bodied men among the workers, peasants and labouring people would be mobilized and armed, creating a huge military force. Commenting on the war between France and Germany at that time, when Metz and Paris were invested by the German army, he remarked that the French had done their best to keep these two strongholds, while the Germans, with their many dozen divisions, had besieged them. With such a huge standing army, what were the Germans able to do? They only occupied one-sixth of the French territory while the remainder was out of their control. Engels thought that, if the revolutionary fervour of the French population living on the remaining five-sixths of France at that time was equal to that of the Spaniards who fought Napoleon in 1808, it would have been possible to arm the French people, destroy communication and supply lines of the German aggressors and relieve Paris. According to Engels, had each town, each city, each village in France become a stronghold and each Frenchman a combatant, the situation would have changed. The Germans would have been finished, because they had no more reserves. The working class and labouring people rose up in Paris and fought with matchless heroism in the Paris Commune. But without the backing of the toiling masses throughout France, they failed. Thus, as early as 1870, Engels had seen the might of the armed masses. He spoke highly of the combats of the Spaniards though their arming of the masses was then very limited.(4)

Later, and especially after the October Revolution in Russia, the masses were armed in many uprisings and revolutionary wars.

In the great patriotic war waged by the Soviet people against the German fascists, Stalin always appealed to the men of the Red Army and guerilla fighters of both sexes. In many fierce battles the armed forces of the population living in the enemy-held areas played a very effective role, coordinating their action with that of the Soviet army. The reports made by German generals recognized that guerilla warfare, widespread in the territories under their control, upset all the principles of German military science and caused great difficulties and heavy losses to their armies. So we can see the importance of the strength of the armed masses, of guerilla warfare!

In the long revolutionary war in China, people’s war was waged over immense rural areas and won great victories. In the resistance war against the Japanese, the Red Army fought shoulder to shoulder with guerilla units which had sprung up behind the enemy’s lines. Developing its tremendous strength in the civil war, the people’s war annihilated millions of Chiang Kai-shek’s troops, and liberated the Chinese mainland.

Our Party’s Line and the Problem of Arming the Masses

In Viet Nam, from the very beginning, we correctly advocated the arming of the masses while setting up the revolutionary army. This clearsighted line was set forth right at the founding of our Party. In its very first documents, our Party discussed such problems as the organization of self-defence units, military training of the labouring masses, preparation of conditions for the building of guerilla units, prosecution of guerilla warfare and armed uprisings, building of the Red Army of the worker-peasant Soviet State. Thus our Party has correctly applied Marxism-Leninism to the realities of our country. It can be said that, compared with any other period in the history of our nation, our Party has had the most success in its implementation of the policy of arming the masses and building the people’s army.

To guide the preparation of armed uprisings in the period of the Second World War, our Party passed a resolution in which it expounded very clearly the necessity to develop the political bases of the masses, expand self-defence and guerilla units and, on this foundation, to organize concentrated armed forces and the revolutionary army. In practice, our people’s army was born and grew up from the widespread armed forces forged by the masses in the crucible of the revolutionary war against Japan, for national salvation. In this crucial moment the August Revolution was a great leap forward, a time when the armed forces of the masses developed vigorously. The Liberation Army and our revolutionary armed forces saw a powerful growth.

From the very beginning of our resistance war against the French the appeals made by President Ho Chi Minh and the Party Central Committee’s instructions on the prosecution of the resistance war and national construction pointed out that each hamlet, each street was to be a stronghold; each citizen a combatant; each Party cell a staff. This policy yielded great results in the defeat of the French imperialist aggressors.

Our country is an agrarian country having large rural areas and many towns and cities. The regular troops of the revolution are the workers and peasants; the workers play the leading role and the peasants make up the bulk. The law of the development of the revolutionary forces in our country is first of all to develop the revolutionary forces among the grassroots masses, among the toiling peasants and also among the workers, in the countryside as well as in the town. In the war against the US, this law is fully expounded in the theory of the three strategic areas: the rural areas in the highlands, the rural areas in the plain, and the urban centres. It is for this reason that, whether in political struggle or in armed struggle, not only the peasants but the revolutionary people in the towns, with the workers at their head, must be armed. In the arming of the masses, our Party advocates the organization of not only the militia and guerilla forces in the countryside but also self-defence and combat self-defence forces in the towns. Not only each peasant but each worker, each toiler in an urban centre, must become a combatant.

Since liberation, the North has embarked on the road of socialist construction; as a result the industrial centres have become more crowded and the working class more numerous. Hence, in arming the masses, we must not only turn each hamlet or village into a stronghold but each enterprise, each town-street, into a fortress. In the armed forces of the masses in the socialist North, the militia and guerilla forces are becoming more widespread and powerful and the self-defence and combat self-defence forces have become more developed and are playing a more important role. We have laid emphasis on the strengthening and development of the militia and guerillas—the grassroots armed forces of the collective peasants. We must pay greater attention to the consolidation and expansion of the self-defence and combat self-defence forces—the grassroots armed forces of the working class. To belittle the role of the self-defence and combat self-defence forces is a mistake that should be corrected.

The people’s war is a revolutionary war, waged by the people and for the people. In the present juncture a genuine people’s war must be led by the working class. To speak of people’s war is to speak of rousing the people, of organizing them for the fight. When the people are organized, armed and correctly led, they are invincible. The revolutionary war waged in our country has shown that the strength of all the armed people will beat any aggressor, however powerful he may be.

The strength of the people’s war stems first from the huge force of the conscious and organized people. The people are the solid mainstay of the whole revolutionary tasks. The political force of the people is the basis of all revolutionary struggle in general and all armed struggle in particular. Political struggle is precisely the basis from which to develop and intensify armed struggle. This is the closely-linked relation between the revolutionary armed forces and the people’s revolutionary forces, between armed struggle and the people’s revolutionary struggle.

If we deeply consider the essence of the problem, armed struggle is a high form of revolutionary struggle, the armed forces, a special form of the political force of the masses, a political force including workers, peasants and labouring people roused, closely organized and fighting the enemy with a gun.

Insofar as armed forces and armed struggle are concerned, the armed forces of the masses are precisely the solid mainstay of all our armed forces. The masses’ guerilla warfare is precisely the foundation of all the revolutionary armed struggle.

