Unforgettable Days

Võ Nguyên Giáp


Part One
XXII


Active preparations for the resistance in various fields were now stepped up.

The most difficult thing to do then was to make the people clearly aware of the dangerous situation without allowing this to affect their morale; to mobilize them and prepare them for the resistance without giving rise to provocative actions against the Chiang troops; to keep the people undisturbed by the perfidious and very dangerous propaganda made by enemies from all directions, yet caused them to remain calm and confident in face of any complicated, even serious situation that might arise.

On February 22, in his “Appeal to maintain and intensify the resistance in Nam Bo”, Uncle Ho wrote:

“At present, besides war by military means, the French colonialists are resorting to psychological warfare; they distribute handbills, put up posters and spread false rumours hoping to make our people worried and anxious: that is the way they attack us morally.

“The ancients said that ‘Striking at the hearts is essential, attacking the fortresses is secondary’. So a fighting nation like ours should always be prepared, while remaining calm and firm and ready to cope with any situation...

“Wherever the enemy goes, the population should carry out a scorched-earth policy so as to deprive enemy troops of food, shelter and gradually wear them out. We will always be ready; we will never show hesitation or confusion...”

President Ho also set forth some basic ideas: the resistance should be protracted and nation-wide; we should fight the enemy in all fields: military, political, economic and diplomatic... He stressed: “First of all we must keep our morale; show no discouragement when defeated, and no conceit when winning; fight on, even if a battle is lost; work together in solidarity and unity; keep order and obey the Government.”

Thus Uncle Ho called on the people throughout the country to get ready for a long fight, a nation-wide fight in every field, against all enemies that might appear, before us, behind us and by our sides.

Hanoi pressmen came to interview President Ho on the Sino-French agreement. He answered: “First, China has not announced it. Second, this news has been reported by Reuter, so we are not in a position to comment yet...” Then he spoke about Sun Yat-sen’s Three People’s Principles and the Chinese resistance to defend national independence. Though he did not refer directly to the Chiang Kai-shek government, he made our people understand clearly the treacherous and reactionary deeds of Chungking.

In those difficult times, our press did a good job in guiding public opinion. On the negotiations with the French, Cuu Quoc (National Salvation) the official organ of the General Committee of Viet Minh, wrote: “Whether we shall achieve complete independence or not depends on our fighting strength at the front... The time when the French want to negotiate is precisely when we must fight hard, and be fully prepared to fight for complete independence... We don’t refuse to negotiate, but we certainly will not let the negotiations be used as a delaying tactic by the enemy. Neither will we allow them to lull our nation’s fighting will... The nation’s fate is always determined by its own fighting strength...”

In Hanoi, the militant self-defence units, propaganda teams of the Viet Minh’s City Committee and Youth League members went to various quarters to give explanations to the population and make preparations for combat. The Chiang troops being present everywhere, our activities had to remain discreet. We couldn’t dig trenches and build fortifications just under their nose. The self-defence fighters learnt the use of mines so as to be able to create obstacles in the city quickly in case the war broke out. National Defence Guard Units were ordered to check up all preparations for combat.

The Hanoi Administrative Committee urged old people and children to leave the city. The press and mass organizations called on the country people to receive and assist the evacuated city people warmly.

Along with preparations for the resistance, we stepped up the formation of the Coalition Government so as to develop the success of the general elections. So far consultations with the reactionary parties had led to no results. The Nationalist Party demanded that they should be given seven out of the ten ministries in the new government, together with other important offices. Even their masters found those claims unreasonable.

The National Assembly was to meet soon. Although the reactionaries were intensifying their disruptive activities, we remained patient and tried to keep down their provocations. The situation was very tense. A large-scale war could break out in a near future. Uncle Ho met Tieu Van and tried to persuade him. We held that it was necessary to establish at once a coalition government for the resistance, which should include people from various parties and non-party men. Finally, after careful considerations, Tieu Van saw no better arrangement, and pressed his agents to accept our solution.

It was only less than a week before the National Assembly met that the reactionaries agreed to form a coalition government for the resistance. The Government was to be composed of ten ministries. Two important ministries, the Interior and National Defence, were to be entrusted to neutral personalities. The Viet Minh front and the Democratic Party would take four ministries. The Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party would take four others. Besides, they also agreed to the setting up of the National Resistance Committee and the National Advisory Group.

Mr. Huynh Thuc Khang was asked to come from Central Viet Nam and take part in the new government.

I had known Mr Huynh when I was on the staff of the newspaper Tieng Dan (People’s Voice) in Hue. He was a scholar well known for his high patriotism and integrity, but who did not have complete faith in our Party’s revolutionary line. When our envoy presented him with our proposal, he showed some hesitation at first, partly because he felt himself too old, and partly because he had not understood what the new leaders from “the younger generations” were. When he learned that President Ho was none other than Comrade Nguyen Ai Quoc, he decided to go to Hanoi. He wanted to know more about the revolutionary Nguyen Ai Quoc whom he had heard so much about.

In Hanoi, when he met us, he expressed concern about what he called the current “partisan dispute”. In his opinion the Viet Minh and the Revolutionary Alliance were both fighting for the people, and their leaders were all patriots who had spent much time abroad, working for the country’s interests. Now, they had to put the nation’s interests above everything else, achieve unity, and should not clash over partisan questions.

The first meeting between Uncle Ho and Mr Huynh was very moving. They both stepped forward and embraced each other, their eyes suddenly dimmed with tears. They evoked the memories of the old scholar (Uncle Ho’s father — Ed) who had trudged about the country during the long dark years of colonialism. And from the very first minute, Mr Huynh found a close friend in the famous revolutionary whom he had been longing to meet. After the meeting, Mr Huynh said to a friend of his, “It is a good fortune for our people to have Mr Ho.” He placed full confidence in him, and although he was Uncle Ho’s senior by many years, he always referred to him as “the old father of the nation.”

Mr Huynh accepted the post of Minister of the Interior in the coalition government of the resistance to be formed soon.

 


 

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