We can affirm that, to wage a true people’s war, to bring into full play the huge strength of people’s war, it is absolutely necessary to mobilize the entire people for the fight, to organize the armed forces of the masses and the revolutionary army; to co-ordinate the political forces with the armed forces, the armed forces of the masses with the revolutionary army. Only by so doing can we fully apply the principle of arming the entire people, of spreading the people’s war far and wide. This is the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, the truth of revolutionary war in our country as well as in any other country and nation resolved to rise up and prosecute a just war.

David versus Goliath or the Problem of Arming the Masses

Here it is important to mention that the revolutionary war in Viet Nam does not only reflect this universal truth but has its own features. In our country, revolutionary war and all wars against foreign aggression have been just wars of a small country against much bigger feudalist and imperialist aggressors.

Our country is not large in area and population; our army is less numerous and less well equipped than that of the enemy. We have to fight an enemy who has greater manpower, better equipment and a more powerful economic and military potential. This is a problem of the utmost importance for our strategists; it is not a new one but has existed for millennia. Whenever our country has been invaded by a foreign army our people and national heroes have had to solve this problem.

What is thus the most important factor which has enabled us to find a solution? It is this: all our people must pool their efforts to fight the enemy, and to organize a nation-wide resistance. The enemy must be repelled not only by the army but also by the civilian population. That is why, formerly, all the people were soldiers. Apart from the regular army, there were the provincial armed units, the dan binh, huong binh, tho binh operating in hamlets and villages and in grottos and caves in the highlands. Today also the entire people fight the enemy; we have a people’s army which, compared with the enemy’s, is smaller in number but has a very high fighting spirit; we must have a big armed force organized by the masses, the regional troops, militia and self-defence units. In his appeal for resistance to the French aggressors, President Ho Chi Minh said: “Men and women, old and young, regardless of religious creed, political affiliation and nationality, all Vietnamese must stand up to fight the French colonialists and save the Fatherland. Those who have rifles will use their rifles; those who have swords will use their swords; those who have no swords will use spades, hoes or sticks. Everyone must endeavour to oppose the colonialists and save his country.” In the resistance war against American aggression he said: “The thirty-one million of our compatriots in both zones, regardless of sex and age, must be thirty-one million valiant people fighting the Americans to save the country”.

As we fought the enemy in the specific conditions mentioned above, our military thinking has also a special content. In the West, from an early date military thought laid stress on the principle of concentrating a numerically superior army so as to wipe out the enemy rapidly, as for example, in the wars of Napoleon. In the East, before the birth of Christ, Ton Tu wrote in his military book: “We besiege the enemy when we are ten times more numerous, we assault him when we have a number five times superior, we can still attack him when we are twice as many, we withdraw when we have an equal number or are less numerous.” But Vietnamese military thinking is different. Our thinking is to oppose a smaller force to a bigger one, to oppose a weaker unit to a stronger one, to oppose humanity to brutality according to the practice of Tran Quoc Tuan and Nguyen Trai. Today, continuing that tradition and applying it to people’s war, Vietnamese military science must satisfactorily solve the problem of opposing a smaller force to a bigger one, and rudimentary weapons to the sophisticated arms of the imperialists including the American imperialists. To apply this military art successfully, we must mobilize and arm the entire people. Moreover, we must train crack troops with a high fighting spirit, and arm the masses whose morale must also be very high. Apart from our great determination to fight, we must adopt skilful methods of combat. This is what makes for the high combative quality of our revolutionary armed forces.

Speaking of the organization and method of combat of the army, of the quality and number of the population and of technique, Engels recalled the mercenary troops of feudal Prussia and the revolutionary army of bourgeois France. The Prussian army fought in three-row-four-side formations, which prevented the hirelings from running away; well aware of that necessity, the Prussian commander at that time said: “Should my soldier know the reason why he has to fight, he would take to flight; he must be made to fear the whip of the corporal more than he does the bullet of the enemy; only on this condition can he fight.” In the revolutionary army of bourgeois France the situation was quite different. The troops had a high morale for the entire people were rising up, the army had an appropriate fighting formation and was organized in columns, enabling it to rout the reactionary European armed forces of that time. Engels also recalled the Spanish guerillas and the American insurrectionists in the war for independence who fought heroically because they defended the interests of their countries, and were victorious as they used the methods of both group fighting and individual fighting. Through this we can see the importance both of morale and of fighting technique. In order to use successfully the method of opposing a smaller unit to a more numerous one, a weaker force to a stronger one, of fighting with rudimentary weapons against sophisticated weapons, our armed forces must have a rational organization, a good fighting method and an iron-like determination to wipe out the enemy. We must know how to organize the armed forces of the masses, and the people’s army. We must be good at fighting in concentrated units and waging guerilla warfare; we must know to fight big, medium-sized and small battles. Our armed forces must have the resolve, formerly to kill all the aggressors, today to defeat completely the American invaders. “So long as there remains an aggressor in our country, we must continue to fight to annihilate him.”

We have taken into account the just and revolutionary character of our people’s war and the reality that “a small country can defeat a big imperialist power” so as to analyse the paramount significance of the problem of arming the masses, of the people’s war at the local level, and the great significance of the revolutionary army and the operations of the main-force army. That is why to speak of people’s war without paying adequate attention to arming the entire people, to fail to build the army on the basis of arming the masses, is also a failure to understand the meaning of the application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of our country, a failure to fully grasp the revolutionary character and specific features of our people’s war in the conduct of the war. Then, naturally, the enemy cannot be defeated.

Arming the Masses and the People’s Army; the Three Categories of Forces

To bring the resistance war of the entire people to a victorious end, to strengthen the national defence of the entire people, it is necessary to build solid armed forces of the masses. I avail myself of this occasion to make it clear that the content of the concept of armed forces of the masses is not quite the same as the content of the concept of people’s army, because the militia and self-defence units do not belong to the army. The army has a tighter organization and discipline; it has a broader military knowledge and a more centralized command. That is the distinction between the armed forces of the masses and the people’s army. The regular armymen and regional troops belong to the army. The militia-men and self-defence fighters do not belong to it. But they are all members of the armed forces of the masses.

The regional armed forces include: the regional army which is that part of the army stationed in the region, and the militia and self-defence forces. When the armed struggle develops, a part of the militia and self-defence forces may become regional army units. The regional armed forces play a very great role: they are closely linked to the revolutionary masses in each locality. They are a military force closely combined with the political force in each locality. Their activity is closely linked to the economic tasks of the people for they directly protect the lives and property of the people. That is why in order to wage a people’s war, to have a core force for the people to rise up and prosecute the war, to provide direct protection to the local inhabitants, it is most important first of all to build the local armed forces. For this reason local armed forces, local troops and the militia and self-defence force play a strategic role not only in armed struggle and guerilla warfare but in revolutionary struggle as a whole. According to Lenin, it is incorrect to dissociate guerilla warfare from an insurrectional situation; this shows a lack of historical and is unscientific.(5)

It is incorrect because “guerilla war is a natural form of struggle unavoidable in the period when the mass movement has effectively taken the path of uprising.(6) It is the form used by the masses rising up to win and maintain power. The regional armed forces are the nucleus of armed struggle, of guerilla warfare and of people’s war in the regions. They are the bases of all armed forces of the Party. Without strong, widespread local armed forces, there would be neither widespread local people’s war nor any powerful movement to arm the population.

The more widespread the war, the more modern equipment the enemy has, and the greater his number, the more strengthened and steady should be the local armed forces. The role played by the regular army is most important, but the regular army develops favourably and brings its huge strength into full play only when the local armed forces and local military work are very solid and powerful.

The militia and self-defence forces and regional army are the two basic armed forces in the region.

The militia and self-defence units have a fighting force of paramount importance, though their organization level is not so high and their command not so effective as those of the regional army and regular army. Militia and self-defence forces are closely bound to the masses. They maintain and bring into play the strength of the masses at the grassroots level. During the war, it is difficult without these forces to protect the people, to keep them and struggle with the enemy for them, and impossible to develop our military, political and economic strength. President Ho Chi Minh said: “The militia, self-defence units, and guerillas are the force of the whole nation, an invincible force, an iron wall of the Fatherland. However brutal the enemy may be, should he bump his head against that wall, he would be forced to withdraw.”(7)

In order to enable them to play their strategic role and fulfil their strategic task in an effective manner, it is indispensable to take into consideration, the number as well as the quality of the militia and self-defence force. We must build them everywhere, in hamlets, cooperatives, state farms, factories, streets, town quarters. Meanwhile we must pay great attention to consolidating the guerillas and self-defence combat units, deploying them with flexibility, combining combat with production work and using them as a core for the grassroots movement, impelling the entire people to fight the enemy.

The regional army, which is one of the three categories of armed forces and the regular force in the region, plays a role of great importance. Together with the militia and self-defence force, it serves as a core for the “Let the entire people fight the enemy” movement in the locality.

It is the link between the forces prosecuting the people’s war and guerilla war at the base and the regular army fighting in concentrated units. It should be strong enough to coordinate its action effectively with the “Let the entire people fight the enemy” movement in the locality, and with the movement for mass uprisings so as to foil all enemy manoeuvres aimed at attacking, pacifying and penning up the local inhabitants, create favourable conditions for action by the regular army, and to coordinate its action with the latter’s in all battlefields. Together with the huge militia and self-defence forces, the regional army is a force operating locally; it stands ready for action in every field of operations. Omnipresent, it can rapidly counter any action of the enemy even when he uses modern weapons and techniques. It is the basis on which to build and develop our posture of strategic offensive, and the direct and most effective force to defend our rear and our war potential. Therefore, at present and in the future, we must lay great emphasis on the building of regional armed forces, especially the militia and self-defence force at grassroots level.

Of course, when stressing the importance of regional armed forces, we must clearly realize the great role played by the regular army operating in concentrated units, the great mainstay of all our people’s armed forces. It is made up of regular units drawn from many arms. Well-equipped and well-trained, they operate under a good command and leadership, fulfilling a mobile operational and strategic task in close coordination with the regional armed forces and dealing decisive blows at the enemy to wipe out his regular forces operating in concentrated formations. It is precisely because we have clearly seen the great role of the regular army that our Party is constantly anxious to build it up, raising its fighting efficiency and strengthening it so that it may develop even more rapidly and steadily and win even more brilliant victories.

Revolutionary Wars through Various Periods in Our Country and the Importance of Arming the Masses

During the years preceding the armed insurrection and in the August Revolution, though the political forces of the masses played the leading role, the armed forces of the masses were also very important. At that time, the liberation forces were still small, amounting to a few platoons and companies, totalling about 5,000 men. But, under the leadership of the Party, the self-defence forces and guerillas developed rapidly all over the country; they were the armed forces of the masses in various localities. The form of armed struggle adopted at that time was guerilla warfare. In close co-ordination with these armed forces, the political forces of the masses waged the general insurrection, brought the August Revolution to success, founded the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam and set up the first people’s democracy in Southeast Asia.

The Liberation Army played a most important role in the general insurrection, but it is erroneous to belittle the great role of the guerillas and self-defence units of the armed forces of the masses in the August Revolution. When Hanoi rose up, it had the resistance bases as its mainstay, but at that time the Liberation Army was still at Thai Nguyen. Therefore, the forces which played a directly decisive role were the political and self-defence forces of the masses. That is why, in armed insurrection the armed forces of the masses and the regional armed forces play a role of paramount importance.

The people’s war and the armed forces in each locality had a fundamental strategic position all through the war of resistance against the French colonialists. Our policy was very correct: we stepped up guerilla warfare and strengthened the militia, guerilla and regional army at the same time as we did our best to build the regular army. There was a time when we resolutely sent a regiment to each of a number of provinces, a battalion to each of a number of districts, and set up independent companies and concentrated battalions in order to establish a political base, organize the guerillas, and serve as a core for guerilla warfare in the region.

During the Hoa Binh campaign, while we attacked the enemy on the main front and in his rear, the regional forces, militia and guerillas were very active in the delta, creating favourable conditions for the regular army units to operate and millions of inhabitants to rise up. This is also a form of armed insurrection.

When the Dien Bien Phu campaign started, local people’s war developed vigorously in all fields of operation behind the enemy’s lines in North, Central and South Viet Nam. Militia, guerilla and regional forces in combination with the inhabitants decimated a large part of the enemy’s forces, overran hundreds of military posts and extended the liberated areas.

But our resistance to the US is the biggest war waged by our people against foreign aggression and for national independence and freedom. Compared with the French, the Americans have more troops, more modern equipment and a greater economic and military potential. They pursue a neo-colonial, not old-style colonial, policy. After many reverses, they have been compelled to change their strategy many times and use different strategies; in the North they have launched the air war of destruction, while in the South they have also used infantrymen, first only the Saigon mercenary army, then also the U.S. expeditionary forces.

In the anti-US resistance war, the very important role and strategic position of the local people’s war and guerilla war and the regional armed forces have come to the fore.

During the “concerted uprisings” in the South, the popular armed forces were small. It was the huge political force and the still limited armed forces of the people which brought these “uprisings” to success, spreading them far and wide in the rural areas of the South. The strength of this self-defence militia, so closely linked to the political mass movement, has created a huge revolutionary force.

While the movement of armed uprising was developing powerfully in the years of resistance to the “special war,” our people in the South stepped up guerilla warfare and local people’s war, and built the regional armed forces. It was during the development of the regional people’s war and the mass political struggle that the liberation regular army, though small in number, was able to operate very effectively. The result was that most of the enemy’s “strategic hamlets” were destroyed, his new tactics, such as those using “heliborne” and “motorized” units were shattered, his “special war” was defeated and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime collapsed.

When the U.S. imperialists shifted to “limited war” by sending increasingly massive numbers of their troops into South Viet Nam, equipping them with ever more sophisticated weapons and raising their mobility, the importance of the local people’s war in defeating the enemy showed all the more clearly. The powerful and ubiquitous units of guerilla and regional troops forced the enemy to scatter his forces and reduce the intensity of his attacks; he was decimated or annihilated everywhere. Thanks to this, the lives and property of our people were protected and conditions were prepared for our regular army to launch annihilation battles.

When this “limited war” was at its height, it received punishing blows from our people and armed forces. The enemy was obliged to shift to the “Vietnamization of the war,” a strategy more consistent with the objectives of neo-colonialism but at the same time fraught with inner contradictions. More consistent because the U.S. imperialists carried out the perfidious policy of pitting Vietnamese against Vietnamese and feeding the war by the war and using Vietnamese blood and American money and weapons to serve the sordid interests of U.S. monopoly capital, fraught with contradictions because, to attain his goal, the enemy must rely on our manpower and resources, things that no aggressor could obtain owing to the fundamental contradictions between our people and the enemy, and to the indomitable spirit of our people. For the execution of this new strategy, with a powerful buildup and using the most perfidious military and political manoeuvres, the Americans carried out their “pacification” policy, a policy which consisted in killing our people, destroying our bases, penning the inhabitants up in strategic hamlets, strengthening the puppet army and administration, coercing and exploiting the inhabitants. In this new situation, it is clear that the schemes of the enemy are best thwarted by the preservation of the political bases and the strengthening of the armed forces of the masses. Thus the self-defence militia, regional army and local people’s war play a role of paramount importance. With powerful, ubiquitous guerilla units, inured to war, with a strong and experienced regional army, with adequate organization and activity and a close co-ordination between armed struggle and political struggle at grassroots level through triple action—military, political and agitation work among enemy troops—we can protect the extensive force of the revolutionary masses, foil all coercive manœuvres of the enemy and preserve the potential of the resistance.

The experience gained during the years of stubborn resistance to the enemy’s “pacification” program has given us a clearer understanding of this fact: the political forces of the people are the foundation of all revolutionary wars, and the armed forces of the masses that of all armed struggles.

In many vast rural areas, our central task was rapidly assessed as the foiling of the “pacification” operations. Agitation work among the masses was given due attention, local military work stepped up and the form of organization and struggle were correctly analysed. As a result, even in the thick of the struggle, we were able to maintain our political and armed forces; the inhabitants clung to their villages and hamlets; the guerillas closed in upon the enemy; the Party cells were constantly by the side of the people; the cadres at higher level kept close to the grassroots; the enemy’s coercive forces were in the end wiped out or disbanded; the enemy posts were overrun or evacuated or surrendered, many “strategic hamlets” were dismantled; the offensives and concerted uprisings were maintained or expanded by the masses, and greater and greater victories won. Together with the big battles of annihilation given by our regular army units co-ordinating their actions with the political struggle put up by the masses, especially in urban centres, the people’s war which is being extensively waged in various localities has contributed to the failure of the “Vietnamization” of the war and will surely defeat it completely.

In the North, we have totally beaten a most barbarous war of destruction launched by the US Air Force and Navy. If we analyse deeply the nature of the great people’s war in the North, we realize that this is a war of national defence to safeguard the socialist North. On the other hand, taking the country as a whole, this is a part of the war of liberation waged against the U.S., for national salvation, for the defence of the great rear base so that the latter can fulfil its task toward the Southern battlefront, make the greatest contribution to national liberation and defeat the US imperialists’ large scale “limited war.”

Without our militia and self-defence forces and the powerful regional army, would we, in recent times, have been able to win such big victories over the enemy’s war of destruction? Certainly not. Thus, if greater attention had been paid to these forces, our successes would have been even greater.

A.A. defence units, missile launching units and the people’s air force are the core and play a role of paramount importance. But the militia and self-defence force and the regional army have also a great role to play in attack as well as in A.A. defence, in the protection of the rear area and of production, in changing the orientation of the economy and production as well as in keeping order and security.

In the new conditions, the militia and self-defence force have great fighting possibilities. In Quang Binh, Vinh Linh and other localities, after receiving more powerful equipment, the militia and guerilla forces doubled the number of planes they were shooting down. With regard to the regional forces there were battalions which had brought down 70 or 80 aircraft each. That is why, apart from rudimentary weapons, we must boldly increase the number of sophisticated armaments in the hands of the militia, self-defence units and regional army. This is a very sound policy.

In the people’s A.A. defence, the militia and self-defence force play the leading role. Without their powerful units, could we carry out successfully civilian A.A. defence, protect and maintain production and keep order and security? No. Without the huge force of militia and self-defence units, local patriotic workers and sappers, without the population, could we keep traffic going while the communication lines were being hard hit by the enemy? No, we would have met with greater difficulties. It is the same in the struggle against enemy commandos. In the coastal areas, most of them have been wiped out by the militia and self-defence forces, who do a great part of such work as observation and deactivation of time-bombs and magnetic bombs on roads and waterways.

To fight against the enemy air force, navy and ground forces, we must have a strong regular army, equipped with modern arms, and, at the same time, we must have a powerful regional armed force. That is why we must build a good militia and self-defence force and do good local military work.

This work must be done satisfactorily also if we want to defend our rear effectively at the same time as protecting and accelerating production during the war and changing our economic orientation. As an armed organization not separated from production, having a huge force composed of the best elements at grassroots level and with a close-knit organization and tight discipline, the militia and self-defence units are also the shock force in production. Local military work must pay due attention to this problem.

One of the great achievements recorded by localities in the North is the achievement of a high level of mobilization and enlistment, in fulfilment of their duty toward the frontline. Why, within a short time, have we been able to carry through such work as mobilization, organization, and training of a great number of the best elements among our young people to send them to the front? This is because we have managed to carry out militia and self-defence work and army reserve work. Under the leadership of the Party cadres at various levels, the provinces, municipalities and branches have contributed a great deal to that achievement.

At present, the primary task of the great rear base is to join forces with the great front in order to defeat the American aggressors. The consolidation of the regional military apparatus at all levels and in all branches is to help the regions carry out the task of mobilization and recruitment satisfactorily and at the same time efficiently build and train the reserve forces. In future, to defend the country and face the eventuality of war, mobilization and recruitment must be prepared even more carefully. It must be done in peace time in all localities, in all branches, in the town as well as in the countryside. To this end, we have to perform our regional military task well. This is a concrete manifestation of our high vigilance and an effective measure to defend the country.

In a word, in the light of Marxism-Leninism and of the Party line and in the practice of revolutionary armed struggle in each stage in our country, we have seen the very important strategic role of regional people’s war and of the local armed forces. Regional military work has become a most important task. It holds a key position in the revolutionary struggle in general and armed struggle in particular, in uprising and the war for liberation, and in the war for national defence. The more modern and the fiercer the war, the greater the importance of regional military work.

The regional military task is a fundamental link in the chain of the Party’s military work and is one of the leading tasks of the Party’s cadres at all levels in the locality.

CONCLUSION

From the above problems we can draw the following conclusions:

Firstly, to carry out the Party’s military line of people’s war, at the same time as developing people’s war and building the people’s army on a nation-wide scale, we must carry out local military work in a satisfactory manner and build local people’s armed forces.

Local military work plays a role of great importance not only in the past and at present, but for a long time to come. Of course, with powerful regional forces but without powerful concentrated units of the regular army, it would be very difficult for us to defeat the enemy in the case of a large scale war of aggression. On the other hand, if the regional military force is not powerful enough, it would be difficult to build a powerful regular army and, if this army exists, it would be difficult to develop our combat efficiency to the full to secure victory for the people’s war.

This is a great experience of our party, a fundamental principle of people’s war in Viet Nam, a country small in size and population, which relies mainly on its own power to defeat a large army of aggression.

Secondly, the more modern the war and the more we have to face powerful imperialist armies using modern techniques and sophisticated weapons, the more we have to strengthen local military work, the militia and regional army, and to prepare for local people’s war. At present, good local military work is an indispensable and most effective way to defend the North, so as to be ready to smash all the frenzied schemes of the U.S. imperialists against the D.R.V.N. and fulfil our task in the war of anti-US resistance for national salvation.

Thirdly, in a neo-colonial war, the enemy is bent on destroying our human and material reserves by hitting at the inhabitants, disputing them with us, swelling the ranks of the quislings and setting up “civilian guards” for the Vietnamization of the war. That is why in local people’s war the militia and self-defence units and regional troops must play an ever more important role; they exert a direct and decisive effect on the foiling of the enemy’s perfidious schemes and on the maintenance of the people’s political and economic bases.

Fourthly, the new possibilities of our socialist system, of the socialist man, of our technical equipment and of our fighting technique develop with every passing day. We are in a better condition to equip our militia, self-defence force and regional troops with better and more powerful means. Our fighting technique, especially that of opposing weaker forces to stronger ones, smaller units to bigger ones, is constantly enriched by innovations. That is why our militia and regional army have a greater fighting capacity and are developing more vigorously than ever before.

Fifthly, local military work becomes more and more important due to the development of the regions, especially the provinces and towns, in man-power, materials, economic and defence potential, and in logistic possibilities to serve the local people’s war. By their all-sided development in the political, economic and military fields, the provinces and towns become basic economic units and basic units of people’s war. Therefore local military work is of paramount importance in relation to operations mounted to defend the locality and the country as a whole.

Sixthly, local military work is very important for the building, consolidation and defence of the rear and shows the effects of the rear on the frontline.

We must in the shortest time make large-scale preparations for the population to change from a state of peace to a state of war, by protecting their lives and property and the property of the State, and by protecting the economic and national defence potential in war.

Seventhly: local military work is closely linked to the important role of the reserve force in people’s war and in people’s national defence. The reserve force must be built up satisfactorily: this is the only way to have a strong reserve so that in peace time it is possible to reduce the size of the regular army while enabling it to be rapidly expanded in case of need. To build this force and make it ready to replenish the army rapidly in war time, is a task of strategic importance.

The Party political and military line must be clearly grasped. The various regions and branches must understand the strategic role of local military work in the present struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation as well as in the future long term building of the people’s national defence. Radical changes must be brought to leadership work by Party committees at all levels and by various administrative authorities, in all branches and even in the army as a contribution to the total victory of the anti-U.S. struggle and the establishment of a steady national defence.

II. TO PERFORM LOCAL MILITARY WORK WELL AND FULFIL EVERY DUTY TOWARD THE RESISTANCE WAR IS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE VICTORY OF THE WAR AGAINST U.S. AGGRESSION, FOR NATIONAL SALVATION

The anti U.S.-struggle of our people in both zones of the country has won great victories, but our resistance war is still going on fiercely.

The American imperialists have suffered repeated defeats, yet they are diehard and warlike. In the South they are doing their best to carry out “Vietnamization” in order to prolong their war of aggression. In the North they have increased their acts of war and brazenly bombed many localities. To seek a way out of their quagmire in Viet Nam, they were rash enough to invade Cambodia and turn that peaceful and neutral land into a bloody battlefield. Meanwhile they stepped up the aggression of Laos. The Indochinese peninsula has become a single battlefield, Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, a single front-line against U.S. aggression.

The tasks of all our Party, people and army at present is to resolutely execute President Ho Chi Minh’s sacred testament, intensify the war of resistance against the U.S. aggressors till victory, liberate the South, defend the North and pave the way for the peaceful reunification of the country and the successful construction of socialism. Meanwhile we must strengthen our militant solidarity with the fraternal peoples of Laos and Cambodia, pooling our efforts with theirs to defeat the aggressors and oust them from Indochina; we will thus contribute a worthy part to the revolution of the people of the world.

In the South, at present the American troops have been obliged to proceed to a phased withdrawal, but the enemy are doing their best to reinforce and strengthen the puppet army, which is to replace the GIs and carry on their scheme of implanting neo-colonialism. They muster their troops to mount “pacification” raids so as to repress, terrorize and pen up the population, pressganging them into the army to strengthen the corrupt puppet administration. Under the N.F.L. and P.R.G. flag, our compatriots in the South, in the flush of their victories, have enthusiastically accelerated the resistance war in every respect and have gained an even clearer realization of the most important role of the people’s war in the regions. Keeping step with the steady building of a broadly-based political force and the work of raising the fighting quality of the liberation troops, there is an urgent need for a powerful development of guerilla and local people’s war and the further reinforcement of leadership over local military work in the plains, the highlands, and the urban centres. Through practice in various localities in the South, we have come to realize that only by constantly developing and strengthening the political forces of the masses, by building and consolidating the guerilla and self-defence forces and strengthening the regional army in the districts and provinces can we steadily increase our offensive posture in the localities and bring into play the fighting force of the Liberation Army.

In the South Viet Nam battlefield at present, the enemy “pacification” program has suffered an important setback in many provinces and this trend is being maintained and developed. This is precisely because these provinces have stressed the role of local people’s war. They have grasped the policies and military line and powerfully developed the political forces and the guerilla and self-defence forces at the base. They have strengthened leadership at grassroots level and over the regional troops in the provinces and districts, reinforced and unified leadership and strengthened the local military organs.

One of the major experiences gained in the South is as follows:

In order to defeat an aggressive army possessing a big buildup and a huge potential, maintain and constantly increase our own aggressiveness and thwart the U.S. neo-colonialist schemes, one of the fundamental necessities is, simultaneously with the building of a powerful regular force, to rely on the powerful development of the army of our political forces to do local military work, step up local people’s war, and strengthen and expand vigorously the local armed forces, especially the guerilla and self-defence units.

Our people in the South have profited by this very important experience to expand guerilla warfare and local people’s war in all localities and strategic areas.

In the North, at the same time as the building of socialism and the carrying out of national defence after defeating the U.S. war of destruction, we in the rear are continuing to do our best to fulfil our sacred task toward the great frontline. Fighting U.S. aggression for national salvation has always been the primary task of all our people. Everything to vanquish U.S. aggression! This is the lofty mission of all the Vietnamese people and the honour of all our Party and people at present.

We must satisfy all the requirements of the frontline. We must have the highest sense of political responsibility toward the frontline. We must devote ourselves heart and soul to the fierce struggle now unfolding on the battlefield so as to make a worthy contribution to its victory.

To build and defend the North, to strengthen its economy and national defence, and to fulfil our task in the rear toward the frontline, we must satisfactorily carry out our local military work. Recently, this has been clearly realized by the cadres at all levels and in all branches. In many localities, attention has been paid to the building of local armed forces and the regular training of the militia, self-defence units and the reserve force. Great efforts have been made for mobilization. Attention has been given to the combination of economic construction and national defence and also to civilian A.A. defence and combat readiness. The cadres at all levels in various regions and branches have constantly heightened their vigilance, and made a sound assessment of the new situation and new tasks. In face of the U.S. imperialists’ dark designs and of the state of war now prevailing in half the country, this is a very correct position.

As a long-term duty, the heightening of vigilance and preventive measures against all imperialist schemes of aggression, is a need which should certainly never be belittled. In a country like ours, this is quite understandable. Because she holds an important position and has rich resources, Viet Nam has been the target of aggression by many cruel enemies. In only a few decades we have had to cope with three powerful imperialisms. In time to come, as our country’s position rises in importance after our victory over the American imperialists, we may have to cope with other insane schemes and adventurist acts on the part of imperialism. President Ho Chi Minh, when alive, constantly reminded us to look out far afield and to heighten our vigilance. If we do not look out, certainly we cannot have the necessary vigilance; then we may easily neglect our national defence. Our President also stressed that, if we are to be vigilant, the most important thing is to build the militia and self-defence units into a powerful force. Some comrades and Party cadres in the localities have not grasped that problem. These comrades, including armymen, have not a profound knowledge of the present revolutionary task and the Party’s military line. That is why they do not pay due attention to local military work. And, as I said above, to neglect this work is to make light of the building and consolidation of national defence at the grassroots, to make light of the achievement of independence and the defence of the country at the grassroots. This is a question of basic viewpoint, of revolutionary stand.

In our present struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, as well as in economic rehabilitation and development and in socialist construction, we are swamped with work. This urgent work needs to be done satisfactorily. The cadres in various branches and localities must endeavour to overtake and outstrip the target figures. Therefore if, in some localities, our Party cadres and inhabitants do not pay full attention to military matters, especially at grassroots level, it is quite possible that the local military task will be neglected. The Party cadres and responsible cadres in these localities will pay less attention to this work; they may have no consideration for it or do it only perfunctorily. Perhaps the requirements of the front will not be met. The need to raise the fighting capacity and the sense of combat readiness of the local armed forces and the building of local military organs may be ignored. Economic construction and the consolidation of national defence may become separated and not given appropriate guidance. Of course, we must actively prevent these phenomena and, if they take place, eliminate them.

We must get down to the construction of socialism, the rehabilitation and development of the economy and the consolidation of national defence. National construction and national defence must be given their rightful due and cannot be dissociated from each other. Therefore, while devoting our efforts to economic work, we must attend carefully to national defence. The cadres at various Party levels and in all branches including villages, hamlets, cooperatives, agricultural farms, enterprises, town quarters and public offices must fully grasp this problem.

All the branches, including industry, agriculture, capital construction, post and telegraph, communications, health service, education, must assume a great part of the responsibility for the construction of the people’s national defence. That is why, while fulfilling the mission entrusted to one’s own branch, one must pay due attention to national defence, especially by a satisfactory performance of local military work. With regard to the various branches, public offices, enterprises and agricultural farms which have been newly set up and are not yet acquainted with local military work, they must carefully study the Party’s military line, and the experiences of other localities so as to carry through that work successfully. This is a problem of paramount importance, because the larger the size of socialist construction, the greater the number of economic undertakings and industrial centres. The self-defence force, which comprises the best sons and daughters of the working class and toiling people, will develop and play an important role. Like the rural militia and guerilla this force serves the proletarian dictatorship at the base. In peace time it is the armed force defending production and the shock force for production; in war time it is the armed force directly prosecuting the people’s war in the locality, it is the core for the entire people to fight the enemy right at the local level. For this reason, in war time as in peace time, all branches of activity, public offices and enterprises must carry out local military work and pay attention to the building and training of the militia, self-defence force and reserve force.

The Party cadres in the army, the cadres in charge of military work in various localities, must fully understand their responsibility to improve their guidance with regard to the execution of this work. They must stick to the military line of the Party and the resolutions and directives of the Central Committee, the Government and the Central Military Committee; they must resolutely and creatively carry out this work by adopting appropriate plans and methods to push it vigorously ahead; they must prevent all symptoms of negligence, lack of vigilance, and conservatism checking their bold march forward.

The staffs, political and logistic departments, regular units, services and arms must understand clearly that, together with building the people’s army, it is necessary to pay attention to arming the masses. They must not think that the regular army, artillery, tanks, aircraft, can solve all problems. True, they can solve many problems, but what about that of the base? Everyone knows that the regular army, operating in concentrated units, is very important; it therefore requires building up and being made well-seasoned and powerful. However we must understand that, parallel to this, it is necessary to build strong units of the regional force and the militia and self-defence force. Recently, in the resistance to the U.S. war of destruction, had we increased even more the strength of the A.A. defence of the regions and strengthened, boldly and rapidly, the A.A. equipment of the militia and regional armed forces, we would certainly have seen a considerable increase in the strength of these local armed forces, and won even greater victories.

Our Navy has done good work by organizing the people’s war on waterways and at sea; this should be continued so as to yield even better results.

All officers and men must fully realize the importance and content of local military work and actively take part in it.

The military cadres, including those in charge of local military work, must also pay sufficient attention to economic construction. They must study this and grasp the requirements of the economy in order to help the Party cadres and branches to combine economic activities with national defence, local economic construction with local military work. They must constantly bear in mind Uncle Ho’s teaching: “Fighting the enemy cannot be divorced from political and economic activities; a military cadre who only knows military matters is like a man standing on one foot.”

It is necessary to continue to bring into play the exemplary and vanguard role of the militia and self-defence force in production. It must be coordinated with production work in order to be strengthened and built and to gain political education and military training. At present this work is under way in some provinces in the Third and Fourth Military Areas, along the left bank of the Red River and in other regions. It must be given due attention by other localities. Apart from their vanguard role in agricultural production, we must highlight the role of the militia and self-defence force in industrial production and in other branches of activity, such as the Bach Dang works (Haiphong), the Vang Danh and Ha Lam coal mines (Quang Ninh province). We must do it in such a way as to make this a widespread movement; this is the responsibility of the Party cadres and those attending to military work in the localities.

Once again, I want to stress that every one of us must be thoroughly acquainted with the new situation. We must heighten our vigilance in the realization that the struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation, is the primary task of our people in both zones of the country. To defend the country is at present and in future one of the cardinal tasks of our Party and people. Therefore, in national construction, in the building of socialism in our country and the effort to improve the livelihood of our people, we must clearly realize all our responsibility towards the frontline and the strengthening of national defence; we must fully understand the importance of local military work, its fundamental role in the struggle against U.S. aggression at present as well as the consolidation of national defence in future. To neglect local military work is to neglect national defence work at the base, and as a consequence there will be neither powerful local people’s war, nor powerful revolutionary military work.

In organization, there is plenty of work to do. First, the cadres at all levels and in all branches must thoroughly understand the military line of the Party, its viewpoint on the role of local people’s war and on local military work. This is a basis on which to solve concrete problems consistent with the situation and task in each locality.

We must pay great attention to the building of regional armed forces and fully understand the importance of the building of the militia and self-defence force. Parallel to this work in the countryside, we must help to form militia, self-defence, and combat self-defence forces, as they embody the new fighting force of the working class and toiling people in urban centres under the socialist regime. Whatever the circumstances, it is necessary to build the militia and self-defence force and the reserve force so that they may develop powerfully and meet the requirements of the struggle against U.S. aggression at present and the consolidation of national defence on a permanent basis.

In the building of the militia, self-defence force and reserve force, we must lay emphasis on military training and the popularization of the necessary military knowledge to the entire people; we must push forward national defence sports and organize competitions of traditional sports and gymnastics in order to enhance their fighting force and spirit. This was formerly done by our ancestors as early as the Tran and Le dynasties, and is done today in many localities in our country. In an independent country, even in peace time, the reservists must always be subject to military training. This is very important as it makes us ready for combat, especially if the standing army is to be reduced.

Military training must be organized according to a clear program and not at random. In training, attention should be paid to specialized teams and brigades making up different arms of the militia and self-defence force. The militia, self-defence and reserve force must continuously improve their quality. In our country every citizen, every young person, must be a good worker; at the same time, he must have both resolve and ability to defend the Fatherland.

The building of the regional army must be attended to. The regional army in each province is much greater at present than it was formerly. Not only is it provided with infantry, but also with other necessary arms. This is the reason why the management, training and organization of the regional army should be all-sided and its quality raised to make it really strong; it must be turned into a nucleus, a school to train military cadres and return them to the localities so that the regional troops can be strengthened swiftly in case of need.

Economic work should be satisfactorily combined with national defence. This problem must be solved both at the central level and in the localities.

As we have found out, people’s war in the whole country in general and in each locality in particular, shows our combined strength in the military, political and economic fields... This force has been brought into play recently, in our resistance to the U.S. war of destruction. On the basis of the new relations of production we have satisfactorily combined production with fighting. We have closely combined the operations of the armed forces with the activities of the economic branches serving the people’s life. Thanks to this our people have won great successes in all fields. At present we are building up the centrally-run economy while developing the local economies. The more developed the local economy, the greater possibility it creates for the improvement of the people’s living conditions and the more it meets the new requirements of national defence and the development of the fighting capacity of the local armed forces and population. It is the material and technical basis of people’s war; therefore, in their leadership, our cadres must not belittle the combination of economic development and the strengthening of national defence, the union of the local economic task and the local military task. With this harmonious combination, in the event of war, conditions will be created for the protection and maintenance of production, the reduction of damage and the continued development of the local economic potential to serve the requirements of the war and the people’s life. This combination must be carried out in all respects, in all branches, in the development of agriculture, industry, transport and communications, post and telegraph, the health and cultural services..., in the construction of the countryside as well as in the development of urban centres.

The local economic branches must see to the combination of their activities with the requirements of national defence; for instance, the combination between industry and the production and repair of armaments; that between various agricultural areas, transport and communications, post and telegraph, and the medical service respectively on the one hand, and national defence on the other; that between national defence and all the above-mentioned branches. This combination must be given great attention all through the process of national construction because such major tasks as division of economic areas, distribution of manpower, and extension of the road network, need many years to complete. Therefore, gradual provision for such tasks must be made in peace time. If not, when the war flares up, we shall have to carry them through under the bombing and then the difficulties and damage incurred will be much greater and the quality of the work affected.

The harmonious combination of local economic construction and local military work requires an all-sided outlook. We must grasp the tasks of economic development, of socialist construction and also of local defence and the vital interests of the nation. We will base ourselves on our economic possibilities, on the concrete situation of the material and human resources of the locality to work out a comprehensive plan with various stages combining immediate with long-term tasks. Work should be done by order of priority, and a plan must be mapped out for some of the tasks to be carried out only in the event of war. Those which are completely in accordance with the requirements of national defence and the national economy can be done forthwith.

Those which basically answer the requirements of these two branches but do not show, for the time being, a close co-ordination between them, are subject to further study and are to be done step by step.

This coordination should be understood even at the grassroots level. In all work—construction of a factory, building of a hydraulic system, transformation of the fields, afforestation—we must bear in mind that it is to be done in the interests of both the national economy and national defence.

The Party’s leadership over local military work must be strengthened.

At present our cadres must have a thorough grasp of the military situation and tasks as well as the Party’s military policy so as to strengthen their guidance over local military work; they must give this work its rightful place, especially when the resistance war against U.S. aggression is raging in half our country and in Cambodia and Laos. While discussing economic construction and other tasks, our cadres must also take decisions on the local military task, they must strengthen the Party’s leadership over the local military organs and send cadres acquainted with local military work to help in various organs and in military commands of provinces, towns and other bases so that they may discharge their task better as staffs of the Party committees. It is necessary to define the responsibility of the State organs and branches toward the strengthening of national defence, the building of local armed forces, and local military work, and to organize and supervise this work in each branch in order to help the Party committee and the head of this branch to guide it. In each village there is a militia staff; in each workshop or factory there must similarly be responsible cadres for military work. Studies should be made to define the responsibility, organization and method of military work in various organs and branches, especially in those directly concerned with national defence.

We are facing a most glorious and important task—to unite the entire people, perseveringly step up the resistance in order to bring our struggle against U.S. aggression for national salvation to total victory.

South Viet Nam has not been liberated yet, the war is going on, our fellow-countrymen and combatants are bravely fighting the enemy at the front. The peoples of the three Indochinese countries are defeating the American aggressors. We are determined to go ahead, carry out the instructions of President Ho Chi Minh in his sacred Testament, fulfil the task of the great rear area towards the great frontline—South Viet Nam—so as worthily to contribute to the cause of national liberation of the Indochinese peoples and to the revolutionary movement of the world’s people.

Whatever work we are doing, military, economic, cultural or social work, we must clearly realize that our first duty is to fight the U.S. aggressors, to save the country. We must thoroughly grasp the slogan “All for victory over the American invaders.” That is why all organizations at every level, all branches of activity, all localities, must pay special attention to national defence work, profoundly understand the role of local military work and the very important strategic significance of the local people’s war, and try to do this work well.

It is hoped that those points will be reported back to the heads of committees, branches, localities so that all of them will actively execute the directives and resolutions of the Party Central Committee, the Government and the Central Military Committee on local military work, and make it progress vigorously. By so doing we shall make a valuable contribution to the present resistance to U.S. aggression, for national salvation, and to the safeguarding of lasting independence for our beloved Fatherland.

I. LOCAL PEOPLE’S WAR AND LOCAL ARMED FORCES: MOST IMPORTANT BASES OF RESISTANCE WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENCE


Footnotes

(1) Speech delivered at the All-North Viet Nam Conference on Local Military Work in July 1970.

(2) V.I. Lenin, Military Strategy and Tactics during the October Revolution, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1959, p. 361.

(3) V.I. Lenin, Complete Works, Progress, Moscow, Vol. 26, 1964, p. 424.

(4) F. Engels, V.I. Lenin, J. Stalin: On People's War, Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, pp. 151, 156.

(5) F. Engels, V.I. Lenin, J. Stalin: On People's War, op. cit.

(6) Ibid.

(7) Ho Chi Minh, On Armed Struggle and People's Armed Forces, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, p. 174.

 


 

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